DESTRUCTIVE DEFORESTATION IN EAST GERMANY, 1945-1954

This report gives information on the effects of land reform and collectivization in forestry in the Soviet Zone of Germany, standing timber and lumbering according to Soviet plan targets, the organization of transport and distribution, reparations deliveries and forced exports of forestry products, neglect of timber reserves and of reforestation, the SED personnel policy in the forestry service, organization of the East German forestry administration, and exploitation of the forest workers.

INTRODUCTION

More than 136 million cubic meters of timber has been cut in the Soviet Zone of Germany from the beginning of the Soviet occupation to late 1953. The plan figures for the annual timber cutting were set by the Soviet occupation power, and the SED guaranteed fulfillment of the plan by the use of terror against the forestry service technicians and lumbermen.

The greater share of the cut timber went as reparations or as forced exports to the Soviet bloc countries and also to their trade partners. A considerable share was used by the occupation forces.

The following statistics give some indications as to the extent of reparations shipments of timber from East German forests. During 1949, the number of railroad cars which rolled each month to the East, loaded with timber and lumber, averaged 7,500 to 8,000. Between 1947 and 1952, prefabricated wooden houses of first-quality wood with a floor area of over 3 million square meters were delivered for reparations account. During June 1954, more than 1,000 railroad cars passed through Frankfurt/Oder en route to the USSR with prefabricated wooden houses and furniture.

These arbitrarily selected examples show the contradictory manner in which East Germany, which, in comparison with its domestic demand, is poor in forest resources and formerly imported lumber from other countries including the USSR, was forced to export wood.

The last example cited above indicates that, after the official termination of reparations, the shipments of wood and wood products for the occupation power did not diminish. In addition to prefabricated wooden houses, furniture, cellulose, paper, railroad ties, and pit wood, timber is also exported now as in previous years to Soviet bloc countries, particularly to the USSR, which itself abounds in forests.
During the last 5 years, the population of the Soviet Zone has suffered directly from this destructive deforestation, and it is still subjected to many sacrifices. Too little wood is made available for the demands of the public. Furniture is available in limited quantity and poor quality, and it is very expensive. Wood supplies for paper production are also extremely short. Even the HCs and the consumer cooperative stores do not have enough paper bags and wrapping material. Cardboard is a bottleneck in the entire consumer goods industry.

East German plan figures for 1954 and 1955, as well as the long-range plan up to 1960, leave no doubt that wood and wood products will continue to be diverted from the population to the Soviet occupation power and its puppet, the GDR government.

The destructive deforestation of East German Forests is accompanied by a reckless exploitation of all forestry workers. The wages of lumbermen are deplorably low and, like all wages in the Soviet Zone, have little purchasing power. A system of work norms which is tied to the low level of wages forces the workers to overwork. In addition, they have little suitable work clothing, particularly shoes. Modern timber cutting tools are also in very short supply. Most saws in operating condition are seen very infrequently. East German workers lack tools as axes and saws are of poor quality and demand increased work efforts.

The East German economic plan systematically neglects the needs of the forestry service in regard to technical supplies in favor of other plan goals. This is also the case with consumer goods production generally.

Of the total of about 2 million hectares of state-exploited woodlands, the Soviet Zone has already completely deforested a total of 400,000 hectares, and a further area of 500,000 hectares has only half of its previous stand of trees. Reforestation measures taken up to the present time are so limited in scope that it will take about 100 years to repair the damages inflicted on the forests.

The measures taken by the Soviet occupation power to change ownership conditions in the forestry field served merely to tie forestry exploitation into the organizational system of the monopolistic dictatorial economy. Bur- lands were expropriated from landowners holding 100 hectares or more. Of this total, about 457,000 hectares were distributed to small agricultural enterprises. Under conditions in the Soviet Zone and with operating capital in short supply, these enterprises were too small to be economically viable, and were forced to exploit their forest lands beyond reason. After this reform of forest lands, the small agricultural enterprises with less than 100 hectares per farm controlled a total of 673,000 hectares of forest lands, but of these, nearly two thirds, or about 559,000 hectares, were split up into little patches. However, the right of exploitation of forest lands was soon taken away even from these agricultural enterprises which were not expropriated in the land reform, but which to some extent profited from it. This was done through an exploitation control instituted by the GDR government.

Further, in mid-1952, the collectivization drive was launched, under terms of which all agricultural and forest lands still formally under private ownership are scheduled to expropriated and reorganized into agricultural producer cooperatives (LPGs) and state-owned farms (Vz-Guetter).
During the first wave of collectivization from mid-1952 to the workers' revolt in June 1953, a large proportion of the agricultural and forestry lands were expropriated. Forest lands held by enterprises not yet expropriated or collectivized have already been organized into "forestry cooperatives" (Waldgemeinschaften) under the administrative control of the Kreis councils, which exploit the lands in accordance with the targets of the SED economic plan.

Thus the entire forest land of the Soviet Zone is being incorporated into the monopolistic economy of the SED dictatorship, and the sovietization of the forest lands is being expanded. This does not proceed without opposition. The forestry experts have resisted the destructive deforestation with all appropriate means and have done their best to modify the more extreme measures. For this reason the SED has purged the forestry force in its usual manner, has eliminated most of the skilled, experienced men, and has replaced them with unskilled, inexperienced, but faithful party-liners. The criterion applied in the selection of these SED cadres was a willingness to fulfill the Soviet production quota and to exploit the forestry workers to the limits of their strength in their pursuit of the destructive deforestation program.

However, not all of the men selected by the SED have reacted as expected. Many of them, together with the held-over older experts, still place the long-term interests of the German people ahead of other considerations and do all they can by way of personal initiative and sacrifice to protect the forest reserves from the policy of destructive deforestation.

It is typical of the cynicism of the SED dictatorship that Rau, member of the Central Committee of the SED, has announced that it will only be a question of time before the regime also administers the forest resources of West Germany. He made this statement in his capacity as chairman of the State Planning Commission, at a time when the forestry experts told him that standing timber in West Germany was less than the plan goal set for 1954 and 1955, and that cutting at this rate could only be done at the expense of future timber resources. Furthermore, the Central Committee of the SED, explaining to the forestry school of the Soviet Zone its request for an extremely large number of forestry students, said that these experts would be needed to administer West German forests.

I. EFFECTS OF LAND REFORM AND COLLECTIVIZATION IN FORESTRY

In 1945, before the land reform, the forest area of the Soviet Zone of Germany was as follows (in 1,000 hectares):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Private Forests</th>
<th>State Forests</th>
<th>Communal Forests</th>
<th>Over 100 ha</th>
<th>Up to 100 ha</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Leender</td>
<td>262</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>484</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mecklenburg</td>
<td>403</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>594</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brandenburg</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>599</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saxony-Anhalt</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>473</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saxony</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>455</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thuringen</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>526</td>
<td>636</td>
<td>2,071</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Total           | 1,162         | 248              | 826         | 636         | 2,072 |

- 3 -
This distribution of ownership was greatly changed by the land reform, during the course of which the following forest areas were expropriated as of 1 January 1946 (later changes were negligible) and incorporated into the land funds of the individual Laender (in 1,000 hectares):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Laender</th>
<th>State Forests</th>
<th>Communal Forests</th>
<th>Private Forests Over 100 ha</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mecklenburg</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brandenburg</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>387</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sachsen-Anhalt</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sachsen</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thuringen</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>78</strong></td>
<td><strong>11</strong></td>
<td><strong>826</strong></td>
<td><strong>913</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to figures as of 1 January 1947, it is reported that a total of 366,700 hectares of forest lands had been expropriated and incorporated into the land funds.

The taking over of state and communal forests was carried out without being called for in the law. This was done at the initiative of the local Soviet Kreis commanders and the local SED so as to be able to distribute land even where there were no private forests of more than 100 hectares. In general, the land reform was carried out largely on the basis of local political whim. The purpose of the Kreis commanders was undoubtedly to try to win the new settlers over to Communism.

Forest land was distributed from the land funds as follows (in 1,000 hectares):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Laender</th>
<th>To New Farmers</th>
<th>To Former Farmers</th>
<th>To State Forests</th>
<th>To Communal Forests</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mecklenburg</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brandenburg</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>327</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sachsen-Anhalt</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sachsen</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thuringen</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>412</strong></td>
<td><strong>54</strong></td>
<td><strong>333</strong></td>
<td><strong>125</strong></td>
<td><strong>915</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although forest lands are probably the most unsuitable land for small individual exploitation, the forestry authorities failed in their efforts to prevent the division of the forests among the new settlers and to add the expropriated forest lands to the state forests.

Just how much political considerations influenced the distribution of forest lands in the land reform can be seen from the fact that the target of 365,000 hectares to be distributed to farmers was exceeded by 113,000 hectares, whereas the target for distribution to communities fell 40,000 hectares below the plan goal of 165,000 hectares.
Yet, only about half of the forest lands in the land funds, about 457,000 hectares, was distributed among new settlers, etc., in parcels of 3-5 hectares, and later 6-10 hectares, although these norms were diluted considerably in practice.

The division of forest reserves was carried out locally with little or no attention paid to the requirements of good forestry practice. The criterion was apparently to distribute the older, exploitable forest lands among the farmers, while the younger stands were given over to the state or communal forests. The resulting patchwork patterns of ownership could seldom be corrected because of the heavy pressure exerted by the SEB, especially since the forestry experts were prohibited from taking any part whatever in the Walde forstry school was thus distributed and could only be reclaimed after long and arduous efforts.

Just how ridiculous the distribution was can be seen from the fact that valuable hardwood stands were divided among farmers living 30 and 50 kilometers away. Only in Sachsen-Anhalt was it possible for an energetically powerful man to correct these excesses.

