

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY


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COUNTRY	USSR	REPORT	
SUBJECT	Comments on the Change in Soviet Leadership	DATE DISTR.	MAR 2 1952 25X1
DATE OF INFO.		NO. OF PAGES	2 25X1
		REQUIREMENT NO.	RD
		REFERENCES	

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1. Even in Stalin's time there was collective leadership. The Western idea of a dictator within the Communist setup is exaggerated. Misunderstandings on that subject are caused by lack of comprehension of the real nature and organization of the Communist power structure. Stalin, although holding wide powers, was merely the captain of a team and it seems obvious that Khrushchev will be the new captain. However, it does not appear that any of the present leaders will rise to the stature of Lenin and Stalin, so that it will be safer to assume that developments in Moscow will be along the lines of what is called collective leadership, unless Western policies force the Soviets to streamline their power organization. The present situation is the most favorable from the point of view of upsetting the Communist dictatorship since the death of Stalin.
2. There will not be a dramatic purge. Inasmuch as the MVD has already been cleaned up and the Party and the Army have not been in the hands of Malenkov's favorites, there can be expected only a normal replacement of officials in the reorganization of the top-level administration of the Party and the Government.
3. It is hard to draw any parallel between present events and those of the 1920's when Stalin was ascending to power. There is now no organized opposition inside the Party or in the Soviet Union in general. As the Communist rulers, and evidently also the Soviet people, see it, there is a grave outside menace.
4. Since the death of Stalin and the blow which was given to the power of the secret police, the Soviet internal situation has been in a state of flux. The new Soviet setup needs time for consolidation. The struggle between national-minded "Titoist" elements in the Soviet leadership and those who think in terms of the more orthodox international line is still going on.
5. No improvement in the food situation can be expected. The promises of Malenkov to improve the poor material conditions of the masses were not kept. Inasmuch

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as the Communist leaders were unable to keep this promise, particularly because of accelerated war preparations, they had to find a scapegoat, and thus Malenkov resigned.

6. Bulganin impressed those who had worked with him in the State Bank, including a famous expert on banking, with his high intelligence, mild manners, and capacity to learn in a very short time the most special and difficult problems.
7. It is difficult to anticipate any withdrawal from the Soviet foreign policy line unless there are concessions from the West with regard to the ratification of the Paris agreements. There is a possibility that a continuation of discord among the Soviet leaders may lead to a softening of the Soviet position and to a recognition by Molotov of his incompetence in the conduct of foreign relations. The Soviet leaders however, have recognized that the balance of power has changed in favor of the West. They are now endeavoring to change this balance as can be seen from the shift to accelerated war production, and the attempts to disrupt Western unity. The aggressiveness of the Chinese Communists may also be a part of this endeavor. A stiff position on the part of the West toward the USSR probably favors the continuation in power of the more stiff elements in the Soviet leadership.

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