

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

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STATE LOAN CAMPAIGNS

1. The administration of Branch No. 1, Institute 88, Gorodomlya Island, carried out yearly campaigns for subscriptions to state loans. In 1950, workers and employees were expected to contribute "voluntarily" an entire month's salary. In 1951 plant authorities called for 110 percent, and in 1952 they intended to "ask for" 120 percent of a month's salary. Theoretically, the Soviets were supposed to volunteer their contributions, but in practice they were under considerable pressure to do so. A sector chief initiated the loan drive by calling on all employees in his sector to contribute the required amount. Those who failed to respond were called to the sector chief's office, where they were given a private lecture. Individuals who still hesitated were subject to the pressure of Party and MVD (MGB) officials.
2. Although there were a few Soviets who consider it their duty to contribute to the state loans, the average person thought that it was unjust to demand so much money. There were many complaints about this point and the compulsory nature of the loan drives.

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3. In 1951, about ten Soviet workers and employees [redacted] refused to make the required contributions. After unsuccessful appeals by the sector chief, they were visited by a commission from the Party committee and security section, which talked to each one separately. They all donated the required amount afterwards. None of the workers was subject to reprisals for his opposition.

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SOVIET ATTITUDES TOWARD POLITICAL PROBLEMS

4. Stalin was frequently discussed by Soviet workers in connection with Lenin. Comparisons between the two were always disadvantageous to Stalin. Such opinions as "Lenin would have done things differently (that is, better) than Stalin if he had lived", or "Lenin was a far greater person than Stalin" were frequently expressed. A few persons even suggested that Stalin had done away with Lenin by some foul means.

5. [redacted] Stalin is probably neither loved nor greatly respected by the Soviet population. On the other hand, Stalin has been deified by Party propaganda. The average Soviet swallows the Party propaganda line, as he has no opinion of his own. The mass of Soviet workers is like a herd of cattle which follows its leaders complacently and without thought. [redacted]

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6. [redacted] only a small percentage of the Soviet population is opposed to the regime. The older generation is the only group which can be singled out as oriented politically against the regime.
7. The Soviet population was not noticeably fearful of the possibility of a new world war between the Soviet Union and the West. However, they seemed very certain in their belief that such a war would come. They were even more convinced that the Soviet Union would win this war. In comparing the strength of the Soviet Union with the West, the Soviets pointed to the size of the Soviet Union and noted that the USSR had never lost a war. The topic of a possible war was generally brought up by the German specialists. Soviet workers and employees apparently did not discuss this point very frequently.
8. All Soviets were certain that the United States had begun the war in Korea. The general opinion was, "What is the United States doing in Korea? The Americans should go home and let the Koreans live in peace". Chinese and Soviet charges of bacteriological warfare were also firmly accepted by the Soviet population. [redacted]

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9. The average Soviet worker's opinion of the United States seemed to conform to the official propaganda line. [redacted] there was neither much respect nor fear of the fighting qualities of the American soldier. The Soviets were more fearful of Japanese and German military prowess.

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FOREIGN RADIO BROADCASTS

10. [redacted] there was a lively interest among the Soviets in buying radios from the German specialists [redacted]

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