The remaining 458,000 hectares of forest lands affected by the land reform became state and communal forests.

The distribution of the forest lands under the land reform in the Soviet Zone was as follows on 1 January 1945 (in 1,000 hectares):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Land</th>
<th>Total - including -</th>
<th>State Forests</th>
<th>Private Forests Under 100 ha</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mecklenburg</td>
<td>451</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brandenburg</td>
<td>894</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sachsen-Anhalt</td>
<td>599</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>314</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sachsen</td>
<td>473</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thueringen</td>
<td>495</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,671</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>1,100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The forestry inventory carried out in the Soviet Zone in 1949 divided the private forests into those over 5 hectares and those of up to 5 hectares. Forest lands were then distributed as follows (in 1,000 hectares):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Land</th>
<th>State Forests</th>
<th>Communal Forests</th>
<th>Over 5 ha</th>
<th>Up to 5 ha</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mecklenburg</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>445</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brandenburg</td>
<td>397</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>871</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sachsen-Anhalt</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>582</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sachsen</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thueringen</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>487</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,455</td>
<td>407</td>
<td>374</td>
<td>599</td>
<td>2,834</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- 5 -
If the foregoing figures should reveal a number of inconsistencies, it
should be borne in mind that many statistics coming out of the Soviet Zone
are undependable. All of the governmental offices there are understaffed, so
that accuracy often suffers.

It is interesting to note that the above statistics, issued by the sta-
tistical office on the 1949 forestry inventory, differ from those of the for-
est administration. The latter reports a total of 2,743,000 hectares,
including 1,385,000 hectares of state forests, 374,000 hectares of communal
forests, 366,000 hectares of private forest lands over 5 hectares, and
629,000 hectares of private forest lands up to 5 hectares [total: 2,750,000].

In early 1952, the communal forests were turned over to the state for-
estry, when the state forestry enterprises (STFBS) were organized. The so-
called church forest was not affected by this measure and has not been touched
up to now.

Forest land owned by farmers was briefly freed of any kind of state for-
estry supervision by the land reform, although the Regulation of Forestry in
the Soviet Zone of 29 October 1949, issued with the consent of the SNA (So-
viet Military Administration), clearly stated: "All forestry in the Soviet
Zone will be centrally administered and carried out." The temporary freedom
was granted in order to make the farmers believe that the SED intended to
promote the interests of the farmers. At that time, forestry experts were
prohibited from interference of any kind in the exploitation of the forest
lands held by farmers.

It could not be expected that the farmers would follow good forestry
practice. The reasons for this lay in the poverty of the refugees, new
farmers, and small farmers, who tried to raise the money required for getting
their farms going by exploiting their forest holdings. The farmers, stripped
by the Soviet occupation of all resources required for operating their farms,
were free to make what use they chose of their forest holdings, and this they
did with an urgency corresponding to their poverty.

In one rural Kreis in Sachsen having a total of 256 hectares of land-re-
form forest lands held by farmers, 25,000 cubic meters of timber was cut in
the period 1.4.61-9.50, which comes to 91 cubic meters per hectare, or, depend-
ing on the stand, 11 to 25 cubic meters per hectare per year. Of this area,
29 percent was stripped without regard to proper forestry practice, but only
5.3 percent was replanted. The state of the area which was not stripped was
described as follows: "Destruction of the backbone of the stand by cutting
out the strongest trunks, exposing the rest to the danger of wind damage,
decreasing crown density (Kronenschluss) from 0.9 to 0.3 area coverage (Ras-
seide). Only 25 percent of this timber ever reached normal trade channels.
The rest disappeared into the black market and barter trade.

In spite of this destructive deforestation, which was by no means the
exception, no steps were taken against the land-reform farmers, since they
were in great difficulties and there was a reluctance to embitter them polit-
ically.

Things were changed, however, when it was discovered that the repair-
tions deliveries could no longer be covered by cuttings from the state forests.
To withdraw the freedom of exploitation from the farm-operated forest lands
by decree was a step no one wanted to take. As early as 1948, there was a
certain amount of pressure from the SNA and SED to merge the farmers' forest
holdings into cooperatives and thus to get their output under control. These
efforts were at first entirely without success, since the farmers were opposed
to any kind of official restriction. In view of the fact that their farms were already under the control of the state economy, they wanted to preserve their freedom to exploit their woodlands at all costs, and, with this freedom, their one means of acquiring ready cash.

With the creation of the Association for Mutual Farmers’ Aid (WdGB), which was designed to control more or less forcibly the agricultural sector of the economy, a similar control of the farm-owned woodlands was established during the same year.

In early 1951, the Forest Exploitation Directives for Forest Cooperatives and Peasant Foresters were implemented by decree. Financial pressures were applied to make the farmers join the cooperatives. Farmers who were not members of the cooperatives had to pay to the state forestry administration fees per hectare of land and cubic meter of timber cut; which were five to seven times as high as those paid by members of cooperatives.

Under this kind of pressure the distribution of forest land ownership was as follows by the end of 1951 (in hectares):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Laender</th>
<th>Total Farm Forest Lands</th>
<th>Forest Lands in Forest Cooperatives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mecklenburg</td>
<td>362,608</td>
<td>114,410</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brandenburg</td>
<td>126,000</td>
<td>65,619</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sachsen-Anhalt</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>147,851</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sachsen</td>
<td>155,000</td>
<td>43,627</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thueringen</td>
<td>131,000</td>
<td>7,079</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>974,608</td>
<td>375,506</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The essential purpose of the exploitation directives was to merge the farm-owned forest lands into forestry districts (Reviere) administered by so-called peasant foresters under the Kreis forestry offices. By 1952, exploitation of the farm-forest lands of less than 5 hectares was no longer permitted without restriction and was planned by the state. In 1952, these 22 percent of the plan was fulfilled.

This timber has to be turned over to the state timber supply organization for the "normal price," which is still the 1/44 ceiling price plus an additional payment. The additional payments average up to 50 percent of the normal price for logs, up to 100 percent for pit props, and up to 75 percent for fiber wood. In establishing the prices of veneers and plywood, the additional payment is set by agreement with the buyer of the wood, so that no additional costs result in production. In this manner, state exploitation of farmers’ wood lots even of 5 hectares or less was accomplished. The farmers can cut wood from their lots for their own use only with the consent of the kreis forestry office.

With this, the right of the farmers to make use of their woodlands, including those allocated to them by the land reform, was completely rescinded. The actual expropriation of the farm wood lots was begun with the collectivization of agriculture in mid-1952. The forest lands of farms of over 20 hectares expropriated during the first wave of collectivization were turned over to the agricultural producer cooperatives (LPGs), or to the local state
agricultural enterprises for later distribution to the LPGs. Furthermore, the woodlands of the smaller farmers whose lands were being collectivized were turned over to the LPGs, and thus into the hands of the SEED dictatorship.

II. STANDING TIMBER AND LUMBERING ACCORDING TO SOVIET PLAN TARGETS

The capital of forestry is the standing timber in the woodlands, which continues to grow and increase. Thus the exploitation level depends on the standing timber and its rate of growth.

In 1945, excessive cutting for armament and war needs had left the forest resources at a subnormal level, without placing continued long-term exploitation in jeopardy however. Although the Third Reich overexploited the forest resources of the country, the forestry experts did manage to reduce the bad effects to a minimum. This situation was radically changed after the Soviet occupation.

To gain an over-all view of the available forest resources, the SMA (Soviet Military Administration) ordered a survey of forest land in the summer of 1946. However, this survey was carried out in such an unscientific fashion and the personnel used were so few and so poorly qualified that no reliable result could be achieved. On the other hand, expectations of the SMA that the data would be unreasonably high so as to justify overexploitation, were not fulfilled.

The forestry resources survey was repeated as of 1 April 1949. This was prepared in such a way as to permit the highest possible level of exploitation, but was, in the final analysis, completely worthless.

When the survey was carried out by reasonably competent personnel the results were perhaps acceptable, but in general they were no more reliable than those of 1946, largely because of too little time and too few people. The target was set at 100 hectares surveyed per day. Even a highly qualified forestry expert could only render a superficial judgment on this basis, and many were in no sense qualified. Some had no experience or training whatever and thus were forced to make rule-of-thumb estimates.

The 1946 inventory set the available timber at 254,677,000 cubic meters for a forest area of 2,938,000 hectares. This breaks down to 95 cubic meters per hectare. Timber with a diameter of more than 25 centimeters at chest height, i.e., timber ready for cutting, was estimated at 6.6 million cubic meters. Of this latter total, 17.7 million cubic meters were in Mecklenburg, 24.6 million in Brandenburg, 16.3 million in Sachsen-Anhalt, 7.7 million in Sachsen, and 21.5 million in Thuringen.

The 1 April 1949 survey, carried out only for state and corporate woodlands, estimated 1,550,000 cubic meters of standing timber on an area of 1,838,000 hectares, or about 80 cubic meters per hectare.

However, between 1946 and 1949 about 55 million cubic meters of timber was cut. This comes to 20 to 22 cubic meters per hectare.

In spite of this, the 1949 estimate was higher than that of 1946! Of course any survey on such a scale will contain a number of unavoidable errors. However, the foregoing figures clearly demonstrate that the surveys are virtually worthless. This is especially true since the normal age ratio of the timber, a factor which has a great bearing on long-term exploitation, has been thoroughly disrupted. Timber in the large and medium-size groups has been virtually all cut. The present make-up of the forests makes any estimate as to future growth completely impossible.

- 8 -
The 1953 forest survey listed a forest area of 1,655,000 hectares with timber reserves of 149,687,000 cubic meters, or 90 cubic meters per hectare. However, between 1949 and 1953, 28 cubic meters per hectare were cut. Thus, the inventory of 1953 can be no more relied upon than those of 1946 and 1949, plan as of 1 January 1953 and also to justify the highest possible exploitation level.

