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SUBJECT Study of the NKVD

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**H. K. V. D.**

**of**

**U. S. S. R.**

FORWORD

Every dictatorial or, as it is now commonly called, totalitarian regime keeps itself in power mainly by means of a carefully conceived system of terror directed against the subjects of this regime. The more radical and absolute the character of the dictatorship, the more developed are its organs of terror and oppression.

The 20th Century gave birth to a new form of dictatorship: the dictatorship of a party, subordinating to itself the governmental apparatus and forcibly directing the whole life of the country and even the private life of its citizens. Two countries presented a picture of this dictatorship of a party in its most radical and perfected form: National-Socialist Germany and the Communist Soviet Union. At present we do not need to point out the similarity of these two dictatorships or even of their apparent mutual hostile ideologies. Both of these dictatorships laid down, as the basis of their foreign and domestic policies, the goal of world domination and both have made merciless terror the chief weapon of their policy.

Military defeat and the following occupation of Germany permitted world public opinion to become acquainted with all the repulsive details of the activities of the Gestapo, SS, and other organs of Hitlerite terror. But the activities of the organs of Soviet terror have remained for long years hidden from the world public opinion. Only from time to time has the testimony of individual victims of this terror appeared in the foreign press and attracted some reaction even if only of a weak nature. The problem of Soviet terror was considered as a Russian domestic affair. But now when an ever increasing number of nations fear that Communism will lay on them its deadly paw and when some nations are already becoming acquainted with the NKVD (MGB) in practice, this problem has begun to attract a special attention.

But even now the system of Soviet terror and suppression is known, rather, according to the testimony of individual victims of the Stalinistic terror. The world is becoming acquainted gradually with the results of the activities of the NKVD (MGB), but not with the inner mechanism of this meat grinder, which exterminates people according to the principle: "If he is not one of us - then he is against us".

Only the Russian people can disclose the details of the structure and methods of work of the Soviet terror system, for they themselves have been subjected to the activities of that institution for 30 years. These people are not deceived by the Kremlin's lying propaganda about the construction of a free and democratic socialist society in the Soviet Union nor are they misled by the illusions of those who believe that an agreement with Stalin is possible concerning peace and co-operation.

Only the Russian people may acquaint the other peoples of the world with all the details of the distasteful aspects of Communism and only they can perform this work with sufficient knowledge of the matter. This is their moral duty to the suffering Russian people and to all of humanity. But this is, at the same time, their practical contribution to the general struggle for national independence and personal freedom. The deciding moment for the clash between the forces of freedom and forces of tyranny is approaching. In order to halt the attack of Communism and then to destroy this danger it is necessary first of all to know its main weapons: tactics and technique of its undermining work outside the Soviet sphere, and methods of terror and suppression inside that sphere. It is necessary to know the most important instruments of the Communist party and of the Stalin dictatorship: its organs of "State Security".

The present work is an attempt to analyze the inner structure and methods of work of the Soviet organs of state security. By means of laborious collection of various data, by means of questioning of many former officials of these organs, and from the personal recollections of the authors an attempt has been made to create a picture of the Soviet organs of state security as they existed.

on the eve of the world war II. As a matter of fact, in many cases, the authors could not be quite certain of their data, not to speak of the exactness of details. We have to point out that the work was written not mainly from documents but from the testimony of individuals. Some of them, from the number of former NKVD agents, could have intentionally distorted the picture in order to misinform the reader, but this could mainly be in the details.

The authors set for themselves the aim of giving a general picture of the organs of the NKVD in a certain limited period of its development: between the end of the "Great Purge" period and the start of the world war II - that is between 1938 and 1941. In this period all organs of Soviet terrorism were united in one office - People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs of the USSR (NKVD). After the war these organs were split between two ministries - Ministry for State Security (MGB) and the Ministry for Internal Affairs (MVD).

The authors consider that one can understand correctly the structure and methods of work of these two ministries only if he knows, even in general outlines, the basic special structure and methods of work of their predecessor - the NKVD. To show the NKVD and to analyse its methods of work - is the aim of this book.

The present work consists of two parts: the text and the "schematic diagrams".

The Authors

## CHAPTER I

### THE MEANING AND ROLE OF THE NKVD IN THE SOVIET SYSTEM

#### 1. The Meaning of the NKVD

The People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs, divided after the war into two ministries, is deservedly called one of the main supports of the Soviet Communist dictatorship in Russia. The Soviet dictatorship has two main weapons to dominate the people: propaganda and terror. The skillful and aggressive propaganda utilises within the USSR misinformation of the surrounding world, and outside the USSR misinformation of Soviet reality, and in that way gives the Kremlin oligarchy rather wide support among the masses of people, - especially in the West. But the NKVD is the most important weapon to suppress and dominate the people inside the Soviet Union. For this purpose the NKVD concentrates in its hands almost unlimited means of control, provocation, and terror. One may say that if the USSR itself is merely the weapon which Communists are using to conquer the world, then the NKVD is the means of securing the reliability and compliance of that weapon (USSR) in the already begun struggle for world domination.

Abroad, the NKVD is ordinarily called the Soviet secret police. This definition is incorrect in substance. It is incorrect because it does not reflect either the true character or the sphere of action of this most important organ of the Bolshevik dictatorship. Any police, whether open or secret, is normally an agency of state power. Its mission is to protect the interests of the state, its political security in the first instance. Even the Gestapo, guarding Hitler's dictatorship, was a state police, and not a personal inquisition of Hitler himself. In the USSR the situation in principle and practice is otherwise. Here are the basic characteristics of this institution:

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1. The NKVD is an agency not of <sup>the</sup> state, but of party power. Under this party power one must understand not the Communist Party as a whole, but only its oligarchical and absolute leadership - the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Party, and the leaders of the Party central and local apparatus which help the Politburo to rule the country: in all, perhaps, some 250-300 persons.

The mission of the NKVD is to serve the securing of the interests not of the state, but of this handful of usurpers, who are making Russia their chief weapon in the struggle for the seizure of power over the entire world. The NKVD guards the security not of the state as a whole, - that is, of the country, the people, and authority, - but solely and alone the security of the ruling group of persons, which is commonly known under its abstract name - the Soviet Power. This power finds itself in permanent conflict with the majority of the people from the very first days of its birth, as a result of the antideocratic treacherous coup d'etat of October, 1917. Its policies inside and outside the country are directed against the natural, basic interests of the Russian people and the country.

Those who are inclined to see in this definition some kind of "propaganda", are advised to think over the question once more when they acquaint themselves with the fact that the "Anti-Soviet Elements" files of the NKVD and the system of "GULAG" (Concentration Camps Administration of the NKVD), together embrace nearly all the adult population of the USSR. We can mention, to the same effect, the activities of the Economic Administration of the NKVD in preventing the "sabotage" and "diversionist acts", which testify to the compulsory character of the Soviet "building of socialism in one country".

Thus, the first peculiarity of the NKVD is that this type of secret police serves only the interests of the ruling chiefs of the party in power, against the interests of the state which this group rules, contrary to the will of the people which it exploits.



2. The NKVD is an organization completely independent of the government system in the USSR, and, partially, of the Party itself. More than that, thanks to their exclusively conspiratorial character, the organization and activities of the NKVD are known in the country only in the most general terms, and then easily, for example, after some facts concerning executions and arrests leak out.

It would be wrong to think that the Soviet Government - The Council of Ministers - at any time would discuss the work of the NKVD or would order it to do or not to do something. It is sufficient to say that the Minister of Finance of the USSR, who prepares the state budget, and later supervises its fulfilment, does not know the structure, nor the personnel, nor the utilization of expenses of the NKVD. To the financial section of the Gosplan and to the State Budget sector of the Planning Administration of the Ministry of Finance of the USSR is presented only the total sum which the NKVD needs. There is no discussion or verification and even this sum does not reveal all the expenditures of the NKVD, because a certain part of these expenditures is included in a special secret fund of the Kremlin.

Not only the ordinary person, but the most high ranking officials in the USSR know only one thing about the NKVD: that it is better not to know anything. If this work were to fall into the hands of a Soviet reader, it would be accepted as a revelation. Here is a fact established by one of the authors: Soviet Foreign Minister Maxim Litvinov did not know what department of the NKVD was located in a building which he saw every day from the window of his office in Dzerzhinsky Street, in Moscow (former Lubjanka Street). One may excuse him, however: not every official of the NKVD itself is informed of that which is outside the frame of his immediate competence. And this fact, by the way, has made extremely difficult the writing of this work, based, as was said in the Foreword, on the evidence of former Chekists.

This insulation of the NKVD in the Soviet system of the party - we would say even its independence - is the second outstanding characteristic of the Soviet Secret Police.

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3. It would be possible to say, by analogy, that the NKVD is a state within a state. But the insulation of the NKVD within the Soviet state bears a very specific character. It is impossible to understand this if one does not take into account its third peculiarity: the simultaneously insulated and dominating position of the Soviet Secret Police.

This expresses itself in the fact that if the NKVD is made a complete secret from other governmental and even party organs (with <sup>the</sup> exception of the very highest - understood to be the Politburo and its apparatus), these organs are as well known to the NKVD as the palm of your hand; at least they should be! The tentacles of the NKVD penetrate all reaches of governmental and party life in the USSR, beginning with the Council of Ministers and ending in the basic party group of some kolhoz, lost in the Siberian forests. It goes without saying that there are no secrets from the NKVD in the private lives of people of the Union; it is not said in jest that each Soviet citizen has two shadows - one of his own and the other of the NKVD.

It is only logical to emphasize that in the governmental and party system of the USSR special conditions are created in order to favor the spy activities of the NKVD. We may characterize the Soviet system as one in which there occurs a fusion of the state and party, the leadership of which formally is in the hands of the state, but actually in the party. but in this amalgamation there is still one more element, unseen but always present - the NKVD. Its organs are infiltrated into governmental and party organizations, unknown to the latter, in order to fully utilize their opportunities to check every step of the state and party officials, up to the highest levels of the Soviet bureaucratic machine. The most wide-spread <sup>example</sup> case of this fusion, or better to say, permeation, of the NKVD in any Soviet governmental institution <sup>is</sup> present <sup>ed by</sup> the "Special Offices" or "Special Branches" which exist in every factory, in every institution or governmental office.

According to its official regulations (the so called "Statute of the NKVD of the USSR"), the NKVD cannot control or, putting it simply, has no right to spy against the Bolshevik Party. Nevertheless we see that one of the basic links of the NKVD chain, binding the whole country, is the SPO - Secret Political Section or Administration. Its mission is the rooting out of sedition within the party, the liquidation of all and any deviationists, beginning with old time Trotskyites and ending with the currently modish originators of cringing before the decadent West. The period of the "Great Purge", 1934-1939, shows us that the NKVD can be used against the Party just as well as it is used daily and hourly against the people and country.

4. However, the self same period of mass extermination of any and all, when the NKVD seized the people, - in the words of Stalin himself, - only for the fact that "they walked on the same street with Trotskyites" showed that sometimes the Party can be used against the NKVD. We speak of reprisals against Yagoda and all his consorts, totaling, it is said, up to 5,000 NKVD officials and of the following reprisal against his executioner, Kozlov.

From this it follows that the NKVD is not the all-powerful master of the situation in the USSR. Spying against the state power and even against the party, enjoying a greater concentration than that of power than the state and party apparatus (in their lower and middle levels), the NKVD finds itself under the thumb of the individual who holds in his hand full power, under the thumb of Stalin. For this aim Stalin uses his own private apparatus, - so called "Stalin's Secretariat", - which operates through the top secret special channels of the Kremlin. Here manifests itself the famous Soviet system of cross-check insurance, that is a system of a double or even triple control of one and the same person, organization, or action.

Therefore, the fourth peculiarity of the NKVD is that this organ, which arose because the Communists trust no one and under no condition does not enjoy itself the full confidence of the dictator and his accomplices.

5. Further, it must be remembered that the NKVD is a kind of secret police which has its own armed forces, independent from the regular army of the USSR.

The mission of the NKVD armed forces is to support Stalin's power within the country against internal enemies, i.e. the people, while the army is designated for defense of his power only against foreign enemies. The border, internal, and escort troops of the NKVD are better armed than units of the regular army; their fighting ability is much greater than that of regular troops located within the country in time of peace. And this is not a coincidence. Stalin still remembers the affair of Marshal Tukachevsky. And, in addition to this there are special detachments of the NKVD inside the army. We shall recall only two titles: the "Squad", with its crew of executioners, and the "Straggle Line Detachments", which liquidated deserters and stragglers from the field of battle. However, the protection of Stalin, himself, is not in the hands of NKVD troops, assigned only for the external guard around the Kremlin, but is performed by two special units: a) by the so-called "School of the Supreme Soviet", and b) by the First section of the NKVD - both of which are directly subordinated to the "Stalin's Secretariat" and form a permanent garrison of the Kremlin.

The NKVD spies against the army, and against the NKVD, spies Stalin, himself. Such is the system. The existence of two armies in one country is the fifth peculiarity of the NKVD, which distinguishes it from the secret police of any other, more normal regime.

6. The history of our times shows that even in the most undemocratic countries of South America or Central Europe the secret police, at least formally, are not invested with judicial powers and the courts are separated from the police. The sixth peculiarity of the NKVD is that it has its own court system independent from the regular court system of the USSR, but completely subordinated to directives from the highest Communist party organs.

The major characteristic of the NKVD court system is that the functions of arrest, prosecution, and adjudication are very often in the hands of one and the same official. The NKVD can

arrest and try by means of its secret "court" any citizen of the USSR. There do exist certain regulations, restricting to some extent the arbitrary actions of the NKVD, but only with respect to those party officials employed in duties of party administration. The entire field of political crime, which is more than wide in the USSR, remains the sphere of the NKVD, and it operates this sphere as it wishes with no control or accounting what so ever, except to the dictator in the Kremlin.

However, the more important political cases remain in the hands of the NKVD only during the preliminary investigation, after which they are decided by the high party leadership. These decisions are then carried out by the NKVD, just as similar decisions and directives are carried out by the regular court system of the USSR.

7. It is necessary to mention here still one more peculiarity of the NKVD, although since the time of the Gestapo this ceased to be its monopoly. We have in mind that the NKVD operates all penal institutions. Included in this term of penal institutions are those prisons which hold so many inmates that they are organized as camps. We speak here about the system called GULAG (Administration of Camps) which operates all numerous concentration and labor camps with their many millions of inmates. All these prisoners find themselves in <sup>the</sup> uncontrolled power of the NKVD which prescribes the conditions of their confinement, which can change and previous court decision by means of special camp "courts", which operates special spy rings inside the camps just as it does in the "free" Soviet society, etc.

While speaking of the Soviet concentration camps, we have to note that in its usage of forced labor the NKVD is semi-officially recognized as an organization taking part in the "planned construction of the socialistic economy of the USSR". The same GULAG of the NKVD carries out a number of most important governmental industrial projects - it digs canals, brings into production coal mines and oil wells in the Arctic, cuts timber for export etc., thereby providing the Soviet Union and the World Communist movement with dollars and gold.

As a result, the seventh and not unimportant peculiarity of the NKVD is its function as a slave owner and colonizer of arctic regions.

8. Our exposé would not be complete, more than that, would be incorrect if still one more very important aspect of the NKVD were not treated for - its significance to the outer world. If we were to say that the USSR is nothing other than a base for the spreading of communist world revolution, then it would be clear that the NKVD must play its own great role in this undertaking. When the reader acquaints himself with the functions of the Foreign Administration of the NKVD, then it would not be difficult to come to the realization that the NKVD may be termed not so much a Soviet as an international communist secret police. This side of the activities of the NKVD is now better known.

However, it would be inopportune to think, in view of the Canadian atomic spy case, that the NKVD occupies itself only with ordinary espionage for military and economic purposes, as is the case in other countries. The persecution of Russian emigrants, the murder of anti-Soviet activists - such as Krotzki, and foreign statesmen - such as the French president Mitterand, Polish general Sikorski; its own agents abroad, as, for example, the secretary of the Central Committee of the Spanish Communist Party, Jose Diaz, the Chinese marshal Lin Biao, the Soviet ambassador in Mexico, Konstantin Gerasinski, etc., - all these being examples of the NKVD activities working in behalf of the international Communist movement.

One may raise an objection that this field of activity does not present the monopoly of the NKVD and that political murders have been frequently practiced by the secret police of other countries, mentioning as an obvious example the Gestapo activities in Nazi Germany. We do not intend to deny this fact, but the new and principally distinguishing factor in the case of the NKVD is its systematic methods, not just isolated cases. We may say it is a planned system, well thought out, organized, and executed with merciless consequence.

Along with its terroristic and black-mailing functions against anti-Soviet organizations outside the USSR, the NKVD plays still another important role for the Kremlin. This is to spy upon Soviet personnel in other countries - such as diplomats, trade representatives, and even Soviet military espionage agents. Included also within its competence are the leaders of the international Communist movement. Just as within the USSR, the NKVD thereby provides for a complete system of double and triple control.

This international function of the NKVD, although the last on our list of peculiarities, is, never the less, in its significance one of the most important characteristics of the Kremlin's secret police.

## 2. The Methods of the NKVD

We turn now to the main features which characterize the methods of the NKVD, features which in many respects differ from those habitually used by ordinary secret police. It is still possible to say this even though the world now knows the methods used by the Gestapo.

1. From the very first words of Lenin's decree creating the "Cheka", - forerunner of the present day NKVD (MVD), - it was clearly evident that the Soviet secret police was to be and became a purely terroristic organization. At the present time the period of revolutionary romanticism is past and the NKVD is no longer hailed as the "proletarian guillotine" or the "all devouring flame of the red terror". "Bureaucraticism", this second nature of the Communistic experiment, has now laid its heavy hand on this apparatus for the hunting and extermination of people. Now people are liquidated according to the "five-year plans". This will be made clear in the chapter which describes a map hanging in the office of the First Special Section of the NKVD, in Moscow, - the map covered with marks indicating numbers of potential victims, that is, the numbers of "ASE" (anti-Soviet elements) in different areas of the USSR.

This map reveals a direct link or connection between the present form of the "red terror" and the construction of war plants and wells in the wide regions beyond the Arctic circle.

The terror of the NKVD has now become less open. No longer are the names of victims published and slogans advertized. Never the less, the terror has become even more cruel. In the earlier days a man might be openly condemned and shot because as a member of the former upper classes (simply - a "former") he, by the Marxist definition of classes, either had or would take part in the fight against the regime. Now people are liquidated by means of overwork, under the inhuman conditions of the Soviet labor camps, only because the regime needs to build a factory or dig a canal. The hunt for people is carried on at present time not only because of danger to the regime, but because of a need for new slave labor power. We are speaking, of course, of tendencies, and therefore do not include the executions of the more active political enemies, such as members of the Vlassov movement and the unfortunate fugitives caught and returned to the USSR by the Western powers.

2. From what has been said above it is already possible to see the second peculiarity of Soviet terrorism, namely, - the preventive character of this terror. Lenin himself declared the working principle of the Soviet security organs to be directly opposed to the teachings by Christ. That is, it is better that nine innocent should suffer than that one guilty should be allowed to escape punishment. Categories of "automatic arrest" was not an invention of the victors over the Nazi Germany, for one of the first steps taken by the Cheka at the end of 1917 was the introduction of a system of mass hostages. The difference here is that from those arrested by the Cheka, as a "precautionary measure", - the former officers, aristocrats, bankers, professors, priests etc., - were dragged the victims of the periodic executions.

One can even say that the NKVD has its own sociologists for, by means of the Red Terror, Lenin and then Stalin changed in a drastic way the social and even age-group structure of the Russian population. When Stalin boasted in one conference that in a Russian village one could not find "in day time with a light" the figures of



the old village "elder", village priest or a kulak, he only paid his respects to the sociological talents of his NKVD.

We see now that the NKVD (MGB) is conducting its experiments with an utmost energy throughout all those countries which were occupied by the Soviets during and after the war. And if a new war does not interrupt this new wave of the Red Terror, the text-books on ethnography will have to cross out the pages of such nations as Estonian or Lettish, and to a greater extent simplify the picture of social composition of the population in Poland, Czech<sup>2</sup>-Slovakia and the Balkan countries.

3. In speaking of the methods of the NKVD, we must note that the officials of the NKVD can act arbitrarily and enjoy the complete impunity of action as long as they degrade the people, as long as they torture and murder in accordance with the currently existing political line - the political line of the Politburo. Though, in the office of the Prosecutor General of the USSR there is a special prosecuting attorney for supervision over the NKVD, nevertheless it is a rare case, bordering on a miracle, when a petition is entertained against the actions of some organ or official of the NKVD and a case is reviewed. But even then, no disciplinary measures are taken against the Chekists even if they are guilty of the death of an innocent individual. In these cases, as a great kindness to the relatives, is issued a certificate to the effect that "the above mentioned was penalized in connection with certain affairs which, upon further investigation, are not substantiated ...". Such a certificate at least gives the widow of the penalized one an opportunity to receive work, and his children the opportunity to enter school, etc.

But when the party line changes, it may happen that yesterday's torturer-investigators are thrown in the same prison cell with the persons whom only last night they had tortured by shackling to the wall or finger nail splitting. It is well known that the occupations of Jagoda occasioned by themselves the death, without exception, of all his closest co-workers, all these Paukers, Trilissers, Bornans, Cehans, and Redanses - who had just before been glorified

as the "wonderful Chekist legion". Together with them "walked down the corridor"<sup>x)</sup> as "enemies of the people" hundreds and hundreds of their assistants; nearly all of whom, through long years, themselves "sent down the corridor" tens of thousands of Russian people, in the greater part innocent even in the face of the famous 58th article of the Soviet penal code<sup>xx)</sup>.

Though Stalin thought that he was liquidating only his own enemies, in these cases he was putting a bullet in the nape of the neck of the unquestionably real enemies of the people. In his own turn, the downfall of the killer and successor of Jagoda - the "Stalinist", "iron" commissar Yeshov, brought about its own bloody purge among those who only just before thoroughly purged the Chekist cadres. All those executors who worked with Yeshov were shot without exception. Stalin know how to emerge from water dry.

Generally speaking, every unsuccessful operation, especially a failure in the secret work abroad, results in the severe punishment of the responsible NKVD personnel. There is no doubt that Canadian justice indirectly caught up with others, in addition to those who sat on the defendant's bench at Montreal: the NKVD dealt severely with all of those people who, being in Canada, were so inattentive as not to apprehend Igor Gouzenko. It is certain that some of the former colleagues of the Russian school teacher Kowlenkina, who jumped from the window of the Soviet consulate in New York, were obliged to pay dearly for her act when they, in turn, had to "jump" from America back into Lubyanka street.

Actually, suspicion and spy fever flourish not less, but more, within the walls of the NKVD than outside. Behind every Chekist stands another one, if not two, checking on his loyalty. Consequently, the inclination is to think that the object of this surveillance is nothing more than another "heretofore undiscovered enemy of the people". This spirit of mutual suspicion and internal spy fever was successfully exploited by the Japanese intelligence:

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x) One of many Chekist terms for the death penalty.

xx) This article deals with "crimes" against the Soviet political system.

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in the chapter on the "KRU" (Counter Intelligence Administration) we shall cite the case of a successful provocation which resulted in the massacre of Chekists by Chekists themselves.

4. One of the most peculiar characteristics of the NKVD lies in its methods for utilization of agents. The Soviet secret police relies not so much upon the quality, as upon the quantity of its agents. From the outside it may appear that this mania of the NKVD tends to convert the entire population of the Soviet Union into a gigantic network of its spies. Ministers and housemaids, generals and inmates of concentration camps, scientists and miners, artists and school boys, people without regard for age and sex, are recruited as agents of NKVD. There is only one restriction: the manual on recruiting "does not recommend the recruiting of children less than twelve years old" in view of "the danger that they will not observe the rules of secrecy". It is understandable that nobody can even approximately estimate the number of NKVD agents. But there is no doubt that they number millions, if not tens of millions. It is sufficient to say that "according to regulations" the ordinary Moscow house must have the following number of NKVD agents: the caretaker, the doorman, and at least one agent per apartment<sup>x</sup>. It is no wonder that in the Soviet Union it is said, half jokingly, half seriously, that if two people are chosen at random, one of them is a "seksot", that is, a secret agent of the NKVD.

The explanation of the reliance upon the quantity of agents lies evidently in the lack within the NKVD of qualified personnel able to properly train agents. We will treat separately the characteristics of NKVD personnel, showing the extremely low level of their general and even police education. These people are very often unable to cope with their tasks, and in order to clear their cases they resort either to beatings of the arrestees or to exhausting <sup>them</sup> by means of endless questioning and special conditions of confinement.

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x) This applies to the typical Moscow apartment, which houses five or six families.

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According to a Russian saying, the Cheka makes a virtue of its shortcomings, proclaiming that "the whole people aids the NKVD". In practice this means that the Communists and members of the Komsomol are formally required to collaborate with the NKVD. As Lenin said: "Every Communist must be a Chekist". When recruited as agents they are told that this is their party duty. To the non party people who refuse such work it is hinted that such refusal shows that they are evidently "against the Soviet Power". And if some brave men still refuse to become a traitor to his relatives and friends, they are directly placed in the file of "ASB" (anti-soviet elements) and sooner or later repressed.

As a result, there is created a gigantic net of secret agents of all embracing types. This net covers, without exception, all Soviet institutions, beginning with the Politburo and ending with the lavatory attendants. Using this net, the NKVD "keeps Chekist vigilance", that is, it uses the daily reports of its millions of agents for the operation of its system of preventive terror. Of course, the value of these agents, recruited in large part under threats, is not great and <sup>as an</sup> for experienced intelligence agency they, by themselves, do not present much danger. On the other hand, because of their very abundance the NKVD reaches its goal, so to say, from the opposite end: knowing that NKVD agents are everywhere and seeing such an agent in almost every person, the opponents of the Soviet regime simply fear to show any activity, not to speak of organizing any opposition. The preventive nature of Soviet terror, in this case, also plays its prominent role in forbidding the very conception of ideas of struggle against Communism.

The system under which the NKVD uses agents may be compared to the actions of a fisherman who, having only bad nets, fills the entire ocean with them in the hope that in at least one of them he would catch a small fish. But what is impossible for an individual fisherman, however capable or rich he might be, is possible for the NKVD, because it has at its disposal an unlimited number of agents and can at any time turn almost any Soviet citizen into <sup>one of</sup> its agents. The more so, since the agents work for nothing! The sole limiting

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factor is the lack of NKVD officials to direct the agents, read their denunciations, and to instruct them. Only in this fact lies the explanation why a certain percentage of the population of this "country of victorious socialism" remains outside this gigantic net of NKVD agents. Future historians of the epoch of Communism in Russia will undoubtedly take the figure of a miserable and unhappy NKVD informer as a symbol of this period. In other words, this unhappy figure is the real support of Stalin's power. This support has a mass character but is far from being trustworthy.

5. It is hardly necessary to remind <sup>one</sup> of the fact that the NKVD is not too scrupulous about its methods and actions. We have no intention to compare in this respect the NKVD with the famous inquisition or with the Gestapo. We avoid this comparison because no one can give the exact number of ~~these~~ victims of their torture-chambers, and because here the palm of priority undoubtedly belongs to the NKVD - it has as its object much greater masses of population, and the enormous territory of the Soviet Union and it has been in operation for a longer period of time. But there is one more peculiarity in the methods of the NKVD which has no precedence, even in the most sinister institutions of this kind.

Here we have in mind the artificial fabrication of culprits and forged cases or, using the NKVD terminology, - "activation of suspects". Certainly, even the principle, laid down by Lenin himself, that it is better to punish nine innocent persons than to let one guilty to escape punishment - even this ominous thesis stimulates the false accusations and incorrect court decisions. But the NKVD has invented something which is much worse than the condemnation of a person whose guilt was not proved, or who is known to be innocent but who was forced, in result of the tortures and unbearable conditions in the prison, to blackmail himself. The NKVD invented the method of provocation. Normally, the usage of this method is forbidden. But practically, - the provocation is the chief method of work in the NKVD. For without this method of provocation, the NKVD would hardly be able to collect even one per cent of the human raw material needed for the disgusting meat grinder in the Lubyanka square.

Without a proper number of victims, the NKVD would never receive its prestige of a "chastising sword" or "the body-guard of the conquests of October", while the Chekists would not be able to enjoy their good life, their numerous orders and governmental rewards, and all those numerous privileges which transform these hangmen into the Soviet elite. One must not forget that as a merit of work of every individual Chekist is taken the number of "enemies" he has discovered, revealed and punished in a certain period of time. If this number is big enough, - then the Chekist is good, his vigilance is high, and his loyalty to the case of Lenin-Stalin is blameless. But if this number is small, - then this Chekist has to forget any orders, promotions, a separate apartment, or a car - this dream of every Soviet careerist. Just in the same way, every chief of an Administration or a local organ of the NKVD is eager to demonstrate, by means of a number of "coffins"<sup>x)</sup> that the "unit trusted to him" is successfully fulfilling the program of the party and the government, and "is holding aloft the banner of Chekist vigilance".

But what to do if there are no real spies, Trotskyites, and wreckers? Then they are being "activated", according to a wonderful Chekist term. This means that certain previously marked victims are being provoked, with the help of some special agents, to make some remarks or to conduct some actions, which can be interpreted later on as anti-Soviet ones. When taking this into account, we can definitely claim that at least a half, or may be even three-quarters, of all the victims of the NKVD are composed of the victims of these provoked "activizations".

But we shall not blame here the Chekists alone. As we shall see from the chapter dealing with the activities of the "SPU" - Secret Political Administration of the NKVD, the entire work of this branch, in its struggle against the "anti-party deviations" and in spying against the members of the ruling Communist party, is prescribed by special instructions of the Politburo, channelled through

x) The Chekist term for those doomed to execution.

the Special Sector of the Central Committee, or coming from Stalin himself. These instructions normally prescribe to "activate" that or the other "deviation" according to Stalin's political needs. To-day he decides to hit those whom he considers as guilty of Trotskyism, and the "SIU" immediately "activates", by means of provocative conversations, leaflets etc., those communists who are marked for subsequent "liquidation". To-morrow he needs to "render harmless" the former opponents of Vyshinski at the Institute for Soviet Right, and the SIU "activates" the "scum of rustukania", that is those Soviet students of law who repeated, after Marx, that under the Communism the state is bound to "die out".

The monstrous processes against Zinoviev, Kamenov, Nadek, Bukharin - all these are simply the examples of those counterfeit cases which Stalin needs in his own political interests. The example of this kind of forged cases represent all those numerous tragedies when millions of innocent people are being sent to the NKVD camps, simply because the Complan decided to dig a certain channel or to bore some new oil wells. Following Stalin, every individual Chekist starts to forge similar counterfeit cases, but in his own interests. He knows only too well, that Stalin trusts only those watch-dogs which bite the greatest number of by-passers.

6. Lastly, in our survey of methods used by the NKVD, is their clumsy character. We have already spoken of the lack of qualified, intelligent, and good workers that in one stroke turned the Cheka-NKVD into a torture chamber. When we find that the majority of people falling into the hands of the NKVD do so not as a result of any sly or well thought out secret police combination, but because of simple denunciation concerning their careless words or actions which might be interpreted as "sabotage", thanks to the reports of the ubiquitous informants of the NKVD. After falling into the hands of the NKVD, a man, sooner or later, signs a confession, again, not as a result of artful fine work of the investigator but as a result of beatings, torture, coercion, provocation, promises and other methods, - in a large part of a physical nature.

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If one were to open the doors of the gloomy buildings in the block between the Lubyanka and Myasnitskaya streets, one would be convinced that the implements of torture which are to be seen in a museum are no more than children's playthings. The NKVD has its own means of physical persuasion, made to its own specifications in its own work-shops. If to this method is added that the guiding principle of the NKVD is that every arrested is an "enemy of the people" whose guilt must only be "made official" and his accomplices found, then it is not surprising that a "false arrest" in the USSR is almost impossible. Events of any one escaping with a laconic document of "released by the NKVD" can be counted on ones fingers. Outside the walls of the NKVD everyone swears of his love and devotion to Stalin. Inside these walls every one confesses to his "criminal plots" against Stalin ...

Such is the system of the Soviet terror, the flesh and bone of the Communist system.

### 3. The Men of the NKVD

Although executioners are necessary at all times and to all regimes, the profession has never been considered particularly honorable. However, the USSR has in this has its own word, for the first organizer of the Communistic torture-chamber, leader of the Soviet hangmen-Chekists, Felix Djerzhinsky, was called even in his lifetime "Knight of the proletarian revolution", and Lenin and Stalin directed their most flattering epitaphs to the Chekists. Here are a few examples :

"Chekists - threat to the world bourgeoisie", "highest and first sons of the revolution", "No higher or more honorable name than that of a Chekist"(Lenin), "Chekists - bodyguard of Socialism", "Eyes and ears of the Party", and so forth.

Not only among the Communists themselves, but among all the people there is carried on the uninterrupted work of praising the "difficult but noble profession of the Chekist" (Stalin), setting up the Chekist as an ideal for other workers, as an "example of



self-sacrifice and bravery". In the Soviet Union there are great masses of literature, the object of which is not only to direct the enthusiasm of the people toward the praise and love <sup>of</sup> their henchmen, but also to incite the people to help them in their dirty work of espionage and treachery. Even in the children's readers one finds descriptions of the "brave deeds" of various Chekists and praise for their activities, which are aiding socialist construction by the "liquidating of all of its enemies". Djerzhinsky, Kirov, and Beria are "beloved" heroes of children's textbooks, songs etc., with the help of which the Communists are poisoning the growing generation.

The libelous designation "Chekist" which is pronounced with fear and caution by the man on the street, was accepted arrogantly by the Soviet regime as a badge of the most honorable profession in the Soviet Union. The Chekists call themselves Chekists, and for the most outstanding of them there has even been established a special emblem "Honorable Chekist", - a sword, surrounded by a laurel wreath, mounted on a rhomboid. Djerzhinsky was possessed with the idea of creating out of his henchmen a sort of closed caste, resembling a monastic order: with severe, ascetic customs, almost isolating themselves from life.

Djerzhinsky, a Pole by birth, and as it happens, a Catholic, obviously borrowed his idea from Ignatius Loyola. Not long before his strangely sudden death in 1926, Djerzhinsky even ordered work started on the writing of special "Chekist status", that is, a collection of rules of conduct, a codex of morals, so to speak. Although the word "moral" is definitely out of place in this instance this fact did not disturb Djerzhinsky and his successors. All the more, since Lenin gave such a definition of morals: "The basis of Communistic morals is the struggle for the strengthening and fulfillment of Communism".

And this definition was later completed by Stalin thus: "From the viewpoint of Communist morals, that is moral which contributes to the extermination of the old regime and the strengthening of the new, socialist order". Consequently, the fellows from

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Lubyanka Street consider themselves as some sort of "Stakhanovites of Communist morals". And so they babble about Chekist ethics. In the first place in "Chekist ethics" stands the idea of devotion to the Party. This means that a Chekist must torture, torment, and kill any body whom the Party considers or might consider an enemy. This notwithstanding the fact that tomorrow any and everybody might be proclaimed "enemies of the people". It is a known fact that by order of Stalin, Iagoda and his closest collaborators, among whom were all of the members of the Collegium of the NKVD, were shot, not by ordinary henchmen of the NKVD, but by their closest subordinates.

Further, the Chekist "ethics" speak about the necessity to be vigilant and "undefatigably uncover and destroy the enemies of the people". If we substitute the word "preventiveness" for the word "vigilance" then the question will become clear. A classic example of vigilance, depicted in all Chekist textbooks, is how a member of the Politburo, Lazar Kaganovich, serving at that time as the right hand of Stalin, "uncovered the camouflaged enemies of the people".

In the late thirties, Kaganovich supervised the construction of the subway in Moscow. At one of the tunnels two workers, semi-literate peasants, father and son just arrived from the country, decided to drink water from the fire hose. Having left they failed to turn off the faucet. As a result of this, a section of the tunnel the next day was flooded. An agent - representative of the NKVD - reported to Kaganovich, that the offenders were already arrested. But Kaganovich ordered the arrest also of the chief of the subway section. "In the first place he was negligent toward his work - his duty was to supply the mines with drinking water fountains. In the second place - added Kaganovich - investigate thoroughly his background". After two weeks the unfortunate engineer confessed, that in the past he was an officer of the Tsarist army. Hence it was made rather easy to <sup>reach</sup> a conclusion about the sabotage.

As regards the third demand of the "Chekist ethics", their "incorruptibility", one has to recognize, that, as a rule, in the NKVD this requisite is respected. But this is because of the simple reason: the Chekists are much better off materially than their victims. In those few cases, however, when the victims have valuable stones or gold (and this occurs rarely in the USSR), this does not produce an impression on the Chekist: wealth in the Soviet society plays an insignificant role - the power of money there is exchanged fully for the force of power.

It is necessary to note still another requirement which is presented to the Chekist. This requirement is - to be merciless toward the enemy. As in the above case, this principle of the "Chekist ethics" does not present in practice any sort of difficulty. We have already mentioned this, while speaking about the methods of work of the Soviet secret police. On the contrary, sometimes the leaders have to ask the Chekists not to be so energetic in following their "ethics of mercilessness". So, for example, Beria, having replaced the crazed Yezhov, in a special order pointed out to the almost crazed subordinates of Yezhov: "One can and even must beat, but it is not necessary to beat every one".

In this case Beria was least of all led by the feeling of humanity: to be human means to be a poor Communist. The reason was simply that the prisons of the NKVD were filled with victims of the wild terror during the time of Yezhov. All these people were clearly innocent of the crimes, to which they had confessed only because of the methods of questioning of the "Iron People's Commissar". A special commission re-examined their cases, and not desiring to set free the witnesses who had seen the horror, gave them a comparatively light punishment - such as banishment to the timber cutting in the extreme north. However, the beaten, tortured, almost crazy people firmly held to their previous confessions, extracted from them during the days of Yezhov. They repeated, for example, that they wanted to kill Yezhov himself (at that time already proclaimed as an enemy of the people), or that they were spies for the long non-existent state Austria-Hungary.

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Not only among simple people, but also among the Communists, among the very highest circles of the Soviet state and Party dignitaries, the very word NKVD brought fear; carefully screened from others, of course, under the pretense of hypocritical praise as regards to "our glorious Chekists". Therefore, usually, they stoop and crawl in order to try to gain the favor of the Chekists. The uniform of the Chekist is equal to the master key of a thief - to this man, with the crimson braid on his collar and with a blue top on his hat, are available all of the goods of the meager Soviet life: a room in the hotel, a berth on the train, a ticket to the theater etc., - and all this without queuing, this plague of simple Soviet mortals. It goes without saying that to bring a suit in court against the Chekists - is a thing unthinkable in the USSR. In a country, in which laws exist only on paper, there is one unwritten but strictly observed law: the NKVD is above the Law, the NKVD is authorized to do as it pleases because it is the NKVD who creates the laws.

It is not surprising that, under such conditions of unlimited arbitrariness, the members of the NKVD feel themselves semi-gods. The secret character of the work, coupled with self isolation in private life (as a rule the Chekists live in houses of the NKVD or in special separate apartments), led to the forming in the USSR of a particular closed caste. In their own country, the Chekists live similar to the Americans in their occupation zone of Germany: they have their own mode of life, their better supply, their places for relaxation and rest, and last but not least their own courts.

All this, taken together, gradually forms a special type of man. The experienced eye can unmistakably guess whether a stranger has any relation to the "organs"<sup>x)</sup> or not. And this not only by conversation, but by his behaviour, even by appearance.

Lastly, we must note the national composition of the Chekists. From the very first days of the Soviet power this question began to play an important role in the internal politics. It must be explained that, as the leaders of Bolshevism, also the management of the

x) In the Chekist slang - NKVD.

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central Soviet institutions, including the Cheka-OGPU-MKVD, in the majority of cases were people of non-Russian origin. This fact was particularly apparent during the years of the leadership of Yagoda. It is well known that during this time there took place the cruel reprisals against the Russian peasants (liquidation of the "kulaks"). In the eyes of the population, MKVD and its work acquired a definite significance.

The picture changed radically after Stalin liquidated the opposition, the leaders of which, basically, were of non-Russian origin. The place of Yagoda and his companions in the MKVD was occupied by new people, whose acceptance depended largely upon three conditions: they had to be, if possible, of Russian nationality; they had to come from the inferior regions of the Soviet Union; and they were to have neither relatives nor close acquaintances abroad. This was a tribute to the spy fever which gripped the Kremlin in the middle thirties. One of the first results of this delivery of the "avenging sword of the proletariat" into the hands of people "from behind the plow", - the Soviet expression meaning simple and poorly educated people, with a low mental development, - but "to the bitter end devoted to the cause of Lenin-Stalin", was a significant lowering of the effectiveness of the MKVD.

Having lost its experienced agents and investigators, the MKVD was forced to use the most primitive methods of a provincial police establishment. There began a period, when the entire task of the MKVD was achieved simply by beating prisoners. Formerly, the MKVD was joined "by calling", that is, by those who had a taste for bestial, sadistic blood shed. Now people joined the MKVD as a result of "Party mobilization", i.e. at the directive of the Party. It is not surprising, that many of them proved to be absolutely unfit for the "specific" work of the MKVD. One of the orders of the MKVD mentions with indignation, for the education of others, that one of the new batch of Chekists, having acquainted himself with the denunciation of a former Trotskyite, called him into his office

and began to admonish him : "it is not good to engage in anti-Party propoganda, Comrade P., didn't you, in the old days, sign an oath to be loyal to the Party?"

Only by slow stages could the NKVD re-establish a cadre of qualified agents, spies, and technicians of secret work. However, the war with Germany once more found the Soviet secret police in a state of complete disorganization. This explains such bungling methods in the fight against the German espionage as the wholesale arrest of all people with "German names", or the banishment to middle Asia of the entire population of the autonomous German Volga republic. They did not know how to ferret out the actual agents, and besides, they did not want to be bothered with "trifles".

There is reason to believe that only by the very end of the war was the NKVD able to conduct some limited activity in German territory. This can be seen, for instance, in the attempted assassination of General Vlasov in 1944. Even those agents who were successfully infiltrated into other countries were very poorly qualified. So, notwithstanding the broadest co-operation, which was accorded to the Soviet repatriation missions in the Western zones of Germany and Austria, the majority of the anti-Soviet elements and defectors from the Soviet Union have successfully secreted themselves, either within the masses of U.S.'s or within the German economy. It must be believed that the weakness of their own cadres until now has compelled the NKVD to run the risk of a wider use of local fifth column members in the "capitalistic" countries.

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CHAPTER IIHISTORY OF THE NKVD

During the three decades of its existence, the apparatus of the Soviet secret police experienced a whole series of re-organizations and even changed its name five times. This fact did not by one iota change the essence of Stalin's secret police, one of the principal means to organize the world-wide Communist revolution.

The following is a short history of the NKVD

On December 20, 1917, just two months after the October revolution in Russia, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR created the "All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for the fight against counter-revolution, sabotage, and speculation". This agency was ordinarily called, in abbreviation, C.E.A. and therefore received, among the people, the colloquial designation "Cheka" or "Chrezvichaika". The first chairman of the All-Russian Cheka was the above mentioned Felix Dzerzhinsky, at whose instigation the Commission was created.

The total red terror was begun by the Cheka in August, 1918, after the murder of the chairman of the retrograd Cheka Mikhail (Moise) Uritsky and an attempt on the life of Lenin.

From this time on the functions of this bloody instrument of the Bolshevik dictatorship were clearly determined. So, for instance, in the proclamation of the retrograd Soviet on the occasion of the attempt upon the life of Lenin, it was said: "For the murder of Comrade Uritsky, and for the attempt upon the life of the leader of the world revolution, Comrade Lenin, the proletariat will answer the rotten bourgeoisie with death blows. Not with an eye for an eye, but with a thousand eyes for one. A thousand lives of the bourgeoisie for the life of our leader. Long live the red Terror!"

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Lenin thus delineated the goal of the Cheka: "The only way for the liberation of the masses lies in the extermination of exploiters. That is the task of the Cheka."

The executive of Dzerzhinsky in the Cheka, one of the most bloody henchmen of the Russian people, a Latvian, Latsis, - was still more frank: "The struggle is one of life and death. If you do not kill, you will be killed. Therefore kill, that you may not be killed!"

From the time of Stalin there appeared in use a number of new, but not less expressive slogans. Here are some of them:

"NKVD - The vindictive sword of the proletarian revolution!"

"Chekists - Bodyguard of the October Revolution!"

During the period of the Civil War of 1918-1922, the Red Terror cost many millions of lives. After the termination of the Civil War and after the Bolsheviks had consolidated their power over Russia, this terror not only failed to cease, but with each year it consumed more and more victims. System of agencies of suppression and compulsion was continually widened and penetrated deeper through-out all the pores of administrative, social, and economic life of the country.

On 21 February, 1922, All-Russian Extraordinary Commission (Cheka) was reorganized into the State Political Administration (Gosudarstvennoye Politicheskoye Upravleniye), in abbreviation - GPU, which quickly was renamed "Unified State Political Administration" (OGPU). The essence of this reorganization was that the system of vindictive organs of the Soviet dictatorship was significantly extended and a new system included additionally: border guards, transport guards, administration of places of confinement, and also significantly widened the net of secret agencies within the Red Army and the Communist Party. Beside that, by 1922 the Comintern was expanding its large activity. Correspondingly, the outer-political tasks of the GPU were to assist the Comintern in certain special spheres of its activities. The Cheka was designed to act only within the country, while the GPU, from the very first day, stretched out its tentacles beyond the borders of the USSR.



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This reorganization had also a great significance in principle: the Cheka was created, as an extraordinary measure, for the defense of the Soviet power during its most critical moments; but the OGPU, at the moment of its creation, was conceived as a permanent organ of the Bolshevik dictatorship. Thus, it was directly recognized, that the mass terror is an inalienable part of the Soviet system. In the course of twelve years, from 1922 to 1934, the Soviet power openly recognized this situation.

On June 10, 1934, the OGPU was reorganized into the NKVD of the USSR. This abbreviation comes from the full Russian title of that institution - Народно Комиссариат Внутренних Дел СССР. Formally this reorganization was explained by the fact that the period of struggle against the counter-revolution had ended, that the Soviet power was definitely strengthened, and therefore there was no more need for the existence of a special organ for the suppression of counter-revolution and opposition within the country. However, the "Great Purge", - beginning shortly after this reform, - with its millions of victims, showed that this official explanation did not in any measure correspond with the actual reason of the transformation.

The actual reason of this reorganization was that at this time the apparatus of the OGPU again so widened, complicated and expanded, that it could no longer be packed into the frame of one administration. The system of universal trailing and spying covered all of the country. This was no more, and by no means, one single organization. This was a complicated net of specialized organs of terror and spying, penetrating to the very deepest corners of the vast territory of the Soviet Union and far beyond its borders.

The essentials of the reorganization of 1934 were, that besides the complicated net of political supervision system of the OGPU, a new system of the NKVD included also the administration of the police and criminal inquiry, passport administration, administration of the fire department and administration of the transport, even a department for the recording of the acts of the civilian state (ZAGS). Besides that, the NKVD united and subordinated into one system all the numerous and widespread prisons, places of preliminary confinement, correctional labor colonies and correctional labor

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camp (the Soviet names for different types of concentration camps), with all their numerous and extraordinarily complicated auxiliary enterprises and institutions.

The basic departments of the OGPU, which performed the trailing and spying within the USSR and beyond its borders, were preserved, generally, in their former structure and were unified into the system of the "Administration of State Security" (UGB NKVD), which in the period of the "Great Purge" (1936-38) received the title of the "Chief Administration for State Security" (GUGB NKVD) - "Glavnoye Upravlenie Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti". Apart of this most important administration, in the system of the NKVD was created a number of other branches and administrations, which spheres of activity will be examined in the following parts of our work.

The fifth of February, 1941, the NKVD was divided into two commissariats: "The People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs" (NKVD) and "The People's Commissariat for State Security" (NKGB). This reform became indispensable after the period of the "Great Purge" and as a result of the forced annexation by the Soviet Union, in 1939-40, of a number of new republics. The apparatus of the NKVD became exceptionally large and complicated, and there was no longer room for this enormous apparatus in the structure of one commissariat. As a result of this reform, the personnel of both new commissariats grew yet more.

This reform took place by means of the separation from the NKVD of its principle administration - that of the Chief Administration for State Security. This organization was given an independent existence and elevated to the rank of a People's Commissariat - The People's Commissariat for State Security (Narodnyi Komissariat Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti, or NKGB). To it was given several necessary services: an administrative and service branch etc.

Under the control of the new NKVD were left the following: the administration of places of confinement and corrective-labor camps (GULAG), transport, militia (police), and passport branch, ZAGS (civil status registration office), fire-brigades, highway

transportation, administrative and service branch with its sanitary section, the numerous sanatoria and rest-homes for Chekists etc. As a result, the NKVD was transformed into a subordinate organization with secondary functions, but the "Sword of Revolution" was entrusted to the NKGB, that is, this new People's Commissariat for State Security reserved for itself the exclusive field of espionage, terrorism and suppression, and at the same time keeping its eye on the activities of the new NKVD.

Almost immediately after the beginning of the war, that is July 20th, 1941, the NKVD and NKGB were again united into the one NKVD under the direction of its former People's Commissar, Lavrenty Beria, who, at the time of the previous division, had been appointed Stalin's deputy in the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, with the task of co-ordinating the work of these two Commissariats.

The NKVD existed in this form until the end of the world war II. The reason for this unification could be found in the necessity of simplifying in time of war the administration of the complicated apparatus of suppression and terror. There is also no doubt that Stalin wanted Beria, as his personal friend and confidant, to reassure at this critical moment the single-handed control of this most important part of the Soviet system. In addition, this new reform was influenced by the fact that during the four months of their existence, these two new Commissariats did not have time to delimit fully the sphere of their activities. Under the conditions of military debacle and retreat, this could have led to the loss of control behind the front lines also. This was the situation in regard to the NKVD until 1945. Reviewing these re-organizations, we do not take into consideration the "SMASH" ("Death to Spies") which was created during the war within the frame of the NKVD, but as a semi-independent institution.

After the end of the war, the NKVD was again divided into the NKVD and NKGB and in March 1946 these Commissariats were renamed the "Ministry of Internal Affairs" (MVD) and the "Ministry of State Security". This was accomplished in accordance with the

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transformation of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR into the Council of Ministers. The principle of division of the NKVD after the war was the same as it had been in 1941: the Chief Administration of State Security of the NKVD, with the Administration of interior troops and border guards of the NKVD, and some servicing organisations became the Ministry of State Security (MGB), while all the remaining administrations and divisions of the former NKVD passed into the hands of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD).

According to the information which the authors of the present work have at hand, the internal structure of the separate divisions in the MVD and MGB remained almost the same as it had been in the system of the NKVD in 1939-1940, to which period refer the materials introduced here. The authors were able to register only one major change: ~~the~~ former "Administrations" of the system of the Chief Administration of State Security have been given the title of the "Chief Administrations" in the MGB. There have been no essential changes in either the methods or practice since that time, only the scope of activity has become even broader. In those isolated instances where the functions or the structure of these or other NKVD divisions underwent serious changes, these changes will be noted additionally. For this reason, the authors have permitted themselves in this analysis to use the present tense of verbs rather than the past, although the NKVD formally ceased to exist in 1946.

According to the Constitution of the USSR, the NKVD is a Union-Republican Commissariat and therefore its local organs must subordinate themselves to the higher organs of Soviet power in the republics, areas, regions and districts. But actually, the local organs of the NKVD are completely autonomous and are subordinated only to their own top-level agencies, while the NKVD itself, in all important questions of its activities, is subordinated only to the Politburo. The Council of People's Commissars of the USSR (now the Council of Ministers) has a former control over the NKVD only in financial matters, - but even this is merely an ephemeral prerogative. Practical control over the NKVD is carried out by the

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Politburo through the "Special Section" of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party, through a special group of the Party Control Commission (KPK CK VKP/b/), located since 1936 in the NKVD building, No 2 Dzerzhinsky Square, in Moscow, and through some other special agencies subordinated directly to the Stalin's "Personal Secretariat".

In a purely abstract case of political divergence or conflict between the government of the USSR and the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, the NKVD, now the MGB, is obliged to carry out only the orders and directives of the Politburo and the General Secretary of the Communist Party, that is of J.V. Stalin. Such a case took place only once, in 1937, when by the order of Stalin, the NKVD arrested and brought to trial <sup>the</sup> former chief of the Soviet Government, - the former chairman of the Council of the People's Commissars of the USSR, Alexei I. Rykov (it is true that by this time Rykov was "only" the Commissar of Communications). This example clearly illustrates that the NKVD is a governmental organ in form only, but factually it is an all powerful instrument of the party dictatorship, that is, of its supreme agency, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Party.

The two ministries remain as the same instrument of Party power, as in the time of the NKVD. The fact that they are subordinate to Beria, who is a deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, changes nothing at all, in so far as Beria is at the same time a member of the Politburo. It will be proper to recall that already in 1934 the transformation from the OGPU to the NKVD was explained thus: instead of a party organ there would be now a normal state organ; however, in reality, this re-organization was not followed by any change whatsoever in the character of the organ itself.

Cheka-OGPU-NKVD-MGB are actually different names for the same instrument of a terroristic system, heretofore unprecedented in the history of humanity. The only difference between them lies in the ever growing widening of their functions and spheres of activity.

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In summary, we can say that the mission of the MKVD-MGB is as follows:

1. Within the borders of the USSR

a) The uncovering and liquidating of all political movements and groups, even individuals who are hostile or in opposition to the Party and Soviet system, or even those who take a neutral stand.

b) The safeguarding of the accomplishments of party decisions and undertakings by all organizations and individuals without exceptions; this is done by secret observations of the activities of all governmental, economic, social, and in certain cases, even party organizations, and always and especially the armed forces of the USSR.

c) Permanent control of all correspondence to and from foreign countries, both official as well as private, and periodical and selective control of correspondence within the USSR.

d) In co-operation with the party, a preventative censorship of all printed matter in the USSR, notwithstanding its character or significance - beginning with the official Communist party publication "Pravda" and ending with the trademarks on cigarettes.

e) Protection of Stalin and other leaders of the Party and the Soviet government.

f) Security of the USSR's borders from the point of view of political as well as customs.

g) Protection of important military objectives, such as factories, bridges, etc.

h) Counter-intelligence work and observation of all foreigners in the USSR.

i) The management and protection of concentration camps and the exploitation of slave labor for the realization of the five-year plans, chiefly in the Far North.

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2. Beyond the borders of the USSR

a) Political intelligence and diversionary-terroristic activities in accordance with special instructions of the Politburo and in co-operation with the so-called "Sister organizations" - ("Smezhnie organi).

b) Co-operation, according to the decisions of the "Molotov Committee" of the Politburo, and the secretariat of the Comintern (Gominform), with the leadership of the foreign Communist parties in their struggle against the governments and hostile political parties of their countries.

c) The disruption, by infiltration, of all anti-soviet political organizations abroad.

d) Spying on all members of the Soviet diplomatic, commercial and other representatives and delegates of the USSR, and also on Soviet military spies.

e) Spying on all leading personnel of the foreign Communist parties.

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**CHAPTER III****STRUCTURE OF THE NKVD****1. Administrative Divisions**

In accordance with the 1936 Soviet constitution, the NKVD was an Union-Republic People's Commissariat just as the MVD and MGB are Union-Republic Ministries at present. This means that there is a central Union-Republic Commissariat (or Ministry) in Moscow and that there are Republic People's Commissariats (now Ministries) in each of the 15 republic capitals (for example: Kiev, Minsk, Baku, Tbilisi, etc.) which are directly subordinated in all most important features to the Union-Republic Commissariat (or Ministry) in Moscow. Only formally, and even then only in certain secondary administrative and budget questions are the Republic NKVD (now the MVD and MGB) controlled by the Councils of People's Commissars of the corresponding Republics (now: the Councils of Ministers)

**See the diagram No 1**

The RSFSR did not have its own NKVD (since 1947 there are MVD and MGB of the RSFSR). The duties of that organ were carried out by the office of the first deputy of the People's Commissar of the NKVD of the USSR. The functions of the NKVD of the RSFSR for regions located in the European part of that republic were ordinarily carried out by the NKVD regional administration for Moscow (abbreviated: UNKVD MO - Upravlenie NKVD Moskovskoi Oblasti). However, the UNKVD-MO did not dispatch orders in its own name to the regions, but administered such regional administration of the NKVD (for example, Tula) by sending orientations and inquiries with references to the orders of the Deputy People's Commissar or of the People's Commissar himself.

The autonomous republics did not have their own People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs, but only the regional administrations of the NKVD of those Union Republics to which the given autonomous republic belonged. So, for example, the Abkhazian ASSR,

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comprising a part of the Georgian SSR, will have the Abkhassian regional administration of the NKVD of the Georgian SSR. Autonomous republics of the RSFSR had the regional administrations of the NKVD of the USSR, while those autonomous republics having small population and no significant military or economic importance, might even come under the jurisdiction of the regional administration of the NKVD of neighboring regions of greater importance. So, for example, the Northern Caucasian autonomous republics of Northern Ossetia and Kabardino-Balkar and the autonomous region of Karachaev were "served" (to use the Chekist terminology) by the Ordjonikidze (former Vladikavkas) area administration of the NKVD of the USSR. Note: The above mentioned autonomous republics were liquidated during the World War II for the anti-soviet activities of their population.

The structure, that is the personnel complement and functions of the NKVD of a Union republic were determined by the size, as well as the strategic and economic importance of a given republic. In such extremely important republics as the Ukraine and Belorussia, their People's Commissariats for Internal Affairs represented somewhat smaller replicas of the All-Union NKVD in Moscow.

See the diagram No 2

In the less important Union Republics, the NKVD of the republics were organized and worked, actually, according to the authority of the NKVD regional administration. Earlier, they were termed the "fully empowered representations of the OGPU (abbreviated- PP OGPU - Polnomochnee Predstavitelstvo OGPU). In such Union Republics the importance of the local NKVD could even be less than the authority of an administration of the NKVD of large regions. For example, the Moldavian Republic's NKVD, by its size and importance, could be considered a much lower level than the NKVD regional administrations of Moscow and Leningrad.

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## 2. Local Agencies

### See the diagrams No 3 and 4

In general, the regional administrations of the NKVD have an identical structure and are fully empowered to resolve all local problems. For the RSFSR, the first Deputy of the People's Commissar of the All-Union NKVD and the office of the Chief Administration for State Security in Moscow furnished the directives for the local agencies of this republic. The remaining 15 republic NKVDs administered the local NKVD agencies located in the corresponding republics.

Practically, the main burden of work rests on the shoulders of these regional administrations. Stalin personally gave special attention to the furthering of the effectiveness of their preventive-terroristic activities. In his language this was cynically called: "making the NKVD intimate with the masses". It is precisely these local organizations of the NKVD, which cover the entire country like a mesh, that are the basis of the Stalin regime. The center only directs their activities and, at that, on the basis of material received from the local agencies.

From the point of view of operations, the regional administrations of the NKVD are divided as follows:

1. District sections of the NKVD ("райотдел" NKVD),
2. City sections of the NKVD,
3. Operational branches of the NKVD ("оперсектор NKVD").

The importance and role of the district sections of the NKVD does not require any special explanation at this place, they are organized in every district of any region ("област") or areas ("край") of the USSR corresponding to the administrative division of the Soviet Union.

City sections of the NKVD exist in all cities and industrial centers of the USSR which in importance are above the level of district centers. They work along the lines of an operational branch.

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In the last years before the war, in such powerful cities as Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, and others, in the efforts to delineate and divide the work, were introduced city administrations of the NKVD (as in the party system); for example - there were "The Moscow Regional Party Committee" and "The Moscow City Party Committee". In the same way there were: "The Moscow Regional NKVD Administration" and "The Moscow City NKVD Administration". These city administrations directed the work of the NKVD agencies only in the city itself, not considering the surrounding districts.

The operational branch could be compared to a district office of the NKVD ("raiotdel" NKVD), but having certain special duties. The structure and personnel complement of these branches are different. Their inauguration in this or that region was dictated by the presence in a given region of some special population group, which could not be dealt with by the ordinary district office of the NKVD and so a special "service" was required from the side of the NKVD. For example, within the Moscow regional administration of the NKVD there was created such an operational branch in connection with the existence in the Sarapukhov district of two or three settlements of German colonists (farmers).

The structure, personnel staff, and activities of the regional, city and district NKVD offices and those of NKVD operational branches will be treated in greater detail in following parts of this work.

Each organ of the NKVD, from the People's Commissariat down to the district office, has its own Party organization. In the local subordinate organs it is the "party group", in the sections - "party collective", in the important divisions and administrations there are "party committees", and in the People's Commissariat of the NKVD is the "Party Committee of the NKVD of the USSR".

From the regional or republic agency of the NKVD, and up, the Party organs publish their own newspapers. The newspaper of the Party committee of the People's Commissariat, titled "The Chekist", was published by the central printing office of the NKVD, in Moscow, and its birth goes back to the time of Dzerzhinsky, i.e. to

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the early twenties. There are evidences that the first editor of this newspaper was Djerzhinsky himself. The secretaries of the party organizations, beginning with the "party committee", are occupied exclusively with their party work and are freed from any other duties. All lower level party secretaries work in the party organizations and, at the same time, perform their basic duties in the organs of the NKVD.

In <sup>contrast</sup> distinction <sup>to</sup> from all other Soviet (i.e. governmental or public) organizations, the party organs of the NKVD occupy only a secondary position. In view of the secret character of work of the NKVD, the local party organizations cannot give either any kind of directions or cannot control the activity of the whole NKVD or of its separate parts, or even of individual Communists in the NKVD. Therefore, the sphere of activity of local party organs in the NKVD is limited to political-educational work (orientation of Communists in the spirit of Marxism-Leninism), carrying on political campaigns, as before the 1st of May, for example, etc.

### 3. Central Agencies

See the diagram No 5

At the moment of its division into two People's Commissariats in 1941, the NKVD of the USSR in Moscow had the following central agencies (with their sub-agencies in all Union Republics and in the NKVD administrations of areas and regions) :

Chief

1. Central Administration of State Security (abbreviated - GUGB NKVD - Glavnoe Upravlenie Gosudarstvennoi Besopasnosti NKVD SSSR);

2. Chief Administration of Border Guards and Internal Troops (abbreviated: GUPVO NKVD SSSR - Glavnoe Upravlenie Pogranichnoi Ohrany i Vozak NKVD SSSR);

3. Chief Administration of Camps of the NKVD (abbreviated: GULAG NKVD SSSR - Glavnoe Upravlenie Lageroi NKVD SSSR);

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4. Chief Administration of Militia and Criminal Police (abbreviated: OUM NKVD SSSR - Glavnoe Upravlenie Militsii i Ugolovnogo Kosyaka NKVD SSSR);

5. Chief Passport Administration (abbreviated: GPU NKVD - Glavnoe Paspportnoe Upravlenie NKVD SSSR) - this agency was subordinated to the Central Administration of Militia;

6. Chief Administration for Civil Status Registration (abbreviated: ZAGS NKVD SSSR - Glavnoe Upravlenie Zapisa i Aktoy Grazhdanskogo Sostoyaniya);

7. Chief Administration of Fire Guards (abbreviated: GUPO NKVD SSSR - Glavnoe Upravlenie Pozarnoi Ohrany);

8. Chief Administration of High Ways Construction (abbreviated: "Glavshodor NKVD" - Glavnoe Upravlenie stroitelstva Shosseinykh i Besrelsovykh Dorog NKVD SSSR).

In addition to these basic administrations, central agencies of the NKVD included also the sport society "Dynamo" and a series of service administrations and agencies such as, for example: administration of personnel, finance administration of the NKVD, "house-keeping" administration with the sanatorium section, which operates the sanatoria and rest homes of the NKVD, etc. All these service administrations are organized according to the ordinary type of the similar institutions in other People's Commissariats of the USSR, and there is no especial interest in analyzing them. These service administrations have sub-sections in all lower organs of the NKVD, but for simplification of the picture, the internal sub-structure of these service agencies will not be explained in detail. There will be exceptions to this only in separate cases, where the work of a service organ of the NKVD has some sort of special interest, as for example: the administration of personnel or the financial administration.

The structure, functions, and sphere of activity of each one of these basic administrations of the NKVD will be dealt with in detail in subsequent chapters of this work.

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#### 4. Higher NKVD Leadership

Just as in any other Soviet People's Commissariat, the NKVD was headed and directed by a People's Commissar with the help of the so-called "Collegia", i.e. his deputies and their staff - secretaries, adjutants, etc. But in the NKVD in the years prior to the war, the collegia as such, that is the permanent council of the People's Commissar with his deputies and assistants (so called members of the collegia) did not play the same role as in other governmental organs. The authors do not even have information as to whether the collegia convened to undertake any decisions from the time of Yeshov (1937-38), - as, say, was the case in the time of Yagoda (early thirties), when it was openly declared: "this one was executed by sentence of the collegia of OGPU".

Judging from all available evidences, the collegia in the NKVD was ~~substituted~~<sup>supplanted</sup> by many different agencies created gradually around the People's Commissar in connection with the increasing volume of the "work". Among their number were the agencies which comprize the so-called "Administration of the People's Commissar".

#### See the diagram No 6

This directorate seems to have been a super organ of the NKVD and consisted of the following: the Commissar himself, his secretariat, four (4) deputies, a special agent-representative for the Commissar, a special tribunal for the commissar, an interim control council and a central engineering-construction bureau.

First deputy of the People's Commissar. Ordinarily he is the chief of the Chief Administration of State Security (GUUS NKVD), and, at the same time, directs the regional and local NKVD administrations in the RSFSR. Sometimes he acts as the chief of the Moscow regional administration of the NKVD. Namely therefore, when the Moscow regional administration of the NKVD issues orders to other NKVD regional administrations throughout the RSFSR, this is always done under the authority of the deputy of the People's

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Commissar, and not from the chief of the Moscow regional NKVD administration (UNKVD-MO).

This post was occupied : 1935-35 by Prokofiev; 1936-37 by Zakovsky, 1940-41 by Markulev, who after the war became the first minister of the MGB.

The Second Deputy of the People's Commissar. He directs : the First Section (Perviy Otdel) of the NKVD - protection of the leaders, the Personnel Section, the Communication Section (Zeldsvyas), the house-keeping administrative offices, and the office of the administrative supervisor of the NKVD (the latter office performing the role of chief executioner of NKVD victims). Including the important problem of protection of the Kremlin and Bolshhevik leaders, this deputy is responsible solely for the inner and administrative problems of the NKVD itself. In 1939-41, Kruglov occupied this post; after the war he was appointed minister of internal Affairs of the USSR (MVD).

The Third Deputy of the People's Commissar. He directs : the Chief Administration of Militia and Criminal Police, the Chief Administration of Concentration Camps (GULAG), High ways and transportation administration, ZAGS (administration of civil status registration) and other establishments of the MVD type. In 1939, Kabulov occupied this post, and after the merger of the commissariats, in July 1941, he was appointed deputy to Beria in commanding the combined NKVD.

The Fourth Deputy of the People's Commissar. He directs : the Chief Administration of the border guards and internal troops of the NKVD, the administration of the border passport control points and all questions of co-ordination of activities of these administrations with other ministries of the USSR, primarily with the Ministries of Armed Forces and Foreign Trade. Here must be noted that until 1937 the prisoner escort troops were under the joint jurisdiction of the NKVD and of the Commissariat of Defense. In 1937-38, Frinovsky occupied this post.

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The Party Committee of the NKVD People's Commissariat. It occupies, as already stated above, a secondary position of importance. This is explained by the fact that, in addition to the confidential character of the NKVD work, the Commissar, himself, his deputies and the directors of the most important administrations are members of the higher party organs, up to the level of the Central Committee of the Party and the Politburo. Therefore, they are not obliged to account for their activities before the secretary of their party organization.

In the lower level organs of the NKVD the party committees enjoy somewhat greater importance, but even there they do not have a shadow of that decisive role which is characteristic in all other Soviet establishments, offices, and undertakings. In this we see still one more confirmation of the fact that the NKVD is not a governmental but purely a party organ. We recall that in the Central Committee of the Party, itself, there is also a Party Committee (which runs mostly the party activities of the auxiliary personnel of that office) which play an identical secondary role.

Special Council. This is a higher permanent judiciary agency of the NKVD. According to its official status, the Special Council consists of : the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR (NKVD), one of the secretaries of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party, and the Attorney General of the USSR. But the Special Council convenes itself in this form only for the examination of affairs of exceptional importance. Ordinarily, it consists of less important officials of these three agencies, acting with authority and on behalf of their superiors.

The NKVD itself ordinarily is represented in the Special Council (Osoboe Sovechanie) by some important official of the commissariat, but necessarily acting with the full authority and on behalf of the People's Commissar himself. This person represents the investigative aspect of any given case. The second member of the Special Council is the representative of the Attorney General of the USSR - fulfilling the prosecutor's functions. Sometimes, and rather often, this role is being given to some senior:



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member of the Military Prosecutor's office which works very closely with the NKVD. The third permanent member of the council ordinarily is the secretary of the Party Committee of the NKVD, acting with full authority of the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. According to this model are organized the Special Councils of each republican NKVD in the Soviet Union.

We shall analyze this agency more closely in the chapter dealing with the activities of the so-called "troika's". Here we have only to state that the "Special Councils" and "troikas" close that vicious ring, by means of which the NKVD becomes the supreme master of life and death of every Soviet citizen - it acts as a spy, police officer, investigator, attorney and judge simultaneously!

Special Agent-Representative for the People's Commissar. It is an official given a complete authority within a defined jurisdiction.

To this duty ordinarily is appointed one of the important operational officials of the central organs of the NKVD. His mission is to settle offenses of personnel of the commissariat itself. In all the republic and regional administrations of the NKVD there are also special agent-representatives who settle the offenses and other misdeeds committed by officials of the local NKVD organs.

The apparatus of the special agent-representative is composed of a special operating section, having 8-10 operative agent-representatives, all of whom are officials of higher authority such as majors or Lt. colonels of State Security. The offenses can be of a most varied nature: from reports of disciplinary offenses to accusations of belonging to the opposition or counter-revolutionary activities and plots. All cases of this type go through administrative channels of the NKVD and if the aspect of offense or crime is not fully apparent or is extraordinarily serious, then they are referred through the chief of the administration or section to the office of the special agent-representative for settlement. This special agent-representative presents his conclusion to the chief of the regional administration of the NKVD or even commissar himself for final decision.

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Curiously enough, according to Chekist customs, appeal to such conclusions and decisions is considered as "not ethical". The reasons of these unique "chekist ethics" are truly characteristic: the investigations are conducted by the "comrades" themselves, the decisions undertaken by the chief of administration, against whom nothing can be done. As to complaints to the Central Committee of the Party, they are out of question because they would immediately become known, and would result only in complicating the affair, in a scandal (with possible expulsion from the Party) and at any rate would result in dismissal from one's work and transfer somewhere to Archangel or Cheliabinsk, if not worse.

Inside the NKVD the special agent-representatives are either feared and avoided or the people attempt to curry favour with them by flattery and small gifts; that is to say, within the NKVD, the relations of the rank and file Chekists towards the special agent-representatives are just the same as the attitude of the population of the USSR towards all members of the NKVD.

When a special agent-representative, himself, gets in trouble, then all the other officials of the NKVD do not miss a chance to repay him for all former trouble occasioned by them by this individual. So, in 1938, by order of the deputy commissar Zakovsky, the special agent-representative of the Moscow region, Hypolytev, was arrested. He was incarcerated in the Taganski prison, in the common cell block, and then was shot. During the time of the investigation the officials of the administration, who earlier had sought his favor, went in droves to the prison in order "to slap him in the face".

The office of the special agent-representative has no agent net of their own.

