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1. All Soviet Army ammunition and weapons, except aerial bombs, were stored in artillery depots. Explosives and demolition caps were also in these depots. Ammunition for rifles and machine guns was stored in a live condition. Artillery shells came to the depots fully assembled from the factories, except for the powder, which was also stored in the artillery depots. Those artillery depots which stored dangerous ammunition [redacted] ie, artillery and mortar shells, poisonous chemical shells, and explosives, had chemical laboratories and "pyrotechnicheskii otdeli" (sections staffed by experts on assembly and disassembly of ammunition). The laboratories tested the condition of the powder. The above conditions prevailed in peacetime. In time of war, the "pyrotechnical" sections organized "snariazhatel'nykh masterskii" (workshops for assembling ammunition and checking on defective ammunition), which became part of the artillery shops in the rear (til) of each army.

2. In Central Asia, all military storage was under the control of the military district. It is probable that the same held true for all other military districts. Only storage facilities in ammunition factories were not under the authority of the military districts; they were under the jurisdiction of Moscow and the factory in question.

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3. [redacted] However, the largest depots were in the western USSR and were housed in old fortresses. The forts had become useless as such, but were excellent

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from the viewpoint of storage, transportation, and depth of shelter. They were particularly good when used as artillery depots. In 1940, the fort in Kaunas (Kovno) was transformed into the largest artillery depot of the Soviet Army. Important depots were also to be found at Brest-Litovsko, Grodno, Dvinsk, Perekyski, and Kaliningrad (Königsberg). The largest supply depot for food and clothing, as of 1941, was at Roslavl.

In regard to sources of military reserves stored in Central Asia, many artillery shells in storage had been manufactured as far back as 1922 and 1923 and therefore many of them had deteriorated. The shells were sent from Kazan to Central Asia when the artillery depot was built near Aris in about 1930. Each of the 25 warehouses in Aris held the equivalent of 30 railway freight cars. The average car in those days was 16 tons. Now the usual Soviet railway freight car is 48 tons and has two axles. New artillery rounds in the late 1930's came from Novosibirsk. Other types of supplies arrived from various Soviet factories. Clothing for troops, as well as equipment for horses, was usually made in Tashkent or elsewhere in Central Asia. Mortars first appeared in the Soviet Army in the spring of 1940. Therefore, mortar shells began to be delivered to the Central Asian military district from the European USSR only after that time.

I have no information on details of military depots or military reserve supply systems or installations outside the Central Asian area.

Soviet mobilization reserve plans were utopian, based on industrial plans impossible of realization. There was a wide gap between theory and actual practice in strategic stockpiling, particularly after 1939 when the Soviet Government began to double the number of divisions in the Soviet Army. Soviet divisions in the west were the only units which had more or less adequate mobilization reserves. In contrast to what I imagine is US military practice, it must be remembered that Soviet and European mobilization plans call for greatly expanded units in time of war. The artillery was in the best position in regard to strategic stockpiling. I would imagine the Soviet Army's general situation in regard to mobilization reserves is much better.

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In regard to detailed data, such as name, number, location, capacity, type, layout and details of construction, and planning, of military depots in the Central Asian military district

the artillery depot--military depot number 20--near Aris, which was the one which stored dangerous ammunition, had warehouses which were constructed in a very primitive manner. The walls were of "glin" (clay) and the roofs were of wood covered with clay. In 1940 the structures began to deteriorate and the latest information available to me at that time was that it had not yet been decided whether to repair them or whether it would be necessary to replace the warehouses.

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