It is demonstrated again and again that the SED dictatorship is trying to obtain its needs through exploitation of the remaining standing timber with no thought whatever for the need for future growth. The supplementary lumbering goals for 1953 and 1954, over and above those previously set, were the result of the fact that the Soviet Zone had been forced to go without the timber imports called for in its trade agreements with the USSR, Poland, and Hungary in favor of urgent imports of foodstuffs.

During the first years of the Soviet occupation, not only the volume but also the type of timber cut by the forestry administration and its allocation among the five laender of the Soviet Zone, were decided by the head of the SMA.

The volume and type of lumbering were determined by the Soviet reparations and military needs. The German forestry experts having not the slightest say in the matter. No attention whatever was paid to the needs of the German economy, insofar as it was not tied up with reparations contracts.

The term reparations must be taken here in a very wide sense. In this sense the Soviets made use of all forestry products which could in any way be turned into foreign currency or other assets. By way of example, a complaint about a large quantity of veneer oak, which was supposedly delivered to Poland as reparations, came to the Soviet Zone from Copenhagen.

The forestry section of the SMA, which gave the orders for forestry exploitations, always added a wide margin to the requirements of the reparations department so that there would be no stoppage of deliveries. The Soviet forestry experts were most eager to prevent any interruption of deliveries, so that they would not be sent back to the USSR, which was the usual way of dealing with such situations. This fear had the natural result in that the stocks of cut timber were far in excess of a tolerable level. For example, on 31 December 1949 there were about 6 million cubic meters of cut timber awaiting pickup in the forests. By 31 May 1951, in a period of 5 months, this volume rose to 9 million cubic meters, and by the end of 1951, it stood at 11 million cubic meters, half of it in logs. Since 1951, a regulation exists that all timber cut in a given calendar year has to be shipped by 31 December. Compliance with this order, however, is always hampered by lack of transport equipment.

When the "German Democratic Republic" was founded in October 1949, the right to order cuttings was transferred to SED officials. However, the Pankow government is just as much subject to the reparations and foreign-exchange requirements of the USSR as the forestry officials of the SMA previously were.

If the SMA forestry department at first seemed primarily interested in getting German lumbering under way again, it soon became clear that their main objective was to subjugate Soviet Zone forestry to Soviet interests to the greatest degree possible. They introduced the Soviet forestry year, based on the calendar year, in the Soviet Zone, replacing the German forestry year, which runs from 1 October to 30 September of the following year, and which is thus more in harmony with the biological rhythm of nature.
Shortly thereafter, it became quite clear that the rhythm of nature was of no importance any more to the lumbering industry in the Soviet Zone. Whereas German forestry practice calls for cutting from fall to spring, timber was now cut from 1 January to 31 December, even though timber cut in the summer, during the growth year, is easily subject to deterioration.

The timber felling plan target was divided into quarters, so that the fulfillment of the annual plan could be better supervised. The fact that 10,000 cubic meters of veneer oak, because of transportation failures, deteriorated to such an extent that 9,000 cubic meters of it could only be used for firewood, seems not to have been a matter of interest to the SMA. Plans to cut another 10,000 cubic meters in the same place could only be blocked by going outside regular channels.

Pine which had discolored as the result of having been cut in summer was refused as reparations delivery, but nonetheless the suggestion that summer cutting be stopped was turned down.

Because of the lack of qualified personnel in the land forestry offices, a logical allocation of the plan targets for timber felling among the various forestry districts was very difficult anyhow. This allocation of quotas was often carried out in an even more illogical way by intervention of the Soviet forestry officers, who had little knowledge of local conditions but who meddled in everything.

By way of example, several thousand cubic meters of pine were cut each year on a peninsula of an inland lake for 3 years in a row without one cubic meter of wood ever being taken out of the woods; this on orders from the Soviet officials. That the Soviets were interested only in plundering the forest resources of the Soviet Zone is indicated by the fact that the only basis used in establishing cutting norms was the total amount of standing timber available and not the amount maturing annually. For example, a quota of an additional million cubic meters of timber was transferred from Sachsen to Mecklenburg when it was learned from the survey carried out in the summer of 1946 that Mecklenburg had greater resources of pine and hardwood timber. In the same way, those industries working on reparations orders (paper, cellulose, textiles, etc.) were given priority in lumber supply.

The official timber cutting quotas of the SMA, in round numbers, ran as follows: last quarter of 1945, 5 million cubic meters; 1946, 17 million; 1947, 21 million; 1948, 17 million; 1949, 13 million; 1950, 14 million; 1951, 14 million; and 1952, 12 million. No final figures are yet known for 1953, but these can be estimated on the basis of available data at about 12 million cubic meters. This comes to a total of 127 million cubic meters of official timber felling.

In the years up to 1949, the total annual cut was considerably exceeded on orders of the local Kreis commanders and other Soviet officials. After 1950, cutting in excess of plan was officially prohibited, but a new trick was used to reach the same end: the annual plan total had to be fulfilled ahead of schedule, i.e., by October. The timber felled during the rest of the year was then called "in start on the next year," without this total ever being taken into account in the total cut the following year. Overfulfillment of the plan was thus achieved by way of the back door.

In addition to the centrally ordered cutting, there was a not inconsiderable local, unofficial cutting. In part, this was carried out as a special firewood action for the population, in part by the occupation forces for their own use, and in part it was covered up by entries as timber damaged by insects, an item which could not be checked. These additional cuttings could
be conservatively estimated as 1.3 million to 2 million cubic meters per year, or a total of 3 million cubic meters to the end of 1950. The total would thus be 1.7 million plus 9 million, or 13.5 million cubic meters, or 66 cubic meters per hectare of the state-administered or state-exploited forest lands of about 2 million hectares. This is many times the total which should have been cut on the basis of the stand and its maturation.

The Five-Year Plan again calls for 10 million cubic meters per year in 1954 and 1955, which means, on the basis of previous experience, that the quotas will be overfulfilled to about 12 million cubic meters annually. In addition to this, there will again be an uncontrollable cutting for military training grounds. If one bears in mind that, of the 2 million hectares of state forests, at least three quarters have less than 40 or 50 percent of their normal stand of timber and that about 600,000 hectares have been completely stripped, it becomes clear that such large-scale cuttings can no longer be covered by maturing timber and will have to come out of existing reserves, which again will reduce the rate of natural increase.

The Soviet zone practice of expressing the excess exploitation in percentage terms of the maturing timber is deliberately false and misleading, since they make use of normal saturation rate figures which have long since lost their validity. A more revealing picture is given by comparing total forest area with rate of cutting, which shows an average exploitation of 6 to 8 cubic meters per hectare. Since a large proportion of the forest area is no longer adequately stocked with standing timber, as has been shown above, the cutting rate per hectare of remaining timber is considerably higher.

The continued overexploitation represents not only a present, but also a future damage to our forest resources. The wood that is being cut today does not by rights belong to this generation, but to our grandchildren. The damage done now cannot be made good for at least a century.

The exploitation excess varies from wood type to wood type, depending on the degree to which the various species are required for reparations or foreign exchange needs. The hardest hit are the stands of pine and oak, while spruce and beech fare somewhat better, since they are exportable only as fiber wood and offer little by way of foreign exchange earnings.

The 460,000-old hectares of privately owned forest lands are not covered by statistics up to 1952. The per-hectare cut is probably no lower than that of the state-administered forest land.

The high wind and insect damage losses are essentially included in the foregoing figures. The great wind damage in the spruce of the Thuringen forests in June 1946 amounted to 1.3 million cubic meters of timber, while the harvest amounted to 300,000 cubic meters. Since these quantities of timber could not be worked away promptly because of the shortage of forestry personnel, the fallen timber added greatly to damage by spruce bark-borer beetles (Fichtenkronkäfer), which had gotten a foothold during the last years of the war and after the capitulation.

Even though 1.4 million cubic meters of timber damaged by beetles had been cleaned up and decontaminated by the fall of 1947, there were still about 1.7 million cubic meters left from the beetle damage of the summer of 1947 which remained to be decontaminated. To take the proper measures against the extensive beetle damage anticipated for the summer of 1948, the forestry offices were relieved of all but the technical aspects of decontamination, while the recruiting, housing, feeding, and equipping of the necessary workers was made the responsibility of the minister-presidents or ministers of the Laender Thuringen (Thuringer Wald), Sachsen-Anhalt (Harz), and Sachsen.
(Erzgebirge). By means of these extraordinary measures it was possible to decontaminate about 3 million cubic meters of beetle-infested timber from May to the fall of 1948. The total of beetle-damaged timber ran to 5.1 million cubic meters and left deforested areas totaling about 23,000 hectares.

The area affected by dendroctonus pini (Kieferspinne) and by lymantria monacha (Mohn) totaled 1.5 million hectares, while a total of 13,000 hectares were completely denuded. The dendroctonus pini affected the Brandenburg and Sachsen-Anhalt forests most heavily. Damage was lighter in Mecklenburg and Sachsen. The lymantria monacha damage occurred primarily in Sachsen, and to a lesser extent in Brandenburg, Mecklenburg, and Sachsen-Anhalt. All attempts to combat the dendroctonus pini with insect lime failed, because neither suitable insect lime nor the necessary raw materials were available in the Soviet Zone. Not until 1948 did the SMD supply a number of planes, which made it possible to dust about 63,000 hectares with insecticide during 1948 and 1949.

The few experienced foresters in the Soviet Zone calculated that the remaining standing timber will hardly cover the targets for 1954 and 1955. When informed of this, Ray stated that West German forests would be available for exploitation by that time.

The reckless exploitation of East German forests not only affects present-day resources but will also affect the growth pattern of future timber.

