

CLASSIFICATION SECRET **SECRET**
 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
 INFORMATION FROM
 FOREIGN DOCUMENTS OR RADIO BROADCASTS

REPORT

CD NO.

50X1-HUM

COUNTRY USSR
 SUBJECT Political - Party in agriculture
 Economic - Agriculture, administration
 HOW PUBLISHED Daily newspapers, semimonthly periodicals,
 books
 WHERE PUBLISHED USSR
 DATE PUBLISHED 5 - 25 Aug 1950
 LANGUAGE Russian

DATE OF INFORMATION 1950

DATE DIST/0 Nov 1950

NO. OF PAGES 7

SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE
 OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF ESPIONAGE ACT 80
 U. S. C. 31 AND 32, AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION
 OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PRO-
 HIBITED BY LAW. REPRODUCTION OF THIS FORM IS PROHIBITED.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE Newspapers, periodicals and books as indicated.

PARTY LEADS KOLKHOZ CONSOLIDATION IN USSR

[Numbers in parentheses refer to appended sources.]

The latest development in the "transition from socialism to Communism" in the USSR is the consolidation of many small kolkhozes into fewer and larger kolkhozes centered around "agroroddy" or rural cities. The purpose of this step, as indicated in the Soviet press, is to eliminate the "contradictions between town and country" and to strengthen party control over agricultural organization and production.

As will be seen in the evidence presented below, economic advantages expected to be derived from the move are: (1) more effective utilization of latest machinery and scientific techniques in large-scale agriculture; (2) an increased labor force, as a result of transferring a number of administrative personnel to productive work in the fields; (3) increased and improved construction of housing and productive and "cultural" (houses of culture, "red corners," medical facilities, etc.) buildings in the agroroddy; more effective electrification and radiofication of the countryside by concentrating rural workers in the agroroddy; and a general increase in the tempo of agricultural production and deliveries to the state.

The press indicates that the political advantage expected to be derived from this latest step is the increase in party control in consolidated kolkhozes, through formation of new, larger primary party organizations which have the right of control over production, as opposed to the rural territorial party organizations, which have largely been done away with in areas of consolidation. One surprising aspect of this development is the absence of press references to the political influence of MTS in consolidated kolkhozes. All references to MTS stress their economic role, while political control is attributed to rayon and primary party organizations.

- 1 - **SECRET**

CLASSIFICATION		SECRET		DISTRIBUTION							
STATE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	NAVY	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	NSRB							
ARMY	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	AIR	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	FBI							

SECRET

SECRET

50X1-HUM

The extent of the consolidation movement is indicated by references to consolidation in all republics of the USSR except the Kirgiz SSR and by figures showing the decrease in the number of kolkhozes. In Moscow Oblast, from January to August 1950, the number of kolkhozes was cut from over 6,000 to about 1,700, in Leningrad Oblast from 2,000 to 600.(1)

The Organization of Consolidation

Press accounts indicate that the adoption of the decision and actual mechanics of unification are quite simple. Each artel has a meeting at which two thirds of the membership must be present; a decision to merge with certain neighboring kolkhozes is adopted; and, upon approval of the executive committee of the rayon soviet, the decision becomes effective. After the rayon executive committee's approval is secured for the merger, the several united kolkhozes hold a general meeting to adopt a kolkhoz statute and elect a chairman, an administration, an auditing commission, and decide other questions.(1)

What actually occurs in the campaign for, and organization of, consolidation, however, is more complicated and reflects party influence and control. Although there are a few references to "the initiative of kolkhoz members" (2) and "spontaneous desire" to unite (3), the press generally asserts that the initiators of consolidation were Communists (4) and "Muscovites" (5). Bol'shevik states unequivocally that the Moscow party organization led the unification of small kolkhozes. In January 1950, in connection with reports-election meetings of its subordinate party organization, the Moscow Oblast Committee sent a letter to all city and rayon committees and rural party organizations directing them to propagandize the desirability of consolidation.(6) In March, N. S. Krushchev, secretary of the Central and Moscow Oblast Committees, VKP(b), stressed the advantages of consolidation and urged consolidation in speeches to the Moscow Oblast Soviet and to agricultural workers of Moscow Oblast. From Moscow the movement spread rapidly, and by August its success was being hailed throughout the USSR.

