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## CRITICIZES METALLURGY MINISTRY, AGENCIES; CITES INDUSTRY-SCIENCE SPLIT

 $igg \lceil$  Numbers in parentheses refer to appended list of sources. $igg \rceil$ 

The administrative agencies of the Ministry of the Metallurgical Industry USSR and the Ministry itself have recently been criticized for shortcomings both on the production level and on the administration level.

Rolling mill workers at the Novo-Tagil'skiy Metallurgical Plant have written an open letter to Kuz'min, Minister of the Metallurgical Industry, in which they state that an intolerable condition has arisen at the plant. For a long time, the plant's rolling mills have been idle and the workers have not been meeting their plans.

According to an order from the ministry, the gap between the production of the plant's open-hearth shop and the requirements of its rolling shops should be covered by delivery of metal from plants belonging to "Glavuralmet" (Main Adminstration of the Ural Metallurgical Industry) and "Glavuspetsstal!" (Main Administration of Special Steels). This order, however, is not being fulfilled, and neither main edministration is providing the metal. For example, the "Glavuralmet" plants in the first 4 months of 1950 fell short of their quota by 4,548 cons, including 3,629 tons from the Chusovoy Plant alone. "Glavuspetsstal!" plants have fallen short by more than 11,500 tons. The Chelyabinsk, Zlatoust, and Kushva plants owe much wetal to the Novo-Tagil'skiy Plant. The directors of these plants, including Zabalujev (director at Chusovoy), Dekhanov (director at Chelyabinsk), Nesterov (director at Zlatoust), and Markov (director at Kushva), have taken a formalistic attitude toward fulfillment of the ministry's order; and it is for this reason alone that the Novo-Magil'skiy mills are not operating at full capacity. (1)

The metallurgical plants supplying metal to the Kirovograd "Krasnaya Zvezda" Plant, Ministry of Agricultural-Machine Building USSR, consistently violate their delivery contracts. The Kirovograd plant produces the most modern types of tractor and norse-drawn plows and is fully capable of meeting its production pledges if it were not for the supply plants. The Stalino and Makeyevka metallurgical plants were supposed to deliver 620 tons of metal during May, which they have not

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done. The Konstantinovka Plant imeni Franze still oves the plant metal which was due in February. In April and May, the Dnepropetrovak Plant was to roll and deliver 200 tone of 2-millimeter sheet. This order has not yet been delivered. The Dneprodzerzhinsk and Sulinskiy (Rostov Oblast) plants are similarly behind in orders. The Ministry of the Metallurgical Industry USSR should take steps to make its plants meet their orders.(2)

At the conference of metallurgists of the East and the Urals, which ended on 2 July in Sverdlovsk, serious criticism was leveled at the activity of the main administrations of the Ministry of the Metallurgical Industry, particularly "Glavspetstal'," "Glavuralmet," and "Glavmetsbyt" (Main Administration of Metal Sales and Distribution).(3) Zakharov, steelworker at the Magnitogorsk Combine, criticized the ministry for failing to support and disseminate the Stakhanovite work methods and to publish technical literature on high-speed steel smelting. Ushakov, steelworker at the Verkh-Isetskiy Plant, stated that "Glavepetstal!" also does not disseminate leading work methods throughout its administration. Its representatives rarely visit its enterprises to give on-the-spot aid to workers. (4)

On the shortcomings in cooperation between science and the metallurgical industry, G. Nosqu, director of the Magnitogorsk Metallurgical Combine, writes that certain scientific workers in scientific research institutes are not keeping pace with the rate of development of Soviet metallurgy. In recent years, ferrous metallurgy enterprises have instituted a number of great improvements, but the majority of new technical ideas behind these improvements originated at the plants themselves, without active assistance from institute workers. Such important problems of new metallurgical technology as the operation of blast furnaces on 100 percent sinter instead of ore, the use of a self-fluxing sinter, automatization of open-hearth furnaces and rolling mills, electrification of plant transport, increase in tonnage and the rebuilding of open-hearth furnaces, and basic improvements in the technology of smelting steel (casting in an intermediate ladle, casting high-quality steels in large open-hearth furnaces, manganese regime in open-hearth smelting) were all solved for the most part by workers in plants. A number of the most important achievements of plants which have resulted in radical improvements in production methods have not found a theoretical basis in science. High-speed smelting is one of these methods which is in extensive use but has not yet been studied from a scientific viewpoint.

Plants lose a large quantity of metal because of such defects as scaling and comuniformity of the steel. The struggle against scaling is one of the greatest problems of quality metallurgy. Scientists have thus far avoided the problem.

The chief cause for the withdrawal of certain scientific workers from the solution of basic problems of metallurgy is that they are not familiar with production practice, but rather fear it and attempt to remove themselves from reality in quest of pure science. Evidence of this attitude is the fact that a considerable proportion of scientists have eluded the school of production and have entered the temple of science straight from the classroom. Directors of chairs and research laboratories rarely visit enterprises, and the entire research work at plants is done by aspirants and young scientific workers during the summer, according to a previously determined and extremely narrow program.

Recently there has not been one occasion when our great metallurgical scientists have visited such a metallurgical plant as the Magnitogorsk Combine and made thorough studies of the problems facing the enterprise. Such visits would act as a real stimulus toward introducing into practice the latest scientific and technical achievements and would at the rame time draw the attention of science to the most pressing problems faced at the plants. The principle by which personnel are selected for scientific work only from the classrooms cannot be upheld.

The removal of a section of scientific personnel from production practice bas had unfavorable effects on the condition of certain branches of metallurgical science, particularly that of the metallurgy of steel. At present, there is no

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plants for 3-5 years for production training. To improve the training of young specialists, the metallurgy chairs of higher educational institutes and technical schools should be filled with highly qualified specialists with production experience. The chief method of improving the qualifications of engineers should be lectures given by outstanding scientific workers and reports by plant workers on the most important technical problems of plants.

plant laboratories should become the centers of scientific research work. The labs' equipment should be on a par with that in scientific higher should and institutes. Scientific research institutes should be set up at the large metallurgical enterprises.(5)

## SOURCES

- 1. Komsomol'skaya Pravda, 7 Jun 50
- 2. Izvestiya, 7 Jun 50
- 3. Izvestiya, 5 Jul 50
- 4. Trud, 4 Jul 50
- 5. Izvestiya, 13 Jul 50

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