Brandenburg spruce has been the hardest hit. Experts estimate that by the end of the Five-Year Plan in 1955, all spruce timber of class 2a (more than 20 centimeters in diameter) and upwards will be completely exhausted.

This will also remove the parent trees for future growth of Brandenburg spruce. For this reason it is all the more welcome that the West Berlin Forest administration has taken steps to preserve the Brandenburg spruce parent stock in its forests and also has established nurseries for spruce stock. A number of conscientious foresters in the Soviet Zone have also taken steps in this direction.

III. THE ORGANIZATION OF TRANSPORT AND DISTRIBUTION

As has already been noted, the volume of cut timber left in the forests increased from 6 million cubic meters to 11 million cubic meters during 1947. It is obvious that a great proportion of this wood deteriorated badly before it was distributed to the consumers. This was not only the situation in 1947, but has been more or less the rule ever since. The reasons for this situation [have been explained above].

Transport facilities were completely inadequate. It was absolutely impossible to bring out the timber with teams of horses, even though the Kreis commanders recklessly tried to enforce this type of transportation. Tractors and trucks were an insufficient solution, since they were not available in sufficient number, to say nothing of the shortages of motor fuel, tires, and spare parts.

In typically Soviet fashion, an attempt was made to improve transport of timber, not through a better supply of equipment, since this could not be done, but by means of a reorganization of the transport system.
The responsibility for bringing the cut timber out of the woods had originally been given to transport brigades of the communities which had the right to use the farmers' teams. Since the matter was not going well, it was made a single additional horse, tractor, truck, tire, or liter of gasoline, the heads of the forestry service, who knew nothing about forestry work, agreed to take over the responsibility, even though they had scarcely been able to do it. Naturally, there was no improvement in the situation. When the DBZ for Wood was established, the responsibility for hauling the cut timber was turned over to this organization.

Similarly, the distribution of timber to the consumer was repeatedly reorganized until it finally was again given to the forestry service. After 1945, the delivery of timber to the consumer was carried out as it had been before the capitulation, i.e., through the forestry service directly to the consumer. This system not only prevented centralized control, but also had an adverse effect on political developments. The political objective was to crush the privately owned wood-using enterprises. This end was not served by the non-Communist forestry officials giving these enterprises sawmills, etc.

A general ban on this sort of activity was unenforceable, and a close control in the widespread forest regions was not practical. The act was generally not detected until after the fact, when the wood had already been delivered and could no longer be returned.

The first step was to take the delivery of cut timber out of the hands of the forestry service and make it the province of the so-called Industrial Offices (Industrie Kontore) of the Land and Kreis, since these offices could be more effectively controlled politically. This experiment could not function, so the DBZ for Wood was created, which then took over the distribution of cut timber from the forestry service to the various consumers.

The DBZ for Wood at first also controlled all wood users, especially furniture makers. These enterprises were soon taken away from it, so that it then became the DBZ for Timber and Lumber (DBZ Holz- und Schnittholz). In 1952, this DBZ had five branches in each of the five Landkreise, each one of the branches covering three to five Landkreise, in addition to which it had a so-called branch office (Aussenstellenbüro) in each Kreis seat.

The average branch had a turnover of about 39 million DM (East), collecting a commission of about 15 percent on lumber and 10 percent on cut timber. Office personnel numbered 60-65 persons.

Transloading stations were established at the railroad terminals, where the wood was delivered for shipment to the consumers. Each of these loading stations was in the charge of a manager (Diaplan), who took over the wood deliveries from the forestry service and then consigned it to the various consumers. In the course of a year he handled about 200,000 units (10,000 cubic meters of cut timber and 10,000 cubic meters of lumber).

A system of norms applied to the loading stations just as for the forestry service. The basic wage, catalogued according to five location classes, ranged from 0.66 to 1.07 DM, or 0.91 to 1.12 DM. Additional compensations and premiums ranged from 3 to 15 percent of the basic wage.
Wood receipts were controlled by the forestry service cutting plan. Delivery schedules were regulated by the goods distribution plan. Since these plans did not agree in practice, there were countless breakdowns in the distribution system, especially since no lumber could be delivered without a written directive from the DMZ branches.

Since cut-timber distribution on the Soviet pattern turned out to be too costly for the smaller area of the GDR, jurisdiction over cut timber, bark, and resin was taken away from the DMZ for wood. These products were then subject to the control of the forestry service under the principle of "direct delivery from producer to consumer." The forestry service not only shipped these products directly from the forests, but also handled such details as transshipping and shipment directly to the plant. As of January 1, 1953, the forestry service (the state forestry enterprises) took over installations of the DMZ for wood engaged in handling cut timber, bark, and resin, including stocks held as of the end of 1952. The forestry service also took over personnel formerly employed by the DMZ for wood at these installations.

Distribution of cut timber is carried out in accordance with a material distribution plan prepared by the marketing divisions of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry or of the Bezirke for the state forestry enterprises (for state forests) and for the Kreis forestry centers (for private woodlands).

IV. REPARATIONS DELIVERIES AND FORCED EXPORTS OF FOREST PRODUCTS

Since 1945, the lion's share of the recklessly excessive cuttings of timber in the Soviet Zone has been taken over by the USSR to cover the needs of its occupation troops, for "reparations," and for forced exports. The scope of the Soviet take from Soviet Zone forests is a "state and party secret." But extensive deforested areas make it clear to even the layman that the damage to German forest resources will not be made good for generations.

The amounts of the cut timber used in the Soviet Zone economy, by occupation troops, or for forced exports are hard to establish. The volume of lumber taken by the Soviets for reparations can not be estimated with accuracy. Private statistics were prohibited and keeping such was dangerous, besides being inadequate. The Soviets organized those reparation deliveries by numerous routes, so that any over-all picture was made impossible. The cutting and stockpiling plans do not give an accurate picture either, since they were often deliberately misleading to cover up the actual take. Some estimate of the scope of the take can be gained from the 194 monthly average of 7,500 to 8,000 railroad carloads of cut timber (logs, pit props, etc.) and lumber. These carload figures do not include industrially processed wood in the form of prefabricated houses, cellulose, paper, textiles, etc. Since delivery of carloads is not accepted until they reach the border stations, rejected quantities are not paid for but are nonetheless shipped on to the East. The deliveries are credited at 1/4 prices.

The prefabricated-house program required large quantities of first-class spruce timber. The prefabricated houses were made in about five different types by the Soviet Zone for reparations or forced exports. The various types have a floor space of about 40 to 90 square meters. The price paid to the producer enterprises ranged from 12,000 to 30,000 DM. The USSR paid only about 60 percent of this price, the remainder being borne by the Soviet Zone. The export price collected by the USSR is not known exactly, but is considerably higher.
The difference between the actual production cost and the 1944-level reparations price paid by the USSR is also borne by the Soviet Zone in the case of forestry product reparations, irrespective of whether the commodity be cut timber, semifinished or finished wood products, resin, bark, etc.

During the period from 1947 to 1952, prefabricated houses with a total floor area of 3.1 million square meters were turned over. Each square meter required 0.7 cubic meter of wood, all of the best class. Grade 2 lumber was rejected. The Soviets set exaggerated quality requirements for all wood deliveries. They required first-class pine for use in railroad ties, packing cases, and the like. No counter arguments were tolerated.

The Hitler war had to be paid for in both East and West Germany with a great loss of timber resources. The following is a comparison of cuttings in the Soviet and Western zones after the war (in cubic meters per hectare):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Soviet Zone</th>
<th>Western Zone</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1945-1949</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950-1953</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total 1945-1953</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This represents a depletion which far exceeds the new growth.

It has been ascertained that the greatest share of the 136 million cubic meters of timber cut between 1945 and 1953 in East Germany was consumed by the Soviet occupation forces or went for so-called reparations shipments.

Since the beginning of 1954, the so-called reparations deliveries have been formally stopped. Actually, the shipments to the Soviets have not diminished. Lumber, prefabricated houses, furniture, and other wood products continue to be shipped as "exports" to the Soviet bloc countries and their trade partners. The prices for these forced exports are barely higher than the prices used for crediting the reparations accounts. The deliveries to long trains loaded with lumber and wood products run daily from the Soviet Zone railroad station with over 1,000 freight cars loaded with prefabricated houses, furniture, and other wood products.
V. HEIGHT OF TIMBER RESERVES AND OF REFORESTATION

In the Soviet Zone of Germany, the fulfillment of the cutting plans and
the supplementary cutting plans have been the center of activity in the forestry
field from 1945 until today. Only the efforts to encourage this activity have
been intensified through these years.

The Statistical Office in the Soviet Zone gave the size of the deforested
area up to 1950 as 400,000 hectares (Mecklenburg, 63,000 hectares; Brandenburg,
and Thueringen, 76,000 hectares; Sachsen, 64,000 hectares; and
Thuringia, 73,000 hectares). 60 of this amount, 35 percent, or 133,000 hect-
hares, has been reforested (Mecklenburg, 28,000 hectares; Brandenburg, 42,000
hectares; Sachsen-Annaberg, 27,000 hectares; Sachsen, 63,000 hectares; and
Thueringen, 73,000 hectares).

The Central Forestry Office differed in its figures somewhat in that it
listed the size of the deforested area as 350,000 hectares and the size of the
reforested area as 189,000 hectares. Which of the two figures is closer to
reality is difficult to say. The deforested area given is unquestionably too
small and the reforested area too large, insofar as reforestation is understood
to mean the full stocking of a given culture in the appropriate locality.

In this last sense, the reforested area is estimated by specialists to be
about one third to one half the size of the deforested area. The insufficient
forestry reasons. While the reforestation has a prominent place in the plan,
the means to fulfill the plan are not ready available at the appropriate time.

