

INFORMATION REPORT

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SUPPLEMENT TO
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1. During March 1953 the summer seed grain situation in East Germany grew worse. The quota required by the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry called for a total of 59,100 metric tons, broken down as follows:

	<u>Requirements</u>	<u>Additional Needs of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry</u>
Summer rye	800	10,000
Wheat	3,300	10,000
Summer barley	9,000	
Oats	26,000	

As of 10 March 1953, however, only 45,699.8 metric tons of summer seed grain were on hand. Moreover, the actual figures represent seed grain in raw form, not the final prepared seed. Of the 2,268.8 metric tons of summer wheat reported on 10 March, for example, only 947 metric tons were passed as good seed grain by the Seed Testing Offices (Saatpruefstellen). The same applies to rye; only 84.3 metric tons of the reported 106.5 tons were approved for seed rye.

2. In spring planting in 1953, emphasis was to be placed on cereal grains (Brotgetreide), since the fall planting in 1952 was only 50 percent completed because of bad weather. About 8,600 metric tons of summer wheat and 2,400 metric tons of summer rye are lacking for spring planting, however. The shortages were in part made up by planting oats, barley, poppies (Mohn) and "Cellein".
(oil flax?)
3. It had been planned to increase 1952/1953 State Grain Reserves from 350,000 to 740,000 metric tons. The plan, however, could not be fulfilled, since otherwise supplies for the period prior to the new harvest would be threatened; moreover, it is known that grain imports from Russia during the first two quarters of the year are never delivered on schedule.
4. The East Germans still do not know what deliveries of grain are supposed to arrive from the USSR in 1953. For this reason Minister Kurt Gregor was requested in a letter [redacted] to make sure that absolutely no further imports from the USSR be sent in the third quarter of 1953 and that no large increase in imports occur during the fourth quarter. The reason for this is the limited storage space in East Germany. With the exception of wheat, the import

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plan for the first quarter of 1953 was very poorly fulfilled. East German stocks of wheat will cover East German requirements up to the third quarter of 1953 anyway, so imports of wheat are actually not needed.

5. The Supply Plan for the second quarter of 1953 for edible legumes and processed grain products was fixed without regard to consumer and industrial demands, and thus the sale and purchase of these items does not follow the natural consumer requirements. Because only 12,000 metric tons of legumes and processed grain products were imported in 1952 and 1953, and because results of the East German harvests were poor, it will be impossible to make available such wares in large quantities during the second quarter of 1953.
6. On the order of the Soviet troop commander, the silo at Wuensdorf/Zossen, which has a capacity of 3,500 metric tons, was to be emptied by the end of March 1953. In addition, the post office, 200 dwellings and 25 retail stores were to be evacuated and made available for Russian troops. The Wuensdorf silo contains 1,700 metric tons of state grain reserves, in addition to grain supplies for local consumption.
7. As of mid-March 1953, no final supply figures for potatoes for the second quarter of 1953 were available. As a result neither the potato processing industries nor the trade organs knew what quantities were to be placed at their disposal during the second quarter. The potato supply situation depends on how much of the stocks stored for the winter is left. In this connection, it is to be noted that a good part of the storage contracts between the VEAB and the farmers exists only on paper. In order to permit the potato-processing plants to continue to function, part of the potatoes allotted to the population is already being transferred to the plants, mainly because a higher profit for the state can be made by processing the potatoes.
8. Vegetable supply plans were sent out to the Bezirke [REDACTED] 25X1X weeks late. The yield figures in the plans are not based on the actual facts, since the "differentiated assessment" has not yet been executed. 1. This is especially apparent in the case of people's owned properties, which, according to the law, are neither to be assessed nor obligated to conclude delivery contracts with the VEAB, as has been the case in previous years. 2
9. Despite increased efforts, only one percent of the shortage of cattle for slaughter has been made up. East German agricultural officials have received more and more reports on how pigs are sick, dying, or being delivered to the abattoirs underweight; this situation was brought about by the shortage of feed. As of 31 March 1953 planned feed supplies were short by 18,400 metric tons of feed barley and 10,600 metric tons of corn (Mais).

