

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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INFORMATION REPORT

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SECURITY INFORMATION

COUNTRY	East Germany/Poland	REPORT NO.	<input type="text"/>	25X1A
SUBJECT	Summary of Events in East Germany between 16 June and 13 July 1953	DATE DISTR.	20 July 1953	
		NO. OF PAGES	5	
25X1A DATE OF INFO.	<input type="text"/>	REQUIREMENT NO.	RD	
PLACE ACQUIRED	<input type="text"/>			

BY CABLE

1. Soviet Ground OB: The deployment of Soviet troops in numerous cities after 16 June was either for the purpose of controlling unrest or as a security measure in order to prevent demonstrations or strikes. The order for the 1st Mechanized Division to occupy East Berlin must have been received by the divisional headquarters around midnight of 16 or 17 June at the latest. The first units of the division entered the southern edge of Berlin at about 5:30 A.M. on 17 June. All other divisions in the East Zone were alerted in the early morning of 17 June and quickly ordered to their assigned areas. The units assigned to Berlin hermetically sealed the sector boundaries immediately after their arrival and occupied the larger factories and enterprises as well as all public buildings and squares. On 19 June, the Soviet troops were replaced at the sector borders by KVP and regular police. On 24 and 25 June, the regular police assumed the responsibility for the control of the sector borders. The divisions assembled their units at selected points in the city. The units changed their locations constantly in order to appear everywhere as much as possible. On the night of 28 June, the first units of the 14th Guards Mechanized Division left Berlin. On 10 July, parts of the 1st Mechanized Division and of the 12th Guards Tank Division were still stationed in the outskirts of East Berlin.

2. The main points of unrest in the zone were Magdeburg, Halle, and Leipzig. Soviet troops moved into these cities during 17 and 18 June after long march movements. The general recall of troops from those cities in which no great demonstrations were observed occurred on 26 June. Units remained in other cities up to early July. Training at troop training grounds was resumed in some cases on 1 July. Engineer exercises were held in the vicinity of Jerichow and Wittenberg beginning on about 7 July. During the week of 1 July, the exchange of AAA units at the Wustrow firing range took place. It is believed however that, in contrast with the dispatch of units to training areas for summer exercises in April, stronger troop units are now present in permanent billeting areas, probably as a security measure against future outbreaks and unrest.

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3. Rumors regarding the movement of Soviet units to Poland cannot be confirmed. It is certain that at the time of the withdrawal of Soviet units from Berlin, no ground forces departed by rail toward the East. According to several indications, it is presumed that the 9th Mechanized Division and possibly units of the 7th Mechanized Division marched by road on about 18 June across the Oder and Neisse to the East. There are indications of the return movement of the 9th Mechanized Division from Goerlitz on 5 July and of the 7th Guards Mechanized Division from Guben on 9 July.

4. The OB of Soviet units during and after the uprisings was as follows:

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
57th Guards Rifle Division	Presumably on alert at its own garrison.
39th Guards Rifle Division	Presumably on alert at its own garrison; units from Plauen were sent to the uranium mining area between 17 and 22 June.
20th Guards Mechanized Division	Units were assigned to Weimar, Jena, and Zeitz. The units were partially withdrawn from Weimar prior to 28 June and returned to Ohrdruf.
21st Guards Mechanized Division	Probably sent to Halle.
94th Guards Rifle Division	Apparently on alert in its own garrison.
18th Mechanized Division	Parts of the division were sent from the Wittstock troop training grounds between 17 and 27 June.
207th Rifle Division	Units were definitely sent to Quedlinurg, Gommern, Aschersleben-Eisleben and probably to Stendal.
19th Guards Mechanized Division	Sent in force to Magdeburg on 17 June. On 6 July only a tank unit remained in Magdeburg. An unidentified engineer regiment of the GOFG was withdrawn from the Aken area on 17 June, where it had been training since April, and sent to Magdeburg, Dessau-Rosslau, Bitterfeld, and Bernburg. It returned again to Aken on 25 June.
11th Guards Tank Division	The division, including tank units, was sent to the Dresden area on 17 June.
9th Tank Division	Some units of the division were recalled from the Zeithain troop training grounds and sent to Riesa and Oschatz on 18 June. Since the troop training grounds were no longer occupied on 2 July, it is assumed that the division was recalled and placed on alert at its own garrison.
8th Guards Mechanized Division	At least two mechanized regiments and two tank regiments were sent to Leipzig on 18 June. Other elements of the division were sent to Grimma and Wurzen. On 3 July, the units of the division were recalled from Leipzig and probably returned to the Koenigsbrueck troop training grounds.