On 1 April 1951, the Statistical Office listed the size of the area not
yet reforested as 172,000 hectares. The same Statistical Office listed the
deforested area around the end of 1950 as being 350,000 hectares; the reforested
area was given as 133,000 hectares at that time. This leaves a deforested area
hundreds large. It is out of the question that the difference between these
end of 1950 and 1 April 1951. Accordingly to the 1951-1955 Five-Year Plan, the
figures, i.e., 90,000 hectares, was reforested during the period between the
reforestation figure amounts to 350,000 hectares. Since the deforested area
against complete deforestation, it follows that 133,000 hectares of deforested
area must exist somewhere or must be created in order to fulfill the quota of
the Five-Year Plan.

It was inevitable that this destructive deforestation as well as the high
cost of reforestation should soon become apparent to all. This was of course
uncomfortable for the GDR regime since it operated with the appearance of a
socially minded economy. A way out was found. Since it was not desired to give
direct effects, such as prohibiting "reactionary, capitalistic deforestation" in
order to follow "new methods, based on the knowledge of progressive, Soviet
biology" and to convert to "progressive forest management with consideration for
timber reserves."

As an example, they used a timber-reserve-minded management method which
had been developed in the large-scale by notorious German Forestry Service
workers. The method and its originators were then misinterpreted in an incredi-
ibly unscrupulous manner. The method of systematic reforestation was similarly
misinterpreted. In order to emphasize the introduction of this timber-reserve-minded
management method, the Forestry Office Doma (in Dessirck Potsdam) which was always
rich in timber reserves, was picked as the exemplary forestry operation.
Smaller cutting plans, not based on tree types, were set up for this forestry office and appropriate instruction courses were given. It is understandable that the young forestry service workers, who were being trained under the GDR regime, turned with favor to this new method, which was reportedly much better, because they too recognized the destructiveness of the deforestation methods which had been employed. While they lacked all practical experience, they did expect it to become a forest conservation method.

Less understandable was the position of some experienced forestry personnel, who were willing to offer these camouflage expediences to the political regime and to propagandize in their behalf. Despite all the camouflage, however, the destructive deforestation continued. The high cutting plans and their timber species selection do not facilitate a timber-reserve forestry operation. Officially the forests are not immediately densified; instead, in an effort to fulfill the cutting plan by number and species and contrary to conservation methods, the best trees are cut and the poorest and most unusable trees are left standing. The resulting gaps in the forest are camouflaged in connection with Krzysch's "Rejuvenation Priorities" with the cover words "rejuvenation centers." Simultaneously with the introduction of the conservational forestry method, complete deforestation was prohibited. Exceptions to this prohibition could be made by the Government Forestry Office or the Kreis Forestry Office in cases where more than one hectare was concerned. Even more than 3 hectares were to be stripped, the Central Forestry Office had to grant permission. Since the plan, including the highly demanding species plan, had to be fulfilled, it became necessary to make 10 one-hectare cuttings instead of one 10-hectare cutting. lumbermen sarcastically refer to these woodlands as "parks with playgrounds." Little can be seen of a reforestation of these rejuvenation centers; in general, reforestation has also been seriously impaired by a lack of funds and manpower.

The same applies to the care of young timber. The clearing of older stands and dense forests requires considerable funds and labor without bringing any income and is therefore not desired. The use of forests as grazing lands for cattle, which was introduced again with the land reform program, is not easily curtailed.

The present picture of East German forests may be presented as follows: one third of the state-managed forests are thinned-out and mutilated middle-aged forests without any chance for reforestation, another third consists of young timber, which as yet is not worth very much, and the remaining third consists of poorly reforested or unreforested bare areas.

The reforestation of these areas is sorely neglected because, in the Soviet Zone, planning is done from the top echelon to the lower echelons in the forestry service too. The reforestation plan is arbitrarily set up at the higher echelons and just downwards, largely passed down the line. Whether or not the seed or seedlings are available at the location or whether they are conditioned for the particular area is only of minor consideration. Nevertheless, regardless of how plans and actuality may balance, no holder of a forestry position would dare report the nonfulfillment of a plan.

Resin extraction from pine trees has been considerably increased. Normally those trees which are marked for cutting in the near future are no cut for resin extraction that the "Leichter," herringbone-design cuts from which the resin seeps, do not cover more than two thirds of the tree, so as to keep it sufficiently alive. Timber which is to be cut in the coming winter in the Soviet Zone—and that includes timber in the intermediate stage between pole timber and timber with a larger diameter (chest-high diameter of about 20 centimeters) -- is tapped for resin in three levels, one above the other (by means of a ladder). With this system, a great part of the timber dies before cutting. The lumbermen call this system "tapping to death." In contrast to this is the "live" tapping system used for timber to be cut in future years, in which the tree is tapped at only one level and sufficient bark (at least one third) is left unsliced.
However, since pay is no longer based on the number of cuts but on the area percent, but only 10 to 20 percent of the tree's bark unslashed in order to earn timber-reserve-minded forestry service, resin tapping is not done on a tree-by-tree basis but on bark-area basis.

VI. THE SED PERSONNEL POLICY IN THE FORESTRY SERVICE

From the very beginning the East German personnel policy in the forestry service was aimed at weeding out all persons who would not willingly accept or even resist the destructive deforestation. The regime wanted to have lumbermen who would be loyal functionaries, bent on fulfilling the Soviet cutting plan. This remained the basic point of view of the personnel policy of the Commnists. An active Nazi past on the part of forestry personnel is of little consequence in this personnel policy. The only decisive factor for former Nazis is subordination to the orders of the SED regime.

In October 1945, the KPA (Korps der Nationalen Volksarmee, or German Workers' Party) Forestry officials, however, ordered the dismissal of all officials and employees of the forestry service. This was done because the Soviets were not satisfied with the slow reorganization of the administration in the Soviet zone, and partly because the opposition of the forestry men to the plan to cut 5 million cubic meters of timber during the quarter October-December 1945 was felt.

Even though the dismissed forestry personnel was retained at first on location so as to prevent the severest damage, the measures soon aimed at the complete exclusion of this personnel. The local SED party executives and the unions increased the pressure on the professional forestry personnel which eventually lead to their dismissal. SED followers tried to find a cozy little rest in the local forestry positions. They observed, however, that no difficulty was foreseen in cutting down the required timber, but also because in addition to a high income, otherwise not attainable to these individuals, the position offered a control of shortage commodities; namely, wood and food, the latter from the public lands (Dienstleistungen), with which all personal needs could be satisfied by (illegal) bartering.

By depositions, denunciations, intrigues, etc., professional people were replaced ruthlessly by lumbermen who were able to ingratiating themselves with local authorities and people not familiar with the profession. The new personnel knew only one goal, that is the punctual fulfillment of the cutting plan, without any regard for forestry principles. Even though it was possible at first to remove the forestry service from the jurisdiction of local political units (Kreise, Bezirke), the local political forces soon gained so much support from political personnel offices in the Laender forestry offices that, by 1947-1948, only a few forestry field stations were occupied by experienced personnel.

As early as 1946, training of forestry personnel was started at the forestry schools at Eberswalde and Thrasmat and in five forestry schools of the Laender to combat the damages which quite naturally resulted from the placement of inexperienced personnel in forestry positions, which later also included positions on the highest level of the forestry service. In addition, training courses were offered on a continuous basis for the forestry service examination. Unfortunately the training did not have the effect desired by the training personnel, despite all their effort.

-18-
The selection of trainees by the political bodies was contrary to all professional traditions and was based exclusively on political considerations. Only "workers' sons" were accepted, and all applicants from families of forestry officials were rejected. Forestry training is permeated with political instructions, and often not the professional knowledge and ability of the trainee, but his political outlook and activity, are the deciding factors at the time of the examination.

It must be noted that the training personnel at the forestry faculties and at the forestry schools are not without success in teaching on a broad basis as possible. Unfortunately, the guidance in the field and the transfer of experience from the older forestry personnel to the new personnel is not always as perfect as it could be. Most of the new forestry personnel is concerned with the professional training and getting ahead, while retraining for professional performance in the position is restricted by the general conditions.

A number of the newly trained forestry people succumb to the system of political considerations, and the emphasis of their activity shifts from forestry to the political arena. Nevertheless, it must be noted that the percentage of such instances remains relatively low. Most of the new forestry personnel, the Communist idea, and the StB dictatorship, even though professional performance in the position is restricted by the general conditions.

The training of the new forestry personnel since 1946 has enabled the partial replacement of untrained personnel, particularly in forestry field stations, where mostly practical forestry work is to be done.

In the higher forestry offices this is not the case as yet. Particularly the leading forestry positions are preferably held by StB functionaries, who implicitly adhere to the political directives and demands. Since the leading personnel understands very little or nothing of forestry, there is no supervision or control. Only a small number of thoroughly trained personnel with pre-1945 experience in forestry work and administration hold offices today; the percentage of such personnel of the total forestry personnel is probably under 10 percent. Thanks to due time for having done their best to turn over to future generations forests which to not bear the scars of the present management.

The training of master foresters (Forstmeister) has undergone many changes since 1946, often through arbitrary local improvisations. Since 1950, all applicants, whether they are applicants for the colleges, for forestry schools, or for work in the forests, must undergo a basic forest work training period of two years. The apprentices, some of whom live in apprentice homes, are organized into apprentices' brigades under the direction of a brigadier; they learn all phases of forest field work and also attend the professional school (Berufs- schule), which is supplemented to some extent by forestry instructions.

The future progress of the apprentice depends on the outcome of the final examination and the forest worker test. Theoretically, forestry knowledge and ability is decisive; however, in practice, the political development of the apprentices, which is influenced considerably by the frequent studies of current events, is decisive.

