1. All athletic activities and teams in the USSR are under the strict control of, and interference by, the Party and Komsomol. All athletes who have been awarded the Master of Sport honors are required to study the history of the Communist Party. Since these "amateur" Masters of Sport usually receive pay and allowances for their sports endeavors, there is a real fear among them of not being able to pass periodic examinations in the political indoctrination program. The members of the Dynamo tennis team spent some time every day with their political studies, applying themselves to the task with sad faces.

2. The Party and the Komsomol are two effective devices for whipping Soviet athletes on to greater achievements. Appeals are made to them on the basis of their obligations to the Party, as well as on the nationalistic basis of the honor and the glory of the USSR.
A. Unless a player puts all he has into his athletic endeavors, and if his scores or points earned begin to show a visible dropping off, he is liable, of what is tantamount to anti-State activity. Such hapless individuals are victimized by the Government and the Party; the psychological pressure put on them is great. The usual result of this sort of thing is that the athlete loses his pay and privileges. Indecently, these inducements keep Soviet athletes keyed up, in full trim, and competitively alert. The tennis players in Moscow who panicked at the prospect of losing their jobs the moment they suffered any trivial ailment as a sore knee.

5. In the typically centralized, highly coordinated style characteristic of all Soviet Government activity, the plans and preparations for USSR participation in the 1952 Olympics were under the direction of the Council of Ministers' Committee of Physical Culture and Sport.

6. For the year or so before the Olympics, the entire sports program in the USSR concentrated on the forthcoming Olympics. Selected athletes went into intensive training. These participants-to-be were provided with everything: meals, sports equipment, and medical assistance. Teams and individual athletes were excused from any kind of work. The chief of the Soviet skating team said, "Millions of rubles had been laid out for these preparations.

7. The chief motive in the intensive preparations for the 1952 Olympics was the deep interest of the Soviet Government in the political and propaganda value, at home and abroad, of superior Soviet sports accomplishments. For this reason, special attention was given during the pre-Olympics training period to those sports in which the Soviets had been consistently weak, especially figure-skating, swimming, diving, slalom racing, ski-jumping, and track-and-field events. Soviet publications of that period reflect the weak sports which were being stressed for improvement.

8. It is interesting to note that the Soviets have recently asked for a meet with a United States track-and-field team. The Soviets have obviously examined American sports capability in this field with great attention, and are now ready to experiment with the United States in a competitive venture. Considering the still strained political relations between the two countries, there is no reason to believe that this athletic feeling marks an amelioration in U.S.-USSR relations. Instead, the Soviets are making a bid to probe and test United States strength in track-and-field events in order better to be prepared in the long-range exploitation for political purposes of Soviet sports abilities.

9. The Soviet press informed the public at home in great detail of the victories won by their teams and star athletes at the Olympics. Little or nothing was said about defeats, especially those suffered at the hands of the United States.

10. The Soviet personnel stationed in Tokyo had the benefit of access to news from all sources. They were honestly puzzled on 5 August 1952 when the Soviet official radio and press announced that the USSR had won first place at the Olympics, particularly since no mention was made of aggregate points and scoring details. A number of people make sarcastic remarks on this calculated duplicity, and some were actually angry at this falsification of the truth by the Soviet Government, especially since the rest of the world realized the lie while those in the Soviet Union had no way of knowing the truth. The whole affair was particularly reprehensible to associates who possessed any kind of sporting attitude.

11. The Party cell chairman at the Soviet Mission could not compose such a fantasy and wondered at the same time why the free world press did not react more strongly to the flagrant Soviet prevarications about the Olympics results.
12. were even more surprised two days later when the Committee of Physical Culture and Sport chairman, M. M. Romanov, announced publicly from Moscow that, "According to checked data, US teams gained not 490 points, but 494— the same as that accumulated by Soviet teams". This was a laughable pronouncement, indicating that this Soviet official spent many sleepless nights with pencil and paper figuring out how to win on paper over the Americans, and it had a strong effect. They all realized that here was another case of the Soviet Union being caught in a lie. No doubt Romanov's calculations helped ensure his own well-being in the months to come. The Soviet press thereupon began a press campaign, in an effort to explain away the lie, by branding as "Wall Street capitalist's hirelings" official judges and umpires of the Olympics. The Soviet Government singled out boxing as one sport in which the judges had ganged up on Soviet athletes to facilitate the wins for fighters from other nations. The judges were called, to a man, "filthy businessmen", ready to sell out for money at a moment's notice.