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<u>Unit</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
6th Guards Tank Division	Elements moved to Wittenburg and Dessau. The units began to return to their posts on 26 June.
9th Mechanized Division	The camp of the division at the Tauer troop-training grounds was empty on 18 June. Individual tanks and trucks were seen in the Cottbus and Weisswasser areas. On 17 and 18 June, 100 tanks, possibly the entire division, moved out of Muskau in the direction of Goerlitz. Empty railroad rolling stock was later ordered to Goerlitz. On the basis of this information, it is assumed that the division was probably employed in Silesia.
1st Mechanized Division	The bulk of the division was in Berlin on 17 June. One regiment was still there on 10 July.
12th Guards Tank Division	The bulk of the division was probably sent to Berlin on 17 June. Elements were still in the inner city and in its northern environs on 10 July.
9th Guards Tank Division	The bulk of the division probably remained in its billeting area. The rifle regiment, however, may have been sent to the Berlin area on 18 June.
7th Guards Tank Division	Parts of the division were possibly employed in the Halle-Merseburg area.
10th Guards Tank Division	Individual units were possibly sent to the Brandenburg-Potsdam area.
25th Tank Division	Elements of the division were located in Oranienburg between 17 and 26 June and sent from there to the northern area of Berlin for two days on a security mission.
6th Guards Mechanized Division	The bulk of the division was apparently withdrawn from Templin between 18 and 30 June. A part may possibly have been sent to northern Berlin as a reserve. The division with most of its units probably returned to its garrison on 1 July.
7th Guards Mechanized Division	No definite information is available. However, the transport of parts of the 84th Heavy Tank and SP Regiment from Guben through Frankfurt/Oder on 9 July suggests that at least parts of this division may have been sent east of the Oder.

5. Volkspolizei: During the unrest the KVP remained predominantly in its garrison on alert status. Some of the units from the Pasewalk army group, Oranienburg, and Saxony (Baarenstein-Niederschlag) were sent to Berlin as reinforcements. Some of the KVP units, especially those in the area of the northern army group, had once more resumed normal training activities on 22 June. The Weisswasser troop training grounds, which were evacuated by the KVP at the beginning of the disturbances, were again occupied by 800 KVP troops on 25 June. Since the beginning of July, the infantry units in Baarenstein-Niederschlag were moved in bulk to Chemnitz and Marienberg. It is possible that parts of the division at Prora were moved to the mainland, possibly to Saxony.