The ramifications of the consolidation movement rapidly became evident in the work of rural rayon and primary party organizations. Consolidation was preceded by active party and mass-political work in the kolkhozes. Rayon committees sent lecturers and speakers from among party and soviet active workers to explain the advantages of consolidation to kolkhoz workers. Agitators and workers of primary party organizations read Krushchev's speeches from Pravda, conducted discussions on the advantages of consolidation, and described the achievements of neighboring consolidated kolkhozes and those in Moscow Oblast, the Ukraine, etc.

An example of more specific preparation occurred in the Belorussian SSR where the Techitskiy Rayon Party Committee carefully studied every group of kolkhozes to see which combination could best utilize the available MTS facilities. For this evaluation agricultural specialists, MTS workers and the best kolkhoz administrators and workers were consulted.(7)

After this preparatory work had been carried out, rayon committee workers and primary party organization workers brought up the subject of consolidation at general kolkhoz meetings. The explanatory work of the Communists achieved good results, since kolkhoz members voted for consolidation with customary "unanimity." As might be expected in the Soviet press, there have been no references to opposition by kolkhoz workers to consolidation; all descriptions have stressed unanimity of decisions.

No reference has been found to the amount of party control over rayon soviet executive committees' decisions as to which particular kolkhozes should be combined. Such control would be "indirect," since party organizations in Soviet institutions "cannot exercise functions of control" (8); but rayon Soviet executive committees undoubtedly "take advantage" of such "studies" by rayon committees as that mentioned above.

- 2 -

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

50X1-HUM

Changes in Party Work Due to Consolidation

Consolidation raises many new tasks and problems before rayon committees and primary organizations of the party. The first organizational change brought about by consolidation is the elimination of many rural territorial party organizations. In Rezeknenskiy Rayon, Latvian SSR, for instance, 11 rural territorial party organizations have been transformed into new kolkhoz party organizations (9). As kolkhoz primary party organizations "have the right of control over the work of the management of their particular establishments" (10), and rural territorial organizations do not have that right (11), this is a definite step toward increasing party influence and control at the lowest level. The new primary organizations can now more effectively criticize and improve the work of kolkhoz administrations.

Party influence and control are strengthened even more, however, by amalgamating and setting up new primary party organizations in the consolidated kolkhozes. Numerous examples are given in the press of new possibilities for party control which had not previously existed. In Leningrad Oblast, before consolidation, there were 423 party organizations including 2,335 Communists; now there are 392 party organizations with over 3,600 party members and candidates. Formerly, kolkhoz party organizations had small memberships; now they have 20 to 30, even up to 45, members, and about 40 primary organizations are headed by bureaus. (12) In the Uzbek SSR, before unification, 500 out of 2,117 kolkhozes had no party organizations. Now, after consolidation, 975 kolkhoz party organizations average 16 members each. (13) The fact that there are fewer and larger kolkhozes affords greater possibilities for establishing a party organization on every kolkhoz. It also enables rayon party committees to control more effectively primary organizations and the work of the kolkhozes. For example, before consolidation the Tschit-skiy Rayon Party Committee in Belorussia found it difficult to go into each of the 84 kolkhozes and study their work. As a result of consolidation, there are 24 kolkhozes, and the rayon party committee can now "work with every kolkhoz chairman, have closer ties with each kolkhoz worker, and know the needs of every kolkhoz in time to render necessary aid." (14)

Many of the new, larger primary organizations now have bureaus, a new development in many rayons (15), another factor might be expected to improve the work and strengthen the control of primary organizations.