Secretariat of the People's Commissar. It has just the same structure and personnel, in general, as have other secretariats of People's Commissariats (or Ministries) in the USSR. Within the secretariat is a control commission for the verification of activities of various administrations and for the clarification of

possible conflicts and misunderstandings among themselves. Linked with the Secretariat, also, is the office for investigating petitions to the People's Commissar. In the building of the NKVD, itself, (ordinarily in the office for entry permits) just as in all other Soviet Commissariats and Ministries, hangs a box for petitions, in which each visitor "may" drop his "petition", the ambiguous term delicately applied to complaints in the USSR. In view of the conditions prevailing in the USSR in general, and particularly in the NKVD, the existence of this office and of the boxes seems only a cynical fraud: since who would dare to make a complaint against the NKVD (especially to the NKVD, itself). The single type of "petitions" seem, therefore, confined to denunciations.

The Engineering-Construction Bureau. This bureau play an important role in the large-scale business enterprises, which are found in the undertakings of the NKVD. To this bureau come all technical inventions and projects, worked out by inmates of camps and prisons, spread throughout the whole territory of the USSR. In special cases, this bureau has authority to free prisoners essential for its work. But in the majority of cases, those prisoners who initiate important projects or inventions, simply are transferred from the jurisdiction of the prison or camp authority to the jurisdiction of this bureau, but still remain in the same prison or camp. Sometimes such prisoners are transferred to a special section of the prison. In such cases the prisoners can act as assistants in special sections, have automobiles, better provisions, but remain in strict isolation and fully cut off from any link with the outside world. In such circumstances, for instance, was the well known designer of steam boilers, Prof. Kamsin, imprisoned in the early thirties at the trial of the "Promparty" ("Industrial party"), and world renowned aviation designer A.M. Tupolev, arrested by the NKVD in 1937, and later freed during the war for copying the American B-29.

This bureau now comes under the jurisdiction of the MVD. There is reason to believe that the Soviet experimentations on atomic energy comes under the supervision of this body.

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### 3. Functions of NKVD Apparatus Components and their Officials

By a mere enumeration of components of the NKVD apparatus, one can see that there are two basic types of NKVD agencies, namely:

- a) Operative,
- b) Administrative or accomodative.

Operative sections (divisions or departments) and administrations (that is their official title - call to your mind the signature on the pass issued for foreign diplomats for entering the Red Square or the Kremlin) are such agencies of the NKVD, which directly fulfil the terroristic functions entrusted to them by the Kremlin oligarchs, - i.e. the Chief Administration of State Security (GUGB) in the NKVD system and the Ministry of State Security (MGB) nowadays. All other NKVD departments are only accomodating, in that or other form, these operative organs. So, for example, the Administrative and Supply Department supplies the operative agencies with stationery, special lamps for making the eyes of the examinees smart, silk stockings - through special Chekist PX - "Co-operative for NKVD officials and troops", etc. The Financial Department pays out the salary to the officials and employees, and gives out special sums for conspiratorial purposes according to the famous par.9. The Sanitary Department enables the Chekists, worn out by torturing their victims, to pick up their health somewhere in the luxury of the former palace of prince Youssouпов in Gercia, in the Crimea.

Similarly, the NKVD officials (we are considering here only those NKVD officials who are on the permanent staff) are divided into two categories: operative officials (otrudniki) and ordinary officials.

There are four grades of the NKVD operative officials:

- a) Assistant operative agent-representative (in Russian: pomocnik operativnogo upolnomochennogo)

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- b) Junior operative agent-representative (in Russian: mladshi operativni upolnomochni);
- c) Operative agent-representative (in Russian: operativni upolnomochni);
- d) Senior operative agent-representative (in Russian: starshi operativni upolnomochni)

In Russian, using the Chekist slang, the operative agent-representative is briefly called the "operupolnomochniy"; for an ordinary Soviet citizen it is one of the most terrible words that he knows, for it reeks of arrest.

The assistant operative agent-representative is the lowest category of operative officials. Usually, all novices begin their career in this capacity. But if the newly admitted official has been previously graduated from one of the numerous NKVD schools, he is appointed straight away as junior operative agent-representative or directly as operative agent-representative. After the grade of the Senior operative agent-representative the NKVD officials are named in accordance with the denomination of the operative unit they are supervising; thus, the official supervising a branch, is called "the chief of the NKVD branch", - and official, engaged as an assistant chief of the administration, is called "Assistant Chief of the Administration", etc.

But practically all these titles are usually abbreviated, and in official correspondence they are written like that: "pom.nach. IEO" (assistant chief of Foreign Division) or "nach.MOZO" (chief of the Administrative department). In the certificates of the NKVD officials ( a little black card made of cardboard and doubled up) for the sake of conspiracy it is only mentioned : comrade so-and-so is "assistant chief of the Division of the NKVD USSR" or " section chief of UNKVD LO (Leningrad region administration of NKVD). But we will give more details later on.

Since 1937 the military ranks, as existing in the Red Army, were also introduced in the NKVD in addition to the official titles. The essential difference was only in the fact that the scale of

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military ranks in NKVD was always one or two grades higher than in the army. Thus, for instance, the sergeant in the NKVD, i.e. a non-commissioned officer, corresponded in reality to the second lieutenant in the army both as to the rights and to the amount of salary. A lieutenant in the NKVD (Lieutenant of State Security) equals to a captain of the Red Army, and a captain of State Security equals to an army colonel. In other words, here a certain discrimination of the officers of the Soviet army took place. They are morbidly aware of this fact, especially as the officers of the Soviet secret police are much better provided for. This is one of the reasons for a certain hostility between the army and the NKVD units; for instance, you will never see army officer walking together with NKVD officers. But this is exactly what the Soviet regime needs so badly: two armies exist in one country, jealously spying after each other, and such a situation is considered by the Kremlin as the best guarantee against a military plot.

As to the methods of work of the NKVD from the organizational point of view, so, of course, they differ in many respects from the usual methods, among them the methods of military institutions. More than anywhere, the decision in a large part of cases is made resulting from personal or telephone conversations; these are, for the most part, such cases where secret organs are involved, where no traces have to be left, i.e. the nearest cases, often connected with personal interest of the officials etc. But even in this citadel of secrecy and conspiracy, the bureaucracy has found a stable seat. The typical maladies of the Soviet bureaucracy - the unwillingness to take over the responsibility and the tendency of "reinsuring" oneself (perestuzhivka) by getting a written sanction of the superiors, thrive also here. Not without reason, in the days of mass massacres, one of the most malicious masters in the art of butchering, the Deputy People's Commissar Zhelezny (executed in 1938) issued "orders about abolition of written orders" in a whole series of cases and especially insisted on the liquidation of "red tape and bureaucracy" in cases of condemnation to death. He himself brought the treatment of such cases

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to the highest grade of simplicity, putting only six letters "VSH. Zak." (vysshaya mera nakazaniia - highest degree of punishment - Zakovsky).

In the recent years the practice of guidance by means of the so called "operative conferences" has been widely spread. Such conferences, arranged according to administrative units (administration - division - section - branch), are usually informed about the important orders of the People's Commissar or about some other urgent arrangements when immediate steps have to be taken. It means that any instructions of the NKVD leaders may be carried into effect on the vast territory of the whole Soviet Union literally in the course of several hours. During the regular, i.e. not so urgent ~~managements~~ operative conferences the current problems are usually discussed, the instructions given, the reports heard.

The verbal instructions of higher authorities are called "settings" ("ustanovka"). Written orders usually confirm such settings, given formerly. Besides orders, local organs of the NKVD regularly get the so called "orientations" from the center. For the most part these orientations comprise data, received from the agents, about the activity of foreign spies and diversionists. These data may serve for the purpose of their detention if they appear on the territory of a certain NKVD agency. But there are also orientations of a general character; especially often the orientations of this kind are given to the local agencies and to the Border Guards, stationed on the frontiers of the Soviet Union. Such general orientations are called the informative ones.

The connection with local agencies is realized by means of correspondence, delivered by special armed courriers (field liaison - "Peldsvyas"), with the help of telephone net work of the NKVD, by means of usual telephone network (for non-secret conversations), by telegraph (using code) and radio, through the special radio-network of the NKVD. It has to be mentioned, that the communication section of the NKVD does not work exclusively for its own ministry, but is also available for all governmental and party

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organizations when secret letters have to be mailed. But as the USSR is afflicted by a "secretomania", it is not difficult to imagine the scope of work reserved for the NKVD in its capacity of letter-carrier.

From this point of view the NKVD is something like the second Ministry of communications in the USSR; it is enough to say that even the diplomatic mail going abroad or coming from abroad is delivered by the courriers employed by the NKVD and not by the Soviet Foreign Office. The telephone connection is achieved through a special telephone network, both for local purposes and for the trunk line telephone. For this purpose special cables are used. Besides all the leading officials of the NKVD have in their offices the so-called direct line, connecting them with their immediate subordinates in other cities of the country (for example in Leningrad, Minsk, Kiev and in other capitals of Union Republics). One has to believe that now the direct line connects also the capitals of all Soviet satellites with Moscow, at least through the diplomatic missions of the USSR in these countries.

The telephone station in Moscow is connected with the general city network. The city telephone network is obliged to give an immediate connection with the NKVD switch-board. By automatic telephone exchange the NKVD headquarters in Moscow may be reached by setting up "K-6" or "O-4". The NKVD telephone network is self-providing and does not depend on the city. Besides all the leaders of central governmental institutions have a direct line connecting them with the NKVD. So, for example, in Stalin's secretariat an NKVD telephone apparatus has been installed bearing the number 37-01, but for his conversations with the People's Commissar and other prominent NKVD officials Stalin uses normally the Kremlin automatic telephone exchange, the so-called "whirligig". As to the telegraph connection, the NKVD sends ciphered telegrams using the general line, but they are given in a special room reserved for governmental correspondence. The workers of this department are NKVD men, but for the sake of conspiracy are on the payroll of the Ministry of Communications. Telegrams, sent by the NKVD, are



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forwarded as governmental cases, according to the series "PK". As to the radio connection, more details will be given in the chapter dealing with the 2nd Special Division of the NKVD.

In conclusion we have to mention the NKVD archives where "cases" of all persons, <sup>whom</sup> whom the NKVD has already avenged <sup>in</sup> that or <sup>an</sup> other form, are kept ( persons whose turn has not yet come are registered with the 1st Special Division). These archives are used for reference, which may be necessary in connection with the inquest of some new case, and are situated in the cellar of House 2 in Lubjanka (old building). It includes the so-called reading-room where the NKVD officials may get acquainted with the cases, but for this purpose they must get permission from such a prominent worker as chief of the branch, sometimes even from the division chief. The Foreign division has its own archives which may not be used by employees of other NKVD agencies.

### h. Chief Administration of State Security

#### Tasks and structure

See the Diagram No 7

The Chief Administration of State Security (GUUGB NKVD MRRM) is the essential and most important agency of the enormous system of Soviet political terror, that has so many ramifications. Strictly speaking, the NKVD or MGB is the Chief Administration of State Security as such, for all other links of the NKVD system or "organs", if we use the Chekist slang, play only an auxiliary part. The "chastising sword" is the GUUGB. Just this Chief Administration of State Security is responsible for discovery, isolation and liquidation of real and imaginary "enemies of the people", real and especially potential antagonists of Communism and its dictatorial leadership. The GUUGB Chief is always the First Deputy of the People's Commissar for Internal Affairs. After the war, the Chief Administration of State Security was transformed into an independent Ministry of State Security as we have already mentioned above.

The general structure of this administration did not suffer any considerable changes since the time of the OGPU, and it was accepted by the new Ministry approximately in the same shape. Anyhow, one has to consider, that, though the structure was preserved, the numeration of some divisions was changed in the course of time, and by the end of the thirties most of the GUGB divisions were renamed as administrations, though the NKVD men continued to call these administrations divisions. This circumstance creates certain difficulties at the classification of the GUGB structure. Therefore the authors draw the attention of the readers at the possibility of some errors and inaccuracies in this respect.

As far as we could find out, at the moment of transforming divisions into administrations (approximately beginning with the year 1937) the GUGB had the following structure :

- 1st Special Division - a center of statistical operative recording of anti-soviet elements (ASL) and NKVD agents;
  - 2nd Special Division - a center of operative technics;
  - 1st Division - protection of the leaders and of the Kremlin;
  - 2nd " - counter-intelligence (KMO);
  - 3rd " - economic (EKO);
  - 4th " - secret political (SPU),
  - 5th " - "Osobiy Otdel" (OO) - spy work in the Army;
  - 6th " - transport (TO);
  - 7th " - foreign (IMO);
  - 8th " - prisons and places of detainment
- Inquest Office of the GUGB

In the course of expansion and re-organization of the NKVD system, such divisions as counter-intelligence, economic, secret-political, foreign and transport were renamed into administrations and their staff was correspondingly enlarged. The authors of this work have no information available as to the transformation of the "Osobiy Otdel" into an administration, though tasks and

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functions of this division "accomodating" the Army and the Navy immensely increased for the last 10-15 years. Further, both in the text and in the album of schematic diagrams the following denomination will be used for the GUQB central agencies : Counter-Intelligence administration (KKU), Economic administration (EKU), Secret-Political administration (SPU), Foreign administration (IKU) and Transport administration (TU), but the term Special Division ("Osobiy Otdel" or "OO") will not be changed. To complete the picture, the accomodating agencies such as Maintenance Administration and Financial Administration, with their branches, are shown on the diagrams, but no analysis of their work will be made as they have no essential meaning for the understanding of characteristic features of the NKVD, and their structure, upon the whole, is following the same pattern as ~~it is done~~ <sup>that it</sup> in all the other People's Commissariats of the USSR.

With the exception of the first and the second special Divisions and of the 1st Division of the GUQB, the numeration of divisions and administrations will not be mentioned either in the text or in the album of diagrams, as the NKVD frequently changed the numeration for the sake of conspiracy, as it was mentioned before. The last change in the numeration was made by the transformation of the GUQB into the MGB. As a result of the above mentioned facts, different materials which were made available to the authors, were often of controversial nature. According to one information, the Secret-Political administration which formerly had number 4, received in the MGB the name of the 3rd administration. Another source indicates that the title of the 3rd administration was reserved for the Counter-Intelligence administration, which was formerly called the 2nd administration. Approximately the same picture may be observed in the cases of the Foreign and Economic administrations. Under such circumstances the applying of numeration of administrations would only lead to misunderstandings and disorientation of the reader.

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The authors are fully aware of the fact that the giving up of the use of numbers for designating divisions and administrations, will be a serious defect of this work, especially as, approximately since 1937, all divisions and administrations of the NKVD-MGB are usually designated only by numbers in the whole official correspondence for the sake of conspiracy. In the certificates of the NKVD officials the name of the division where they are working, is never given.

The general features of the structure of administrations that were part of the GUGB, were not changed in the last fifteen years; the administrations of the MGB are based upon almost the same scheme that was made out for the corresponding divisions of the OGPU. The difference lies only in the scale, i.e. the administrations of the MGB are more cumbersome and have many more employees than the OGPU divisions. But the number of people on staff is not constant in that or another administration. Such staff may be either increased or diminished depending on the fact, which administration has the largest portion of work at the present moment, or, according to the picturesque expression of Yagoda, where the "GPU God" is seated, i.e. the terrorization of which part of the Soviet population is more important from the point of view of the Politburo at a certain time. So, for example, during the first Five-year plan and collectivization the residence of this "GPU God" was the Economic division, after the murder of Kirov he moved to the Secret-Political division, before the war his presence was distinctly felt in the Foreign administration, but during the war he moved again to the "Osebiy Otdel" and to the Counter-Intelligence administration. In such cases, some of the personnel of administrations and divisions less important at this period of time, are transferred to that administration on which the particular attention of the Politburo is concentrated at the moment.

In special cases separate administrations may be temporarily joined in order to fulfil this or another special task set by

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the Politburo, but the structure of each remains unchanged in the principal features. So, for example, during the war a special administration "СМЕРТЬ ШПИОНАМ" ("Smertj shpionam" - death to spies) was formed. Many foreign observers erroneously took this administration for the Counter-Intelligence administration of the Red Army General staff. In reality it was only a union of the "Osobiy Otdel" with the Counter-Intelligence administration of the NKVD under the general direction of the Deputy People's Commissar of the NKVD and Chief of the "Osobiy Otdel", General-Colonel V.G. Abakumov who during the war was directly subordinated to Stalin, as People's Commissar for Defence. Because of this, a mistake was made abroad in connecting the "СМЕРТЬ ШПИОНАМ" with the General staff of the Red Army. After the resignation of Stalin of his functions of People's Commissar for Defence, "СМЕРТЬ ШПИОНАМ" was liquidated and the administrations of the NKVD (now MVD), out of which it was formed, resumed their previous structure with only some minor changes.

For the period dealt with in this work (1939-1945), the general structure of the USSR NKVD of the USSR was as follows: (See the Diagram No 7) -

- 1st Special Division - registration of agents and operative recording of anti-soviet elements;
- 2nd Special Division - operative technique.
- 1st Division - protection of leaders and of the Kremlin;
- KKU - Counter-Intelligence administration (former 2nd Division);
- SRU - Secret-Political administration (former 4th or 3rd Division);
- KKU - Economic administration (former 3rd or 4th Division);
- OO - "Osobiy Otdel" or Special Division (former 5th Div.);
- Surveillance in the Red Army;
- TU - Transport administration (former 6th Division);
- INU - Foreign administration (former 7th Division);
- Administration of prisons and places of detention - (former 8th Division)
- Inquest Division - (former Inquest Office);

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The author ~~warns~~ <sup>cautions</sup> their readers ~~from~~ confusing the Transport administration of the GUGB ("Transportnoe upravlenie GUGB NKVD SSSR") with the Administration of Highways of the NKVD ("Glavshodдор NKVD SSSR"), which will be considered in the later chapters of this work. The first of these administrations is concerned with maintaining of State Security rules on the rail road and water transport, while the second one controls the auto roads and highways as the NKVD supervises them also from the technical point of view.

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CHAPTER IX  
THE FIRST SPECIAL DIVISION  
OF THE GUGB NKVD USSR

DISKRAM No 8

The terroristic activity of the NKVD inside the Soviet Union is based upon the registration and classification of two elements of the Soviet population : 1) NKVD agents, 2) the so-called anti-Soviet element ("ASE" - according to the NKVD abbreviation).

The first form of recording is called the agent-act registration ("uchet agentury"), the second one - the operative registering ("operuchet"). The recording of agents and "ASE" is the concern of the 1st Special Division of the GUGB NKVD, whose subdivisions or branches are to be found in all territorial agencies of the NKVD. The work of the 1st Special Division of the GUGB is closely connected with the Central Archives of the NKVD, where all the cases that have been dealt with by the Soviet punitive organs since the time of Cheka may be found on the files. But the work of the Central Archives is not doubled by the 1st Special Division, as the main task of the latter is the service to the operative organs of the NKVD in their current work.

The structure of the 1st Special Division is very simple. In the People's Commissariat (now Ministry) as such, as well as in all territorial agencies, it consists only of two sectors: 1) recording of agents, 2) recording of anti-Soviet element "ASE". These sectors may be considered as independent divisions and are subdivided into sections or branches, according to the character of the contingent of the population that is being registered or is subject to such a registration. Besides, in both sectors there are statistical sections that have to deal only with general numbers: general number of agents according to different nomenclatures, number of "ASE" etc.

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The "operative-statistical" section of the second sector systematizes the figures according to the summary ("svodka") compiled by all local operative agencies of the NKVD about the "political-moral" frame of mind of the population and about its reaction to these or other events inside the USSR and abroad. If no particular events took place, the "operative-statistical" section only systematizes the regular summaries of the operative agencies, and on their basis compiles reviews for the whole territory of the USSR and then turns to other problems: for instance, compiles a summary based on the reports of the local agencies of KRU about the anti-Soviet opinions, expressed by the former Russian emigrants who had returned to the USSR. A selection out of these summaries is regularly forwarded to the Central Committee of the Communist Party for the information of corresponding party organs.

#### OPERATIVE RECORDING

Operative recording or the so-called special recording of the anti-Soviet element is the concern of the 2nd Sector of the 1st Special Division GUGB NKVD USSR. Its tentacles embrace a huge number of the Soviet citizens and it is based on the individual card of special record, that is on the file for every person who is under suspicion of the NKVD.

All persons, registered with NKVD, are divided into categories, or, using the NKVD terminology, have their "tints". The corresponding category or "tint" is entered on the registration card of the recorded person; so, the registration card of a person, who uses to relate political views is marked by letters "AS", put in the corner - it means that the "tint" of this person is "AS" - anti-Soviet. The number of these categories or "tints" is very great. The basic ones are :

- AS - anti-Soviet element;
- B - "bielly" - "white" (former participants of the white movement in 1917-1921);

SECRET  
NO OFFICIAL USE



**PR** - "pretivnik" - antagonist. ( This category comprises members of former political parties in the pre-revolutionary Russia. The party membership is indicated by putting after this "tint" some additional letters: so, "PR/MR", or "PR/S" -will denote in the first case former "Menshevik", in the second - former "Kser" - Socialist-Revolutionary.

**KR** - Counter-revolutionary;

**TR** - "tserkovnik" - a man connected in some way with the church. Besides priests, this group comprises all believers who are active in their religious communities and in church matters. The sectarians (dissenters) are not recorded under the "tint" TR, for they are forming a separate group.

**S** - "sektantny" - sectarians (dissenters). From the operative point of view this group is considered equal to PR (antagonists).

**P** - "povstantsi" - insurgents. This group comprises all persons who took part in any rebellion at the time of Civil War, military communism and collectivization periods, and also persons who have shown seditious tendencies in later periods.

**N** - nationalists of all shades.

**SI** - "svyaz s inostrantsami" - connection with foreigners ( personnel of foreign embassies, exchange of letters with relatives abroad, etc.)

**shpion** - "shpion" - spies. This group includes all persons suspected of espionage on the basis of their correspondence, connection with relatives abroad, etc. It represents, so to say, the next stage of natural development after the person was registered as "SI".

**T** - terrorist.

**D** - diversionist.

**Prav.** - "pravyye" - the rightists. Members of the right opposition in the Party (Bakharinists).

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**Tr. - The Trotskyite.** The same symbol is used for the adherents of Zinoviev and other participants or supporters of the left opposition.

This list of recorded "tints" is in no case complete and it may be admitted that, in the years of war, it was made considerably longer by adding such new "tints" as F - fascist, H - adherent of Hitler, B - "benderist" (Ukrainian nationalist), Vl. - "vlasovets" (member or adherent of the Vlassov movement), ss. - "nizkopoklenik" - servility to the bourgeoisie etc. But even the list, given above, shows what a large part of the population is under the constant supervision of the NKVD. At the same time, it also shows how wide spread is the struggle of the people of the USSR against the Soviet regime. Together with all arrestees and millions of persons who are being "punished", the NKVD incessantly remind Stalin of the fact that his regime is the most terrible but, at the same time, the weakest in the whole world, for it is opposed by the huge mass of the population. All those persons, on whose cards the symbol of their "tint" has been drawn, are automatically set under a supervision of the NKVD agents.

Once more it has to be repeated that, in case of a corresponding directive from the Politburo, all persons sharing that or another "tint" are arrested, and their further fate depends not on their real guilt but on the "general line of the Party" for the present period of time.

Data, gathered by the agents during their watch (during "rasrabotka" - "elaboration" in the Chekist terminology) of a certain person who has been recorded with the special NKVD registration, gives a start for building up a "case".

"Cases" are divided into the following groups:

1. "Agenturnaya rasrabotka" (agent elaboration) which is officially called "agenturnoye delo" (agent case), and embraces a group of persons sharing the same views, who are tied together by periodic encounters, conversations or personal friendship.

2. "Delo formulir" - ( service list case), where only one principal person who is under suspicion ( "figurant" according to the Chekist terminology) is being "elaborated", and all his connections are being recorded only to complete the case. In most cases the "service list case" is sooner or later transformed into an "agenturnoye delo", or (provided the "figurant" shows any activity) leads to <sup>his</sup> arrest.

The overwhelming majority of cases of "figurants" who are being "elaborated" by the operative MVD organs, are on the records as "service list cases". Under normal conditions, the group cases are comparatively rarely recorded on the files of the 1st Special Division.

3. "U-D" ("Uchetnoye delo") - "registration case" is brought against less active "figurants". Usually as a basis for such a case serves some instruction from the center ordering to make records about a certain group of population. For example, in 1935, after the customary purge in the party, a considerable percentage of the so-called "hangers on" ("primasovshisya") was excluded from the party, as being not fit for this high privilege. On the ground of a special secret instruction all such persons were registered as "U-D" in those cases <sup>in which</sup> when they were not accused as Trotskyists, or when their ABZ registration cards had not been previously marked out with some other "tint". Later on, following a new special secret directive, a campaign of liquidating the people registered within this group, was carried on, and ... par.169 of the Criminal Code of the USSR (ill-intended fraud, or forgery) was incriminated against them .

4. "Liternoe delo" - "lettered case" is usually concerned with a certain industrial or some other object. This case includes all lists of persons on the staff of this enterprise, different data of official commissions, correspondence with trusts, acts of audits, materials of Party purges, different declarations, anonymous statements and other casual materials - up to the information that this enterprise does not fulfil the program of the output, reports about the breaking out of fire, about damages etc.

All this is completed by a special list of persons, included in this "Lettered Case". Such a special list usually does not show persons that have already been recorded according to some "tint". Usually this list is composed of the names of persons, about whom the NKVD has some material of small importance, i.e. anonymous denunciation, expulsion from the Komsomol because of the loss of the membership card, or even some suspicion. All these persons are specially recorded and registration cards are made out marked with the symbol "L-D" ("Liternoye dielo"). This category is considered to be the least active one, still the presence of a card, marked with "L-D" on the files of the 1st Special Division, is already like a brand and puts certain restrictions <sup>on</sup> the person concerned both in his social life and his activity. For instance, if such a person is casually included in a list of guests to be present at a session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR (and the names of such guests are invariably checked with the special registration files) he will never get the invitation card for the session.

The center for special recording of anti-Soviet elements is the 2nd sector of the 1st Special Division of the USSR NKVD (now KGB USSR). In its hands detailed statistical data as to "tints" and as to the spreading of these tints in republics, regions and districts of the Soviet Union are concentrated. Usually, besides collecting statistical data, the 1st Special Division makes out special geographical maps according to the "tints". This enables the leadership of the People's Commissariat at any time to orient themselves in directing the work of the NKVD agencies in the whole USSR and in separate republics and districts.

Not only the "tint", but rather detailed data about the recorded person are marked on the registration card. (See Appendix). In the local subordinate agencies of the NKVD the registration card of the recorded person is filled out in three copies; one copy is forwarded to the agency that is conducting the "elaboration"; the second one is sent to the 2nd Special Division of the Regional administration of the NKVD - to control the "elaboration", and the

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third one goes to Moscow, to the 1st Special Division of the center, statistical section.

Statistical records of the 1st Special Division of the People's Commissariat and of the 1st Special Divisions in local NKVD (MGB) administrations are kept in absolute secret. According to an order of Lavrenty Beria, issued in 1940, the chiefs of regional administrations were prohibited to give any information in this respect even to the secretaries of the regional committees of the Communist Party, who could obtain these data only through the Central Committee of the Party. For this purpose, the chief of the 1st Special Division in Moscow had to adapt and filtrate these data, and forward them to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party only when they acquired special wording. It was well known in the NKVD circles that this order was provoked by the fact that new secretaries of the regional committees of the Bolshevik party, who took over this work after the "Great Purge" and who were often recruited, in this period of time, from the NKVD men, in a series of cases made such demands to the chiefs of the regional NKVD administrations and received the wished information. This is a clear illustration of the fact, that the NKVD does not reveal its secrets even to official representatives of the ruling party, with the exception of its highest organs.

In the NKVD (MGB) regional administrations the staff of the 1st Special Division is divided between two branches (operative recording and registration of agents). The employees of these branches enjoy the rights of the operative agents-representatives and their assistants, but in fact they are functionaries, clerks and statisticians.

In addition to the data of special records, all operative agencies of the NKVD-MGB are systematically and regularly compiling summaries about the frame of mind of the broad masses of the Soviet people and their reaction to certain events inside the Soviet Union and abroad. These summaries are forwarded to the

"operative-statistical" branch of the 2nd sector of the 1st Special Division GUGB NKVD for the purpose of systematizing the picture of moral-political state of the population throughout the whole Soviet Union. Here is one of specimens of such a summary: after the governmental decree about the abolition of the ration-card system in the USSR, all the regional NKVD administrations through their operative agencies collected reports about "negative attitude in connection with the decision of the Party and Government to abolish the ration-card system". These summaries depict in short the character of statements made by separate persons, giving their "tints". The most characteristic facts are reported to the chief of the regional NKVD administration and certain measures are taken - up to the arrest. But this is not the most important thing. Much more essential is that the chief of the administration, having received the statistical picture of the frame of mind of the population in his region, sends a copy of these figures, in the form of a ciphered telegram or radiogram, to the "operative-statistical" branch of the center, in Moscow, where these materials are summarized and forwarded to the NKVD People's Commissar for a report to Politburo, or simply for his information.

This double system of constant operative recording of "tints" and regular summaries about the frame of mind of the population fully enables the leadership of the NKVD-MGB to dispose the forces of their network as it is needed by the concrete situation in the country. In fact, it is nothing else but a constantly active and very intensive reconnoitering of forces and disposition of the enemy, where their own people is meant under this term. This is the principal difference between the system of the operative recording in the NKVD-MGB and the similar methods used by police agencies of all other countries of the world. The matter is not only in the scale, and not in the fact that in the USSR the punitive organs carry out a special registration of such elements of the population, who in no case could be classified as "criminals" in any other country of the world.

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The peculiarity of the Soviet operative recording lies first of all in its preventive character, i.e. the registration card of the NKVD-MGB is filled out for a certain citizen of the Soviet Union not because he or she committed any crimes or offences, but only because the personnel of the Soviet punitive organs considers him, or her, to be able to commit such crimes or offences in the future.

The second peculiarity may be seen in the fact that a registration card, once filled out for a certain person, is never destroyed even if the "tint", marked on it, is not substantiated or is a result of an obvious calumny. The man may be acquitted in the court, may be fully rehabilitated by the party organs, but the files of the NKVD-MGB will brand him for ever. The All-Union Communist party and its punitive organs do not apply the notion of the "term of limitation" to the actions of their political antagonists, and the NKVD-MGB may at any time resume the persecution of any person for actions performed twenty or even thirty years ago. If this happens, it is only necessary to "renovate" to some extent the case of such a person, and this is one of the main tasks of the Soviet operative recording. This is what is called the "record of the figurant's activity".

The third, and may be the most essential, peculiarity of the Soviet operative recording is that its data are never checked up by anybody else. The Commission of the Party Control in Moscow may check the activity of the NKVD-MGB, but there does not exist such an organization in the whole USSR that could check the equity of data, filling in millions of registration cards in the numerous recording sectors of the punitive organs, scattered all over the country. The lack of "vigilance" is severely punished in the USSR, but the Bolshevik rulers will never blame their punitive organs for the overzealousness in this respect.

The People's Commissariat as well as the local NKVD administrations strictly stick to the principle that in the 1st Special Division a certain employee occupies himself with one definite "tint" and does not get in touch with work and data of other

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branches. The officials of other NKVD divisions and administrations have no access to the files of the 1st Special Division and they can contact this agency only through their secretariats, which are directly subordinated to higher NKVD organs.

The operative-statistical recording is the basis for all political and operative work of the whole complicated network of NKVD-MGB agencies, that spread their sticky cobweb over the whole country. If any political discontent of anti-communist nature arises in the country, the geographical files of the operative recording will immediately show where this "tint" was most active for some time past, and where the principal, or most dangerous from the Kremlin's point of view, center of such a movement is located. All NKVD forces will be disposed there, the agents among persons of this "tint" will be recruited and thus the discontent will not be allowed to turn into a direct resistance movement.

The access to the map of "tints" is free only for a very limited circle of the most prominent officials in the Soviet secret police. Neither its whereabouts nor even the fact of its existence is known to the majority of the NKVD men. Probably, from time to time this map is shown to Stalin. It is even more probable that he has either a copy of this map, or his own map which has been compiled by a special "NKVD" inside the NKVD - by a Special Sector of the Central Committee of the Party.

In the days of war the "Generalissime" made his decisions as to the plan of military operations, bending together with Zhukov and Vassilevsky over a secret "operative map" showing the dislocation of Hitler troops. This map was drawn for him by the 4th Administration of the General Staff. In the days of peace he examines in the same way, together with Beria, Merkulov and Kruglev, a map showing the dislocation of anti-communist activists among the peoples of Russia - the map drawn for him by the 1st Special Division ...

This system of constant and secret "operative recording" makes possible for the NKVD-MGB to leave to its mercy the whole of the population in the USSR. The NKVD-MGB registers every libel,



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every anonymous denunciation and, without a special order from the Kremlin, does not show either to its victims or to the court, on which data its actions were based.

A real liberation of the peoples of the USSR from Bolshevism will be completed only at the moment when, after the liquidation of Chekists and their Kremlin bosses, all files and archives of the Soviet punitive organs will be destroyed.

### Recording of Agents

If the operative recording of ASB (anti-Soviet elements) is basic for the distribution of forces and direction of actions of the Soviet punitive organs, the work with agents, their recording and classification is the principal element in the operative work of all NKVD-MGB agencies. The constant tension inside the country and the fact, that the Bolshevik potentates are fully aware of the hatred they have inspired to all strata of the population, led to the creation of a mass net of NKVD agents in the USSR. This net consists of many millions of secret agents belonging to different divisions and administrations of Soviet punitive organs.

It may be supposed that the principle of the <sup>German counter-</sup> ~~intelligenced~~ intelligence service, aiming at creating a possible wider net of agents, was borrowed to a certain extent by the setting up of a Soviet network of agents. But the Soviet system proceeded considerably further, and a network of mass agents was set up not only by the Counter-Intelligence administration of the NKVD, but also by the rest of its administrations and divisions, first of all by the Secret-Political administration, "Osobiy Otdel", Economic administration and Transport administration.

The system of recruiting, classifying and recording the agents in all these administrations is almost the same, though first of all it is worked out by the counter-intelligence administration. Still it would be erroneous to refer all the work of agents to the counter-intelligence branch, as it is done in all other countries of the world, as far as the Soviet Government

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leads a constant war not so much against external enemies as against peoples of its own country. The essential forces of the Soviet punitive organs are just concentrated on this internal struggle with the population.

The statistical and operative recording of agents employed by all NKVD-MGB agencies is the concern of the 1st Sector of the 1st Special Division of GUGB in Moscow and corresponding offices of republican, regional and area administrations of the NKVD. All territorial and specialized agencies of the NKVD-MGB fill in special registration cards for all their agents (see appendix). Copies of these cards are forwarded to the files of the 1st Special Division in Moscow (1st Sector) for further classification and statistical recording. This is the center of recording for agents of all NKVD-MGB organs throughout the Soviet Union, and therefore it is more convenient to make an analysis of principles of the classification of agents and the work with them, in connection with the analysis of structure and field of operation of the 1st Special Division of the GUGB NKVD USSR (now Sub U.S.S.R.). But, of course, it does not mean that the recruiting of agents and the work with them is the concern of this NKVD branch. This practical work is carried out by different operative agencies and depends on the tasks they have to fulfill. The 1st Special Division of the Center, in Moscow, and its local branches are concerned only with the operative recording of agents.

### Agents

There are several grades of agents, differentiated by their field of operations, competence and their significance in the NKVD-MGB system. The principal categories of the agents are the following :

	Usual abbreviation:
1. Resident	"R"
2. Agent	"ag"
3. Special agent	"sp/ag"
4. Agent of internal observation	"ag/V" ("Vnutrenny" - internal)

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5. Secret informer "a/o" ("oswiedomitelj" - in-  
former
6. Secret informer for lodging "80/K" ("kwartira"-lodging)
7. Tenant of conspirative quarters - Ch/KK ("Chonyain"-  
tenant)

These categories of agents have the following peculiarities:

1. Resident. Is usually member of the Communist Party or a former Chekist, failing this - a Komsomol. He may be also picked out of capable and reliable informers, but he must invariably have practical experience in conspiracy and agent's work. Carrying on his usual official tasks, i.e. being the Chief of the Secret Department of some factory, Chief of the Personnel Section of some works, Assistant Commander of a military unit as to political work ("pompolit"), such a man is at the same time an NKVD man, "accomodating" this industrial or military object, i.e. supervising it.

A special personal file is kept for every resident with manifold characteristics and check-ups, including a check-up with the files of the 1st Special Division of the regional administration and center. In this file are noted and checked all his connections and acquaintances, whereby his family and all his relatives are checked in the most careful way. Some anti-Soviet statements, i.e. any critical remarks on the address of the Soviet government made by persons, connected with this man or their former social background, can be no obstacle for this man to be appointed resident. But if the registration cards of the persons connected with him, are marked with such "tints" as "Shp" (spy), "T" (terrorist), "KR" (counter-revolutionary), "Prav." (rightists), or "Tr" (Trotskyist) - he cannot be appointed resident.

A resident is connected with a "network" of 5-8-12 agents and secret informers, whom he receives according to a special time-table, instructs them and collects their information. Only the resident is usually paid for the work. As to the "network", this or another method of compulsion is used, and people work

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out of fear for the consequences of not fulfilling their obligations, which these secret agents and informers have signed in the NKVD agency that recruited them.

Residents are future official employees of different NKVD-MGB agencies; there are no specifications as to the terms of their work as residents.

2. Agent. Usually<sup>2</sup> secret informer, but invariably belonging to that or another registered group of "tints", having connections with the ASB-group. So, for instance, if an agent is needed for the "elaboration" of the Trotskyists, a Trotskyist is picked out for this work, and especially such a Trotskyist who is in full confidence of the group to be elaborated. The agent is recruited with the help of some concrete compromising material and invariably is brought to a stadium where he has to make his decision, having been told - "NKVD work or prison!". Operative expenses of the agent - for trips, entertaining his friends, etc. - are usually paid. Sometimes agents receive some periodical rewards for their work. But upon the whole, agents work out of fear, i.e. trying to save themselves and their families from possible repercussions by loyal spying for the NKVD.

3. Special agent. There are two categories of such special agents according to the character of the tasks they have to fulfill, though these categories are not mentioned in the operative recording. The first group is composed out of specialists in some branch of national economy or industry, such as chemists, metallurgists, building engineers etc. The task of these agents is to control the work of some enterprise or trust and to expose all elements of sabotage, wreckage etc.

The second category of agents-specialists includes pickpockets, burglars, specialists for opening safes and other highly-skilled criminals. These agents-specialists fulfill various tasks. For instance, an agent-representative has to make a secret perquisition (called "vyemka" by the Chekists) in the home of a "figurant" whose "elaboration" is in process. For some reasons this perquisition is appointed for "17,00,<sup>h2</sup>" but usually the owner

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of the lodging comes home at that time. It is necessary to detain him in some way so that he does not see the agent-representative making<sup>a</sup> search in his room. For this purpose a specialist-kooligan is summoned. He waits for the "figurant" somewhere in the street and, using some kind of pretext, attacks and beats him. A scandal breaks out, both are brought to a police-station, the case is investigated for 2-3 hours and at last the victim of the assault is set free. In the meantime the perquisition is brought to an end. The agent-representative rings up the police station and the agent-bandit is set free. Though this method is very mean and cynical, nevertheless it is rather often applied by the NKVD men.

The first group of special agents work without pay and exclusively under compulsion, but the agents-criminals get their rewards. The same group comprises cheats, prostitutes, jugglers etc. These "useful services" of the criminal underworld to the operative agencies of the NKVD are partly responsible for the fact that these "socially-close" elements are granted different privileges and advantages in the prisons and camps, and they are even promoted to different administrative posts, including that of camp commanders. The USSR is the only country in the world where burglars and murderers command the imprisoned professors, engineers, actors and writers.

A. Agent of internal observation. This is a non-active agent recruited from the immediate environment of the "figurant" (very often from his own family), but who is not registered with the "tint", marking the registration card of the "figurant". As such an agent may serve the sister of a Trotskyist, who is in permanent contact with him and knows or may know more about him than anybody else or may help in carrying out some measures that would lead to the activation of his "elaboration". Such persons are recruited after a very careful study, and usually some very important material, mostly of private character, is applied; the fear of revelation forces these persons to work for the NKVD. Thus, these people are simply victims of blackmail. If such material is not available, it is prepared artificially. Very often such a

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candidate for an agent is persuaded that he must work in this branch for the sake of safety of the very person, who has to be the object for this special observation.

For instance, the sister of the "figurant" is summoned to the NKVD, where forged papers are shown to her while she is being told, that the NKVD agencies are aware of the fact that somebody wants to recruit her brother or half succeeded in doing this. But this is not so important, they say, - "we know that your brother is a good man, but we must take hold of the persons, who want to entangle your brother into their dirty meshes. You must help us in this respect for the sake of safety of your brother" ... The unfortunate woman gives her consent and, not knowing herself, helps the NKVD to ruin her own brother. Such plotting led and leads to many terrific personal tragedies, but the people "who are guarding the conquests of the revolution" are not at the least embarrassed by them.

The work with such kinds of agents is very delicate and requires a lot of tact and shrewdness. Therefore, it is usually entrusted to experienced operative agents-representatives or even deputy chiefs of the branches. Such agents are usually rewarded for their work, but not necessarily with money or material goods. A frequently applied form of reward is a promise to facilitate the fate of relatives or intimates of such an agent.

5. Secret informers. This is the most widespread and the less specialized species of NKVD-MGB agents. When millions of agents of the Soviet secret police are mentioned, one refers just to this category. Secret informers are recruited by the NKVD-MGB organs out of all strata of population, whereby no distinction of age and sex are made. According to a secret instruction, issued at the times of Yagoda (1934-1937), only children below the age of 12 cannot be recruited for this work - they do not stick to conspiracy. As to all the rest of the population of the Soviet Union, the NKVD-MGB agencies consider it to be a gigantic reservoir for recruiting secret informers. This recruiting is usually done by means of blackmailing, threats, bullying and, in less frequent cases, mostly when young people are concerned, by

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influencing their patriotic feelings.

As strange as it may seem, but directly this miserable figure of a secret informer, terrorized and despising himself, is essentially supporting Stalin's dictatorship. Experience has shown that Stalin cannot trust either workers or peasants, or army, or even his party - all hate him and would sacrifice all to overthrow his odious tyranny. He can fully rely only upon this miserable secret informer. Of course, the latter also hates "the beloved leader", and may be even more than anybody else. But he has nowhere to go - he is entangled in the NKVD meshes, he constantly walks with a loop around his neck and therefore, even against his will, he is forced to carry out the orders of his tormenters. There are millions of secret informers - they are recruited among workers, party members, intellectuals, collective farmers, students, pensioners, housewives. The overwhelming majority of them work out of fear and do not get any rewards. Their exact number is unknown, but legion is their name.

6. Secret informer for lodging. This special category of secret informers has only the task of controlling who enters a certain house or lodging, when, how long he stayed and what happened then in the lodging. Besides that, such an agent may be entrusted with getting letters, things etc., from a person, who lives close by and is "elaborated" by the NKVD. This category includes first of all housemasters and house-managers, whose duty is to notify the NKVD in a regular way about all events, happening in their houses. But frequently some lodgers of "communal" i.e. common lodgings are recruited for this purpose, especially housewives and pensioners who spend much time in their lodgings. In many cases domestic servants are recruited to spy <sup>upon</sup> after their masters. They are usually paid for this kind of service.

Quarrels and squabbles among families occupying common lodging are frequently used by the recruiting of these agents. In some cases such agents get a reward, but in most cases they give their information with the wish to do an ill turn to their

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neighbour who lives in a better room, has better food, wakes in the radio late at night etc. Soviet conditions of life create ideal grounds for recruiting such agents, but all their information has to be carefully filtrated, for it often bears strong traces of personal feelings.

2. Tenant of a Conspiratorial Quarters. Usually he is a Communist, a Komsomol or at any rate a person who was well checked up. The principal requirement - limited circle of connections (all of them have to be checked up) and a lodging, suitable for conspiratorial meetings with residents or agents. Such a tenant is regularly paid. All members of the family have to sign a promise of silence. If there are any children, conspiratorial quarters cannot be established.

Every operative worker must have at least two such conspiratorial quarters; one of them may serve for meetings with agents and informers, the other - only with residents (for the sake of conspiracy). Usually for meeting agents two or even three lodgings are available, but agents suspicious or even dangerous as to double-dealing are usually seen in hotels. As a rule, operative workers and residents see no agents at home and do not conduct any work there.

The former chief of the American Military Mission in Moscow, General John H. Dean, describes in his book "The Strange Alliance" some of his meetings with leading officials of the NKVD Foreign administration, General-Lieutenant P.M. Fitin and Major-General A.P. Ossipov. The purpose of this meeting was to establish a working arrangement between the American O.S.S. and the Soviet Intelligence agencies. The American general was greatly puzzled by the fact that these two leading workers of the Soviet secret intelligence never met him at the same place twice and always took the greatest precautions when arranging these meetings. Once the driver of the NKVD car who had to bring him to this meeting, arranged a true race along the Moscow streets trying to lose the private car of the American general, the Russian driver of which was following the NKVD car at the heels.



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Obviously in this case Fitin and Ossipov did not want to give up the usual principles of their work, and besides they probably had instructions to arrange these meetings without any supervision by the agents of the "external observation" (L-M) of the 2nd Special Division of the GUGB NKVD and "SMKKKH" administration, whose agent was, probably, was the private Russian driver of the American general. The circumstances under which these meetings took place greatly surprised the American general, but they were typical for the NKVD principles of work. In this case Fitin and Ossipov met their American counterparts under the same circumstances, as an average NKVD operative agent-representative meets his residents and agents. There can be no doubts that all this had been done deliberately and after some serious discussion in the highest quarters of the NKVD. What was the secret aim of all these tricks - is hard to say, but there had to be one.

#### Recruiting of Agents

As a rule, the recruiting of an agent is preceded by checking with data of the 1st Special Division, and, in more important cases, with files of all operative divisions and their special archives. Enquiries are invariably sent to : 1) place of birth - about the social origin of the parents and their background; 2) NKVD agency, "accommodating" the region where the candidate lives; 3) NKVD agency, "accommodating" the industrial or any other object, where the candidate works. Besides that secret characteristics of the candidate are demanded from the local party organization (this is very often camouflaged so as if these characteristics are asked for by the regional military commissariat, police-station etc.), then a "setting" ("ustanovka"), i.e. checking up is made in his place of residence - usually through house managers, house-masters and other "agents for lodging". All these data are used as basis for a "Report for recruiting".

The recruiting of a resident must be sanctioned: in regional administrations - by the chief of the division or administration; in Moscow - by chief of the branch of the division in question.

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The recruiting of an agent is sanctioned in the same way. If the agent has been picked out of the number of "figurants" of a certain "elaboration", for which, of course, he is recruited, his recruiting is sanctioned by the deputy chief of the NKVD administration. Recruiting of other categories of agents are sanctioned and approved by less responsible officials, usually by chiefs of the branches or sections.

The "report for recruiting" must contain the data for the "setting" of the recruited person (i.e. the conclusions drawn from the materials dealing with his person); besides it must be mentioned where and how the actual recruiting will take place, who is recruiting and for what purpose, and also what steps will be taken providing the recruited person will refuse to work for the NKVD.

The actual recruitings are usually based either on the so-called loyalty to the Soviet regime (residents, tenants of conspiratorial quarters, in some cases - secret informers) or on some compromising material which is either available or artificially created. If a "figurant" is recruited out of a certain "elaboration", he has usually to choose: either work for the NKVD or arrest with all its consequences. If the material is created artificially and the recruiting is based on blackmailing, some additional material of this kind is usually available which is used if the first method of recruiting fails. If the candidate still persists in his refusal to work for the NKVD, he must sign a promise of keeping silence about the negotiations and then he is recorded as an "antagonist", thus being put in the same level with oppositionists and sectarians. The refusal of work for the NKVD is usually followed, some time later, by the arrest of the unyielding candidate.

There are cases when agents that have been recruited, either commit suicide or perform some other desperate deeds. So, for example, in 1957 L. Krasotina, relative of late Pobedonostsev, the former attorney general of the Holy Synod, took

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poison in Moscow, after having signed her consent to work as an agent of "internal observation", i.e. for spying against her closest relatives. In 1941 a Hungarian girl K. threw herself out of the window of her lodging after having given her consent to work against her fiancé. Such tragedies occur for the most part when a certain person is recruited to work inside his or her own family. Both these cases, mentioned above, were thrashed out on the operative conferences of NKVD divisions, and the Chekists who actually carried out the recruiting in these cases, were dismissed and sent to some less responsible work - as punishment for "want of skill in recruiting" but not as murderers of two innocent human beings. As far as it is known, the operative workers are always punished in some way for failure at the recruiting.

Curiously enough, according to the NKVD materials, the most difficult categories for recruiting consist of former Social-Revolutionaries (Es-er), Mensheviks and churchmen. The most easy task is considered in the NKVD to recruit agents out of the number of Trotskyists and Rightists.

While being recruited, the candidate has to sign his consent, and, if he is supposed to be an agent, he is immediately asked to give his first material. Secret informers are gradually introduced into the course of their future activity. At first, their contributions are limited to the information bearing general character, and only after some time they receive definite and concrete tasks. But there are no firm rules in this respect, and in every separate case the operative worker himself must find individual ways of approaching agents and secret informers of his team as he thinks it best.

Special registration cards are filled in for every recruited person and forwarded to the 1st Special Division of the corresponding regional NKVD-MGB administration and to the 1st Sector of the 1st Special Division of the center, in Moscow. The 1st Special Division of the NKVD-MGB regional administration sends a numerated case for the agent or secret informer which is

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further carried on under a special anonymous sobriquet as "Belshovich", "Master", "Fighter", "Ivan" etc. All "Agenturaya razrabotki's" (agent elaboration) and "Service-list cases" are also conducted under sobriquets.

### Work with Agents

As a rule, operative workers of the NKVD are in direct contact only with residents and agents (of all three categories). The work with ordinary secret informers and "secret informers for lodgings" is usually carried on by the residents. But also here no general rules can be applied, and from time to time the operative workers who are on the staff of the NKVD-MGB, see themselves the secret informers (usually in the presence of the resident, to whose team they belong).

The operative worker gives regular instructions to his residents according to his own materials as well as in conformance with requirements of the higher quarters. All operative workers have weekly time-tables for meeting agents, and they are obliged to give a copy of such a time-table to the chief of their section or branch, so that he may know where (in which conspiratorial quarters) his subordinates are at a certain moment. From time to time the chiefs of the branches have to see agents together with their operative workers in order to control them.

The residents meet their mass net-work of secret informers usually somewhere near their places of work or residence, but here is also no general rule, everything depending on local conditions. But this is always done according to a schedule the copy of which is being sent to the operative worker who may sometimes control such meetings.

The encounters with the agents are arranged in the conspiratorial lodgings or, depending on the circumstances, in various places: in the streets, in squares and gardens, out of town etc.

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The NKVD premises may be used only for seeing residents (rather infrequently) or "itinerant agents". The latter denomination is used for a special group of agents employed by the Secret-Political administration of the NKVD. This group is being recruited from a certain "tint" and is supposed to travel in the domain of their "tint". Such agents are usually informed by phone that they must visit a certain person, and then the encounter is arranged in some of the NKVD quarters. But even in these cases the encounters do not take place in the very premises of the NKVD regional administration, but in some less conspicuous, though subordinate to that administration, place.

The general principle of Soviet work with agents may be expressed in few words - "No stone must be left unturned to achieve the aim". Any lies, any provocations may be used for recruiting agents, and any crimes may be staged for the same purpose. All this is called in the NKVD slang "agenturnaya kombinatsiya" (agent work combination) and is carried on according to approved plans. It is also the principal subject in the course of training NKVD officials in special schools - in the Central NKVD School in Moscow, in inter-regional NKVD schools in different cities of the Soviet Union and in the higher school for border guards NKVD in Moscow.

Note The authors once more call the attention to the fact that the theme concerning NKVD agents was worked out in connection with the work of the 1st Special Division therefore as this problem is common for all divisions and administrations of the GUGB NKVD USSR. All operative work with agents, including recruiting and training, is carried out by the operative organs of the NKVD-MGB, while the 1st Special Division is only concerned with the operative-statistical recording of agents and supplies the People's Commissar (now Minister of State Security) or the Chief of the NKVD-MGB administration it belongs to with operative-statistical information of all kind. It may also give similar information to other NKVD agencies and to the

Party, but only according to the indications of the secretary of the NKVD People's Commissar or the Chief of the NKVD regional administration this particular 1st Special Divisions belongs to, and only in the wording wished by the above mentioned NKVD institutions. The same order was preserved when the GPU NKVD was transformed into the Ministry of State Security.

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## CHAPTER I

### THE SECOND SPECIAL DIVISION OF THE OUGB NKVD USSR

#### Diagram No 2

The activities of all organs of the State Security of the USSR, or, strictly speaking, their operative work with agents, is based, upon the whole, on four principal foundations, mentioned below according to their succession :

1. Operative recording;
2. Agents;
3. Operative technique;
4. Inquest.

These are, so to say, four corner stones of the whole NKVD-MGB system supporting the entire practical work of its operative agencies or "organs" (using the Chekist terminology). The operative recording gives a full, manifold and detailed picture of how and where the real or potential centers of resistance to the Communist dictatorship are disposed throughout the country. An intricate and manifold network of agents, that knows no bounds in attaining its purpose, gives full possibility of locating beforehand the centers of such a future resistance, defining its forms, and exposing its participators and possible leaders. The organization and functions of these two first elements of the Soviet state security have been discussed in the previous chapter in connection with the analysis of the structure of the 1st Special Division of the OUGB NKVD USSR.

The inquest is the final stage of the whole complicated work, performed by the organs of state security of the USSR, and will be discussed in the following chapters of this manuscript.

As to the operative technique of the NKVD, it is a system, not less intricate and manifold than the operative recording

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and network of agents, one can have a judgement about the term "operative technique", applied to the NKVD-MGB, only if one takes into consideration that the Stalinist dictatorship is the only and exclusive master of all material and technical resources of this vast country and that the organa, securing the safety of this dictatorship and preventing the outbursts of hatred of the enslaved people, may at any time use any of these unlimited material and technical resources. The NKVD may also fully dispose of such extensive technical means, and has in its hands such an elaborate and complicated apparatus for making the most of them, that the punitive organs of all other countries cannot even dream of anything like it.

From the operative point of view, the whole of this diverse and exceedingly intricate apparatus, including various technical means, is the concern of the 2nd Special Division of the GUGB NKVD (now MGB) and of its subdivisions in all republican, regional and area administration of the NKVD-MGB.

Formerly the functions of the 2nd Special Division comprised also the protection of the Bolshevik leaders and this task was entrusted to the 1st subdivision of the 2nd Special Division. But by the end of the thirties this subdivision was reorganized into the so-called 1st Division of the GUGB NKVD, the structure and functions of which will be discussed in Chapter 7. However, as regards the operative functions, the 1st Division is still closely connected with the 2nd Special Division, and their fields of operation are so interlinked, especially in Moscow, that in many cases it is difficult to draw a line of demarcation between them. The importance of the 2nd Special Division is revealed by the fact that in the period of the "Great Purge" it was headed by Kruglov, who occupied the post of the 2nd Deputy to the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR in 1939-1941, and was appointed Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR after the war.

The operative or special technique which is the concern of the 2nd Special Division of the GUGB NKVD is usually denominated

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in NKVD-MGB documents as "letter" ("litera"). The most important of such "letters" are :

- HN - ("narushnoye nabliudeniye") - external observation;
- F - photography;
- M - membrane - control of the telephone network;
- K - eavesdropping, i.e. listening in by means of special devices and microphones;
- PK - ("perliustratsia korrespondentskii") censoring of letters;
- P - ("pelengatsiya") - control, search and location of illegal radio receiving and transmitting sets;
- Sh - ("shifrovaniye") - ciphering;
- RSh - ("rasshifrovka") - deciphering.

Sections and subdivisions that are concerned with all these branches of operative and special technique, are usually denominated by the abbreviations, mentioned above, while letter "L" (abbreviation from the word "litera" - letter) is added to them. Thus, for example, a subdivision, concerned with censoring of letters, is named "L-PK". Each of these subdivisions is, if it possible to say so, something like a trust, comprising a series of very cumbersome and therefore nearly independent industrial objects.

Let us take a closer view of some of these "letters".

"L-HN" - External Observation or Outside Surveillance.

The task of this service is the securing of an all-day-round, constant and persistent observation of all persons who are at this period of time "elaborated" by the NKVD. In Moscow this is the concern of the 2nd Special Division of the NKVD People's Commissariat, in provinces - of the 2nd Special Divisions of NKVD regional and area administrations, in the capitals of Union Republics - of the 2nd Special Divisions of republican NKVD-MGB. For this purpose a special brigade of agents of external observation is created for trailing after every "figurant". A car, a motor cycle if necessary, is assigned to this brigade, and it is equipped with technical means, needed in every concrete case. The observa-

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is extended not only upon the "figurant" himself, but upon all persons he may meet and speak to in the streets or in public places. According to the Chekist terminology this is called the "setting of the figurant's connections" ("ustanovka svyazei figuranta").

The "setting" means that every person, whom the "figurant" greets or addresses, is followed by an agent - member of the brigade, whose task is to establish the identity of this person, his place of residence, his profession and place of work. In the Chekist slang it is called "to bring the connection up to long". Then the agent makes a short report about the results of his observations, and this report is called the "setting". Later on, such a "setting" is forwarded to the 2nd sector of the 1st special division where it has to be checked whether this person has been specially recorded and what is his "tint". If the answer is a positive one, these data are copied in the "setting", which is then filed with the "figurant's" case. But even if such a "setting" does not provide any compromising material, nevertheless it is filled for the purpose of "mounting" in case of need. The usual proceedings are as follows: by the end of the day the NAB-man, heading the brigade, compiles a "summary of external observation of the figurant", fixing to it all "settings" with data obtained after the checking up with the 1st special division. An agent on duty (in especially important cases there may be several agents) is posted near the dwelling of the "figurant". This agent has to spy on all persons, coming in and out, and make "settings" for them.

Besides "figurant" the external observation invariably extends upon all foreigners.

Service "L-AN" does not include spying after the "figurant" at his places of residence and of work as well as in the quarters of his friends, this is the task of a network of secret informers or agents belonging to the team of the operative NAB official or resident who is concerned with the "elaboration" of this

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"figurant". "L-MN" ("Narushka" in the Chekist slang) is not even informed about the essential part of the case of the person under their constant observation. Usually the activity of the brigade is directed by the operative NKVD official who is entrusted with the "elaboration" of the "figurant" in question. But if the "figurant" is a foreigner or came from some other town, the whole work of observation is performed by the "L-MN" subdivision, and only the results of the work are reported to a certain NKVD division or administration.

It is very difficult, and may be even impossible, for a simple mortal to imagine the scope of work of the "L-MN", for instance, in Moscow. This "Moscow MN" means, that many hundreds of "figurants" of different "elaborations" are secretly watched day and night, while this secret observation is entrusted to a brigade of 3-4, and sometimes more, persons in each case. Besides, posts of external observation are needed for watching several dozens, and sometimes hundreds, of conspicuous "figurants", coming to Moscow on their business. These "figurants" are being "elaborated" by different regional administrations and republican NKVD People's Commissariats, who often notify the 2nd Special Division about the necessity of watching certain "figurant" just on the day of his arrival to Moscow.

But that is not all: according to a special instruction of the NKVD People's Commissar, a constant external observation has to be carried on every member of foreign missions, embassies, consulates, all military attaches and their employees, all foreigners coming from abroad, and especially all correspondents of telegraphic agencies and foreign newspapers. It seems that foreign tourists give the least trouble to the organs of "L-MN" as they are always following established routs and are invariably accompanied by an Intourist interpreter who is always an agent or even an official on staff of the organs of state security. At any rate, the special section of the Intourist, and not the "L-MN", is responsible for the behaviour of foreign tourists and for their intercourse with Soviet citizens in the streets and public places.

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But some foreigners give a lot of trouble to the 2nd Special Division.

So, for example, before the war the secretary of the Japanese military attache, a certain Kembo Sasaki, was in the habit of going for a quotidian walk. Evening was his favourite time for this purpose, and he usually followed the same route - down the Okhotny Riad and along the Gorky Street to the Pushkin monument in the Boulevard Ring. He used to have an unlit cigarette in his teeth and asked every man he met for light. Thus he addressed 30-40 persons during his walk, besides he came up to different stalls, flower girls etc., and everywhere entered into short conversations. It is difficult to imagine how many agents were needed to compile a "setting" for everyone he had talked to. Summary of external observation of this Sasaki alone included daily up to 50-60 "settings", checked up with special records. It was well known in the center that it was sheer mockery from the part of Sasaki who tried his best to give as much trouble to the NKVD as possible, but nevertheless the external observation of Sasaki persisted in the same scope.

Germans, as well as representatives of the neighbouring countries of the Eastern Europe, did not give too much trouble, but the Americans were at first a true plague for the "L-22". Usually, having not the slightest notion about the real state of things in the Soviet Union, and enjoying full liberty back at home, the Americans strived to preserve all their habits in Moscow and persistently tried to study the life of the Soviet Union applying the same methods that were habitual for the study of all other countries. They visited all public places, were in a hurry to make private acquaintances, and desks of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs were piled with their applications to get the permission of travelling all over the Soviet Union. Not taking into consideration all other reasons, this peculiarity of Americans, that annoyed the NKVD so much, could be explained by the fact that the USA established the diplomatic relations with the USSR nearly 15 years later than all other great powers, and the American

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representatives tried to get into "contact" with Soviet citizens directly at the time when the main point of the NKVD activity was just to cut off any connections between the Soviet population and the foreigners.

It was not easy for the "L-M" to handle William C. Bullitt, the first ambassador of the USA in Moscow (1933-1936). He was very fond of sports and often attended the "Dynamo" stadium where he tried to make acquaintances with Soviet sportsmen. By the way, Mr. Bullitt was the first who taught Soviet officers to play polo. Thus, taking into consideration such habits of the American ambassador, a special intensified brigade of the external observation was required, and several dozens of "settings" were compiled every day. To make the work of the NKVD easier two special agents were attached to Mr. Bullitt: a record runner and a tennis player that has represented the USSR at international games in France, an exceedingly slender woman whose good figure attracted general attention. But the combination with the tennis player did not pass. When the winter came, Mr. Bullitt started skiing out of town, and this drove to despair agents, attached to him, who could not ski well. At the time he, like other Americans, was often discussed by the NKVD men, for there were piles of NKVD "settings", trying to fix his connections. The NKVD could breathe freely only when Mr. Bullitt "nibbled" at an attractive bait - the renowned ballet dancer Lepeshinskaya, agent of the 2nd Special Division, supposedly sent on a secret message, and spent all his free time exclusively in her company.

Besides all the above mentioned objects, the external observation is carried on for all agents of the Foreign Administration of the NKVD and of the Intelligence Administration of the General Staff of the Soviet army, during their stay in the USSR. Many of the Comintern workers were exposed to such a control observation, which is periodically extended even on the NKVD-MOS men, to check their behaviour and their connections.

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All these various tasks explain the fact that only in Moscow there are many thousands of "L-M" agents. An exception in all other countries of the world, this extensive "external observation" is a daily practice in the USSR, the usual routine of the "L-M" section of the 2nd Special Division of the NKVD-MGB.

### "L-F" - Photographing

Letter "F" comprises not only the photographing of objects and persons, but also the preparation of photostat copies of documents, drafts, projects and even complete books. Microphotography and photomounting, i.e. preparation of one picture out of several ones, are also within the province of this branch, supplying first-rate "proofs" for lawsuits, recruiting of agents etc.

A classical example of applying such forged photographs is the well-known action against the "Industrial Party" ("Prompartiya") in 1930, when, during the lawsuit, "secret instructions" of the French 2nd Bureau, mounted from the documents dating back to the period of the First World War, were produced. As another colourful example of applying such "proofs" in the USSR may serve a widespread trick of producing to the accused, denying his acquaintance, let us say, with some leader of the anti-Stalinist opposition in the Communist Party, a photomounting, on which he is represented conferring with Trotsky or Bukharin.

The team of the "L-F" includes also a special sub-unit, the printing one, that is able to prepare any certificate or visa in any language, with any stamps or signs. So, for example, during the reception of Molotov in the British House of Commons, in 1942, the galleries for guests were invaded by armed British communists, who used cards that had been forged in Moscow for the purpose of entering the House. The same team may forge any technical draft or calculation in an extraordinarily short time.

Let us again turn to examples: once, in summer 1937, an agent of the Secret Intelligence Administration of the People's Commissariat of Defense, who was at the same time employed on the staff of the Japanese military attache in Moscow, informed his administration about the necessity of an urgent interview. The

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letter took place in the same evening, approximately at 22.00 in the neighbourhood of the Timiryazev Agricultural Academy. During the interview the agent stated that the assistant of the military attache had just received a parcel with the following stamp: "All-Union Communist Party (bolshheviks), Central Committee, Military Department", and locked it in his safe. The agent was ordered to bring this parcel. Approximately at 1 a.m., a second interview took place and the agent handed the parcel to the official of Intelligence administration.

Some 20 minutes later the parcel was passed to the 2nd Special Division of the NKVD for an urgent preparation of forged documents to be returned to the safe of the Japanese attache. At 6.30 in the morning, at a third interview, the agent received the parcel back, and did not even suspect that he got a copy, which had been considerably changed in comparison with the original. This forged copy was passed off for the use of the attache. The envelope contained some ten documents, including 3 drafts, which had been approved by the People's Commissar for Defense Industry, the deputy People's Commissar for Defense, and by the Chief of the Military Department of the Central Party Committee. The matter was in the switching of a giant plant on the production of a new type of the anti-aircraft guns. Forged calculations and drafts were prepared for the misinformation of the attache. The signatures were made so well that they did not call out any suspicions, but in the case of a graphological analysis they could not be identical and the document would be considered as a sample of forgery, made by the foreigners.

By the by, it has to be mentioned to the credit of the Japanese Intelligence Service, that the military attache got into the possession of the documents only one hour and a half later than the director of the plant, who received them personally from the secretary of the Military Department and acknowledged their receipt with his signature.

The "L-F" functions include also copying and changing of letters, compiling of forged diaries, different forgeries in financial

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accounts etc. For instance, a letter from a certain Prof. Kluchnikov was sent to the address of his acquaintance, a lawyer Kolchanovsky, employed in the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, who was at that time being "elaborated" as a conspicuous "figurant". In this letter Kolchanovsky was invited to call on the professor and pick the book he was in need of. This letter was intercepted at the post-office by a "L-PK" agent and forwarded to the "F" branch where it was changed and then posted again. This time the letter requested the "figurant" to take an English book from the library of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs and give it to Kluchnikov's domestic worker, who would come especially for this purpose from the summer cottage of the professor. Two days later Kolchanovsky was summoned to the NKVD where he was told that a secret document of the Commissariat, employing him, was found in the book which he sent to the professor. This document was even shown to the panic-stricken Kolchanovsky, and soon thereafter he was recruited as a NKVD informer and gave detailed statements about his business conversations with Soviet Foreign Commissar Maxim Litvinov and his deputy Karakhan, both of whom were also under secret "elaboration" of the Secret-Political administration of the NKVD.

Such forgeries do not embarrass in the least the pontiffs of the Soviet "justice", and are systematically studied in all NKVD schools as examples of "operative work combinations".

"L-PK" - Censoring of Letters. The scope of work of this branch is so extensive that it is impossible to give a detailed description of its functions. Covering themselves with the formal guarantee of inviolability of private correspondence, stated in the "Stalinist Constitution", the "L-PK" agents constantly open, read and even make photographs of the correspondence of the Soviet citizens with their relatives or friends abroad, as well as of the whole correspondence of those categories or "lists" of the population which are being "elaborated" by the organs of the State Security at this period of time. In the course of mass purges and



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repressions or at some particular moments of international or internal tension, the "L-PK" agents read all letters in the USSR.

All major post-offices (up to the district ones) have special officials who are censoring the correspondence. But the post-office chiefs are not aware of this fact, at least not officially. Usually it is done in such a way: the chief of the special branch "recommends" to the head of the Regional Administration of Post and Telegraph to appoint some "Comrade X." as a telegraphist or as a clerk to a certain post-office. This man appears before his new chief showing simply a paper from the provincial office of Post and Telegraph. For some time he carries on the usual work of an ordinary clerk and is completely subordinate to the chief of the post-office. Then he is instructed to get into contact with a certain group of employees of this post-office, and proceeds to his special tasks, not reporting about them to the chief of the post-office. Usually this work is entrusted to letter-carriers, employees sorting out the correspondence or taking the letters out of the letter-boxes.

Copies of the letters that are characteristic in any way are forwarded to the district section of the NKVD, and in provincial offices - to the chief of the 2nd Special Division of the NKVD administration for this region. Depending on the "general line" of the Party and on the NKVD instructions, the utmost attention may be paid to "alien elements", to persons connected with different kinds of opposition, to "corrupt elements" in the army etc

In the army this system is completed in such a way that every military unit has its own letter-box, and all soldiers and junior officers are obliged to use it for mailing their letters (officially it is done to have the letters posted free of charge). All these letters are read by the officials of the NKVD Special Section ("Osobyi Otdel") or of the political section of the military unit. During the war such a system accounted for the fact that a letter sent through the field post at Falbove (five miles from Leningrad) reached the addressee in Leningrad only in ten days.

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All correspondence of "figurants" of special "elaborations" is under a constant control of "L-PK", and summaries of this control are being separately forwarded to the 2nd Special Division. The "L-PK" team sometimes includes special agents, controlling the work of the "L-PK" men. These agents belong to the group "sp/ag" - special agents - and are specially paid. Ordinary "L-PK" men usually work as secret informers, i.e. without pay, but from time to time they may get some rewards.

As a result of this complex system of all-round and selective censorship without informing the chiefs of the post-offices, the letters in the USSR often disappear or reach the addressees with a considerable delay. This system creates most favourable conditions for abuses on the part of post officials. With an obvious purpose of facilitating the work of "L-PK" agents, long before the war in the USSR an obligatory rule was introduced that the address of the sender had to be written on the obverse side of the envelope. In all telegrams the address of the sender had to be invariably mentioned.

"L-M" - Monitoring. The "Letter M" branch is in charge of controlling the telephone conversations. The center of its activity in Moscow is the special section of the central telephone station, in the capitals of the Union Republics and in regional centers - special sections of local telephone exchanges.

The operative technique "M" may be considered as one of the most popular means of the "elaborations". Usually the number of the "figurant" is taken for control, and any call, even from the automatic telephones, is easily checked up. The number of the phone is automatically recorded after the conversation by means of the operative technique "M", and therefore the "M" summary always shows on which telephone the call was made and where this telephone is situated, if the call was made from a booth with automatic telephone. There is nothing new in such a method, and it is regularly applied by the police agencies of other countries, but there, in the time of peace, it is used only for the exposition

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and seizure of particularly dangerous criminal offenders, while in the USSR it is a constant and exceedingly regular system for assisting the Party in its daily struggle with all elements of opposition in the country.

The operative technique "M" is particularly often applied for the "elaboration" of prominent "figurants", as the bureaucratic circles of the Soviet Union make a broad use of the telephone network. The Soviet people know very well that the telephone conversations are tapped, and therefore they get accustomed to use <sup>use</sup> a code for their telephone calls. But exactly this codified character of the simplest telephone conversations is necessary for the NKVD, being just the proper thing for the "elaborations", blackmailing and bringing charges, sometimes of a phantastic and improbable nature.