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6. Soviet Air OB: On 16 June, units of the 24th Air Army were observed engaged in routine flying activity. The situation, however, must have changed radically on the night of 16 to 17 June because all air units were placed on ready alert (Erhoehnte Alarm-Bereitschaft) between 17 and 19 June. Ground-attack units were immediately stationed in the vicinity of the troubled centers and prepared for eventual attacks. For example, bombs were transferred to Doeberitz and Brandis airfields where pilots were already seated in IL-10 planes. Alert status was intensified at the fighter airfields. Moreover, all planes were withdrawn from the hangars and parked in revetments. The pilots remained near their planes, field guard watch was increased and defense measures were taken to protect the fields against uprisings. The air units were placed on a war footing in readiness against a possible attack by the Western Powers. Normal training and routine flying activity was resumed on the night of 20 June.
7. A transfer of bomber and reconnaissance units equipped with IL-28's to the East began on 24 June. Many reliable reports ascertained and confirmed that as of 13 July Werneuchen, Brand, Welzow, and Jueterbog airfields had been evacuated. Of the six bomber unit fields, only the evacuation of Finsterwalde has not yet been conclusively confirmed. It must be assumed, however, that the movement involves the entire bomber corps of the 24th Air Army. Between 24 and 30 June, a total of 8 large air-force railroad transports were observed at Guben which is assumed to be the assembly-departure point (Abgangsort) for Werneuchen airfield. The trains were allegedly enroute to Kovel.
8. It is unknown whether the eastward movement of the planes is related to the reported disturbances in Poland. Other possible reasons are as follows: protection of IL-28's against sabotage or further disturbances; maneuvers of Soviet light bomber units outside of East Germany; rotation of these units for new ones paralleling the exchange of MiG-15 units in the fall of 1951. Whatever the reason, the departure of the bomber units means a great weakening of the attack strength of the 24th Air Army.
9. Transport: As seen from the limited view of the local RBD's, railroad movements in the East Zone remained normal throughout the disturbances. Only the S-Bahn in Berlin was stopped completely. Important traffic centers were occupied by Soviet troops. Railroads were not used to transport troops to the trouble centers, in order to avoid a delay in the dispatch of troops and to circumvent possible sabotage of railroad facilities. After order was restored and the danger minimized, all track-laying vehicles were transported back to garrisons or troop-training grounds by railroad.
10. Possibly as a consequence of the uprising in East Germany, an increase of information on partisan activity in Poland was received at the end of June and in early July. As far as it is known, sabotage was directed against the Frankfurt/Oder-Warsaw-Brest railroad lines. Numerous bridges and track were reported to have been blasted. Through traffic to Poland was diverted to the northern transit lines since about 6 July. Border crossings at Frankfurt/Oder have fallen off since 4 July. No information on the southern border crossings is available. If Polish partisan activities increase, a part of the Soviet railroad transit traffic must come to a standstill resulting in a consequent increase of Baltic Sea traffic. Since disturbances may likewise affect Czechoslovakia, the rerouting of traffic through Czechoslovakia would also present many uncertainties.
11. Political: The uprising in East Germany undoubtedly constituted a severe setback to the Soviet political program, because the revolt caused the officially directed revision of SED policy to get out of hand domestically, while internationally the Communist pose of an alleged change of heart was destroyed.
12. Accordingly, the period immediately after the uprising was dominated by partially conflicting moves. Steps were taken initially to restore the SED régime as the only inner-political instrument available, simply as a reaction against the uprising and out of fear of repetition. This was done despite the fact that the SED had been compromised by the new political course and even more so by the uprising. Numerous arrests and interrogations were carried out while simultaneously SED functionaries launched an extensive propaganda campaign to "pacify" and "enlighten". According to all indications before and after 17 June, the intention at most was a modification of the SED régime but not its dissolution. In any case, the abandonment of the SED

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is not contemplated until such a time as it would fit into the framework of German reunification along Eastern lines. Punitive measures and, to some extent, lack of fulfillment of promises made in conjunction with the new political force resulted in new limited uprisings in early July. These, however, are more in the nature of after-pains.

13. On the other hand, an increasing adherence to the new political course, particularly its foreign policy aspects, could be detected despite the retarding efforts of certain SED functionaries. The decisions adopted by the Politbüro on 9 June were featured by the SED Central Committee on 21 June. Disintegrating symptoms within the SED, FDGB, and FEJ (numerous resignations, prophylactic barring of new members) and the increased activity of the non-Communist parties, which received permission to do some careful recruiting among SED members, pointed to a shift towards the revamping of the internal political structure along bourgeois lines. Additional pronouncements regarding the raising of the civilian living standards in the future, the lifting of restrictions on the Church, abatement of propaganda attacks on the SPD, in addition to the relatively speedy lifting of martial law and the restoration of normal traffic to Berlin, and finally, various statements concerning the issuance of directives along the political line developed by Semenov, confirm the view that the new political course aiming at the reunification and neutralization of Germany will be adhered to.
14. SSD: Unconfirmed information states that one of the SSD district administrations was placed on an alert basis on 17 June at an unknown hour. All SSD staff members remained at their posts day and night. By the evening of 17 June, necessary preparations had been made to destroy all files which had been concentrated in one spot. Either on 17 June or on one of the following days, the district office received a directive, presumably from the Ministry of State Security in Berlin, not to divert personnel in answer to outlying requests for aid. Patrol and arrest operations were carried out throughout the period of 17 to 19 June.

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