The most concrete form of strengthening party control in the kolkhoz is the release of many Communists from administrative posts and their assignment to productive work. In this connection, when 2,425 small kolkhozes were consolidated in the Uzbek SSR, 8,912 persons were relieved from administrative and service positions and a significant number have been transferred to brigades, squads, and livestock farms (16). In the Kolkhoz imeni Mikoyan in Tadzhikistan, before consolidation, the party organization had 15 members, only five of whom were engaged in full-time production, while the other ten worked in the kolkhoz administrative apparatus; party influence was therefore weak, according to the local press. In July, the kolkhoz united with three others, the four party organizations were consolidated by decision of the rayon committee, and many Communists were relieved of administrative duties and sent into field work, thus increasing party influence in production. (17) In Vinnitsa Oblast, Ukrainian SSR, 547 small artels were united into 231 consolidated kolkhozes. As a result of this reduction in administrative apparatus, party organizations could send more Communists into field brigades and livestock farms, "a significant step in spreading party influence to all aspects of kolkhoz life." (18)

- 3 -

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

50X1-HUM

New Problems Arising Out of Consolidation

The problem most commonly referred to after consolidation is that of selecting and training personnel for positions of party and kolkhoz leadership. The rayon committee and primary organizations of the party exert decisive influence in these functions. Communists are generally elected to leadership positions. In Ionishkiy Rayon, Shyaulay Oblast, Lithuanian SSR, for example,

...the rayon committee and the kolkhoz party organizations render great service to kolkhoz workers in the selection of worthy candidates for positions of chairmen of consolidated kolkhozes, members of administrations and auditing commissions, production brigade leaders, and heads of livestock farms. At their general meetings, the kolkhoz workers show great faith in the Communists, electing them to leading posts. A majority of consolidated kolkhozes are headed by Communists, and also by nonparty active workers (aktivisty). Many field brigades and livestock farms are also headed by Communists and Komsomols.(19)

In Rezeknenskiy Rayon, Latvian SSR, the rayon committee sent 15 politically trained Communists into the villages. Some of them who had leadership experience and a knowledge of agriculture have been elected chairmen of consolidated kolkhozes.(20) In Maltakiy Rayon, Latvian SSR, chairmen of consolidated kolkhozes were recruited from among former leading rayon party and Soviet workers -- a former head of the agriculture section of the rayon soviet executive committee; a former instructor of the rayon party committee; the former head of the reclamation section of the rayon executive committee, a man who had previously been an MTS director; a former propagandist; and a former head of the kolkhoz construction section of the rayon executive committee.(21) One consolidated kolkhoz in the Karelo-Finnish SSR has all 14 party members and candidates working in full-time production: one directs livestock production; one directs a field brigade; one directs the newly formed construction brigade; one keeps kolkhoz accounts; one runs the kolkhoz electricity supply system; one runs the kolkhoz mill; one is a machinery expert (mashinoved); and four (note that only 11 workers are accounted for) work in the construction and field brigades.(22)

In many cases, one of the chairmen of the small kolkhozes which are united is elected chairman of the consolidated kolkhoz, but party influence and control are still evident in continual checking and training by rayon committees and primary organizations of the party. Rayon party committees hold seminars once or twice a month for chairmen of kolkhozes, production brigade leaders, and heads of livestock farms. Reports are given by agricultural specialists and leading workers of rayon party committees and rayon soviet executive committees.(23) Pravda noted that the increased importance of larger primary party organizations makes it even more imperative that oblast and rayon party committees give special attention to their leadership, to selection of secretaries, and to assigning Communists to decisive sectors of production.(24) Seminars are held for primary organization secretaries to discuss problems of organizing socialist competitions, selection and assignment of kolkhoz personnel, content of mass-agitation work in field brigades, direction of wall newspapers, and political education of women kolkhoz workers. Section chiefs and instructors of the rayon committee also give on-the-spot assistance to primary organization secretaries.(25) Rayon and oblast committees regularly hear reports from primary organization secretaries on party work in consolidated kolkhozes.(26) In Vinnitsa Oblast, Ukrainian SSR, a joint oblast meeting was held for chairmen of consolidated kolkhozes and rayon committee and primary organization secretaries of the party.(27) City party organizations often sponsor kolkhozes and aid them by sending Communists to the villages with reports and lectures on political subjects.(28)

- 4 -

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

50X1-HUM

Increased attention is devoted to brigade leaders and heads of livestock farms of consolidated kolkhozes. Their responsibility has greatly increased as a result of consolidation. Rayon party committees hold special meetings for them to discuss government and TsK VKP(b) decrees on the 1950 harvest and organization of socialist competition.(29)