The case of the former head of the Central Council of "Osoaviakhim" (the semi-military organization for development of aerial and chemical defence of the Soviet Union) General R.P. Eideman, who was executed together with Marshal Tukhachevsky in 1937, may serve as a characteristic example of the work of "L-M" branch. It was known in the circles of the leading NKVD officials that at the moment when the Tukhachevsky plot had been exposed, no compromising material was available for Eideman who had only <sup>aroused</sup> ~~arisen~~ some suspicions. Eideman was a close friend of General Kork, the Commanding Officer of the Frunze Military Academy, who was also executed later on for having been involved in the Tukhachevsky plot. The following trick was used to expose Eideman: an NKVD agent rang him up through a local telephone exchange of the "M" branch, and, calling himself Kork, "warned" him of the impending danger of an immediate arrest. An NKVD man was selected for this conversation, whose voice had exactly the same timbre as that of Kork. The well informed NKVD officials mentioned afterwards that Eideman took immediate steps to disappear and was arrested at the moment when he was ready to get into his car.

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Some time afterwards, the official of the Secret-Political Division of the GUGB Ischarev who was present at the inquest of Kidman, told his intimate friends that Kidman immediately started to make confessions after having been directly asked where he wanted to flee and what were the reasons for his flight. When Kidman gave an evasive answer, probably to gain time, he was asked without beating around the bush: did he receive a warning about an impending arrest? When Kidman answered in the negative, the investigator declared that he was lying, that the apparatus of the control telephone station was used for this communication and that he spoke with a NKVD man and not with Kerk.

Then Kidman confessed that such a conversation had really taken place, and that having been warned he decided to flee, but did not know where. After that he was questioned about the reason of his denying the call and the warning (all persons, examined in the NKVD, have to sign all their answers without any delay) and he had to explain, why he, a person without any sense of guilt, decided to leave his summer cottage near Moscow and to flee not knowing where?

Thus, such a measure provided the investigator with concrete material, and on its base, one hour later, Kidman gave detailed depositions; still later, the same Kidman convicted others, including Kerk, at the cross-examinations.

The listening-in of telephone conversations is called "passive measures" in the instruction about the operative technique "M". But the "M" tasks of the 2nd Special Division include also the column "active measures" where following steps are enumerated: "to cut off the conversation", or "in case of a conversation about some appointment to make it one hour later, urgently notifying the section ..." or "to switch off the telephone from... till.. " etc.

Besides "figurants" the "L-M" constantly taps the following categories of subjects:

- a) foreign embassies and consulates;
- b) private telephones of all foreigners;

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- c) all telephones of such hotels as "Moscow", "Metropol" and "Savoy";
- d) all telephones of People's Commissariats of Foreign Affairs, of Defence, of External Trade and of the Executive Committee of the Communist International (Comintern).

As to the governmental telephone network, the so called "Kremlin Automatic Telephone Exchange" (or "whirligig" in the Chekist slang), the "L-M" control does not extend <sup>to</sup> only very few of the highest leaders of the USSR. They are put on the list by Stalin himself and the list is forwarded through the special Sector of the Central Party Committee. This sector is supervised by the member of the Orgburo Shkiryatov.

"L-P" - Patroling or Radio Location. The tasks of this branch comprise sending of ciphered radiograms from the central NKVD administrations in Moscow to every corner of the Soviet Union, receiving of such ciphered radiograms from local NKVD agencies, discovering the presence of underground radio-stations on the USSR territory and locating them, as well as muffling of all undesirable broadcasts what ever their origin may be.

The section "L-P" has its own radio-stations and radio location posts as well as other devices for carrying out these various and complicated tasks. Before the war the Central NKVD radio-station was located in the hamlet Monino near Moscow, but in October 1941, when the German troops drew nearer to the Soviet capital, it was partly evacuated and partly destroyed by the demolition detachments of the NKVD. The authors of this manuscript are not informed about the location of this radio-station after the war.

Already before the war, the functions of the "L-P" acquired such a scope that it became necessary to bring into effect a fundamental reorganization of the whole branch.

So, for instance, the new functions of the "L-P" included the propaganda broadcasts in foreign languages which were received and re-broadcasted further through secret radio-stations of local

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Communist parties. A great stress was put on this work in relation to the Latin-American countries (Cuba, the region of the Panama Channel, Brazil, Chile etc.). The habitual time for such broadcasts was the period from 1 a.m. till 5 a.m. (Moscow time). The so-called "white spots" appeared for that period in the regular broadcasting program of the Moscow radio-committee, and nothing was officially known about these "spots".

The using of the short-wave stations of the USSR for current instructing of the foreign agents of the Foreign NKVD Administration, the Intelligence Administration of the General Staff, and the Communist International (now Cominform) is another function of the "L-P" branch. Usually a code is used for such transmissions. Anyhow, in a series of cases - for example, instructions to the Spanish guerilla in Asturias in 1939-41 (and now, undoubtedly, to the Greek guerrillas), - such broadcasts were made openly, but, of course, in the name of the Central Committee of the corresponding Communist party. So, for instance, it is known, that the order for the dismissal of Harry Pollitt (British Communist party) <sup>as</sup> the result of his tactical error at the moment of the declaration of the war, came through radio directly from Moscow.

The information intended for the agents is usually received by the ciphering branch of the Soviet embassy or of the Soviet commercial representation with the help of "PPSh-38" radio set, and is transmitted further in the same way, i.e. to the receiver of the agent, which has, as a rule, only one wave for transmissions, thus making possible the control of the setting from some other point.

The scope of work for deciphering or simply for tapping of foreign broadcasts and radio-telephone communications was also increased in an unusual way. Already before the war, a special section for recording the radio-telephone communications between the Foreign Departments of London and Washington was organized in the "L-P" branch. There are also some evidences that the first successful attempts to intercept the transatlantic talks between Churchill and Roosevelt took place in 1940.

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Finally, the "L-P" was transformed into a huge organization with international staff of workers. These were mostly members of foreign Communist parties who were sent to Moscow as the result of a secret mobilization which was personally performed by the secretaries of the Communist parties abroad. The old premises in the Malaya Lubyanka Street were too small for this department, and in 1941 it was transferred into a spacious building in Lenin Hills by Moscow. The whole central Comintern apparatus had been transferred there from the Sapozhkov Square somewhat earlier, in 1940. As to its organization, the "L-P" still belonged to the NKVD system but practically it was subordinated to the Special Sector of the All-Union Communist party Central Committee.

"L-E". The work of this branch consists in overhearing the conversations in different premises with the help of special devices. The central Moscow hotels are the principal field of operations of this branch, for they usually give shelter to foreigners and most prominent party men, coming to Moscow from the provinces.

The most habitual method of listening-in is the installation of special membranes-dictophones into the switches, ventilators, clocks, table legs etc. Hidden wires go from these membranes through the intensifying sub-stations to the Control center (in Malaya Lubyanka Street 7).

The "L-E" branch pays even more attention to the buildings of foreign embassies, missions, consulates and different commercial and cultural representations. But this portion of work belongs first of all to the field of operations of the NKVD Foreign and Counter-Intelligence Administrations and will be discussed in more details in the corresponding chapters of this manual book.

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Such are the manifold and intricate functions of the 2nd Special Division of the OGPU NKVD USSR. The specific features of its work account for the fact, that each of its branches has a considerable independence and the Chief of the Division only co-ordinates the functioning of different kinds of operative technique. Like the 1st Special Division it does not perform any

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operative work of its own and is intended to assist all operative divisions and administrations of the NKVD wherever such an assistance might be needed. This is true for Moscow and for all NKVD regional administrations, each of which has its own 2nd Special Division, subordinated to its territorial NKVD administration and to the 2nd Special Division of the Moscow NKVD headquarters.

Formerly the functions of this division comprised also the protection of leaders, but some years before the World War II this task went over to the newly created 1st Division of the OUGB. The 1st Division of the NKVD USSR exists only in Moscow, and the protection of all provincial leaders is still entrusted to the 2nd Special Division, or, to be more exact, to its "L-KN" branch.

The majority of the workers of the 2nd Special Division are the NKVD staff officials and they themselves are on the NKVD pay-roll. This division usually hires "special agents" for the needs of operative NKVD divisions and administrations - thieves, burglars, pick-pockets, specialists in kicking up a row in the street, and other criminals.

The abundance of technical devices in this division and their complexity accounts for the fact that this branch is one of the most expensive in the NKVD system. According to some data the "technique" absorbs up to 50% of official budget appropriations for the NKVD needs.

The organization of the 2nd Special Division is shown on the diagram No 9.

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**CHAPTER VI****THE INQUEST DIVISION  
OF THE OGPU NKVD USSR****Diagram No 10**

It has already been mentioned above that the work of the NKVD organs is based on four principal foundations: operative recording, agents, operative technique and inquest. To avoid a gap in the unity of exposition, we place the analysis of structure and principles of work of the NKVD inquest organs immediately after the analysis of structure and functions of the 1st and 2nd Special Division and previously to the study of the activity and structure of purely operative agencies of the NKVD.

First of all, let us call to our mind that by a normal legal procedure the inquest is the preliminary stage for the exposure of the circumstances of the crime and for the establishment of the identity of persons who might have possibly committed it, and the conclusions of the investigator are in no way obligatory for the decision of the court. The investigator cannot take part in the proceedings of the court or influence them in any way. The body of the crime has to be irrefutably proved, and only under this condition the verdict of guilty may be passed. Furthermore, the court cannot be influenced only by indirect proofs and evidences when passing in a verdict. An inward conviction of the jury that the accused really committed a certain crime, not substantiated by any proofs, cannot be a reason, sufficient for passing a sentence. These elementary rules of legal procedure are obligatory for judicial organs of normal countries but not for those of the Soviet Union.

In order to understand the role of Soviet inquest organs and methods of their work, it is necessary to dwell upon the principles of judicial proofs in the Soviet law. The most detailed consideration of this problem is found in the book of the

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former Attorney General of the USSR, now Minister of Foreign Affairs A.I. Vishinsky "Theory of Judicial Proofs in the Soviet Law" (first edition - Moscow, 1941; second - 1946). Vishinsky was awarded the Stalin premium of the first grade (200,000 rubles) and the title of the regular member of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR for this work. This book served also as an initial point for the compilation of new criminal and civil codes of the USSR (this work was begun in 1947). Vishinsky does not set out any new standards or regulations in his work, but he lays down in very plain and precise terms the fundamental regulations of the Soviet legal procedure already used in practice.

These fundamental regulations may be briefly formulated as follows :

1. The Soviet jurisprudence is permeated by party-spirit and is based upon the Marxist-Leninist methodology.
2. The Soviet state (i.e. the Communist party) is the begetter of the Soviet court which is flesh and blood of the new Socialist society.
3. The inward conviction of the Soviet judges is connected with their socialist interpretation of the law, with their communist conception of law based upon the social-political world outlook of the working class. The sentence passed by the court is based upon this conviction of the judges, but this conviction has to be persuasive being supported by the Marxist-Leninist principles of the Soviet juridical science.
4. If there is a lack of direct proofs or if they are insufficient to state the body of the crime, the decisions of the Soviet court may be based upon indirect proofs or evidences.

These four regulations make the Soviet court a simple tool of the ruling party, one of the organs of the Stalinist dictatorship. The Soviet court may condemn a person even if the direct proofs of his guilt are lacking - and this is its principal peculiarity. Analyzing numerous facts, supposedly selected out of practice of Soviet courts, Vishinsky rather cynically states that if the indirect proofs are applied correctly, the court-

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examination may be absolutely reliable and the results, thus achieved - veritable and persuasive. This statement of Vishinsky is nothing but an attempt to lay a theoretical foundation for iniquity and club-law of the NKVD-MGB "judicial boards", "special councils" and "troikas".

In the Soviet Union the system of public legal procedures - with their pleadings, debates, with leaving the accused the right of defending himself, with citation of witnesses etc. - is practically reserved only for "People's Court" ("Narodnyy Sud") that considers only criminal offences, unimportant misdemeanours or litigations, and controversies between separate citizens or institutions. At the trials of these insignificant offenders the Soviet courts adhere to the usual standards of legal procedure, and this enables the Soviet government and its numerous naive or dishonest friends abroad to demonstrate the fairness, legality and even democratic character of Soviet justice.

However, in all cases when the Soviet government itself or the Communist party plays the role of the accuser - and this happens in the absolute majority of cases and leads to the most drastic sentences, - this normal standard of legal procedure is not followed, the trial takes place behind closed doors, even without the accused and his defenders, and is practically reduced to the approval of accusing materials or "notices", that had been prepared by the investigator beforehand. We have already dwelt on this procedure when we mentioned the Special Council attached to the People's Commissar of the NKVD. This kind of "trial" is nothing but mockery at all norms of legal procedure and at the very conception of justice. But namely this was the practice of condemning millions of innocent citizens of the Soviet Union to execution, long years of imprisonment or deportation. In all these cases special NKVD-MGB "courts" have passed their verdicts on the basis of indirect proofs, as in majority of such cases the NKVD investigators are usually unable to discover any direct proofs of the "guilt".

When the actions of the NKVD-MGB follow the line of a new campaign of political terror proclaimed by the Politburo, and

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this is mostly the case, - the inquest is not the preliminary but the final stage of the court-examination (if we can apply this name to the procedure, habitual in the USSR), and it concludes the process, that had its beginning in the operative recording and the so-called "elaboration of the figurant". The "notice" submitted by the investigator to the judgement of the "special board" usually encloses not only the material, provided by the inquest itself, but also the indictment and a suggestion as to the punitive measure, in the form of a certain paragraph of the Criminal Code of the USSR or some other Union Republic. The work of the "Special Council" usually consists only in approving of the investigator's conclusions or in the selection of some other clause of the Criminal-Political Code with the corresponding changes in the punitive measures. The "legal procedure" of the "troika" is even more simplified ( see chapter "Regional Organs of the NKVD").

Usually, in the practice of the NKVD work the operative part is not separated from the inquest ( especially at the periods of political campaigns and purges). One and the same NKVD operative worker begins the elaboration of the case, i.e. organizes the trailing after the "figurant", collects preliminary data and is very often charged with detaining of this person and making a search of his lodgings. After the arrest of the "figurant" or of a group of persons involved in the same case, the operative worker is temporarily transferred to the inquest department. He personally makes the examination and, having completed the investigation, he reports on the case to the corresponding NKVD court. Having completed and closed the case, the operative worker returns again to his operative unit. This may be illustrated by the following example:

The operative recording of the 1st Special Division includes a group of tsarist officers, noblemen and other "have-beens" among the lecturers and professors of the Leningrad university. The "elaboration" of this group is entrusted to the operative

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agent-representative of the secret-political division of the Leningrad NKVD regional administration. He organizes the trailing, fixes the network of agents, succeeds in his efforts to secure the expulsion from the party of all persons who "wriggled" into the ranks of the Party, and finally arrests them as "enemies of the people".

Having completed all these preliminary stages, he is transferred to the inquest division of the Leningrad NKVD regional administration and starts to obtain from the arrestees such "confessions" of the crimes which seem to him to be the most suitable ones in this case. Having completed the investigation, he compiles a "reference notice" ("spravka") which is announced at the meeting of the "troika" of the Leningrad NKVD regional administration. Thereafter the case is considered to be closed, and the operative worker in question is again returned to his permanent work in the secret-political division. If the case is brought before the "Special Council", this operative agent-representative, having compiled a "notice" and the indictment, leaves for Moscow and personally reports his material at a meeting of the "Special Council" of the NKVD USSR.

Such an order of carrying on the investigation is especially favourable for the inequity, club-law and fabrication of false cases and forged accusations, as the operative agent-representative carrying on the lawsuit, is personally interested in condemning persons whom he has been "elaborating". This is a kind of a chain reaction and the only possible result is the conviction of all suspected persons.

Practically, a person is convicted already at the moment when his name appears on the registration card of the 1st Special Division. The only question is how long it will take to liquidate him and what forms will this liquidation assume. Having received the order for the "elaboration" of a certain person and being in possession of the data, provided by special recording, the agent-representative must obtain the confirmation of these materials,

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securing the conviction of his victim. <sup>Even at the time</sup> ~~Already when~~ he starts working <sup>at</sup> the case, he is aware of the fact that if he does not get the required confirmation of the data, provided by special recording, the case will not be closed, but passed over to another NKVD man, and he himself will be recorded as a "accomplice" of this "figurant" and will be liquidated sooner or later.

Therefore the question of the real culpability of this man does not exist for the agent. He must be guilty, if the agent-representative wants to be safe and sound. The culpability of the "figurant" is a settled thing for the agent-representative already at the moment <sup>that</sup> when the "elaboration" of this person is being entrusted to him. "The NKVD does not arrest for nothing" - such is the standard answer, given to all, trying to protect their relatives or intimates who got into trouble, and expressing a naive hope that it is only a mistake, a misunderstanding.

From the very beginning of the "elaboration", the suspected man becomes the personal enemy of the operative-agent-representative as the well-being and security of the later depend on the "success" of the elaboration. The Chekist-spy-investigator-judge persecutes his victim with the obstinacy and fury of a hound trying to hunt him down as soon as possible.

After the arrest of the "enemy of the people" the operative agent-representative assumes the role of the investigator, and he must prove that the arrest and all the accusations of the "figurant" have been justified, otherwise another NKVD man will be entrusted with the inquest, and this operative agent-representative will be punished in some way for his failure, at least losing his official position. In this stage he is not even interested in getting to the bottom of the matter: the accused has to be convicted and the difficulty lies only in the best "mounting" of the case. If several cases have been successfully mounted and their "form" was found to be adequate, this investigator, i.e. the operative agent-representative, will be promoted and rewarded; if the mounting is found to be poor, he will stay without promotion or

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will be even reduced to a lower rank. The NKVD-MGB releases its victims from its deadly grip only in those rare cases when the supreme party organs have some reasons for sending general instructions to reconsider cases of all persons, whose arrests have not been substantiated, and rehabilitate them. This happened, for instance, in 1939, when Beria replaced Yezhov in the post of the head of the NKVD.

The structure of the inquest division is comparatively simple and it reflects in general lines the structure of the NKVD-MGB operative agencies (See diagram No 10).

Each NKVD administration or division has the inquest section or the inquest branch which is subordinated both to this NKVD administration or division and to the inquest division of the center, in Moscow. It is more convenient to make an analysis of this structure using, as an example, the inquest <sup>branch</sup> ~~division~~ of the NKVD regional administration. In this case the inquest branch is composed out of several sections, depending on the number of the operative divisions of this NKVD regional administration. Usually it consists of the following sections: 1st - Secretariat; 2nd - "serving" the Counter Intelligence Division (KRO); 3rd - serving the Secret-political Division (SPO); 4th - serving the Economic Division (EKO), and 5th - serving the Special Division ("Osobiy Otdel").

Operative workers of each group of the inquest branch are divided in accordance with the number of operative sections accommodated by this inquest group. Thus in 1938-39 the 3rd group of the inquest branch of a large regional NKVD administration consisted of at least ~~eight~~ 8 senior investigators, and was organized in such a way that one of them worked with the 1st section of the SPO, the other - with the 2nd etc. In such a way the investigators are specialized on cases of a similar type, and besides it is very helpful in respect to the conspiracy, for only one person is informed about all cases under the jurisdiction of this section.

Usually every section of the provincial inquest branch consists of only one senior investigator with the rank of an operative agent-representative, and of several investigators having the rank of assistant operative agents-representatives. But, as we have seen

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in the above mentioned example of a branch serving the Secret-Political Division (SPO), the number of senior investigators may be considerably increased depending on the attention paid to a certain operative division or administration of the NKVD. This example refers to the period when the essential attention of the Communist party and of the NKVD itself was drawn to the Secret-Political Administration.

The staffs of the branches in the central inquest division in Moscow are much more numerous and the investigators have higher ranks there. Besides, there is a special inquest branch serving the 1st Division of the NKVD USSR, i.e. considering the cases connected with the protection of the members of the Soviet Government, party leaders and the Kremlin.

Every central administration of the GUGB (now MGB) also has its own inquest section or inquest branch which is subordinated to the inquest division of the GUGB NKVD USSR. It consists of sub-sections which correspond to the division of this central administration of the GUGB. Thus, for example, the inquest section of the Economic Administration of the GUGB is composed of sub-sections concerned with oil industry, fishing trade etc.

#### Inquest and Methods of Examination

We have already discussed above the particularities of the inquest in the NKVD practice. Its purpose is not the finding out of the fact, under which circumstances the real crime was committed, and not the ascertaining of the persons who have possibly committed that crime, but only the maintaining of decorum in the retribution of the arrested "enemy", who usually has to be liquidated only on the basis of some general instructions of higher Party organs and of the data of the operative recording and of his previous "elaboration" by the NKVD agents. In the overwhelming majority of cases the NKVD-MGB investigators succeed only in squeezing out of their victims the confessions about some crimes they intended to commit, but very seldom the arrestees admit that they have really committed these crimes.



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Formally, the NKVD investigators must stick to certain norms of the legal procedure, but practically they never adhere to them and nobody prevents them from applying any "methods of physical influence", i.e. tortures to their victims. The most horrid tortures the beating and tormenting of arrestees were always practiced by the Cheka-GPU-NKVD-MGB, but they achieved unheard-of dimensions at the times of Yeshov - this period is called the "Great Purge" abroad, but - the "yeshovshina" in the Soviet Union. Yeshov's predecessor on the post of the NKVD People's Commissariat, Yagoda attached a very great importance to the operative technique and to the work with agents. He was an adherent of applying chiefly the psychological and not the physical methods of influence. Just when he was heading the NKVD, a masterly system of trailing, spying, blackmailing and provocations was set to work. He used to say that if the investigator beats or tortures an arrestee, he acknowledges his own utter inability of extorting a confession from this arrestee by any other means. Of course it does not mean that at the times of Yagoda the NKVD investigators behaved like gentlemen with their victims: tortures and beatings always took place but they were not the only or the essential method.

All these "ceremonies with the enemies of the people" were completely rejected in the fearful period of the "Great Purge" and of Yeshov's reign. The deputy to the NKVD People's Commissar Zakovsky behaved with particular brutality. In 1937-38 he introduced a system of mass beatings and murders during the inquest. At the same time Zakovsky held the office of the Chief of the Moscow regional NKVD administration, while prior to that he had been heading for several years the NKVD administration of the Leningrad region. As an illustration of the inquest methods introduced by this dreadful man in Soviet punitive organs may serve the boastful declaration of Zakovsky himself, at a meeting of leading NKVD officials in Moscow, in 1938, that "in six weeks he contrived to draw a confession out of 11 thousands of spies in the Leningrad region". It is very significant that the horrid period of 1937-38, called "Yeshovshina" (Yeshov's reign) by the

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Soviet people, was usually nominated "Zakvashchias" in the Chekist circles.

By the end of this period the number of arrestees was so great, that no spy-work of agents ("agenturnaya rabota") was possible before the beginning of the inquest in prison. People were arrested by hundreds, ~~and~~ on the basis of the data of operative recording or as a result of a libel, squeezed out of some prisoner by means of horrid tortures. For several years an ignorant, cruel and dull investigator became the "NKVD God" while the leg of a chair, the handle of a revolver or simply a boot or a fist, combined with dirtiest swearing and most fearful insults were his "methods of inquest". When "softhearted" Boris replaced Yezhov, he declared: "It is not forbidden to beat, and it is necessary to beat, but not everybody as ~~it~~ was done before".

In all periods of the Soviet regime in Russia the investigators of the punitive organs have acted and still act more according to the principle of "revolutionary consciousness" than according to juridical norms. Besides all reasons, mentioned above, this is also explained by the fact that the investigators (i.e. the NKVD operative agents-representatives) very often have no notion about these norms in general, and if they refer in the end of every case to the clause 206 of the Criminal Code (about the conclusion of the inquest), they do it only because it has been ordered by the office of the Attorney General to do so. They are directed in all their actions by the simple rule that "purpose justifies the means", and if the "enemy" has already been arrested he has to be forced to make his confession by any means. The usual and the most widespread method of the Soviet investigators of screwing real or, much more often, false confessions out of a prisoner, may be briefly represented in the following formula: 1) terrorizing of the prisoner by bringing against him the most phantastic accusations; 2) a systematic exhaustion of all physical and moral strength of the prisoner; 3) arousing hopes and striking of a psychological bargain between the investigator and the prisoner.

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This method ruined the lives of thousands and even millions of Russian people. <sup>Since</sup> After the war the same method <sup>has been</sup> applied to the new hundreds of thousands or even millions of victims of the Soviet regime in the countries of the Central and South-Eastern Europe. Therefore it deserves to be studied in the most detailed and attentive way.

The authors of this work have interviewed several dozens of persons, former prisoners of Soviet places of detention and concentration camps as well as former NKVD men as to this problem. The picture of the gradual "working up" of the victims of this institution is nearly the same in its principal features though somewhat differs in details. The following method is the most typical :

*Coll. Leningrad*

For instance, the operative agent-representative of the Secret-Political Division of the Moscow regional NKVD administration is ordered to "elaborate" the economist of the Moscow machine-building plant "Sharikopodshipnik", a certain Ivanov. The NKVD has no incriminating materials for this Ivanov, but a registration card has been filled out for him by the special recording as he was seen in the theatre in the company of Petrov, engineer-constructor of the same plant who had been arrested after having told a <sup>lie</sup> ~~was~~, connected in some way with the attempt upon the life of Kirov, to other workers of his section. Ivanov was not present then, but owing to this casual encounter in the theatre he was included into the "agentur case" of the <sup>lie</sup> ~~is~~-teller Petrov, who was sentenced to ten years of banishment for his crime.

By the way, it is worth of mentioning that a wave of arrests, executions and deportations which followed the assassination of Kirov was called by the people "the Kirov recruitment", a similar wave that followed the death of Kuibyshev - "the Kuibyshev recruitment", and the fearful period of 1936-1938, the so-called "Yezhovshchina", was also defined as "the Great Recruitment".

Thus, the operative agent-representative begins the "elaboration" of the economist Ivanov, who, since this very moment, has been transformed in the NKVD files into the "figurant Ivanov".

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The operative agent-representative makes enquiries in the special section of the plant, and the collected information shows that Ivanov is a painstaking and accurate employee, and that during the whole period of his work at this plant he was never reprimanded by his chiefs. But he leads a very reticent life, devotes all his free time to his family (he has a wife and two children), seldom attends meetings, does not display any enthusiasm at the prospect of a new subscription to the loan, evades social obligations and therefore was recorded as a "passive member" by the trade-union organization. Direct anti-Soviet declarations (criticism of the Soviet regime) were not recorded, but he likes to <sup>read</sup> take from the "Techprop" (propaganda of technical knowledge) American technical magazines, and when the Austrian film "Peter" appeared on Soviet screens, he made the following remark: "At last we shall be able to see a really good film".

But this scarce information does not disappoint the operative agent-representative. He decides to classify Ivanov with the category of "concealed SOE" (socially dangerous elements) and to "create" the material for his "elaboration". Rehashing the old proverb, the NKVD men say in such cases: "Find the man, and you will find the case".

And so a systematic elaboration begins. Through the secret informers at Ivanov's place of work, and through the "lodging agent" at his place of living the operative agent-representative learns little by little all the details of Ivanov's biography, he becomes acquainted with his character, manners, habits, his circle of friends, his way of life.

Meanwhile the NKVD agencies gathered information at his place of birth and his former place of residence. Similar information was also gathered for his wife. It has been found out that his father had a small grocery shop in Saratov before the revolution, and that the father of his wife was "dekulakized" ("reakulichen") in 1930 and departed to the Kazakhstan steppes for colonization. This information "lawfully" enables the operative agent-representative to consider Ivanov as SOE (socially dangerous element

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(in Russian - "sozialno opasny element"), for he has concealed both his and his wife's origin. There are still no concrete accusations against Ivanov, but his "case" gradually swells with these and other "indirect proofs", as Vishinsky calls them. When his case is sufficiently voluminous, the operative agent-representative gets an order for the "detention of potentially dangerous and suspicious as to his connections citizen Ivanov".

At night a car stops near Ivanov's house ... Sleepy and frightened Ivanov, not understanding anything, is roused from his bed. A search is made and Ivanov is stunned by horrifying questions: "Where is the pistol?", "where have you hidden it?", "we know everything, so better confess, it will help you"...

The first task of the operative agent-representative is to frighten his victim with accusation of some most terrific crimes and vicious intentions. Thus, the "working up" of the arrestee begins with terrorizing him. He is brought to the NKVD and is left till morning in the waiting-room jammed with the "night take". Frightened people, not understanding anything, sit or stand around him. While he is still not able to come to his senses, a man in the NKVD uniform approaches him and looking into some papers asks: "You are citizen so-and-so?" The flabbergasted arrestee answers "yes" in a shaky voice and wants to ask why he was arrested, but the man in the uniform mutters: "A fine fellow indeed! It took us a long time to catch you!", -and steps aside.

The legs of the arrestee give way under him. He wants to make the situation clear, he wants to say that he was arrested by mistake, but everybody he addresses, gives the same answer: "Keep silent, it is prohibited to speak here!" In the morning he is summoned for registration, a careful search is made once more, all his personal belongings are taken away and approximately at 10 a.m. he is brought to a overrammed prison cell.

Immediately he is surrounded by some unshaken, tangle-haired persons in rumpled coats and overcoats. He hears questions: "Why have you been arrested?", "What news are there in the free world?", and so forth. The arrestee decides that he has been put

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into a cell with criminals and timidly clings to the wall. But gradually it becomes known that persons, surrounding him, are also economists, engineers, professors, actors, officers of the Red Army and party workers. He does not put any questions, his instinct of a Soviet citizen tells him that all of them are "enemies" who have been arrested for some real crimes, but he is quite innocent and therefore this misunderstanding will be cleared after the first interview with the investigator. But, of course, he has to shun any contact with these "enemies of the people".

The second stage of the previous "working up" takes place. The arrestee is left in peace, and it seems to him that the investigator has forgotten him. Meanwhile, other prisoners are summoned to the inquest. They are brought back after a long time and in a terrific state. Sometimes they are pushed into the cell being quite unconscious. The new prisoner ( in our case - Ivanov) begins to realize that people do not leave this place, but still he nurses the hope that he will be set free as soon as the "misunderstanding" will be cleared. In the meantime he listens to sad and hopeless tales of other prisoners, who have been arrested in the same unexpected way, but still he refuses to believe them. Gradually all his surroundings create a psychological preparedness for his first interview with the investigator. This preparatory period may be different as to its duration - from one day up to several weeks, depending on the intentions of the investigator and the number of other cases he has at hand at that time.

At last our Ivanov is summoned to the inquest. He is led through long corridors, and on the way he must stand with his face turned to the wall if some other prisoner meets him halfway. He will hear all the time the jingling of a large key, beating against the clasp on the soldier's belt; that is how the warders notify each other that another arrestee is being brought along the corridor, to enable the warder to turn his prisoner with his face to the wall - so that the prisoners might not see each other. But at last he enters the investigator's room. A formal inquest begins, and its purpose is the ascertaining of biographical data

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of the prisoner and his social origin.

"Where were you born, where did you live and work, who are your parents, your grandfather and grandmother, what was their occupation?" - these questions have to be answered in details, day after day, year after year. During this preliminary inquest the investigator studies the prisoner, tries to understand his psychology, and his conclusions as well as the impression, made by the prisoner, will determine the behaviour of the investigator during this first inquest. Depending on them he will be either polite and obliging, treating the arrestee to tea and sandwiches and offering him cigarettes, or will knock with his pistol at the table, swear and shout: "I'll kill you like a dog!"

At least the formal part of the inquest is finished. The investigator comes to certain conclusions and he proceeds to the "case" as such.

His first question as to this "business part" has normally such a sense though it may vary as to the form:

"Your attitude towards the Soviet regime?" - whereby he adds: "You have to take into account, that we know everything, and you have to make an open-hearted confession, which will prove your complete loyalty to the Party and Soviet Government. In that case we shall not bring you to the trial. But if you persist in denying your guilt, I shall remind you of the words of Maxim Gorky: "If the enemy does not surrender, he is crushed".

By saying this, the operative agent-representative at once shows the prisoner the general direction - denounce yourself as much as possible. But in spite of this all prisoners usually vow that they are absolutely loyal and are ready to sacrifice their life for the Soviet Power and their leaders.

At this moment of the inquest, the investigator comes down upon the arrestee with all his stock of information collected from secret informers. He tells the prisoner about his intimate friends. He shows that he knows who and when paid any visits to the arrestee, he describes the character of these persons and the kind of relations between them and the prisoner. He may even

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describe the colour of the hair of the girl with whom the prisoner had an affair and he may mention a whole series of the most intimate details of the prisoner's life. But he will not say a word about his anti-Soviet actions or crimes, for his information does not mention any of such actions or crimes. He will only slap the file of the case with the back of his hand, repeating again and again: "You see, we know everything but we would like you to confess sincerely in all your errors. Repent, and we shall forgive you. But if you don't plead guilty, you will be executed as an inveterate class enemy".

Usually, at this stage of inquest such version of the accusation is brought into action which the operative agent-representative (who is now acting as the investigator) invented and prepared during his preliminary "elaboration" of this man. Such versions and combinations greatly vary, and they may be even of <sup>3</sup>fantastic nature: from an attempt to kill Stalin and other members of the Soviet Government up to an intention to blow up a coal mine. This part completely depends on the phantasy and tastes of the investigator. In such cases the very first inquest begins with swearing, threatening and beating.

But in many cases the investigator does not bring any concrete accusation against the prisoner at the first inquest, but simply mentions several names of persons, known to the prisoner, who have been arrested some time before, and affirms, that they have already confessed everything, and that the NKVD knows about the part of the prisoner in their crimes, but he does not mention the crimes as such. From time to time he only puts some leading questions, provoking the prisoner to choose the necessary version.

But notwithstanding the nature of the chosen version, the investigator leads the inquest in such a way that the prisoner has the impression that he is not considered by the investigator to be the chief culprit, but only a blind tool in the hands of some main persons, who have to be brought to light with the help of this prisoner. Thus, from the very beginning, the investigator gives the prisoner a clue for the future psychological bargain,



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while the form and character of this bargain are determined by the investigator in the course of the inquest, depending on the personal qualities of the prisoner, his education, intellectuality, etc.

This first stormy attack of the investigator usually at once sets the prisoner off the rails. He is abashed, he has never expected that all the details of his personal life, his acquaintances and connections, even his own words and thoughts are so well known to the investigator. Nearly every citizen of the Soviet Union has in his past such facts which he carefully conceals from the representatives of the Soviet power. All these facts from his own past or that of his parents, as insignificant as they may be in reality, here, in the investigator's room, acquire in his tormented brain the meaning of a terrible deadly danger threatening him and to his family. Such a state of mind is explained by the "normal" psychology of the Soviet Citizen, terrorized by constant purges, check-ups, self-criticism etc. and this factor is fully taken into consideration by the investigator.

Some of the arrestees "crack-up" i.e. agree to sign anything suggested by the investigator, already during the first inquest, but in the most cases the first violent attack of the investigator does not give any decisive results, and the prisoner keeps on proving his innocence. In such cases the investigator, sprawling on a chair and smoking one cigarette after another, for many hours will repeat his only requirement: "Speak!". In the intervals he will knock at the table with his pistol, swear, stamp with his feet, threaten with tortures and execution and even beat the prisoner, though it is not always done in the course of the first inquest.

The continuance of the first inquest may vary from several hours to several days. This depends entirely on the investigator, his intentions, the character of the material collected during the preliminary "elaboration", on the version of the "crime", prepared by the investigator, on the impression created by the arrestee, on the physical and moral firmness of the prisoner himself.

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The inquests that lasted for several days were especially widespread in the period of "Yeshovshchina" when the lack of material that had to be collected previously, and the abundance of "cases" did not give any possibility to the investigators to pursue a systematic "working up" of the prisoners, and forced them to try "cracking" the arrestees by means of a single furious attack.

In the case of one of the authors of this work, such an inquest in the Special Division of the NKVD lasted for five days and a half without any interruption.

If such method is applied, after some hours of the inquest, when the will of the prisoner is not yet broken but the organism already begins to lose capacity of resisting owing to the fatigue and nervous strain, the investigator usually leaves with the words: "Stand and think!" Here it is necessary to have in view that during the inquests in the NKVD the prisoners are very rarely allowed to sit. Usually the arrestee has to stand all the time he is in the investigator's room. This necessity of standing for many hours and sometimes even for several days is already a cruel torture in itself, and may break the resistance even of firm people; but the chief purpose of this measure is to bring prisoners to a half-conscious state when they lose control over their answers. Sometimes (as in the case with one of the authors of this book) the prisoner under investigation is driven to such a state that, being influenced by the investigator on duty, he begins imagining that the latter helps him and proposes the best version for his defence and the best course to adopt in this situation. But this measure is not included into the category of "physical measures for influencing" and represents the "normal" way of the "work" of the NKVD organs. Depriving the prisoner of food and drink during the inquest, or feeding him with herrings not giving any water afterwards, is also considered to be the usual method. To emphasize this measure, the investigator usually puts a carafe with water and a glass on his desk, and amuses himself from time to time by pouring water into the glass and back again into the carafe.

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And so, the investigator leaves. Instead of him some operative worker in a low rank who is on duty, or a student of advanced course of the Moscow School of the NKVD investigators who is on probation, stay with the prisoner. The orderly NKVD man uninterruptedly speaks with the prisoner, using, as a rule, the most insulting language, trying to humiliate and outrage him. The purpose of such a behaviour is to oppress morally and to tire physically the person under investigation not giving him a single minute of rest. If the prisoner, exhausted by sleeplessness and long inquest, falls asleep while standing, the NKVD man on duty wakes him with a new flood of bad language and sometimes by pushing him. So it goes for a long time. Every six hours the investigators on duty are changed while the man under investigation must keep standing and "thinking". For emphasizing this measure the investigator sometimes draws two lines on the wall near the shoulders of the prisoner or on the floor near his feet, and prohibits to swerve from it or to step over them.

At last, on the next day, the investigator appears again. He has slept well and rested, he is cleanly shaven, even sprayed with eau de Cologne. He is quite ready to begin his normal working day. But the prisoner hardly stands on his feet by this time. The investigator usually begins this second half of the inquest with a violent attack, demanding the prisoner to take a seat and write down his testimony as he had time enough to think them over by night. And usually the investigator adds: "Then you can go and sleep". A characteristic detail has to be mentioned here: almost always in the beginning of the first inquest the investigator addresses the prisoner in the second person of plural ("vy"- the polite form in Russian), but later on he replaces this form by a rude "ty" (the second person of singular), and rarely uses other expressions than "villain", "rascal", "fascist Vermin" etc. while addressing his victim. He returns to the polite form "vy" only when the prisoner agrees to take a seat and write the required testimony.

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In such case the prisoner is always given tea with sandwiches, and a package of cigarettes or of cheap tobacco is put on the table for his use. All arrestees know about it, and after a cramped cell, swarming with bugs, this tea with sandwiches and the possibility of smoking again turn into such an alluring bait that cannot be resisted by many a prisoner.

Here the investigator applies the following, very typical psychological trick. Before closing the night inquest he comes down upon the prisoner with some horrible and even fantastic accusation, as, for instance, the organization of an attempt upon Stalin's life, an attempt of blowing up the plant where the prisoner works or something like that. The prisoner is left for the night to "think over" this terrible accusation, that threatens him with a "pass into eternity". In the course of the night the prisoner gets accustomed to the thought of the impending death and all his mental ability is directed upon attaining only one purpose : to avoid this terrible menacing prospect and at least to save his life. If in the beginning of the inquest the prisoner strove to prove his innocence and wanted to be set free, he has only one wish now - to escape impending death and as soon as possible to put an end to this excruciating inquest. His feet are swollen from the long standing, his brains are inflamed and he has almost lost his capacity for understanding.

The investigator takes into consideration such a state of the prisoner and abruptly changes his tactics. He begins the morning inquest in a soothing tone : "Both of us lost our temper yesterday. Each of us was tired. Your enemies have slandered you a lot. But we know that you are not such a bad man. Everybody may make an error. We do not want to ruin innocent people, we want only to know the truth." - The further harangue is of the similar nature but ends with releasing the prisoner from the most terrible accusation while the prisoner is summoned to sign some "trifle", i.e. the testimony of a "disloyal attitude towards the Soviet power", "petty wreckage" etc. Here the investigator adds with a pretended sympathy to the fate of the prisoner : "Nothing particular will threaten you for that. May be you will be only

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forced to spend a couple of years in a camp. Then the Soviet power will forgive you and you will be free again." After the terrible experience of the last night the prospect of "going to a camp for a couple of years" seems to be almost a blessing to the weary prisoner. Many take the bait of the "compassionate" investigator and ruin themselves and their relatives and intimates.

But if the prisoner is firm enough to refuse signing this "trifle", the investigator uses floods of bad language, and throwing aside all his "compassion" and "sympathy" applies to the prisoner the most cruel "measures of physical influence" in the result of which the prisoner usually loses his senses. Then cold water is poured on him and he is dragged into the solitary confinement cell or back to his ordinary cell, or even to the prison hospital - depending on the wish of the investigator and on the state of the prisoner.

But besides the "physical influence" there is also the following method which is applied very frequently. Being tired out with shouting and having exhausted his stock of curses the investigator declares: "All is finished with you. You are such an incorrigible vermin that there is nothing else to be done with you but to shoot you down. That's enough!"

The prisoner is put into an elevator. He feels that he comes down somewhere. The memories of all his past life pass before his mental sight. But suddenly the elevator stops. The door is opened and the prisoner sees a long corridor, dimly lit by electrical bulbs. Two NKVD men stand by the elevator holding pistols in their hands. The prisoner is ordered to go ahead. Staggering, clinging to the wall, he slowly moves and sees the bullet marks on the corridor walls. The NKVD men gradually fall behind, he hears their steps, echoing hollowly in the stillness of the corridor. ~~Strange~~  
This is an end...

But no shots are fired. The prisoner reaches the end of the corridor. Again he is put into an elevator and brought before the investigator who meets him with the words: "Well, have you seen? I was sorry for you and thought you might repent. You have wife and children, then think it over once more! We don't stand upon ceremony with the enemies of the people: one, two and ready!"

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Again the horrid accusation of terrorism, spying activities, diversion etc. appears on the stage, then the investigator again has "pity" on the prisoner, and summons him to sign some "trifle" which will cost him only two-three years in the camp. Variations and forms of the methods used by the investigator may be different, but the argumentation is nearly always the same: "Sign this 'trifle' and the accusation of terrorism and diversion will be taken off, as you will show that you sincerely repent in your errors". At last the worn-out man signs this "trifle" and is sent to some concentration camp for 5-10 years.

However, the investigator rarely achieves his purpose in the course of the first inquest though it may last for several days. An opinion is wide-spread abroad that the NKVD investigators can model anything out of the prisoners as if they were soft wax. Such an opinion was created after the "big processes" of 1936-38 but it is quite a wrong one.

These big processes are called "show trials" or "demonstrative trials" in the U.S.S.R. But in reality they do not demonstrate anything. Only such "enemies of the people" who "cracked up", capitulated and agreed to be partners of Krylenko and Vishinsky appear on the platform of the Column Hall of the Moscow Union House. But all those who have courageously endured moral and physical tortures simply get a bullet into the napes of their necks and this is done without any posposity. It is sufficient to mention only the most popular names of those who perished without this comedy of an open trial - the names of Marshal Tukhachevsky, Yegorov, Blucher, Army Generals Kork, Uborevich, Yakir, Admirals Panderzhansky and Orlov, ministers of the government and members of the Central Party Committee and even of the Politburo as Rudzutak, Kessler, Postyshev and others, prominent diplomats as Karakhan and Masolnikov, and what is more important - let us recollect millions of courageous Russian men whose names and whose very existence remained unnoticed by the foreign correspondents, eager only to find a sensation - millions of patriots and anti-communists, tortured and executed in the secret NKVD places, killed as they could not be curbed or broken.

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The names of generals Vlassov and Malyskin, Trukhin and Meandrov who were executed in 1946 without witnesses, may serve as a symbol of all <sup>of</sup> these innumerate army of fighters for freedom who conquered the horrors of the NKVD system.

Thus, this monstrous system of moral and physical violence is not always the winner. More often it is conquered by the human spirit, strong in its hate of all evil, in its love of the good, i.e. by those qualities of the people which the Communism was unable to change in the long thirty years of its complete mastery over bodies but not the souls of the Russian people.

The unknown victims of Stalin's dictatorship lead their heroic struggle against their tormentors for long months, though they are denied all human rights and though they are fully aware of the fact that this struggle leads only to their death. Many lose their strength and firmness in this unequal struggle, sign everything they are requested to, and even turn into obedient agents of their tormentors. But still greater number of Russian people remain firm to the very end in spite of all indescribable physical and moral tortures.

The procedure of a gradual influence of the NKVD investigator upon the prisoner's mind, as described above, is often spun out for many months and even years. It happens very often that one and the same investigator is in charge of several dozens of cases, and as a result of this, persons under investigation are called out by him for the inquest once in a <sup>while</sup> way. In 1937-38 it was not infrequent that people were summoned to the first inquest only after 4-5 months of imprisonment, and then they were again forgotten for several months. There were also cases when persons arrested in the very height of "Yeshovshchina", i.e. in winter of 1937-38, had not been called for the inquest until Yeshov himself was dismissed by the end of the year 1938, and then they were set free, "for lack of the body of the crime". These people never learned why they had been arrested and why they had to spend a year in prison. But all these cases have to be considered as exceptions and they cannot be characteristic for the usual methods of the inquest in the NKVD prisons.

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In order to understand the actions of the investigator and of the prisoner in such cases when the investigation is not limited only by the first violent inquest but is spun out for a long period of time, it is necessary to take into consideration the atmosphere of the NKVD prison cell. In the period of great repressions 25-30 persons were crammed into normal cells, designed for four persons. People could sit only by turns, and for the night large wooden shields were brought into the cells and put on the plank-beds across the whole cell. Thus the whole space of the cell was divided into two or three stories the height of which did not exceed one meter. 8-10 and even more prisoners were placed on these stories, so that they were lying tightly pressed to each other and filling almost the whole of the cubature of the cell with their bodies. Those who had to lie on the floor under the plank-beds and the first row of shields were in the worst position. In the Moscow prisons these places were called "subways".

Horrid filth, stench from the close-stool, lice, bugs swarming in plank-beds and in the shields, an impossibility of washing, shaving or combing, a thin soup called "balanda" with a piece of bread for dinner and supper, complete lack of news from outside and the agonizing uncertainty about the fate of the relatives and intimates, shrieks of tortured men, moans of those who have come back from an inquest, the night calls "without things" for execution and deafening roar of automobile motors that had to muffle the sound of shots in the cellars - all this created such an atmosphere in the cells, in comparison to which even the worst concentration camp seemed like a rest home.

In such conditions the investigator had only to create in the mind of the prisoner a certitude that he won't be released under any circumstances and that death is lurking for him. Such a state of mind <sup>is</sup> was achieved <sup>as a</sup> in the result of the most terrible and even fantastic accusations and by means of brutal beatings and tortures during the first inquests. Then, for some time, the prisoner is left in peace. As it is prohibited to speak in a loud voice in the cells, the prisoners talk in a low whisper with each



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other for the whole days, and gradually losing <sup>a</sup> the sense of fear, tell their stories and ask for advice as to their behaviour at future inquests, though each prisoner is aware of the fact that two-three secret agents are normally present among the prisoners of the cell. However, each arrestee tells his fellow-prisoners only a part of the truth - the fear of the investigator is too strong. Therefore, of course, it is impossible to speak about any co-ordinated actions of the inmates of one and the same cell - each of them takes his own risk and acts according to his own plan. The inveterate habit of Soviet people to hide their innermost "I" from the eyes of the strangers is preserved even in the hell of a NKVD cell. The analysis of the conditions in the NKVD prisons is not the purpose of this work, but we are obliged to dwell on the following two points that are of decisive value :

1. Such conditions have been created in the NKVD prisons, in comparison to which any punitive measure (with the only exception of a death penalty) seems to the prisoners a facilitation of their fate.

2. Collective demonstrations, riots, hunger-strikes etc. take place in the prisons of other countries, while in the NKVD prison, as a rule, a duel between the investigator and the prisoner is going on.

Though the circumstances of each separate case may greatly vary, it is possible to state three essential lines in the behaviour of the prisoners, and consequently all political prisoners of the NKVD are divided into three main categories.

The first category embraces those persons who rapidly lose their moral and physical strength, strike a bargain with the investigator, "crack up" i.e. sign everything they are suggested to <sup>them</sup> by the investigator, and in the most cases perish or consent to become NKVD agents.

The second category consists of persons who are strong enough to bear all tortures of the inquest as well as inhuman conditions of their imprisonment, admitting none of the points of the accusation, brought against them by the investigator. Many of them

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perish <sup>as a</sup> result of false testimonies of ~~many~~ other prisoners or friends, colleagues and fellow-workers who have not been arrested but terrorized to bear witness against them. However, a certain number of such prisoners are lucky enough to be released "because of the lack of the body of the crime" after many months of inhuman tortures and at the cost of a colossal strain <sup>upon</sup> of their physical and moral strength. Usually they draw this fortunate lot in such instances when the Kromia decides, for certain reasons, to reconsider the cases of the prisoners.

The third category is the most numerous and the most characteristic one for the Soviet conditions, though such a category cannot be found among the prisoners of any other countries. It consists of persons who rather quickly come to the conclusion that they won't be able to snatch <sup>themselves from</sup> out of the NKVD clutches, and therefore these people lead their struggle with the investigator not for their freedom, but for applying to their cases such a clause of the criminal code in the indictment which seems to them to be the most favourable one. This is approximately the same course of action, adopted by the advocates of other countries when they see the impossibility of gaining a lawsuit for their client. But here is a principal difference: the defenders of obviously hopeless cases concentrate their efforts on the extenuating circumstances in so far as the fact of the crime is beyond any doubt. The Soviet prisoners of the third category have themselves invented for their "cases" such crimes that <sup>they</sup> have never been committed by them, and direct all their phantasy and mental ability to bring the characteristics and circumstances of these "crimes" in conformance with certain clauses of the criminal code that may threaten them "only" with deportation to a concentration camp.

The tactics of this original "defense" of the NKVD prisoners is approximately the following:

At a certain stage of the investigation the prisoner clearly sees that he won't be released, that his conviction has been decided beforehand by the investigator and his superiors. The atmosphere in the cell and tortures during the inquests gradually

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undermine his will for struggle. On the other hand the absurdity of the investigator's version of his "crime" is also obvious to him in all its details. His brain is painfully and strenuously working in the effort of making this version like the truth, but at the same time taking care that the punishment does not exceed "deportation to the camp for 2-3 years". Usually this way is chosen by persons who have been arrested by the organs of the Economic Administration of the NKVD and charged with "diversion", "economic spying" and "wreckage".

Arrestees begin consulting their fellow-prisoners. In every cell there are always several "specialists" as to the Criminal Code, who know by heart the most frequently used clauses of the Soviet Criminal Code and punitive measures involved by them. The prisoner chooses a clause which seems to him to be the most suitable one, and starts working on the details of his "crime" as well as on the general plan of his "confession". When such a plan is made out, the prisoner comes up to the warden in the door of his cell and asks the warden to give him an interview with the investigator for "giving testimony". Such an interview is normally given without any delay. Being brought before the investigator he declares that he has "realized his errors" and wants to "make an open-hearted confession" and therefore asks for some ink, pen and the files of his case.

Having received all this, the prisoner, in the presence of the investigator, begins working at his own case. The attitude of the investigator is immediately changed into the most sympathetic one and the prisoner invariably gets tea with sandwiches and cigarettes or tobacco. The investigator has by that time fully realized all the discrepancies and even absurdities of his version of the accusation, and he gladly accepts the prisoner's co-operation. He is interested neither in the essential part of the "case" as such nor in the punitive measure, but only in the suitable "mounting" or "framing" of the notice which he has to prepare for the session of the "troika" or "Special Council". The rudeness of the investigator's abuses, blows and tortures

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are immediately stopped at this stage, and the investigator puts on a sympathetic and even good-humoured mask.

This way is usually chosen by intellectuals and specialists. As soon as the prisoner has started writing his "version", he becomes the temporary master of the situation. In such cases he works without hurrying, trying to prolong his "leave" from the cell and enjoy comparatively human conditions. There are cases when prisoners work at their "testimonies" for a week or even more, and they compile a really scientific work, imbued with formulas and calculations. The investigator does not hasten him, and only attentively watches over the prisoner to prevent him from trying to prove his complete innocence. As long as he "confesses" and does not rebut directly the version of the investigator - the latter will not intrude.

Starting this strange and unnatural "co-operation" with the investigator, the prisoner may pursue different objects, but in the majority of cases he strives to facilitate his fate or that of his family. Under the most favourable circumstances such a "detailed confession" may lead to the appointment of a commission for revising his case. But much more frequently the prisoner "goes" to a camp for several years and all his inventiveness serves only for mitigating his fate to a certain extent and somewhat shortening his prison term. This strange work of prisoners for inventing the crimes they have never committed shows in the clearest way how desperate and hopeless the people feel in the NKVD prisons. In fact, it is the same principle of the Soviet "self-criticism" but amounting to absurdity in prison.

Sometimes the wish to escape from the lousy and stinking cell and to go to the concentration camp acquires the character of a real psychosis. Hungry and weary people begin to paint in the brightest colours the pictures of the Siberian taiga (vast forests) and of rivers, abounding in water and swarming with fish. They can discuss for hours and with the participation of all inmates of the cell, how they will fell trees, build their barracks in the desolate taiga, how they will go a-fishing and cook a

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fish-coup. In their imagination the "correctional camp" of the NKVD turns into the climax of the human well-being, and in order to achieve their deportation as soon as possible, people compile the versions of the crimes, never committed by them but required by the investigator. Such psychoses, very profitable for the investigator, are sometimes provoked by him through his agents in the cell. A lot of people under investigation, especially former soldiers and officers of the Red Army, try to be deported to a camp as soon as possible, while they are still healthy and strong in order to flee from there. On this account there is even a special saying in the prisons: "I go to the camp, - to the green prosecutor..."

There are also cases when the prisoners try to mock quite consciously at their ignorant investigators. So, for instance, in 1937, an inmate of the NKVD prison invented with all details a story how he intended to sink several ships of the Black Sea navy in Armavir, and the investigator put down all this nonsense, not knowing that Armavir is situated 300 miles away from the Black Sea coast. Only on the next day he saw what a trick was played on him by the prisoner, summoned this prisoner to his room and beat him so that he was more dead than alive. Another "participant of an armed revolt on the Lower Volga" signed a testimony that he, being the chief of the auto-repairing shop of the MTS (Machine-tractor station), intended to make tanks out of the tractors "Fordson" and armoured cars out of the auto-cisterns in order to secure the success for this "revolt". But more often there are cases when weary and desperate prisoners - this is mostly the case with almost illiterate peasants and workers - ask the investigator to write down exactly what he wants and finds better for them and thus sign themselves their death sentences.

It is absolutely impossible to give a detailed analysis of all methods of the inquest and investigation of the NKVD-MGB in a short chapter of this book. Such an analysis must be a theme for a special work.

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Closing this chapter it is only necessary to point out that the chief weapon of a NKVD investigator is neither the material which has been collected by him during the "elaboration of the figurant", nor the physical measures of influence, but this atmosphere of ultimate despair and complete lawlessness which envelops every prisoner since the very first moment of his arrest, and to which he has been prepared by all his previous life in the "normal" Soviet surroundings. It won't be an exaggeration if we say that the atmosphere of this "normal" Soviet life differs from the atmosphere of an NKVD prison only by a concentration and acuteness of the measures of enforcement as here and there the Soviet citizen has no personal freedom and all his life fate is in the hands of the authorities in power.

The work with the witnesses is of a much simpler nature. The investigator reads to the summoned witness a false testimony of the prisoner, where the latter makes a clean breast of everything. If the witness does not want to say anything that may be of any harm to the prisoner, the investigator declares: "Well, you are such an enemy as he is, even a more dangerous one, for he has confessed and repents openheartedly for what he has done while you want to conceal everything from us".

Having been summoned to the NKVD, the witness cannot leave the premises without the signature of the investigator on his pass. The investigator suggests to the witness to go out into a corridor and think there, while a soldier bids him to stand with his face turned to the wall, and he may be kept in such a position for many hours according to the investigator's order. As a result persons of weak character sign everything given to them by the investigator, only anxious to leave this damned building.

The foreigners often ask: what does the Soviet government arrest such a lot of people for, especially as they are obviously innocent? The usual answer is that it is necessary for the reinforcement of the army of the prisoners who are carrying out the most difficult work without being paid. But this answer does not give an exhaustive explanation of the problem, as the whole population of the Soviet Union already works for the state, i.e. party,

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and gets starvation wages for their labors. And the work of a slave is always less productive than that of a free man, even if his freedom is as ephemeral as it is in the Soviet Union. Therefore, the above question will be more correct if we put the word "why" instead of "what for", used there.

Then the answer will be as following : because being afraid of the people's hatred the Soviet government created a multi-millioned army of jailers, who have to arrest, torture and deport millions of people in order to justify their existence, and because there is no organ in the Soviet Union that could stop on a certain limit the signal, received from the center, for liquidating or "purging" that or another group of the Soviet population. Thus the well-known theory of the snow-ball is brought into life. The dictatorship of the Communist party cannot exist without the army of NKVD-MGB butchers, and this army requires millions of victims to justify its existence. This is a vicious circle from which there is no other escape but the making away of both the dictatorship and the butchers in its service.

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CHAPTER VII

THE FIRST DIVISION  
OF THE GUGB NKVD USSR

The task of this division is to protect Stalin and other top ranking leaders of the Party and Government, as the Stalinist oligarchy is officially nominated.

The 1st Division is particularly concerned with the protection of : Stalin, all members and candidates of the Politburo, secretaries of the Central Party Committee, members and candidates of the Orgburo, the chairman and some members of the Commission for Party Control, all Vice-Chairmen of the Sovnarkom ( now - Council of Ministers) of the USSR, and some People's Commissars (now ministers) as well as a series of the highest officials according to a list approved by Stalin himself.

The most important objects, guarded by the 1st Division, are :

- a) the Kremlin ;
- b) the building of the Central Committee of the Party;
- c) the building of the Sovnarkom in Skhotny Road in Moscow;
- d) the buildings of the Party Control Commission, of the Executive Committee of the Comintern, that of the Central Committee of Komsomol, and a series of others;
- e) the building of the NKVD USSR - Moscow, Dzerzhinsky Square, House No 2;
- f) Stalin's country-house;
- g) Country-houses of all the Politburo members and other persons under protection of the 1st Division;
- h) the road from the Kremlin to the country-houses of the above mentioned persons;
- i) Government villas in the Caucasus and the Crimea;
- j) Government trains, aeroplanes, cars, yachts and other transport means.



Besides these main objects, the 1st Division guards absolutely all places, visited by Stalin and his closest collaborators, as well as all roads, chosen for their routes. For instance, the 1st Division guards the government boxes in the Moscow Art Theater, in the Bolshoi and Maly Theaters, the government hunting estate near Moscow etc.

The strictly specific task of the 1st Division is, naturally, reflected in its whole structure ( see Diagram No 11). Unlike all other organs of the OUGB (now MGB) the 1st Division has no ramifications going downwards, and it exists only in the central apparatus of the OUGB, as its main object is the region of the city of Moscow.

The 1st Division is closely connected in all its work with the 2nd Special Division, especially with its "L-AM" branch. In the capitals of the Union Republics and regional centers the functions of the 1st Division as to the protection of local party leaders (secretaries of regional and area committees) go over to the 2nd Special Divisions of the corresponding NKVD administrations in these cities. However, when Stalin and other Moscow leaders visit these cities, they are guarded on their way and during their stay there by the 1st Division, though the latter uses the already existing brigades and groups of the 2nd Special Division of the local NKVD administrations for the exterior observation, regulation of traffic and other purposes.

When Molotov, Vyshinsky and other Soviet "leaders" go abroad they are accompanied by a special reinforced brigade of the NKVD men on the staff of the 1st Division. Two of these men must always accompany the leader wherever he goes, without leaving him alone. They may wear uniforms or plain clothes. Besides, long before the "leader" leaves for a certain country, a special brigade of the 1st Division is sent there (usually under the pretence of sending ahead technical workers of the Soviet delegation), being entrusted with the task of securing protective measures in local conditions. During the whole stay of the leader abroad, all the serving personnel consists of the 1st Division men. So, for instance, during the diplomatic journey of Molotov to Kan-

Francisco in the spring of 1945, he was accompanied by a whole platoon of guards of the 1st Division, and Kruglov himself, the future Minister for State Security, was entrusted with the general direction of operations for securing the safety of Russia's leader No 2.

The journey of Stalin abroad is technically impossible. The position of Stalin prevents him from using foreign means of communication, and it would be necessary for the 1st Division to get the exclusive right for guarding everything that has to do with Stalin's route, i.e. the guarding of all roads, railway stations, ports, streets that lie in the Stalin's way, and the government of no country will agree to such a measure. For the last 30 years Stalin formally crossed the boundaries of the Soviet Union only twice : in November 1943, going to Teheran, and in August 1945, leaving for Potsdam. But in both cases he practically moved in the regions, occupied by the Soviet troops, and therefore there was full possibility for the 1st Division to secure his safety according to the strictly set rules.

But even in such conditions, precautions of quite exceptional nature were taken in Teheran and Potsdam. In the first case up to three thousands NKVD men on staff of the 1st Division and Special Sector of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party as well as a battalion of troops, guarding the Aerialia, arrived in Teheran. The conference with Churchill and Roosevelt took place in the premises of the Soviet embassy, and in its course Stalin left the building only twice : for the first time to pay official calls to Roosevelt and Churchill, and for the second - to attend the celebration of Churchill's birthday.

In Potsdam the inhabitants were ousted from all buildings in the streets adjoining the area, where the conference took place, and the whole area was encompassed by the intensified detachments of "SMERSH", "L-SH" and 1st Division. All the way from Moscow to Potsdam was guarded by the NKVD troops, and Stalin arrived at Potsdam in a special train, leaving Berlin aside.

The 1st Division originated as a special organ evidently after the attempt upon Lenin's life in August 1918, but its organizational set-up was not completed during Lenin's life. It is possible to assume that in these times Trotsky, and not Lenin, paid more attention to the development of this organ. It was Trotsky who took for his private use the train that formerly belonged to the Russian tsar, and that was he who introduced special body-guard for himself and other Soviet leaders. This bodyguard was the initial stage of the 1st Division. It is difficult to decide which part was played by Stalin in the erection of this specific organ in that early period of the Soviet power, but it is characteristic that during the defence of Tsaritsyn (Stalingrad) in autumn 1918, Stalin surrounded himself by a detachment of Chekists and under no circumstances parted with this special body-guard.

In the OGPU period the 1st Division was joined with the 2nd Special Division and, according to some information, it was something like a subdivision of the 2nd Special Division, though its functions were highly specialized. On the other hand, the general structure of the NKVD and the numeration of its main divisions and administrations make us suppose that the 1st special Division, the 2nd Special Division and the 1st Division constituted formerly a general 1st Division, which was divided later into three divisions in connection with the complication and specialization of its functions. However, the authors did not succeed as yet in finding a definite answer as to the history of organization of the 1st Division.

In any case there is no doubt that before the war the 1st Division closely coordinated its activity with the 2nd Special Division, and both these divisions were subordinated to the then Deputy People's Commissar of the NKVD, S.N. Kruglov, who was personally responsible for the safety of Stalin and other Moscow leaders. The same Kruglov appointed the superintendent of the Kremlin and checked up all technical workers on the staff of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party, and of the Sovnarkom of the USSR. After the war Kruglov was appointed the Minister for Interior Affairs of the USSR.

Unlike other central organs of the NKVD-MGB, the 1st Division is an independent unit, practically subordinated not to the NKVD People's Commissar (Minister), but to the Special Sector of the Central Party Committee, i.e. to the Stalin's secretariat. If Stalin or any other leader leaves Moscow to go to the provinces, all local agencies of the NKVD-MGB are bound to fulfil exactly and with absolute submission all orders of the NKVD men on the staff of the 1st Division, accompanying this leader (of course, only in the questions concerned with the protection of the leader during his stay in a certain republic or region). The chief of the 1st Division is subordinated both to the chief of the GUGB and directly to the People's Commissar of Interior Affairs (now to the Minister of State Security or directly to Lavrenty Beria).

According to the information collected by the authors of this work, the 1st Division included the following units :

- a) Operative section;
- b) Inquest section;
- c) Personnel section;
- d) Registration and information section;
- e) Chief of the bodyguard;
- f) Commander of the Kremlin guard with the 1st Commandant's office of the Kremlin guard and the guard division subordinated to him;
- g) Commander of the guard of objects with the 2nd Commandant's office subordinated to him;
- h) Transport section;
- 1) the Kremlin supply department;
- k) the MTO section (material-technical provision);
- l) Administrative and maintenance section.

Probably there <sup>are</sup> is a series of subdivisions of this division, not mentioned on our list; on the other hand, it is quite possible that some of the mentioned units have been joined together. The unusual secrecy in the organisational structure of the 1st Division makes very difficult the construction of schemes and the correct denomination of its sections and subunits. This must be the object of further studies.

Probably the field of operations and the character of the activity of these sections of the 1st Division are as follows :

Operative section (probably several of them). Plans the work of the special operative groups subordinated to the 1st Division. The number of persons, constituting these groups may vary as well as the tasks, carried out by them.

For example, Stalin attends some theater performance in Moscow. Several operative groups of the 1st Division will be sent to this theater during Stalin's stay there in order to secure his safety.

If Stalin or someone of his closest collaborators ( the so called "nomenclature workers") leave Moscow, they are protected during their journey by operative groups, specially formed for this purpose. These groups do not include the personal bodyguard of each "leader", which is directly subordinated to the commander of the bodyguard.

Besides these essential tasks the personnel of the operative groups makes arrests carrying out the orders of the 1st Division, and searches the quarters of persons, "elaborated" by this division. Besides all this, the operative groups may carry out other operative tasks which are the concern of the 1st Division.

Inquest section. Is carrying on inquests and inquiries of persons, arrested by the 1st Division. It has to be mentioned here that the whole work of the 1st Division is carried on in close contact with the private secretariat of Stalin and with the Special Sector of the Central Party Committee, more precisely with the so-called "Stalin's battalion". In the period of the "Great Purge", 1936-1938, all arrests of members of the Politburo, the Central Committee and the Sovnarkom, who were not lucky enough to please Stalin, were partly carried out through the inquest section of the 1st Division. Therefore, it has to be assumed that the field of operations of the inquest section of the 1st Division is not limited only with cases of persons, arrested for breaking the rules, set for the protection of the leaders. Practically the investigators of this section execute the functions of

the investigators for especially important and super-secret cases. So, in 1957-58, arrests of all NKVD bosses, to begin with Iagoda and Yeshov, were carried out with the assent of the Special Sector of the Central Party Committee, and the cases went through the highest section of the 1st Division.

Personnel section. Is concerned with the problem of personnel for the whole 1st Division and also checks up and selects technical workers for the maintenance of the Kremlin, "nomenclature objects" (i.e. government buildings) and private accommodation of all persons under protection of the 1st Division.

The personnel section of the 1st Division is connected in its work with the Personnel Administration of the NKVD USSR but is not bound to carry out all its orders. However, the instructions of Stalin's personal private secretariat as to the selection, checking-up and distribution of the personnel are obligatory for the personnel section of the 1st Division. It is even possible to say, that the Special Sector, i.e. Stalin's private secretariat, if we want to be more precise, is directing the work of the whole 1st Division through its personnel section.

Registration and Information Section. Registers all travels of the persons who have to be guarded and accordingly gives instructions to the operative section and to the commandants. Registers all persons, visiting the Kremlin, who are not in the possession of permanent passes, and carries on all other forms and kinds of registration, necessary for the current work of the 1st Division. Is permanently connected in its work with the 2nd sector of the 1st Special Division (the recording of anti-Soviet elements) from which it gets all the necessary information. It is possible to assume that formerly this section was a part of the 1st Special Division. The registration section is also directly connected with Stalin's private secretariat, as well as with the secretariat of the Politburo and that of the Central Party Committee.

According to the data that have not been verified, it publishes a secret information bulletin for the 1st Division. The Record Office of the 1st Division is attached to this section.

The Commander of the bodyguard. Is subordinated directly to the Chief of the 1st Division (and through him to the Special Sector of the Central Committee) and is concerned with guarding Stalin and other persons under the protection of the 1st Division. The corresponding men of the bodyguard of the persons, mentioned above, are subordinated to him.

A special brigade of bodyguards, consisting exclusively of the NKVD-men on the staff of the 1st Division, is attached to each "leader". Two of his bodyguards have always to accompany the "leader" wherever he is and wherever he goes. These men are changed every eight hours. Thus, the brigade of the bodyguards normally consists of 6 guards and one commander. When the "leader" leaves Moscow, the brigade of the bodyguards is reinforced by the operative group. Besides, the country-houses where the "leaders" reside, have their internal and external guard.

Stalin and all members of the Politburo have quarters in the Kremlin and, besides that, country-houses, situated some 25-30 miles from Moscow along the Mozhaisk road, on the banks of the river Moskva. All the area around these government villas with the radius of 5-10 kilometers has been proclaimed "forbidden zone", and is guarded by a special division of NKVD troops. Every person who enters this forbidden zone without a special pass, has to be arrested without delay, and his identity has to be ascertained through the special recording of the NKVD.

The Commander of the Kremlin guards. Is concerned with the whole internal and external guard of the Kremlin and is subordinated to the Chief of the 1st Division (and through him - to the Special Sector of the Central Committee). The commander of the Kremlin guards has under him :

- a) the 1st commandant's office of the Kremlin guard,
- b) the division of the Kremlin guards - a division of the Chekist troops - corps d'elite - of the NKVD, armed and manned according to special provisions. This division is entrusted with the service of the internal and external guarding of the Kremlin, carried out together with the students of the special military school, bearing the name of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and situated within the Kremlin walls.

By the way, the commander of the Kremlin guards has not to be confused with the Kremlin superintendent. The latter carries on the administrative and supply duties as to the inner regulations in the Kremlin, receives foreigners of high standing, plans and organizes different receptions at Stalin's, Molotov's and other "leaders", is responsible for the maintenance of order during the sessions of the Supreme Soviet in the Big Kremlin Palace etc.

The Kremlin is undoubtedly the most carefully guarded object of the whole world, though an uninitiated person will hardly notice it. The visitors can enter the Kremlin mainly through the gates of the Spassky Tower, opening on the Red Square. All other entrances to the Kremlin are closed for the visitors, and they may be used only by persons, living in the Kremlin and having a permanent pass for entering it. The Spassky gate is open in the day time, and the way is apparently barred only by two sentries in the uniforms of the Supreme Soviet military school, but it is, probably, much more difficult to pass through this open gate than to get to the American depot where atom bombs are stored.

Foreign diplomats of high standing and foreign guests of the Soviet government, having been invited to visit the Kremlin, pass the Spassky gate almost without any impediments, and they cannot even imagine what it means for an ordinary Soviet citizen to go through the whole procedure for getting a pass to the Kremlin. Such a pass can be got only in the result of a call made by some of the high party and government institutions located there, or according to a personal invitation of one of the leaders. The usual order of issuing a pass is as follows :

The person, calling that or another visitor, sends to the commander of the Kremlin guards a request of the established type, indicating name, patronymic, surname of the visitor, his address, place of work and the reason of his being called to the Kremlin. The commander sends the copy of this request through the registration section of the 1st Division to the special recording sector of the 1st Special Division of the GUGB. If this person is a non-resident of Moscow, a ciphered enquiry about him is being sent



to the 1st Special Division of the regional administration of the NKVD that is concerned with his place of residence or work. If such a person was recorded with the registration files of the ANK (anti-Soviet elements), the pass will not be issued to him, but neither he, nor the person who submitted the request for seeing him will be informed about the reasons of the denial.

