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SUMMARY

In the period since March of this year Moscow has exerted increased efforts to reach the American radio audience and to undermine American public support for the Korean war. Broadcast time for American audiences has been boosted by an increase in broadcasting to North America from 35 to 50 hours weekly and by the addition of a daily two hour transmission for U.S. forces in the Far East. Transmitter facilities have been augmented in an effort to ensure better reception in the U.S.: additional frequencies have been allocated to the North American service, including those of four Satellite radios which now relay Moscow's North American programs. In April Prague, Warsaw, and Budapest started relaying these broadcasts, which had previously been carried only by stations within the USSR, and in May a new Sofia transmitter was added on a frequency which reaches the U.S. with particular effectiveness.

The new programs in English to the Far East, transmitted on frequencies usually used for broadcasts to Japan, Korea and Northeast China, are connected only with the Korean war, a concentration which in itself constitutes a departure from Moscow's usual broadcasting patterns. The broadcasts are clearly intended to lower the morale of the United Nations forces; their highly repetitious contents are for the most part devoted to American opposition to the war, the profit-seeking motives of American industrialists, and the subservience of Washington to Wall Street.

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Impact of Moscow Broadcasts to North America

	Weekly Total In All Foreign Languages Words / Lines	Weekly Broadcasts to North America Words / Lines / % of Col. I
April 1949	20 15	20 30 5.2
October 1949	145 15	22 15 4.8
April 1950	175 15	25 45 5.4
October 1950	145 20	32 40 5.9
April 1951	185 15	51 10 8.5
(Including broadcasts to U.S. Forces)		64 10 10.9)

As indicated in the preceding table, the sharpest increase to North America in the past two years occurred with the spring frequency changes in April of this year, when Moscow also added 15 hours weekly in English to the Far East program. The total time devoted to American audiences to all Moscow 10 minutes weekly 10.9 percent of the total effort to non-Soviet audiences. This accounts for 55 hours of the 100 hour Soviet program (55 hours in all languages) and that the all broadcasts in Russian languages (54 hours 15 minutes) the two other audiences for which Moscow demonstrates great interest.

During the spring months Moscow also took steps to improve the audibility of its North American broadcasts by increasing the number of frequencies used on this band from seven to twenty, commensurate with the services of satellite communications to relay messages. Messages relayed only from inside the Soviet Union. Although there is no indication of increased power in American communications, the increased relay facilities and the shift to summer frequencies on both the 4 MHz band improved in the signal strength of Soviet broadcasts received in the United States. The addition of the new North American band has brought a particularly marked improvement, for the transmission frequency is better suited to prevailing seasonal conditions than those of the other relay stations.

Shift in Broadcast Pattern

With the change to summer frequencies, the addition of satellite relay facilities, and the increase of transmission time Moscow shifted the emphasis pattern of the English-language broadcasts on the Korean war. First, it increased the percentage of Korean war propaganda broadcast to North America so that in the past two months more than a third of all content of the war has been devoted to North American alone. (Discussions of the war in Russian and Mandarin broadcasts have declined and now constitute less than one-tenth of Moscow's total attention to the war.)

Second, more increased concentration of comment on the war in broadcasts to North America is coupled with an increased concentration on the propaganda campaign to undermine the morale of the American audience. In the three months of 1951 discussion of American opposition to the war amounted to one-third of total English-language comment on the war; since April this figure has increased to 50%. In the same period claims that American leaders and industrialists are preparing the war out of their desire for profits, another standard element of the propaganda attack on the home front, have increased from 14% to 24% of English-language comment on the war.

The morale-boosting purpose of the broadcasts for U.S. forces in the Far East are indicated by their structure and content. The same half-hour program is repeated four times during the evening, Korean time. Its commentary follows the same emphasis patterns found in broadcasts to North American. American opposition to the war fills one half the content, and Wall Street's profiteering one fifth.

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