## NFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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COUNTRY	USSR	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		REPORT		
SUBJECT		s on the Change i	in Leadership	DATE DISTR.	24 Februa	ry 1955
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N.S. Wheth only relat	Khrushche ner the fo real power ively uni	ev is completely ogmer publicly c	responsible : laims persona Union. The	for the demotion l leadership or Council of Minis	ters will become	v.
		been unpopular i: an apparatchik.	n Party and G	overnment circle	es. He was con-	25X1
a sto	ry that	immediately after	r the death o	f Stalin, Malen	ov had agreed to	
cons	ire with	Bériya to give	the latter po	wer; but that la	ter, either from a, Malenkov con-	
rear fide	or dissa the plo	t to Khrushchev.	The latter	has never since	fully trusted	
Maler	kov. Si	nce the death of	Stalin, the	Central Committe	chas blamed Male	nkov
		rệs and mismanage			ne reduction in	25 <b>X</b> 1
		ministries arte: nfusion, with no			indled, resulting responsibility.	
		anti-bureaucrac				
to he	alf the pe	ersonnel in a mi	nistry was fi	red, but provis	ons for the tran	S <del>-</del>
fer	of those	dismissed to pro	ductive work	in the ministry	s enterprises wa	S
not	ındertakei				cled bureaucrats.	25 <b>X</b> 1
duct	lng the a	gřicultural prog				
Comm	Lttee, i.e	e., Khrushchev, ha	d decided to	increase the pro	duction of consu	mers'
good	but no	tat the expense	of heavy ind	ustry. Malenko	v went too far in Is and underempha	sizino
					agers and engine	
		e production of	consumerja g		l for errors such	
			SECRÉE		LOGTON	
STATE #X	ARMÝ	₩ <sub>X</sub> NAVY <sub>X</sub>	AIR 建炭	FBI AEC	cated by "X"; Field distribution	on by "#".)
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as failure to fulfill norms; this punishment previously had been reserved exclusively for those engaged in heavy industry.

3. Khrushchev is extremely popular among Party and Government groups. The West has underrated his strength before Stalin's death. While Malenkov, on the Secretariat, concerned himself with working with Beriya and directing the agricultural program, Khrushchev concerned himself with policy questions. After the death of Zhdanov, Khrushchev was the strongest man below Stalin on the Central Committee. He got along well with all members of the apparatus. He was also popular among the peasants, since as Secretary of the Ukrainian Party Committee he made a practice of frequently visiting kolkhozy and consequently was closer to the people than other leaders were. He was also postpopular because of his struggle against the Jews. war Kiev and Kharkov were so full of Jews that others could not find work. When L.M. Kaganovich was sent to the Ukraine, he did nothing. When Khrushchev was again in charge, he dismissed Jews. Since Great Russians are habitually anti-semitic, this increased Khrushchev's popularity. This popularity among the people is relative, that is, Khrushchev is preferred to other leaders.

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- 4. Khrushchev used his party position skillfully. After the arrest of Beriya, he filled the MVD with Party men and did the same to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- 5. Bulganin is an extremely limited person and will have no authority. At Khrushchev's instigation he will gradually make changes in the Council of Ministers. A.I. Mikoyan will probably be completely dropped since he was a partisan of Beriya. V.M. Molotov and K.Ya. Voroshilov have no ideas of their own and will do anyone's will. They will probably remain. Before the 9 February announcement,

  G.K. Zhukov would be Minister of Defense, not so much because of any increased role of the army but because he is needed as the only genuinely popular leader in the Soviet Union.

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5.		25 <b>X</b> 1
	Khrushchev simply did not trust Malenkov for any Party work. Malenkov's	25 <b>X</b> 1

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no change in Soviet foreign or domestic policy, since Khrushchev has controlled both for some time. Regarding Formosa this is Soviet, not Chinese, policy, although probably worked out with the Chinese when Khrushchev visited China. This policy is an experiment designed to test the position of the United States. the Soviets are not willing to commit forces on the Korean scale.

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8. Any belief that China and the Soviet Union may split is wishful thinking. This might have happened under Stalin, who wanted to keep the Chinese under his thumb. But the post-Stalin policy, attributed by source to Khrushchev, pictures China as an important buffer area to be maintained at all costs.

7.

Comment: On 9 February 1955, Malenkov was appointed Minister of 25X1 Electric Power Stations and Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers.

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