If the answer of the 1st Special Division is a favourable one, the request is being forwarded to the office of the Kremlin superintendent, that summons this person to visit the Kremlin on a certain day and at a certain time. In such cases a car on duty with the transport section of the 1st Division is being sent to bring the man to the Spassky Tower. By this time a pass has already been made out, in four copies and usually of different colors, in the pass office. All these four copies are handed to the visitor and he is told, politely but firmly, to go in a certain direction without stopping anywhere or staring at anything. Some two hundred meters away the visitor is met by a guardman who checks up his passes, leaves one of them with him and directs the visitor to the next guardman with the same instructions. The last guardman on duty accompanies him to the door of the room where he has been called. There he is met by the private secretary of the person calling him, who checks up his documents and instructs the visitor to give a short account of his business, not detaining the chief with unnecessary talk. As soon as the "audience" is closed, the visitor is accompanied exactly in the same way to the exit from the Kremlin.

If a Politburo member works outside the Kremlin walls, the same procedure is introduced in the institution where he is the boss. So, for instance, when Lazar M. Kaganovich was the People's Commissar for Heavy Industry (1932-1942), the pass to the building of the People's Commissariat was issued by the Transport administration of the NKVD, but a special official of the 1st Division issued the passes to the flat where the office of Kaganovich was located. In this case the visitor also received four passes, the last of which he handed to the official of the 1st Division on duty on the

Karben's flat, who showed him the necessary door and instructed him to pass quickly without stopping and looking at the boards on other doors. Two guards in the NKVD uniform, armed with guns were on duty at the door of Kaganovich's reception-room.

The former People's Commissar for Heavy Industry, Soggo Ordshonikidze, <sup>was</sup> the only one <sup>of</sup> all members of the Politburo, who flatly refused to have special guards, and made the access to his comparatively simple. Ordshonikidze protested against the setting up of the bodyguard in such a categorical way, that the 1st Division was obliged to protect him secretly, in a way, not noticeable to Ordshonikidze himself.

Commander of the Guard of Objects is concerned with guarding of the government objects, mentioned above, with the exception of the Kremlin. He has in his subordination the second commandant's office (vtoroy komandantskoy komandatura) that has <sup>at</sup> its disposal the following units of the NKVD guard troops :

a) special division BUD (regulirovka ulichnogo dvizheniya) - regulation of traffic). This division consists of approximately three thousand NKVD men, that have been specially trained. The division owes its name to the fact, that a considerable part of its personnel wears the militia uniforms with the oversleeve sign "MVD". This division guards the road from the Kremlin to the country residences of Stalin and other persons on the "nomenclature list". Their permanent duties include also the regulation of the traffic and the guarding of all streets between the Kremlin and the buildings occupied by the Central Party Committee, the Central Committee of the Komsomol, the Council of the People's Commissars of the USSR and other objects under protection of the 1st Division. If Stalin or other members of the Politburo visit some plants or constructions in Moscow, the guarding of all streets included in the route is immediately passed from the militia to the BUD division.

b) A special division of night guards is used for guarding the governmental high road in Moscow at night. The posts manned by these guards intensify the protection of this road, already secured by other sub-units. The staff of this division is situated in one of the houses in the Balshoy Gnedikovskiy lane.

c) Guard division of the NKVD - named and armed according to the same standards as the guard division of the Kremlin, is guarding the territory, where persons under protection of the 1st Division reside.

Besides this, a special group of water militia, guarding the part of the river Moskva where it flows through the territory reserved for the residence of the Government members, is obviously subordinated to the 2nd commandant's office.

Besides the two Kommandatura's (commandant's offices), mentioned above, there are other Kommandaturas, concerned with the guarding of other objects under protection of the 1st Division. The authors had no possibility of clearing up the functions and tasks of all these kommandaturas of the 1st Division, but it is known that the 3rd Kommandatura is concerned with the anti-aircraft defence of Moscow.

The protection of Stalin and other high party officials during their daily journey from the Kremlin to the "governmental area" is carried on with utmost care, and even at the time of peace surpasses by far anything that was permitted, for example, by Hitler during the years of war.

According to the general plan of reconstruction of Moscow all streets, included into the daily route of Stalin and his collaborators, required unusual breadth of 40 and even 60 meters, that is practically absolutely unnecessary. The cars of "leaders" run always along the very middle of these streets <sup>which</sup> practically excludes every possibility of an attempt. The inhabitants of the houses along this route are subjected to a special check-up of the 1st Division, and all families that evoke a suspicion in any way are immediately ousted <sup>and transferred</sup> into other regions of Moscow.

On the Moshaisk highroad all the territory up to the government villas and <sup>beyond</sup> ~~farther~~ about, for some 80 miles from Moscow, is divided into several kommandaturas, with an all-day-round duty in the area of each kommandatura. Before the war these kommandaturas were named exclusively by the employees of the 1st Division, and this system has probably been preserved after the war.

Usually these men wore the militia uniforms without any distinguishing features of their special destination. Each section of the road was secured with signal posts and telephones. When Stalin left the Kremlin or the gates of his villa, the "alarm" signal was given to all posts.

As soon as the cortege of Stalin or of some other leader has left the section of one komsomolnitsa, the next one is notified by a special signal about the approach of cars in order to stop any cross-movement. Any person, riding or walking along the highroad at this moment and stopping for any reason (for instance, to pump the tire of a car or a bicycle, etc.) has to present his personal documents for a check-up, and if anything seems suspicious he is arrested and questioned in the latest section of the 1st Division. One former prisoner of the Ukhta-Pechora "corrective labor camp" told the authors of this work that one of his fellow-inmates was a collective farmer from the environs of Moscow, who was sentenced in 1936 for an attempt upon Stalin's life. This collective farmer came to Moscow on some business. By the evening he had <sup>had</sup> drop tea, much, and being drunk, fell down to sleep somewhere near the Moshaisk highroad. He woke in the NKVD. During the search a "weapon" was found on him - a kitchen knife of the kind used in the country. Three days later this collective farmer was brought to the Butyrka prison, and the "troika" of the Moscow regional NKVD administration sentenced him to five years of deportation, according to the clause 56, par. 6 - terrorism. Taking into consideration such cases one must not be astonished at the fact, that Moscow citizens try to turn into the side streets as soon as they hear the <sup>heels</sup> of the approaching government cars.

Stalin's cortege for his journeys in Moscow and along the Moshaisk highroad usually consists of 3-4 cars with the "ZIS-7" trade-mark. These cars are home-made, armored, their greenish glasses are bullet-proof. A representative of the 1st Division must be always present at their reception from the plant.

The first car in the Stalin's cortege has the task of knocking down all persons crossing the road before the cortege as well

as any car that might be a danger to the governmental cars. Besides the driver, men of the 1st Division are in the first car, keeping an attentive eye on all persons and cars on Stalin's route. Stalin himself is usually in the second or in the third car, which periodically change their place in the cortege. Stalin's car could get to the head of the column only before the very entrance to the Kremlin or directly at the gate of Stalin's villa. The drivers of all governmental cars were without any exception on the staff of the 1st Division as workers of its transport section.

The commandant of the guard of objects is also concerned with guarding the government hunting estates. The so called "preserve" at the station Los of the Northern railway by Moscow, was one of such estates. Hk were among other animals of this estate, though ordinary citizens of the Soviet Union were prohibited to hunt them.

Transport section. is concerned with all governmental means of transportation.

While travelling over the Soviet Union, Stalin and other Politburo members use their private railway cars. Before the war the Soviet leaders almost never used the airplanes, finding this kind of transport too risky for their precious selves. According to some information, a special, absolutely secret order was issued by Stalin before the war, formally prohibiting to the "nomenclature workers" to use planes without exceptionally serious reasons and without his own approval of every flight. May be, the "great leader" feared that someone of his collaborators might flee abroad!!! As far as it is known, Stalin himself flew only once - from Moscow to Teheran, in 1945.

The former chief of the government train Kislovodsk-Sochi informed the authors about the following details of protecting Stalin and other "leaders" during their railway travels.

Every member of the Politburo has its own private railway car that may be used only by himself and by his family members. As to their outward appearance these cars differed in no way from the usual passenger's cars, but they were exceedingly luxurious inside. So, for instance, mahogany was used for the

interior decoration and furniture of Stalin's car, Karelian birch was used for the same purposes in Kaganovich's car etc. The cars were constructed in such a way that the jerks at the joints of rails were not felt inside the car. For this aim a thick layer of lead, two layers of rough felt and one of cork were put under the wooden planking of the floor which was covered in its turn with a layer of felt, linoleum and a magnificent carpet. Such a personal car was used only for 20-30 days in the year, but nevertheless every year there were obligatory capital repairs, the costs of which amounted to hundreds of thousands of roubles for only one car.

The Soviet bureaucrats of a lower rank travelled generally in sleeping-cars (the so-called "Mitropa" cars) of the usual fast trains; several fast trains were accommodating them: the "Red Arrow" express plying between Moscow and Leningrad, "Lux-Express No 1" - Moscow-Manchuria etc. The governmental train Kislovodsk-Sochi, plying between the groups of spas, was of the same kind.

When Stalin or other members of the Politburo were travelling, their personal car was coupled in the end of the train, and it was followed by exactly the same "covering" car with an NKVD detachment. Such an order existed only for the governmental train Kislovodsk-Sochi; if Stalin or his colleagues were travelling in other directions, a special train was put together for each of them including the personal car of the "leader". Before such person got into the train, the chief of the train had been summoned to the NKVD headquarters of this railroad and signed a special promise of avoiding any leakage about the person of the traveller and his guards.

When the train leaves the station, the chief of the train and the chief of the railroad NKVD get into the locomotive and stay there until the train reaches its place of destination.

A day or two before the arrival of Stalin, a special official of the 1st Division comes to every railroad administration to work out with the chief of the railroad NKVD measures securing the safety of the "leader". Stalin is accompanied only by a small

group of his bodyguard and officials of the 1st Division, coming from Moscow. All the rest of the guards are provided by the chief of the railroad NKVD. The men of the NKVD team always wear plain clothes, and are distributed in a more or less proportional way to stand in the tambours of the whole train, or are mixed up with other passengers of the train. Some men always take a seat in the dining-car to listen<sup>to</sup> the conversations of the passengers. The chief of the railroad NKVD, travelling in the locomotive, is considered to be the chief of the local guards, but besides him, a representative of the 1st Division, is travelling in Stalin's car. Before the train leaves the station, the chief of the train is introduced to him, and the orders of this official of the 1st Division are obligatory both for the chief of the train and the chief of the railroad NKVD.

Besides those three persons nobody else has the right to know who travels in the special car, coupled in the end of the train. But usually the personnel of the train and the station masters guess the rank of the traveller by the character of the protective measures. Such a train stops only at central stations to take water. When the train has to pass, all arrival and departure railway points are tightly closed with spikes at all stations. A pointsman stands together with an NKVD agent-representative of this station at each railway point. The guards wearing NKVD uniforms, operative agents-representatives of the Transport Section of the railroad NKVD, the railway militia stand along the trenches, in tunnels and along the road-bed.

The train is stopped at the departure and arrival platforms in such a way that the passenger's personal car of Stalin or of any other member of the Politburo would be exactly opposite the operative post of the NKVD at this station. Immediately after the arrival of the train the NKVD guards in plain clothes range themselves in lines on both sides of the car, and a group of guards fills in the adjoining part of the platform and in different ways prevents the public to go ahead, though no formal order is given to the people to stop. At first two officials of the 1st

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Division alight from the car, then they are followed by Stalin and a couple of NKVD men. All this group passes quickly the NKVD post and gets into some cars, looking exactly the same and waiting for Stalin. Usually the "Zisak" cars are waiting for Stalin at the Sochi station. During all this ceremony even the chief of the train cannot approach the Stalin's car. All these measures of precaution are taken in spite of the fact that only the members of the government, the high ranking party officials and some distinguished generals enjoy the right to travel in this governmental train.

In case of any breakage or disrepair in Stalin's car, the master may enter it only accompanied by the chief of the railroad NKVD, and his box with tools is previously inspected with greatest care. A "forbidden zone" with a radius of more than 5 kilometers has been established around the governmental villas between Sochi and Matsesta. But the fear of the NKVD is so intense, that people don't even try to approach this zone. When Molotov, Kaganovich, Voroshilov, Andreyev, Zhdanov and other leaders were travelling, the same precaution measures were taken. The only exception was made by the member of Politburo and People's Commissar for Heavy Industry, Sergo Ordzhenikidze (died in 1937) who liked to walk along the platform among the public that hailed him. Such a behaviour of the "leader" drove to despair the men of the 1st Division who had to guard him. The second-best "leaders" travelled in general cars of this governmental train, while Budennyi spent most of his time in the dining-car, where he took a lot of drinks of different kinds.

Stalin and other Politburo members did not take their food from the dining-car during their travels, as each of them had a kitchen in his personal car, where food for him and the group of persons, accompanying him, was prepared. The normal car of this train had eight two-seated compartments, with a bath-room for each two compartments. Stalin's car consisted of a kitchen, a study, secretary's office, two bed-rooms, a bath-room, a drawing-room and a reserve compartment. All of this was furnished with highest possible comfort and luxury that best by far the interior decora-



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tion of the former tsar's train. It is characteristic that the train of the murdered tsar Nikolai the Second was left on the side-track of Detskoye Selo (formerly Tsarskoye Selo) near Leningrad and its cars could not be used for this governmental train, not saying anything about using them for Stalin's personal needs, as they were found to be "unsufficiently comfortable".

The yearly maintenance of only this governmental train gave about a million roubles of dead loss, which was covered out of the special fund of the Sovmarkom of the USSR. Capital repairs of this train were made every year, when absolutely all the equipment of the cars was changed, while all other passenger trains in the USSR are subjected to capital repairs once in six years. And what are the costs for maintaining all personal cars? There are more than a thousand of them in the USSR for the use of different Soviet and Party bureaucrats, though, of course, they are not furnished with such a luxury, as Stalin's car. It is sufficient to mention that before the war personal cars were assigned, besides the Kremlin aristocracy, to all the secretaries of the regional party committees, all chiefs of the regional NKVD administrations, all the commanders of the military districts, all chiefs of the railways, all chiefs of the railroad NKVD's etc., etc. That is how the leaders of the "first socialist state in world" arrange their personal life!

If Stalin's train is stopped on its way even for five minutes, all the personnel guilty of this "crime" is subjected to immediate arrest. Such a case occurred once in 1954 on the way from Mostov to Sechi. A train of tank-cars with benzine was running casually ahead of Stalin's train, and for some reasons or others it could not be put on the side track. As a result of this the governmental train was stopped before the semaphore of an intermediate station for three minutes. This happened at night, and Stalin did not even notice it, but the men on duty at the station the station-master and even the chief of the railroad were immediately arrested.

All, described above, gives some ideas of the functions and tasks of the transport section of the 1st Division.

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The Kremlin Supply Department. Controls all food products received for the use in the Kremlin and in governmental country-houses. Is subordinated to the Kremlin superintendent and to the chief of the 1st Division.

The department consists of sanitary section, laboratory and transport section. The laboratory is concerned with the analysis of all food stuffs coming to the Kremlin, while the transport section of the Kremlin supply department not only delivers these food products to the Kremlin, but also takes care that they may not be poisoned on the way.

So, for instance, if, let us say, milk is being delivered to the Kremlin from the governmental state farm near Moscow, it is accompanied without fail by an official of the transport section of the supply department of the 1st Division.

The MTO section (material-technical provision) is concerned with covering the material and technical needs of the 1st Division, from arms, military and civil clothing and up to fuel for the auto-transport section.

Administrative and Maintenance section. is concerned with the problems of supplying the officials of the 1st Division, of providing them with lodgings, permits for a place in a rest-home and fulfils hundreds of other administrative and maintenance functions, connected with the well-being of the employees of the 1st Division.

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Such are tasks, structure and field of operations of the 1st Division of the NKVD USSR. Let us call once more to our mind that the 1st Division exists only in Moscow, while the protection of provincial "leaders" of the Communist party and Soviet government is carried on by the 2nd Special Divisions of the corresponding territorial administrations of the NKVD-SSR.

This chapter could not be so complete and exact as it might be desirable, but it is possible to give a complete survey of the activity of the 1st Division only after a long and minute collection

... activity of KVD-MGB. The  
... secret on all information connected with the protection  
... of the "Secrets" of the Kremlin dictatorship made this work par-  
ticularly difficult. The authors were obliged to collect this in-  
formation from different persons, many of whom, as a rule, knew  
very little about these innermost secrets of the Kremlin. There-  
fore, just in this chapter one may expect to find various inaccura-  
cies not only in the structure of the organization, but even in the  
denomination of its units.

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Every dictatorial or, as it is now commonly called, totalitarian regime keeps itself in power mainly by means of a carefully conceived system of terror directed against the subjects of this regime. The more radical and absolute the character of the dictatorship, the more developed are its organs of terror and oppression.

The 20th Century gave birth to a new form of dictatorship: the dictatorship of a party, subordinating to itself the governmental apparatus and forcibly directing the whole life of the country and even the private life of its citizens. Two countries presented a picture of this dictatorship of a party in its most radical and perfected form: National-Socialist Germany and the Communist Soviet Union. At present we do not need to point out the similarity of these two dictatorships or even of their apparent mutual hostile ideologies. Both of these dictatorships laid down, as the basis of their foreign and domestic policies, the goal of world domination and both have made merciless terror the chief weapon of their policy.

Military defeat and the following occupation of Germany permitted world public opinion to become acquainted with all the repulsive details of the activities of the Gestapo, SA, and other organs of Hitlerite terror. But the activities of the organs of Soviet terror have remained for long years hidden from the world public opinion. Only from time to time has the testimony of individual victims of this terror appeared in the foreign press and attracted some reaction even if only of a weak nature. The problem of Soviet terror was considered as a Russian domestic affair. But now when an ever increasing number of nations fear that Communism will lay on them its deadly paw and when some nations are already becoming acquainted with the NKVD (MGB) in practice, this problem has begun to attract a special attention.

But even now the system of Soviet terror and suppression is known, rather, according to the testimony of individual victims of the Stalinistic terror. The world is becoming acquainted gradually with the results of the activities of the NKVD (MVD), but not with the inner mechanism of this meat grinder, which exterminates people according to the principles: "If he is not one of us - then he is against us".

Only the Russian people can disclose the details of the structure and methods of work of the Soviet terror system, for they themselves have been subjected to the activities of that institution for 50 years. These people are not deceived by the Kremlin lying propaganda about the construction of a free and democratic socialist society in the Soviet Union nor are they misled by the illusions of those who believe that an agreement with Stalin is possible concerning peace and co-operation.

Only the Russian people may acquaint the other peoples of the world with all the details of the distasteful aspects of Communism and only they can perform this work with sufficient knowledge of the matter. This is their moral duty to the suffering Russian people and to all of humanity. But this is, at the same time, their practical contribution to the general struggle for national independence and personal freedom. The deciding moment for the clash between the forces of freedom and forces of tyranny is approaching. In order to halt the attack of Communism and then to destroy this danger it is necessary first of all to know its main responsibilities and technique of its undermining work outside the Soviet sphere, and methods of terror and suppression inside that sphere. It is necessary to know the most important instruments of the Communist party and of the Stalin dictatorship: its organs of "State Security".

The present work is an attempt to analyze the inner structure and methods of work of the Soviet organs of state security. By means of laborious collection of various data, by means of questioning of many former officials of these organs, and from the personal recollections of the authors an attempt has been made to create a picture of the Soviet organs of state security as they existed

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on the eve of the world war II. As a matter of fact, in many cases, the authors could not be quite certain of their data, not to speak of the exactness of details. We have to point out that the work was written not mainly from documents but from the testimony of individuals. Some of them, from the number of former NKVD agents, could have intentionally distorted the picture in order to misinform the reader, but this could mainly be in the details.

The authors set for themselves the aim of giving a general picture of the organs of the NKVD in a certain limited period of its development: between the end of the "Great Purge" period and the start of the world war II - that is between 1938 and 1941. In this period all organs of Soviet terrorism were united in one office - People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs of the USSR (NKVD). After the war these organs were split between two ministries - Ministry for State Security (MGB) and the Ministry for Internal Affairs (MVD).

The authors consider that one can understand correctly the structure and methods of work of these two ministries only if he knows, even in general outlines, the basic special structure and methods of work of their predecessor - the NKVD. To show the NKVD and to analyze its methods of work - is the aim of this book.

The present work consists of two parts: the text and the "schematic diagrams".

The Authors



## CHAPTER I

### THE MEANING AND ROLE OF THE NKVD IN THE SOVIET SYSTEM

#### 1. The Meaning of the NKVD

The People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs, divided after the war into two ministries, is deservedly called one of the main supports of the Soviet Communist dictatorship in Russia. The Soviet dictatorship has two main weapons to dominate the people: propaganda and terror. The skillful and aggressive propaganda utilizes within the USSR misinformation of the surrounding world, and outside the USSR misinformation of Soviet reality, and in that way gives the Kremlin oligarchy rather wide support among the masses of people, - especially in the West. But the NKVD is the most important weapon to suppress and dominate the people inside the Soviet Union. For this purpose the NKVD concentrates in its hands almost unlimited means of control, provocation, and terror. One may say that if the USSR itself is merely the weapon which Communists are using to conquer the world, then the NKVD is the means of securing the reliability and compliance of that weapon (USSR) in the already begun struggle for world domination.

Abroad, the NKVD is ordinarily called the Soviet secret police. This definition is incorrect in substance. It is incorrect because it does not reflect either the true character or the sphere of action of this most important organ of the Bolshevik dictatorship. Any police, whether open or secret, is normally an agency of state power. Its mission is to protect the interests of the state, its political security in the first instance. Even the Gestapo, guarding Hitler's dictatorship, was a state police, and not a personal inquisition of Hitler himself. In the USSR the situation in principle and practice is otherwise. Here are the basic characteristics of this institution:

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1. The NKVD is an agency not of <sup>the</sup> state, but of party power. Under this party power one must understand not the Communist Party as a whole, but only its oligarchical and absolute leadership - the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Party, and the leaders of the Party central and local apparatus which help the Politburo to rule the country: in all, perhaps, some 250-300 persons.

The mission of the NKVD is to serve the securing of the interests not of the state, but of this handful of usurpers, who are making Russia their chief weapon in the struggle for the seizure of power over the entire world. The NKVD guards the security not of the state as a whole, - that is, of the country, the people, and authority, - but solely and alone the security of the ruling group of persons, which is commonly known under its abstract name - the Soviet Power. This power finds itself in permanent conflict with the majority of the people from the very first days of its birth, as a result of the antidemocratic treacherous coup d'etat of October, 1917. Its policies inside and outside the country are directed against the natural, basic interests of the Russian people and the country.

Those who are inclined to see in this definition some kind of "propaganda", are advised to think over the question once more when they acquaint themselves with the fact that the "anti-Soviet elements" files of the NKVD and the system of "GULAG" (Concentration Camps Administration of the NKVD), together embrace nearly all the adult population of the USSR. As can be seen, to the same effect, the activities of the Economic Administration of the NKVD in preventing the "sabotage" and "diversionist acts", which testify to the compulsory character of the Soviet "building of socialism in one country".

Thus, the first peculiarity of the NKVD is that this type of secret police serves only the interests of the ruling chiefs of the party in power, against the interests of the state which this group rules, contrary to the will of the people which it exploits.

2. The NKVD is an organization completely independent of the government system in the USSR, and, partially, of the Party itself. More than that, thanks to their exclusively conspiratorial character, the organization and activities of the NKVD are known in the country only in the most general terms, and they can, for example, after some facts concerning executions and arrests leak out.

It would be wrong to think that the Soviet Government - The Council of Ministers - at any time would discuss the work of the NKVD or would order it to do or not to do something. It is sufficient to say that the Minister of Finance of the USSR, who prepares the state budget, and later supervises its fulfillment, does not know the structure, nor the personnel, nor the utilization of expenses of the NKVD. In the financial section of the Gosplan and to the State Budget sector of the Planning Administration of the Ministry of Finance of the USSR is presented only the total sum which the NKVD needs. There is no discussion or verification and even this sum does not reveal all the expenditures of the NKVD, because a certain part of these expenditures is included in a special secret fund of the Kremlin.

Not only the ordinary person, but the most high ranking officials in the USSR know only one thing about the NKVD: that it is better not to know anything. If this work were to fall into the hands of a Soviet reader, it would be accepted as a revelation. Here is a fact established by one of the authors: Soviet Foreign Minister Maxim Litvinov did not know what department of the NKVD was located in a building which he saw every day from the window of his office in Dzerzhinsky Street, in Moscow (former Labjanka Street). One may excuse him, however: not every official of the NKVD itself is informed of that which is outside the frame of his immediate competence. And this fact, by the way, has made extremely difficult the writing of this work, based, as was said in the Foreword, on the evidence of former Chekists.

This insulation of the NKVD in the Soviet system of the party - we would say even its independence - is the second outstanding characteristic of the Soviet Secret Police.

3. It would be possible to say, by analogy, that the NKVD is a state within a state. But the insulation of the NKVD within the Soviet state bears a very specific character. It is impossible to understand this if one does not take into account its third peculiarity: the simultaneously insulated and dominating position of the Soviet Secret Police.

This expresses itself in the fact that if the NKVD is made a complete secret from other governmental and even party organs (with exception of the very highest - understood to be the Politburo and its apparatus), these organs are as well known to the NKVD as the palm of your hand; at least they should be! The tentacles of the NKVD penetrate all reaches of governmental and party life in the USSR, beginning with the Council of Ministers and ending in the basic party group of some kolhoz, lost in the Siberian forests. It goes without saying that there are no secrets from the NKVD in the private lives of people of the USSR; it is not said in jest that each Soviet citizen has two shadows - one of his own and the other of the NKVD.

It is only logical to emphasize that in the governmental and party system of the USSR special conditions are created in order to favor the spy activities of the NKVD. We may characterize the Soviet system as one in which there occurs a fusion of the state and party, the leadership of which formally is in the hands of the state, but actually in the party. But in this amalgamation there is still one more element, unseen but always present - the NKVD. Its organs are infiltrated into governmental and party organizations, unknown to the latter, in order to fully utilize their opportunities to check every step of the state and party officials, up to the highest levels of the Soviet bureaucratic machine. The most wide-spread <sup>example</sup> of this fusion, or better to say, permeation, of the NKVD in any Soviet governmental institution <sup>is</sup> present <sup>at</sup> the "Special Offices" or "Special Branches" which exist in every factory, in every institution or governmental office.

According to its official regulations (the so called "Statute of the NKVD of the USSR), the NKVD cannot control or, putting it simply, has no right to spy against the Bolshevik Party. Nevertheless we see that one of the basic links of the NKVD chain, binding the whole country, is the SRD - Secret Political Section of Administration. Its mission is the rooting out of heretics within the party, the liquidation of all and any deviationists, beginning with old time Trotskyites and ending with the currently modern originators of cringing before the decadent West. The period of the "Great Purge", 1934-1939, shows us that the NKVD can be used against the Party just as well as it is used daily and hourly against the people and country.

4. However, the self same period of mass extermination of any and all, when the NKVD seized the people, - in the words of Stalin himself, - only for the fact that "they walked on the same street with Trotskyites" showed that sometimes the Party can be used against the NKVD. We speak of reprisals against Teboda and all his consorts, totaling, it is said, up to 3,000 NKVD officials and of the following reprisal against his executioner, Iezhov.

From this it follows that the NKVD is not the all-powerful master of the situation in the USSR. Spying against the state power and even against the party, enjoying a greater concentration than that of power than the state and party apparatus (in their lower and middle levels), the NKVD finds itself under the thumb of the individual who holds in his hand full power, under the thumb of Stalin. For this aim Stalin uses his own private apparatus, - so called "Stalin's Secretariat", - which operates through the top secret special channels of the Kremlin. Here manifests itself the famous Soviet system of cross-check insurance, that is a system of a double or even triple control of one and the same person, organization, or action.

Therefore, the fourth peculiarity of the NKVD is that this organ, which arose because the Communists trust no one and under no conditions does not enjoy itself the full confidence of the dictator and his accomplices.

5. Further, it must be remembered that the NKVD is a kind of secret police which has its own armed forces, independent from the regular army of the USSR.

The mission of the NKVD armed forces is to support Stalin's power within the country against internal enemies, i.e. the people, while the army is designated for defense of his power only against foreign enemies. The border, internal, and escort troops of the NKVD are better armed than units of the regular army; their fighting ability is much greater than that of regular troops located within the country in time of peace. And this is not a coincidence, - Stalin still remembers the affair of Marshal Tukachevsky. And, in addition to this there are special detachments of the NKVD inside the army. We shall recall only two titles: the "Smerch", with its crew of executioners, and the "Straggle Line Detachments", which liquidated deserters and stragglers from the field of battle. However, the protection of Stalin, himself, is not in the hands of NKVD troops, assigned only for the external guard around the Kremlin, but is performed by two special units: a) by the so-called "School of the Supreme Soviet", and b) by the First Section of the NKVD - both of which are directly subordinated to the "Stalin's Secretariat" and form a permanent garrison of the Kremlin.

The NKVD spies against the army, and against the NKVD, spies Stalin, himself. Such is the system. The existence of two armies in one country is the fifth peculiarity of the NKVD, which distinguishes it from the secret police of any other, more normal regime..

6. The history of our times shows that even in the most undemocratic countries of South America or Central Europe the secret police, at least formally, are not invested with judicial powers and the courts are separated from the police. The sixth peculiarity of the NKVD is that it has its own court system independent from the regular court system of the USSR, but completely subordinated to directives from the highest Communist Party organs.

The major characteristic of the NKVD court system is that the functions of arrest, prosecution, and adjudication are very often in the hands of one and the same official. The NKVD can

arrest and try by means of its secret "court" any citizen of the USSR. There do exist certain regulations, restricting to some extent the arbitrary actions of the NKVD, but only with respect to those party officials employed in duties of party administration. The entire field of political crime, which is more than wide in the USSR, remains the sphere of the NKVD, and it operates this sphere as it wishes with no control or accounting what so ever, except to the dictator in the Kremlin.

However, the more important political cases remain in the hands of the NKVD only during the preliminary investigation, after which they are decided by the high party leadership. These decisions are then carried out by the NKVD, just as similar decisions and directives are carried out by the regular court system of the USSR.

7. It is necessary to mention here still one more peculiarity of the NKVD, although since the time of the Gestapo this ceased to be its monopoly. We have in mind that the NKVD operates all penal institutions. Included in this term of penal institutions are those prisons which hold so many inmates that they are organized as camps. We speak here about the system called GULAG (Administration of Camps) which operates all numerous concentration and labor camps with their many millions of inmates. All these prisoners find themselves in <sup>the</sup> uncontrolled power of the NKVD which prescribes the conditions of their confinement, which can change and previous court decision by means of special camp "courts", which operates special spy rings inside the camps just as it does in the "free" Soviet society, etc.

While speaking of the Soviet concentration camps, we have to note that in its usage of forced labor the NKVD is semi-officially recognized as an organization taking part in the "planned construction of the socialistic economy of the USSR". The same GULAG of the NKVD carries out a number of most important governmental industrial projects - it digs canals, brings into production coal mines and oil wells in the Arctic, cuts timber for export etc., thereby providing the Soviet Union and the world Communist movement with dollars and gold.

As a result, the seventh and not unimportant peculiarity of the NKVD is its function as a slave owner and colonizer of arctic regions.

8. Our exposé would not be complete, more than that, would be incorrect if still one more very important aspect of the NKVD were not treated for - its significance to the outer world. If we were to say that the USSR is nothing other than a case for the spreading of communistic world revolution, then it would be clear that the NKVD must play its own great role in this undertaking. When the reader acquaints himself with the functions of the foreign administration of the NKVD, then it would not be difficult to come to the realization that the NKVD may be termed not so much a Soviet as an international communistic secret police. This side of the activities of the NKVD is now better known.

However, it would be inopportune to think, in view of the Canadian atomic spy case, that the NKVD occupies itself only with ordinary espionage for military and economic purposes, as is the case in other countries. The persecution of Russian emigrants, the murder of anti-Soviet activists - such as Trotzky, and foreign statesmen - such as the French president Doumer, Polish general Sikorski, its own agents abroad, as, for example, the secretary of the Central Committee of the Spanish Communist Party, Jose Diaz, the Chinese Marshal Lin Muing Chang, the Soviet ambassador in Mexico, Konstantin Gerasinski, etc., - all these being examples of the NKVD activities working in behalf of the international Communist movement.

One may raise an objection that this field of activity does not present the monopoly of the NKVD and that political murders have been frequently practiced by the secret police of other countries, mentioning as an obvious example the Gestapo activities in Nazi Germany. We do not intend to deny this fact, but the new and principally distinguishing factor in the case of the NKVD is its systematic methods, not just isolated cases. We may say it is a planned system, well thought out, organized, and executed with merciless consequence.



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Along with its terroristic and black-mailing functions against anti-Soviet organizations outside the USSR, the NKVD plays still another important role for the Kremlin. This is to spy upon Soviet personnel in other countries - such as diplomats, trade representatives, and even Soviet military espionage agents. Included also within its competence are the leaders of the international Communist movement. Just as within the USSR, the NKVD thereby provides for a complete system of double and triple control.

This international function of the NKVD, although the last on our list of peculiarities, is, never the less, in its significance one of the most important characteristics of the Kremlin's secret police.

## 2. The Methods of the NKVD

We turn now to the main features which characterize the methods of the NKVD, features which in many respects differ from those habitually used by ordinary secret police. It is still possible to say this even though the world now knows the methods used by the Gestapo.

1. From the very first words of Lenin's decree creating the "Cheka", - forerunner of the present day NKVD (MVD), - it was clearly evident that the Soviet secret police was to be and became a purely terroristic organization. At the present time the period of revolutionary romanticism is past and the NKVD is no longer hailed as the "proletarian guillotine" or the "all devouring flame of the red terror". "Bureaucraticism", this second nature of the Communistic experiment, has now laid its heavy hand on this apparatus for the hunting and extermination of people. Now people are liquidated according to the "five-year plans". This will be made clear in the chapter which describes a spy hanging in the office of the first Special Section of the NKVD, in Moscow, - the spy covered with marks indicating numbers of potential victims, that is, the numbers of "ASE" (anti-Soviet elements) in different areas of the USSR.

This map reveals a direct link or connection between the present form of the "red terror" and the construction of war plants and oil wells in the wide regions beyond the Arctic circle.

The terror of the NKVD has now become less open. No longer are the names of victims published and slogans advertized. Nevertheless, the terror has become even more cruel. In the earlier days a man might be openly condemned and shot because as a member of the former upper classes (simply - a "former") he, by the marxist definition of classes, either had or would take part in the fight against the regime. Now people are liquidated by means of overwork, under the inhuman conditions of the soviet labor camps, only because the regime needs to build a factory or dig a canal. The hunt for people is carried on at present time not only because of danger to the regime, but because of a need for new slave labor power. We are speaking, of course, of tendencies, and therefore do not include the executions of the more active political enemies, such as members of the Vlassov movement and the unfortunate fugitives caught and returned to the USSR by the Western powers.

2. From what has been said above it is already possible to see the second peculiarity of soviet terrorism, namely, - the preventive character of this terror. Lenin himself declared the working principle of the Soviet security organs to be directly opposed to the teachings by Christ. That is, it is better that nine innocent should suffer than that one guilty should be allowed to escape punishment. Categories of "automatic arrest" was not an invention of the victors over the Nazi Germany, for one of the first steps taken by the Cheka at the end of 1917 was the introduction of a system of mass hostages. The difference here is that from those arrested by the Cheka, as a "precautionary measure", - the former officers, aristocrats, bankers, professors, priests etc., - were dragged the victims of the periodic executions.

One can even say that the NKVD has its own sociologists for, by means of the Red Terror, Lenin and then Stalin changed in a drastic way the social and even age-group structure of the Russian population. When Stalin boasted in one conference that in a Russian village one could not find "in day time with a light" the figures of

the old village "elder", village priest or a kulak, he only paid his respects to the sociological talents of his NKVD.

We see now that the NKVD (MGB) is conducting its experiments with an utmost energy throughout all those countries which were occupied by the Soviets during and after the war. And if a new war does not interrupt this new wave of the Red Terror, the text-books on ethnography will have to cross out the names of such nations as Estonian or Lettish, and to a greater extent simplify the picture of social composition of the population in Poland, Czech-Slovakia and the Balkan countries.

3. In speaking of the methods of the NKVD, we must note that the officials of the NKVD can act arbitrarily and enjoy the complete impunity of action as long as they degrade the people, as long as they torture and murder in accordance with the currently existing political line - the political line of the Politburo. Although, in the office of the Prosecutor General of the USSR there is a special prosecuting attorney for supervision over the NKVD, never the less it is a rare case, bordering on a miracle, when a petition is entertained against the actions of some organ or official of the NKVD and a case is reviewed. But even then, no disciplinary measures are taken against the Chekists even if they are guilty of the death of an innocent individual. In these cases, as a great kindness to the relatives, is issued a certificate to the effect that "the above mentioned was penalized in connection with certain affairs which, upon further investigation, are not substantiated ...". Such a certificate at least gives the widow of the penalized one an opportunity to receive work, and his children the opportunity to enter school, etc.

But when the party line changes, it may happen that yesterday's torturer-investigators are thrown in the same prison cell with the persons whom only last night they had tortured by shackling to the wall or finger nail splitting. It is well known that the occupations of Yagoda occasioned by themselves the death, without exception, of all his closest co-workers, all those Paukers, Trilissers, Karmans, Cohens, and Medensses - who had just before been glorified

as the "wonderful Chekist legion". Together with them "walked down the corridor"<sup>x)</sup> as "enemies of the people" hundreds and hundreds of their assistants; nearly all of whom, through long years, themselves "sent down the corridor" tens of thousands of Russian people, in the greater part innocent even in the face of the famous 58th article of the Soviet penal code<sup>xx)</sup>.

Though Stalin thought that he was liquidating only his own enemies, in these cases he was putting a bullet in the nape of the neck of the unquestionably real enemies of the people. In his own turn, the downfall of the killer and successor of Jagoda - the "Stalinist", "iron" commissar Yezhov, brought about its own bloody purge among those who only just before thoroughly purged the Chekist cadres. All those executors who worked with Yezhov were shot without exception. Stalin know how to emerge from water dry.

Generally speaking, every unsuccessful operation, especially a failure in the secret work abroad, results in the severe punishment of the responsible NKVD personnel. There is no doubt that Canadian justice indirectly caught up with others, in addition to those who sat on the defendant's bench at Montreal: the NKVD dealt severely with all of those people who, being in Canada, were so inattentive as not to apprehend Igor Gouzenko. It is certain that some of the former colleagues of the Russian school teacher Kozintzina, who jumped from the window of the Soviet consulate in New York, were obliged to pay dearly for her act when they, in turn, had to "jump" from America back into Lubjanka street.

Actually, suspicion and spy fever flourish not less, but more, within the walls of the NKVD than outside. Behind every Chekist stands another one, if not two, checking on his loyalty. Consequently, the inclination is to think that the object of this surveillance is nothing more than another "heretofore undiscovered enemy of the people". This spirit of mutual suspicion and internal spy fever was successfully exploited by the Japanese intelligence:

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x) One of many Chekist terms for the death penalty.

xx) This article deals with "crimes" against the Soviet political system.

in the chapter on the "KNU" (Counter Intelligence Administration) we shall cite the case of a successful provocation which resulted in the massacre of Chekists by Chekists themselves.

4. One of the most peculiar characteristics of the NKVD lies in its methods for utilization of agents. The Soviet secret police relies not so much upon the quality, as upon the quantity of its agents. From the outside it may appear that this mania of the NKVD tends to convert the entire population of the Soviet Union into a gigantic network of its spies. Ministers and housemaids, generals and inmates of concentration camps, scientists and miners, artists and school boys, people without regard for age and sex, are recruited as agents of NKVD. There is only one restriction: the manual on recruiting "does not recommend the recruiting of children less than twelve years old" in view of "the danger that they will not observe the rules of secrecy". It is understandable that nobody can even approximately estimate the number of NKVD agents. But there is no doubt that they number millions, if not tens of millions. It is sufficient to say that "according to regulations" the ordinary Moscow house must have the following number of NKVD agents: the caretaker, the doorman, and at least one agent per apartment<sup>x)</sup>. It is no wonder that in the Soviet Union it is said, half jokingly, half seriously, that if two people are chosen at random, one of them is a "sokob", that is, a secret agent of the NKVD.

The explanation of the reliance upon the quantity of agents lies evidently in the lack within the NKVD of qualified personnel able to properly train agents. We will treat separately the characteristics of NKVD personnel, showing the extremely low level of their general and even police education. These people are very often unable to cope with their tasks, and in order to clear their cases they resort either to beatings of the arrestees or to exhausting<sup>them</sup> by means of endless questioning and special conditions of confinement.

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x) This applies to the typical Moscow apartment, which houses five or six families.

According to a Russian saying, the Cheka makes a virtue of its shortcomings, proclaiming that "the whole people aids the NKVD". In practice this means that the Communists and members of the komsomol are formally required to collaborate with the NKVD. As Lenin said: "Every Communist must be a Chekist". When recruited as agents they are told that this is their party duty. To the non party people who refuse such work it is hinted that such refusal shows that they are evidently "against the Soviet Power". And if some brave men still refuse to become a traitor to his relatives and friends, they are directly placed in the file of "ASB" (anti-Soviet elements) and sooner or later repressed.

As a result, there is created a gigantic net of secret agents of all embracing types. This net covers, without exception, all Soviet institutions, beginning with the Politburo and ending with the lavatory attendants. Using this net, the NKVD "keeps Chekist vigilance", that is, it uses the daily reports of its millions of agents for the operation of its system of preventive terror. Of course, the value of these agents, recruited in large part under threats, is not great and for <sup>an</sup> experienced intelligence agency they, by themselves, do not present such danger. On the other hand, because of their very abundance the NKVD reaches its goal, so to say, from the opposite end: knowing that NKVD agents are everywhere and seeing such an agent in almost every person, the opponents of the Soviet regime simply fear to show any activity, not to speak of organizing any opposition. The preventive nature of Soviet terror, in this case, also plays its prominent role in forbidding the very conception of ideas of struggle against Communism.

The system under which the NKVD uses agents may be compared to the actions of a fisherman who, having only bad nets, fills the entire ocean with them in the hope that in at least one of them he would catch a small fish. But what is impossible for an individual fisherman, however capable or rich he might be, is possible for the NKVD, because it has at its disposal an unlimited number of agents and can at any time turn almost any Soviet citizen into <sup>one of</sup> its agents. The more so, since the agents work for nothing! The sole limiting

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factor is the lack of NKVD officials to direct the agents, read their denunciations, and to instruct them. Only in this fact lies the explanation why a certain percentage of the population of this "country of victorious socialism" remains outside this gigantic net of NKVD agents. Future historians of the epoch of Communism in Russia will undoubtedly take the figure of a miserable and unhappy NKVD informer as a symbol of this period. In other words, this unhappy figure is the real support of Stalin's power. This support has a mass character but is far from being trustworthy.

5. It is hardly necessary to remind <sup>one</sup> of the fact that the NKVD is not too scrupulous about its methods and actions. We have no intention to compare in this respect the NKVD with the famous inquisition or with the Gestapo. We avoid this comparison because no one can give the exact number of ~~many~~ victims of their torture-chambers, and because here the palm of priority undoubtedly belongs to the NKVD - it has as its object much greater masses of population, and the enormous territory of the Soviet Union and it has been in operation for a longer period of time. But there is one more peculiarity in the methods of the NKVD which has no precedence, even in the most sinister institutions of this kind.

Here we have in mind the artificial fabrication of culprits and forged cases or, using the NKVD terminology, - "activation of suspects". Certainly, even the principle, laid down by Lenin himself, that it is better to punish nine innocent persons than to let one guilty to escape punishment - even this cynical thesis stimulates the false accusations and incorrect court decisions. But the NKVD has invented something which is much worse than the condemnation of a person whose guilt was not proved, or who is known to be innocent but who was forced, in result of the tortures and unbearable conditions in the prison, to blackmail himself. The NKVD invented the method of provocation. Formally, the usage of this method is forbidden. But practically, - the provocation is the chief method of work in the NKVD. For without this method of provocation, the NKVD would hardly be able to collect even one per cent of the human raw material needed for the disgusting meat grinder in the Lubyanka square.

Without a proper number of victims, the NKVD would never receive its prestige of a "chastising sword" or "the body-guard of the conquests of October", while the Chekists would not be able to enjoy their good life, their numerous orders and governmental rewards, and all those numerous privileges which transform these hangmen into the Soviet elite. One must not forget that as a merit of work of every individual Chekist is taken the number of "enemies" he has discovered, revealed and punished in a certain period of time. If this number is big enough, - then the Chekist is good, his vigilance is high, and his loyalty to the case of Lenin-Stalin is blameless. But if this number is small, - then this Chekist has to forget any orders, promotions, a separate apartment, or a car - this dream of every Soviet careerist. Just in the same way, every chief of an Administration or a local organ of the NKVD is eager to demonstrate, by means of a number of "coffins"<sup>x)</sup> that the "unit trusted to him" is successfully fulfilling the program of the party and the government, and "is holding aloft the banner of Chekist vigilance".

But what to do if there are no real spies, Trotskyites, and wreckers? Then they are being "activated", according to a wonderful Chekist term. This means that certain previously marked victims are being provoked, with the help of some special agents, to make some remarks or to conduct some actions, which can be interpreted later on as anti-Soviet ones. When taking this into account, we can definitely claim that at least a half, or may be even three-quarters, of all the victims of the NKVD are composed of the victims of these provoked "activizations".

But we shall not blame here the Chekists alone. As we shall see from the chapter dealing with the activities of the "SPJ" - Secret Political Administration of the NKVD, the entire work of this branch, in its struggle against the "anti-party deviations" and in spying against the members of the ruling Communist party, is prescribed by special instructions of the Politburo, channelled through

x) The Chekist term for those doomed to execution.



the Special Sector of the Central Committee, or coming from Stalin himself. These instructions normally prescribe to "activate" that or the other "deviation" according to Stalin's political needs. To-day he decides to hit those whom he considers as guilty of Trotskyism, and the "SIU" immediately "activates", by means of provocative conversations, leaflets etc., those communists who are marked for subsequent "liquidation". To-morrow he needs to "render harmless" the former opponents of Vyshinski at the Institute for Soviet Right, and the SIU "activates" the "scum of rashkenis", that is those Soviet students of law who repeated, after Marx, that under the Communism the state is bound to "die out".

The monstrous processes against Zinoviev, Kamenev, Nadezhda Bukharin - all these are simply the examples of those counterfeit cases which Stalin needs in his own political interests. The example of this kind of forged cases represent all those numerous tragedies when millions of innocent people are being sent to the NKVD camps, simply because the Gosplan decided to dig a certain channel or to bore some new oil wells. Following Stalin, every individual Chekist starts to forge similar counterfeit cases, out in his own interests. He knows only too well, that Stalin trusts only those watch-dogs which bite the greatest number of by-passers.

6. Lastly, in our survey of methods used by the NKVD, is their clumsy character. We have already spoken of the lack of qualified, intelligent, and good workers that in one stroke turned the Cheka-NKVD into a torture chamber. Then we find that the majority of people falling into the hands of the NKVD do so not as a result of any sly or well thought out secret police combination, but because of simple denunciation concerning their careless words or actions which might be interpreted as "sabotage", thanks to the reports of the ubiquitous informants of the NKVD. After falling into the hands of the NKVD, a man, sooner or later, signs a confession; again, not as a result of artful fine work of the investigator but as a result of beatings, torture, coercion, provocation, promises and other methods, - in a large part of a physical nature.

If one were to open the doors of the gloomy buildings in the block between the Lubyanka and Myasnitskaya streets, one would be convinced that the implements of torture which are to be seen in a museum are no more than children's playthings. The NKVD has its own means of physical persuasion, made to its own specifications in its own work-shops. If to this method is added that the guiding principle of the NKVD is that every arrested is an "enemy of the people" whose guilt must only be "made official" and his accomplices found, then it is not surprising that a "false arrest" in the USSR is almost impossible. Events of any one escaping with a laconic document of "released by the NKVD" can be counted on ones fingers. Outside the walls of the NKVD everyone swears of his love and devotion to Stalin. Inside these walls every one confesses to his "criminal plots" against Stalin ...

Such is the system of the Soviet terror, the flesh and bone of the Communist system.

### 3. The Men of the NKVD

Although executioners are necessary at all times and to all regimes, the profession has never been considered particularly honorable. However, the USSR has in this has its own word, for the first organizer of the Communistic torture-chamber, leader of the Soviet hangmen-Chekists, Felix Dzerzhinsky, was called even in his lifetime "Knight of the proletarian revolution", and Lenin and Stalin directed their most flattering epithets to the Chekists. Here are a few examples :

"Chekists - threat to the world bourgeoisie", "biggest and first sons of the revolution", "No higher or more honorable name than that of a Chekist"(Lenin), "Chekists - bodyguard of socialism", "Eyes and ears of the Party", and so forth.

Not only among the Communists themselves, but among all the people there is carried on the uninterrupted work of praising the "difficult but noble profession of the Chekist" (Stalin), setting up the Chekist as an ideal for other workers, as an "example of

self-sacrifice and bravery". In the Soviet Union there are great masses of literature, the object of which is not only to direct the enthusiasm of the people toward the praise and love <sup>for</sup> their henchmen, but also to incite the people to help them in their dirty work of espionage and treachery. Even in the children's readers one finds descriptions of the "brave deeds" of various Chekists and praise for their activities, which are aiding socialist construction by the "liquidating of all of its enemies". Djerzhinsky, Kirov, and Beria are "beloved" heroes of children's textbooks, songs etc., with the help of which the Communists are poisoning the growing generation.

The libelous designation "Chekist" which is pronounced with fear and caution by the man on the street, was accepted arrogantly by the Soviet regime as a badge of the most honorable profession in the Soviet Union. The Chekists call themselves Chekists, and for the most outstanding of them there has even been established a special emblem "honorable Chekist", - a sword, surrounded by a laurel wreath, mounted on a rhomboid. Djerzhinsky was possessed with the idea of creating out of his henchmen a sort of closed caste, resembling a monastic order: with severe, ascetic customs, almost isolating themselves from life.

Djerzhinsky, a Pole by birth, and as it happens, a Catholic, obviously borrowed his idea from Ignatius Loyola. Not long before his strangely sudden death in 1926, Djerzhinsky even ordered work started on the writing of special "Chekist Status", that is, a collection of rules of conduct, a codex of morals, so to speak. Although the word "moral" is definitely out of place in this instance this fact did not disturb Djerzhinsky and his successors. All the more, since Lenin gave such a definition of morals: "The basis of Communistic morals is the struggle for the strengthening and fulfilment of Communism".

And this definition was later completed by Stalin thus: "From the viewpoint of Communist morals, that is moral which contributes to the extermination of the old regime and the strengthening of the new, socialist order". Consequently, the fellows from

Lubyanka Street consider themselves as some sort of "Stakhanovites of Communist morals". And so they babble about Chekist ethics. In the first place in "Chekist ethics" stands the idea of devotion to the Party. This means that a Chekist must torture, torment, and kill anybody whom the Party considers or might consider an enemy. This notwithstanding the fact that tomorrow any and everybody might be proclaimed "enemies of the people". It is a known fact that by order of Stalin, Yagoda and his closest collaborators, among whom were all of the members of the Collegium of the NKVD, were shot, not by ordinary henchmen of the NKVD, but by their closest subordinates.

Further, the Chekist "ethics" speak about the necessity to be vigilant and "undefatigably uncover and destroy the enemies of the people". If we substitute the word "preventive" for the word "vigilance" then the question will become clear. A classic example of vigilance, depicted in all Chekist textbooks, is now a member of the Politburo, Lazar Kaganovich, serving at that time as the right hand of Stalin, "uncovered the camouflaged enemies of the people".

In the late thirties, Kaganovich supervised the construction of the subway in Moscow. At one of the tunnels two workers, semi-literate peasants, father and son just arrived from the country, decided to drink water from the fire hose. Having left they failed to turn off the faucet. As a result of this, a section of the tunnel the next day was flooded. An agent - representative of the NKVD - reported to Kaganovich, that the offenders were already arrested. But Kaganovich ordered the arrest also of the chief of the subway section. "In the first place he was negligent toward his work - his duty was to supply the mines with drinking water fountains. In the second place - added Kaganovich - investigate thoroughly his background". After two weeks the unfortunate engineer confessed, that in the past he was an officer of the tsarist army. Hence it was made rather easy to <sup>reach</sup> ~~make~~ a conclusion about the sabotage.

As regards to the third demand of the "Chekist ethics", their "incorruptibility", one has to recognize, that, as a rule, in the NKVD this requisite is respected. But this is because of the simple reason: the Chekists are much better off materially than their victims. In those few cases, however, when the victims have valuable stones or gold (and this occurs rarely in the USSR), this does not produce an impression on the Chekist: wealth in the Soviet society plays an insignificant role - the power of money there is exchanged fully for the force of power.

It is necessary to note still another requirement which is presented to the Chekist. This requirement is - to be merciless toward the enemy. As in the above case, this principle of the "Chekist ethics" does not present in practice any sort of difficulty. We have already mentioned this, while speaking about the methods of work of the Soviet secret police. On the contrary, sometimes the leaders have to ask the Chekists not to be so energetic in following their "ethics of mercilessness". So, for example, Beria, having replaced the crazed Yezhov, in a special order pointed out to the almost crazed subordinates of Yezhov: "One can and even must beat, but it is not necessary to beat every one".

In this case Beria was least of all led by the feeling of humanity: to be human means to be a poor Communist. The reason was simply that the prisons of the NKVD were filled with victims of the wild terror during the time of Yezhov. All these people were clearly innocent of the crimes, to which they had confessed only because of the methods of questioning of the "Iron people's Commissar". A special commission re-examined their cases, and not desiring to set free the witnesses who had seen the horror, gave them a comparatively light punishment - such as banishment to the timber cutting in the extreme north. However, the beaten, tortured, almost crazy people firmly held to their previous confessions, extracted from them during the days of Yezhov. They repeated, for example, that they wanted to kill Yezhov himself (at that time already proclaimed as an enemy of the people), or that they were spies for the long non-existent state Austria-Hungary.

ordinary

Not only among simple people, but also among the Communists, among the very highest circles of the Soviet state and Party dignitaries, the very word NKVD brought fear; carefully screened from others<sup>s</sup>, of course, under the pretense of hypocritical praise <sup>in</sup> regards to "our glorious Chekists". Therefore, usually they stoop and crawl in order to try to gain the favor of the Chekists. The uniform of the Chekist is equal to the master key of a thief - to this man, with the crimson braid on his collar and with a blue top on his hat, are available all of the goods of the meager Soviet life: a room in the hotel, a berth on the train, a ticket to the theater etc., - and all this without queuing, this plague of simple Soviet mortals. It goes without saying that to bring a suit in court against the Chekists - is a thing unobtainable in the USSR. In a country, in which laws exist only on paper, there is one unwritten but strictly observed law: the NKVD is above the law, the NKVD is authorized to do as it pleases because it is the NKVD who creates the laws.

It is not surprising that, under such conditions of unlimited arbitrariness, the members of the NKVD feel themselves semi-gods. The secret character of the work, coupled with self isolation in private life (as a rule the Chekists live in houses of the NKVD or in special separate apartments), led to the forming in the USSR of a particular closed caste. In their own country, the Chekists live similar to the Americans in their occupation zone of Germany: they have their own mode of life, their better supply, their places for relaxation and rest, and last but not least their own courts.

All this, taken together, gradually forms a special type of man. The experienced eye can unmistakably guess whether a stranger has any relation to the "organs"<sup>x)</sup> or not, and this not only by conversation, but by his behaviour, even by appearance.

Lastly, we must note the national composition of the Chekists. From the very first days of the Soviet power this question began to play an important role in the internal politics. It must be explained that, as the leaders of Bolshevism, also the management of the

x) In the Chekist slang - NKVD.

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central Soviet institutions, including the Cheka-OGPU-MKVD, in the majority of cases were people of non-Russian origin. This fact was particularly apparent during the years of the leadership of Yagoda. It is well known that during this time there took place the cruel reprisals against the Russian peasants (liquidation of the "kulaks"). In the eyes of the population, MKVD and its work acquired a definite significance.

The picture changed radically after Stalin liquidated the opposition, the leaders of which, basically, were of non-Russian origin. The place of Yagoda and his companions in the MKVD was occupied by new people, whose acceptance depended largely upon three conditions: they had to be, if possible, of Russian nationality; they had to come from the inferior regions of the Soviet Union; and they were to have neither relatives nor close acquaintances abroad. This was a tribute to the spy fever which gripped the Kremlin in the middle thirties. One of the first results of this delivery of the "avenging sword of the proletariat" into the hands of people "from behind the plow", - the Soviet expression meaning simple and poorly educated people, with a low mental development, - but "to the bitter end devoted to the cause of Lenin-Stalin", was a significant lowering of the effectiveness of the MKVD.

Having lost its experienced agents and investigators, the MKVD was forced to use the most primitive methods of a provincial police establishment. There began a period, when the entire task of the MKVD was achieved simply by beating prisoners. Formerly, the MKVD was joined "by calling", that is, by those who had a taste for bestial, sadistic blood shed. New people joined the MKVD as a result of "Party mobilization", i.e. at the directive of the Party. It is not surprising, that many of them proved to be absolutely unfit for the "specific" work of the MKVD. One of the orders of the MKVD mentions with indignation, for the education of others, that one of the new batch of Chekists, having acquainted himself with the damnation of a former Trotskyite, called him into his office

and began to admonish him : "it is not good to engage in anti-Party propaganda, Comrade P., didn't you, in the old days, sign an oath to be loyal to the Party?"

Only by slow stages could the NKVD re-establish a cadre of qualified agents, spies, and technicians of secret work. However, the war with Germany once more found the Soviet secret police in a state of complete disorganization. This explains such bungling methods in the fight against the German espionage as the wholesale arrest of all people with "German names", or the banishment to Middle Asia of the entire population of the Autonomous German Volga Republic. They did not know how to ferret out the actual agents, and besides, they did not want to be bothered with "trifles".

There is reason to believe that only by the very end of the war was the NKVD able to conduct some limited activity in German territory. This can be seen, for instance, in the attempted assassination of General Vlassov in 1944. Even those agents who were successfully infiltrated into other countries were very poorly qualified. So, notwithstanding the broadest co-operation, which was accorded to the Soviet repatriation missions in the Western zones of Germany and Austria, the majority of the anti-Soviet elements and deserters from the Soviet Union have successfully secreted themselves, either within the masses of A.G.'s or within the German economy. It must be believed that the weakness of their own cadres until now has compelled the NKVD to run the risk of a wider use of local fifth column members in the "capitalistic" countries.

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## CHAPTER II

### HISTORY OF THE NKVD

During the three decades of its existence, the apparatus of the Soviet secret police experienced a whole series of re-organizations and even changed its name five times. This fact did not by one iota change the essence of Stalin's secret police, one of the principal means to organize the world-wide Communist revolution.

#### The following is a short history of the NKVD

On December 20, 1917, just two months after the October revolution in Russia, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR created the "All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for the fight against counter-revolution, sabotage, and speculation". This agency was ordinarily called, in abbreviation, C.C.A. and therefore received, among the people, the colloquial designation "Cheka" or "Chrezvichka". The first chairman of the All-Russian Cheka was the above mentioned Felix Dzerzhinsky, at whose instigation the Commission was created.

The total Red Terror was begun by the Cheka in August, 1918, after the murder of the chairman of the Petrograd Cheka Mikhail (Moise) Uritsky and an attempt on the life of Lenin.

From this time on the functions of this bloody instrument of the Bolshevik dictatorship were clearly determined. So, for instance, in the proclamation of the Petrograd Soviet on the occasion of the attempt upon the life of Lenin, it was said: "For the murder of Comrade Uritsky, and for the attempt upon the life of the leader of the world revolution, Comrade Lenin, the proletariat will answer the rotten bourgeoisie with death blows. Met with an eye for an eye, but with a thousand eyes for one. A thousand lives of the bourgeoisie for the life of our leader. Long live the Red Terror!"

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Lenin thus delineated the goal of the Cheka: "the only way for the liberation of the masses lies in the extermination of exploiters. That is the task of the Cheka."

The executive of Dzerzhinsky in the Cheka, one of the most bloody henchmen of the Russian people, a Latvian, Latsis, - was still more frank: "The struggle is one of life and death. If you do not kill, you will be killed. Therefore kill, that you may not be killed!"

From the time of Stalin there appeared in use a number of new, but not less expressive slogans. Here are some of them:

"KAVD - the vindictive sword of the proletarian revolution!"

"Chekists - Bodyguard of the October Revolution!"

During the period of the Civil War of 1918-1922, the Red Terror cost many millions of lives. After the termination of the Civil War and after the Bolsheviks had consolidated their power over Russia, this terror not only failed to cease, but with each year it consumed more and more victims. System of agencies of suppression and compulsion was continually widened and penetrated deeper through-out all the pores of administrative, social, and economic life of the country.

On 6th of February, 1922, All-Russian Extraordinary Commission (Cheka) was reorganized into the State Political Administration (Gosudarstvennoye Politicheskoye Upravleniye), in abbreviation - GPU, which quickly was renamed "Unified State Political Administration" (OGPU). The essence of this reorganization was that the system of vindictive organs of the Soviet dictatorship was significantly extended and a new system included additionally: border guards, transport guards, administration of places of confinement, and also significantly widened the net of secret agencies within the Red Army and the Communist Party. Beside that, by 1922 the Comintern was expanding its large activity. Correspondingly, the outer-political tasks of the GPU were to assist the Comintern in certain special spheres of its activities. The Cheka was designed to act only within the country, while the GPU, from the very first day, stretched out its tentacles beyond the borders of the USSR.

This reorganization had also a great significance in principle: the Cheka was created, as an extraordinary measure, for the defense of the Soviet power during its most critical moments; but the OGPU, at the moment of its creation, was conceived as a permanent organ of the Bolshevik dictatorship. Thus, it was directly recognized, that the mass terror is an inalienable part of the Soviet system. In the course of twelve years, from 1922 to 1934, the Soviet power openly recognized this situation.

On June 10, 1934, the OGPU was reorganized into the NKVD of the USSR. This abbreviation comes from the full Russian title of that institution - Narodnyy Komissariat Vnutrennih Del SSSR. Formally this reorganization was explained by the fact that the period of struggle against the counter-revolution had ended, that the Soviet power was definitely strengthened, and therefore there was no more need for the existence of a special organ for the suppression of counter-revolution and opposition within the country. However, the "Great Purge", - beginning shortly after this reform, - with its millions of victims, showed that this official explanation did not in any measure correspond with the actual reason of the transformation.

The actual reason of this reorganization was that at this time the apparatus of the OGPU again so widened, complicated and expanded, that it could no longer be packed into the frame of one administration. The system of universal trailing and spying covered all of the country. This was no more, and by no means, one single organization. This was a complicated net of specialized organs of terror and spying, penetrating to the very deepest corners of the vast territory of the Soviet Union and far beyond its borders.

The essentials of the reorganization of 1934 were, that besides the complicated net of political supervision system of the OGPU, a new system of the NKVD included also the administration of the police and criminal inquiry, passport administration, administration of the fire department and administration of the transport, even a department for the recording of the acts of the civilian state (ZAGS). Besides that, the NKVD united and subordinated into one system all the numerous and widespread prisons, places of preliminary confinement, correctional labor colonies and correctional labor

camp (the Soviet names for different types of concentration camps), with all their numerous and extraordinarily complicated auxiliary enterprises and institutions.

The basic departments of the OGPU, which performed the trailing and spying within the USSR and beyond its borders, were preserved, generally, in their former structure and were unified into the system of the "Administration of State Security" (UGB NKVD), which in the period of the "Great Purge" (1936-38) received the title of the "Chief Administration for State Security" (Glavnoye Upravlenie Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti). Apart of this most important administration, in the system of the NKVD was created a number of other branches and administrations, which spheres of activity will be examined in the following parts of our work.

The fifth of February, 1941, the NKVD was divided into two commissariats: "The People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs" (NKVD) and "The People's Commissariat for State Security" (NKGB). This reform became indispensable after the period of the "Great Purge" and as a result of the forced annexation by the Soviet Union, in 1939-40, of a number of new republics. The apparatus of the NKVD became exceptionally large and complicated, and there was no longer room for this enormous apparatus in the structure of one commissariat. As a result of this reform, the personnel of both new commissariats grew yet more.

This reform took place by means of the separation from the NKVD of its principle administration - that of the Chief Administration for State Security. This organization was given an independent existence and elevated to the rank of a People's Commissariat - The People's Commissariat for State Security (Narodnyi Komissariat Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti, or NKGB). To it was given several necessary services: an administrative and service branch etc.

Under the control of the new NKVD were left the following: the administration of places of confinement and corrective-labor camps (GULAG), transport, militia (police), and passport branch, ZAGS (civil status registration office), fire-brigades, highway

transportation, administrative and service branch with its sanitary section, the numerous sanatoria and rest-homes for Chekists etc. As a result, the NKVD was transformed into a subordinate organization with secondary functions, but the "Sword of Revolution" was entrusted to the NKGB, that is, this new People's Commissariat for State Security reserved for itself the exclusive field of espionage, terrorism and suppression, and at the same time keeping its eye on the activities of the new NKVD.

Almost immediately after the beginning of the war, that is July 20th, 1941, the NKVD and NKGB were again united into the one NKVD under the direction of its former People's Commissar, Lavrenty Beria, who, at the time of the previous division, had been appointed Stalin's deputy in the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, with the task of co-ordinating the work of these two Commissariats.

The NKVD existed in this form until the end of the world war II. The reason for this unification could be found in the necessity of simplifying in time of war the administration of the complicated apparatus of suppression and terror. There is also no doubt that Stalin wanted Beria, as his personal friend and confidant, to reassure at this critical moment the single-handed control of this most important part of the Soviet system. In addition, this new reform was influenced by the fact that during the four months of their existence, these two new Commissariats did not have time to delimit fully the sphere of their activities. Under the conditions of military debacle and retreat, this could have led to the loss of control behind the front lines also. This was the situation in regard to the NKVD until 1945. Reviewing these re-organizations, we do not take into consideration the "SMERSH" ("Death to Spies") which was created during the war within the frame of the NKVD, but as a semi-independent institution.

After the end of the war, the NKVD was again divided into the NKVD and NKGB and in March 1946 these Commissariats were renamed the "Ministry of Internal Affairs" (MVD) and the "Ministry of State Security". This was accomplished in accordance with the

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transformation of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR into the Council of Ministers. The principle of division of the NKVD after the war was the same as it had been in 1941: the Chief Administration of State Security of the NKVD, with the Administration of interior troops and border guards of the NKVD, and some servicing organizations became the Ministry of State Security (MGB), while all the remaining administrations and divisions of the former NKVD passed into the hands of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD).

According to the information which the authors of the present work have at hand, the internal structure of the separate divisions in the MVD and MGB remained almost the same as it had been in the system of the NKVD in 1939-1940, to which period refer the materials introduced here. The authors were able to register only one major change: ~~the~~ former "Administrations" of the system of the Chief Administration of State Security have been given the title of the "Chief Administrations" in the MGB. There have been no essential changes in either the methods or practice since that time, only the scope of activity has become even broader. In those isolated instances where the functions or the structure of these or other NKVD divisions underwent serious changes, these changes will be noted additionally. For this reason, the authors have permitted themselves in this analysis to use the present tense of verbs rather than the past, although the NKVD formally ceased to exist in 1946.

According to the Constitution of the USSR, the NKVD is a Union-Republican Commissariat and therefore its local organs must subordinate themselves to the higher organs of Soviet power in the republics, areas, regions and districts. But actually, the local organs of the NKVD are completely autonomous and are subordinated only to their own top-level agencies, while the NKVD itself, in all important questions of its activities, is subordinated only to the Politburo. The Council of People's Commissars of the USSR (now the Council of Ministers) has a former control over the NKVD only in financial matters, - but even this is merely an ephemeral prerogative. Practical control over the NKVD is carried out by the

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Politburo through the "Special Section" of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party, through a special group of the Party Control Commission (KPK CK VKP/b/), located since 1936 in the NKVD building, No 2 Dzerzhinsky Square, in Moscow, and through some other special agencies subordinated directly to the Stalin's "Personal Secretariat".

In a purely abstract case of political divergence or conflict between the government of the USSR and the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, the NKVD, now the MGB, is obliged to carry out only the orders and directives of the Politburo and the General Secretary of the Communist Party, that is of J.V. Stalin. Such a case took place only once, in 1937, when by the order of Stalin, the NKVD arrested and brought to trial <sup>the</sup> former chief of the Soviet Government, - the former chairman of the Council of the People's Commissars of the USSR, Alexei I. Rykov (it is true that by this time Rykov was "only" the Commissar of Communications). This example clearly illustrates that the NKVD is a governmental organ in form only, but factually it is an all powerful instrument of the party dictatorship, that is, of its supreme agency, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Party.

The two ministries remain as the same instrument of Party power, as in the time of the NKVD. The fact that they are subordinate to Beria, who is a deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, changes nothing at all, in so far as Beria is at the same time a member of the Politburo. It will be proper to recall that already in 1934 the transformation from the OGPU to the NKVD was explained thus: instead of a party organ there would be now a normal state organ; however, in reality, this re-organization was not followed by any change whatsoever in the character of the organ itself.

Cheka-OGPU-NKVD-MGB are actually different names for the same instrument of a terroristic system, heretofore unprecedented in the history of humanity. The only difference between them lies in the ever growing widening of their functions and spheres of activity.

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In summary, we can say that the mission of the MKVD-MGB is as follows:

1. Within the borders of the USSR

a) The uncovering and liquidating of all political movements and groups, even individuals who are hostile or in opposition to the Party and Soviet system, or even those who take a neutral stand.

b) The safeguarding of the accomplishments of party decisions and undertakings by all organizations and individuals without exceptions; this is done by secret observations of the activities of all governmental, economic, social, and in certain cases, even party organizations, and always and especially the armed forces of the USSR.

c) Permanent control of all correspondence to and from foreign countries, both official as well as private, and periodical and selective control of correspondence within the USSR.

d) In co-operation with the party, a preventative censorship of all printed matter in the USSR, notwithstanding its character or significance - beginning with the official Communist party publication "Pravda" and ending with the trademarks on cigarettes.

e) Protection of Stalin and other leaders of the Party and the Soviet government.

f) Security of the USSR's borders from the point of view of political as well as customs.

g) Protection of important military objectives, such as factories, bridges, etc.

h) Counter-intelligence work and observation of all foreigners in the USSR.

i) The management and protection of concentration camps and the exploitation of slave labor for the realization of the five-year plans, chiefly in the Far North.



2. Beyond the borders of the USSR

a) Political intelligence and diversionary-terroristic activities in accordance with special instructions of the Politburo and in co-operation with the so-called "Sister organizations" - ("Smezhnie organi).

b) Co-operation, according to the decisions of the "Molotov Committee" of the Politburo, and the secretariat of the Comintern (Cominform), with the leadership of the foreign Communist parties in their struggle against the governments and hostile political parties of their countries.

c) The disruption, by infiltration, of all anti-Soviet political organizations abroad.

d) Spying on all members of the Soviet diplomatic, commercial and other representatives and delegates of the USSR, and also on Soviet military spies.

e) Spying on all leading personnel of the foreign Communist parties.