13. The stupidity of these statements reached a peak when the Soviets began claiming that American Negro athletes had won as Negroes, not as Americans. At the same time, however, the Soviets made no mention of their own Armenians or Georgians and others, who had won medals; these were uniformly all Soviet champions. It is characteristic of Soviet official propaganda to overdo its material on anti-Negro discrimination in the US. The Soviet public has long been fed on such fables as the exclusion of Negroes in the US from baseball and football.

14. The buying of referees, umpires, judges, and other sports officials, "broad as well as in the USSR, is attempted in order to ensure the victory of Soviet teams or athletes. In this connection, in a conversation he had in 1928 with Spandaryan (fn1), coach of the Dynamo basketball team. Spandaryan was complaining that his basketball players had little prospect of going abroad because it was feared they would make a poor showing outside the USSR. Then Spandaryan added, quite frankly, "really, our team is not bad at all. And international competition would improve them even more. Besides, we can buy the judges to guarantee victory—even if the judges are foreigners!"

15. Despite the government's intensive concentration to build up Soviet soccer, and despite the players' improved form, the overall Soviet technique and ability are still not up, to the levels of teams in the eastern satellites and in western Europe. The world soccer championships took place in Switzerland in June 1954. Many countries had their teams enter, including Hungary. But the Soviets were not present. In arranging for matches with foreign teams, the Soviets will carefully select secondary teams, and will studiously steer clear of the top-notch teams.

16. There is a concerted effort on the part of the Soviet press to show that Soviet athletics and sports achievements are the world's best. (There is one weekly sports newspaper and one monthly sports magazine.) Each victory over a foreign team is described minutely, well larded with typical Soviet expansive boasting. Losses are either not reported or else reported in such a way that the reader is hard-put to understand who really won the game.

17. Strangely enough, one can hear among Soviet sports fans and even among the athletes themselves snide remarks about the m.n-objectivity of Soviet sportwriting. They flaunt the dangers of political repression in openly criticizing the big-lie technique as applied to the reporting of sports events.

18. There is an almost complete lack in the USSR of truthful reporting on sports abroad, especially in the United States. When propaganda capital is made of foreign sports, vicious deceit of the Soviet reading public is the keynote.

19. The governments of the "people's democracies" toe the Party line concerning sports 100 percent. Each government has its own committee on sports and physical culture. Teams have names such as "Red Star", "Dynamo", and "Locomotive", Soviet-style.
20. The levels of sports development in the satellites had been higher before their communication than similar levels in the USSR. This was especially true in the cases of swimming, soccer, figure-skating, fencing, and tennis. The satellite countries have, in effect, helped the Soviets improve their own sports abilities because the Soviets have had a firsthand opportunity since that time to utilize the "bourgeois method" of copying others.

21. Even sports equipment from the satellite countries is brought into the USSR in great quantities. Czechoslovakian tennis racquets, for example, were used in Moscow. A tennis player named Ozerov, who wore a size 13 or 14 shoe; Soviet-made tennis shoes were not available at that time in the largest sizes, so Ozerov had to make do with a smaller-size pair from which he had cut the toes to make way for his oversized feet.

22. The countries of the free world should re-examine their attitude toward Soviet sports because it is clear that Soviet athletes are not amateurs. They are professionals, pure and simple. How is it honestly possible to differentiate between the "amateur" Soviet All-Union ice-hockey team, which recently won a world championship, and a full-time professional Canadian or American team? The Soviet amateurs spend as much time on their game, in practice and in play, as do Western professionals. If a Soviet team, truly amateur in character, were to be pitted against a Western counterpart, there would be different results in almost every sport—mostly defeat.

23. It is equally unfortunate, but true, that it is no longer possible to engage in friendly, amateur sports in competition with the USSR. The 1952 Olympics served as the final step in the transformation of Soviet sports into a political weapon of the first order, another instrument in the USSR's cold war campaign to dominate the world.

24. If the countries of the free world are to be at all evenly matched, they must send their very best athletic talent into any game, match, or meet with the Soviet Union.

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