Another example of party influence and control is the emphasis on permanent construction brigades on each consolidated kolkhoz. In most cases, this brigade is headed by a Communist, sometimes the secretary of the party organization.(30)

Political Role of the MTS

The paucity of references to the political function of the MTS in the consolidation movement may be significant. The role of the MTS in economic-organizational strengthening of consolidated kolkhozes is frequently mentioned, but the function of the MTS deputy director for political affairs (po politchasti) in kolkhoz consolidation is rarely described. Numbers 1 through 8 (January through August 1950) of Mashinno-Trektoraya Stantsiya made no reference to this function, and there are very few press references through August. Sovetskaya Belorussiya, which has dealt at considerable length with kolkhoz consolidation, did not mention the MTS political function in a full page devoted to kolkhoz consolidation and MTS on 18 August 1950. One article in Sovetskaya Litva, 23 August 1950, described the recently established political section in the Ionishkaskaya MTS and its manning of an agitator group with the best mechanics, tractor operators, and brigade leaders for mass-political work on consolidated kolkhozes. It reported that the MTS political section worked out practical measures for aiding primary party organizations, candidate and party-Komsomol groups of consolidated kolkhozes, and that responsible workers of the political section were sent to the kolkhozes. Sovetskaya Latvija, 25 August 1950, made a general reference to MTS political sections which "must be centers of political and organizational work in the village, must assist in strengthening and emphasizing the leading role of party and Komsomol organizations in MTS and kolkhozes, and must train the broad masses of kolkhoz workers in the Communist spirit." The same article describes the activities of MTS workers, explaining the advantages of consolidation to kolkhoz workers and holding seminars for field brigade leaders; but general press coverage is devoted to descriptions of more profitable utilization of machinery and agricultural techniques by larger units and economic reorganization of MTS resulting from consolidation. In many cases where a tractor brigade formerly served several kolkhozes, it now serves only one. On the Kolkhoz Imeni "Shlyakh do kommunizmu," Vinnitsa Oblast, Ukrainian SSR, there are three tractor brigades, and an "MTS Section" (uchastok) was set up.(31) The local press reveals that consolidation has brought changes in direction of MTS in Tschitskiy Rayon, Belorussian SSR. It warns that it is now impossible to direct MTS as a whole; each tractor, thresher, and combine brigade must be regarded separately. Rayon committee agitators are required to go out to all these units, and the bureau of the rayon party committee must hear reports from individual brigade leaders.(32) Emphasis on the rayon committee and primary organizations of the party and lack of reference to the MTS political function might conceivably point to a new alignment of political control at the lowest rural level.

Shortcomings in Organization of Consolidation

Although the extensive consolidation movement is relatively new in the USSR, swift progress has been hailed in the press. At the same time, however, there are the inevitable references to shortcomings. Some newly consolidated kolkhozes are not meeting their production plans. Others are suffering from poor and inexperienced leadership. For example, I. Abdullejev, Minister of Agriculture Azerbaydzhan SSR, complained that in Shemakhinskiy, Marazinskiy, Divichinskiy, Khudat-skiy, Lenkoranskiy, and Lerikskiy rayons some illiterate persons with no leadership experience were named kolkhoz chairmen. He claimed that leaders of party and soviet organizations did not understand the importance of these positions in

- 5 -

SECRET

SECRET

50X1-HUM

strengthening agriculture, and recommended that specialists be chosen who have secondary education or higher training in agriculture.(33) In the Kazakh SSR, a rayon party committee secretary criticized the oblast agricultural administration for not manning the rayon soviet agricultural section with qualified personnel.(34) It is said that a majority of new kolkhoz chairmen in Novorossiyskiy Rayon, Aktyubinsk Oblast, Kazakh SSR, lack enough experience to direct large agricultural enterprises. They need qualified aid, but neither the party committee nor the rayon soviet executive committee help them in selecting brigade and farm leaders. The rayon party committee has not even held a seminar for secretaries of primary party organizations of new kolkhozes. The chief of the Party, Komsomol, and Trade-Union Organizations Section said that could wait until all consolidation in the rayon is completed.(35)