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**CHAPTER III****STRUCTURE OF THE NKVD****1. Administrative Division**

In accordance with the 1936 Soviet constitution, the NKVD was an Union-Republic People's Commissariat just as the MVD and MGB are Union-Republic Ministries at present. This means that there is a central Union-Republic Commissariat (or ministry) in Moscow and that there are Republic People's Commissariats (now ministries) in each of the 15 republic capitals (for example: Kiev, Minsk, Baku, Tbilisi, etc.) which are directly subordinated in all most important features to the Union-Republic Commissariat (or Ministry) in Moscow. Only formally, and even then only in certain secondary administrative and budget questions are the Republic NKVD (now the MVD and MGB) controlled by the Councils of People's Commissars of the corresponding Republics (now: the Councils of Ministers)

**See the diagram No 1**

The RSFSR did not have its own NKVD (since 1947 there are MVD and MGB of the RSFSR). The duties of that organ were carried out by the office of the first deputy of the People's Commissar of the NKVD of the USSR. The functions of the NKVD of the RSFSR for regions located in the European part of that republic were ordinarily carried out by the NKVD regional administration for Moscow (abbreviated: UNKVD MO - Upravlenie NKVD Moskovskoi Oblasti). However, the UNKVD-MO did not dispatch orders in its own name to the regions, but administered such regional administration of the NKVD (for example, Tula) by sending orientations and inquiries with references to the orders of the Deputy People's Commissar or of the People's Commissar himself.

The autonomous republics did not have their own People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs, but only the regional administrations of the NKVD of those Union Republics to which the given autonomous republic belonged. So, for example, the Abkhazian ASSR,

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comprising a part of the Georgian SSR, will have the Abkhazian regional administration of the NKVD of the Georgian SSR. Autonomous republics of the RSFSR had the regional administrations of the NKVD of the USSR, while those autonomous republics having small population and no significant military or economic importance, might even come under the jurisdiction of the regional administration of the NKVD of neighboring regions of greater importance. So, for example, the Northern Caucasian autonomous republics of Northern Ossetia and Kabardino-Balkar and the autonomous region of Karachay were "served" (to use the Chekist terminology) by the Ordjonikidze (former Vladikavkas) area administration of the NKVD of the USSR. Note: The above mentioned autonomous republics were liquidated during the World War II for the anti-Soviet activities of their population.

The structure, that is the personnel complement and functions of the NKVD of a Union Republic were determined by the size, as well as the strategic and economic importance of a given republic. In such extremely important republics as the Ukraine and Belorussia, their People's Commissariats for Internal Affairs represented somewhat smaller replicas of the All-Union NKVD in Moscow.

See the diagram No 2

In the less important Union Republics, the NKVD of the republics were organized and worked, actually, according to the authority of the NKVD regional administration. Earlier, they were termed the "fully empowered representations of the OGPU (abbreviated - PP OGPU - Polnomochnoe Predstavitelstvo OGPU). In such Union Republics the importance of the local NKVD could even be less than the authority of an administration of the NKVD of large regions. For example, the Moldavian Republic's NKVD, by its size and importance, could be considered a much lower level than the NKVD regional administrations of Moscow and Leningrad.

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2. Local AgenciesSee the diagrams No 3 and 4

In general, the regional administrations of the NKVD have an identical structure and are fully empowered to resolve all local problems. For the USSR, the first Deputy of the People's Commissar of the All-Union NKVD and the office of the Chief Administration for State Security in Moscow furnished the directives for the local agencies of this republic. The remaining 15 republic NKVDs administered the local NKVD agencies located in the corresponding republics.

Practically, the main burden of work rests on the shoulders of these regional administrations. Stalin personally gave special attention to the furthering of the effectiveness of their preventive-terroristic activities. In his language this was cynically called: "making the NKVD intimate with the masses". It is precisely these local organizations of the NKVD, which cover the entire country like a mesh, that are the basis of the Russian regime. The center only directs their activities and, at that, on the basis of material received from the local agencies.

From the point of view of operations, the regional administrations of the NKVD were divided as follows:

1. District sections of the NKVD ("райотдел" NKVD),
2. City sections of the NKVD,
3. Operational branches of the NKVD ("оперсектор NKVD").

The importance and role of the district sections of the NKVD does not require any special explanation at this place, they are organized in every district of any region ("oblast") or areas ("krai") of the USSR corresponding to the administrative division of the Soviet Union.

City sections of the NKVD exist in all cities and industrial centers of the USSR which in importance are above the level of district centers. They work along the lines of an operational branch.

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In the last years before the war, in such powerful cities as Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, and others, in the efforts to delineate and divide the work, were introduced city administrations of the NKVD (as in the party system); for example - there were "The Moscow Regional Party Committee" and "The Moscow City Party Committee". In the same way there were: "The Moscow Regional NKVD Administration" and "The Moscow City NKVD Administration". These city administrations directed the work of the NKVD agencies only in the city itself, not considering the surrounding districts.

The operational branch could be compared to a district office of the NKVD ("raiotdel" NKVD), but having certain special duties. The structure and personnel complement of these branches are different. Their inauguration in this or that region was dictated by the presence in a given region of some special population group, which could not be dealt with by the ordinary district office of the NKVD and so a special "service" was required from the side of the NKVD. For example, within the Moscow regional administration of the NKVD there was created such an operational branch in connection with the existence in the Serpukhov district of two or three settlements of German colonists (farmers).

The structure, personnel staff, and activities of the regional, city and district NKVD offices and those of NKVD operational branches will be treated in greater detail in following parts of this work.

Each organ of the NKVD, from the People's Commissariat down to the district office, has its own Party organization. In the local subordinate organs it is the "party group", in the sections - "party collective", in the important divisions and administrations there are "party committees", and in the People's Commissariat of the NKVD is the "Party Committee of the NKVD of the USSR".

From the regional or republic agency of the NKVD, and up, the Party organs publish their own newspapers. The newspaper of the Party committee of the People's Commissariat, titled "The Chekist", was published by the central printing office of the NKVD, in Moscow, and its birth goes back to the time of Djerzhinsky, i.e. to

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the early twenties. There are evidences that the first editor of this newspaper was Djerzhinsky himself. The secretaries of the party organizations, beginning with the "party committee", are occupied exclusively with their party work and are freed from any other duties. All lower level party secretaries work in the party organizations and, at the same time, perform their basic duties in the organs of the NKVD.

In <sup>contrast</sup> distinction <sup>to</sup> from all other Soviet (i.e. governmental or public) organizations, the party organs of the NKVD occupy only a secondary position. In view of the secret character of work of the NKVD, the local party organizations cannot give either any kind of directions or cannot control the activity of the whole NKVD or of its separate parts, or even of individual Communists in the NKVD. Therefore, the sphere of activity of local party organs in the NKVD is limited to political-educational work (orientation of Communists in the spirit of Marxism-Leninism), carrying on political campaigns, as before the 1st of May, for example, etc.

### 3. Central Agencies

#### See the diagram No 3

At the moment of its division into two People's Commissariats in 1941, the NKVD of the USSR in Moscow had the following central agencies (with their sub-agencies in all Union Republics and in the NKVD administrations of areas and regions) :

Chief

1. Central Administration of State Security (abbreviated - GUGB NKVD - Glavnoe Upravlenie Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti NKVD SSSR);

2. Chief Administration of Border Guards and Internal Troops (abbreviated: GUPVO NKVD SSSR - Glavnoe Upravlenie Pogranichnoi Ohrany i Vozsk NKVD SSSR);

3. Chief Administration of Camps of the NKVD (abbreviated: GULAG NKVD SSSR - Glavnoe Upravlenie Lageroi NKVD SSSR);

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4. Chief Administration of Militia and Criminal Police (abbreviated: GUM MKVD SSSR - Glavnoe Upravlenie Militsii i Ugolovnogo Resnyaka MKVD SSSR);

5. Chief Passport Administration (abbreviated: GPU MKVD - Glavnoe Paspertnoe Upravlenie MKVD SSSR) - this agency was subordinated to the Central Administration of Militia;

6. Chief Administration for Civil Status Registration (abbreviated: ZAGS MKVD SSSR - Glavnoe Upravlenie Zapisa i Aktov Grazhdanskogo Sostoyaniya);

7. Chief Administration of Fire Guards (abbreviated: GUPO MKVD SSSR - Glavnoe Upravlenie Pozarnoi Ohrany);

8. Chief Administration of High Ways Construction (abbreviated: "Glavshodor MKVD" - Glavnoe Upravlenie Stroitelstva Shosseinykh i Besrelsovykh Dorog MKVD SSSR).

In addition to these basic administrations, central agencies of the MKVD included also the sport society "Lynano" and a series of service administrations and agencies such as, for example: administration of personnel, finance administration of the MKVD, "house-keeping" administration with the sanatorium section, which operates the sanatoria and rest homes of the MKVD, etc. All these service administrations are organized according to the ordinary type of the similar institutions in other People's Commissariats of the USSR, and there is no especial interest in analyzing them. These service administrations have sub-sections in all lower organs of the MKVD, but for simplification of the picture, the internal sub-structure of these service agencies will not be explained in detail. There will be exceptions to this only in separate cases, where the work of a service organ of the MKVD has some sort of special interest, as for example: the administration of personnel or the financial administration.

The structure, functions, and sphere of activity of each one of these basic administrations of the MKVD will be dealt with in detail in subsequent chapters of this work.

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#### 4. Higher NKVD Leadership

Just as in any other Soviet People's Commissariat, the NKVD was headed and directed by a People's Commissar with the help of the so-called "Collegia", i.e. his deputies and their staff - secretaries, adjutants, etc. But in the NKVD in the years prior to the war, the collegia as such, that is the permanent council of the People's Commissar with his deputies and assistants (so called members of the collegia) did not play the same role as in other governmental organs. The authors do not even have information as to whether the collegia convened to undertake any decisions from the time of Yeshov (1937-38), - as, say, was the case in the time of Yagoda (early thirties), when it was openly declared: "this one was executed by sentence of the collegia of OGPU".

Judging from all available evidences, the collegia in the NKVD was <sup>substituted</sup> ~~substituted~~ by many different agencies created gradually around the People's Commissar in connection with the increasing volume of the "work". Among their number were the agencies which comprize the so-called "Administration of the People's Commissar".

See the diagram No 6

This directorate seems to have been a super organ of the NKVD and consisted of the following: the Commissar himself, his secretariat, four (4) deputies, a special agent-representative for the Commissar, a special tribunal for the commissar, an interia control council and a central engineering-construction bureau.

First deputy of the People's Commissar. Ordinarily he is the chief of the Chief Administration of State Security (GUGB NKVD), and, at the same time, directs the regional and local NKVD administrations in the RSFSR. Sometimes he acts as the chief of the Moscow regional administration of the NKVD. Namely therefore, when the Moscow regional administration of the NKVD issues orders to other NKVD regional administrations throughout the RSFSR, this is always done under the authority of the deputy of the People's



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Commissar, and not from the chief of the Moscow regional NKVD administration (UNKVD-MO).

This post was occupied : 1933-35 by Prekofiev; 1936-37 by Zakovsky, 1940-41 by Merkulov, who after the war became the first minister of the MGB.

The Second Deputy of the People's Commissar. He directs : the First Section (Perviy Otdel) of the NKVD - protection of the leaders, the Personnel Section, the Communication Section (Feldsvyas), the house-keeping administrative offices, and the office of the administrative supervisor of the NKVD (the latter office performing the role of chief executioner of NKVD victims). Excluding the important problem of protection of the Kremlin and Bolshevik leaders, this deputy is responsible solely for the inner and administrative problems of the NKVD itself. In 1939-41, Kruglov occupied this post; after the war he was appointed minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR (MVD).

The Third Deputy of the People's Commissar. He directs : the Chief Administration of Militia and Criminal Police, the Chief Administration of Concentration Camps (GULAG), high ways and transportation administration, ZAGS (administration of civil status registration) and other establishments of the MVD type. In 1939, Kabulov occupied this post, and after the merger of the commissariats, in July 1941, he was appointed deputy to Beria in commanding the combined NKVD.

The Fourth Deputy of the People's Commissar. He directs : the Chief Administration of the border guards and internal troops of the NKVD, the administration of the border passport control points and all questions of co-ordination of activities of these administrations with other ministries of the USSR, primarily with the Ministries of Armed Forces and Foreign Trade. Here must be noted that until 1937 the prisoner escort troops were under the joint jurisdiction of the NKVD and of the Commissariat of Defense. In 1937-38, Frinovsky occupied this post.

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The Party Committee of the NKVD People's Commissariat. It occupies, as already stated above, a secondary position of importance. This is explained by the fact that, in addition to the confidential character of the NKVD work, the Commissar, himself, his deputies and the directors of the most important administrations are members of the higher party organs, up to the level of the Central Committee of the Party and the Politburo. Therefore, they are not obliged to account for their activities before the secretary of their party organization.

In the lower level organs of the NKVD the party committees enjoy somewhat greater importance, but even there they do not have a shadow of that decisive role which is characteristic in all other Soviet establishments, offices, and undertakings. In this we see still one more confirmation of the fact that the NKVD is not a governmental but purely a party organ. We recall that in the Central Committee of the Party, itself, there is also a Party Committee (which runs mostly the party activities of the auxiliary personnel of that office) which play an identical secondary role.

Special Council. This is a higher permanent judiciary agency of the NKVD. According to its official status, the Special Council consists of : the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR (NKVD), one of the secretaries of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party, and the Attorney General of the USSR. But the Special Council convenes itself in this form only for the examination of affairs of exceptional importance. Ordinarily, it consists of less important officials of these three agencies, acting with authority and on behalf of their superiors.

The NKVD itself ordinarily is represented in the Special Council (Osooboe Soveshanie) by some important official of the commissariat, but necessarily acting with the full authority and on behalf of the People's Commissar himself. This person represents the investigative aspect of any given case. The second member of the Special Council is the representative of the Attorney General of the USSR - fulfilling the prosecutor's functions. Sometimes, and rather often, this role is being given to some senior

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member of the Military Prosecutor's office which works very closely with the NKVD. The third permanent member of the council ordinarily is the secretary of the Party Committee of the NKVD, acting with full authority of the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. According to this model are organized the Special Councils of each republican NKVD in the Soviet Union.

We shall analyze this agency more closely in the chapter dealing with the activities of the so-called "troika's". Here we have only to state that the "Special Councils" and "troikas" close that vicious ring, by means of which the NKVD becomes the supreme master of life and death of every Soviet citizen - it acts as a spy, police officer, investigator, attorney and judge simultaneously!

Special Agent-Representative for the people's Commissar. It is an official given a complete authority within a defined jurisdiction.

To this duty ordinarily is appointed one of the important operational officials of the central organs of the NKVD. His mission is to settle offenses of personnel of the commissariat itself. In all the republic and regional administrations of the NKVD there are also special agent-representatives who settle the offenses and other misdeeds committed by officials of the local NKVD organs.

The apparatus of the special agent-representative is composed of a special operating section, having 8-10 operative agent-representatives, all of whom are officials of higher authority such as majors or Lt. colonels of State Security. The offenses can be of a most varied nature: from reports of disciplinary offenses to accusations of belonging to the opposition or counter-revolutionary activities and plots. All cases of this type go through administrative channels of the NKVD and if the aspect of offense or crime is not fully apparent or is extraordinarily serious, then they are referred through the chief of the administration or section to the office of the special agent-representative for settlement. This special agent-representative presents his conclusion to the chief of the regional administration of the NKVD or even commissar himself for final decision.

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Curiously enough, according to Chekist customs, appeal to such conclusions and decisions is considered as "not ethical". The reasons of these unique "chekist ethics" are truly characteristic: the investigations are conducted by the "comrades" themselves, the decisions undertaken by the chief of administration, against whom nothing can be done. As to complaints to the Central Committee of the Party, they are out of question because they would immediately become known, and would result only in complicating the affair, in a scandal (with possible expulsion from the Party) and at any rate would result in dismissal from one's work and transfer somewhere to Archangel or Cheliabinsk, if not worse.

Inside the NKVD the special agent-representatives are either feared and avoided or the people attempt to curry favour with them by flattery and small gifts; that is to say, within the NKVD, the relations of the rank and file Chekists towards the special agent-representatives are just the same as the attitude of the population of the USSR towards all members of the NKVD.

When a special agent-representative, himself, gets in trouble, then all the other officials of the NKVD do not miss a chance to repay him for all former trouble occasioned by them by this individual. So, in 1938, by order of the deputy commissar Zakovsky, the special agent-representative of the Moscow region, Hypolytov, was arrested. He was incarcerated in the Taganski prison, in the common cell block, and then was shot. During the time of the investigation the officials of the administration, who earlier had sought his favor, went in droves to the prison in order "to slap him in the face".

The office of the special agent-representative has no agent net of their own.

Secretariat of the People's Commissar. It has just the same structure and personnel, in general, as have other secretariats of People's Commissariats (or Ministries) in the USSR. Within the secretariat is a control commission for the verification of activities of various administrations and for the clarification of

possible conflicts and misunderstandings among themselves. Linked with the Secretariat, also, is the office for investigating petitions to the People's Commissar. In the building of the NKVD, itself, (ordinarily in the office for entry permits) just as in all other Soviet Commissariats and Ministries, hangs a box for petitions, in which each visitor "may" drop his "petition", the ambiguous term delicately applied to complaints in the USSR. In view of the conditions prevailing in the USSR in general, and particularly in the NKVD, the existence of this office and of the boxes seems only a cynical fraud: since who would dare to make a complaint against the NKVD (especially to the NKVD, itself). The single type of "petitions" seem, therefore, confined to denunciations.

The Engineering-Construction Bureau. This bureau play an important role in the large-scale business enterprises, which are found in the undertakings of the NKVD. To this bureau come all technical inventions and projects, worked out by inmates of camps and prisons, spread throughout the whole territory of the USSR. In special cases, this bureau has authority to free prisoners essential for its work. But in the majority of cases, those prisoners who initiate important projects or inventions, simply are transferred from the jurisdiction of the prison or camp authority to the jurisdiction of this bureau, but still remain in the same prison or camp. Sometimes such prisoners are transferred to a special section of the prison. In such cases the prisoners can act as assistants in special sections, have automobiles, better provisions, but remain in strict isolation and fully cut off from any link with the outside world. In such circumstances, for instance, was the well known designer of steam boilers, Prof. Kamsin, imprisoned in the early thirties at the trial of the "Promparty" ("Industrial party"), and world renowned aviation designer A.N. Tupolev, arrested by the NKVD in 1937, and later freed during the war for copying the American B-29.

This bureau now comes under the jurisdiction of the NKVD. There is reason to believe that the Soviet experimentations on atomic energy comes under the supervision of this body.

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## 2. Functions of NKVD Apparatus Components and their Officials

By a mere enumeration of components of the NKVD apparatus, one can see that there are two basic types of NKVD agencies, namely:

- a) Operative,
- b) Administrative or accommodative.

Operative sections (divisions or departments) and administrations (that is their official title - call to your mind the signature on the pass issued for foreign diplomats for entering the Red Square or the Kremlin) are such agencies of the NKVD, which directly fulfil the terroristic functions entrusted to them by the Kremlin oligarchs, - i.e. the Chief Administration of State Security (GUGB) in the NKVD system and the Ministry of State Security (MGB) nowadays. All other NKVD departments are only accommodating, in that or other form, these operative organs. So, for example, the Administrative and Supply Department supplies the operative agencies with stationery, special lamps for making the eyes of the examinees smart, silk stockings - through special Chekist PX - "Co-operative for NKVD officials and troops", etc. The Financial Department pays out the salary to the officials and employees, and gives out special sums for conspiratorial purposes according to the famous par.9. The Sanitary Department enables the Chekists, worn out by torturing their victims, to pick up their health somewhere in the luxury of the former palace of prince Youssoupev in Corais, in the Crimea.

Similarly, the NKVD officials (we are considering here only those NKVD officials who are on the permanent staff) are divided into two categories: operative officials (sotrudniki) and ordinary officials.

There are four grades of the NKVD operative officials:

- a) Assistant operative agent-representative (in Russian: pomeshnik operativnogo upolnomochennogo)

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- b) Junior operative agent-representative (in Russian: mladshi operativni upolnomochni);
- c) Operative agent-representative (in Russian: operativni upolnomochni);
- d) Senior operative agent-representative (in Russian: starshi operativni upolnomochni)

In Russian, using the Chekist slang, the operative agent-representative is briefly called the "operupolnomochniy"; for an ordinary Soviet citizen it is one of the most terrible words that he knows, for it reeks of arrest.

The assistant operative agent-representative is the lowest category of operative officials. Usually, all novices begin their career in this capacity. But if the newly admitted official has been previously graduated from one of the numerous NKVD schools, he is appointed straight away as junior operative agent-representative or directly as operative agent-representative. After the grade of the Senior operative agent-representative the NKVD officials are named in accordance with the denomination of the operative unit they are supervising; thus, the official supervising a branch, is called "the chief of the NKVD branch", - and official, engaged as an assistant chief of the administration, is called "Assistant Chief of the Administration", etc.

But practically all these titles are usually abbreviated, and in official correspondence they are written like that: "pom.nach. IHO" (assistant chief of Foreign Division) or "nach.HOZO" (chief of the Administrative department). In the certificates of the NKVD officials ( a little black card made of cardboard and doubled up) for the sake of conspiracy it is only mentioned : comrade so-and-so is "assistant chief of the Division of the NKVD USSR" or " section chief of UNKVD LO (Leningrad region administration of NKVD). But we will give more details later on.

Since 1937 the military ranks, as existing in the Red Army, were also introduced in the NKVD in addition to the official titles. The essential difference was only in the fact that the scale of

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military ranks in NKVD was always one or two grades higher than in the army. Thus, for instance, the sergeant in the NKVD, i.e. a non-commissioned officer, corresponded in reality to the second lieutenant in the army both as to the rights and to the amount of salary. A lieutenant in the NKVD (lieutenant of State Security) equals to a captain of the Red Army, and a captain of State Security equals to an army colonel. In other words, here a certain discrimination of the officers of the Soviet army took place. They are morbidly aware of this fact, especially as the officers of the Soviet secret police are much better provided for. This is one of the reasons for a certain hostility between the army and the NKVD units; for instance, you will never see army officer walking together with NKVD officers. But this is exactly what the Soviet regime needs so badly: two armies exist in one country, jealously spying after each other, and such a situation is considered by the Kremlin as the best guarantee against a military plot.

As to the methods of work of the NKVD from the organizational point of view, so, of course, they differ in many respects from the usual methods, among them the methods of military institutions. More than anywhere, the decision in a large part of cases is made resulting from personal or telephone conversations; these are, for the most part, such cases where secret organs are involved, where no traces have to be left, i.e. the meanest cases, often connected with personal interest of the officials etc. But even in this citadel of secrecy and conspiracy, the bureaucracy has found a stable seat. The typical maladies of the Soviet bureaucracy - the unwillingness to take over the responsibility and the tendency of "reinsuring" oneself (perestuzhewka) by getting a written sanction of the superiors, thrive also here. Not without reason, in the days of mass massacres, one of the most malicious masters in the art of butchering, the deputy People's Commissar Zakovsky (executed in 1938) issued "orders about abolition of written orders" in a whole series of cases and especially insisted on the liquidation of "red tape and bureaucracy" in cases of condemnation to death. He himself brought the treatment of such cases

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to the highest grade of simplicity, putting only six letters "V.M. Zak." (vysshaya mera nakazaniya - highest degree of punishment - Zekovsky).

In the recent years the practice of guidance by means of the so called "operative conferences" has been widely spread. Such conferences, arranged according to administrative units (administration - division - section - branch), are usually informed about the important orders of the People's Commissar or about some other urgent arrangements when immediate steps have to be taken. It means that any instructions of the NKVD leaders may be carried into effect on the vast territory of the whole Soviet Union literally in the course of several hours. During the regular, i.e. not so urgent ~~and~~ operative conferences the current problems are usually discussed, the instructions given, the reports heard.

The verbal instructions of higher authorities are called "settings" ("ustanovka"). Written orders usually confirm such settings, given formerly. Besides orders, local organs of the NKVD regularly get the so called "orientations" from the center. For the most part these orientations comprise data, received from the agents, about the activity of foreign spies and diversionists. These data may serve for the purpose of their detention if they appear on the territory of a certain NKVD agency. But there are also orientations of a general character; especially often the orientations of this kind are given to the local agencies and to the Border Guards, stationed on the frontiers of the Soviet Union. Such general orientations are called the informative ones.

The connection with local agencies is realized by means of correspondence, delivered by special armed courriers (field liaison - "Poldsvyas"), with the help of telephone net work of the NKVD, by means of usual telephone network (for non-secret conversations), by telegraph (using code) and radio, through the special radio-network of the NKVD. It has to be mentioned, that the communication section of the NKVD does not work exclusively for its own ministry, but is also available for all governmental and party

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organizations when secret letters have to be mailed. But as the USSR is afflicted by a "secretomania", it is not difficult to imagine the scope of work reserved for the NKVD in its capacity of letter-carrier.

From this point of view the NKVD is something like the second Ministry of communications in the USSR; it is enough to say that even the diplomatic mail going abroad or coming from abroad is delivered by the courriers employed by the NKVD and not by the Soviet Foreign Office. The telephone connection is achieved through a special telephone network, both for local purposes and for the trunk line telephone. For this purpose special cables are used. Besides all the leading officials of the NKVD have in their offices the so-called direct line, connecting them with their immediate subordinates in other cities of the country (for example in Leningrad, Minsk, Kiev and in other capitals of Union Republics). One has to believe that now the direct line, connects also the capitals of all Soviet satellites with Moscow, at least through the diplomatic missions of the USSR in these countries.

The telephone station in Moscow is connected with the general city network. The city telephone network is obliged to give an immediate connection with the NKVD switch-board. By automatic telephone exchange the NKVD headquarters in Moscow may be reached by setting up "K-6" or "O-4". The NKVD telephone net work is self-providing and does not depend on the city. Besides all the leaders of central governmental institutions have a direct line connecting them with the NKVD. So, for example, in Stalin's secretariat an NKVD telephone apparatus has been installed bearing the number 37-01, but for his conversations with the People's Commissar and other prominent NKVD officials Stalin uses normally the Kremlin automatic telephone exchange, the so-called "whirligig". As to the telegraph connection, the NKVD sends ciphered telegrams using the general line, but they are given in a special room reserved for governmental correspondence. The workers of this department are NKVD men, but for the sake of conspiracy are on the payroll of the Ministry of Communications. Telegrams, sent by the NKVD, are

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forwarded as governmental ones, according to the series "PK". As to the radio connection, more details will be given in the chapter dealing with the 2nd Special Division of the NKVD.

In conclusion we have to mention the NKVD archives where "cases" of all persons, <sup>whom</sup> whom the NKVD has already avenged <sup>in</sup> that or <sup>an</sup> other form, are kept ( persons whose turn has not yet come are registered with the 1st Special Division). These archives are used for reference, which may be necessary in connection with the inquest of some new case, and are situated in the cellar of House 2 in Lubjanka (old building). It includes the so-called reading-room where the NKVD officials may get acquainted with the cases, but for this purpose they must get permission from such a prominent worker as chief of the branch, sometimes even from the division chief. The foreign division has its own archives which may not be used by employees of other NKVD agencies.

### 4. Chief Administration of State Security

#### Tasks and Structure

##### See the Diagram No 7

The Chief Administration of State Security (GUGB NKVD SSSR) is the essential and most important agency of the enormous system of Soviet political terror, that has so many ramifications. Strictly speaking, the NKVD or MGB is the Chief Administration of State Security as such, for all other links of the NKVD system or "organs", if we use the Chekist slang, play only an auxiliary part. The "chastising sword" is the GUGB. Just this Chief Administration of State Security is responsible for discovery, isolation and liquidation of real and imaginary "enemies of the people", real and especially potential antagonists of Communism and its dictatorial leadership. The GUGB Chief is always the First Deputy of the People's Commissar for Internal Affairs. After the war, the Chief Administration of State Security was transformed into an independent Ministry of State Security as we have already mentioned above.

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The general structure of this administration did not suffer any considerable changes since the time of the GPU, and it was accepted by the new Ministry approximately in the same shape. Anyhow, one has to consider, that, though the structure was preserved, the numeration of some divisions was changed in the course of time, and by the end of the thirties most of the GUGB divisions were renamed as administrations, though the NKVD men continued to call these administrative divisions. This circumstance creates certain difficulties at the classification of the GUGB structure. Therefore the authors draw the attention of the readers at the possibility of some errors and inaccuracies in this respect.

As far as we could find out, at the moment of transforming divisions into administrations (approximately beginning with the year 1937) the GUGB had the following structure :

- 1st Special Division - a center of statistical operative recording of anti-soviet elements (ASB) and NKVD agents;
  - 2nd Special Division - a center of operative technics;
  - 1st Division - protection of the leaders and of the Kremlin;
  - 2nd " - counter-intelligence (KNO);
  - 3rd " - economic (EKO);
  - 4th " - secret political (SPKO);
  - 5th " - "Osobiy Otdel" (OO) - spy work in the Army;
  - 6th " - transport (TO);
  - 7th " - foreign (INO);
  - 8th " - prisons and places of detainment
- Inquest Office of the GUGB

In the course of expansion and re-organization of the NKVD system, such divisions as counter-intelligence, economic, secret-political, foreign and transport were renamed into administrations and their staff was correspondingly enlarged. The authors of this work have no information available as to the transformation of the "Osobiy Otdel" into an administration, though tasks and

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functions of this division "accomodating" the Army and the Navy immensely increased for the last 10-15 years. Further, both in the text and in the album of schematic diagrams the following denomination will be used for the GUGB central agencies : Counter-Intelligence administration (KBU), Economic administration (EKU), Secret-Political administration (SPU), Foreign administration (IFU) and Transport administration (TU), but the term Special Division ("Osobiy Otdel" or "OO") will not be changed. To complete the picture, the accomodating agencies such as Maintenance Administration and Financial Administration, with their branches, are shown on the diagrams, but no analysis of their work will be made as they have no essential meaning for the understanding of characteristic features of the NKVD, and their structure, upon the whole, is following the same pattern as ~~it is done~~<sup>that</sup> in all the other People's Commissariats of the USSR.

With the exception of the first and the second Special Divisions and of the 1st Division of the GUGB, the numeration of divisions and administrations will not be mentioned either in the text or in the album of diagrams, as the M.V. frequently changed the numeration for the sake of conspiracy, as it was mentioned before. The last change in the numeration was made by the transformation of the GUGB into the MGB. As a result of the above mentioned facts, different materials which were made available to the authors, were often of controversial nature. According to one information, the Secret-Political administration which formerly had number 4, received in the MGB the name of the 3rd administration. Another source indicates that the title of the 3rd administration was reserved for the Counter-Intelligence administration, which was formerly called the 2nd administration. Approximately the same picture may be observed in the cases of the Foreign and Economic administrations. Under such circumstances the applying of numeration of administrations would only lead to misunderstandings and disorientation of the reader.

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The authors are fully aware of the fact that the giving up of the use of numbers for denoting divisions and administrations, will be a serious defect of this work, especially as, approximately since 1937, all divisions and administrations of the NKVD-MGB are usually designated only by numbers in the whole official correspondence for the sake of conspiracy. In the certificates of the NKVD officials the name of the division where they are working, is never given.

The general features of the structure of administrations that were part of the GUGB, were not changed in the last fifteen years; the administrations of the MGB are based upon almost the same scheme that was made out for the corresponding divisions of the OGPU. The difference lies only in the scale, i.e. the administrations of the MGB are more cumbersome and have many more employees than the OGPU divisions. But the number of people on staff is not constant in that or another administration. Such staff may be either increased or diminished depending on the fact, which administration has the largest portion of work at the present moment, or, according to the picturesque expression of Lagoda, where the "GPU God" is seated, i.e. the terrorization of which part of the Soviet population is more important from the point of view of the Politburo at a certain time. So, for example, during the first Five-year plan and collectivization the residence of this "GPU God" was the Economic division, after the murder of Kirov he moved to the Secret-Political division, before the war his presence was distinctly felt in the Foreign administration, but during the war he moved again to the "Osobiy Otdel" and to the Counter-Intelligence administration. In such cases, some of the personnel of administrations and divisions less important at this period of time, are transferred to that administration on which the particular attention of the Politburo is concentrated at the moment.

In special cases separate administrations may be temporarily joined in order to fulfil this or another special task set by

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the Politburo, but the structure of each remains unchanged in the principal features. So, for example, during the war a special administration "SMERSH" ("Smertj shpionam" - death to spies) was formed. Many foreign observers erroneously took this administration for the Counter-Intelligence administration of the Red Army General staff. In reality it was only a union of the "Osobiy Otdel" with the Counter-Intelligence administration of the Red Army under the general direction of the Deputy People's Commissar of the NKVD and Chief of the "Osobiy Otdel", General-Colonel V.C. Abakumov who during the war was directly subordinated to Stalin, as People's Commissar for Defence. Because of this, a mistake was made abroad in connecting the "SMERSH" with the General staff of the Red Army. After the resignation of Stalin of his functions of People's Commissar for Defence, "SMERSH" was liquidated and the administrations of the NKVD (now MVD), out of which it was formed, resumed their previous structure with only some minor changes.

For the period dealt with in this work (1929-1940), the general structure of the NKVD of the USSR was as follows: (see the Diagram No 7) -

- 1st Special Division - registration of agents and operative recording of anti-soviet elements;
- 2nd Special Division - Operative technique;
- 1st Division - protection of leaders and of the Kremlin;
- KRU - Counter-Intelligence administration (former 2nd Division);
- SPU - Secret-Political administration (former 4th or 3rd Division);
- AKU - Economic administration (former 3rd or 4th Division);
- OO - "Osobiy Otdel" or Special Division (former 5th Div.); surveillance in the Red Army;
- TU - Transport administration (former 6th Division);
- ISU - Foreign administration (former 7th Division);
- Administration of prisons and places of detention - (former 8th Division)
- Inquest Division - (former Inquest Office);

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The authors warn their readers <sup>against</sup> ~~from~~ confusing the Transport administration of the GUGB ("Transportnoe upravlenie GUGB NKVD SSSR) with the Administration of Highways of the NKVD ("Glavshosdor NKVD SSSR"), which will be considered in the later chapters of this work. The first of these administrations is concerned with maintaining of State Security rules on the rail road and water transport, while the second one controls the auto roads and highways as the NKVD supervises them also from the technical point of view.

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CHAPTER IXTHE FIRST SPECIAL DIVISION  
OF THE GUGB NKVD USSRDiagram No 2

The terroristic activity of the NKVD inside the Soviet Union is based upon the registration and classification of two elements of the Soviet population : 1) NKVD agents, 2) the so-called anti-soviet element ("ASE" - according to the NKVD abbreviation).

The first form of recording is called the agent-net registration ("uchet agentury"), the second one - the operative registering ("operuchet"). The recording of agents and "ASE" is the concern of the 1st Special Division of the GUGB NKVD, whose subdivisions or branches are to be found in all territorial agencies of the NKVD. The work of the 1st Special Division of the GUGB is closely connected with the Central Archives of the NKVD, where all the cases that have been dealt with by the Soviet punitive organs since the time of Cheka may be found on the files. But the work of the Central Archives is not doubled by the 1st Special Division, as the main task of the latter is the service to the operative organs of the NKVD in their current work.

The structure of the 1st Special Division is very simple. In the People's Commissariat (now Ministry) as such, as well as in all territorial agencies, it consists only of two sectors: 1) Recording of agents, 2) Recording of anti-soviet element "ASE". These sectors may be considered as independent divisions and are subdivided into sections or branches, according to the character of the contingent of the population that is being registered or is subject to such a registration. Besides, in both sectors there are statistical sections that have to deal only with general numbers: general number of agents according to different nomenclatures, number of "ASE" etc.

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The "operative-statistical" section of the second sector systematizes the figures according to the summary ("svodka") compiled by all local operative agencies of the NKVD about the "political-moral" frame of mind of the population and about its reaction to these or other events inside the USSR and abroad. If no particular events took place, the "operative-statistical" section only systematizes the regular summaries of the operative agencies, and on their basis compiles reviews for the whole territory of the USSR and then turns to other problems: for instance, compiles a summary based on the reports of the local agencies of KRU about the anti-Soviet opinions, expressed by the former Russian emigrants who had returned to the USSR. A selection out of these summaries is regularly forwarded to the Central Committee of the Communist Party for the information of corresponding party organs.

#### OPERATIVE RECORDING

Operative recording or the so-called special recording of the anti-Soviet element is the concern of the 2nd sector of the 1st Special Division GUGB NKVD USSR. Its tentacles embrace a huge number of the Soviet citizens and it is based on the individual card of special record, that is on the file for every person who is under suspicion of the NKVD.

All persons, registered with NKVD, are divided into categories, or, using the NKVD terminology, have their "tints". The corresponding category or "tint" is entered on the registration card of the recorded person; so, the registration card of a person, who uses to relate political views is marked by letters "AS", put in the corner - it means that the "tint" of this person is "AS"-anti-Soviet. The number of these categories or "tints" is very great. The basic ones are :

AS - anti-Soviet element;

B - "bielly" - "white" (former participants of the white movement in 1917-1921);

- PH** - "protivnik" - antagonist. ( This category comprises members of former political parties in the pre-revolutionary Russia. The party membership is indicated by putting after this "tint" some additional letters: so, "PH/MR", or "PH/R" -will denote in the first case former "Menshevik", in the second - former "Kser" - socialist-Revolutionary.
- KR** - Counter-revolutionary;
- TS** - "tserkovnik" - a man connected in some way with the church. Besides priests, this group comprises all believers who are active in their religious communities and in church matters. The sectarians (dissenters) are not recorded under the "tint" Ts, for they are forming a separate group.
- S** - "sektant" - sectarians (dissenters). From the operative point of view this group is considered equal to PH (antagonists).
- P** - "povstantsi" - insurgents. This group comprises all persons who took part in any rebellion at the time of Civil War, military communism and collectivization periods, and also persons who have shown seditious tendencies in later periods.
- N** - nationalists of all shades.
- SI** - "svyaz s inostrantsami" - connection with foreigners ( personnel of foreign embassies, exchange of letters with relatives abroad, etc.)
- Shp** - "shpion" - spies. This group includes all persons suspected of espionage on the basis of their correspondence, connection with relatives abroad, etc. It represents, so to say, the next stage of natural development after the person was registered as "SI".
- T** - terrorist.
- D** - diversionist.
- Prav.** - "pravyye" - the rightists. Members of the right opposition in the Party (Bukharinites).

**Tr.** - The Trotskyite. The same symbol is used for the adherents of Zinoviev and other participants or supporters of the left opposition.

This list of recorded "tints" is in no case complete and it may be admitted that, in the years of war, it was made considerably longer by adding such new "tints" as F- fascist, H - adherent of Hitler, B - "benderist" (Ukrainian nationalist), Vl. - "vlasovets" (member or adherent of the Vlassov movement), ns. - "niskopoklenik" - servility to the bourgeoisie etc. But even the list, given above, shows what a large part of the population is under the constant supervision of the NKVD. At the same time, it also shows how wide spread is the struggle of the people of the USSR against the Soviet regime. Together with all arrestees and millions of persons who are being "punished", the NKVD inevitably remind Stalin of the fact that his regime is the most terrible but, at the same time, the weakest in the whole world, for it is opposed by the huge mass of the population. All those persons, on whose cards the symbol of their "tint" has been drawn, are automatically set under a supervision of the NKVD agents.

Once more it has to be repeated that, in case of a corresponding directive from the Politburo, all persons sharing that or another "tint" are arrested, and their further fate depends not on their real guilt but on the "general line of the Party" for the present period of time.

Data, gathered by the agents during their watch (during "rasrabotka" - "elaboration" in the Chekist terminology) of a certain person who has been recorded with the special NKVD registration, gives a start for building up a "case".

"Cases" are divided into the following groups:

1. "Agenturnaya rasrabotka" (agent elaboration) which is officially called "agenturnoye delo" (agent case), and embraces a group of persons sharing the same views, who are tied together by periodic encounters, conversations or personal friendship.

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2. "Delo formuliar" - ( service list case), where only one principal person who is under suspicion ( "figurant" according to the Chekist terminology) is being "elaborated", and all his connections are being recorded only to complete the case. In most cases the "service list case" is sooner or later transformed into an "agenturnoye delo", or (provided the "figurant" shows any activity) leads to <sup>his</sup> arrest.

The overwhelming majority of cases of "figurants" who are being "elaborated" by the operative NKVD organs, are on the records as "service list cases". Under normal conditions, the group cases are comparatively rarely recorded on the files of the 1st Special Division.

3. "U-D" ("Uchetnyye diale") - "Registration case" is brought against less active "figurants". Usually as a basis for such a case serves some instruction from the center ordering to make records about a certain group of population. For example, in 1935, after the customary purge in the party, a considerable percentage of the so-called "hangers on" ("primasovshihaya") was excluded from the party, as being not fit for this high privilege. On the ground of a special secret instruction all such persons were registered as "U-D" in those cases <sup>in which</sup> when they were not accused as Trotskyists, or when their ASK registration cards had not been previously marked out with some other "tint". Later on, following a new special secret directive, a campaign of liquidating the people registered within this group, was carried on, and ... par.169 of the Criminal Code of the MSVM (ill-intended fraud, or forgery) was incriminated against them .

4. "Liternoe diale" - "Lettered case" is usually concerned with a certain industrial or some other object. This case includes all lists of persons on the staff of this enterprise, different data of official commissions, correspondence with trusts, acts of audits, materials of Party purges, different declarations, anonymous statements and other casual materials - up to the information that this enterprise does not fulfill the program of the output, reports about the breaking out of fire, about damages etc.

All this is completed by a special list of persons, included in this "Lettered Case". Such a special list usually does not show persons that have already been recorded according to some "tint". Usually this list is composed of the names of persons, about whom the NKVD has some material of small importance, i.e. anonymous denunciation, expulsion from the Komsomol because of the loss of the membership card, or even some suspicion. All these persons are specially recorded and registration cards are made out marked with the symbol "L-D" ("Literaoye dielo"). This category is considered to be the least active one, still the presence of a card, marked with "L-D" on the files of the 1st Special Division, is already like a brand and puts certain restrictions <sup>on</sup> for the person concerned both in his social life and his activity. For instance, if such a person is casually included in a list of guests to be present at a session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR (and the names of such guests are invariably checked with the special registration files) he will never get the invitation card for the session.

The center for special recording of anti-Soviet elements is the 2nd sector of the 1st Special Division of the USSR NKVD USSR (now KGB USSR). In its hands detailed statistical data as to "tints" and as to the spreading of these tints in republics, regions and districts of the Soviet Union are concentrated. Usually, besides collecting statistical data, the 1st Special Division makes out special geographical maps according to the "tints". This enables the leadership of the People's Commissariat at any time to orient themselves in directing the work of the NKVD agencies in the whole USSR and in separate republics and districts.

Not only the "tint", but rather detailed data about the recorded person are marked on the registration card. (See Appendix). In the local subordinate agencies of the NKVD the registration card of the recorded person is filled out in three copies; one copy is forwarded to the agency that is conducting the "elaboration" the second one is sent to the 2nd Special Division of the Regional administration of the NKVD - to control the "elaboration", and the

third one goes to Moscow, to the 1st Special Division of the center, statistical section.

Statistical records of the 1st Special Division of the People's Commissariat and of the 1st Special Divisions in local NKVD (MGB) administrations are kept in absolute secret. According to an order of Lavrenty Beria, issued in 1940, the chiefs of regional administrations were prohibited to give any information in this respect even to the secretaries of the regional committees of the Communist Party, who could obtain these data only through the Central Committee of the Party. For this purpose, the chief of the 1st Special Division in Moscow had to adapt and filtrate these data, and forward them to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party only when they acquired special wording. It was well known in the NKVD circles that this order was provoked by the fact that new secretaries of the regional committees of the Bolshevik party, who took over this work after the "Great Purge" and who were often recruited, in this period of time, from the NKVD men, in a series of cases made such demands to the chiefs of the regional NKVD administrations and received the wished information. This is a clear illustration of the fact, that the NKVD does not reveal its secrets even to official representatives of the ruling party, with the exception of its highest organs.

In the NKVD (MGB) regional administrations the staff of the 1st Special Division is divided between two branches (operative recording and registration of agents). The employees of these branches enjoy the rights of the operative agents-representatives and their assistants, but in fact they are functionaries, clerks and statisticians.

In addition to the data of special records, all operative agencies of the NKVD-MGB are systematically and regularly compiling summaries about the frame of mind of the broad masses of the Soviet people and their reaction to certain events inside the Soviet Union and abroad. These summaries are forwarded to the

"operative-statistical" branch of the 2nd sector of the 1st Special Division GUGB NKVD for the purpose of systematizing the picture of moral-political state of the population throughout the whole Soviet Union. Here is one of specimens of such a summary: after the governmental decree about the abolition of the ration-card system in the USSR, all the regional NKVD administrations through their operative agencies collected reports about "negative attitude in connection with the decision of the Party and Government to abolish the ration-card system". These summaries depict in short the character of statements made by separate persons, giving their "tints". The most characteristic facts are reported to the chief of the regional NKVD administration and certain measures are taken - up to the arrest. But this is not the most important thing. Much more essential is that the chief of the administration, having received the statistical picture of the frame of mind of the population in his region, sends a copy of these figures, in the form of a ciphered telegram or radiogram, to the "operative-statistical" branch of the center, in Moscow, where these materials are summarized and forwarded to the NKVD People's Commissar for a report to Politburo, or simply for his information.

This double system of constant operative recording of "tints" and regular summaries about the frame of mind of the population fully enables the leadership of the NKVD-MGB to dispose the forces of their network as it is needed by the concrete situation in the country. In fact, it is nothing else but a constantly active and very intensive reconnoitering of forces and disposition of the enemy, where their own people is meant under this term. This is the principal difference between the system of the operative recording in the NKVD-MGB and the similar methods used by police agencies of all other countries of the world. The matter is not only in the scale, and not in the fact that in the USSR the punitive organs carry out a special registration of such elements of the population, who in no case could be classified as "criminals" in any other country of the world.



of all in its preventive character, i.e. the registration card of the NKVD-MGB is filled out for a certain citizen of the Soviet Union not because he or she committed any crimes or offenses, but only because the personnel of the Soviet punitive organs considers him, or her, to be able to commit such crimes or offenses in the future.

The second peculiarity may be seen in the fact that a registration card, once filled out for a certain person, is never destroyed even if the "tint", marked on it, is not substantiated or is a result of an obvious calumny. The man may be acquitted in the court, may be fully rehabilitated by the party organs, but the files of the NKVD-MGB will brand him for ever. The All-Union Communist party and its punitive organs do not apply the notion of the "term of limitation" to the actions of their political antagonists, and the NKVD-MGB may at any time resume the persecution of any person for actions performed twenty or even thirty years ago. If this happens, it is only necessary to "renovate" to some extent the case of such a person, and this is one of the main tasks of the Soviet operative recording. This is what is called the "record of the figurant's activity".

The third, and may be the most essential, peculiarity of the Soviet operative recording is that its data are never checked up by anybody else. The Commission of the Party Control in Moscow may check the activity of the NKVD-MGB, but there does not exist such an organization in the whole USSR that could check the equity of data, filling in millions of registration cards in the numerous recording sectors of the punitive organs, scattered all over the country. The lack of "vigilance" is severely punished in the USSR, but the Bolshevik rulers will never blame their punitive organs for the overzealousness in this respect.

The People's Commissariat as well as the local NKVD administrations strictly stick to the principle that in the 1st Special Division a certain employee occupies himself with one definite "tint" and does not get in touch with work and data of other

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branches. The officials of other NKVD divisions and administrations have no access to the files of the 1st Special Division and they can contact this agency only through their secretariats, which are directly subordinated to higher NKVD organs.

The operative-statistical recording is the basis for all political and operative work of the whole complicated network of NKVD-MGB agencies, that spread their sticky cobweb over the whole country. If any political discontent of anti-communist nature arises in the country, the geographical files of the operative recording will immediately show where this "tint" was most active for some time past, and where the principal, or most dangerous from the Kremlin's point of view, center of such a movement is located. All NKVD forces will be disposed there, the agents among persons of this "tint" will be recruited and thus the discontent will not be allowed to turn into a direct resistance movement.

The access to the map of "tints" is free only for a very limited circle of the most prominent officials in the Soviet secret police. Neither its whereabouts nor even the fact of its existence is known to the majority of the NKVD men. Probably, from time to time this map is shown to Stalin. It is even more probable that he has either a copy of this map, or his own map which has been compiled by a special "NKVD" inside the NKVD - by a Special Sector of the Central Committee of the Party.

In the days of war the "Generalissimo" made his decisions as to the plan of military operations, banding together with Zhukov and Vassilevsky over a secret "operative map" showing the dislocation of Hitler troops. This map was drawn for him by the 4th Administration of the General Staff. In the days of peace he examines in the same way, together with Beria, Merkulov and Kruglov, a map showing the dislocation of anti-communist activists among the peoples of Russia - the map drawn for him by the 1st Special Division ...

This system of constant and secret "operative recording" makes possible for the NKVD-MGB to leave to its mercy the whole of the population in the USSR. The NKVD-MGB registers every libel,

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every anonymous denunciation and, without a special order from the Kremlin, does not show either to its victims or to the court, on which data its actions were based.

A real liberation of the peoples of the USSR from Bolshevism will be completed only at the moment when, after the liquidation of Chekists and their Kremlin bosses, all files and archives of the Soviet punitive organs will be destroyed.

### Recording of Agents

If the operative recording of ASB (anti-Boviet elements) is basic for the distribution of forces and direction of actions of the Soviet punitive organs, the work with agents, their recording and classification is the principal element in the operative work of all NKVD-MGB agencies. The constant tension inside the country and the fact, that the Bolshevik potentates are fully aware of the hatred they have inspired to all strata of the population, led to the creation of a mass net of NKVD agents in the USSR. This net consists of many millions of secret agents belonging to different divisions and administrations of Soviet punitive organs.

It may be supposed that the principle of the German counter-intelligence service, aiming at creating a possible wider net of agents, was borrowed to a certain extent by the setting up of a Soviet network of agents. But the Soviet system proceeded considerably further, and a network of mass agents was set up not only by the Counter-Intelligence administration of the NKVD, but also by the rest of its administrations and divisions, first of all by the Secret-Political administration, "Osoby Otdel", Economic administration and Transport administration.

The system of recruiting, classifying and recording the agents in all these administrations is almost the same, though first of all it is worked out by the counter-intelligence administration. Still it would be erroneous to refer all the work of agents to the counter-intelligence branch, as it is done in all other countries of the world, as far as the Soviet Government

leads a constant war not so much against external enemies as against peoples of its own country. The essential forces of the Soviet punitive organs are just concentrated on this internal struggle with the population.

The statistical and operative recording of agents employed by all NKVD-MGB agencies is the concern of the 1st Sector of the 1st Special Division of GUGB in Moscow and corresponding offices of republican, regional and area administrations of the NKVD. All territorial and specialized agencies of the NKVD-MGB fill in special registration cards for all their agents (see Appendix). Copies of these cards are forwarded to the files of the 1st Special Division in Moscow (1st Sector) for further classification and statistical recording. This is the center of recording for agents of all NKVD-MGB organs throughout the Soviet Union, and therefore it is more convenient to make an analysis of principles of the classification of agents and the work with them, in connection with the analysis of structure and field of operation of the 1st Special Division of the GUGB NKVD USSR (now MGB USSR). But, of course, it does not mean that the recruiting of agents and the work with them is the concern of this NKVD branch. This practical work is carried out by different operative agencies and depends on the tasks they have to fulfill. The 1st Special Division of the Center, in Moscow, and its local branches are concerned only with the operative recording of agents.

### Agents

There are several grades of agents, differentiated by their field of operations, competence and their significance in the NKVD-MGB system. The principal categories of the agents are the following :

	Usual abbreviation:
1. Resident	"R"
2. Agent	"ag"
3. Special agent	"sp/ag"
4. Agent of internal observation -	"ag/V" ("Vnutrenny" -
	internal)

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5. Secret informer "a/e" ("oswiedomitelj" - informer)
6. Secret informer for lodging "SO/K" ("kwartira"-lodging)
7. Tenant of conspirative quarters - Ch/KK ("Chozain"-tenant)

These categories of agents have the following peculiarities:

1. Resident. Is usually member of the Communist Party or a former Chekist, failing this - a Komsozol. He may be also picked out of capable and reliable informers, but he must invariably have practical experience in conspiracy and agent's work. Carrying on his usual official tasks, i.e. being the Chief of the Secret Department of some factory, Chief of the Personnel Section of some works, Assistant Commander of a military unit as to political work ("pompolit"), such a man is at the same time an NKVD man, "accomodating" this industrial or military object, i.e. supervising it.

A special personal file is kept for every resident with manifold characteristics and check-ups, including a check-up with the files of the 1st Special Division of the regional administration and center. In this file are noted and checked all his connections and acquaintances, whereby his family and all his relatives are checked in the most careful way. Some anti-Soviet statements, i.e. any critical remarks on the address of the Soviet government made by persons, connected with this man or their former social background, can be no obstacle for this man to be appointed resident. But if the registration cards of the persons connected with him, are marked with such "tints" as "Shr" (spy), "T" (terrorist), "KK" (counter-revolutionary), "Prav." (rightists), or "Tr" (Trotskyist) - he cannot be appointed resident.

A resident is connected with a "network" of 5-8-12 agents and secret informers, whom he receives according to a special time-table, instructs them and collects their information. Only the resident is usually paid for the work. As to the "network", this or another method of compulsion is used, and people work

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out of fear for the consequences of not fulfilling their obligations, which these secret agents and informers have signed in the NKVD agency that recruited them.

Residents are future official employees of different NKVD-MGB agencies; There are no specifications as to the terms of their work as residents.

2. Agent. Usually <sup>secret</sup> informer, but invariably belonging to that or another registered group of "tints", having connections with the ABH-group. So, for instance, if an agent is needed for the "elaboration" of the Trotskyists, a Trotskyist is picked out for this work, and especially such a Trotskyist who is in full confidence of the group to be elaborated. The agent is recruited with the help of some concrete compromising material and invariably is brought to a stadium where he has to make his decision, having been told - "NKVD work or prison!". Operative expenses of the agent - for trips, entertaining his friends, etc. - are usually paid. Sometimes agents receive some periodical rewards for their work. But upon the whole, agents work out of fear, i.e. trying to save themselves and their families from possible repercussions by loyal spying for the NKVD.

3. Special agent. There are two categories of such special agents according to the character of the tasks they have to fulfill, though these categories are not mentioned in the operative recording. The first group is composed out of specialists in some branch of national economy or industry, such as chemists, metallurgists, building engineers etc. The task of these agents is to control the work of some enterprise or trust and to expose all elements of sabotage, wreckage etc.

The second category of agents-specialists includes pick-pockets, burglars, specialists for opening safes and other highly-skilled criminals. These agents-specialists fulfill various tasks. For instance, an agent-representative has to make a secret perquisition (called "vyezka" by the Chekists) in the home of a "figurant" whose "elaboration" is in process. For some reasons this perquisition is appointed for 17,00, but usually the owner

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of the lodging comes home at that time. It is necessary to detain him in some way so that he does not see the agent-representative making a search in his room. For this purpose a specialist-booligan is summoned. He waits for the "figurant" somewhere in the street and, using some kind of pretext, attacks and beats him. A scandal breaks out, both are brought to a police-station, the case is investigated for 2-3 hours and at last the victim of the assault is set free. In the meantime the perquisition is brought to an end. The agent-representative rings up the police station and the agent-bandit is set free. Though this method is very mean and cynical, nevertheless it is rather often applied by the NKVD men.

The first group of special agents work without pay and exclusively under compulsion, but the agents-criminals get their rewards. The same group comprises cheats, prostitutes, jugglers etc. These "useful services" of the criminal underworld to the operative agencies of the NKVD are partly responsible for the fact that these "socially-close" elements are granted different privileges and advantages in the prisons and camps, and they are even promoted to different administrative posts, including that of camp commanders. The USSR is the only country in the world where burglars and murderers command the imprisoned professors, engineers, actors and writers.

A. Agent of internal observation. This is a non-active agent recruited from the immediate environment of the "figurant" (very often from his own family), but who is not registered with the "tint", marking the registration card of the "figurant". As such an agent may serve the sister of a Trotskyist, who is in permanent contact with him and knows or may know more about him than anybody else or may help in carrying out some measures that would lead to the activation of his "elaboration". Such persons are recruited after a very careful study, and usually some very important material, mostly of private character, is applied; the fear of revelation forces these persons to work for the NKVD. Thus, these people are simply victims of blackmail. If such material is not available, it is prepared artificially. Very often such a

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candidate for an agent is persuaded that he must work in this branch for the sake of safety of the very person, who has to be the object for this special observation.

For instance, the sister of the "figurant" is summoned to the NKVD, where forged papers are shown to her while she is being told, that the NKVD agencies are aware of the fact that somebody wants to recruit her brother or half succeeded in doing this. But this is not so important, they say, - "we know that your brother is a good man, but we must take hold of the persons, who want to entangle your brother into their dirty meshes. You must help us in this respect for the sake of safety of your brother" ... The unfortunate woman gives her consent and, not knowing herself, helps the NKVD to ruin her own brother. Such plotting led and leads to many terrific personal tragedies, but the people "who are guarding the conquests of the revolution" are not at the least embarrassed by them.

The work with such kinds of agents is very delicate and requires a lot of tact and shrewdness. Therefore, it is usually entrusted to experienced operative agents-representatives or even deputy chiefs of the branches. Such agents are usually rewarded for their work, but not necessarily with money or material goods. A frequently applied form of reward is a promise to facilitate the fate of relatives or intimates of such an agent.

5. Secret informers. This is the most widespread and the less specialized species of NKVD-MGB agents. When millions of agents of the Soviet secret police are mentioned, one refers just to this category. Secret informers are recruited by the NKVD-MGB organs out of all strata of population, whereby no distinction of age and sex are made. According to a secret instruction, issued at the times of Yagoda (1934-1937), only children below the age of 12 cannot be recruited for this work - they do not stick to conspiracy. As to all the rest of the population of the Soviet Union, the NKVD-MGB agencies consider it to be a gigantic reservoir for recruiting secret informers. This recruiting is usually done by means of blackmailing, threats, bullying and, in less frequent cases, mostly when young people are concerned, by



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influencing their patriotic feelings.

As strange as it may seem, but directly this miserable figure of a secret informer, terrorized and despising himself, is essentially supporting Stalin's dictatorship. Experience has shown that Stalin cannot trust either workers or peasants, or army, or even his party - all hate him and would sacrifice all to overthrow his odious tyranny. He can fully rely only upon this miserable secret informer. Of course, the latter also hates "the beloved leader", and may be even more than anybody else. But he has nowhere to go - he is entangled in the NKVD meshes, he constantly walks with a loop around his neck and therefore, even against his will, he is forced to carry out the orders of his tormentors. There are millions of secret informers - they are recruited among workers, party members, intellectuals, collective farmers, students, pensioners, housewives. The overwhelming majority of them work out of fear and do not get any rewards. Their exact number is unknown, but legion is their name.

6. Secret informer for lodging. This special category of secret informers has only the task of controlling who enters a certain house or lodging, when, how long he stayed and what happened then in the lodging. Besides that, such an agent may be entrusted with getting letters, things etc., from a person, who lives close by and is "elaborated" by the NKVD. This category includes first of all housemasters and house-managers, whose duty is to notify the NKVD in a regular way about all events, happening in their houses. But frequently some lodgers of "communal" i.e. common lodgings are recruited for this purpose, especially housewives and pensioners who spend much time in their lodgings. In many cases domestic servants are recruited to spy <sup>upon</sup> their masters. They are usually paid for this kind of service.

Quarrels and squabbles among families occupying common lodging are frequently used by the recruiting of these agents. In some cases such agents get a reward, but in most cases they give their information with the wish to do an ill turn to their

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neighbour who lives in a better room, has better food, tunes in the radio late at night etc. Soviet conditions of life create ideal grounds for recruiting such agents, but all their information has to be carefully filtrated, for it often bears strong traces of personal feelings.

2. Tenant of a Conspirator's Quarters. Usually he is a Communist, a Komsomol or at any rate a person who was well checked up. The principal requirement - limited circle of connections (all of them have to be checked up) and a lodging, suitable for conspirator's meetings with residents or agents. Such a tenant is regularly paid. All members of the family have to sign a promise of silence. If there are any children, conspirator's quarters cannot be established.

Every operative worker must have at least two such conspirator's quarters; one of them may serve for meetings with agents and informers, the other - only with residents (for the sake of conspiracy). Usually for meeting agents two or even three lodgings are available, but agents suspicious or even dangerous as to double-dealing are usually seen in hotels. As a rule, operative workers and residents see no agents at home and do not conduct any work there.

The former chief of the American Military Mission in Moscow, General John H. Dean, describes in his book "The Strange Alliance" some of his meetings with leading officials of the NKVD Foreign administration, General-Lieutenant P.M. Pitin and Major-General A.P. Ossipov. The purpose of this meeting was to establish a working arrangement between the American O.S.S. and the Soviet Intelligence agencies. The American general was greatly puzzled by the fact that these two leading workers of the Soviet secret intelligence never met him at the same place twice and always took the greatest precautions when arranging these meetings. Once the driver of the NKVD car who had to bring him to this meeting, arranged a true race along the Moscow streets trying to lose the private car of the American general, the Russian driver of which was following the NKVD car at the heels.

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Obviously in this case Fitin and Ossipov did not want to give up the usual principles of their work, and besides they probably had instructions to arrange these meetings without any supervision by the agents of the "external observation" (L-M) of the 2nd Special Division of the GUGB NKVD and "SMERSH" administration, whose agent was, probably, was the private Russian driver of the American general. The circumstances under which these meetings took place greatly surprised the American general, but they were typical for the NKVD principles of work. In this case Fitin and Ossipov met their American counterparts under the same circumstances, as an average NKVD operative agent-representative meets his residents and agents. There can be no doubts that all this had been done deliberately and after some serious discussion in the highest quarters of the NKVD. What was the secret aim of all these tricks - is hard to say, but there had to be one.

#### Recruiting of Agents

As a rule, the recruiting of an agent is preceded by checking with data of the 1st Special Division, and, in more important cases, with files of all operative divisions and their special archives. Enquiries are invariably sent to : 1) place of birth - about the social origin of the parents and their background; 2) NKVD agency, "accommodating" the region where the candidate lives; 3) NKVD agency, "accommodating" the industrial or any other object, where the candidate works. Besides that secret characteristics of the candidate are demanded from the local party organization (this is very often camouflaged so as if these characteristics are asked for by the regional military commissariat, police-station etc.), then a "setting" ("ustanovka"), i.e. checking up is made in his place of residence - usually through house managers, house-masters and other "agents for lodging". All these data are used as basis for a "Report for recruiting".

The recruiting of a resident must be sanctioned: in regional administrations - by the chief of the division or administration; in Moscow - by chief of the branch of the division in question.

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The recruiting of an agent is sanctioned in the same way. If the agent has been picked out of the number of "figurants" of a certain "elaboration", for which, of course, he is recruited, his recruiting is sanctioned by the deputy chief of the NKVD administration. Recruiting of other categories of agents are sanctioned and approved by less responsible officials, usually by chiefs of the branches or sections.

The "report for recruiting" must contain the data for the "setting" of the recruited person (i.e. the conclusions drawn from the materials dealing with his person); besides it must be mentioned where and how the actual recruiting will take place, who is recruiting and for what purpose, and also what steps will be taken providing the recruited person will refuse to work for the NKVD.

The actual recruitings are usually based either on the so-called loyalty to the Soviet regime (residents, tenants of conspiratorial quarters, in some cases - secret informers) or on some compromising material which is either available or artificially created. If a "figurant" is recruited out of a certain "elaboration", he has usually to choose: either work for the NKVD or arrest with all its consequences. If the material is created artificially and the recruiting is based on blackmailing, some additional material of this kind is usually available which is used if the first method of recruiting fails. If the candidate still persists in his refusal to work for the NKVD, he must sign a promise of keeping silence about the negotiations and then he is recorded as an "antagonist", thus being put in the same level with oppositionists and sectarians. The refusal of work for the NKVD is usually followed, some time later, by the arrest of the unyielding candidate.

There are cases when agents that have been recruited, either commit suicide or perform some other desperate deeds. So, for example, in 1937 L. Krasotina, relative of late Pobedonostsev, the former attorney general of the Holy Synod, took

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poison in Moscow, after having signed her consent to work as an agent of "internal observation", i.e. for spying against her closest relatives. In 1941 a Hungarian girl K. threw herself out of the window of her lodging after having given her consent to work against her fiancé. Such tragedies occur for the most part when a certain person is recruited to work inside his or her own family. Both these cases, mentioned above, were thrashed out on the operative conferences of NKVD divisions, and the Chekists who actually carried out the recruiting in these cases, were dismissed and sent to some less responsible work - as punishment for "want of skill in recruiting" but not as murderers of two innocent human beings. As far as it is known, the operative workers are always punished in some way for failure at the recruiting.

Curiously enough, according to the NKVD materials, the most difficult categories for recruiting consist of former Social-revolutionaries (he-er), Mensheviks and churchmen. The most easy task is considered in the NKVD to recruit agents out of the number of Trotskyists and Rightists.

While being recruited, the candidate has to sign his consent, and, if he is supposed to be an agent, he is immediately asked to give his first material. Secret informers are gradually introduced into the course of their future activity. At first, their contributions are limited to the information bearing general character, and only after some time they receive definite and concrete tasks. But there are no firm rules in this respect, and in every separate case the operative worker himself must find individual ways of approaching agents and secret informers of his team as he thinks it best.

Special registration cards are filled in for every recruited person and forwarded to the 1st Special Division of the corresponding regional NKVD-MGB administration and to the 1st Sector of the 1st Special Division of the center, in Moscow. The 1st Special Division of the NKVD-MGB regional administration sends a numerated case for the agent or secret informer which is

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further carried on under a special anonymous sobriquet as "Bolshevik", "Master", "Fighter", "Ivan" etc. All "Agenturaya rasrabotka's" (agent elaboration) and "Service-list cases" are also conducted under sobriquets.

#### Work with Agents

As a rule, operative workers of the NKVD are in direct contact only with residents and agents (of all three categories). The work with ordinary secret informers and "secret informers for lodgings" is usually carried on by the residents. But also here no general rules can be applied, and from time to time the operative workers who are on the staff of the NKVD-MGB, see themselves the secret informers (usually in the presence of the resident, to whose team they belong).

The operative worker gives regular instructions to his residents according to his own materials as well as in conformance with requirements of the higher quarters. All operative workers have weekly time-tables for meeting agents, and they are obliged to give a copy of such a time-table to the chief of their section or branch, so that he may know where (in which conspiratorial quarters) his subordinates are at a certain moment. From time to time the chiefs of the branches have to see agents together with their operative workers in order to control them.

The residents meet their mass network of secret informers usually somewhere near their places of work or residence, but here is also no general rule, everything depending on local conditions. But this is always done according to a schedule the copy of which is being sent to the operative worker who may sometimes control such meetings.

The encounters with the agents are arranged in the conspiratorial lodgings or, depending on the circumstances, in various places: in the streets, in squares and gardens, out of town etc.

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The NKVD premises may be used only for seeing residents (rather infrequently) or "itinerant agents". The latter designation is used for a special group of agents employed by the Secret-Political administration of the NKVD. This group is being recruited from a certain "tint" and is supposed to travel in the domain of their "tint". Such agents are usually informed by phone that they must visit a certain person, and then the encounter is arranged in some of the NKVD quarters. But even in these cases the encounters do not take place in the very premises of the NKVD regional administration, but in some less conspicuous, though subordinate to that administration, place.

The general principle of Soviet work with agents may be expressed in few words - "No stone must be left unturned to achieve the aim". Any lies, any provocations may be used for recruiting agents, and any crimes may be staged for the same purpose. All this is called in the NKVD slang "agenturnaya kombinatsiya" (agent work combination) and is carried on according to approved plans. It is also the principal subject in the course of training NKVD officials in special schools - in the Central NKVD School in Moscow, in inter-regional NKVD schools in different cities of the Soviet Union and in the Higher School for Border Guards NKVD in Moscow.

Note The authors once more call the attention to the fact that the theme concerning NKVD agents was worked out in connection with the work of the 1st Special Division therefore as this problem is common for all divisions and administrations of the GUGB NKVD USSR. All operative work with agents, including recruiting and training, is carried out by the operative organs of the NKVD-MGB, while the 1st Special Division is only concerned with the operative-statistical recording of agents and supplies the People's Commissar (now Minister of State Security) or the Chief of the NKVD-MGB administration it belongs to with operative-statistical information of all kind. It may also give similar information to other NKVD agencies and to the

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Party, but only according to the indications of the secretary of the NKVD People's Commissar or the Chief of the NKVD regional administration this particular 1st Special Division belongs to, and only in the wording wished by the above mentioned NKVD institutions. The same order was preserved when the GUGB NKVD was transformed into the Ministry of State Security.

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## CHAPTER V

### THE SECOND SPECIAL DIVISION OF THE GUGB NKVD USSR

#### Diagram No 2

The activities of all organs of the State Security of the USSR, or, strictly speaking, their operative work with agents, is based, upon the whole, on four principal foundations, mentioned below according to their succession :

1. Operative recording;
2. Agents;
3. Operative technique;
4. Inquest;

These are, so to say, four corner stones of the whole NKVD-MGB system supporting the entire practical work of its operative agencies or "organs" (using the Chekist terminology). The operative recording gives a full, manifold and detailed picture of how and where the real or potential centers of resistance to the Communist dictatorship are disposed throughout the country. An intricate and manifold network of agents, that knows no bounds in attaining its purpose, gives full possibility of locating beforehand the centers of such a future resistance, defining its forms, and exposing its participators and possible leaders. The organization and functions of these two first elements of the Soviet state security have been discussed in the previous chapter in connection with the analysis of the structure of the 1st Special Division of the GUGB NKVD USSR.

The inquest is the final stage of the whole complicated work, performed by the organs of state security of the USSR, and will be discussed in the following chapters of this manuscript.

As to the operative technique of the NKVD, it is a system, not less intricate and manifold than the operative recording

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and network of agents. One can have a judgement about the term "operative technique", applied to the NKVD-MGB, only if one takes into consideration that the Stalinist dictatorship is the only and exclusive master of all material and technical resources of this vast country and that the organs, securing the safety of this dictatorship and preventing the outbursts of hatred of the enslaved people, may at any time use any of these unlimited material and technical resources. The NKVD may also fully dispose of such extensive technical means, and has in its hands such an elaborate and complicated apparatus for making the most of them, that the punitive organs of all other countries cannot even dream of anything like it.

From the operative point of view, the whole of this diverse and exceedingly intricate apparatus, including various technical means, is the concern of the 2nd Special Division of the GUGB NKVD (now MGB) and of its subdivisions in all republican, regional and area administration of the NKVD-MGB.

Formerly the functions of the 2nd Special Division comprised also the protection of the Bolshevik leaders and this task was entrusted to the 1st subdivision of the 2nd Special Division. But by the end of the thirties this subdivision was reorganized into the so-called 1st Division of the GUGB NKVD, the structure and functions of which will be discussed in Chapter 7. However, as regards the operative functions, the 1st Division is still closely connected with the 2nd Special Division, and their fields of operation are so interlinked<sup>ed</sup> especially in Moscow, that in many cases it is difficult to draw a line of demarcation between them. The importance of the 2nd Special Division is revealed by the fact that in the period of the "Great Purge" it was headed by Kruglev, who occupied the post of the 2nd Deputy to the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR in 1939-1941, and was appointed Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR after the war.