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[REDACTED] Comment. "Differentiated assessment" (differenzierte Veranlagung) is the method of assigning quotas to farmers according to a sliding scale; that is, quotas are proportional to the size of the farm.

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[REDACTED] Comment. In 1952, people's owned farms had to sign contracts with the VEAB. In 1953, individual people's owned agricultural enterprises are not permitted to contract directly with VEAB or Konsumgenossenschaften. Instead, a total delivery quota for the people's owned enterprises as a whole is determined in Berlin and distributed to the Bezirke people's-owned agricultural enterprises and agricultural production cooperatives in the Bezirke delivery to the best of their ability.

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TABLE I

Plan and Actual Seed Grain Reserves
(Amounts are in metric tons)

	<u>Summer Rye</u>	<u>Summer Wheat</u>	<u>Summer Barley</u>	<u>Oats</u>	<u>Totals</u>
Legal Quota	800.00	3,300.00	9,000.00	26,000.00	39,100.00
Quota according to the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (letter of 3 and 20/2/53)	106.5	1,998.4	10,151.0	24,548.0	36,803.9
Actual as of 10/3/53	106.5	2,268.8	12,523.0	20,801.5	45,699.8 ^{1/}

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Comment. Correct total is 45,699.8

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TABLE II

STOCKS IN CENTRAL STORAGE
as of 28 February 1953

(all amounts in metric tons)

<u>District</u>	<u>Rye</u>	<u>Wheat</u>	<u>Barley</u>	<u>Oats</u>
Rostock	6,510,204	3,491,000	3,879,980	6,412,264
Schwerin	- - - -	1,999,998	3,057,885	3,036,000
Neubrandenburg	8,760,000	8,991,542	6,059,352	7,944,046
Potsdam	18,175,355	5,822,638	6,610,000	3,950,000
Frankfurt	17,340,000	1,500,000	2,880,000	3,100,000
Cottbus	11,300,000	1,200,000	2,650,000	1,850,000
Magdeburg	12,550,000	5,500,000	12,000,000	1,400,000
Halle	21,050,000	51,860,000	10,000,000	7,400,000
Erfurt	3,000,000	2,800,000	- - - -	- - - -
Gera	3,500,000	2,700,000	- - - -	- - - -
Dresden	62,100,000	15,000,000	2,400,000	3,300,000
Chemnitz	25,820,000	5,600,000	1,600,000	1,800,000
Leipzig	50,480,000	13,240,000	4,000,000	5,000,000
East Germany TOTALS	240,585,559	119,705,178	55,137,217	45,192,210
To be stored in 1952/53 accord- ing to the People's Economic Plan (<u>Volkswirtschaftsplan</u>)	240,000,000	120,000,000	55,000,000	45,000,000

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STATUS OF GRAIN IMPORTS AS OF 15 MARCH 1953

TABLE III

(All amounts in thousands of metric tons)

	<u>Import Plan</u> <u>1/53</u>	<u>Actual Imports</u> <u>as of 15 March</u>	<u>Via Sea</u>	<u>Via Land</u>
Wheat	155.0	117.0	47.0	70.0
Rye	20.0	4.0	1.3	2.7
Barley	140.0	74.0	19.0	55.0
Oats	30.0	15.0	9.6	5.4
Corn (Mais)	30.0	27.0	- - -	27.0

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~~6~~TABLE IVEAST GERMAN STORAGE CAPACITY IN ROSTOCK AND WISMAR
(IN 1000 TONS)

	<u>Capacity</u>	<u>Filled</u>	<u>Still Available</u>
Rostock	23.0	11.0	12.0
Wismar	18.0	11.5	6.5

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