In Belorussia, where the subject of consolidation has received the most press coverage (through August), the TsK KP(b) of Belorussia had a long discussion on the work of the newly consolidated (in June) Kolkhoz imeni Kirov in Pukhovichskiy Rayon. The kolkhoz was not fulfilling its production plan, so the TsK KP(b) of Belorussia studied the work of the kolkhoz in great detail and made specific recommendations for the kolkhoz administration, the primary party organization, and the rayon party committee to improve economic and mass-political organizational work. The party organization together with the kolkhoz administration was to strengthen labor discipline by checking on work attendance, holding open party meetings to discuss the reasons for 40 to 50 of the 90 members of a brigade appearing in the field at 1000 or 1100 hours, and deciding how to get all brigade members to work on time. The nine party members and candidates of the primary organization were exhorted to improve their work in decisive sectors of the kolkhoz economy; the secretary of the rayon party committee was told that he must himself study the work of the kolkhoz. In addition, recommendations were made to the Ministry of Agriculture Belorussian SSR to send an agronomist for permanent work in the kolkhoz, to speed construction of the Krasno-Turinsk Interkolkhoz State Hydroelectric Power Station, to deliver one truck to the kolkhoz, and to guarantee delivery to the kolkhoz of 2,000 fruit trees from the state nursery. The TsK also approved the decision of the kolkhoz administration on radiofication of all houses of kolkhoz workers and obliged the Authorized Representative of the Ministry of Communications USSR for the Belorussian SSR to guarantee radiofication of the Kolkhoz imeni Kirov before 1 September 1950.(36) It would seem that this study was intended to serve as an example to other consolidated kolkhozes in Belorussia, because as early as 8 August 1950 Sovetskaya Belorussiya referred to the discussion by the TsK KP(b) of Belorussia of the Kolkhoz imeni Kirov in connection with criticism of other kolkhozes.

The above information derived from the press indicates that, criticisms of shortcomings to the contrary, the kolkhoz consolidation movement is making headway. It may be concluded that the local party organizations are given more control (rather, more active control is forced upon them) through the reorganization of agriculture, but at the same time their responsibility and accountability to higher party organs is correspondingly increased.

SOURCES

1. Trud, 16 August 1950
2. Sovetskaya Litva, 24 August 1950
3. Pravda Vostoka, 6 August 1950
4. Sovetskaya Litva, 23 August 1950
5. Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, 22 August 1950

- 6 -

SECRET

SECRET

50X1-HUM

6. Bol'shevik, No 12, June 1950, p 49
7. Sovetskaya Belorussiya, 9 August 1950
8. 1939 Party Rules
9. Sovetskaya Latviya, 15 August 1950
10. 1939 Party Rules
11. Voprosy partiynno-organizatsionnoy raboty (Moscow, 1948), p 23
12. Leningradskaya Pravda, 5 August 1950
13. Pravda Vostoka, 24 August 1950
14. Sovetskaya Belorussiya, 9 August 1950
15. Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, 22 August 1950
16. Pravda Vostoka, 24 August 1950
17. Kommunist Tadzhikistana, 25 August 1950
18. Pravda Ukrainy, 20 August 1950
19. Sovetskaya Litva, 23 August 1950
20. Sovetskaya Latviya, 15 August 1950
21. Op. cit., 17 August 1950
22. Leninskoye Znamya, 2 August 1950
23. Kommunist Tadzhikistana, 18 August 1950, and Sovetskaya Litva, 23 August 1950
24. Pravda, 16 August 1950
25. Sovetskaya Latviya, 15 August 1950
26. Bol'shevik, No 15, August 1950, p 58
27. Pravda Ukrainy, 20 August 1950
28. Sovetskaya Latviya, 15 August 1950
29. Sovetskaya Belorussiya, 9 August 1950
30. Sovetskaya Latviya, 24 August 1950
31. Bol'shevik, No 15, August 1950, p 46
32. Sovetskaya Belorussiya, 9 August 1950
33. Bakinskiy Rabochiy, 17 August 1950
34. Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, 24 August 1950
35. Op. cit., 22 August 1950
36. Sovetskaya Belorussiya, 6 August 1950

- E N D -

- 7 -

SECRET