The operative or special technique which is the concern of the 2nd Special Division of the GUGB NKVD is usually denominated

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in NKVD-MGB documents as "letter" ("litera"). The most important of such "letters" are :

- SN - ("narushnoye nabludeniye") - external observation;
- F - photography;
- M - membrane - control of the telephone network;
- K - eavesdropping, i.e. listening in by means of special devices and microphones;
- PK - ("perliustratsia korrespondentsai") censoring of letters;
- P - ("pelengatsiya") - control, search and location of illegal radio receiving and transmitting sets;
- Sh - ("shifrovaniye") - ciphering;
- RSh - ("rasshifrovka") - deciphering.

Sections and subdivisions that are concerned with all these branches of operative and special technique, are usually denominated by the abbreviations, mentioned above, while letter "L" (abbreviation from the word "litera" - letter) is added to them. Thus, for example, a subdivision, concerned with censoring of letters, is named "L-PK". Each of these subdivisions is, if it possible to say so, something like a trust, comprising a series of very cumbersome and therefore nearly independent industrial objects.

Let us take a closer view of some of these "letters".

"L-SN" - External Observation or Outside Surveillance.

The task of this service is the securing of an all-day-round, constant and persistent observation of all persons who are at this period of time "elaborated" by the NKVD. In Moscow this is the concern of the 2nd Special Division of the NKVD People's Commissariat, in provinces - of the 2nd Special Divisions of NKVD regional and area administrations, in the capitals of Union Republics - of the 2nd Special Divisions of republican NKVD-MGB. For this purpose a special brigade of agents of external observation is created for trailing after every "figurant". A car, a motor cycle if necessary, is assigned to this brigade, and it is equipped with technical means, needed in every concrete case. The observation

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is extended not only upon the "figurant" himself, but upon all persons he may meet and speak to in the streets or in public places. According to the Chekist terminology this is called the "setting of the figurant's connections" ("ustanovka svyazei figuranta").

The "setting" means that every person, whom the "figurant" greets or addresses, is followed by an agent - member of the brigade, whose task is to establish the identity of this person, his place of residence, his profession and place of work. In the Chekist slang it is called "to bring the connection up to date". Then the agent makes a short report about the results of his observations, and this report is called the "setting". Later on, such a "setting" is forwarded to the 2nd sector of the 1st special division where it has to be checked whether this person has been specially recorded and what is his "tint". If the answer is a positive one, these data are copied in the "setting", which is then filed with the "figurant's" case. But even if such a "setting" does not provide any compromising material, nevertheless it is filled for the purpose of "mounting" in case of need. The usual proceedings are as follows: by the end of the day the N&V-man, heading the brigade, compiles a "summary of external observation of the figurant", fixing to it all "settings" with data obtained after the checking up with the 1st special division. An agent on duty (in especially important cases there may be several agents) is posted near the dwelling of the "figurant". This agent has to spy on all persons, coming in and out, and make "settings" for them.

Besides "figurant" the external observation invariably extends upon all foreigners.

Service "L-AN" does not include spying after the "figurant" at his places of residence and of work as well as in the quarters of his friends. This is the task of a network of secret informers or agents belonging to the team of the operative N&V official or resident who is concerned with the "elaboration" of this

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"figurant". "L-M" ("narushka" in the Chekist slang) is not even informed about the essential part of the case of the person under their constant observation. Usually the activity of the brigade is directed by the operative NKVD official who is entrusted with the "elaboration" of the "figurant" in question. But if the "figurant" is a foreigner or case from some other town, the whole work of observation is performed by the "L-M" subdivision, and only the results of the work are reported to a certain NKVD division or administration.

It is very difficult, and may be even impossible, for a simple mortal to imagine the scope of work of the "L-M", for instance, in Moscow. This "Moscow M" means, that many hundreds of "figurants" of different "elaborations" are secretly watched day and night, while this secret observation is entrusted to a brigade of 3-4, and sometimes more, persons in each case. Besides, posts of external observation are needed for watching several dozens, and sometimes hundreds, of conspicuous "figurants", coming to Moscow on their business. These "figurants" are being "elaborated" by different regional administrations and republican NKVD People's Commissariats, who often notify the 2nd Special Division about the necessity of watching certain "figurant" just on the day of his arrival to Moscow.

But that is not all: according to a special instruction of the NKVD People's Commissar, a constant external observation has to be carried on every member of foreign missions, embassies, consulates, all military attaches and their employees, all foreigners coming from abroad, and especially all correspondents of telegraphic agencies and foreign newspapers. It seems that foreign tourists give the least trouble to the organs of "L-M" as they are always following established routs and are invariably accompanied by an Intourist interpreter who is always an agent or even an official on staff of the organs of state security. At any rate, the special section of the Intourist, and not the "L-M", is responsible for the behaviour of foreign tourists and for their intercourse with Soviet citizens in the streets and public places.

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But some foreigners give a lot of trouble to the 2nd Special Division.

So, for example, before the war the secretary of the Japanese military attache, a certain Kembe Sasaki, was in the habit of going for a quotidian walk. Evening was his favourite time for this purpose, and he usually followed the same route - down the Okhotny Riad and along the Gorky Street to the Pushkin monument in the Boulevard Ring. He used to have an unlit cigarette in his teeth and asked every man he met for light. Thus he addressed 30-40 persons during his walk, besides he came up to different stalls, flower girls etc., and everywhere entered into short conversations. It is difficult to imagine how many agents were needed to compile a "setting" for everyone he had talked to. Summary of external observation of this Sasaki alone included daily up to 50-60 "settings", checked up with special records. It was well known in the center that it was sheer mockery from the part of Sasaki who tried his best to give as much trouble to the NKVD as possible, but nevertheless the external observation of Sasaki persisted in the same scope.

Germans, as well as representatives of the neighbouring countries of the Eastern Europe, did not give too much trouble, but the Americans were at first a true plague for the "L-33". Usually, having not the slightest notion about the real state of things in the Soviet Union, and enjoying full liberty back at home, the Americans strived to preserve all their habits in Moscow and persistently tried to study the life of the Soviet Union applying the same methods that were habitual for the study of all other countries. They visited all public places, were in a hurry to make private acquaintances, and desks of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs were piled with their applications to get the permission of travelling all over the Soviet Union. Not taking into consideration all other reasons, this peculiarity of Americans, that annoyed the NKVD so much, could be explained by the fact that the USA established the diplomatic relations with the USSR nearly 15 years later than all other great powers, and the American

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representatives tried to get into "contact" with Soviet citizens directly at the time when the main point of the NKVD activity was just to cut off any connections between the Soviet population and the foreigners.

It was not easy for the "L-M" to handle William C. Bullitt, the first ambassador of the USA in Moscow (1933-1936). He was very fond of sports and often attended the "Dynamo" stadium where he tried to make acquaintances with Soviet sportsmen. By the way, Mr. Bullitt was the first who taught Soviet officers to play polo. Thus, taking into consideration such habits of the American ambassador, a special intensified brigade of the external observation was required, and several dozens of "settings" were compiled every day. To make the work of the NKVD easier two special agents were attached to Mr. Bullitt: a record runner and a tennis player that has represented the USSR at international games in France, an exceedingly slender woman whose good figure attracted general attention. But the combination with the tennis player did not pass. When the winter came, Mr. Bullitt started skiing out of town, and this drove to despair agents, attached to him, who could not ski well. At the time he, like other Americans, was often discussed by the NKVD men, for there were piles of NKVD "settings", trying to fix his connections. The NKVD could breathe freely only when Mr. Bullitt "nibbled" at an attractive bait - the renowned ballet dancer Lepeshinskaya, agent of the 2nd Special Division, supposedly sent on a secret message, and spent all his free time exclusively in her company.

Besides all the above mentioned objects, the external observation is carried on for all agents of the Foreign Administration of the NKVD and of the Intelligence Administration of the General Staff of the Soviet army, during their stay in the USSR. Many of the Comintern workers were exposed to such a control observation, which is periodically extended even on the NKVD-MUS men, to check their behaviour and their connections.

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All these various tasks explain the fact that only in Moscow there are many thousands of "L-M" agents. An exception in all other countries of the world, this extensive "external observation" is a daily practice in the USSR, the usual routine of the "L-M" section of the 2nd Special Division of the NKVD-MGB.

#### "L-F" - Photographing

Letter "F" comprises not only the photographing of objects and persons, but also the preparation of photostat copies of documents, drafts, projects and even complete books. Microphotography and photomounting, i.e. preparation of one picture out of several ones, are also within the province of this branch, supplying first-rate "proofs" for lawsuits, recruiting of agents etc.

A classical example of applying such forged photographs is the well-known action against the "Industrial Party" ("Prompartiya") in 1930, when, during the lawsuit, "secret instructions" of the French 2nd Bureau, mounted from the documents dating back to the period of the First World War, were produced. As another colourful example of applying such "proofs" in the USSR may serve a widespread trick of producing to the accused, denying his acquaintance, let us say, with some leader of the anti-Stalinist opposition in the Communist Party, a photomounting, on which he is represented conferring with Trotsky or Bukharin.

The team of the "L-F" includes also a special sub-unit, the printing one, that is able to prepare any certificate or visa in any language, with any stamps or signs. So, for example, during the reception of Molotov in the British House of Commons, in 1942, the galleries for guests were invaded by armed British communists, who used cards that had been forged in Moscow for the purpose of entering the House. The same team may forge any technical draft or calculation in an extraordinarily short time.

Let us again turn to examples: once, in summer 1937, an agent of the Secret Intelligence Administration of the People's Commissariat of Defense, who was at the same time employed on the staff of the Japanese military attache in Moscow, informed his administration about the necessity of an urgent interview. The



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letter took place in the same evening, approximately at 22.00 in the neighbourhood of the Timiryazev Agricultural Academy. During the interview the agent stated that the assistant of the military attache had just received a parcel with the following stamp: "All-Union Communist Party (bolshheviks), Central Committee, Military Department", and locked it in his safe. The agent was ordered to bring this parcel. Approximately at 1 a.m., a second interview took place and the agent handed the parcel to the official of Intelligence administration.

Some 20 minutes later the parcel was passed to the 2nd Special Division of the NKVD for an urgent preparation of forged documents to be returned to the safe of the Japanese attache. At 6.30 in the morning, at a third interview, the agent received the parcel back, and did not even suspect that he got a copy, which had been considerably changed in comparison with the original. This forged copy was passed off for the use of the attache. The envelope contained some ten documents, including 3 drafts, which had been approved by the People's Commissar for Defense Industry, the deputy People's Commissar for Defense, and by the Chief of the Military Department of the Central Party Committee. The matter was in the switching of a giant plant on the production of a new type of the anti-aircraft guns. Forged calculations and drafts were prepared for the misinformation of the attache. The signatures were made so well that they did not call out any suspicions, but in the case of a graphological analysis they would not be identical and the document would be considered as a sample of forgery, made by the foreigners.

By the by, it has to be mentioned to the credit of the Japanese Intelligence Service, that the military attache got into the possession of the documents only one hour and a half later than the director of the plant, who received them personally from the secretary of the Military Department and acknowledged their receipt with his signature.

The "I-F" functions include also copying and changing of letters, compiling of forged diaries, different forgeries in financial

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accounts etc. For instance, a letter from a certain Prof. Kluchnikov was sent to the address of his acquaintance, a lawyer Kolchanovsky, employed in the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, who was at that time being "elaborated" as a conspicuous "figurant". In this letter Kolchanovsky was invited to call on the professor and pick the book he was in need of. This letter was intercepted at the post-office by a "L-PK" agent and forwarded to the "F" branch where it was changed and then posted again. This time the letter requested the "figurant" to take an English book from the library of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs and give it to Kluchnikov's domestic worker, who would come especially for this purpose from the summer cottage of the professor. Two days later Kolchanovsky was summoned to the NKVD where he was told that a secret document of the Commissariat, employing him, was found in the book which he sent to the professor. This document was even shown to the panic-stricken Kolchanovsky, and soon thereafter he was recruited as a NKVD informer and gave detailed statements about his business conversations with Soviet Foreign Commissar Maxim Litvinov and his deputy Arakhan, both of whom were also under secret "elaboration" of the secret-political administration of the NKVD.

Such forgeries do not embarrass in the least the pontiffs of the Soviet "justice", and are systematically studied in all NKVD schools as examples of "operative work combinations".

"L-PK" - Censoring of Letters. The scope of work of this branch is so extensive that it is impossible to give a detailed description of its functions. Covering themselves with the formal guarantee of inviolability of private correspondence, stated in the "Stalinist Constitution", the "L-PK" agents constantly open, read and even make photographs of the correspondence of the Soviet citizens with their relatives or friends abroad, as well as of the whole correspondence of those categories or "tiers" of the population which are being "elaborated" by the organs of the State Security at this period of time. In the course of mass purges and

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repressions or at some particular moments of international or internal tension, the "L-PK" agents read all letters in the USSR.

All major post-offices (up to the district ones) have special officials who are censoring the correspondence. But the post-office chiefs are not aware of this fact, at least not officially. Usually it is done in such a way: the chief of the special branch "recommends" to the head of the Regional Administration of Post and Telegraph to appoint ~~some~~ "Comrade X." as a telegraphist or as a clerk to a certain post-office. This man appears before his new chief showing simply a paper from the provincial office of Post and Telegraph. For some time he carries on the usual work of an ordinary clerk and is completely subordinate to the chief of the post-office. Then he is instructed to get into contact with a certain group of employees of this post-office, and proceeds to his special tasks, not reporting about them to the chief of the post-office. Usually this work is entrusted to letter-carriers, employees sorting out the correspondence or taking the letters out of the letter-boxes.

Copies of the letters that are characteristic in any way are forwarded to the district section of the NKVD, and in provincial offices - to the chief of the 2nd Special Division of the NKVD administration for this region. Depending on the "general line" of the Party and on the NKVD instructions, the utmost attention may be paid to "alien elements", to persons connected with different kinds of opposition, to "corrupt elements" in the army etc

In the army this system is completed in such a way that every military unit has its own letter-box, and all soldiers and junior officers are obliged to use it for mailing their letters (officially it is done to have the letters posted free of charge). All these letters are read by the officials of the NKVD Special Section ("Osobyi Otdel") or of the political section of the military unit. During the war such a system accounted for the fact that a letter sent through the field post at Pulkevo (five miles from Leningrad) reached the addressee in Leningrad only in ten days.

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All correspondence of "figurants" of special "elaborations" is under a constant control of "L-PK", and summaries of this control are being separately forwarded to the 2nd Special Division. The "L-PK" team sometimes includes special agents, controlling the work of the "L-PK" men. These agents belong to the group "sp/ag" - special agents - and are specially paid. Ordinary "L-PK" men usually work as secret informers, i.e. without pay, but from time to time they may get some rewards.

As a result of this complex system of all-round and selective censorship without informing the chiefs of the post-offices, the letters in the USSR often disappear or reach the addressees with a considerable delay. This system creates most favourable conditions for abuses on the part of post officials. With an obvious purpose of facilitating the work of "L-PK" agents, long before the war in the USSR an obligatory rule was introduced that the address of the sender had to be written on the obverse side of the envelope. In all telegrams the address of the sender had to be invariably mentioned.

"L-M" - Membran. The "Letter M" branch is in charge of controlling the telephone conversations. The center of its activity in Moscow is the special section of the central telephone station, in the capitals of the Union Republics and in regional centers - special sections of local telephone exchanges.

The operative technique "M" may be considered as one of the most popular means of the "elaborations". Usually the number of the "figurant" is taken for control, and any call, even from the automatic telephones, is easily checked up. The number of the phone is automatically recorded after the conversation by means of the operative technique "M", and therefore the "M" summary always shows on which telephone the call was made and where this telephone is situated, if the call was made from a booth with automatic telephone. There is nothing new in such a method, and it is regularly applied by the police agencies of other countries, but there, in the time of peace, it is used only for the exposition

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and seizure of particularly dangerous criminal offenders, while in the USSR it is a constant and exceedingly reinforced system for assisting the Party in its daily struggle with all elements of opposition in the country.

The operative technique "W" is particularly often applied for the "elaboration" of prominent "figures", as the bureaucratic circles of the Soviet Union make a broad use of the telephone network. The Soviet people knew very well that the telephone conversations are tapped, and therefore they got accustomed to use <sup>W</sup>a code for their telephone calls. But exactly this codified character of the simplest telephone conversations is necessary for the NKVD, being just the proper thing for the "elaborations", blackmailing and bringing charges, sometimes of a phantastic and improbable nature.

The case of the former head of the Central Council of "Osoaviakhim" (the semi-military organization for development of aerial and chemical defence of the Soviet Union) General R.P. Eideman, who was executed together with Marshal Tukhachevsky in 1937, may serve as a characteristic example of the work of "L-W" branch. It was known in the circles of the leading NKVD officials that at the moment when the Tukhachevsky plot had been exposed, no compromising material was available for Eideman who had only <sup>aroused</sup> some suspicions. Eideman was a close friend of General Kork, the Commanding Officer of the Frunze Military Academy, who was also executed later on for having been involved in the Tukhachevsky plot. The following trick was used to expose Eideman: an NKVD agent rang him up through a local telephone exchange of the "W" branch, and, calling himself Kork, "warned" him of the impending danger of an immediate arrest. An NKVD man was selected for this conversation, whose voice had exactly the same timbre as that of Kork. The well informed NKVD officials mentioned afterwards that Eideman took immediate steps to disappear and was arrested at the moment when he was ready to get into his car.

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Some time afterwards, the official of the Secret-Political Division of the GUGB Zecharev who was present at the inquest of Kidman, told his intimate friends that Kidman immediately started to make confessions after having been directly asked where he wanted to flee and what were the reasons for his flight. When Kidman gave an evasive answer, probably to gain time, he was asked without beating around the bush : did he receive a warning about an impending arrest? When Kidman answered in the negative, the investigator declared that he was lying, that the apparatus of the control telephone station was used for this communication and that he spoke with a NKVD man and not with Kork.

Then Kidman confessed that such a conversation had really taken place, and that having been warned he decided to flee, but did not know where. After that he was questioned about the reason of his denying the call and the warning (all persons, examined in the NKVD, have to sign all their answers without any delay) and he had to explain, why he, a person without any sense of guilt, decided to leave his summer cottage near Moscow and to flee not knowing where ?

Thus, such a measure provided the investigator with concrete material, and on its base, one hour later, Kidman gave detailed depositions; still later, the same Kidman convicted others, including Kork, at the cross-examinations.

The listening-in of telephone conversations is called "passive measures" in the instruction about the operative technique "M". But the "M" tasks of the 2nd Special Division include also the column "active measures" where following steps are enumerated : "to cut off the conversation", or "in case of a conversation about some appointment to make it one hour later, urgently notifying the section ..." or "to switch off the telephone from... till.. " etc.

Besides "figurants" the "L-M" constantly tape the following categories of subjects :

- a) foreign embassies and consulates;
- b) private telephones of all foreigners;

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- c) all telephones of such hotels as "Moscow", "Metropol" and "Savoy";
- d) all telephones of People's Commissariats of Foreign Affairs, of Defence, of External Trade and of the Executive Committee of the Communist International (Comintern).

As to the governmental telephone network, the so called "Kremlin Automatic Telephone Exchange" (or "whirligig" in the Chekist slang), the "L-M" control does not extend <sup>to</sup> only very few of the highest leaders of the USSR. They are put on the list by Stalin himself and the list is forwarded through the Special Sector of the Central Party Committee. This sector is supervised by the member of the Orgburo Shkilyatov.

"L-P" - Relocation or Radio Location. The tasks of this branch comprise sending of ciphered radiograms from the central NKVD administrations in Moscow to every corner of the Soviet Union, receiving of such ciphered radiograms from local NKVD agencies, discovering the presence of underground radio-stations on the USSR territory and locating them, as well as muffling of all undesirable broadcasts what ever their origin may be.

The section "L-P" has its own radio-stations and radio location posts as well as other devices for carrying out these various and complicated tasks. Before the war the Central NKVD radio-station was located in the hamlet Monino near Moscow, but in October 1941, when the German troops drew nearer to the Soviet capital, it was partly evacuated and partly destroyed by the demolition detachments of the NKVD. The authors of this manuscript are not informed about the location of this radio-station after the war.

Already before the war, the functions of the "L-P" acquired such a scope that it became necessary to bring into effect a fundamental reorganization of the whole branch.

So, for instance, the new functions of the "L-P" included the propaganda broadcasts in foreign languages which were received and re-broadcasted further through secret radio-stations of local

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Communist parties. A great stress was put on this work in relation to the Latin-American countries (Cuba, the region of the Panama Channel, Brazil, Chile etc.). The habitual time for such broadcasts was the period from 1 a.m. till 5 a.m. (Moscow time). The so-called "white spots" appeared for that period in the regular broadcasting program of the Moscow radio-committee, and nothing was officially known about these "spots".

The using of the short-wave stations of the USSR for current instructing of the foreign agents of the Foreign NKVD Administration, the Intelligence Administration of the General Staff, and the Communist International (now Cominform) is another function of the "L-P" branch. Usually a code is used for such transmissions. Anyhow, in a series of cases - for example, instructions to the Spanish guerillas in Asturias in 1939-41 (and now, undoubtedly, to the Greek guerillas), - such broadcasts were made openly, but, of course, in the name of the Central Committee of the corresponding Communist party. So, for instance, it is known, that the order for the dismissal of Harry Pollitt (British Communist party) <sup>was</sup> the result of his tactical error at the moment of the declaration of the war, came through radio directly from Moscow.

The information intended for the agents is usually received by the ciphering branch of the Soviet embassy or of the Soviet commercial representation with the help of "PPSh-38" radio set, and is transmitted further in the same way, i.e. to the receiver of the agent, which has, as a rule, only one wave for transmissions, thus making possible the control of the setting from some other point.

The scope of work for deciphering or simply for tapping of foreign broadcasts and radio-telephone communications was also increased in an unusual way. Already before the war, a special section for recording the radio-telephone communications between the Foreign Departments of London and Washington was organized in the "L-P" branch. There are also some evidences that the first successful attempts to intercept the transatlantic talks between Churchill and Roosevelt took place in 1940.

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OFFICIALS ONLY



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Finally, the "L-P" was transformed into a huge organization with international staff of workers. These were mostly members of foreign Communist parties who were sent to Moscow as the result of a secret mobilization which was personally performed by the secretaries of the Communist parties abroad. The old premises in the Malaya Lubyanka Street were too small for this department, and in 1941 it was transferred into a spacious building in Lenin Hills by Moscow. The whole central Comintern apparatus had been transferred there from the Sapozhkov Square somewhat earlier, in 1940. As to its organization, the "L-P" still belonged to the NKVD system but practically it was subordinated to the Special Sector of the All-Union Communist Party Central Committee.

"L-E". The work of this branch consists in overhearing the conversations in different premises with the help of special devices. The central Moscow hotels are the principal field of operations of this branch, for they usually give shelter to foreigners and most prominent party men, coming to Moscow from the provinces.

The most habitual method of listening-in is the installation of special membranes-dictophones into the switches, ventilators, clocks, table legs etc. Hidden wires go from these membranes through the intensifying sub-stations to the Control center (in Malaya Lubyanka Street 7).

The "L-E" branch pays even more attention to the buildings of foreign embassies, missions, consulates and different commercial and cultural representations. But this portion of work belongs first of all to the field of operations of the NKVD Foreign and Counter-Intelligence Administrations and will be discussed in more details in the corresponding chapters of this manual book.

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Such are the manifold and intricate functions of the 2nd Special Division of the USSR NKVD. The specific features of its work account for the fact, that each of its branches has a considerable independence and the Chief of the Division only co-ordinates the functioning of different kinds of operative techniques. Like the 1st Special Division it does not perform any

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operative work of its own and is intended to assist all operative divisions and administrations of the NKVD wherever such an assistance might be needed. This is true for Moscow and for all NKVD regional administrations, each of which has its own 2nd Special Division, subordinated to its territorial NKVD administration and to the 2nd Special Division of the Moscow NKVD headquarters.

Formerly the functions of this division comprised also the protection of leaders, but some years before the World War II this task went over to the newly created 1st Division of the OGPU. The 1st Division of the NKVD USSR exists only in Moscow, and the protection of all provincial leaders is still entrusted to the 2nd Special Division, or, to be more exact, to its "L-MN" branch.

The majority of the workers of the 2nd Special Division are the NKVD staff officials and they likewise are on the NKVD pay-roll. This division usually hires "special agents" for the needs of operative NKVD divisions and administrations - thieves, burglars, pick-pockets, specialists in kicking up a ruckus in the street, and other criminals.

The abundance of technical devices in this division and their complexity accounts for the fact that this branch is one of the most expensive in the NKVD system. According to some data the "technique" absorbs up to 50% of official budget appropriations for the NKVD needs.

The organization of the 2nd Special Division is shown on the diagram No 9.

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**CHAPTER VI****THE INQUEST DIVISION  
OF THE OGPU NKVD USSR****Diagram No 10**

It has already been mentioned above that the work of the NKVD organs is based on four principal foundations: operative recording, agents, operative technique and inquest. To avoid a gap in the unity of exposition, we place the analysis of structure and principles of work of the NKVD inquest organs immediately after the analysis of structure and functions of the 1st and 2nd Special Division and previously to the study of the activity and structure of purely operative agencies of the NKVD.

First of all, let us call to our mind that by a normal legal procedure the inquest is the preliminary stage for the exposure of the circumstances of the crime and for the establishment of the identity of persons who might have possibly committed it, and the conclusions of the investigator are in no way obligatory for the decision of the court. The investigator cannot take part in the proceedings of the court or influence them in any way. The body of the crime has to be irrefutably proved, and only under this condition the verdict of guilty may be passed. Furthermore, the court cannot be influenced only by indirect proofs and evidences when passing in a verdict. An inward conviction of the jury that the accused really committed a certain crime, not substantiated by any proofs, cannot be a reason, sufficient for passing a sentence. These elementary rules of legal procedure are obligatory for judicial organs of normal countries but not for those of the Soviet Union.

In order to understand the role of Soviet inquest organs and methods of their work, it is necessary to dwell upon the principles of judicial proofs in the Soviet law. The most detailed consideration of this problem is found in the back of the

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former Attorney General of the USSR, now Minister of Foreign Affairs A.Y. Vishinsky "Theory of Judicial Proofs in the Soviet Law" (first edition - Moscow, 1941; second - 1946). Vishinsky was awarded the Stalin premium of the first grade (200,000 rubles) and the title of the regular member of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR for this work. This book served also as an initial point for the compilation of new criminal and civil codes of the USSR (this work was begun in 1947). Vishinsky does not set out any new standards or regulations in his work, but he lays down in very plain and precise terms the fundamental regulations of the Soviet legal procedure already used in practice.

These fundamental regulations may be briefly formulated as follows :

1. The Soviet jurisprudence is permeated by party-spirit and is based upon the Marxist-Leninist methodology.
2. The Soviet state (i.e. the Communist party) is the begetter of the Soviet court which is flesh and blood of the new Socialist society.
3. The inward conviction of the Soviet judges is connected with their socialist interpretation of the law, with their communist conception of law based upon the social-political world outlook of the working class. The sentence passed by the court is based upon this conviction of the judges, but this conviction has to be persuasive being supported by the Marxist-Leninist principles of the Soviet juridical science.
4. If there is a lack of direct proofs or if they are insufficient to state the body of the crime, the decisions of the Soviet court may be based upon indirect proofs or evidences.

These four regulations make the Soviet court a simple tool of the ruling party, one of the organs of the Stalinist dictatorship. The Soviet court may condemn a person even if the direct proofs of his guilt are lacking - and this is its principal peculiarity. Analyzing numerous facts, supposedly selected out of practice of Soviet courts, Vishinsky rather cynically states that if the indirect proofs are applied correctly, the court-

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examination may be absolutely reliable and the results, thus achieved - veritable and persuasive. This statement of Vishinsky is nothing but an attempt to lay a theoretical foundation for iniquity and club-law of the NKVD-MGB "judicial boards", "special councils" and "troikas".

In the Soviet Union the system of public legal procedures - with their pleadings, debates, with leaving the accused the right of defending himself, with citation of witnesses etc. - is practically reserved only for "People's Court" ("Narodnyy Sud") that considers only criminal offences, unimportant misdemeanours or litigations, and controversies between separate citizens or institutions. At the trials of these insignificant offenders the Soviet courts adhere to the usual standards of legal procedure, and this enables the Soviet government and its numerous naive or dishonest friends abroad to demonstrate the fairness, legality and even democratic character of Soviet justice.

However, in all cases when the Soviet government itself or the Communist party plays the role of the accuser - and this happens in the absolute majority of cases and leads to the most drastic sentences, - this normal standard of legal procedure is not followed, the trial takes place behind closed doors, even without the accused and his defenders, and is practically reduced to the approval of accusing materials or "notices", that had been prepared by the investigator beforehand. We have already dwelt on this procedure when we mentioned the Special Council attached to the People's Commissar of the NKVD. This kind of "trial" is nothing but mockery at all norms of legal procedure and at the very conception of justice. But namely this was the practice of condemning millions of innocent citizens of the Soviet Union to execution, long years of imprisonment or deportation. In all these cases special NKVD-MGB "courts" have passed their verdicts on the basis of indirect proofs, as in majority of such cases the NKVD investigators are usually unable to discover any direct proofs of the "guilt".

When the actions of the NKVD-MGB follow the line of a new campaign of political terror proclaimed by the Politburo, and

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this is mostly the case, - the inquest is not the preliminary but the final stage of the court-examination (if we can apply this name to the procedure, habitual in the USSR), and it concludes the process, that had its beginning in the operative recording and the so-called "elaboration of the figurant". The "notice" submitted by the investigator to the judgement of the "special board" usually encloses not only the material, provided by the inquest itself, but also the indictment and a suggestion as to the punitive measure, in the form of a certain paragraph of the Criminal Code of the USSR or some other Union Republic. The work of the "Special Council" usually consists only in approving of the investigator's conclusions or in the selection of some other clause of the Criminal-Political Code with the corresponding changes in the punitive measures. The "legal procedure" of the "troika" is even more simplified ( See chapter "Regional Organs of the NKVD").

Usually, in the practice of the NKVD work the operative part is not separated from the inquest ( especially at the periods of political campaigns and purges). One and the same NKVD operative worker begins the elaboration of the case, i.e. organizes the trailing after the "figurant", collects preliminary data and is very often charged with detaining of this person and making a search of his lodgings. After the arrest of the "figurant" or of a group of persons involved in the same case, the operative worker is temporarily transferred to the inquest department. He personally makes the examination and, having completed the investigation, he reports on the case to the corresponding NKVD court. Having completed and closed the case, the operative worker returns again to his operative unit. This may be illustrated by the following example:

The operative recording of the 1st Special Division encloses a group of tsarist officers, noblemen and other "have beens" among the lecturers and professors of the Leningrad university. The "elaboration" of this group is entrusted to the operative

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agent-representative of the secret-political division of the Leningrad NKVD regional administration. He organizes the trailing, fixes the network of agents, succeeds in his efforts to secure the expulsion from the party of all persons who "wriggled" into the ranks of the Party, and finally arrests them as "enemies of the people".

Having completed all these preliminary stages, he is transferred to the inquest division of the Leningrad NKVD regional administration and starts to obtain from the arrestees such "confessions" of the crimes which seem to him to be the most suitable ones in this case. Having completed the investigation, he compiles a "reference notice" ("spravka") which is announced at the meeting of the "troika" of the Leningrad NKVD regional administration. Thereafter the case is considered to be closed, and the operative worker in question is again returned to his permanent work in the secret-political division. If the case is brought before the "Special Council", this operative agent-representative, having compiled a "notice" and the indictment, leaves for Moscow and personally reports his material at a meeting of the "Special Council" of the NKVD USSR.

Such an order of carrying on the investigation is especially favourable for the inequity, club-law and fabrication of false cases and forged accusations, as the operative agent-representative carrying on the lawsuit, is personally interested in condemning persons whom he has been "elaborating". This is a kind of a chain reaction and the only possible result is the conviction of all suspected persons.

Practically, a person is convicted already at the moment when his name appears on the registration card of the 1st Special Division. The only question is how long it will take to liquidate him and what forms will this liquidation assume. Having received the order for the "elaboration" of a certain person and being in possession of the data, provided by special recording, the agent-representative must obtain the confirmation of these materials,

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securing the conviction of his victim. <sup>Even at the time.</sup> ~~Already when~~ he starts working <sup>on</sup> the case, he is aware of the fact that if he does not get the required confirmation of the data, provided by special recording, the case will not be closed, but passed over to another NKVD man, and he himself will be recorded as a "complice" of this "figurant" and will be liquidated sooner or later.

Therefore the question of the real culpability of this man does not exist for the agent. He must be guilty, if the agent-representative wants to be safe and sound. The culpability of the "figurant" is a settled thing for the agent-representative already at the moment <sup>that</sup> when the "elaboration" of this person is being entrusted to him. "The NKVD does not arrest for nothing" - such is the standard answer, given to all, trying to protect their relatives or intimates who got into trouble, and expressing a naive hope that it is only a mistake, a misunderstanding.

From the very beginning of the "elaboration", the suspected man becomes the personal enemy of the operative-agent-representative as the well-being and security of the latter depend on the "success" of the elaboration. The Chekist-spy-investigator-judge persecutes his victim with the obstinacy and fury of a hound trying to hunt him down as soon as possible.

After the arrest of the "enemy of the people" the operative agent-representative assumes the role of the investigator, and he must prove that the arrest and all the accusations of the "figurant" have been justified, otherwise another NKVD man will be entrusted with the inquest, and this operative agent-representative will be punished in some way for his failure, at least losing his official position. In this stage he is not even interested in getting to the bottom of the matter: the accused has to be convicted and the difficulty lies only in the best "mounting" of the case. If several cases have been successfully mounted and their "form" was found to be adequate, this investigator, i.e. the operative agent-representative, will be promoted and rewarded; if the mounting is found to be poor, he will stay without promotion or



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will be even reduced to a lower rank. The NKVD-MGB releases its victims from its deadly grip only in those rare cases when the supreme party organs have some reasons for sending general instructions to reconsider cases of all persons, whose arrests have not been substantiated, and rehabilitate them. This happened, for instance, in 1939, when Beria replaced Yezhev in the post of the head of the NKVD.

The structure of the inquest division is comparatively simple and it reflects in general lines the structure of the NKVD-MGB operative agencies (See diagram No 10).

Each NKVD administration or division has the inquest section or the inquest branch which is subordinated both to this NKVD administration or division and to the inquest division of the center, in Moscow. It is more convenient to make an analysis of this structure using, as an example, the inquest <sup>branch</sup> ~~division~~ of the NKVD regional administration. In this case the inquest branch is composed out of several sections, depending on the number of the operative divisions of this NKVD regional administration. Usually it consists of the following sections: 1st - Secretariat; 2nd - "serving" the Counter Intelligence Division (KRO); 3rd - serving the Secret-Political Division (SPO); 4th - serving the Economic Division (EKO), and 5th - serving the Special Division ("Osobiy Otdel").

Operative workers of each group of the inquest branch are divided in accordance with the number of operative sections accommodated by this inquest group. Thus in 1938-39 the 3rd group of the inquest branch of a large regional NKVD administration consisted of at least ~~eight~~ 8 senior investigators, and was organized in such a way that one of them worked with the 1st section of the SPO, the other - with the 2nd etc. In such a way the investigators are specialized on cases of a similar type, and besides it is very helpful in respect to the conspiracy, for only one person is informed about all cases under the jurisdiction of this section.

Usually every section of the provincial inquest branch consists of only one senior investigator with the rank of an operative agent-representative, and of several investigators having the rank of assistant operative agents-representatives. But, as we have seen

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in the above mentioned example of a branch serving the Secret-Political Division (SPD), the number of senior investigators may be considerably increased depending on the attention paid to a certain operative division or administration of the NKVD. This example refers to the period when the essential attention of the Communist party and of the NKVD itself was drawn to the Secret-Political Administration.

The staffs of the branches in the central inquest division in Moscow are much more numerous and the investigators have higher ranks there. Besides, there is a special inquest branch serving the 1st Division of the NKVD USSR, i.e. considering the cases connected with the protection of the members of the Soviet Government, party leaders and the Kremlin.

Every central administration of the GUGB (now MGB) also has its own inquest section or inquest branch which is subordinated to the inquest division of the GUGB NKVD USSR. It consists of sub-sections which correspond to the division of this central administration of the GUGB. Thus, for example, the inquest section of the Economic Administration of the GUGB is composed of sub-sections concerned with all industry, fishing trade etc.

#### Inquest and Methods of Examination

We have already discussed above the particularities of the inquest in the NKVD practice. Its purpose is not the finding out of the fact, under which circumstances the real crime was committed, and not the ascertaining of the persons who have possibly committed that crime, but only the maintaining of decorum in the retribution of the arrested "enemy", who usually has to be liquidated only on the basis of some general instructions of higher Party organs and of the data of the operative recording and of his previous "elaboration" by the NKVD agents. In the overwhelming majority of cases the NKVD-MGB investigators succeed only in squeezing out of their victims the confessions about some crimes they intended to commit, but very seldom the arrestees admit that they have really committed these crimes.

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Formally, the NKVD investigators must stick to certain norms of the legal procedure, but practically they never adhere to them and nobody prevents them from applying any "methods of physical influence", i.e. tortures to their victims. The most horrid tortures the beating and tormenting of arrestees were always practiced by the Gbeka-GPU-NKVD-MGB, but they achieved unheard-of dimensions at the times of Yezhov - this period is called the "Great Purge" abroad, but - the "yeshovshina" in the Soviet Union. Yezhov's predecessor on the post of the NKVD People's Commissariat, Yagoda attached a very great importance to the operative technique and to the work with agents. He was an adherent of applying chiefly the psychological and not the physical methods of influence. Just when he was heading the NKVD, a masterly system of trailing, spying, blackmailing and provocations was set to work. He used to say that if the investigator beats or tortures an arrestee, he acknowledges his own utter inability of extorting a confession from this arrestee by any other means. Of course it does not mean that at the times of Yagoda the NKVD investigators behaved like gentlemen with their victims: tortures and beatings always took place but they were not the only or the essential method.

All these "ceremonies with the enemies of the people" were completely rejected in the fearful period of the "Great Purge" and of Yezhov's reign. The deputy to the NKVD People's Commissar Zakovsky behaved with particular brutality. In 1937-38 he introduced a system of mass beatings and murders during the inquest. At the same time Zakovsky held the office of the Chief of the Moscow regional NKVD administration, while prior to that he had been heading for several years the NKVD administration of the Leningrad region. As an illustration of the inquest methods introduced by this dreadful man in Soviet punitive organs may serve the boastful declaration of Zakovsky himself, at a meeting of leading NKVD officials in Moscow, in 1938, that "in six weeks he contrived to draw a confession out of 11 thousands of spies in the Leningrad region". It is very significant that the horrid period of 1937-38, called "Yeshovshina" (Yezhov's reign) by 'ne

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Soviet people, was usually nominated "Zakovshchina" in the Chekist circles.

By the end of this period the number of arrestees was so great, that no spy-work of agents ("agenturnaya rabota") was possible before the beginning of the inquest in prison. People were arrested by hundreds, <sup>usually</sup> on the basis of the data of operative recording or as a result of a libel, squeezed out of some prisoner by means of horrid tortures. For several years an ignorant, cruel and dull investigator became the "NKVD God" while the leg of a chair, the handle of a revolver or simply a boot or a fist, combined with dirtiest swearing and most fearful insults were his "methods of inquest". When "softhearted" Beria replaced Yezhov, he declared: "it is not forbidden to beat, and it is necessary to beat, but not everybody as ~~it~~ was done before".

In all periods of the Soviet regime in Russia the investigators of the punitive organs have acted and still act more according to the principle of "revolutionary consciousness" than according to juridical norms. Besides all reasons, mentioned above, this is also explained by the fact that the investigators (i.e. the NKVD operative agents-representatives) very often have no notion about these norms in general, and if they refer in the end of every case to the clause 206 of the Criminal Code (about the conclusion of the inquest), they do it only because it has been ordered by the office of the Attorney General to do so. They are directed in all their actions by the simple rule that "purpose justifies the means", and if the "enemy" has already been arrested he has to be forced to make his confession by any means. The usual and the most widespread method of the Soviet investigators of screwing real or, much more often, false confessions out of a prisoner, may be briefly represented in the following formula: 1) terrorizing of the prisoner by bringing against him the most phantastic accusations; 2) a systematic exhaustion of all physical and moral strength of the prisoner; 3) arousing hopes and striking of a psychological bargain between the investigator and the prisoner.

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This method ruined the lives of thousands and even millions of Russian people. <sup>Since</sup> After the war the same method <sup>has been</sup> applied to the new hundreds of thousands or even millions of victims of the Soviet regime in the countries of the Central and South-Eastern Europe. Therefore it deserves to be studied in the most detailed and attentive way.

The authors of this work have interviewed several dozens of persons, former prisoners of Soviet places of detention and concentration camps as well as former NKVD men as to this problem. The picture of the gradual "working up" of the victims of this institution is nearly the same in its principal features though somewhat differs in details. The following method is the most typical :

*Def. Kirov Case*

For instance, the operative agent-representative of the Secret-Political Division of the Moscow regional NKVD administration is ordered to "elaborate" the economist of the Moscow machine-building plant "Sharikopodshipnik", a certain Ivanov. The NKVD has no incriminating materials for this Ivanov, but a registration card has been filled out for him by the special recording as he was seen in the theatre in the company of Petrov, engineer-constructor of the same plant who had been arrested after having told a <sup>fake</sup> ~~lie~~, connected in some way with the attempt upon the life of Kirov, to other workers of his section. Ivanov was not present then, but owing to this casual encounter in the theatre he was included into the "agentur case" of the <sup>life</sup> ~~life~~-teller Petrov, who was sentenced to ten years of banishment for his crime.

By the way, it is worth of mentioning that a wave of arrests, executions and deportations which followed the assassination of Kirov was called by the people "the Kirov recruitment"; a similar wave that followed the death of Kuibyshev - "the Kuibyshev recruitment", and the fearful period of 1936-1938, the so-called "Yezhovshchina", was also defined as "the Great Recruitment".

Thus, the operative agent-representative begins the "elaboration" of the economist Ivanov, who, since this very moment, has been transformed in the NKVD files into the "figurant Ivanov".

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The operative agent-representative makes enquiries in the special section of the plant, and the collected information shows that Ivanov is a painstaking and accurate employee, and that during the whole period of his work at this plant he was never reprimanded by his chiefs. But he leads a very reticent life, devotes all his free time to his family (he has a wife and two children), seldom attends meetings, does not display any enthusiasm at the prospect of a new subscription to the loan, evades social obligations and therefore was recorded as a "passive member" by the trade-union organisation. Direct anti-Soviet declarations (criticisms of the Soviet regime) were not recorded, but he likes to <sup>read</sup> take from the "Techprop" (propaganda of technical knowledge) American technical magazines, and when the Austrian film "Peter" appeared on Soviet screens, he made the following remark: "At last we shall be able to see a really good film".

But this scarce information does not disappoint the operative agent-representative. He decides to classify Ivanov with the category of "concealed SOE" (socially dangerous elements) and to "create" the material for his "elaboration". Rehashing the old proverb, the NKVD men say in such cases: "Find the man, and you will find the case".

And so a systematic elaboration begins. Through the secret informers at Ivanov's place of work, and through the "lodging agent" at his place of living the operative agent-representative learns little by little all the details of Ivanov's biography, he becomes acquainted with his character, manners, habits, his circle of friends, his way of life.

Meanwhile the NKVD agencies gathered information at his place of birth and his former place of residence. Similar information was also gathered for his wife. It has been found out that his father had a small grocery shop in Ustretov before the revolution, and that the father of his wife was "dekulakized" ("raskulachen") in 1930 and deported to the Kazakhstan steppes for colonisation. This information "lawfully" enables the operative agent-representative to consider Ivanov as SOE (socially dangerous element

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(in Russian - "sotsialno opasny element?"), for he has concealed both his and his wife's origin. There are still no concrete accusations against Ivanov, but his "case" gradually swells with these and other "indirect proofs", as Vishinsky calls them. When his case is sufficiently voluminous, the operative agent-representative gets an order for the "detention of potentially dangerous and suspicious as to his connections citizen Ivanov".

At night a car stops near Ivanov's house ... Sleepy and frightened Ivanov, not understanding anything, is roused from his bed. A search is made and Ivanov is stunned by horrifying questions: "Where is the pistol?", "where have you hidden it?", "we know everything, so better confess, it will help you"...

The first task of the operative agent-representative is to frighten his victim with accusation of some most terrific crimes and vicious intentions. Thus, the "working up" of the arrestee begins with terrorizing him. He is brought to the NKVD and is left till morning in the waiting-room jammed with the "night take". Frightened people, not understanding anything, sit or stand around him. While he is still not able to come to his senses, a man in the NKVD uniform approaches him and looking into some papers asks: "You are citizen so-and-so?" The flabbergasted arrestee answers "yes" in a shaky voice and wants to ask why he was arrested, but the man in the uniform utters: "A fine fellow indeed! It took us a long time to catch you!", -and steps aside.

The legs of the arrestee give way under him. He wants to make the situation clear, he wants to say that he was arrested by mistake, but everybody he addresses, gives the same answer: "Keep silent, it is prohibited to speak here!" In the morning he is summoned for registration, a careful search is made once more, all his personal belongings are taken away and approximately at 10 a.m. he is brought to a overcrowded prison cell.

Immediately he is surrounded by some unshaken, tangle-haired persons in rumpled coats and overcoats. He hears questions: "Why have you been arrested?", "What news are there in the free world?", and so forth. The arrestee decides that he has been put

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into a cell with criminals and timidly clings to the wall. But gradually it becomes known that persons, surrounding him, are also economists, engineers, professors, actors, officers of the Red Army and party workers. He does not put any questions, his instinct of a Soviet citizen tells him that all of them are "enemies" who have been arrested for some real crimes, but he is quite innocent and therefore this misunderstanding will be cleared after the first interview with the investigator. But, of course, he has to shun any contact with these "enemies of the people".

The second stage of the previous "working up" takes place. The arrestee is left in peace, and it seems to him that the investigator has forgotten him. Meanwhile, other prisoners are summoned to the inquest. They are brought back after a long time and in a terrific state. Sometimes they are pushed into the cell being quite unconscious. The new prisoner ( in our case - Ivanov) begins to realize that people do not leave this place, but still he nurses the hope that he will be set free as soon as the "misunderstanding" will be cleared. In the meantime he listens to sad and hopeless tales of other prisoners, who have been arrested in the same unexpected way, but still he refuses to believe them. Gradually all his surroundings create a psychological preparedness for his first interview with the investigator. This preparatory period may be different as to its duration - from one day up to several weeks, depending on the intentions of the investigator and the number of other cases he has at hands at that time.

At last our Ivanov is summoned to the inquest. He is led through long corridors, and on the way he must stand with his face turned to the wall if some other prisoner meets him halfway. He will hear all the time the jingling of a large key, beating against the clasp on the soldier's belt; that is how the warders notify each other that another arrestee is being brought along the corridor, to enable the warden to turn his prisoner with his face to the wall - so that the prisoners might not see each other. But at last he enters the investigator's room. A formal inquest begins, and its purpose is the ascertaining of biographical data



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of the prisoner and his social origin.

"Where were you born, where did you live and work, who are your parents, your grandfather and grandmother, what was their occupation?" - these questions have to be answered in details, day after day, year after year. During this preliminary inquest the investigator studies the prisoner, tries to understand his psychology, and his conclusions as well as the impression, made by the prisoner, will determine the behaviour of the investigator during this first inquest. Depending on them he will be either polite and obliging, treating the arrestee to tea and sandwiches and offering him cigarettes, or will knock with his pistol at the table, swear and shout: "I'll kill you like a dog!"

At last the formal part of the inquest is finished. The investigator came to certain conclusions and he proceeds to the "case" as such.

His first question as to this "business part" has normally such a sense though it may vary as to the form:

"Your attitude towards the Soviet regime?" - whereby he adds: "You have to take into account, that we know everything, and you have to make an open-hearted confession, which will prove your complete loyalty to the Party and Soviet Government. In that case we shall not bring you to the trial. But if you persist in denying your guilt, I shall remind you of the words of Maxim Gorky: "If the enemy does not surrender, he is crushed".

By saying this, the operative agent-representative at once shows the prisoner the general direction - denounce yourself as much as possible. But in spite of this all prisoners usually vow that they are absolutely loyal and are ready to sacrifice their life for the Soviet Power and their leaders.

At this moment of the inquest, the investigator comes down upon the arrestee with all his stock of information collected from secret informers. He tells the prisoner about his intimate friends. He shows that he knows who and when paid any visits to the arrestee, he describes the character of these persons and the kind of relations between them and the prisoner. He may even

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describe the colour of the hair of the girl with whom the prisoner had an affair and he may mention a whole series of the most intimate details of the prisoner's life. But he will not say a word about his anti-Soviet actions or crimes, for his informant does not mention any of such actions or crimes. He will only slap the file of the case with the back of his hand, repeating again and again: "You see, we know everything but we would like you to confess sincerely in all your errors. Aspent, and we shall forgive you. But if you don't plead guilty, you will be executed as an inveterate class enemy".

Usually, at this stage of inquest such version of the accusation is brought into action which the operative agent-representative (who is not acting as the investigator) invented and prepared during his preliminary "elaboration" of this man. Such versions and combinations greatly vary, and they may be even of <sup>of</sup> fantastic nature: from an attempt to kill Stalin and other members of the Soviet Government up to an intention to blow up a coal mine. This part completely depends on the phantasy and tastes of the investigator. In such cases the very first inquest begins with swearing, threatening and beating.

But in many cases the investigator does not bring any concrete accusation against the prisoner at the first inquest, but simply mentions several names of persons, known to the prisoner, who have been arrested some time before, and affirms, that they have already confessed everything, and that the NKVD knows about the part of the prisoner in their crimes, but he does not mention the crimes as such. From time to time he only puts some leading questions, provoking the prisoner to choose the necessary version.

But notwithstanding the nature of the chosen version, the investigator leads the inquest in such a way that the prisoner has the impression that he is not considered by the investigator to be the chief culprit, but only a blind tool in the hands of some main persons, who have to be brought to light with the help of this prisoner. Thus, from the very beginning, the investigator gives the prisoner a clue for the future psychological bargain,

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while the form and character of this bargain are determined by the investigator in the course of the inquest, depending on the personal qualities of the prisoner, his education, intellectualism, etc.

This first stormy attack of the investigator usually at once sets the prisoner off the rails. He is abashed, he has never expected that all the details of his personal life, his acquaintances and connections, even his own words and thoughts are so well known to the investigator. Nearly every citizen of the Soviet Union has in his past such facts which he carefully conceals from the representatives of the Soviet power. All these facts from his own past or that of his parents, as insignificant as they may be in reality, here, in the investigator's room, acquire in his tormented brain the meaning of a terrible deadly danger threatening him and to his family. Such a state of mind is explained by the "normal" psychology of the Soviet Citizen, terrorized by constant purges, check-ups, self-criticism etc. and this factor is fully taken into consideration by the investigator.

Some of the arrestees "crack-up" i.e. agree to sign anything suggested by the investigator, already during the first inquest, but in the most cases the first violent attack of the investigator does not give any decisive results, and the prisoner keeps on proving his innocence. In such cases the investigator, sprawling on a chair and smoking one cigarette after another, for many hours will repeat his only requirement: "Speak!". In the intervals he will knock at the table with his pistol, swear, stamp with his feet, threaten with tortures and execution and even beat the prisoner, though it is not always done in the course of the first inquest.

The continuance of the first inquest may vary from several hours to several days. This depends entirely on the investigator, his intentions, the character of the material collected during the preliminary "elaboration", on the version of the "crime", prepared by the investigator, on the impression created by the arrestee, on the physical and moral firmness of the prisoner himself.

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The inquests that lasted for several days were especially widespread in the period of "Yeshovshchias" when the lack of material that had to be collected previously, and the abundance of "cases" did not give any possibility to the investigators to pursue a systematic "working up" of the prisoners, and forced them to try "cracking" the arrestees by means of a single furious attack.

In the case of one of the authors of this work, such an inquest in the Special Division of the NKVD lasted for five days and a half without any interruption.

If such method is applied, after some hours of the inquest, when the will of the prisoner is not yet broken but the organism already begins to lose capacity of resisting owing to the fatigue and nervous strain, the investigator usually leaves with the words: "Stand and think!" Here it is necessary to have in view that during the inquests in the NKVD the prisoners are very rarely allowed to sit. Usually the arrestee has to stand all the time he is in the investigator's room. This necessity of standing for many hours and sometimes even for several days is already a cruel torture in itself, and may break the resistance even of firm people; but the chief purpose of this measure is to bring prisoners to a half-conscious state when they lose control over their answers. Sometimes (as in the case with one of the authors of this book) the prisoner under investigation is driven to such a state that, being influenced by the investigator on duty, he begins imagining that the latter helps him and proposes the best version for his defence and the best course to adopt in this situation. But this measure is not included into the category of "physical measures for influencing" and represents the "normal" way of the "work" of the NKVD organs. Depriving the prisoner of food and drink during the inquest, or feeding him with herrings not giving any water afterwards, is also considered to be the usual method. To emphasize this measure, the investigator usually puts a carafe with water and a glass on his desk, and amuses himself from time to time by pouring water into the glass and back again into the carafe.

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And so, the investigator leaves. Instead of him some operative worker in a low rank who is on duty, or a student of advanced course of the Moscow School of the NKVD investigators who is on probation, stay with the prisoner. The orderly NKVD man uninter- ruptedly speaks with the prisoner, using, as a rule, the most insulting language, trying to humiliate and outrage him. The purpose of such a behaviour is to oppress morally and to tire physically the person under investigation not giving him a single minute of rest. If the prisoner, exhausted by sleeplessness and long inquest, falls asleep while standing, the NKVD man on duty wakes him with a new flood of bad language and sometimes by pushing him. So it goes for a long time. Every six hours the investigators on duty are changed while the man under investigation must keep standing and "thinking". For emphasizing this measure the investigator sometimes draws two lines on the wall near the shoulders of the prisoner or on the floor near his feet, and prohibits to swerve from it or to step over them.

At last, on the next day, the investigator appears again. He has slept well and rested, he is cleanly shaven, even sprayed with eau de Cologne. He is quite ready to begin his normal working day. But the prisoner hardly stands on his feet by this time. The investigator usually begins this second half of the inquest with a violent attack, demanding the prisoner to take a seat and write down his testimony as he had time enough to think them over by night. And usually the investigator adds: "Then you can go and sleep". A characteristic detail has to be mentioned here: almost always in the beginning of the first inquest the investigator addresses the prisoner in the second person of plural ("vy"-- the polite form in Russian), but later on he replaces this form by a rude "ty" (the second person of singular), and rarely uses other expressions than "villain", "rascal", "fascist Vermin" etc. while addressing his victim. He returns to the polite form "vy" only when the prisoner agrees to take a seat and write the required testimony.

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In such case the prisoner is always given tea with sandwiches, and a package of cigarettes or of cheap tobacco is put on the table for his use. All arrestees know about it, and after a cramped cell, swarming with bugs, this tea with sandwiches and the possibility of smoking again turn into such an alluring bait that cannot be resisted by many a prisoner.

Here the investigator applies the following, very typical psychological trick. Before closing the night inquest he comes down upon the prisoner with some horrible and even fantastic accusation, as, for instance, the organization of an attempt upon Stalin's life, an attempt of blowing up the plant where the prisoner works or something like that. The prisoner is left for the night to "think over" this terrible accusation, that threatens him with a "pass into eternity". In the course of the night the prisoner gets accustomed to the thought of the impending death and all his mental ability is directed upon attaining only one purpose : to avoid this terrible menacing prospect and at least to save his life. If in the beginning of the inquest the prisoner strove to prove his innocence and wanted to be set free, he has only one wish now - to escape impending death and as soon as possible to put an end to this excruciating inquest. His feet are swollen from the long standing, his brains are inflamed and he has almost lost his capacity for understanding.

The investigator takes into consideration such a state of the prisoner and abruptly changes his tactics. He begins the morning inquest in a soothing tone : " Both of us lost our temper yesterday. Each of us was tired. Your enemies have slandered you a lot. But we know that you are not such a bad man. Everybody may make an error. We do not want to ruin innocent people, we want only to know the truth." - The further harangue is of the similar nature but ends with releasing the prisoner from the most terrible accusation while the prisoner is summoned to sign some "trifle", i.e. the testimony of a "disloyal attitude towards the Soviet power", "petty wreckage" etc. Here the investigator adds with a pretended sympathy to the fate of the prisoner : "Nothing particular will threaten you for that. May be you will be only

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forced to spend a couple of years in a camp. Then the Soviet power will forgive you and you will be free again." After the terrible experience of the last night the prospect of "going to a camp for a couple of years" seems to be almost a blessing to the weary prisoner. Many take the bait of the "compassionate" investigator and ruin themselves and their relatives and intimates.

But if the prisoner is firm enough to refuse signing this "trifle", the investigator uses floods of bad language, and throwing aside all his "compassion" and "sympathy" applies to the prisoner the most cruel "measures of physical influence" in the result of which the prisoner usually loses his senses. Then cold water is poured on him and he is dragged into the solitary confinement cell or back to his ordinary cell, or even to the prison hospital, - depending on the wish of the investigator and on the state of the prisoner.

But besides the "physical influence" there is also the following method which is applied very frequently. Being tired out with shouting and having exhausted his stock of curses the investigator declares: "All is finished with you. You are such an incorrigible vermin that there is nothing else to be done with you but to shoot you down. That's enough!"

The prisoner is put into an elevator. He feels that he comes down somewhere. The memories of all his past life pass before his mental sight. But suddenly the elevator stops. The door is opened and the prisoner sees a long corridor, dimly lit by electrical bulbs. Two NKVD men stand by the elevator holding pistols in their hands. The prisoner is ordered to go ahead. Staggering, clinging to the wall, he slowly moves and sees the bullet marks on the corridor walls. The NKVD men gradually fall behind, he hears their steps, echoing hollowly in the stillness of the corridor. ~~Change~~  
This is an end ...

But no shots are fired. The prisoner reaches the end of the corridor. Again he is put into an elevator and brought before the investigator who meets him with the words: "Well, have you seen? I was sorry for you and thought you might repent. You have wife and children, then think it over once more! We don't stand upon ceremony with the enemies of the people: one, two and ready!"

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Again the horrid accusation of terrorism, spying activities, diversion etc. appears on the stage, then the investigator again has "pity" on the prisoner, and summons him to sign some "trifle" which will cost him only two-three years in the camp. Variations and forms of the methods used by the investigator may be different, but the argumentation is nearly always the same: "Sign this 'trifle' and the accusation of terrorism and diversion will be taken off, as you will show that you sincerely repent in your errors". At last the worn-out man signs this "trifle" and is sent to some concentration camp for 5-10 years.

However, the investigator rarely achieves his purpose in the course of the first inquest though it may last for several days. An opinion is wide-spread abroad that the NKVD investigators can model anything out of the prisoners as if they were soft wax. Such an opinion was created after the "big processes" of 1936-38 but it is quite a wrong one.

These big processes are called "show trials" or "demonstrative trials" in the U.S.S.R. But in reality they do not demonstrate anything. Only such "enemies of the people" who "cracked up", capitulated and agreed to be partners of Krylenko and Visninsky appear on the platform of the Column Hall of the Moscow Union House. But all those who have courageously endured moral and physical tortures simply get a bullet into the napes of their necks and this is done without any pomposity. It is sufficient to mention only the most popular names of those who perished without this comedy of an open trial - the names of Karabel's, Luchachevsky, Yegorov, Blucher, Army Generals Kork, Uborevich, Yakir, Admirals Pendershenky and Orlov, ministers of the government and members of the Central Party Committee and even of the Politburo as Kuznetsov, Kossior, Pestyshev and others, prominent diplomats as Karakhan and Maslennikov, and what is more important - let us recollect millions of courageous Russians, men whose names and whose very existence remained unnoticed by the foreign correspondents, eager only to find a sensation - millions of patriots and anti-communists, tortured and executed in the secret NKVD places, killed as they could not be curbed or broken.



The names of generals Vlasov and Malyskina, Trukhin and Meandrov who were executed in 1946 without witnesses, may serve as a symbol of all <sup>of</sup> these innumerate army of fighters for freedom who conquered the horrors of the NKVD system.

Thus, this monstrous system of moral and physical violence is not always the winner. More often it is conquered by the human spirit, strong in its hate of all evil, in its love of the good, i.e. by those qualities of the people which the Communism was unable to change in the long thirty years of its complete mastery over bodies but not the souls of the Russian people.

The unknown victims of Stalin's dictatorship lead their heroic struggle against their tormentors for long months, though they are denied all human rights and though they are fully aware of the fact that this struggle leads only to their death. Many lose their strength and firmness in this unequal struggle, sign everything they are requested to, and even turn into obedient agents of their tormentors. But still greater number of Russian people remain firm to the very end in spite of all indescribable physical and moral tortures.

The procedure of a gradual influence of the NKVD investigator upon the prisoner's mind, as described above, is often spun out for many months and even years. It happens very often that one and the same investigator is in charge of several dozens of cases, and as a result of this, persons under investigation are called out by him for the inquest once in a <sup>while</sup> way. In 1937-38 it was not infrequent that people were summoned to the first inquest only after 4-5 months of imprisonment, and then they were again forgotten for several months. There were also cases when persons arrested in the very height of "Yeshovshchina", i.e. in winter of 1937-38, had not been called for the inquest until Yeshov himself was dismissed by the end of the year 1938, and then they were set free, "for lack of the body of the crime". These people never learned why they had been arrested and why they had to spend a year in prison. But all these cases have to be considered as exceptions and they cannot be characteristic for the usual methods of the inquest in the NKVD prisons.

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In order to understand the actions of the investigator and of the prisoner in such cases when the investigation is not limited only by the first violent inquest but is spun out for a long period of time, it is necessary to take into consideration the atmosphere of the NKVD prison cell. In the period of great repressions 25-30 persons were crammed into normal cells, designed for four persons. People could sit only by turns, and for the night large wooden shields were brought into the cells and put on the plank-beds across the whole cell. Thus the whole space of the cell was divided into two or three storages the height of which did not exceed one meter. 8-10 and even more prisoners were placed on these storages, so that they were lying tightly pressed to each other and filling almost the whole of the cubature of the cell with their bodies. Those who had to lie on the floor under the plank-beds and the first row of shields were in the worst position. In the Moscow prisons these places were called "subways".

Horrid filth, stench from the close-stool, lice, bugs swarming in plank-beds and in the shields, an impossibility of washing, shaving or combing, a thin soup called "balanda" with a piece of bread for dinner and supper, complete lack of news from outside and the agonizing uncertainty about the fate of the relatives and intimates, shrieks of tortured men, moans of those who have come back from an inquest, the night calls "without things" for execution and deafening roar of automobile motors that had to muffle the sound of shots in the cellars - all this created such an atmosphere in the cells, in comparison to which even the worst concentration camp seemed like a rest home.

In such conditions the investigator had only to create in the mind of the prisoner a certitude that he won't be released under any circumstances and that death is lurking for him. Such a state of mind was achieved <sup>is</sup> as a result of the most terrible and even fantastical accusations and by means of brutal beatings and tortures during the first inquests. Then, for some time, the prisoner is left in peace. As it is prohibited to speak in a loud voice in the cells, the prisoners talk in a low whisper with each

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other for the whole days, and gradually losing <sup>a</sup> the sense of fear, tell their stories and ask for advice as to their behaviour at future inquests, though each prisoner is aware of the fact that two-three secret agents are normally present among the prisoners of the cell. However, each arrestee tells his fellow-prisoners only a part of the truth - the fear of the investigator is too strong. Therefore, of course, it is impossible to speak about any co-ordinated actions of the inmates of one and the same cell - each of them takes his own risk and acts according to his own plan. The inveterate habit of Soviet people to hide their innermost "I" from the eyes of the strangers is preserved even in the hell of a NKVD cell. The analysis of the conditions in the NKVD prisons is not the purpose of this work, but we are obliged to dwell on the following two points that are of decisive value :

1. Such conditions have been created in the NKVD prisons, in comparison to which any punitive measure (with the only exception of a death penalty) seems to the prisoners a facilitation of their fate.

2. Collective demonstrations, riots, hunger-strikes etc. take place in the prisons of other countries, while in the NKVD prison, as a rule, a duel between the investigator and the prisoner is going on.

Though the circumstances of each separate case may greatly vary, it is possible to state three essential lines in the behaviour of the prisoners, and consequently all political prisoners of the NKVD are divided into three main categories.

The first category embraces those persons who rapidly lose their moral and physical strength, strike a bargain with the investigator, "crack up" i.e. sign everything ~~they are~~ suggested to <sup>them</sup> by the investigator, and in the most cases perish or consent to become NKVD agents.

The second category consists of persons who are strong enough to bear all tortures of the inquest as well as inhuman conditions of their imprisonment, admitting none of the points of the accusation, brought against them by the investigator. Many of them

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perish <sup>as a</sup> ~~in the~~ result of false testimonies of ~~many~~ other prisoners or friends, colleagues and fellow-workers who have not been arrested but terrorized to bear witness against them. However, a certain number of such prisoners are lucky enough to be released "because of the lack of the body of the crime" after many months of inhuman tortures and at the cost of a colossal strain <sup>upon</sup> of their physical and moral strength. Usually they draw this fortunate lot in such instances when the Krealia decides, for certain reasons, to reconsider the cases of the prisoners.

The third category is the most numerous and the most characteristic one for the Soviet conditions, though such a category cannot be found among the prisoners of any other countries. It consists of persons who rather quickly come to the conclusion that they won't be able to snatch <sup>themselves from</sup> ~~out of~~ the NKVD clutches, and therefore these people lead their struggle with the investigator not for their freedom, but for applying to their cases such a clause of the criminal code in the indictment which seems to them to be the most favourable one. This is approximately the same course of action, adopted by the advocates of other countries when they see the impossibility of gaining a lawsuit for their client. But here is a principal difference: the defenders of obviously hopeless cases concentrate their efforts on the extenuating circumstances in so far as the fact of the crime is beyond any doubt. The Soviet prisoners of the third category have themselves invented for their "cases" such crimes that <sup>they</sup> have never been committed by them, and direct all their phantasy and mental ability to bring the characteristics and circumstances of these "crimes" in conformance with certain clauses of the criminal code that may threaten them "only" with deportation to a concentration camp.

The tactics of this original "defense" of the NKVD prisoners is approximately the following:

At a certain stage of the investigation the prisoner clearly sees that he won't be released, that his conviction has been decided beforehand by the investigator and his superiors. The atmosphere in the cell and tortures during the inquests gradually

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undermine his will for struggle. On the other hand the absurdity of the investigator's version of his "crime" is also obvious to him in all its details. His brain is painfully and strenuously working in the effort of making this version like the truth, but at the same time taking care that the punishment does not exceed "deportation to the camp for 2-3 years". Usually this way is chosen by persons who have been arrested by the organs of the Economic Administration of the NKVD and charged with "diversion", "economic spying" and "wreckage".

Arrestees begin consulting their fellow-prisoners. In every cell there are always several "specialists" as to the Criminal Code, who know by heart the most frequently used clauses of the Soviet Criminal Code and punitive measures involved by them. The prisoner chooses a clause which seems to him to be the most suitable one, and starts working on the details of his "crime" as well as on the general plan of his "confession". When such a plan is made out, the prisoner comes up to the judge in the door of his cell and asks the warden to give him an interview with the investigator for "giving testimony". Such an interview is normally given without any delay. Being brought before the investigator he declares that he has "realized his errors" and wants to "make an open-hearted confession" and therefore asks for some ink, pen and the files of his case.

Having received all this, the prisoner, in the presence of the investigator, begins working at his own case. The attitude of the investigator is immediately changed into the most sympathetic one and the prisoner invariably gets tea with sandwiches and cigarettes or tobacco. The investigator has by that time fully realized all the discrepancies and even absurdities of his version of the accusation, and he gladly accepts the prisoner's co-operation. He is interested neither in the essential part of the "case" as such nor in the punitive measure, but only in the suitable "mounting" or "framing" of the notice which he has to prepare for the session of the "troika" or "Special Council". The rudeness of the investigator's abuses, blows and tortures

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are immediately stopped at this stage, and the investigator puts on a sympathetic and even good-humoured mask.

This way is usually chosen by intellectuals and specialists. As soon as the prisoner has started writing his "version", he becomes the temporary master of the situation. In such cases he works without hurrying, trying to prolong his "leave" from the cell and enjoy comparatively human conditions. There are cases when prisoners work at their "testimonies" for a week or even more, and they compile a really scientific work, imbued with formulas and calculations. The investigator does not hasten him, and only attentively watches over the prisoner to prevent him from trying to prove his complete innocence. As long as he "confesses" and does not rebut directly the version of the investigator - the latter will not intrude.

Starting this strange and unnatural "co-operation" with the investigator, the prisoner may pursue different objects, but in the majority of cases he strives to facilitate his fate or that of his family. Under the most favourable circumstances such a "detailed confession" may lead to the appointment of a commission for revising his case. But much more frequently the prisoner "goes" to a camp for several years and all his inventiveness serves only for mitigating his fate to a certain extent and somewhat shortening his prison term. This strange work of prisoners for inventing the crimes they have never committed shows in the clearest way how desperate and hopeless the people feel in the NKVD prisons. In fact, it is the same principle of the Soviet "self-criticism" but amounting to absurdity in prison.

Sometimes the wish to escape from the lousy and stinking cell and to go to the concentration camp requires the character of a real psychosis. Hungry and weary people begin to paint in the brightest colours the pictures of the Siberian taiga (vast forests) and of rivers, abounding in water and swarming with fish. They can discuss for hours and with the participation of all inmates of the cell, how they will fell trees, build their barracks in the desolate taiga, how they will go a-fishing and cook a

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fish-soup. In their imagination the "correctional camp" of the NKVD turns into the climax of the human well-being, and in order to achieve their deportation as soon as possible, people compile the versions of the crimes, never committed by them but required by the investigator. Such psychoses, very profitable for the investigator, are sometimes provoked by him through his agents in the cell. A lot of people under investigation, especially former soldiers and officers of the Red Army, try to be deported to a camp as soon as possible, while they are still healthy and strong in order to flee from there. On this account there is even a special saying in the prisons: "I go to the camp, - to the green prosecutor..."

There are also cases when the prisoners try to mock quite consciously at their ignorant investigators. So, for instance, in 1937, an inmate of the NKVD prison invented with all details a story how he intended to sink several ships of the Black Sea navy in Arzavir, and the investigator put down all this nonsense, not knowing that Arzavir is situated 300 miles away from the Black Sea coast. Only on the next day he saw what a trick was played on him by the prisoner, summoned this prisoner to his room and beat him so that he was more dead than alive. Another "participator of an armed revolt on the Lower Volga" signed a testimony that he, being the chief of the auto-repairing shop of the MTS (machine-tractor station), intended to make tanks out of the tractors "Fordson" and armoured cars out of the auto-cisterns in order to secure the success for this "revolt". But more often there are cases when weary and desperate prisoners - this is mostly the case with almost illiterate peasants and workers - ask the investigator to write down exactly what he wants and finds better for them and thus sign themselves their death sentences.

It is absolutely impossible to give a detailed analysis of all methods of the inquest and investigation of the NKVD-MGB in a short chapter of this book. Such an analysis must be a theme for a special work.

