

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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SOURCE EVALUATIONS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

1. The possibility that the present regime in Yugoslavia may gradually evolve into a truly democratic government should be excluded. The great majority of the population is anti-Communist and anti-regime, but the people are not organized and there is no hope that they could even attempt to overthrow the regime. The financial aid, material assistance, and moral support given to Tito by the West has greatly affected the moral of the nationalist masses because they conclude that the Western world is interested in maintaining Tito in power. 25X1

2. The great majority of the Yugoslav population wholeheartedly desires the establishment of democracy in that country. The majority of peasants in Serbia favor the restoration of the monarchy, while the urban population of Serbia and most of the remainder of the country favor a government of federated republics. The sympathies and hopes of the people are with the United States. They despise the Soviet Union because it established the Communist regime in Yugoslavia and because of the atrocities and plundering committed by Soviet troops and administrators during the period 1944-1948. The public is suspicious of the normalization of relations with the USSR and fears that Yugoslavia may return to the Soviet Bloc.

3. There is no covert anti-regime activity in Serbia. 25X1

The population of Macedonia is, for the most part, anti-regime; but, as with the Albanian minority in Kosmet, they are chauvinists and separatists and are no real threat to the regime. The Hungarian minority is anti-regime, but most of them are pro-Cominform in sympathy (sic). The German minority is anti-regime. In general, although most of the people long for the liberation of the country from Communism and for the restoration of personal freedom and political liberty, they are apathetic. No active movement against the regime can be expected unless the opposition receives moral and material assistance from the West. 25X1

4. The participation of Yugoslavia in any armed conflict between the East and

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
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the West would result in the liquidation of the regime regardless of which side Tito joined. Tito would find himself with very few supporters and the nationalist masses, the Catholic church, minority groups, and the covert Cominformists would take advantage of the opportunity to overthrow the government. At the present time Tito could not organize an effective guerilla action in the country because he would receive no support from the population. The Army and the regime would surely collapse very shortly after the beginning of the conflict.

- 5. At the present time the covert Cominformists in Yugoslavia constitute the only serious danger to the regime. In 1948, following the split, a large number of Cominformists were arrested and sent to prisons and forced labor camps. Most of these persons were released in 1954 and 1955 as a gesture to the USSR. A small number of Cominformists were executed after the split, while others succeeded in fleeing to other Communist countries where they still live and work against Tito's regime with Soviet support and protection. It would be wrong to assume that Tito succeeded in detecting and liquidating all Cominformists and that the Soviets pulled out of Yugoslavia without leaving a network of agents behind. It is reasonable to believe that a considerable number of Cominformists remained undetected by the regime and kept their positions in the Union of Communists of Yugoslavia where they continued to work covertly against the regime. If, to this number, one adds the Cominformists recently released from prison as a concession to Moscow plus the Cominformists recruited since the normalization of relations, these persons now at liberty in Yugoslavia is considerable. They are ideologically motivated, dynamic, well organized, led and supported by the Soviet Union and devoted to Moscow. They work underground on preparations to overthrow the regime and will swing into action when they feel confident of success or when ordered to do so by Moscow. The regime is aware of this danger and considers it one of its most important problems. Although the regime's actions to counteract this danger are unknown, many political observers believe that the Cominformist danger is one of the main issues which compels Tito to remain on friendly terms with the West, where he will turn for protection when needed.



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