Applications of apprentices who hold a diploma from a secondary school, who have passed the forest worker test satisfactorily, and who have the political recommendation of the StB will be accepted by the forestry schools at Dbergau and Tharandt. The duration of the studies is roughly the same as at West German forestry schools; however, some semester progress examinations have been added. Final examinations lead to the degree of graduate master forester; if the occasion should arise, the degree of Doctor of Forestry may be granted.
Forestry worker examinees who are not admitted to the forestry schools -- political and subject qualifications are the same as for university study -- may be admitted to a forestry trade school on completion of a special entrance examination. The forestry trade schools were founded in 1946 in Rabensteinfeld, Mecklenburg; Spreewalde, Brandenburg; Stolberg, Sachsen-Anhalt; Tharandt, Sachsen; and Schwarzburg-Thuringen. The forestry trade school at Spreewalde was dissolved or combined with the Rabensteinfeld school as the result of 'political un- reliability,' or in other words, as the result of denunciation. (Six students were arrested and given long sentences.) The Stolberg school was moved to Rossau, and finally to Ballenstedt/Harz. Since 1956, the four forestry trade schools, with their 2-year courses, have been developed into schools of forest technology (Forstechnikum) with six-semester courses. The students are graduated as forestry engineers after completion of the final examination.

No basic differentiation is made in the employment of graduate master foresters and forestry engineers in either forestry administration or in the field. The positions are open to all, depending only on political suitability and reliability in theSED sense. This is roughly similar to the Soviet system, or that of the People's Democracies. In this connection, one must not lose sight of the fact that the attitude toward the SED dictatorship and political suitability is decisive and that even the person not at all familiar with the field is given preference over the 'politically retarded' graduate master forester or forestry engineer. This has had the result that some of the trained forestry personnel have gone into other occupations. Those forestry worker apprentices who are not admitted to either a forestry school or a forestry trade school remain forestry workers and can work their way up to the position of brigadier (timber cutting boss, loading boss) in timber distribution, timber transportation, etc. Those in political favor with the SED or who have rendered outstanding service may, in exceptional cases, be given training opportunities and a chance to rise by way of the workers and peasants schools; through correspondence courses for master forester, which have been initiated by one of the forestry trade schools; and, in the case of graduates of forestry trade schools, through admission to university study.

The number of master forestry trainees has, in the meantime, been sharply increased. At the order of the Minister of Education, the entrance committees of the forestry schools at Spreewalde and Tharandt were directed to admit 75 forestry students each for the semester beginning on 1 September 1953, bringing the total number of forestry students at Spreewalde to about 200 and somewhat fewer at Tharandt. When the schools protested that there were neither sufficient facilities for such a large number of students nor positions for them on graduation, they were informed that the order would nonetheless stand. Reason given: the students would be required to fill positions in West German forestry offices. This gives a clear indication as to how the Pankow regime 'visualizes a reunification of Germany.

VII. ORGANIZATION OF THE EAST GERMAN FORESTRY ADMINISTRATION

The organization of the East German forestry administration has been subject to constant change since 1945. The basic principle behind these changes was obviously to eliminate all forestry administration tradition, which was equated with 'reaction,' and not only basically to reorder the previous tradition, but also to impose the Soviet economic organization with its totalitarian planning principle. The present form of the "People-Owned State Forestry Enterprises" is approximately the same as that of the Soviet satellite states.
The goal of sovietization of East German forestry was not pursued directly at all times. In part this was due to the special circumstances prevailing there, in part to conceal the reparations deliveries, or in order to overcome difficulties in the transportation or distribution of timber.

Parallel to the administrative organizations dominated by the SD (central administration, Land governments, Kreis governments), there was a control forestry administration in the SWA Khrishtov and a forestry official in the central functions with each Kreis commander. The forestry officials attached to the Land administrations were part foresters and in part timber buyers; forestry nor lumber experience. This Soviet control apparatus, until the situation at all levels, but also directly interfered with forestry operations. This was particularly the case with the Kreis commanders.

A description of the development of forestry in East Germany from 1945 to the present can only present a cross section of the average circumstances, which need not reflect all local circumstances at all times. Even now there is a great deal of local improvisation, in spite of all detailed plans, which are frequently contradictory, not in harmony with local conditions, or, in general, poorly conceived. There being a lack of forestry knowledge in the higher offices, nothing is done about this situation; indeed, it is often not even recognized.

Forestry in East Germany was hit just as hard as other parts of the economy by Soviet measures, although it was affected somewhat later. In any case, the exploitation has greater long-term effects, and is therefore more serious.

The forestry offices -- Land forest offices, forest boards and forest districts -- were occupied only inadequately or not at all in 1945. The personnel had been "transferred" previously or had fled to the West ahead of the Soviet troops. Instead of these people not return soon, the local Soviets took over the positions with "reliable" Communists, without regard to forestry experience. The Land forest offices took up their work again shortly after the end of the war in similar fashion, though not entirely without trained forestry personnel.

Not until August 1945 did the Soviets create the "Central Administration for Agriculture and Forestry" with a "Central Forestry Office" within the framework of the Central Administration of the Soviet Zone.

Shortly thereafter the SWA instituted the "Forestry Order in the Soviet Zone of Occupation." In essence this order projected the formation of a forestry office (which was to administer all forests, irrespective of type or ownership) on the former German pattern: a central forestry office for the entire zone, five Land forest offices, as well as local boards of appropriate size for individual forests and forest districts. The organizational plan adhered to the principle that the forests should not be subject to any local government. In retrospect, it can be said that this order was put into effect to make reparations deliveries possible.
After a temporary and provisional application of this system in the Länder in 1951, the Forestry Ministry offices were realigned in 58 state forest districts (Bezirksforstämter) grouped in Kreis Forest Boards (Kreisforstämter) subordinate to the Kreis political authorities. These Kreis Forest Board were of various sizes, depending on the forest area of the Kreis (between 30,000 and 60,000 hectares). An "instructor" was appointed to each of the Kreis Forest Boards to direct and supervise one of the forest districts.

Concurrent with the creation of the Kreis Forest Boards, which did not control the present condition, there was a large-scale reform of administrative work, while at the same time the transition to the "commercial exploitation" (Handelserziehung) of the forests. In Hesse, for example, the responsibility of large tracts in the Kreis Forest Boards was to be handled by the instructors of the district foresters. The Kreis Forest Boards were dissolved and were merged into a large number of forest districts without any change in their administration of forest resources.

As early as 1951, efforts were made to organize forestry and woodland in vertical trusts along the lines of industry, i.e., from raw material to final product. This effort failed after the forest industry was administratively impossible to handle under the current conditions. It would have involved the processing enterprises (Sammelkommissionen) and with the wood processing industry (Einfahrtindustrie) combined in one administrative whole. These plans were dropped, but efforts were then made to find an organizational plan for forestry similar to that of the industrial economy under the NSDAP leadership.

The highest official body for the forestry of East Germany is the State Forest Commission, which is supported by the various associations, such as the Association for Forestry, Forest Management, Forestry Workers, and others, which are in association with the Retail Forest Industry.
The state forest enterprises are organized as follows:

A. The enterprise administration, consisting of:

The enterprise manager

The cultural leader, who has nothing to do with forest culture, but rather is charged with political culture and ideology. He is the political surveillance and informant center of the enterprise.

The personnel chief, who has duties usual to this office, but whose activity is predominantly political. He is in contact with the SED cadre section and with the SED (State Security Service).

The head bookkeeper, who is at the same time head of the business department.

There are, in addition, an enterprise trade union leader and a head of the enterprise SST organization. The latter is placed in the enterprise by the SED as its party secretary and is in contact with the personnel chief and the enterprise trade union leader. He is the chief man of the enterprise and the manager must heed his wishes if he intends to maintain his position.

In many enterprises, the position of manager was filled by persons lacking in forestry background who have no great wish to have in the enterprise trained forestry personnel who might be able to pass judgment on their technical mistakes.

B. The technical department, with subdepartments for forest culture, exploitation, labor, work norms, distribution, and transportation pool.

C. The business department, with subdepartments for financial accounting, payroll, inventory, equipment, and cost accounting.

The personnel of a state forest enterprise (without field personnel) runs to 30-40 persons, depending on the size of the enterprise; an enterprise has a monthly payroll in the neighborhood of 12,000-15,000 DM.

For field personnel, the manager depends on an "instructor" with one or two assistants, and a district leader (Dorferleiter) for each forest district. The instructor not only supervises the efforts of the district leader, but also the handling of timber outside the forests (transportation, stockpiling of the timber at railroad stations and collection points, transloading, etc.)

The position of the "brigadier," roughly similar to the former cutting boss (Hausmeister), has been considerably expanded. He is no longer the right hand of the district leader in day-to-day operation, but now receives written instructions for his crew of up to 15 men on a weekly basis and is personally responsible for completion of the work. In the Central Forestry Office, the SED functionaries are already beginning to toy with the idea of not restricting the brigades to their forest districts, but to assign them on a mobile basis, through the instructor, in rather large areas, since a forest district has been shown to be too small for the operation of standing brigades.

On paper, the state forest enterprises are independent business enterprises which are expected to maintain themselves through their own resources. They practice business accounting, have an opening balance sheet, and are required to submit a statement at the end of the year. Their business accounting method has been developed mainly by persons unfamiliar with forestry. The method ignores, completely, the requirements of forestry practice, even though the
forestry services have in the meantime tried to salvage something in the interest of good forestry practice. For example, inventory is carried on the books on a "forest district basis," instead of in exploitation units (Wirtschaftsfiguren). The accounting practice used is designed primarily for business control.