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Closing this chapter it is only necessary to point out that the chief weapon of a NKVD investigator is neither the material which has been collected by him during the "elaboration of the figurant", nor the physical measures of influence, but this atmosphere of ultimate despair and complete lawlessness which envelops every prisoner since the very first moment of his arrest, and to which he has been prepared by all his previous life in the "normal" Soviet surroundings. It won't be an exaggeration if we say that the atmosphere of this "normal" Soviet life differs from the atmosphere of an NKVD prison only by a concentration and acuteness of the measures of enforcement as here and there the Soviet citizen has no personal freedom and all his life fate is in the hands of the authorities in power.

The work with the witnesses is of a much simpler nature. The investigator reads to the summoned witness a false testimony of the prisoner, where the latter makes a clean breast of everything. If the witness does not want to say anything that may be of any harm to the prisoner, the investigator declares: "Well, you are such an enemy as he is, even a more dangerous one, for he has confessed and repents openheartedly for what he has done while you want to conceal everything from us".

Having been summoned to the NKVD, the witness cannot leave the premises without the signature of the investigator on his pass. The investigator suggests to the witness to go out into a corridor and think there, while a soldier bids him to stand with his face turned to the wall, and he may be kept in such a position for many hours according to the investigator's order. As a result persons of weak character sign everything given to them by the investigator, only anxious to leave this damned building.

The foreigners often ask: what does the Soviet government arrest such a lot of people for, especially as they are obviously innocent? The usual answer is that it is necessary for the reinforcement of the army of the prisoners who are carrying out the most difficult work without being paid. But this answer does not give an exhaustive explanation of the problem, as the whole population of the Soviet Union already works for the state, i.e. party.



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and gets starvation wages for their labors. And the work of a slave is always less productive than that of a free man, even if his freedom is as ephemeral as it is in the Soviet Union. Therefore, the above question will be more correct if we put the word "why" instead of "what for", used there.

Then the answer will be as following : because being afraid of the people's hatred the Soviet government created a multi-millioned army of jailers, who have to arrest, torture and deport millions of people in order to justify their existence, and because there is no organ in the Soviet Union that could step on a certain limit the signal, received from the center, for liquidating or "purging" that or another group of the Soviet population. Thus the well-known theory of the snow-ball is brought into life. The dictatorship of the Communist party cannot exist without the army of NKVD-MGB butchers, and this army requires millions of victims to justify its existence. This is a vicious circle from which there is no other escape but the making away of both the dictatorship and the butchers in its service.

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CHAPTER VII

THE FIRST DIVISION  
OF THE GUGB NKVD USSR

The task of this division is to protect Stalin and other top ranking leaders of the Party and Government, as the Stalinist oligarchy is officially nominated.

The 1st Division is particularly concerned with the protection of : Stalin, all members and candidates of the Politburo, secretaries of the Central Party Committee, members and candidates of the Orgburo, the chairman and some members of the Commission for Party Control, all Vice-Chairmen of the Sovnarkom ( now - Council of ministers) of the USSR, and some People's Commissars (now ministers) as well as a series of the highest officials according to a list approved by Stalin himself.

The most important objects, guarded by the 1st Division, are :

- a) the Kremlin ;
- b) the building of the Central Committee of the Party.
- c) the building of the Sovnarkom in Okhotny Naid in Moscow;
- d) the buildings of the Party Control Commission, of the Executive Committee of the Comintern, that of the Central Committee of Komsomol, and a series of others;
- e) the building of the NKVD USSR - Moscow, Dzerzhinsky Square, House No 2;
- f) Stalin's country-house;
- g) Country-houses of all the Politburo members and other persons under protection of the 1st Division;
- h) the road from the Kremlin to the country-houses of the above mentioned persons;
- i) Government villas in the Caucasus and the Crimea;
- j) Government trains, aeroplanes, cars, yachts and other transport means.

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Besides these main objects, the 1st Division guards absolutely all places, visited by Stalin and his closest collaborators, as well as all roads, chosen for their routes. For instance, the 1st Division guards the government boxes in the Moscow Art Theater, in the Bolshoi and Maly Theaters, the government hunting estate near Moscow etc.

The strictly specific task of the 1st Division is, naturally, reflected in its whole structure ( see Diagram No 11). Unlike all other organs of the GUGB (now MGB) the 1st Division has no ramifications going downwards, and it exists only in the central apparatus of the GUGB, as its main object is the region of the city of Moscow.

The 1st Division is closely connected in all its work with the 2nd Special Division, especially with its "L-25" branch. In the capitals of the Union Republics and regional centers the functions of the 1st Division as to the protection of local party leaders (secretaries of regional and area committees) go over to the 2nd Special Divisions of the corresponding NKVD administrations in these cities. However, when Stalin and other Moscow leaders visit these cities, they are guarded on their way and during their stay there by the 1st Division, though the latter uses the already existing brigades and groups of the 2nd Special Division of the local NKVD administrations for the exterior observation, regulation of traffic and other purposes.

When Molotov, Vyshinsky and other Soviet "leaders" go abroad they are accompanied by a special reinforced brigade of the NKVD men on the staff of the 1st Division. Two of these men must always accompany the leader wherever he goes, without leaving him alone. They may wear uniforms or plain clothes. Besides, long before the "leader" leaves for a certain country, a special brigade of the 1st Division is sent there (usually under the pretence of sending ahead technical workers of the Soviet delegation), being entrusted with the task of securing protective measures in local conditions. During the whole stay of the leader abroad, all the serving personnel consists of the 1st Division men. So, for instance, during the diplomatic journey of Molotov to San-

Francisco in the spring of 1945, he was accompanied by a whole platoon of guards of the 1st Division, and Kruglov himself, the future Minister for State Security, was entrusted with the general direction of operations for securing the safety of Russia's leader No 2.

The journey of Stalin abroad is technically impossible. The position of Stalin prevents him from using foreign means of communication, and it would be necessary for the 1st Division to get the exclusive right for guarding everything that has to do with Stalin's route, i.e. the guarding of all roads, railway stations, ports, streets that lie in the Stalin's way, and the government of no country will agree to such a measure. For the last 30 years Stalin formally crossed the boundaries of the Soviet Union only twice : in November 1943, going to Teheran, and in August 1945, leaving for Potsdam. But in both cases he practically moved in the regions, occupied by the Soviet troops, and therefore there was full possibility for the 1st Division to secure his safety according to the strictly set rules.

But even in such conditions, precautions of quite exceptional nature were taken in Teheran and Potsdam. In the first case up to three thousands NKVD men on staff of the 1st Division and Special Sector of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party as well as a battalion of troops, guarding the Kremlin, arrived in Teheran. The conference with Churchill and Roosevelt took place in the premises of the Soviet embassy, and in its course Stalin left the building only twice : for the first time to pay official calls to Roosevelt and Churchill, and for the second - to attend the celebration of Churchill's birthday.

In Potsdam the inhabitants were ousted from all buildings in the streets adjoining the area, where the conference took place, and the whole area was encompassed by the intensified detachments of "SMERSH", "L-N" and 1st Division. All the way from Moscow to Potsdam was guarded by the NKVD troops, and Stalin arrived at Potsdam in a special train, leaving Berlin aside.

SECRET  
UNOFFICIALS USE

The 1st Division originated as a special organ evidently after the attempt upon Lenin's life in August 1918, but its organizational set-up was not completed during Lenin's life. It is possible to assume that in those times Trotsky, and not Lenin, paid more attention to the development of this organ. It was Trotsky who took for his private use the train that formerly belonged to the Russian tsar, and that was he who introduced special body-guard for himself and other Soviet leaders. This bodyguard was the initial stage of the 1st Division. It is difficult to decide which part was played by Stalin in the creation of this specific organ in that early period of the Soviet power, but it is characteristic that during the defense of Tsaritsyn (Stalingrad) in autumn 1918, Stalin surrounded himself by a detachment of Chekists and under no circumstances parted with this special body-guard.

In the OGPU period the 1st Division was joined with the 2nd Special Division and, according to some information, it was something like a subdivision of the 2nd Special Division, though its functions were highly specialized. On the other hand, the general structure of the NKVD and the numeration of its main divisions and administrations make us suppose that the 1st special Division, the 2nd Special Division and the 1st Division constituted formerly a general 1st Division, which was divided later into three divisions in connection with the complication and specialization of its functions. However, the authors did not succeed as yet in finding a definite answer as to the history of organization of the 1st Division.

In any case there is no doubt that before the war the 1st Division closely coordinated its activity with the 2nd Special Division, and both these divisions were subordinated to the then Deputy People's Commissar of the NKVD, S.M. Kruglov, who was personally responsible for the safety of Stalin and other Moscow leaders. The same Kruglov appointed the superintendent of the Kremlin and checked up all technical workers on the staff of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party, and of the Sovmarks of the USSR. After the war Kruglov was appointed the Minister for Interior Affairs of the USSR.

Unlike other central organs of the NKVD-MVD, the 1st Division is an independent unit, practically subordinated not to the NKVD People's Commissar (Minister), but to the Special Sector of the Central Party Committee, i.e. to the Stalin's secretariat. If Stalin or any other leader leaves Moscow to go to the provinces, all local agencies of the NKVD-MVD are bound to fulfil exactly and with absolute submission all orders of the NKVD men on the staff of the 1st Division, accompanying this leader (of course, only in the questions concerned with the protection of the leader during his stay in a certain republic or region). The chief of the 1st Division is subordinated both to the chief of the OUGB and directly to the People's Commissar of Interior Affairs (now to the minister of State Security or directly to Lavrenty Beria).

According to the information collected by the authors of this work, the 1st Division included the following units :

- a) Operative section;
- b) Inquest section;
- c) Personnel section;
- d) Registration and information section;
- e) Chief of the bodyguard;
- f) Commander of the Kremlin guard with the 1st Commandant's office of the Kremlin guard and the guard division subordinated to him;
- g) Commander of the guard of objects with the 2nd Commandant's office subordinated to him;
- h) Transport section;
  - 1) the Kremlin supply department;
  - k) the MTO section (material-technical provision);
  - l) Administrative and maintenance section.

Probably there <sup>are</sup> a series of subdivisions of this division, not mentioned on our list; on the other hand, it is quite possible that some of the mentioned units have been joined together. The unusual secrecy in the organizational structure of the 1st Division makes very difficult the construction of schemes and the correct denomination of its sections and subunits. This must be the object of further studies.

Probably the field of operations and the character of the activity of these sections of the 1st Division are as follows :

Operative section (probably several of them). Plans the work of the special operative groups subordinated to the 1st Division. The number of persons, constituting these groups may vary as well as the tasks, carried out by them.

For example, Stalin attends some theater performance in Moscow. Several operative groups of the 1st Division will be sent to this theater during Stalin's stay there in order to secure his safety.

If Stalin or someone of his closest collaborators ( the so called "nomenclature workers") leave Moscow, they are protected during their journey by operative groups, specially formed for this purpose. These groups do not include the personal bodyguard of each "leader", which is directly subordinated to the commander of the bodyguard.

Besides these essential tasks the personnel of the operative groups makes arrests carrying out the orders of the 1st Division, and searches the quarters of persons, "elaborated" by this division. Besides all this, the operative groups may carry out other operative tasks which are the concern of the 1st Division.

Inquest section. Is carrying on inquests and inquiries of persons, arrested by the 1st Division. It has to be mentioned here that the whole work of the 1st Division is carried on in close contact with the private secretariat of Stalin and with the Special Sector of the Central Party Committee, more precisely with the so-called "Stalin's battalion". In the period of the "Great Purge", 1936-1938, all arrests of members of the Politburo, the Central Committee and the Sovmarkom, who were not lucky enough to please Stalin, were partly carried out through the inquest section of the 1st Division. Therefore, it has to be assumed that the field of operations of the inquest section of the 1st Division is not limited only with cases of persons, arrested for breaking the rules, set for the protection of the leaders. Practically the investigators of this section execute the functions of

the investigators for especially important and super-secret cases. So, in 1957-58, arrests of all NKVD bosses, to begin with Iagoda and Ieshov, were carried out with the assent of the Special Sector of the Central Party Committee, and the cases went through the inquest section of the 1st Division.

Personnel section. Is concerned with the problem of personnel for the whole 1st Division and also checks up and selects technical workers for the maintenance of the Kremlin, "nonenclosure objects" (i.e. government buildings) and private accommodation of all persons under protection of the 1st Division.

The personnel section of the 1st Division is connected in its work with the Personnel Administration of the NKVD USSR but is not bound to carry out all its orders. However, the instructions of Stalin's personal private secretariat as to the selection, checking-up and distribution of the personnel are obligatory for the personnel section of the 1st Division. It is even possible to say, that the Special Sector, i.e. Stalin's private secretariat, if we want to be more precise, is directing the work of the whole 1st Division through its personnel section.

Registration and Information Section. Registers all travels of the persons who have to be guarded and accordingly gives instructions to the operative section and to the commandants. Registers all persons, visiting the Kremlin, who are not in the possession of permanent passes, and carries on all other forms and kinds of registration, necessary for the current work of the 1st Division. Is permanently connected in its work with the 2nd sector of the 1st Special Division (the recording of anti-soviet elements) from which it gets all the necessary information. It is possible to assume that formerly this section was a part of the 1st Special Division. The registration section is also directly connected with Stalin's private secretariat, as well as with the secretariat of the Politburo and that of the Central Party Committee.

According to the data that have not been verified, it publishes a secret information bulletin for the 1st Division. The Record Office of the 1st Division is attached to this section.



The Commander of the bodyguard. Is subordinated directly to the Chief of the 1st Division (and through him to the Special Sector of the Central Committee) and is concerned with guarding Stalin and other persons under the protection of the 1st Division. The corresponding men of the bodyguard of the persons, mentioned above, are subordinated to him.

A special brigade of bodyguards, consisting exclusively of the NKVD-men on the staff of the 1st Division, is attached to each "leader". Two of his bodyguards have always to accompany the "leader" wherever he is and wherever he goes. These men are changed every eight hours. Thus, the brigade of the bodyguards normally consists of 6 guards and one commander. When the "leader" leaves Moscow, the brigade of the bodyguards is reinforced by the operative group. Besides, the country-houses where the "leaders" reside, have their internal and external guard.

Stalin and all members of the Politburo have quarters in the Kremlin and, besides that, country-houses, situated some 25-30 miles from Moscow along the Moshaisk road, on the banks of the river Moskva. All the area around these government villas with the radius of 5-10 kilometers has been proclaimed "forbidden zone", and is guarded by a special division of NKVD troops. Every person who enters this forbidden zone without a special pass, has to be arrested without delay, and his identity has to be ascertained through the special recording of the NKVD.

The Commander of the Kremlin Guards. Is concerned with the whole internal and external guard of the Kremlin and is subordinated to the Chief of the 1st Division (and through him - to the Special Sector of the Central Committee). The commander of the Kremlin guards has under him :

- a) the 1st commandant's office of the Kremlin guard,
- b) the division of the Kremlin guards - a division of the Chekist troops - corps d'elite - of the NKVD, armed and manned according to special provisions. This division is entrusted with the service of the internal and external guarding of the Kremlin, carried out together with the students of the special military school, bearing the name of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and situated within the Kremlin walls.

By the way, the commander of the Kremlin guards has not to be confused with the Kremlin superintendent. The latter carries on the administrative and supply duties as to the inner regulations in the Kremlin, receives foreigners of high standing, plans and organizes different receptions at Stalin's, Molotov's and other "leaders", is responsible for the maintenance of order during the sessions of the Supreme Soviet in the Big Kremlin Palace etc.

The Kremlin is undoubtedly the most carefully guarded object of the whole world, though an uninitiated person will hardly notice it. The visitors can enter the Kremlin mainly through the gates of the Spassky Tower, opening on the Red Square. All other entrances to the Kremlin are closed for the visitors, and they may be used only by persons, living in the Kremlin and having a permanent pass for entering it. The Spassky gate is open in the day time, and the way is apparently barred only by two sentries in the uniforms of the Supreme Soviet military school, but it is, probably, much more difficult to pass through this open gate than to get to the American depot where atom bombs are stored.

Foreign diplomats of high standing and foreign guests of the Soviet government, having been invited to visit the Kremlin, pass the Spassky gate almost without any impediments, and they cannot even imagine what it means for an ordinary Soviet citizen to go through the whole procedure for getting a pass to the Kremlin. Such a pass can be got only in the result of a call made by some of the high party and government institutions located there, or according to a personal invitation of one of the leaders. The usual order of issuing a pass is as follows :

The person, calling that or another visitor, sends to the commander of the Kremlin guards a request of the established type, indicating name, patronymic, surname of the visitor, his address, place of work and the reason of his being called to the Kremlin. The commander sends the copy of this request through the registrars' section of the 1st Division to the special recording sector of the 1st Special Division of the OUGB. If this person is a non-resident of Moscow, a ciphered enquiry about his being sent

to the 1st Special Division of the regional administration of the NKVD that is concerned with his place of residence or work. If such a person was recorded with the registration files of the ASB (anti-Soviet elements), the pass will not be issued to him, but neither he, nor the person who submitted the request for seeing him will be informed about the reasons of the denial.

If the answer of the 1st Special Division is a favourable one, the request is being forwarded to the office of the Kremlin superintendent, that summons this person to visit the Kremlin on a certain day and at a certain time. In such cases a car on duty with the transport section of the 1st Division is being sent to bring the man to the Spassky Tower. By this time a pass has already been made out, in four copies and usually of different colors, in the pass office. All these four copies are handed to the visitor and he is told, politely but firmly, to go in a certain direction without stopping anywhere or staring at anything. Some two hundred meters away the visitor is met by a guardman who checks up his passes, leaves one of them with him and directs the visitor to the next guardman with the same instructions. The last guardman on duty accompanies him to the door of the room where he has been called. There he is met by the private secretary of the person calling him, who checks up his documents and instructs the visitor to give a short account of his business, not detaining the chief with unnecessary talk. As soon as the "audience" is closed, the visitor is accompanied exactly in the same way to the exit from the Kremlin.

If a Politburo member works outside the Kremlin walls, the same procedure is introduced in the institution where he is the boss. So, for instance, when Lazar M. Kaganovich was the People's Commissar for Rail Ways (1935-1942), the pass to the building of the People's Commissariat was issued by the Transport administration of the NKVD, but a special official of the 1st Division issued the passes to the flat where the office of Kaganovich was located. In this case the visitor also received four passes, the last of which he handed to the official of the 1st Division on duty; the

Karshen's flat, who showed him the necessary door and instructed him to pass quickly without stopping and looking at the boards on other doors. Two guards in the NKVD uniform, armed with guns were on duty at the door of Kaganovich's reception-room.

The former People's Commissar for Heavy Industry, Soggo Ordshonikidze, <sup>was</sup> the only one <sup>of</sup> all members of the Politburo, who flatly refused to have special guards, and made the access to his comparatively simple. Ordshonikidze protested against the setting up of the bodyguard in such a categorical way, <sup>so</sup> that the 1st Division was obliged to protect him secretly, in a way, not noticeable to Ordshonikidze himself.

Commander of the Guard of Objects is concerned with guarding of the government objects, mentioned above, with the exception of the Kremlin. He has in his subordination the second commandant's office (vtoroy komandantskoy komendatura) that has in its disposal the following units of the NKVD guard troops :

a) Special division MUD (regulirovka ulichnogo dvizheniya) - regulation of traffic). This division consists of approximately three thousand NKVD men, that have been specially trained. The division owes its name to the fact, that a considerable part of its personnel wears the militia uniforms with the oversleeve sign "MUD". This division guards the road from the Kremlin to the country residences of Stalin and other persons on the "nomenclature list". Their permanent duties include also the regulation of the traffic and the guarding of all streets between the Kremlin and the buildings occupied by the Central Party Committee, the Central Committee of the Komsomol, the Council of the People's Commissars of the USSR and other objects under protection of the 1st Division. If Stalin or other members of the Politburo visit some plants or constructions in Moscow, the guarding of all streets included in the route is immediately passed from the militia to the MUD division.

b) A special division of night guards is used for guarding the governmental high road in Moscow at night. The posts manned by these guards intensify the protection of this road, already secured by other sub-units. The staff of this division is situated in one of the houses in the Bolshoy Gnezdihevsky lane.

e) Guard division of the NKVD - manned and armed according to the same standards as the guard division of the Kremlin, is guarding the territory, where persons under protection of the 1st Division reside.

Besides this, a special group of water militia, guarding the part of the river Moskva where it flows through the territory reserved for the residence of the Government members, is obviously subordinated to the 2nd commandant's office.

Besides the two Kommandatura's (commandant's offices), mentioned above, there are other Kommandaturas, concerned with the guarding of other objects under protection of the 1st Division. The authors had no possibility of clearing up the functions and tasks of all these Kommandaturas of the 1st Division, but it is known that the 3rd Kommandatura is concerned with the anti-aircraft defense of Moscow.

The protection of Stalin and other high party officials during their daily journey from the Kremlin to the "governmental area" is carried on with utmost care, and even at the time of peace surpasses by far anything that was permitted, for example, by Hitler during the years of war.

According to the general plan of reconstruction of Moscow all streets, included into the daily route of Stalin and his collaborators, acquired unusual breadth of 40 and even 60 meters, that is practically absolutely unnecessary. The cars of "leaders" run always along the very middle of these streets <sup>which</sup> practically excludes every possibility of an attempt. The inhabitants of the houses along this route are subjected to a special check-up of the 1st Division, and all families that awake a suspicion in any way are immediately <sup>and transferred</sup> ~~custody~~ into other regions of Moscow.

On the Moschaisk highway all the territory up to the government villas and <sup>beyond</sup> ~~farther ahead~~, for some 80 miles from Moscow, is divided into several Kommandaturas, with an all-day-round duty in the area of each Kommandatura. Before the war these Kommandaturas were manned exclusively by the employees of the 1st Division, and this system has probably been preserved after the war.

Usually these men were the militia uniforms without any distinguishing features of their special destination. Each section of the road was secured with signal posts and telephones. When Stalin left the Kremlin or the gates of his villa, the "alarm" signal was given to all posts.

As soon as the cortege of Stalin or of some other leader has left the section of one kommandantura, the next one is notified by a special signal about the approach of cars in order to stop any cross-movement. Any person, riding or walking along the highroad at this moment and stopping for any reason (for instance, to pump the tire of a car or a bicycle, etc.) has to present his personal documents for a check-up, and if anything seems suspicious he is arrested and questioned in the inquest section of the 1st Division. One former prisoner of the Ukhta-Pechora "corrective labor camp" told the authors of this work that one of his fellow-inmates was a collective farmer from the environs of Moscow, who was sentenced in 1936 for an attempt upon Stalin's life. This collective farmer came to Moscow on some business. By the evening he had <sup>had</sup> drop too much, and being drunk, fell down to sleep somewhere near the Mozhaisk highroad. He woke in the NKVD. During the search a "weapon" was found on him - a kitchen knife of the kind used in the country. Three days later this collective farmer was brought to the Butyrka prison, and the "troika" of the Moscow regional NKVD administration sentenced him to five years of deportation, according to the clause 58, par.8 - terrorism. Taking into consideration such cases one must not be astonished at the fact, that Moscow citizens try to turn into the side streets as soon as they hear the <sup>horns</sup> ~~beepers~~ of the approaching government cars.

Stalin's cortege for his journeys in Moscow and along the Mozhaisk highroad usually consists of 3-4 cars with the "ZIS-7" trade-mark. These cars are home-made, armoured, their greenish glasses are bullet-proof. A representative of the 1st Division must be always present at their reception from the plant.

The first car in the Stalin's cortege has the task of knocking down all persons crossing the road before the cortege as well

as any car that might be a danger to the governmental cars. Besides the driver, men of the 1st Division are in the first car, keeping an attentive eye on all persons and cars on Stalin's route. Stalin himself is usually in the second or in the third car, which periodically change their place in the cortege. Stalin's car could get to the head of the column only before the very entrance to the Kremlin or directly at the gate of Stalin's villa. The drivers of all governmental cars were without any exception on the staff of the 1st Division as workers of its transport section.

The commandant of the guard of objects is also concerned with guarding the government hunting estates. The so called "preserves" at the station Los of the Northern railway by Moscow, was one of such estates. Elk were among other animals of this estate, though ordinary citizens of the Soviet Union were prohibited to hunt them.

Transport section. Is concerned with all governmental means of transportation.

While travelling over the Soviet Union, Stalin and other Politburo members use their private railway cars. Before the war the Soviet leaders almost never used the airplanes, finding this kind of transport too risky for their precious selves. According to some information, a special, absolutely secret order was issued by Stalin before the war, formally prohibiting to the "nomenclature workers" to use planes without exceptionally serious reasons and without his own approval of every flight. May be, the "great leader" feared that someone of his collaborators might flee abroad!!! As far as it is known, Stalin himself flew only once - from Moscow to Tehran, in 1943.

The former chief of the government train Dislovedak-Sochi informed the authors about the following details of protecting Stalin and other "leaders" during their railway travels.

Every member of the Politburo has its own private railway car that may be used only by himself and by his family members. As to their outward appearance these cars differed in no way from the usual passenger's cars, but they were exceedingly luxurious inside. So, for instance, mahogany was used for the

interior decoration and furniture of Stalin's car, Karelian birch was used for the same purposes in Kaganovich's car etc. The cars were constructed in such a way that the jerks at the joints of rails were not felt inside the car. For this aim a thick layer of lead, two layers of rough felt and one of cork were put under the wooden planking of the floor which was covered in its turn with a layer of felt, linoleum and a magnificent carpet. Such a personal car was used only for 20-30 days in the year, but nevertheless every year there were obligatory capital repairs, the costs of which amounted to hundreds of thousands of roubles for only one car.

The Soviet bureaucrats of a lower rank travelled generally in sleeping-cars (the so-called "Mitropa" cars) of the usual fast trains; several fast trains were accommodating them: the "Red Arrow" express plying between Moscow and Leningrad, "Luz-Express No 1" - Moscow-Manchuria etc. The governmental train Kislovodsk-Sochi, plying between the groups of spas, was of the same kind.

When Stalin or other members of the Politburo were travelling, their personal car was coupled in the end of the train, and it was followed by exactly the same "covering" car with an NKVD detachment. Such an order existed only for the governmental train Kislovodsk-Sochi; if Stalin or his colleagues were travelling in other directions, a special train was put together for each of them including the personal car of the "leader". Before such a person got into the train, the chief of the train had been summoned to the NKVD headquarters of this railroad and signed a special promise of avoiding any leakage about the person of the traveller and his guards.

When the train leaves the station, the chief of the train and the chief of the railroad NKVD get into the locomotive and stay there until the train reaches its place of destination.

A day or two before the arrival of Stalin, a special official of the 1st Division comes to every railroad administration to work out with the chief of the railroad NKVD measures securing the safety of the "leader". Stalin is accompanied only by a small



group of his bodyguard and officials of the 1st Division, coming from Moscow. All the rest of the guards are provided by the chief of the railroad NKVD. The men of the NKVD team always wear plain clothes, and are distributed in a more or less proportional way to stand in the tambours of the whole train, or are mixed up with other passengers of the train. Some men always take a seat in the dining-car to listen<sup>to</sup> the conversations of the passengers. The chief of the railroad NKVD, travelling in the locomotive, is considered to be the chief of the local guards, but besides him, a representative of the 1st Division, is travelling in Stalin's car. Before the train leaves the station, the chief of the train is introduced to him, and the orders of this official of the 1st Division are obligatory both for the chief of the train and the chief of the railroad NKVD.

Besides those three persons nobody else has the right to know who travels in the special car, coupled in the end of the train, but usually the personnel of the train and the station masters guess the rank of the traveller by the character of the protective measures. Such a train stops only at central stations to take water. When the train has to pass, all arrival and departure railway points are tightly closed with spikes at all stations. A pointsman stands together with an NKVD agent-representative of this station at each railway point. The guards wearing NKVD uniforms, operative agents-representatives of the Transport Section of the railroad NKVD, the railway militia stand along the trenches, in tunnels and along the road-bed.

The train is stopped at the departure and arrival platforms in such a way that the ~~passenger's~~ personal car of Stalin or of any other member of the Politburo would be exactly opposite the operative post of the NKVD of this station. Immediately after the arrival of the train the NKVD guards in plain clothes range themselves in lines on both sides of the car, and a group of guards fills in the adjoining part of the platform and in different ways prevents the public to go ahead, though no formal order is given to the people to stop. At first two official of the 1st

Division alight from the car, then they are followed by Stalin and a couple of NKVD men. All this group passes quickly the NKVD post and gets into some cars, looking exactly the same and waiting for Stalin. Usually the "Buick" cars are waiting for Stalin at the Sochi station. During all this ceremony even the chief of the train cannot approach the Stalin's car. All these measures of precaution are taken in spite of the fact that only the members of the government, the high ranking party officials and some distinguished generals enjoy the right to travel in this governmental train.

In case of any breakage or disrepair in Stalin's car, the master may enter it only accompanied by the chief of the railroad NKVD, and his box with tools is previously inspected with greatest care. A "forbidden zone" with a radius of more than 5 kilometers has been established around the governmental villas between Sochi and Matsesta. But the fear of the NKVD is so intense, that people don't even try to approach this zone. When Molotov, Kaganovich, Voroshilov, Andreyev, Zhdanov and other leaders were travelling, the same precaution measures were taken. The only exception was made by the member of Politburo and people's Commissar for heavy industry, Sergo Ordzhonikidze (died in 1937) who liked to walk along the platform among the public that hailed him. Such a behaviour of the "leader" drove to despair the men of the 1st Division who had to guard him. The second-best "leaders" travelled in general cars of this governmental train, while suddenly spent most of his time in the dining-car, where he took a lot of drinks of different kinds.

Stalin and other Politburo members did not take their food from the dining-car during their travels, as each of them had a kitchen in his personal car, where food for him and the group of persons, accompanying him, was prepared. The normal car of this train had eight two-seated compartments, with a bath-room for each two compartments. Stalin's car consisted of a kitchen, a study, secretary's office, two bed-rooms, a bath-room, a drawing-room and a reserve compartment. All of this was furnished with highest possible comfort and luxury that beat by far the interior decore-

tion of the former tsar's train. It is characteristic that the train of the murdered tsar Nikolai the Second was left on the side-track of Detskoye Sele (formerly Tsarskoye Sele) near Leningrad and its cars could not be used for this governmental train, - not saying anything about using them for Stalin's personal needs, - as they were found to be "unsufficiently comfortable".

The yearly maintenance of only this governmental train gave about a million roubles of dead loss, which was covered out of the special fund of the Sovnarkom of the USSR. Capital repairs of this train were made every year, when absolutely all the equipment of the cars was changed, while all other passenger trains in the USSR are subjected to capital repairs once in six years. And what are the costs for maintaining all personal cars? There are more than a thousand of them in the USSR for the use of different Soviet and Party bureaucrats, though, of course, they are not furnished with such a luxury, as Stalin's car. It is sufficient to mention that before the war personal cars were assigned, besides the Kremlin aristocracy, to all the secretaries of the regional party committees, all chiefs of the regional NKVD administrations, all the commanders of the military districts, all chiefs of the railways, all chiefs of the railroad NKVD's etc., etc. That is how the leaders of the "first socialistic state in world" arrange their personal life !

If Stalin's train is stopped on its way even for five minutes, all the personnel guilty of this "crisis" is subjected to immediate arrest. Such a case occurred once in 1934 on the way from Kostov to Sechi. A train of tank-cars with benzine was running casually ahead of Stalin's train, and for some reasons or others it could not be put on the side track. As a result of this, the governmental train was stopped before the semaphore of an intermediate station for three minutes. This happened at night, and Stalin did not even notice it, but the men on duty at the station the station-master and even the chief of the railroad were immediately arrested.

All, described above, gives some ideas of the functions and tasks of the transport section of the 1st Division.

The Kremlin Supply Department. Controls all food products received for the use in the Kremlin and in governmental country-houses. Is subordinated to the Kremlin superintendent and to the chief of the 1st Division.

The department consists of sanitary section, laboratory and transport section. The laboratory is concerned with the analysis of all food stuffs coming to the Kremlin, while the transport section of the Kremlin supply department not only delivers these food products to the Kremlin, but also takes care that they may not be poisoned on the way.

So, for instance, if, let us say, milk is being delivered to the Kremlin from the governmental state farm near Moscow, it is accompanied without fail by an official of the transport section of the supply department of the 1st Division.

The MTO section (material-technical provision) is concerned with covering the material and technical needs of the 1st Division, from arms, military and civil clothing, and up to fuel for the auto-transport section.

Administrative and Maintenance section. Is concerned with the problems of supplying the officials of the 1st Division, of providing them with lodgings, permits for a place in a rest-home and fulfils hundreds of other administrative and maintenance functions, connected with the well-being of the employees of the 1st Division.

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Such are tasks, structure and field of operations of the 1st Division of the MVD USSR. Let us call once more to our mind that the 1st Division exists only in Moscow, while the protection of provincial "leaders" of the Communist party and Soviet government is carried on by the 2nd Special Divisions of the corresponding territorial administrations of the MVD-sub.

This chapter could not be so complete and exact as it might be desirable, but it is possible to give a complete survey of the activity of the 1st Division only after a long and minute collection

of all possible materials

stamp "top secret" on all information connected with the protection of the "leaders" of the Kremlin dictatorship made this work particularly difficult. The authors were obliged to collect this information from different persons, each of whom, as a rule, knew very little about these innermost secrets of the Kremlin. Therefore, just in this chapter one may expect to find various inaccuracies not only in the structure of a section, but even in the denomination of its units.

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FORWARD

Every dictatorial or, as it is now commonly called, totalitarian regime keeps itself in power mainly by means of a carefully conceived system of terror directed against the subjects of this regime. The more radical and absolute the character of the dictatorship, the more developed are its organs of terror and oppression.

The 20th Century gave birth to a new form of dictatorship: the dictatorship of a party, subordinating to itself the governmental apparatus and forcibly directing the whole life of the country and even the private life of its citizens. Two countries presented a picture of this dictatorship of a party in its most radical and perfected form: National-Socialist Germany and the Communist Soviet Union. At present we do not need to point out the similarity of these two dictatorships or even of their apparent mutual hostile ideologies. Both of these dictatorships laid down, as the basis of their foreign and domestic policies, the goal of world domination and both have made merciless terror the chief weapon of their policy.

Military defeat and the following occupation of Germany permitted world public opinion to become acquainted with all the repulsive details of the activities of the Gestapo, SS, and other organs of Hitlerite terror. But the activities of the organs of Soviet terror have remained for long years hidden from the world public opinion. Only from time to time has the testimony of individual victims of this terror appeared in the foreign press and attracted some reaction even if only of a weak nature. The problem of Soviet terror was considered as a Russian domestic affair. But now when an ever increasing number of nations fear that Communism will lay on them its deadly paw and when some nations are already becoming acquainted with the NKVD (MGB) in practice, this problem has begun to attract a special attention.

But even now the system of Soviet terror and suppression is known, rather, according to the testimony of individual victims of the Stalinistic terror. The world is becoming acquainted gradually with the results of the activities of the NKVD (MGB), but not with the inner mechanism of this meat grinder, which exterminates people according to the principle: "If he is not one of us - then he is against us".

Only the Russian people can disclose the details of the structure and methods of work of the Soviet terror system, for they themselves have been subjected to the activities of that institution for 30 years. These people are not deceived by the Kremlin's lying propaganda about the construction of a free and democratic socialist society in the Soviet Union nor are they misled by the illusions of those who believe that an agreement with Stalin is possible concerning peace and co-operation.

Only the Russian people may acquaint the other peoples of the world with all the details of the distasteful aspects of Communism and only they can perform this work with sufficient knowledge of the matter. This is their moral duty to the suffering Russian people and to all of humanity. But this is, at the same time, their practical contribution to the general struggle for national independence and personal freedom. The deciding moment for the clash between the forces of freedom and forces of tyranny is approaching. In order to halt the attack of Communism and then to destroy this danger it is necessary first of all to know its main weapons: tactics and technique of its undermining work outside the Soviet sphere, and methods of terror and suppression inside that sphere. It is necessary to know the most important instruments of the Communist party and of the Stalin dictatorship: its organs of "State Security".

The present work is an attempt to analyze the inner structure and methods of work of the Soviet organs of state security. By means of laborious collection of various data, by means of questioning of many former officials of these organs, and from the personal recollections of the authors an attempt has been made to create a picture of the Soviet organs of state security as they existed.



on the eve of the world war II. As a matter of fact, in many cases, the authors could not be quite certain of their data, not to speak of the exactness of details. We have to point out that the work was written not mainly from documents but from the testimony of individuals. Some of them, from the number of former NKVD agents, could have intentionally distorted the picture in order to misinform the reader, but this could mainly be in the details.

The authors set for themselves the aim of giving a general picture of the organs of the NKVD in a certain limited period of its development: between the end of the "Great Purge" period and the start of the world war II - that is between 1938 and 1941. In this period all organs of Soviet terrorism were united in one office - People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs of the USSR (NKVD). After the war these organs were split between two ministries - Ministry for State Security (MGB) and the Ministry for Internal Affairs (MVD).

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## CHAPTER I

### THE MEANING AND ROLE OF THE NKVD IN THE SOVIET SYSTEM

#### 1. The Meaning of the NKVD

The People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs, divided after the war into two ministries, is deservedly called one of the main supports of the Soviet Communist dictatorship in Russia. The Soviet dictatorship has two main weapons to dominate the people: propaganda and terror. The skillful and aggressive propaganda utilizes within the USSR misinformation of the surrounding world, and outside the USSR misinformation of Soviet reality, and in that way gives the Kremlin oligarchy rather wide support among the masses of people, - especially in the West. But the NKVD is the most important weapon to suppress and dominate the people inside the Soviet Union. For this purpose the NKVD concentrates in its hands almost unlimited means of control, provocation, and terror. One may say that if the USSR itself is merely the weapon which Communists are using to conquer the world, then the NKVD is the means of securing the reliability and compliance of that weapon (USSR) in the already begun struggle for world domination.

Abroad, the NKVD is ordinarily called the Soviet secret police. This definition is incorrect in substance. It is incorrect because it does not reflect either the true character or the sphere of action of this most important organ of the Bolshevik dictatorship. Any police, whether open or secret, is normally an agency of state power. Its mission is to protect the interests of the state, its political security in the first instance. Even the Gestapo, guarding Hitler's dictatorship, was a state police, and not a personal inquisition of Hitler himself. In the USSR the situation in principle and practice is otherwise. Here are the basic characteristics of this institution:

1. The NKVD is an agency not of <sup>the</sup> state, but of party power. Under this party power one must understand not the Communist Party as a whole, but only its oligarchical and absolute leadership - the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Party, and the leaders of the Party central and local apparatus which help the Politburo to rule the country: in all, perhaps, some 250-300 persons.

The mission of the NKVD is to serve the securing of the interests not of the state, but of this handful of usurpers, who are making Russia their chief weapon in the struggle for the seizure of power over the entire world. The NKVD guards the security not of the state as a whole, - that is, of the country, the people, and authority, - but solely and alone the security of the ruling group of persons, which is commonly known under its abstract name - the Soviet Power. This power finds itself in permanent conflict with the majority of the people from the very first days of its birth, as a result of the antidemocratic treacherous coup d'etat of October, 1917. Its policies inside and outside the country are directed against the natural, basic interests of the Russian people and the country.

Those who are inclined to see in this definition some kind of "propaganda", are advised to think over the question once more when they acquaint themselves with the fact that the "Anti-Boviet Elements" files of the NKVD and the system of "GULAG" (Concentration Camps Administration of the NKVD), together embrace nearly all the adult population of the U.S.S.R. we can mention, to the same effect, the activities of the Economic Administration of the NKVD in preventing the "sabotage" and "diversionist acts", which testify to the compulsory character of the Soviet "building of socialism in one country".

Thus, the first peculiarity of the NKVD is that this type of secret police serves only the interests of the ruling chiefs of the party in power, against the interests of the state which this group rules, contrary to the will of the people which it exploits.

2. The NKVD is an organization completely independent of the government system in the USSR, and, partially, of the Party itself. More than that, thanks to their exclusively conspiratorial character, the organization and activities of the NKVD are known in the country only in the most general terms, and then only, for example, after some facts concerning executions and arrests leak out.

It would be wrong to think that the Soviet Government - the Council of Ministers - at any time would discuss the work of the NKVD or would order it to do or not to do something. It is sufficient to say that the minister of Finance of the USSR, who prepares the state budget, and later supervises its fulfillment, does not know the structure, nor the personnel, nor the utilization of expenses of the NKVD. To the financial section of the Gosplan and to the State Budget sector of the Planning Administration of the Ministry of Finance of the USSR is presented only the total sum which the NKVD needs. There is no discussion or verification and even this sum does not reveal all the expenditures of the NKVD, because a certain part of these expenditures is included in a special secret fund of the Kremlin.

Not only the ordinary person, but the most high ranking officials in the USSR know only one thing about the NKVD: that it is better not to know anything. If this work were to fall into the hands of a Soviet reader, it would be accepted as a revelation. Here is a fact established by one of the authors: Soviet Foreign Minister Maxim Litvinov did not know what department of the NKVD was located in a building which he saw every day from the window of his office in Dzerzhinsky Street, in Moscow (former Lubjansk Street). One may excuse him, however: not every official of the NKVD itself is informed of that which is outside the frame of his immediate competence. And this fact, by the way, has made extremely difficult the writing of this work, based, as was said in the Foreword, on the evidence of former Chekists.

This insulation of the NKVD in the Soviet system of the party - we would say even its independence - is the second outstanding characteristic of the Soviet Secret Police.

3. It would be possible to say, by analogy, that the NKVD is a state within a state. But the insulation of the NKVD within the Soviet state bears a very specific character. It is impossible to understand this if one does not take into account its third peculiarity: the simultaneously insulated and dominating position of the Soviet Secret Police.

This expresses itself in the fact that if the NKVD is made a complete secret from other governmental and even party organs (with <sup>the</sup> exception of the very highest - understood to be the Politburo and its apparatus), these organs are as well known to the NKVD as the palm of your hand; at least they should be! The tentacles of the NKVD penetrate all reaches of governmental and party life in the USSR, beginning with the Council of Ministers and ending in the basic party group of some kolhoz, lost in the Siberian forests. It goes without saying that there are no secrets from the NKVD in the private lives of people of the USSR; it is not said in jest that each Soviet citizen has two shadows - one of his own and the other of the NKVD.

It is only logical to emphasize that in the governmental and party system of the USSR special conditions are created in order to favor the spy activities of the NKVD. We may characterize the Soviet system as one in which there occurs a fusion of the state and party, the leadership of which formally is in the hands of the state, but actually in the party. But in this amalgamation there is still one more element, unseen but always present - the NKVD. Its organs are infiltrated into governmental and party organizations, unknown to the latter, in order to fully utilize their opportunities to check every step of the state and party officials, up to the highest levels of the Soviet bureaucratic machine. The most wide-spread <sup>example</sup> case of this fusion, or better to say, permeation, of the NKVD in any Soviet governmental institution <sup>is</sup> present <sup>ed by</sup> the "Special Offices" or "Special Branches" which exist in every factory, in every institution or governmental office.

According to its official regulations (the so called "Status of the NKVD of the USSR"), the NKVD cannot control or, putting it simply, has no right to spy against the Bolshevik Party. Nevertheless we see that one of the basic links of the NKVD chain, binding the whole country, is the SPO - Secret Political Section of Administration. Its mission is the rooting out of sedition within the party, the liquidation of all and any deviationists, beginning with old time Trotskyites and ending with the currently modish originators of cringing before the decadent West. The period of the "Great Purge", 1934-1939, shows us that the NKVD can be used against the Party just as well as it is used daily and hourly against the people and country.

4. However, the self same period of mass extermination of any and all, when the NKVD seized the people, - in the words of Stalin himself, - only for the fact that "they walked on the same street with Trotskyites" showed that sometimes the Party can be used against the NKVD. We speak of reprisals against Yagoda and all his consorts, totaling, it is said, up to 3,000 NKVD officials and of the following reprisal against his executioner, Yezhov.

From this it follows that the NKVD is not the all-powerful master of the situation in the USSR. Spying against the state power and even against the party, enjoying a greater concentration than that of power than the state and party apparatus (in their lower and middle levels), the NKVD finds itself under the thumb of the individual who holds in his hand full power, under the thumb of Stalin. For this via Stalin uses his own private apparatus, - so called "Stalin's Secretariat", - which operates through the top secret special channels of the Kremlin. Here manifests itself the famous Soviet system of cross-check insurance, that is a system of a double or even triple control of one and the same person, organization, or action.

Therefore, the fourth peculiarity of the NKVD is that this organ, which arose because the Communists trust no one and under no conditions does not enjoy itself the full confidence of the dictator and his accomplices.

5. Further, it must be remembered that the NKVD is a kind of secret police which has its own armed forces, independent from the regular army of the USSR.

The mission of the NKVD armed forces is to support Stalin's power within the country against internal enemies, i.e. the people, while the army is designated for defense of his power only against foreign enemies. The border, internal, and escort troops of the NKVD are better armed than units of the regular army; their fighting ability is much greater than that of regular troops located within the country in time of peace. And this is not a coincidence. Stalin still remembers the affair of Marshal Tukachevsky. And, in addition to this there are special detachments of the NKVD inside the army. We shall recall only two titles: the "Smerch", with its crew of executioners, and the "Straggle Line Detachments", which liquidated deserters and stragglers from the field of battle. However, the protection of Stalin, himself, is not in the hands of NKVD troops, assigned only for the external guard around the Kremlin, but is performed by two special units: a) by the so-called "School of the Supreme Soviet", and b) by the First Section of the NKVD - both of which are directly subordinated to the "Stalin's Secretariat" and form a permanent garrison of the Kremlin.

The NKVD spies against the army, and against the NKVD, spies Stalin, himself. Such is the system. The existence of two armies in one country is the fifth peculiarity of the NKVD, which distinguishes it from the secret police of any other, more normal regime.

6. The history of our times shows that even in the most undemocratic countries of South America or Central Europe the secret police, at least formally, are not invested with judicial powers and the courts are separated from the police. The sixth peculiarity of the NKVD is that it has its own court system independent from the regular court system of the USSR, but completely subordinated to directives from the highest Communist Party organs.

The major characteristic of the NKVD court system is that the functions of arrest, prosecution, and adjudication are very often in the hands of one and the same official. The NKVD can

arrest and try by means of its secret "court" any citizen of the USSR. There do exist certain regulations, restricting to some extent the arbitrary actions of the NKVD, but only with respect to those party officials employed in duties of party administration. The entire field of political crime, which is more than wide in the USSR, remains the sphere of the NKVD, and it operates this sphere as it wishes with no control or accounting what so ever, except to the dictator in the Kremlin.

However, the more important political cases remain in the hands of the NKVD only during the preliminary investigation, after which they are decided by the high party leadership. These decisions are then carried out by the NKVD, just as similar decisions and directives are carried out by the regular court system of the USSR.

7. It is necessary to mention here still one more peculiarity of the NKVD, although since the time of the Gestapo this ceased to be its monopoly. We have in mind that the NKVD operates all penal institutions. Included in this term of penal institutions are those prisons which hold so many inmates that they are organized as camps. We speak here about the system called GULAG (Administration of Camps) which operates all numerous concentration and labor camps with their many millions of inmates. All these prisoners find themselves in <sup>the</sup> uncontrolled power of the NKVD which prescribes the conditions of their confinement, which can change and previous court decision by means of special camp "courts", which operates special spy rings inside the camps just as it does in the "free" Soviet society, etc.

While speaking of the Soviet concentration camps, we have to note that in its usage of forced labor the NKVD is semi-officially recognized as an organization taking part in the "planned construction of the socialistic economy of the USSR". The same GULAG of the NKVD carries out a number of most important governmental industrial projects - it digs canals, brings into production coal mines and oil wells in the Arctic, cuts timber for export etc., thereby providing the Soviet Union and the World Communist movement with dollars and gold.



As a result, the seventh and not unimportant peculiarity of the NKVD is its function as a slave owner and colonizer of arctic regions.

8. Our exposé would not be complete, more than that, would be incorrect if still one more very important aspect of the NKVD were not treated for - its significance to the outer world. If we were to say that the USSR is nothing other than a base for the spreading of communistic world revolution, then it would be clear that the NKVD must play its own great role in this undertaking. When the reader acquaints himself with the functions of the Foreign Administration of the NKVD, then it would not be difficult to come to the realization that the NKVD may be termed not so much a Soviet as an international communistic secret police. This side of the activities of the NKVD is now better known.

However, it would be inappropriate to think, in view of the Canadian atomic spy case, that the NKVD occupies itself only with ordinary espionage for military and economic purposes, as is the case in other countries. The persecution of Russian emigrants, the murder of anti-Soviet activists - such as Trotsky, and foreign statesmen - such as the French President Pompidou, Polish general Sikorski, its own agents abroad, as, for example, the secretary of the Central Committee of the Spanish Communist Party, Jose Diaz, the Chinese Marxist Lin Biao, the Soviet ambassador in Mexico, Konstantin Gromyko, etc., - all these being examples of the NKVD activities working in behalf of the international Communist movement.

One may raise an objection that this field of activity does not present the monopoly of the NKVD and that political murders have been frequently practiced by the secret police of other countries, mentioning as an obvious example the Gestapo activities in Nazi Germany. We do not intend to deny this fact, but the new and principally distinguishing factor in the case of the NKVD is its systematic methods, not just isolated cases. We may say it is a planned system, well thought out, organized, and executed with merciless consequence.

Along with its terroristic and black-mailing functions against anti-Soviet organizations outside the USSR, the NKVD plays still another important role for the Kremlin. This is to spy upon Soviet personnel in other countries - such as diplomats, trade representatives, and even Soviet military espionage agents. Included also within its competence are the leaders of the international Communist movement. Just as within the USSR, the NKVD thereby provides for a complete system of double and triple control.

This international function of the NKVD, although the last on our list of peculiarities, is, never the less, in its significance one of the most important characteristics of the Kremlin's secret police.

## 2. The Methods of the NKVD

We turn now to the main features which characterize the methods of the NKVD, features which in many respects differ from those habitually used by ordinary secret police. It is still possible to say this even though the world now knows the methods used by the Gestapo.

1. From the very first words of Lenin's decree creating the "Cheka", - forerunner of the present day NKVD (MVD), - it was clearly evident that the Soviet secret police was to be and became a purely terroristic organization. At the present time the period of revolutionary romanticism is past and the NKVD is no longer hailed as the "proletarian guillotine" or the "all devouring flame of the red terror". "Bureaucraticism", this second nature of the Communistic experiment, has now laid its heavy hand on this apparatus for the hunting and extermination of people. Now people are liquidated according to the "five-year plans". This will be made clear in the chapter which describes a map hanging in the office of the first Special Section of the NKVD, in Moscow, - the map covered with marks indicating numbers of potential victims, that is, the numbers of "ASE" (anti-Soviet elements) in different areas of the USSR.

This map reveals a direct link or connection between the present form of the "red terror" and the construction of war plants and oil wells in the wide regions beyond the Arctic circle.

The terror of the NKVD has now become less open. No longer are the names of victims published and slogans advertised. Nevertheless, the terror has become even more cruel. In the earlier days a man might be openly condemned and shot because as a member of the former upper classes (simply - a "former") he, by the Marxist definition of classes, either had or would take part in the fight against the regime. Now people are liquidated by means of overwork, under the inhuman conditions of the Soviet labor camps, only because the regime needs to build a factory or dig a canal. The hunt for people is carried on at present time not only because of danger to the regime, but because of a need for new slave labor power. We are speaking, of course, of tendencies, and therefore do not include the executions of the more active political enemies, such as members of the Vlassov movement and the unfortunate fugitives caught and returned to the USSR by the Western powers.

2. From what has been said above it is already possible to see the second peculiarity of Soviet terrorism, namely, - the preventive character of this terror. Lenin himself declared the working principle of the Soviet security organs to be directly opposed to the teachings by Christ. That is, it is better that nine innocent should suffer than that one guilty should be allowed to escape punishment. Categories of "automatic arrest" was not an invention of the victors over the Nazi Germany, for one of the first steps taken by the Cheka at the end of 1917 was the introduction of a system of mass hostages. The difference here is that from those arrested by the Cheka, as a "precautionary measure", - the former officers, aristocrats, bankers, professors, priests etc., - were dragged the victims of the periodic executions.

One can even say that the NKVD has its own sociologists for, by means of the Red Terror, Lenin and then Stalin changed in a dramatic way the social and even age-group structure of the Russian population. When Stalin boasted in one conference that in a Russian village one could not find "in day time with a light" the figures of

the old village "elder", village priest or a kulak, he only paid his respects to the sociological talents of his NKVD.

We see now that the NKVD (Mub) is conducting its experiments with an utmost energy throughout all those countries which were occupied by the Soviets during and after the war. And if a new war does not interrupt this new wave of the Red Terror, the text-books on ethnography will have to cross out the names of such nations as Estonian or Lettish, and to a greater extent simplify the picture of social composition of the population in Poland, Czech-Slovakia and the Balkan countries.

3. In speaking of the methods of the NKVD, we must note that the officials of the NKVD can act arbitrarily and enjoy the complete impunity of action as long as they degrade the people, as long as they torture and murder in accordance with the currently existing political line - the political line of the Politburo. Though, in the office of the Prosecutor General of the USSR there is a special prosecuting attorney for supervision over the NKVD, never the less it is a rare case, bordering on a miracle, when a petition is entertained against the actions of some organ or official of the NKVD and a case is reviewed. But even then, no disciplinary measures are taken against the Chekists even if they are guilty of the death of an innocent individual. In these cases, as a great kindness to the relatives, is issued a certificate to the effect that "the above mentioned was penalized in connection with certain affairs which, upon further investigation, are not substantiated ...". Such a certificate at least gives the widow of the penalized one an opportunity to receive work, and his children the opportunity to enter school, etc.

But when the party line changes, it may happen that yesterday's torturer-investigators are thrown in the same prison cell with the persons whom only last night they had tortured by shackling to the wall or finger nail splitting. It is well known that the occasions of Tagoda occasioned by themselves the death, without exception, of all his closest co-workers, all these Paukers, Trilissers, Bornens, Cehans, and Redens - who had just before been glorified

as the "wonderful Chekist legion". Together with them "walked down the corridor"<sup>x)</sup> as "enemies of the people" hundreds and hundreds of their assistants; nearly all of whom, through long years, themselves "sent down the corridor" tens of thousands of Russian people, in the greater part innocent even in the face of the famous 58th article of the Soviet penal code<sup>xx)</sup>.

Though Stalin thought that he was liquidating only his own enemies, in these cases he was putting a bullet in the nape of the neck of the unquestionably real enemies of the people. In his own turn, the downfall of the killer and successor of Yagoda - the "Stalinist", "iron" commissar Yezhov, brought about its own bloody purge among those who only just before thoroughly purged the Chekist cadres. All those executors who worked with Yezhov were shot without exception. Stalin know how to emerge from water dry.

Generally speaking, every unsuccessful operation, especially a failure in the secret work abroad, results in the severe punishment of the responsible NKVD personnel. There is no doubt that Canadian justice indirectly caught up with others, in addition to those who sat on the defendant's bench at Montreal: the NKVD dealt severely with all of those people who, being in Canada, were so inattentive as not to apprehend Igor Gouzenko. It is certain that some of the former colleagues of the Russian school teacher Kosienkina, who jumped from the window of the Soviet consulate in New York, were obliged to pay dearly for her act when they, in turn, had to "jump" from America back into Lubjanka street.

Actually, suspicion and spy fever flourish not less, but more, within the walls of the NKVD than outside. Behind every Chekist stands another one, if not two, checking on his loyalty. Consequently, the inclination is to think that the object of this surveillance is nothing more than another "heretofore undiscovered enemy of the people". This spirit of mutual suspicion and internal spy fever was successfully exploited by the Japanese intelligence!

x) One of many Chekists' terms for the death penalty.

xx) This article deals with "crimes" against the Soviet political system.

in the chapter on the "KRU" (Counter Intelligence Administration) we shall cite the case of a successful provocation which resulted in the massacre of Chekists by Chekists themselves.

4. One of the most peculiar characteristics of the NKVD lies in its methods for utilization of agents. The Soviet secret police relies not so much upon the quality, as upon the quantity of its agents. From the outside it may appear that this mania of the NKVD tends to convert the entire population of the Soviet Union into a gigantic network of its spies. Ministers and housemaids, generals and inmates of concentration camps, scientists and miners, artists and school boys, people without regard for age and sex, are recruited as agents of NKVD. There is only one restriction: the manual on recruiting "does not recommend the recruiting of children less than twelve years old" in view of "the danger that they will not observe the rules of secrecy". It is understandable that nobody can even approximately estimate the number of NKVD agents. But there is no doubt that they number millions, if not tens of millions. It is sufficient to say that "according to regulations" the ordinary Moscow house must have the following number of NKVD agents: the caretaker, the doorman, and at least one agent per apartment<sup>x)</sup>. It is no wonder that in the Soviet Union it is said, half jokingly, half seriously, that if two people are chosen at random, one of them is a "sekret", that is, a secret agent of the NKVD.

The explanation of the reliance upon the quantity of agents lies evidently in the lack within the NKVD of qualified personnel able to properly train agents. We will treat separately the characteristics of NKVD personnel, showing the extremely low level of their general and even police education. These people are very often unable to cope with their tasks, and in order to clear their cases they resort either to beatings of the arrestees or to exhausting <sup>them</sup> by means of endless questioning and special conditions of confinement.

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x) This applies to the typical Moscow apartment, which houses five or six families.

According to a Russian saying, the Cheka makes a virtue of its shortcomings, proclaiming that "the whole people aids the NKVD". In practice this means that the Communists and members of the Komsomol are formally required to collaborate with the NKVD. As Lenin said: "Every Communist must be a Chekist". When recruited as agents they are told that this is their party duty. To the non party people who refuse such work it is hinted that such refusal shows that they are evidently "against the Soviet Power". And if some brave men still refuse to become a traitor to his relatives and friends, they are directly placed in the file of "ASE" (anti-Soviet elements) and sooner or later repressed.

As a result, there is created a gigantic net of secret agents of all embracing types. This net covers, without exception, all Soviet institutions, beginning with the Politburo and ending with the lavatory attendants. Using this net, the NKVD "keeps Chekist vigilance", that is, it uses the daily reports of its millions of agents for the operation of its system of preventive terror. Of course, the value of these agents, recruited in large part under threats, is not great and <sup>as an</sup> for experienced intelligence agency they, by themselves, do not present such danger. On the other hand, because of their very abundance the NKVD reaches its goal, so to say, from the opposite end: knowing that NKVD agents are everywhere and seeing such an agent in almost every person, the opponents of the Soviet regime simply fear to show any activity, not to speak of organizing any opposition. The preventive nature of Soviet terror, in this case, also plays its prominent role in forbidding the very conception of ideas of struggle against Communism.

The system under which the NKVD uses agents may be compared to the actions of a fisherman who, having only bad nets, fills the entire ocean with them in the hope that in at least one of them he would catch a small fish. But what is impossible for an individual fisherman, however capable or rich he might be, is possible for the NKVD, because it has at its disposal an unlimited number of agents and can at any time turn almost any Soviet citizen into <sup>one of</sup> its agents. The more so, since the agents work for nothing! The sole limiting

factor is the lack of NKVD officials to direct the agents, read their denunciations, and to instruct them. Only in this fact lies the explanation why a certain percentage of the population of this "country of victorious socialism" remains outside this gigantic net of NKVD agents. Future historians of the epoch of Communism in Russia will undoubtedly take the figure of a miserable and unhappy NKVD informer as a symbol of this period. In other words, this unhappy figure is the real support of Stalin's power. This support has a mass character but is far from being trustworthy.

5. It is hardly necessary to remind <sup>one</sup> of the fact that the NKVD is not too scrupulous about its methods and actions. We have no intention to compare in this respect the NKVD with the famous inquisition or with the Gestapo. We avoid this comparison because no one can give the exact number of ~~many~~ victims of their torture chambers, and because here the palm of priority undoubtedly belongs to the NKVD - it has as its object much greater masses of population, and the enormous territory of the Soviet Union and it has been in operation for a longer period of time. But there is one more peculiarity in the methods of the NKVD which has no precedent, even in the most sinister institutions of this kind.

Here we have in mind the artificial fabrication of culprits and forged cases or, using the NKVD terminology, - "activization of suspects". Certainly, even the principle, laid down by Lenin himself, that it is better to punish nine innocent persons than to let one guilty to escape punishment - even this cautious thesis stimulates the false accusations and incorrect court decisions. But the NKVD has invented something which is much worse than the condemnation of a person whose guilt was not proved, or who is known to be innocent but who was forced, in result of the tortures and unbearable conditions in the prison, to blackmail himself. The NKVD invented the method of provocation. Formally, the usage of this method is forbidden. But practically, - the provocation is the chief method of work in the NKVD. For without this method of provocation, the NKVD would hardly be able to collect even one percent of the human raw material needed for the disgusting meat grinder in the Lubyanka square.



Without a proper number of victims, the NKVD would never receive its prestige of a "chastising sword" or "the body-guard of the conquests of October", while the Chekists would not be able to enjoy their good life, their numerous orders and governmental rewards, and all those numerous privileges which transform these hangmen into the Soviet elite. One must not forget that as a merit of work of every individual Chekist is taken the number of "enemies" he has discovered, revealed and punished in a certain period of time. If this number is big enough, - then the Chekist is good, his vigilance is high, and his loyalty to the case of Lenin-Stalin is blameless. But if this number is small, - then this Chekist has to forget any orders, promotions, a separate apartment, or a car - this dream of every Soviet careerist. Just in the same way, every chief of an Administration or a local organ of the NKVD is eager to demonstrate, by means of a number of "coffins"<sup>X)</sup> that the "unit trusted to him" is successfully fulfilling the program of the Party and the government, and "is holding aloft the banner of Chekist vigilance".

But what to do if there are no real spies, Trotskyites, and wreckers? Then they are being "activated", according to a wonderful Chekist term. This means that certain previously marked victims are being provoked, with the help of some special agents, to make some remarks or to conduct some actions, which can be interpreted later on as anti-Soviet ones. When taking this into account, we can definitely claim that at least a half, or may be even three-quarters, of all the victims of the NKVD are composed of the victims of these provoked "activizations".

But we shall not blame here the Chekists alone. As we shall see from the chapter dealing with the activities of the "GPU" - Secret Political Administration of the NKVD, the entire work of this branch, in its struggle against the "anti-party deviations" and in spying against the members of the ruling Communist party, is prescribed by special instructions of the Politburo, channelled through

X) The Chekist term for those doomed to execution.

the Special Sector of the Central Committee, or coming from Stalin himself. These instructions normally prescribe to "activate" that or the other "deviation" according to Stalin's political needs. To-day he decides to hit those whom he considers as guilty of Trotskyism, and the "S.U." immediately "activates", by means of provocative conversations, leaflets etc., those communists who are marked for subsequent "liquidation". To-morrow he needs to "render harmless" the former opponents of Vyshinski at the Institute for Soviet Right, and the S.U. "activates" the "school of rashkensis", that is those Soviet students of law who repeated, after Marx, that under the Communism the state is bound to "die out".

The monstrous processes against Zinoviev, Kaganov, Redek, Bukharin - all these are simply the examples of those counterfeit cases which Stalin needs in his own political interests. The example of this kind of forged cases represent all those numerous tragedies when millions of innocent people are being sent to the NKVD camps, simply because the boss has decided to dig a certain channel or to bore some new oil wells. Following Stalin, every individual Chekist starts to forge similar counterfeit cases, but in his own interests. He knows only too well, that Stalin trusts only those watch-dogs which bite the greatest number of by-passers.

6. Lastly, in our survey of methods used by the NKVD, is their clumsy character. We have already spoken of the lack of qualified, intelligent, and good workers that in one stroke turned the Cheka-NKVD into a torture chamber. Then we find that the majority of people falling into the hands of the NKVD do so not as a result of any sly or well thought out secret police combination, but because of simple denunciation concerning their careless words or actions which might be interpreted as "sabotage", thanks to the reports of the ubiquitous informants of the NKVD. After falling into the hands of the NKVD, a man, sooner or later, signs a confession; again, not as a result of artful fine work of the investigator but as a result of beatings, torture, coercion, provocation, promises and other methods, - in a large part of a physical nature.

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If one were to open the doors of the gloomy buildings in the block between the Lubyanka and Myasnitskaya streets, one could be convinced that the implements of torture which are to be seen in a museum are no more than children's playthings. The NKVD has its own means of physical persuasion, made to its own specifications in its own work-shops. If to this method is added that the guiding principle of the NKVD is that every arrestee is an "enemy of the people" whose guilt must only be "made official" and his accomplices found, then it is not surprising that a "false arrest" in the USSR is almost impossible. Events of any one escaping with a laconic document of "released by the NKVD" can be counted on one's fingers. Outside the walls of the NKVD everyone swears of his love and devotion to Stalin. Inside these walls every one confesses to his "criminal plots" against Stalin ...

Such is the system of the Soviet terror, the flesh and bone of the Communist system.

### 3. The Men of the NKVD

Although executioners are necessary at all times and to all regimes, the profession has never been considered particularly honorable. However, the USSR has in this has its own word, for the first organizer of the Communistic torture-chamber, leader of the Soviet hangmen-Chekists, Felix Dzerzhinsky, was called even in his lifetime "Knight of the proletarian revolution", and Lenin and Stalin directed their most flattering epitaphs to the Chekists. Here are a few examples :

"Chekists - threat to the world bourgeoisie", "highest and first sons of the revolution", "no higher or more honorable name than that of a Chekist" (Lenin), "Chekists - bodyguard of Socialism", "Eyes and ears of the Party", and so forth.

Not only among the Communists themselves, but among all the people there is carried on the uninterrupted work of praising the "difficult but noble profession of the Chekist" (Stalin), setting up the Chekist as an ideal for other workers, as an "example of

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self-sacrifice and bravery". In the Soviet Union there are great masses of literature, the object of which is not only to direct the enthusiasm of the people toward the praise and love <sup>for</sup> ~~of~~ their henchmen, but also to incite the people to help them in their dirty work of espionage and treachery. Even in the children's readers one finds descriptions of the "brave deeds" of various Chekists and praise for their activities, which are aiding socialist construction by the "liquidating of all of its enemies". Djerzhinsky, Kirov, and Beria are "beloved" heroes of children's textbooks, songs etc., with the help of which the Communists are poisoning the growing generation.

The libelous designation "Chekist" which is pronounced with fear and caution by the man on the street, was accepted arrogantly by the Soviet regime as a badge of the most honorable profession in the Soviet Union. The Chekists call themselves Chekists, and for the most outstanding of them there has even been established a special emblem "honorable Chekist", - a sword, surrounded by a laurel wreath, mounted on a rhomboid. Djerzhinsky was possessed with the idea of creating out of his henchmen a sort of closed caste, resembling a monastic order: with severe, ascetic customs, almost isolating themselves from life.

Djerzhinsky, a Pole by birth, and as it happens, a Catholic, obviously borrowed his idea from Ignatius Loyola. Not long before his strangely sudden death in 1926, Djerzhinsky even ordered work started on the writing of special "Chekist status", that is, a collection of rules of conduct, a codex of morals, so to speak. Although the word "moral" is definitely out of place in this instance this fact did not disturb Djerzhinsky and his successors. All the more, since Lenin gave such a definition of morals: "The basis of Communistic morals is the struggle for the strengthening and fulfilment of Communism".

And this definition was later completed by Stalin thus: "From the viewpoint of Communist morals, that is moral which contributes to the extermination of the old regime and the strengthening of the new, socialist order". Consequently, the fellows from

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Lubyanka Street consider themselves as some sort of "Stakhanovites of Communist morals". And so they babble about Chekist ethics. In the first place in "Chekist ethics" stands the idea of devotion to the Party. This means that a Chekist must torture, torment, and kill anybody whom the Party considers or might consider an enemy. This notwithstanding the fact that tomorrow any and everybody might be proclaimed "enemies of the people". It is a known fact that by order of Stalin, Yagoda and his closest collaborators, among whom were all of the members of the Collegium of the NKVD, were shot, not by ordinary henchmen of the NKVD, but by their closest subordinates.

Further, the Chekist "ethics" speak about the necessity to be vigilant and "undefatigably uncover and destroy the enemies of the people". If we substitute the word "preventivness" for the word "vigilance" then the question will become clear. A classic example of vigilance, depicted in all Chekist textbooks, is how a member of the Politburo, Lazar Kaganovich, serving at that time as the right hand of Stalin, "uncovered the camouflaged enemies of the people".

In the late thirties, Kaganovich supervised the construction of the subway in Moscow. At one of the tunnels two workers, semi-literate peasants, father and son just arrived from the country, decided to drink water from the fire hose. Having left they failed to turn off the faucet. As a result of this, a section of the tunnel the next day was flooded. An agent - representative of the NKVD - reported to Kaganovich, that the offenders were already arrested. But Kaganovich ordered the arrest also of the chief of the subway section. "In the first place he was negligent toward his work - his duty was to supply the mines with drinking water fountains. In the second place - added Kaganovich - investigate thoroughly his background". After two weeks the unfortunate engineer confessed, that in the past he was an officer of the Tsarist army. Hence it was made rather easy to <sup>reach</sup> make a conclusion about the sabotage.

As regards to the third demand of the "Chekist ethics", their "incorruptibility", one has to recognize, that, as a rule, in the NKVD this requisite is respected. But this is because of the simple reason: the Chekists are much better off materially than their victims. In those few cases, however, when the victims have valuable stones or gold (and this occurs rarely in the USSR), this does not produce an impression on the Chekists: wealth in the Soviet society plays an insignificant role - the power of money there is exchanged fully for the force of power.

It is necessary to note still another requirement which is presented to the Chekist. This requirement is - to be merciless toward the enemy. As in the above case, this principle of the "Chekist ethics" does not present in practice any sort of difficulty. We have already mentioned this, while speaking about the methods of work of the Soviet secret police. On the contrary, sometimes the leaders have to ask the Chekists not to be so energetic in following their "ethics of mercilessness". So, for example, Beria, having replaced the crazed Yezhov, in a special order pointed out to the almost crazed subordinates of Yezhov: "One can and even must beat, but it is not necessary to beat every one".

In this case Beria was least of all led by the feeling of humanity: to be human means to be a poor Communist. The reason was simply that the prisons of the NKVD were filled with victims of the wild terror during the time of Yezhov. All these people were clearly innocent of the crimes, to which they had confessed only because of the methods of questioning of the "Iron People's Commissar". A special commission re-examined their cases, and not desiring to set free the witnesses who had seen the horror, gave them a comparatively light punishment - such as banishment to the timber cutting in the extreme north. However, the beaten, tortured, almost crazy people firmly held to their previous confessions, extracted from them during the days of Yezhov. They repeated, for example, that they wanted to kill Yezhov himself (at that time already proclaimed as an enemy of the people), or that they were spies for the long non-existent state Austria-Hungary.

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Not only among simple people, but also among the Communists, among the very highest circles of the Soviet state and Party dignitaries, the very word NKVD brought fear; carefully screened from others, of course, under the pretense of hypocritical praise as regards to "our glorious Chekists". Therefore, usually, they stoop and crawl in order to try to gain the favor of the Chekists. The uniform of the Chekist is equal to the master key of a thief - to this man, with the crimson braid on his collar and with a blue top on his hat, are available all of the goods of the meager Soviet life: a room in the hotel, a berth on the train, a ticket to the theater etc., - and all this without queuing, this plague of simple Soviet mortals. It goes without saying that to bring a suit in court against the Chekists - is a thing unthinkable in the USSR. In a country, in which laws exist only on paper, there is one unwritten but strictly observed law: the NKVD is above the law, the NKVD is authorized to do as it pleases because it is the NKVD who creates the laws.

It is not surprising that, under such conditions of unlimited arbitrariness, the members of the NKVD feel themselves semi-gods. The secret character of the work, coupled with self isolation in private life (as a rule the Chekists live in houses of the NKVD or in special separate apartments), led to the forming in the USSR of a particular closed caste. In their own country, the Chekists live similar to the Americans in their occupation zone of Germany: they have their own mode of life, their better supply, their places for relaxation and rest, and last but not least their own courts.

