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INTRODUCTION: With a reaction-speed entirely out of character, Moscow's initial response to Secretary Acheson's Berkeley speech was broadcast on 18 March--less than two days after its delivery. Soviet propagandists usually take at least three to four days to react to important events not of Soviet devising. The remarkable alacrity of response to the Berkeley speech suggests that it may have been considered a major threat to the massive and long-sustained Soviet "peace" campaign, or that established Soviet propaganda directives were considered sufficient to handle it--or both. The initial Soviet reaction, broadcast to the Soviet domestic audience, was embodied in a LITERARY GAZETTE article, "Total Hysteria of an American Liar," by Anatoli Surov, the vilifying author of the play "The Mad Haberdasher." This was followed the next day by Viktorov's PRAVDA article, "The Total Diplomacy of Acheson in the Service of the Policy of Aggression," also broadcast over the Soviet Home Service.* Outside of the USSR, Communist media, somewhat slower with their comments, generally follow the Soviet lead. Approval comes from most of the Western-oriented radios.

"INTENSIFICATION OF AMERICAN AGGRESSION": Filled with a conglomeration of vilification, denials, and counter-charges, the entirely negative Soviet-Communist comments issue forth without even a momentary change of propaganda pace. As with practically all official statements of American foreign policy, Acheson's speech is treated as further evidence "not only of a continuation but also of an intensification of the aggressive course of U.S. foreign policy." Particular significance is seen in his warning that the American desire for peace must be supported by strength. "To reach one's aim, to solve the problems by force--this is the most significant end of the speech," says Surov. And Acheson's concept of total diplomacy, allegedly borrowed from Hitler and his reliance on force and deceit, is said to be "apparently designed to replace the finally outworn

* Viktoro 's PRAVDA article has since been broadcast at least 25 different times to foreign audiences; Surov's article has been beamed only to the domestic audience.

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'atomic diplomacy'...." Thus, Acheson "stands before us as a hired lackey of the instigators of war who spent his scanty brains in attempts to belie truth, freedom, and peace."

"LIES AND SLANDERS": Where Viktorov undertakes a stereotyped point-by-point rebuttal of Acheson's seven points, Surov resorts to a more personal type of calumny as well. Acheson, "obviously envying Ribbentrop," is called an "incorrigible liar" and "fascist-like diplomat" who "crawls to the end of his speech like a snake." As for the speech itself, Surov studs his description of it with such phrases as: "considerable agglomeration of fantastic lies," "entangled in absurd assurances," "writhing in the mud of his own inventions," "hackneyed inventions about (the USSR)," and "abundantly interspersed with anti-Soviet slander." It is thus implied that everything Acheson said was a tissue of lies--compounded by slanders against the USSR.

THE IDEA OF PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE: Although many of these alleged lies and slanders are spelled out in stereotyped detail, it may be noted that Soviet-Communist comments avoid explicit reference to Acheson's expressed belief in the possibility of peaceful coexistence. Instead, as if implying that this were solely a Soviet idea, Moscow cites Acheson's warning against any moral compromise with international Communism as indicative of his "doubts that the two systems... can really exist side by side." And the "value of his insincere statement on the readiness of the U.S. to cooperate in genuine efforts to find peaceful settlements" is assertedly exposed by his reference to the need for American strength.

ACHESON'S MOTIVES--(1) TO ASSUAGE THE PEOPLE'S DESIRE FOR PEACE: One of the standard Soviet-Communist methods of discrediting Western statements dedicated to the idea of peace and international cooperation is to claim that they represent hypocritical responses to the growing demands of the people, whose wish for peace can no longer be ignored. In the face of these demands, says Moscow, "the reactionary politicians* are forced to resort to all kinds of tricks and inventions"; and Acheson's speech is just another of these "demagogical attempts to win public opinion." This theme is stressed in practically all of the Soviet-Communist comments on the speech.

ACHESON'S MOTIVES--(2) TO COUNTER THE REPUBLICAN-PARTY ATTACKS: While referring to the "growing dissatisfaction in certain circles of the ruling top American group" as one of the elements motivating Acheson's speech, Moscow does not deal explicitly with the recent Republican attacks on Acheson and the State Department. Radio Warsaw, however, does cite "these Republican attacks"*** in explaining that Acheson was seeking a way out of "this somewhat compromising situation." But the Republican attacks are dismissed as of relatively minor significance since they are held to be merely electioneering maneuvers. "For that reason, the dissatisfaction among the masses on account of the U.S. foreign policy is of far greater significance."

The only Western-oriented radio to have mentioned the Republican attacks as one of the alleged reasons for Acheson's speech is Radio Madrid; it claims that Senator McCarthy's "sensational revelations... had forced Acheson to hurry up a radical change of policy...." Grudging approval is accorded this change of policy; but in view of Soviet intransigence, Madrid expresses doubt as to whether Acheson's "newly formulated peace program" will be any more successful than "its predecessors."

WESTERN-ORIENTED COMMENT: There is general agreement that the issue of peace is now up to the Soviet Union, and that peace would be possible provided the seven points were accepted by the USSR. But there is general doubt that this will be the case. A French comment points out that, in any case, the Communist world does not believe that coexistence "is destined to last long." Acheson's forthrightness, the "new face of American diplomacy," receives favorable comment. There are few references to his rejection of peace at any price.

* McMahon, Tydings, and Connally are specifically mentioned; but their proposals, because of the conditions attached, are categorically rejected.

** Especially those associated with Acheson's statements about Alger Hiss and his recommendation for Gubitchev's deportation; also, McCarthy's charges about Communists in the State Department.

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