The most important factor of a balance sheet or closing statement is the status of inventory and stocks held by an enterprise. Thus, with the state forest enterprises, the decisive factor is the reserve of standing timber in the forests. It need hardly be explained that this standing reserve cannot be evaluated either as to quantity or value for inclusion in an annual statement. Scientific forestry experience has shown that these reserves estimates inevitably contain errors of as much as plus or minus 30 percent, thus a total error range of 40 percent. At the same time the rate of growth varies only from 3 to 7 percent. An estimate of value would contain an even greater margin of error. In addition to the foregoing, there is no way of checking to what extent the state forest enterprises, which constantly require large subsidies, exist on the earnings of current production or on their capital (timber reserves). The paper war and the constant reporting on plan progress are also a great burden to the enterprises.

The pressure to maintain themselves without subsidies is intended to force the enterprises into more intensive work. In practice, their solution undoubtedly lies more in the direction of ever-increasing plundering of the timber reserves, the more so since the personnel is poorly equipped for more intensive and rational work, whereas reduction of timber reserves can hardly be detected.

Since it is virtually impossible to effect central supervision of a state forest enterprise ranging in area from 20,000-25,000 hectares, often in widely scattered parcels, there has in the meantime again been a tendency to quietly decentralize operations and to turn over a portion of the work which should be carried out by the enterprise manager to the instructors and district leaders.

Each state forest enterprise has its own transportation pool. The vehicles require enormous expenditures. For example, the transportation pool of a state forest enterprise in Jachenau includes 12 trucks, 12 tractors, and 30 horses, together with the required personnel. The operation could in no way be called profitable.

The state forest enterprises are subordinate to the "Administration of State Forest Enterprises" at the Kreis level and to the corresponding "Main Administration" on the ministry level. Ever since the completion of the forest reserves survey of 1949, interested foresters have worked toward the re-establishment of a so-called "Forestry Program" (Forsteinrichtung), i.e., for the establishment of long-range forest plans for 10-20 years in each district. These efforts did not take concrete form until 1952-1953. Basically, the forestry program effort in each district was preceded by a timber stand survey (Standorterkenntnis) and mapping. For those purposes a forestry program board was established for each of the former five Lander. Each of the boards is divided into a division for forestry programming and a division for timber stand survey. These boards, located in Schwerin, Potsdam, Halle, Dresden, and Weimar, are not subordinate to the administrations of state forest enterprises, but are responsible directly to the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry.

Directives for the timber stand survey were given by the Institute for Timber Stand Survey (Institut fuer Forstliche Standorterkentung) in Breslau. The timber survey had already been started in the forestry research districts of the institute as early as 1951. This is a difficult task, which requires extraordinary specialized knowledge, forestry training, and experience. The staffs for this assignment are made up largely of graduates of forestry trade schools and, to a lesser extent, of graduate foresters from the forestry schools of East Germany, who did not receive their training until after 1945.
Only a very small number are older, experienced forestry officials. Although all of the workers were given a 3-month introductory course (4 hours a week have to be devoted to "lectures on social science"), the results would still be inadequate, in view of the general lack of specialized training. This does not mean that the master foresters assigned to this project do not work intensively and with great interest, especially since a minimum of the political difficulties could arise in this particular field of work. Scientific institutes in Scharnweiler, Jerms, and Thurandt.

The forestry program effort is concurrent with the timber mapping, which is the actual basis for the forestry program. The forestry school at Scharnweiler gives so-called "plan brigades" 60-80 men each, although these are officially subordinate to the forest administration.

The forestry program plan goal is that, by 1960, all districts will be supplied with new detailed local programs (Einrichtungswerke). Taking into account the fact that, with 103 state forest enterprises, each brigade will have to survey an average of 21 state forest enterprises (50 to 70 years later, it would seem that this plan goal will only be achieved much

Private forest lands (farmers' and church woodlands) were merged into 88 Kreis forest boards as of 1 January 1952. Depending on the forest land area, these Kreis forest boards, with an average 10,000 hectares of forest land, are state administrative organs and supervise the exploitation of the farmers' woodlands, assure adherence to the cutting goals, and exercise state powers and control over all forest lands.

The Kreis forest boards are distributed as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bezirk</th>
<th>Number of Kreise</th>
<th>Number of Kreise Forest Boards</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rostock</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schwerin</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neubrandenburg</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frankfurt/Oder</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cottbus</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potsdam</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magdeburg</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Halle</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karl-Marx-Stadt</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dresden</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leipzig</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suhl</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gera</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erfurt</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As the foregoing table shows, the Kreis forest boards cover two to four Kreise, i.e., an area over which the Kreis master forester can have practically no influence, from a forestry point of view. Where the farmers' woodlands have been merged into forest cooperatives, the Kreis master forester depends on the so-called farmer-forester and, where this is not possible, on the Forester appointed by the Kreis council to administer the state forests. The forest surveys initiated in the private forests have not yet been completed. Timber stands for the private woodlands, have not as yet been scheduled for forests, such efforts are not likely to be made soon.
The Kreis master forester’s duties do not include such survey and planning responsibilities. First and foremost, the Kreis forester has the duty of seeing that the plan goals are met by the farmers' woodlands and, secondly, of reducing private cutting in the farmers' woodlands as much as possible, since such timber is earmarked for meeting the plan goal.

The Kreis forest boards are part of the Kreis councils and are subordinate to the Bezirk level and in the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry to the forestry sections of the departments for agriculture. In this way, the state forests and the private forests are subordinate to separate authority at both the Bezirk and the ministerial levels.

VIII. EXPLOITATION OF THE FOREST WORKERS

In East Germany, not only the forest lands, but also the forest workers are subjected to destructive exploitation. With poor and inadequate equipment, and under primitive working conditions, the workers are driven with the whip of work norms to overfulfill the plan targets.

Timber cutting and timber utilization in East Germany suffered under Soviet occupation from the very beginning from a lack of equipment and other difficulties which have not as yet been completely eliminated. The forest worker suffers most of all from this situation. Timber has to be cut with tools which are inadequate both as to number and quality; wood utilization suffers from inadequate transport facilities, resulting in uneconomic distribution to the consumers.

At the end of the war, there was still a certain stock of tools for timber cutting, but this was far from enough to equip the large number of workers who had to be recruited in order to meet the Soviet plan goals.

All efforts to acquire these tools in West Germany failed in the face of government refusal to make available sufficient funds. Efforts to obtain the tools through barter trade were inadequate to the task and later were banned altogether.

East German forestry is kept on a very short financial rein. It is expected to produce maximum quantities of raw materials without being allocated corresponding amounts of capital. Efforts to obtain the necessary tools in West Germany were doomed because the necessary raw materials and production capacity were not projected in the economic plan.

Even today, the crosscut saws produced in East Germany are of such poor quality that, if used, they do not spring back into shape. Even axes which carry the highest quality designations are inferior and chip. A particularly bad bottleneck is the supply of really usable files. The supply of power saws is also very unsatisfactory. If a small number of power saws available, the hours spent on repair exceed the number of hours the saws are in use. If the saws were produced in West Germany, they are of inferior quality; if they come from West Germany, there are not enough spare parts.

Attempts are made to compensate for the inadequate supply of tools by increased exploitation of human labor. Increased production through "increased labor productivity" is the basic principle of the SED dictatorship and implementable "increased labor productivity" is the leitmotif of its attitude toward the worker. In addition to ideological-propaganda and material pressures, there is an ever-increasing use of force and compulsion to achieve this end. All of this is couched with "volunteer," actually forced, "self-imposed obligations" (Selbstverpflichtungen) and the like. The fact is that only if more is produced, the Soviets and their SED regime will be able to take more.
After forestry was organized into state forest enterprises, the forest worker, too, became an employee of the GDR state and was virtually powerless against it. The labor unions, which in a democratic state represent the interests of the worker, are not only powerless in the GDR state, but have also become slaves of the interests of the GDR state.

The extensive interlocking personnel relationship of party, state, economy, and "labor union" guarantees that the demands of the workers will be throttled and passed over, but that the demands of the GDR Central Committee and of the East German regime on the workers will always be pressed in the sharpest manner. The right to strike, the right to quit, protection of mothers and youth, wage rights, and the like, which in a democracy are the backbone of the working man, have become empty phrases in East Germany. That remains is a "guaranteed minimum hourly wage" of 0.90 DM (East).

The wages of forest workers are low and lag behind those of similar working groups. Timber cutters and skilled forest workers are paid in accordance with group V, and conservation workers (nursery, etc.) are paid according to group IV and, in part, group III. The wage increase promised in 1950 was put off again and again, until finally, after the uprisings of 17 June 1953, an increase was approved.

Since August 1953, hourly wages in group III have been 0.90; in group IV, 0.93; and in group V, 1.05 DM (East). Minimum performance wages (Leistungsgrundlohn) were set at 1.04 in group III; 1.13 in group IV; and 1.26 DM (East) in group V.

In comparing these wage scales with West German wages, it should be borne in mind that the purchasing power of the East Mark is only a fraction of that of the West Mark. The firewood allowance of about 12 cubic meters per year was reduced to 4 cubic meters for married workers and 2 cubic meters for single workers. Contract wages, as practiced in the West, were replaced by "production norms," that is, by means of "collective work contracts" (Kollektiv-Arbeitsvertrag) and "norm catalogues." An output norm is established for every forest activity. This output norm is not set at the average output level, but is rather based on short-term peak output by "activists" and "Hennekees."

Not until the worker has exceeded this norm does he receive a contract wage, called a "performance wage." The "norm offices" under the GDR have orders to assume that if a norm has been exceeded, it was obviously been set too low and to raise it accordingly. The forest worker has no legal means of resisting this speed-up system, since the "industrial trade union" (Industrie Gewerkschaft) for agriculture and forestry does not support him, but is rather a tool of the GDR dictatorship. It is a hellish exploitation system, which forces the forest worker to exceed the norm in order to earn an adequate wage, thus creating the whip which will impose even higher norms in the future.

One must also take note of the fact that the position of the worker is further weakened by the elimination of individual and group work, that work is now done "collectively," in "brigades" under the supervision of a "brigadier," whose income level depends on fulfillment of norms by the workers in the brigade, and who is thus another whip over the workers. When all this is taken into account, it becomes clear that the Soviet system is the ultimate in the exploitation of human labor.

The central norm catalogue for forestry in East Germany includes per-minute rates and hardship bonuses for every type of work, type of timber, etc. Hardship bonuses are seldom applied, so as to force the workers to exceed the established norm in order to earn an adequate wage.
The enterprise collective contract in state forest enterprises in East Germany hardly deserves the name contract, since it is prepared by officials and submitted to the enterprises, which may discuss the contract, but, in any case, are finally forced to accept it. The enterprise collective contract is expanded by the enterprise itself, in that many members of the enterprise, or even the enterprise itself, are forced to take on extra duties. Thus we see many examples of the following: "To increase labor productivity by 5 percent; reduce operating costs by 4.5 percent; to review the work norms and organize a continuing effort for increasing the norms; to organize instruction brigades under the leadership of production innovators and activists," etc.

Supplies of shoes and clothing are even worse than those of tools. Shoes are so inadequate that it is impossible for a worker to keep his feet dry when there is rain or snow. In addition, the prices of shoes and clothing bear no relation to wages. The forest worker in East Germany necessarily has a lower living standard than his West German colleague. It need hardly be said that the forest workers, in his out-of-the-way village and isolated working site, suffers far more from the economic and political lack of liberty than his more compactly organized industrial colleagues in the city.

Up to the present, the SED and the FUGB (Free German Trade Unions Federation) have not yet been able to win the support of the forest workers for the SED dictatorship. The Industrial Union for Agriculture and Forestry (IG Land und Forst) makes vain efforts to organize competitions for the overfulfillment of the plan among the forest workers and to stimulate them to take on self-imposed obligations. The forest workers of East Germany reject Soviet working methods.

The forest workers of East Germany place all of their hopes on a reunification of Germany in freedom. They unequivocally support truly free and democratic elections and have expressed as much in meetings of the Industrial Union for Agriculture and Forestry, as well as in meetings of state forestry enterprises.

APPENDIX. LIST OF STATE FORESTRY ENTERPRISES IN THE SOVIET ZONE

I. Bezirk Rostock

1. Ruegen
2. Greifswald
3. Schwerin
4. Rostock
5. Wismar

in Werder near Sassnitz
in Wolgast
in Kreis Stralsund
in Roesenruigen
in Neu Nikol

II. Bezirk Schwerin

6. Schwerin
7. Hagenow
8. Ludwigslust
9. Perleberg
10. Parchim
11. Gustrow

in Schwerin, Schlossparkenallee 36
in Todten
in Ludwigslust, Wilhelm-Preuss Str. 42
in Perleberg, Neickerstrasse 20
in Parchim, Stalinallee 25
in Gustrow, Longastege
### III. Bezirk Neubrandenburg

12. Malchin  
13. Waren  
14. Malchow  
15. Mirow  
16. Neubrandenburg  
17. Neustrelitz  
18. Egggesin  
19. Torgelow  
20. Lycken  
21. Templin

in Dargun  
in Waren, Fontanestr.  
in Malchow  
in Mirow  
in Burg Stargard  
in Alt Strelitz, Fuerstenberger Str. 33  
in Egggesin  
in Torgelow  
in Lycken  
in Templin

### IV. Bezirk Potsdam

22. Fuerstenberg/l  
23. Rheinsberg  
24. Karnow  
25. Altruppin  
26. Gruenienburg  
27. Potsdam  
28. Rathenow  
29. Lehn  
30. Luckenwalde  
31. Koenigs Wusterhausen

in Fuerstenberg/l, Bahnhofstr. 21  
in Rheinsberg  
in Karnow near Kyritz  
in Altruppin, Friedr. Engel Str. 33a  
in Borgsdorf, Bahnhofstr. 17  
in Babelsberg, Steinstr. 1  
in Rathenow, Ferdinand-Lassalle Str. 11  
in Belzig/Mark, Wittenberg Str. 1  
in Luckenwalde, Platz der Jugend  
in Koenigs-Wusterhausen, Friedrich-Engels Strasse 7

### V. Bezirk Frankfurt (Oder)

32. Hangelsberg  
33. Gross Schonebeck  
34. Joachimsthal  
35. Eberswalde  
36. Maenchenberg  
37. Kolpin  
38. Frankfurt (Oder)

in Hangelsberg near Fuerstenwalde  
in Gross Schoenebeck, Schlossgasse 31  
in Joachimsthal, Grimnitzerstr. 11  
in Eberswalde, Pichesslerstr. 6  
in Maenchenberg, Krs. Seelow, Florastr. 6  
in Kolpin near Storkow/Mark  
in Muellrose, Gabener Str. 7

### VI. Bezirk Cottbus

39. Peitz  
40. Weissenau  
41. Hoyerswerda  
42. Alt Doebern  
43. Luebben  
44. Doberlug-Kirchhain  
45. Falkenberg  
46. Annaburg

in Peitz, August-Bebel Str. 27  
in Weissenau, August-Bebel Str. 49  
in Hoyerswerda, Steinstrasse  
in Alt Doebern  
in Luebben, Friedenstr. 2  
in Doberlug-Kirchhain, Hauptstr. 18  
in Falkenberg/Elster, Schulstr. 16  
in Annaburg Krs. Jessen, Holzdorfer Str.

- 29 -
VII. Bezirk Magdeburg

47. Zerbst
48. Burg
49. Genthin
50. Colditz
51. Salzwedel
52. Gardelegen
53. Haldensleben
54. Wernigerode
55. Elbing
56. Blankenburg

in Mehlitz, Krs. Zerbst
in Petershagen, Krs. Burg
in Genthin, OFD-Straße
in Colditz-Habenzol, Krs. Wollin
in Salzwedel, Bahnhofstr. 6
in Gardelegen, Bahnhofstr. 22
in Haldensleben, Bismarckstr. 5
in Wernigerode, Lindenallee 27
in Elbing, Bismarckstr. 3
in Blankenburg, Ks. Quedlinburg, Schloßstr. 9

VIII. Bezirk Halle

57. Ballenstedt
59. Mansfeld
60. Dessau
61. Torgau
62. Ziegelroda
63. Rossa

in Ballenstedt, Krs. Quedlinburg
in Mansfeld, Ks. Eisleben, Sangerhausen
in Dessau, Heldenburg
in Rossa, OFD-Straße 51
in Torgau near Neu, Ks. Bitterfeld
in Ziegelroda, Ks. Querfurt
in Rossa, Ks. Sangerhausen, Hallesche Str. 63

IX. Bezirk Erfurt

64. Northeim
65. Heiligenstadt
66. Sonderhausen
67. Muehlhausen
68. Eisenach
69. Gotha
70. Bad Berka

in Ilfeld
in Werra, Heiligenstadt
in Sonderhausen, Stalinallee 54
in Muehlhausen, on the Tonberg 1
in Eisenach, Karlstr. 11
in Gotha, Hüttenstr. 11
in Bad Berka, Ilmstrasse

X. Bezirk Gera

71. Jena
72. Gera
73. Schleiz
74. Saalfeld

in Jena, Unterer Philosophenweg 33
in Weida, Bahnhofstr. 59
in Schleiz, Heinrichshaus 5
in Saalfeld

XI. Bezirk Suhl

75. Gehren
76. Neuhaus
77. Sonnewalde
78. Eisleben
79. Hildburghausen
80. Suhl
81. Zella-Mehlis
82. Neuhausen
83. Bad Salzungen

in Gehren
in Kastanien
in Sonnewalde, Weisser Rang 34
in Eisleben, Jostus-Jonas-Straße 9
in Hildburghausen
in Suhl, Heinrichstrasse
in Zella-Mehlis, Anstr. 21
in Neuhausen, Thuringer Schloss
in Bad Salzungen, Heinrich-Heine Str. 7

- 30 -
XII. Bezirk Dresden

84. Niesky
85. Loebnau
86. Bautzen
87. Kamenz
88. Sebnitz
89. Koenigstein/Elbe
90. Dippoldiswalde
91. Dresden

in Niesky, Sonnenweg 9
in Loebnau/Loebnau/Sebnitz, Heideweg 31
in Bautzen, An Stadtwall
in Kamenz, Poststr. 6
in Sebnitz, Strasse d. Freundschaft
in Koenigstein/Elbe, Pirmaer Str.
in Dippoldiswalde, Kirchstr.
in Dresden - N.15

XIII. Bezirk Leipzig

92. Werdasdorf
93. Torgau/Elbe
94. Grimma
95. Altenburg

in Werdasdorf, Bez. Leipzig, Hubertusstr. 2
in Torgau/Elbe, Baeckstr. 15
in Grimma/Grimma, Ernst-Thaelmann Str. 16
in Altenburg, Leipziger Str. 1

XIV. Bezirk Karl-Marx-Stadt

96. Floehn
97. Freiberg
98. Marienberg
99. Annaberg
100. Schwarzenberg
101. Hohnstein
102. Zwickau
103. Tannenbergsthal
104. Oelsnitz

in Floehn, Krs. Floehn, Uhlenpark 4
in Loescnitz near Freiberg/Sa
in Marienberg, Erzgebirge, Park 3
in Annaberg, Bockholz 1
in Schwarzenberg, Erzgebirge
in Hohnstein, Erzgebirge
in Zwickau/Sa.
in Tannenbergsthal/Vogtland
in Oelsnitz/Vogtland, Wehrstr. 4

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- 31 -