All this, taken together, gradually forms a special type of man. The experienced eye can unmistakably guess whether a stranger has any relation to the "organs"<sup>X)</sup> or not. And this not only by conversation, but by his behaviour, even by appearance.

Lastly, we must note the national composition of the Chekists. From the very first days of the Soviet power this question began to play an important role in the internal politics. It must be explained that, as the leaders of Bolshevism, also the management of the

<sup>X)</sup> In the Chekist slang - NKVD.

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central Soviet institutions, including the Cheka-OGPU-MKVD, in the majority of cases were people of non-Russian origin. This fact was particularly apparent during the years of the leadership of Yagoda. It is well known that during this time there took place the cruel reprisals against the Russian peasants (liquidation of the "kulaks"). In the eyes of the population, MKVD and its work acquired a definite significance.

The picture changed radically after Stalin liquidated the opposition, the leaders of which, basically, were of non-Russian origin. The place of Yagoda and his companions in the MKVD was occupied by new people, whose acceptance depended largely upon three conditions: they had to be, if possible, of Russian nationality; they had to come from the inferior regions of the Soviet Union; and they were to have neither relatives nor close acquaintances abroad. This was a tribute to the spy fever which gripped the Kremlin in the middle thirties. One of the first results of this delivery of the "avenging sword of the proletariat" into the hands of people "from behind the plow", - the Soviet expression meaning simple and poorly educated people, with a low mental development, but "to the bitter and devoted to the cause of Lenin-Stalin", was a significant lowering of the effectiveness of the MKVD.

Having lost its experienced agents and investigators, the MKVD was forced to use the most primitive methods of a provincial police establishment. There began a period, when the entire task of the MKVD was achieved simply by beating prisoners. Formerly, the MKVD was joined "by calling", that is, by those who had a taste for bestial, sadistic blood shed. Now people joined the MKVD as a result of "Party mobilization", i.e. at the directive of the Party. It is not surprising, that many of them proved to be absolutely unfit for the "specific" work of the MKVD. One of the orders of the MKVD mentions with indignation, for the education of others, that one of the new batch of Chekists, having acquainted himself with the damnation of a former Trotskyite, called him into his office



and began to admonish him : "it is not good to engage in anti-Party propoganda, Comrade P., didn't you, in the old days, sign an oath to be loyal to the Party?"

Only by slow stages could the NKVD re-establish a cadre of qualified agents, spies, and technicians of secret work. However, the war with Germany once more found the Soviet secret police in a state of complete disorganization. This explains such bungling methods in the fight against the German espionage as the wholesale arrest of all people with "German names", or the banishment to Middle Asia of the entire population of the Autonomous German Volga Republic. They did not know how to ferret out the actual agents, and besides, they did not want to be bothered with "trifles".

There is reason to believe that only by the very end of the war was the NKVD able to conduct some limited activity in German territory. This can be seen, for instance, in the attempted assassination of General Vlassov in 1944. Even those agents who were successfully infiltrated into other countries were very poorly qualified. So, notwithstanding the broadest co-operation, which was accorded to the Soviet repatriation missions in the Western zones of Germany and Austria, the majority of the anti-soviet elements and deserters from the Soviet Union have successfully secreted themselves, either within the masses of D.P.'s or within the German economy. It must be believed that the weakness of their own cadres until now has compelled the NKVD to run the risk of a wider use of local fifth column members in the "capitalistic" countries.

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CHAPTER IIHISTORY OF THE NKVD

During the three decades of its existence, the apparatus of the Soviet secret police experienced a whole series of re-organizations and even changed its name five times. This fact did not by one iota change the essence of Stalin's secret police, one of the principal means to organize the world-wide Communist revolution.

The following is a short history of the NKVD

On December 20, 1917, just two months after the October revolution in Russia, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR created the "All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for the fight against counter-revolution, sabotage, and speculation". This agency was ordinarily called, in abbreviation, C.E.A. and therefore received, among the people, the colloquial designation "Cheka" or "Chrezvichaiski". The first chairman of the All-Russian Cheka was the above mentioned Felix Dzerzhinsky, at whose instigation the Commission was created.

The total Red Terror was begun by the Cheka in August, 1918, after the murder of the chairman of the retrograd Cheka Mikhail (Moise) Uritsky and an attempt on the life of Lenin.

From this time on the functions of this bloody instrument of the Bolshevik dictatorship were clearly determined. So, for instance, in the proclamation of the retrograd Soviet on the occasion of the attempt upon the life of Lenin, it was said: "For the murder of Comrade Uritsky, and for the attempt upon the life of the leader of the world revolution, Comrade Lenin, the proletariat will answer the rotten bourgeoisie with death blows. Not with an eye for an eye, but with a thousand eyes for one. A thousand lives of the bourgeoisie for the life of our leader. Long live the Red Terror!"

Lenin thus delineated the goal of the Cheka : "The only way for the liberation of the masses lies in the extermination of exploiters. That is the task of the Cheka."

The executive of Djerzhinsky in the Cheka, one of the most bloody henchmen of the Russian people, a Latvian, Latsis, - was still more frank: "The struggle is one of life and death. If you do not kill, you will be killed. Therefore kill, that you may not be killed!

From the time of Stalin there appeared in use a number of new, but not less expressive slogans. Here are some of them:

"NKVD - The vindictive sword of the proletarian revolution!"

"Chekists - Bodyguard of the October Revolution!"

During the period of the Civil War of 1918-1922, the Red Terror cost many millions of lives. After the termination of the Civil War and after the Bolsheviks had consolidated their power over Russia, this terror not only failed to cease, but with each year it consumed more and more victims. System of agencies of repression and compulsion was continually widened and penetrated deeper through-out all the pores of administrative, social, and economic life of the country.

6th of February, 1922, All-Russian Extraordinary Commission (Cheka) was reorganized into the State Political Administration (Gosudarstvennoye Politicheskoye Upravlenie), in abbreviation - GPU, which quickly was renamed "Unified State Political Administration" (OGPU). The essence of this reorganization was that the system of vindictive organs of the Soviet dictatorship was significantly extended and a new system included additionally: border guards, transport guards, administration of places of confinement, and also significantly widened the net of secret agencies within the Red Army and the Communist Party. Beside that, by 1922 the Comintern was expanding its large activity. Correspondingly, the outer-political tasks of the GPU were to assist the Comintern in certain special spheres of its activities. The Cheka was designed to act only within the country, while the GPU, from the very first day, stretched out its tentacles beyond the borders of the USSR.

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This reorganization had also a great significance in principle: the Cheka was created, as an extraordinary measure, for the defense of the Soviet power during its most critical moments; but the GPU, at the moment of its creation, was conceived as a permanent organ of the Bolshevik dictatorship. Thus, it was directly recognized, that the mass terror is an inalienable part of the Soviet system. In the course of twelve years, from 1922 to 1934, the Soviet power openly recognized this situation.

On June 10, 1934, the GPU was reorganized into the NKVD of the USSR. This abbreviation comes from the full Russian title of that institution - Narodny Komissariat Vnutrennih Del USSR. Formally this reorganization was explained by the fact that the period of struggle against the counter-revolution had ended, that the Soviet power was definitely strengthened, and therefore there was no more need for the existence of a special organ for the suppression of counter-revolution and opposition within the country. However, the "Great Purge", - beginning shortly after this reform, - with its millions of victims, showed that this official explanation did not in any measure correspond with the actual reason of the transformation.

The actual reason of this reorganization was that at this time the apparatus of the GPU again so widened, complicated and expanded, that it could no longer be packed into the frame of one administration. The system of universal trailing and spying covered all of the country. This was no more, and by no means, one single organization. This was a complicated net of specialized organs of terror and spying, penetrating to the very deepest corners of the vast territory of the Soviet Union and far beyond its borders.

The essentials of the reorganization of 1934 were, that besides the complicated net of political supervision system of the GPU, a new system of the NKVD included also the administration of the police and criminal inquiry, passport administration, administration of the fire department and administration of the transport, even a department for the recording of the acts of the civilian state (ZAGS). Besides that, the NKVD united and subordinated into one system all the numerous and widespread prisons, places of preliminary confinement, correctional labor colonies and correctional labor

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camp (the Soviet names for different types of concentration camps), with all their numerous and extraordinarily complicated auxiliary enterprises and institutions.

The basic departments of the OGPU, which performed the trailing and spying within the USSR and beyond its borders, were preserved, generally, in their former structure and were unified into the system of the "Administration of State Security" (UGS NKVD), which in the period of the "Great Purge" (1936-38) received the title of the "Chief Administration for State Security" (GUOS NKVD) - "Glavnoye Upravlenie Gosudarstvennoi Besopasnosti". Apart of this most important administration, in the system of the NKVD was created a number of other branches and administrations, which spheres of activity will be examined in the following parts of our work.

The fifth of February, 1941, the NKVD was divided into two commissariats: "The People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs" (NKVD) and "The People's Commissariat for State Security" (NKGB). This reform became indispensable after the period of the "Great Purge" and as a result of the forced annexation by the Soviet Union, in 1939-40, of a number of new republics. The apparatus of the NKVD became exceptionally large and complicated, and there was no longer room for this enormous apparatus in the structure of one commissariat. As a result of this reform, the personnel of both new commissariats grew yet more.

This reform took place by means of the separation from the NKVD of its principle administration - that of the Chief Administration for State Security. This organization was given an independent existence and elevated to the rank of a People's Commissariat - The People's Commissariat for State Security (Narodnyi Komissariat Gosudarstvennoy Besopasnosti, or NKGB). To it was given several necessary services: an administrative and service branch etc.

Under the control of the new NKVD were left the following: the administration of places of confinement and corrective-labor camps (GULAG), transport, militia (police), and passport branch, ZAGS (civil status registration office), fire-brigades, highway

transportation, administrative and service branch with its sanitary section, the numerous sanatoria and rest-houses for Chekists etc. As a result, the NKVD was transformed into a subordinate organization with secondary functions, but the "Sword of Revolution" was entrusted to the NKGB, that is, this new People's Commissariat for State Security reserved for itself the exclusive field of espionage, terrorism and suppression, and at the same time keeping its eye on the activities of the new NKVD.

Almost immediately after the beginning of the war, that is July 20th, 1941, the NKVD and NKGB were again united into the one NKVD under the direction of its former People's Commissar, Lavrenty Beria, who, at the time of the previous division, had been appointed Stalin's deputy in the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, with the task of co-ordinating the work of these two Commissariats.

The NKVD existed in this form until the end of the world war II. The reason for this unification could be found in the necessity of simplifying in time of war the administration of the complicated apparatus of suppression and terror. There is also no doubt that Stalin wanted Beria, as his personal friend and confident, to reassure at this critical moment the single-handed control of this most important part of the Soviet system. In addition, this new reform was influenced by the fact that during the four months of their existence, these two new Commissariats did not have time to delimit fully the sphere of their activities. Under the conditions of military debacle and retreat, this could have led to the loss of control behind the front lines also. This was the situation in regard to the NKVD until 1945. Reviewing these re-organizations, we do not take into consideration the "SMASH" ("Death to Spies") which was created during the war within the frame of the NKVD, but as a semi-independent institution.

After the end of the war, the NKVD was again divided into the NKVD and NKGB and in March 1946 these Commissariats were renamed the "Ministry of Internal Affairs" (MVD) and the "Ministry of State Security". This was accomplished in accordance with the

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transformation of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR into the Council of Ministers. The principle of division of the NKVD after the war was the same as it had been in 1941: the Chief Administration of State Security of the NKVD, with the Administration of interior troops and border guards of the NKVD, and some servicing organizations became the Ministry of State Security (MGB), while all the remaining administrations and divisions of the former NKVD passed into the hands of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD).

According to the information which the authors of the present work have at hand, the internal structure of the separate divisions in the MVD and MGB remained almost the same as it had been in the system of the NKVD in 1939-1940, to which period refer the materials introduced here. The authors were able to register only one major change: ~~the~~ former "Administrations" of the system of the Chief Administration of State Security have been given the title of the "Chief Administrations" in the MGB. There have been no essential changes in either the methods or practice since that time, only the scope of activity has become even broader. In those isolated instances where the functions or the structure of these or other NKVD divisions underwent serious changes, these changes will be noted additionally. For this reason, the authors have permitted themselves in this analysis to use the present tense of verbs rather than the past, although the NKVD formally ceased to exist in 1946.

According to the Constitution of the USSR, the NKVD is a Union-Republican Commissariat and therefore its local organs must subordinate themselves to the higher organs of Soviet power in the republics, areas, regions and districts. But actually, the local organs of the NKVD are completely autonomous and are subordinated only to their own top-level agencies, while the NKVD itself, in all important questions of its activities, is subordinated only to the Politburo. The Council of People's Commissars of the USSR (now the Council of Ministers) has a former control over the NKVD only in financial matters, - but even this is merely an ephemeral prerogative. Practical control over the NKVD is carried out by the

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Politburo through the "Special Section" of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party, through a special group of the Party Control Commission (KPK CK VKP/b/), located since 1936 in the NKVD building, No 2 Dzerzhinsky Square, in Moscow, and through some other special agencies subordinated directly to the Stalin's "Personal Secretariat".

In a purely abstract case of political divergence or conflict between the government of the USSR and the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, the NKVD, now the MGB, is obliged to carry out only the orders and directives of the Politburo and the General Secretary of the Communist Party, that is of J.V. Stalin. Such a case took place only once, in 1937, when by the order of Stalin, the NKVD arrested and brought to trial <sup>the</sup> former chief of the Soviet Government, - the former chairman of the Council of the People's Commissars of the USSR, Alexei I. Rykov (it is true that by this time Rykov was "only" the Commissar of Communications). This example clearly illustrates that the NKVD is a governmental organ in form only, but factually it is an all powerful instrument of the party dictatorship, that is, of its supreme agency, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Party.

The two ministries remain as the same instrument of Party power, as in the time of the NKVD. The fact that they are subordinate to Beria, who is a deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, changes nothing at all, in so far as Beria is at the same time a member of the Politburo. It will be proper to recall that already in 1934 the transformation from the OGPU to the NKVD was explained thus: instead of a party organ there would be now a normal state organ; however, in reality, this re-organization was not followed by any change whatsoever in the character of the organ itself.

Cheks-OGPU-NKVD-MGB are actually different names for the same instrument of a terroristic system, heretofore unprecedented in the history of humanity. The only difference between them lies in the ever growing widening of their functions and spheres of activity.



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In summary, we can say that the mission of the MKVD-MGB is as follows:

1. within the borders of the USSR

a) The uncovering and liquidating of all political movements and groups, even individuals who are hostile or in opposition to the Party and Soviet system, or even those who take a neutral stand.

b) The safeguarding of the accomplishments of party decisions and undertakings by all organizations and individuals without exceptions; this is done by secret observations of the activities of all governmental, economic, social, and in certain cases, even party organizations, and always and especially the armed forces of the USSR.

c) Permanent control of all correspondence to and from foreign countries, both official as well as private, and periodical and selective control of correspondence within the USSR.

d) In co-operation with the party, a preventative censorship of all printed matter in the USSR, notwithstanding its character or significance - beginning with the official Communist party publication "Pravda" and ending with the trademarks on cigarettes.

e) Protection of Stalin and other leaders of the party and the Soviet government.

f) Security of the USSR's borders from the point of view of political as well as customs.

g) Protection of important military objectives, such as factories, bridges, etc.

h) Counter-intelligence work and observation of all foreigners in the USSR.

i) The management and protection of concentration camps and the exploitation of slave labor for the realization of the five-year plans, chiefly in the Far North.

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2. Beyond the borders of the USSR

a) Political intelligence and diversionary-terroristic activities in accordance with special instructions of the Politburo and in co-operation with the so-called "sister organizations" - ("Saxhale organi).

b) Co-operation, according to the decisions of the "Molotov Committee" of the Politburo, and the secretariat of the Comintern (Cominform), with the leadership of the foreign Communist parties in their struggle against the governments and hostile political parties of their countries.

c) The disruption, by infiltration, of all anti-soviet political organizations abroad.

d) Spying on all members of the Soviet diplomatic, commercial and other representatives and delegates of the USSR, and also on Soviet military spies.

e) Spying on all leading personnel of the foreign Communist parties.

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**CHAPTER III****STRUCTURE OF THE NKVD****1. Administrative Division**

In accordance with the 1936 Soviet constitution, the NKVD was an Union-Republic People's Commissariat just as the MVD and MGB are Union-Republic Ministries at present. This means that there is a central Union-Republic Commissariat (or Ministry) in Moscow and that there are Republic People's Commissariats (now Ministries) in each of the 15 republic capitals (for example: Kiev, Minsk, Baku, Riga, etc.) which are directly subordinated in all most important features to the Union-Republic Commissariat (or Ministry) in Moscow. Only formally, and even then only in certain secondary administrative and budget questions are the Republic NKVD (now the MVD and MGB) controlled by the Councils of People's Commissars of the corresponding Republics (now: the Councils of ministers)

**See the diagram No 1**

The RSFSR did not have its own NKVD (since 1947 there are MVD and MGB of the RSFSR). The duties of that organ were carried out by the office of the first deputy of the People's Commissar of the NKVD of the USSR. The functions of the NKVD of the RSFSR for regions located in the European part of that republic were ordinarily carried out by the NKVD regional administration for Moscow (abbreviated : UNKVD MO - Upravlenie NKVD Moskovskoi Oblasti). However, the UNKVD-MO did not dispatch orders in its own name to the regions, but administered such regional administration of the NKVD (for example, Tula) by sending orientations and inquiries with references to the orders of the Deputy People's Commissar or of the People's Commissar himself.

The autonomous republics did not have their own People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs, but only the regional administrations of the NKVD of these Union Republics to which the given autonomous republic belonged. So, for example, the Abkhazian ASSR,

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comprising a part of the Georgian SSR, will have the Abkhassian regional administration of the NKVD of the Georgian SSR. Autonomous republics of the USSR had the regional administrations of the NKVD of the USSR, while those autonomous republics having small population and no significant military or economic importance, might even come under the jurisdiction of the regional administration of the NKVD of neighboring regions of greater importance. So, for example, the Northern Caucasian autonomous republics of Northern Ossetia and Kabardino-Balkar and the autonomous region of Es-rachsev were "served" (to use the Chekist terminology) by the Ordjonikidze (former Vladikavkas) area administration of the NKVD of the USSR. Note: The above mentioned autonomous republics were liquidated during the world war II for the anti-soviet activities of their population.

The structure, that is the personnel complement and functions of the NKVD of a Union Republic were determined by the size, as well as the strategic and economic importance of a given republic. In such extremely important republics as the Ukraine and Belorussia, their People's Commissariats for Internal Affairs represented somewhat smaller replicas of the All-Union NKVD in Moscow.

See the diagram No 2

In the less important Union Republics, the NKVD of the republics were organized and worked, actually, according to the authority of the NKVD regional administration. Earlier, they were termed the "fully empowered representations of the OGPU (abbreviated- PP OGPU - Polnomochnoe Predstavitelstvo OGPU). In such Union Republics the importance of the local NKVD could even be less than the authority of an administration of the NKVD of large regions. For example, the Moldavian Republic's NKVD, by its size and importance, could be considered a much lower level than the NKVD regional administrations of Moscow and Leningrad.

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## 2. Local Agencies

### See the diagrams No 3 and 4

In general, the regional administrations of the NKVD have an identical structure and are fully empowered to resolve all local problems. For the USSR, the first Deputy of the People's Commissar of the All-Union NKVD and the office of the Chief Administration for State Security in Moscow furnished the directives for the local agencies of this republic. The remaining 15 republic NKVDs administered the local NKVD agencies located in the corresponding republics.

Practically, the main burden of work rests on the shoulders of these regional administrations. Stalin personally gave special attention to the furthering of the effectiveness of their preventive-terroristic activities. In his language this was cynically called: "making the NKVD intimate with the masses". It is precisely these local organizations of the NKVD, which cover the entire country like a rash, that are the basis of the Stalin regime. The center only directs their activities and, at that, on the basis of material received from the local agencies.

From the point of view of operations, the regional administrations of the NKVD were divided as follows:

1. District sections of the NKVD ("rayotdel" NKVD),
2. City sections of the NKVD,
3. Operational branches of the NKVD ("opersektor NKVD").

The importance and role of the district sections of the NKVD does not require any special explanation at this place, they are organized in every district of any region ("oblast") or areas ("krai") of the USSR corresponding to the administrative division of the Soviet Union.

City sections of the NKVD exist in all cities and industrial centers of the USSR which in importance are above the level of district centers. They work along the lines of an operational branch.

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In the last years before the war, in such powerful cities as Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, and others, in the efforts to delineate and divide the work, were introduced city administrations of the NKVD (as in the party system); for example - there were "The Moscow Regional Party Committee" and "The Moscow City Party Committee". In the same way there were: "The Moscow Regional NKVD Administration" and "The Moscow City NKVD Administration". These city administrations directed the work of the NKVD agencies only in the city itself, not considering the surrounding districts.

The operational branch could be compared to a district office of the NKVD ("raietdel" NKVD), but having certain special duties. The structure and personnel complement of these branches are different. Their inauguration in this or that region was dictated by the presence in a given region of some special population group, which could not be dealt with by the ordinary district office of the NKVD and so a special "service" was required from the side of the NKVD. For example, within the Moscow regional administration of the NKVD there was created such an operational branch in connection with the existence in the Maryukhov district of two or three settlements of German colonists (farmers).

The structure, personnel staff, and activities of the regional, city and district NKVD offices and those of NKVD operational branches will be treated in greater detail in following parts of this work.

Each organ of the NKVD, from the People's Commissariat down to the district office, has its own Party organization. In the local subordinate organs it is the "party group", in the sections - "party collective", in the important divisions and administrations there are "party committees", and in the People's Commissariat of the NKVD is the "Party Committee of the NKVD of the USSR".

From the regional or republic agency of the NKVD, and up, the Party organs publish their own newspapers. The newspaper of the Party committee of the People's Commissariat, titled "The Chekist", was published by the central printing office of the NKVD, in Moscow, and its birth goes back to the time of Dzerzhinsky, i.e. to

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the early twenties. There are evidences that the first editor of this newspaper was Djerzhinsky himself. The secretaries of the party organizations, beginning with the "party committee", are occupied exclusively with their party work and are freed from any other duties. All lower level party secretaries work in the party organizations and, at the same time, perform their basic duties in the organs of the NKVD.

In <sup>contrast</sup> distinction from all other Soviet (i.e. governmental or public) organizations, the party organs of the NKVD occupy only a secondary position. In view of the secret character of work of the NKVD, the local party organizations cannot give either any kind of directions or cannot control the activity of the whole NKVD or of its separate parts, or even of individual Communists in the NKVD. Therefore, the sphere of activity of local party organs in the NKVD is limited to political-educational work (orientation of Communists in the spirit of Marxism-Leninism), carrying on political campaigns, as before the 1st of May, for example, etc.

### 3. Central Agencies

See the diagram No 5

At the moment of its division into two People's Commissariats in 1941, the NKVD of the USSR in Moscow had the following central agencies (with their sub-agencies in all Union Republics and in the NKVD administrations of areas and regions) :

Chief

1. Central Administration of State Security (abbreviated - **GUSS NKVD - Glavnoe Upravlenie Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti NKVD SSSR**);

2. Chief Administration of Border Guards and Internal Troops (abbreviated: **GUPTO NKVD SSSR - Glavnoe Upravlenie Pogranichnoi Ohrany i Vozdukh NKVD SSSR**);

3. Chief Administration of Camps of the NKVD (abbreviated: **GULAG NKVD SSSR - Glavnoe Upravlenie Lagerей NKVD SSSR**);

4. Chief Administration of Militia and Criminal Police (abbreviated: GUM NKVD SSSR - Glavnoe Upravlenie Militsii i Ugolovnogo Resnyaka NKVD SSSR);

5. Chief Passport Administration (abbreviated: GPU NKVD - Glavnoe Paspertnoe Upravlenie NKVD SSSR) - this agency was subordinated to the Central Administration of Militia;

6. Chief Administration for Civil Status Registration (abbreviated: ZAGS NKVD SSSR - Glavnoe Upravlenie Zapisa i Aktov Grazhdanskogo Sostoyaniya);

7. Chief Administration of Fire Guards (abbreviated: GUPO NKVD SSSR - Glavnoe Upravlenie Pozarnoi Ochrany);

8. Chief Administration of High Ways Construction (abbreviated: "Glavshodor NKVD" - Glavnoe Upravlenie stroitelstva Shosseinykh i Bezelesovnykh Dorog NKVD SSSR).

In addition to these basic administrations, central agencies of the NKVD included also the sport society "Lynamo" and a series of service administrations and agencies such as, for example: administration of personnel, finance administration of the NKVD, "house-keeping" administration with the sanatorium section, which operates the sanatoria and rest homes of the NKVD, etc. All these service administrations are organized according to the ordinary type of the similar institutions in other People's Commissariats of the USSR, and there is no especial interest in analyzing them. These service administrations have sub-sections in all lower organs of the NKVD, but for simplification of the picture, the internal sub-structure of these service agencies will not be explained in detail. There will be exceptions to this only in separate cases, where the work of a service organ of the NKVD has some sort of special interest, as for example: the administration of personnel or the financial administration.

The structure, functions, and sphere of activity of each one of these basic administrations of the NKVD will be dealt with in detail in subsequent chapters of this work.



#### 4. Higher NKVD Leadership

Just as in any other Soviet People's Commissariat, the NKVD was headed and directed by a People's Commissar with the help of the so-called "Collegia", i.e. his deputies and their staff - secretaries, adjutants, etc. But in the NKVD in the years prior to the war, the collegia as such, that is the permanent council of the People's Commissar with his deputies and assistants (so called members of the collegia) did not play the same role as in other governmental organs. The authors do not even have information as to whether the collegia convened to undertake any decisions from the time of Iezhov (1937-38), - as, say, was the case in the time of Yagoda (early thirties), when it was openly declared: "this one was executed by sentence of the collegia of OGPU".

Judging from all available evidences, the collegia in the NKVD was <sup>substituted</sup> ~~substituted~~ by many different agencies created gradually around the People's Commissar in connection with the increasing volume of the "work". Among their number were the agencies which comprise the so-called "Administration of the People's Commissar".

#### See the diagram No 5

This directorate seems to have been a super organ of the NKVD and consisted of the following: the Commissar himself, his secretariat, four (4) deputies, a special agent-representative for the Commissar, a special tribunal for the commissar, an interia control council and a central engineering-construction bureau.

First deputy of the People's Commissar. Ordinarily he is the chief of the Chief Administration of State Security (GUGB NKVD), and, at the same time, directs the regional and local NKVD administrations in the RSFSR. Sometimes he acts as the chief of the Moscow regional administration of the NKVD. Namely therefore, when the Moscow regional administration of the NKVD issues orders to other NKVD regional administrations throughout the RSFSR, this is always done under the authority of the deputy of the People's

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Commissar, and not from the chief of the Moscow regional NKVD administration (UNKVD-MO).

This post was occupied : 1935-35 by Prokofiev; 1936-37 by Zakovsky, 1940-41 by Markulev, who after the war became the first minister of the MGB.

The Second Deputy of the People's Commissar. He directs : the First Section (Pervyi Otdel) of the NKVD - protection of the leaders, the Personnel Section, the Communication Section (Svyastryas), the house-keeping administrative offices, and the office of the administrative supervisor of the NKVD (the latter office performing the role of chief executioner of NKVD victims). Including the important problem of protection of the Krenalin and Belshovich leaders, this deputy is responsible solely for the inner and administrative problems of the NKVD itself. In 1939-41, Kraglov occupied this post; after the war he was appointed Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR (MVD).

The Third Deputy of the People's Commissar. He directs : the Chief Administration of Militia and Criminal Police, the Chief Administration of Concentration Camps (GULAG), high ways and transportation administration, ZAGS (administration of civil status registration) and other establishments of the MVD type. In 1939, Kabulov occupied this post, and after the merger of the commissariats, in July 1941, he was appointed deputy to Beria in commanding the combined NKVD.

The Fourth Deputy of the People's Commissar. He directs : the Chief Administration of the border guards and internal troops of the NKVD, the administration of the border passport control points and all questions of co-ordination of activities of these administrations with other ministries of the USSR, primarily with the Ministries of Armed Forces and Foreign Trade. Here must be noted that until 1937 the prisoner escort troops were under the joint jurisdiction of the NKVD and of the Commissariat of Defense. In 1937-38, Brinovsky occupied this post.

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The Party Committee of the NKVD People's Commissariat occupies, as already stated above, a secondary position of importance. This is explained by the fact that, in addition to the confidential character of the NKVD work, the Commissar, himself, his deputies and the directors of the most important administrative organs are members of the higher party organs, up to the level of the Central Committee of the Party and the Politburo. Therefore, they are not obliged to account for their activities before the secretariat of their party organization.

In the lower level organs of the NKVD the party committees enjoy somewhat greater importance, but even there they do not have a shadow of that decisive role which is characteristic in all other Soviet establishments, offices, and undertakings. In this we see still one more confirmation of the fact that the NKVD is not a governmental but purely a party organ. We recall that in the Central Committee of the Party, itself, there is also a Party Committee (which runs mostly the party activities of the auxiliary personnel of that office) which play an identical secondary role.

Special Council. This is a higher permanent judiciary agency of the NKVD. According to its official status, the Special Council consists of : the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR (NKVD), one of the secretaries of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party, and the Attorney General of the USSR. But the Special Council convenes itself in this form only for the examination of affairs of exceptional importance. Ordinarily, it consists of less important officials of these three agencies, acting with authority and on behalf of their superiors.

The NKVD itself ordinarily is represented in the Special Council (Osoboe Soveshanie) by some important official of the commissariat, but necessarily acting with the full authority and on behalf of the People's Commissar himself. This person represents the investigative aspect of any given case. The second member of the Special Council is the representative of the Attorney General of the USSR - fulfilling the prosecutor's functions. Sometimes, and rather often, this role is being given to some senior

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member of the Military Prosecutor's office which works very closely with the NKVD. The third permanent member of the council ordinarily is the secretary of the Party Committee of the NKVD, acting with full authority of the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. According to this model are organized the Special Councils of each republican NKVD in the Soviet Union.

We shall analyze this agency more closely in the chapter dealing with the activities of the so-called "troika's". Here we have only to state that the "Special Councils" and "troikas" close that vicious ring, by means of which the NKVD becomes the supreme master of life and death of every Soviet citizen - it acts as a spy, police officer, investigator, attorney and judge simultaneously.

Special Agent-Representative for the People's Commissariat. This is an official given a complete authority within a defined jurisdiction.

To this duty ordinarily is appointed one of the important operational officials of the central organs of the NKVD. His mission is to settle offenses of personnel of the commissariat itself. In all the republic and regional administrations of the NKVD there are also special agent-representatives who settle the offenses and other misdeeds committed by officials of the local NKVD organs.

The apparatus of the special agent-representative is composed of a special operating section, having 8-10 operative agent-representatives, all of whom are officials of higher authority such as majors or Lt. colonels of State Security. The offenses can be of a most varied nature: from reports of disciplinary offenses to accusations of belonging to the opposition or counter-revolutionary activities and plots. All cases of this type go through administrative channels of the NKVD and if the aspect of offense or crime is not fully apparent or is extraordinarily serious, then they are referred through the chief of the administration or section to the office of the special agent-representative for settlement. This special agent-representative presents his conclusion to the chief of the regional administration of the NKVD or even commissar himself for final decision.

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Curiously enough, according to Chekist customs, appeal of such conclusions and decisions is considered as "not ethical". The reasons of these unique "chekist ethics" are truly characteristic: the investigations are conducted by the "comrades" themselves, the decisions undertaken by the chief of administration, against whom nothing can be done. As to complaints to the Central Committee of the Party, they are out of question because they would immediately become known, and would result only in complicating the affair, in a scandal (with possible expulsion from the Party) and at any rate would result in dismissal from one's work and transfer somewhere to Archangel or Cheliabinsk, if not worse.

Inside the NKVD the special agent-representatives are either feared and avoided or the people attempt to curry favour with them by flattery and small gifts; that is to say, within the NKVD, the relations of the rank and file Chekists towards the special agent-representatives are just the same as the attitude of the population of the USSR towards all members of the NKVD.

When a special agent-representative, himself, gets in trouble, then all the other officials of the NKVD do not miss a chance to repay him for all former trouble occasioned ... then by this individual. So, in 1938, by order of the deputy commissar Laskovsky, the special agent-representative of the Moscow region, Hypolitov, was arrested. He was incarcerated in the Taganski prison, in the common cell block, and then was shot. During the time of the investigation the officials of the administration, who earlier had sought his favor, went in droves to the prison in order "to slap him in the face".

The office of the special agent-representative has no agent net of their own.

Secretariat of the People's Commissar. It has just the same structure and personnel, in general, as have other secretariats of People's Commissariats (or Ministries) in the USSR. Within the secretariat is a control commission for the verification of activities of various administrations and for the clarification of

possible conflicts and misunderstandings among themselves. Linked with the Secretariat, also, is the office for investigating petitions to the People's Commissar. In the building of the NKVD itself, (ordinarily in the office for entry permits) just as in all other Soviet Commissariats and Ministries, hangs a box for petitions, in which each visitor "may" drop his "petition", the ambiguous term delicately applied to complaints in the USSR. In view of the conditions prevailing in the USSR in general, and particularly in the NKVD, the existence of this office and of the bureau seems only a cynical fraud: since who would dare to make a complaint against the NKVD (especially to the NKVD, itself). The single type of "petitions" seen, therefore, confined to denunciations.

The Engineering-Construction Bureau. This bureau plays an important role in the large-scale business enterprises, which are found in the undertakings of the NKVD. To this bureau come all technical inventions and projects, worked out by inmates of camps and prisons, spread throughout the whole territory of the USSR. In special cases, this bureau has authority to free prisoners essential for its work. But in the majority of cases, these prisoners who initiate important projects or inventions, simply are transferred from the jurisdiction of the prison or camp authority to the jurisdiction of this bureau, but still remain in the same prison or camp. Sometimes such prisoners are transferred to a special section of the prison. In such cases the prisoners can act as assistants in special sections, have automobiles, better provisions, but remain in strict isolation and fully cut off from any link with the outside world. In such circumstances, for instance, was the well known designer of steam boilers, Prof. Kamsin, imprisoned in the early thirties at the trial of the "Promparty" ("Industrial party"), and world renowned aviation designer A.S. Tupolev, arrested by the NKVD in 1937, and later freed during the war for copying the American B-29.

This bureau now comes under the jurisdiction of the NKVD. There is reason to believe that the Soviet experimentations on atomic energy come under the supervision of this body.

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## 5. Functions of NKVD Apparatus Components and their Officials

By a mere enumeration of components of the NKVD apparatus, one can see that there are two basic types of NKVD agencies, namely:

- a) Operative,
- b) Administrative or accomodative.

Operative sections (divisions or departments) and administrations (that is their official title - call to your mind the signature on the pass issued for foreign diplomats for entering the Red Square or the Kremlin) are such agencies of the NKVD, which directly fulfil the terroristic functions entrusted to them by the Kremlin oligarchs, - i.e. the Chief Administration of State Security (GUGB) in the NKVD system and the Ministry of State Security (MGB) nowadays. All other NKVD departments are only accomodating, in that or other form, these operative organs. So, for example, the Administrative and Supply Department supplies the operative agencies with stationery, special lamps for making the eyes of the examinees smart, silk stockings - through special Chekist PX - "Co-operative for NKVD officials and troops", etc. The Financial Department pays out the salary to the officials and employees, and gives out special sums for conspiratorial purposes according to the famous par.9. The Sanitary Department enables the Chekists, worn out by torturing their victims, to pick up their health somewhere in the luxury of the former palace of prince Youssoupev in Cercis, in the Crimea.

Similarly, the NKVD officials (we are considering here only those NKVD officials who are on the permanent staff) are divided into two categories: operative officials (ostrudniki) and ordinary officials.

There are four grades of the NKVD operative officials:

- a) Assistant operative agent-representative (in Russian: pomocnik operativnogo upolnomochennogo)

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- b) Junior operative agent-representative (in Russian: mladshi operativni upolnomocheni);
- c) Operative agent-representative (in Russian: operativni upolnomocheni);
- d) Senior operative agent-representative (in Russian: starshi operativni upolnomocheni)

In Russian, using the Chekist slang, the operative agent-representative is briefly called the "operupolnomocheniy"; for an ordinary Soviet citizen it is one of the most terrible words that he knows, for it reeks of arrest.

The assistant operative agent-representative is the lowest category of operative officials. Usually, all novices begin their career in this capacity. But if the newly admitted official has been previously graduated from one of the numerous NKVD schools, he is appointed straight away as junior operative agent-representative or directly as operative agent-representative. After the grade of the Senior operative agent-representative the NKVD officials are named in accordance with the denomination of the operative unit they are supervising; thus, the official supervising a branch, is called "the chief of the NKVD branch", - and official, engaged as an assistant chief of the administration, is called "Assistant Chief of the Administration", etc.

But practically all these titles are usually abbreviated, and in official correspondence they are written like that: "pom.nach. INO" (assistant chief of Foreign Division) or "nach.MOIO" (chief of the Administrative department). In the certificates of the NKVD officials ( a little black card made of cardboard and doubled up) for the sake of conspiracy it is only mentioned: comrade so-and-so is "assistant chief of the Division of the NKVD USSR" or "section chief of UNKVD LO (Leningrad region administration of NKVD)". But we will give more details later on.

Since 1937 the military ranks, as existing in the Red Army, were also introduced in the NKVD in addition to the official titles. The essential difference was only in the fact that the scale of



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military ranks in NKVD was always one or two grades higher than in the army. Thus, for instance, the sergeant in the NKVD, i. e. a non-commissioned officer, corresponded in reality to the second lieutenant in the army both as to the rights and to the amount of salary. A lieutenant in the NKVD (lieutenant of State Security) equals to a captain of the Red Army, and a captain of State Security equals to an army colonel. In other words, here a certain discrimination of the officers of the Soviet army took place. They are morbidly aware of this fact, especially as the officers of the Soviet secret police are much better provided for. This is one of the reasons for a certain hostility between the army and the NKVD units; for instance, you will never see army officer walking together with NKVD officers. But this is exactly what the Soviet regime needs so badly: two armies exist in one country, jealously spying after each other, and such a situation is considered by the Kremlin as the best guarantee against a military plot.

As to the methods of work of the NKVD from the organizational point of view, so, of course, they differ in many respects from the usual methods, among them the methods of military institutions. More than anywhere, the decision in a large part of cases is made resulting from personal or telephone conversations; these are, for the most part, such cases where secret organs are involved, where no traces have to be left, i. e. the meanest cases, often connected with personal interest of the officials etc. But even in this citadel of secrecy and conspiracy, the bureaucracy has found a stable seat. The typical maladies of the Soviet bureaucracy - the unwillingness to take over the responsibility and the tendency of "reinsuring" oneself (perestuzhivka) by getting a written sanction of the superiors, thrive also here. Not without reason, in the days of mass massacres, one of the most malicious masters in the art of butchering, the deputy People's Commissar Zakovsky (executed in 1938) issued "orders about abolition of written orders" in a whole series of cases and especially insisted on the liquidation of "red tape and bureaucracy" in cases of condemnation to death. He himself brought the treatment of such cases

to the highest grade of simplicity, putting only six letters "VSH. Zak." (vysshaya mera nakazaniya - highest degree of punishment - Zakovsky).

In the recent years the practice of guidance by means of the so called "operative conferences" has been widely spread. Such conferences, arranged according to administrative units (administration - division - section - branch), are usually informed about the important orders of the People's Commissar or about some other urgent arrangements when immediate steps have to be taken. It means that any instructions of the NKVD leaders may be carried into effect on the vast territory of the whole Soviet Union literally in the course of several hours. During the regular, i.e. not so urgent ~~managements~~ operative conferences the current problems are usually discussed, the instructions given, the reports heard.

The verbal instructions of higher authorities are called "settings" ("ustanovka"). Written orders usually confirm such settings, given formerly. Besides orders, local organs of the NKVD regularly get the so called "orientations" from the center. For the most part these orientations comprise data, received from the agents, about the activity of foreign spies and diversionists. These data may serve for the purpose of their detention if they appear on the territory of a certain NKVD agency. But there are also orientations of a general character; especially often the orientations of this kind are given to the local agencies and to the Border Guards, stationed on the frontiers of the Soviet Union. Such general orientations are called the informative ones.

The connection with local agencies is realized by means of correspondence, delivered by special armed couriers (field liaison - "Polisvyas"), with the help of telephone net work of the NKVD, by means of usual telephone network (for non-secret conversations), by telegraph (using code) and radio, through the special radio-network of the NKVD. It has to be mentioned, that the communication section of the NKVD does not work exclusively for its own ministry, but is also available for all governmental and party

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organizations when secret letters have to be mailed. But as the USSR is afflicted by a "secretomania", it is not difficult to imagine the scope of work reserved for the NKVD in its capacity of letter-carrier.

From this point of view the NKVD is something like the second Ministry of communications in the USSR; it is enough to say that even the diplomatic mail going abroad or coming from abroad is delivered by the courriers employed by the NKVD and not by the Soviet Foreign Office. The telephone connection is achieved through a special telephone network, both for local purposes and for the trunk line telephone. For this purpose special cables are used. Besides all the leading officials of the NKVD have in their offices the so-called direct line, connecting them with their immediate subordinates in other cities of the country (for example in Leningrad, Minsk, Kiev and in other capitals of Union republics). One has to believe that now the direct line connects also the capitals of all Soviet satellites with Moscow, at least through the diplomatic missions of the USSR in these countries.

The telephone station in Moscow is connected with the general city network. The city telephone network is obliged to give an immediate connection with the NKVD switch-board. By automatic telephone exchange the NKVD headquarters in Moscow may be reached by setting up "K-6" or "O-4". The NKVD telephone network is self-providing and does not depend on the city. Besides all the leaders of central governmental institutions have a direct line connecting them with the NKVD. So, for example, in Stalin's secretariat an NKVD telephone apparatus has been installed bearing the number 57-01, but for his conversations with the People's Commissar and other prominent NKVD officials Stalin uses normally the Kremlin automatic telephone exchange, the so-called "whirligig". As to the telegraph connection, the NKVD sends ciphered telegrams using the general line, but they are given in a special room reserved for governmental correspondence. The workers of this department are NKVD men, but for the sake of conspiracy are on the payroll of the Ministry of Communications. Telegrams, sent by the NKVD, are

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forwarded as governmental ones, according to the series "PK". As to the radio connection, more details will be given in the chapter dealing with the 2nd Special Division of the NKVD.

In conclusion we have to mention the NKVD archives where "cases" of all persons, <sup>whom</sup> whom the NKVD has already avenged <sup>in</sup> that or <sup>an</sup> other form, are kept ( persons whose turn has not yet come are registered with the 1st Special Division). These archives are used for reference, which may be necessary in connection with the inquest of some new case, and are situated in the cellar of House 2 in Lubjanka (old building). It includes the so-called reading-room where the NKVD officials may get acquainted with the cases, but for this purpose they must get permission from such a prominent worker as chief of the branch, sometimes even from the division chief. The Foreign division has its own archives which may not be used by employees of other NKVD agencies.

## 6. Chief Administration of State Security

### Tasks and Structure

#### See the Diagram No 7

The Chief Administration of State Security (GUGB NKVD BSMK) is the essential and most important agency of the enormous system of Soviet political terror, that has so many ramifications. Strictly speaking, the NKVD or MGB is the Chief Administration of State Security as such, for all other links of the NKVD system or "organs", if we use the Chekist slang, play only an auxiliary part. The "chastising sword" is the GUGB. Just this Chief Administration of State Security is responsible for discovery, isolation and liquidation of real and imaginary "enemies of the people", real and especially potential antagonists of Communism and its dictatorial leadership. The GUGB Chief is always the First Deputy of the People's Commissar for Internal Affairs. After the war, the Chief Administration of State Security was transformed into an independent Ministry of State Security as we have already mentioned above.

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The general structure of this administration did not suffer any considerable changes since the time of the OGPU, and it was accepted by the new Ministry approximately in the same shape. Anyhow, one has to consider, that, though the structure was preserved, the numeration of some divisions was changed in the course of time, and by the end of the thirties most of the GUGB divisions were renamed as administrations, though the NKVD men continued to call these administrations divisions. This circumstance creates certain difficulties at the classification of the GUGB structure. Therefore the authors draw the attention of the readers at the possibility of some errors and inaccuracies in this respect.

As far as we could find out, at the moment of transforming divisions into administrations (approximately beginning with the year 1937) the GUGB had the following structure :

- 1st Special Division - a center of statistical operative recording of anti-Soviet elements (ASB) and NKVD agents;
  - 2nd Special Division - a center of operative technics;
  - 1st Division - protection of the leaders and of the Kremlin;
  - 2nd " - counter-intelligence (KRO);
  - 3rd " - economic (EKU);
  - 4th " - secret political (SPU);
  - 5th " - "Osobiy Otdel" (OO) - spy work in the Army;
  - 6th " - transport (TO);
  - 7th " - foreign (IKO);
  - 8th " - prisons and places of detainment
- Inquest Office of the GUGB

In the course of expansion and re-organization of the NKVD system, such divisions as counter-intelligence, economic, secret-political, foreign and transport were renamed into administrations and their staff was correspondingly enlarged. The authors of this work have no information available as to the transformation of the "Osobiy Otdel" into an administration, though tasks and

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functions of this division "accommodating" the Army and the Navy immensely increased for the last 10-15 years. Further, both in the text and in the album of schematic diagrams the following denomination will be used for the GUGB central agencies : Counter-Intelligence administration (KIU), Economic administration (EKU), Secret-Political administration (SPU), Foreign administration (INU) and Transport administration (TU), but the term Special Division ("Osobiy Otdel" or "OO") will not be changed. To complete the picture, the accommodating agencies such as Maintenance Administration and Financial Administration, with their branches, are shown on the diagrams, but no analysis of their work will be made as they have no essential meaning for the understanding of characteristic features of the NKVD, and their structure, upon the whole, is following the same pattern as ~~it is done~~<sup>that is</sup> in all the other People's Commissariats of the USSR.

With the exception of the first and the second Special Divisions and of the 1st Division of the GUGB, the numeration of divisions and administrations will not be mentioned either in the text or in the album of diagrams, as the NKVD frequently changed the numeration for the sake of conspiracy, as it was mentioned before. The last change in the numeration was made by the transformation of the GUGB into the MGB. As a result of the above mentioned facts, different materials which were made available to the authors, were often of controversial nature. According to one information, the Secret-Political administration which formerly had number 4, received in the MGB the name of the 3rd administration. Another source indicates that the title of the 3rd administration was reserved for the Counter-Intelligence administration, which was formerly called the 2nd administration. Approximately the same picture may be observed in the cases of the Foreign and Economic administrations. Under such circumstances the applying of numeration of administrations would only lead to misunderstandings and disorientation of the reader.

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The authors are fully aware of the fact that the giving up of the use of numbers for designating divisions and administrations, will be a serious defect of this work, especially as, approximately since 1937, all divisions and administrations of the NKVD-MGB are usually designated only by numbers in the whole official correspondence for the sake of conspiracy. In the certificates of the NKVD officials the name of the division where they are working, is never given.

The general features of the structure of administrations that were part of the OGPU, were not changed in the last fifteen years; the administrations of the MGB are based upon almost the same scheme that was made out for the corresponding divisions of the OGPU. The difference lies only in the scale, i.e. the administrations of the MGB are more cumbersome and have many more employees than the OGPU divisions. But the number of people on staff is not constant in that or another administration. Such staff may be either increased or diminished depending on the fact, which administration has the largest portion of work at the present moment, or, according to the picturesque expression of Lagoda, where the "GPU God" is seated, i.e. the terrorization of which part of the Soviet population is more important from the point of view of the Politburo at a certain time. So, for example, during the first Five-year plan and collectivization the residence of this "GPU God" was the Economic division, after the murder of Kirov he moved to the Secret-Political division, before the war his presence was distinctly felt in the Foreign administration, but during the war he moved again to the "Osoby Otdel" and to the Counter-Intelligence administration. In such cases, some of the personnel of administrations and divisions less important at this period of time, are transferred to that administration on which the particular attention of the Politburo is concentrated at the moment.

In special cases separate administrations may be temporarily joined in order to fulfil this or another special task set by

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the Politburo, but the structure of each remains unchanged in the principal features. So, for example, during the war a special administration "SMERSH" ("Smertj shpicam" - death to spies) was formed. Many foreign observers erroneously took this administration for the Counter-Intelligence administration of the Red Army General staff. In reality it was only a union of the "Osobiy Otdel" with the Counter-Intelligence administration of the NKVD under the general direction of the Deputy People's Commissar of the NKVD and Chief of the "Osobiy Otdel", General-Colonel V.C. Abakumov who during the war was directly subordinated to Stalin, as People's Commissar for Defence. Because of this, a mistake was made abroad in connecting the "SMERSH" with the General Staff of the Red Army. After the resignation of Stalin of his functions of People's Commissar for Defence, "SMERSH" was liquidated and the administrations of the NKVD (now MVD), out of which it was formed, resumed their previous structure with only some minor changes.

For the period dealt with in this work (1937-1945), the general structure of the USSR NKVD of the USSR was as follows: (See the Diagram No 7) -

- 1st Special Division - registration of agents and operative recording of anti-soviet elements;
- 2nd Special Division - Operative technique;
- 1st Division - protection of leaders and of the Kremlin;
- KKU - Counter-Intelligence administration (former 2nd Division);
- SPU - Secret-Political administration (former 4th or 3rd Division);
- KKU - Economic administration (former 3rd or 4th Division);
- OO - "Osobiy Otdel" or Special Division (former 5th Div.); surveillance in the Red Army;
- TU - Transport administration (former 6th Division);
- ISU - Foreign administration (former 7th Division);
- Administration of prisons and places of detention - (former 8th Division)
- Inquest Division - (former Inquest Office);



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The authors warn their readers <sup>against</sup> ~~from~~ confusing the transport administration of the GUGB ("Transportnoe upravlenie GUGB NKVD SSSR") with the Administration of Highways of the NKVD ("Glavshosdor NKVD SSSR"), which will be considered in the later chapters of this work. The first of these administrations is concerned with maintaining of State Security rules on the rail road and water transport, while the second one controls the auto roads and highways as the NKVD supervises them also from the technical point of view.

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**CHAPTER IX****THE FIRST SPECIAL DIVISION  
OF THE GUGB NKVD USSR****Diagram No 8**

The terroristic activity of the NKVD inside the Soviet Union is based upon the registration and classification of two elements of the Soviet population : 1) NKVD agents, 2) the so-called anti-Soviet element ("ASE" - according to the NKVD abbreviation).

The first form of recording is called the agent-net registration ("uchet agentury"), the second one - the operative registering ("operuchet"). The recording of agents and "ASE" is the concern of the 1st Special Division of the GUGB NKVD, whose subdivisions or branches are to be found in all territorial agencies of the NKVD. The work of the 1st Special Division of the GUGB is closely connected with the Central Archives of the NKVD, where all the cases that have been dealt with by the Soviet punitive organs since the time of Cheka may be found on the files. But the work of the Central Archives is not doubled by the 1st Special Division, as the main task of the latter is the service to the operative organs of the NKVD in their current work.

The structure of the 1st Special Division is very simple. In the People's Commissariat (now Ministry) as such, as well as in all territorial agencies, it consists only of two sectors: 1) Recording of agents, 2) recording of anti-Soviet element "ASE". These sectors may be considered as independent divisions and are subdivided into sections or branches, according to the character of the contingent of the population that is being registered or is subject to such a registration. Besides, in both sectors there are statistical sections that have to deal only with general numbers: general number of agents according to different nomenclatures, number of "ASE" etc.

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The "operative-statistical" section of the second sector systematizes the figures according to the summary ("svodka") compiled by all local operative agencies of the NKVD about the "political-moral" frame of mind of the population and about its reaction to these or other events inside the USSR and abroad. If no particular events took place, the "operative-statistical" section only systematizes the regular summaries of the operative agencies, and on their basis compiles reviews for the whole territory of the USSR and then turns to other problems: for instance, compiles a summary based on the reports of the local agencies of KRU about the anti-Soviet opinions, expressed by the former Russian emigrants who had returned to the USSR. A selection out of these summaries is regularly forwarded to the Central Committee of the Communist Party for the information of corresponding party organs.

#### OPERATIVE RECORDING

Operative recording or the so-called special recording of the anti-Soviet element is the concern of the 2nd Sector of the 1st Special Division GUGB NKVD USSR. Its tentacles embrace a huge number of the Soviet citizens and it is based on the individual card of special record, that is on the file for every person who is under suspicion of the NKVD.

All persons, registered with NKVD, are divided into categories, or, using the NKVD terminology, have their "tints". The corresponding category or "tint" is entered on the registration card of the recorded person; so, the registration card of a person, who uses to relate political wits is marked by letters "AB", put in the corner - it means that the "tint" of this person is "AB" - anti-Soviet. The number of these categories or "tints" is very great. The basic ones are :

- AB - anti-Soviet element;
- B - "bieliy" - "white" (former participants of the white movement in 1917-1921);

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- PR** - "protivnik" - antagonist. ( This category comprises members of former political parties in the pre-revolutionary Russia. The party membership is indicated by putting after this "tint" some additional letters: so, "PR/MR", or "PR/R" -will denote in the first case former "Menshevik", in the second - former "Kser" - Socialist-Revolutionary.
- KR** - Counter-revolutionary;
- TS** - "tserkovnik" - a man connected in some way with the church. Besides priests, this group comprises all believers who are active in their religious communities and in church matters. The sectarians (dissenters) are not recorded under the "tint" TS, for they are forming a separate group.
- S** - "sektanty" - sectarians (dissenters). From the operative point of view this group is considered equal to PR (antagonists).
- P** - "povstani" - insurgents. This group comprises all persons who took part in any rebellion at the time of Civil War, military communism and collectivization periods, and also persons who have shown seditious tendencies in later periods.
- N** - nationalists of all shades.
- SI** - "svyas s inostrantsami" - connection with foreigners ( personnel of foreign embassies, exchange of letters with relatives abroad, etc.)
- SHI** - "shpion" - spies. This group includes all persons suspected of espionage on the basis of their correspondence, connection with relatives abroad, etc. It represents, so to say, the next stage of natural development after the person was registered as "SI".
- T** - terrorist.
- D** - diversionist.
- Prav.** - "pravlye" - the rightists. Members of the right opposition in the Party (Bukharinites).

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**Tr. - The Trotskyite.** The same symbol is used for the adherents of Zinoviev and other participants or supporters of the left opposition.

This list of recorded "tints" is in no case complete and it may be admitted that, in the years of war, it was made considerably longer by adding such new "tints" as F- fascist, H - adherent of Hitler, B - "benderist" (Ukrainian nationalist), Vl. - "vlasovets" (member or adherent of the Vlasov movement), Ms. - "nizkopoklennik" - servility to the bourgeoisie etc. But even the list, given above, shows what a large part of the population is under the constant supervision of the NKVD. At the same time, it also shows how wide spread is the struggle of the people of the USSR against the Soviet regime. Together with all arrestees and millions of persons who are being "punished", the NKVD inevitably remind Stalin of the fact that his regime is the most terrible but, at the same time, the weakest in the whole world, for it is opposed by the huge mass of the population. All those persons, on whose cards the symbol of their "tint" has been drawn, are automatically set under a supervision of the NKVD agents.

Once more it has to be repeated that, in case of a corresponding directive from the Politburo, all persons sharing that or another "tint" are arrested, and their further fate depends not on their real guilt but on the "general line of the Party" for the present period of time.

Data, gathered by the agents during their watch (during "rasrabotka" - "elaboration" in the Chekist terminology) of a certain person who has been recorded with the special NKVD registration, gives a start for building up a "case".

"Cases" are divided into the following groups:

1. "Agenturnaya rasrabotka" (agent elaboration) which is officially called "agenturnoye delo" (agent case), and embraces a group of persons sharing the same views, who are tied together by periodic encounters, conversations or personal friendship.

2. "Delo formulliar" - ( service list case), where only one principal person who is under suspicion ( "figurant" according to the Chekist terminology) is being "elaborated", and all his connections are being recorded only to complete the case. In most cases the "service list case" is sooner or later transformed into an "agenturnoye delo", or (provided the "figurant" shows any activity) leads to <sup>his</sup> arrest.

The overwhelming majority of cases of "figurants" who are being "elaborated" by the operative MVD organs, are on the records as "service list cases". Under normal conditions, the group cases are comparatively rarely recorded on the files of the 1st Special Division.

3. "U-D" ("Uchetnoye delo") - "registration case" is brought against less active "figurants". Usually as a basis for such a case serves some instruction from the center ordering to make records about a certain group of population. For example, in 1935, after the customary purge in the party, a considerable percentage of the so-called "hangers on" ("prizakovshchikaya") was excluded from the party, as being not fit for this high privilege. On the ground of a special secret instruction all such persons were registered as "U-D" in those cases <sup>in which</sup> when they were not accused as Trotskyists, or when their ASB registration cards had not been previously marked out with some other "tint". Later on, following a new special secret directive, a campaign of liquidating the people registered within this group, was carried on, and ... par.169 of the Criminal Code of the USSR (ill-intended fraud, or forgery) was incriminated against them .

4. "Liternoe delo" - "Lettered case" is usually concerned with a certain industrial or some other object. This case includes all lists of persons on the staff of this enterprise, different data of official commissions, correspondence with trusts, acts of audits, materials of Party purges, different declarations, anonymous statements and other casual materials - up to the information that this enterprise does not fulfil the program of the output, reports about the breaking out of fire, about damages etc.

All this is completed by a special list of persons, included in this "Lettered Case". Such a special list usually does not show persons that have already been recorded according to some "tint". Usually this list is composed of the names of persons, about whom the NKVD has some material of small importance, i.e. anonymous denunciation, expulsion from the Komsomol because of the loss of the membership card, or even some suspicion. All these persons are specially recorded and registration cards are made out marked with the symbol "L-D" ("Liternoye delo"). This category is considered to be the least active one, still the presence of a card, marked with "L-D" on the files of the 1st Special Division, is already like a brand and puts certain restrictions <sup>on</sup> for the person concerned both in his social life and his activity. For instance, if such a person is casually included in a list of guests to be present at a session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR (and the names of such guests are invariably checked with the special registration files) he will never get the invitation card for the session.

The center for special recording of anti-Soviet elements is the 2nd sector of the 1st Special Division of the USSR NKVD USSR (now MGB USSR). In its hands detailed statistical data as to "tints" and as to the spreading of these tints in republics, regions and districts of the Soviet Union are concentrated. Usually, besides collecting statistical data, the 1st Special Division makes out special geographical maps according to the "tints". This enables the leadership of the People's Commissariat at any time to orient themselves in directing the work of the NKVD agencies in the whole USSR and in separate republics and districts.

Not only the "tint", but rather detailed data about the recorded person are marked on the registration card. (See Appendix). In the local subordinate agencies of the NKVD the registration card of the recorded person is filled out in three copies; one copy is forwarded to the agency that is conducting the "elaboration"; the second one is sent to the 2nd Special Division of the Regional administration of the NKVD - to control the "elaboration", and the

third one goes to Moscow, to the 1st Special Division of the center, statistical section.

Statistical records of the 1st Special Division of the People's Commissariat and of the 1st Special Divisions in local NKVD (MGB) administrations are kept in absolute secret. According to an order of Lavrenty Beria, issued in 1940, the chiefs of regional administrations were prohibited to give any information in this respect even to the secretaries of the regional committees of the Communist Party, who could obtain these data only through the Central Committee of the Party. For this purpose, the chief of the 1st Special Division in Moscow had to adapt and filtrate these data, and forward them to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party only when they acquired special wording. It was well known in the NKVD circles that this order was provoked by the fact that new secretaries of the regional committees of the Bolshevik party, who took over this work after the "Great Purge" and who were often recruited, in this period of time, from the NKVD men, in a series of cases made such demands to the chiefs of the regional ~~administrations~~ NKVD administrations and received the wished information. This is a clear illustration of the fact, that the NKVD does not reveal its secrets even to official representatives of the ruling party, with the exception of its highest organs.

In the NKVD (MGB) regional administrations the staff of the 1st Special Division is divided between two branches (operative recording and registration of agents). The employees of these branches enjoy the rights of the operative agents-representatives and their assistants, but in fact they are functionaries, clerks and statisticians.

In addition to the data of special records, all operative agencies of the NKVD-MGB are systematically and regularly compiling summaries about the frame of mind of the broad masses of the Soviet people and their reaction to certain events inside the Soviet Union and abroad. These summaries are forwarded to the



"operative-statistical" branch of the 2nd sector of the 1st Special Division GUGB NKVD for the purpose of systematizing the picture of moral-political state of the population throughout the whole Soviet Union. Here is one of specimens of such a summary: after the governmental decree about the abolition of the ration-card system in the USSR, all the regional NKVD administrations through their operative agencies collected reports about "negative attitude in connection with the decision of the Party and Government to abolish the ration-card system". These summaries depict in short the character of statements made by separate persons, giving their "tints". The most characteristic facts are reported to the chief of the regional NKVD administration and certain measures are taken - up to the arrest. But this is not the most important thing. Much more essential is that the chief of the administration, having received the statistical picture of the frame of mind of the population in his region, sends a copy of these figures, in the form of a ciphered telegram or radiogram, to the "operative-statistical" branch of the center, in Moscow, where these materials are summarized and forwarded to the NKVD People's Commissar for a report to Politburo, or simply for his information.

This double system of constant operative recording of "tints" and regular summaries about the frame of mind of the population fully enables the leadership of the NKVD-MGB to dispose the forces of their network as it is needed by the concrete situation in the country. In fact, it is nothing else but a constantly active and very intensive reconnoitering of forces and disposition of the enemy, where their own people is meant under this term. This is the principal difference between the system of the operative recording in the NKVD-MGB and the similar methods used by police agencies of all other countries of the world. The matter is not only in the scale, and not in the fact that in the USSR the punitive organs carry out a special registration of such elements of the population, who in no case could be classified as "criminals" in any other country of the world.

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The peculiarity of the Soviet operative recording lies first of all in its preventive character, i.e. the registration card of the NKVD-MGB is filled out for a certain citizen of the Soviet Union not because he or she committed any crimes or offences, but only because the personnel of the Soviet punitive organs considers him, or her, to be able to commit such crimes or offences in the future.

The second peculiarity may be seen in the fact that a registration card, once filled out for a certain person, is never destroyed even if the "tint", marked on it, is not substantiated or is a result of an obvious calumny. The man may be acquitted in the court, may be fully rehabilitated by the party organs, but the files of the NKVD-MGB will brand him for ever. The All-Union Communist party and its punitive organs do not apply the notion of the "term of limitation" to the actions of their political antagonists, and the NKVD-MGB may at any time resume the persecution of any person for actions performed twenty or even thirty years ago. If this happens, it is only necessary to "renovate" to some extent the case of such a person, and this is one of the main tasks of the Soviet operative recording. This is what is called the "record of the figurant's activity".

The third, and may be the most essential, peculiarity of the Soviet operative recording is that its data are never checked up by anybody else. The Commission of the Party Control in Moscow may check the activity of the NKVD-MGB, but there does not exist such an organization in the whole USSR that could check the equity of data, filling in millions of registration cards in the numerous recording sectors of the punitive organs, scattered all over the country. The lack of "vigilance" is severely punished in the USSR, but the Bolshevik rulers will never blame their punitive organs for the overzealousness in this respect.

The People's Commissariat as well as the local NKVD administrations strictly stick to the principle that in the 1st Special Division a certain employee occupies himself with one definite "tint" and does not get in touch with work and data of other

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branches. The officials of other NKVD divisions and administrations have no access to the files of the 1st Special Division and they can contact this agency only through their secretariats, which are directly subordinated to higher NKVD organs.

The operative-statistical recording is the basis for all political and operative work of the whole complicated network of NKVD-MGB agencies, that spread their sticky cobweb over the whole country. If any political discontent of anti-communist nature arises in the country, the geographical files of the operative recording will immediately show where this "tint" was most active for some time past, and where the principal, or most dangerous from the Kremlin's point of view, center of such a movement is located. All NKVD forces will be disposed there, the agents among persons of this "tint" will be recruited and thus the discontent will not be allowed to turn into a direct resistance movement.

The access to the map of "tints" is free only for a very limited circle of the most prominent officials in the Soviet secret police. Neither its whereabouts nor even the fact of its existence is known to the majority of the NKVD men. Probably, from time to time this map is shown to Stalin. It is even more probable that he has either a copy of this map, or his own map which has been compiled by a special "NKVD" inside the NKVD - by a Special Sector of the Central Committee of the Party.

In the days of war the "Generalissime" made his decisions as to the plan of military operations, bending together with Zhukov and Vassilevsky over a secret "operative map" showing the dislocation of Hitler troops. This map was drawn for him by the 4th Administration of the General Staff. In the days of peace he examined in the same way, together with Beria, Merkulov and Kruglov, a map showing the dislocation of anti-communist activists among the peoples of Russia - the map drawn for him by the 1st Special Division ...

This system of constant and secret "operative recording" makes possible for the NKVD-MGB to leave to its mercy the whole of the population in the USSR. The NKVD-MGB registers every libel,

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every anonymous denunciation and, without a special order from the Kremlin, does not show either to its victims or to the court, on which data its actions were based.

A real liberation of the peoples of the USSR from Bolshevism will be completed only at the moment when, after the liquidation of Chekists and their Kremlin bosses, all files and archives of the Soviet punitive organs will be destroyed.

### Recording of Agents

If the operative recording of ASB (anti-Soviet elements) is basic for the distribution of forces and direction of actions of the Soviet punitive organs, the work with agents, their recording and classification is the principal element in the operative work of all NKVD-MGB agencies. The constant tension inside the country and the fact, that the Bolshevik potentates are fully aware of the hatred they have inspired to all strata of the population, led to the creation of a mass net of NKVD agents in the USSR. This net consists of many millions of secret agents belonging to different divisions and administrations of Soviet punitive organs.

It may be supposed that the principle of the German counter-intelligence service, aiming at creating a possible wider net of agents, was borrowed to a certain extent by the setting up of a Soviet network of agents. But the Soviet system proceeded considerably further, and a network of mass agents was set up not only by the Counter-Intelligence administration of the NKVD, but also by the rest of its administrations and divisions, first of all by the Secret-Political administration, "Osobiy Otdel", Economic administration and Transport administration.

The system of recruiting, classifying and recording the agents in all these administrations is almost the same, though first of all it is worked out by the counter-intelligence administration. Still it would be erroneous to refer all the work of agents to the counter-intelligence branch, as it is done in all other countries of the world, as far as the Soviet Government

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leads a constant war not so much against external enemies as against peoples of its own country. The essential forces of the Soviet punitive organs are just concentrated on this internal struggle with the population.

The statistical and operative recording of agents employed by all NKVD-MGB agencies is the concern of the 1st Sector of the 1st Special Division of GUGB in Moscow and corresponding offices of republican, regional and area administrations of the NKVD. All territorial and specialized agencies of the NKVD-MGB fill in special registration cards for all their agents (see Appendix). Copies of these cards are forwarded to the files of the 1st Special Division in Moscow (1st Sector) for further classification and statistical recording. This is the center of recording for agents of all NKVD-MGB organs throughout the Soviet Union, and therefore it is more convenient to make an analysis of principles of the classification of agents and the work with them, in connection with the analysis of structure and field of operation of the 1st Special Division of the GUGB NKVD USSR (now MGB USSR). But, of course, it does not mean that the recruiting of agents and the work with them is the concern of this NKVD branch. This practical work is carried out by different operative agencies and depends on the tasks they have to fulfill. The 1st Special Division of the Center, in Moscow, and its local branches are concerned only with the operative recording of agents.

### Agents

There are several grades of agents, differentiated by their field of operations, competence and their significance in the NKVD-MGB system. The principal categories of the agents are the following :

#### Usual abbreviation:

- |                                    |                        |
|------------------------------------|------------------------|
| 1. Resident                        | "R"                    |
| 2. Agent                           | "ag"                   |
| 3. Special agent                   | "sp/ag"                |
| 4. Agent of internal observation - | "ag/V" ("Vnutrenniy" - |
|                                    | internal)              |

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5. Secret informer "a/e" ("oswiedomitelj" - in-  
former
6. Secret informer for lodging "SO/K" ("kwartira"-lodging)
7. Tenant of conspirative quarters - Ch/KK ("Chonyain"-  
tenant)

These categories of agents have the following peculiarities:

1. Resident. Is usually member of the Communist Party or a former Chekist, failing this - a Komsomol. He may be also picked out of capable and reliable informers, but he must invariably have practical experience in conspiracy and agent's work. Carrying on his usual official tasks, i.e. being the Chief of the Secret Department of some factory, Chief of the Personnel Section of some works, Assistant Commander of a military unit as to political work ("pompolit"), such a man is at the same time an NKVD man, "accomodating" this industrial or military object, i.e. supervising it.

A special personal file is kept for every resident with manifold characteristics and check-ups, including a check-up with the files of the 1st Special Division of the regional administration and center. In this file are noted and checked all his connections and acquaintances, whereby his family and all his relatives are checked in the most careful way. Some anti-Soviet statements, i.e. any critical remarks on the address of the Soviet government made by persons, connected with this man or their former social background, can be no obstacle for this man to be appointed resident. But if the registration cards of the persons connected with him, are marked with such "tints" as "Shp" (spy), "T" (terrorist), "KR" (counter-revolutionary), "Frav." (rightists), or "fr" (Trotskyist) - he cannot be appointed resident.

A resident is connected with a "network" of 5-8-12 agents and secret informers, whom he receives according to a special time-table, instructs them and collects their information. Only the resident is usually paid for the work. As to the "network", this or another method of compulsion is used, and people work

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out of fear for the consequences of not fulfilling their obligations, which these secret agents and informers have signed in the NKVD agency that recruited them.

Residents are future official employees of different NKVD-MGB agencies; there are no specifications as to the terms of their work as residents.

2. Agent. Usually secret informer, but invariably belonging to that or another registered group of "tints", having connections with the ASK-group. So, for instance, if an agent is needed for the "elaboration" of the Trotskyists, a Trotskyist is picked out for this work, and especially such a Trotskyist who is in full confidence of the group to be elaborated. The agent is recruited with the help of some concrete compromising material and invariably is brought to a stadium where he has to make his decision, having been told - "NKVD work or prison!". Operative expenses of the agent - for trips, entertaining his friends, etc. - are usually paid. Sometimes agents receive some periodical rewards for their work. But upon the whole, agents work out of fear, i.e. trying to save themselves and their families from possible repercussions by loyal spying for the NKVD.

3. Special agent. There are two categories of such special agents according to the character of the tasks they have to fulfill, though these categories are not mentioned in the operative recording. The first group is composed out of specialists in some branch of national economy or industry, such as chemists, metallurgists, building engineers etc. The task of these agents is to control the work of some enterprise or trust and to expose all elements of sabotage, wreckage etc.

The second category of agents-specialists includes pickpockets, burglars, specialists for opening safes and other highly-skilled criminals. These agents-specialists fulfill various tasks. For instance, an agent-representative has to make a secret perquisition (called "vyeuka" by the Chekists) in the home of a "figurant" whose "elaboration" is in process. For some reasons this perquisition is appointed for 17,00, but usually the owner

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of the lodging comes home at that time. It is necessary to detain him in some way so that he does not see the agent-representative making<sup>a</sup> search in his room. For this purpose a specialist-beeligan is summoned. He waits for the "figurant" somewhere in the street and, using some kind of pretext, attacks and beats him. A scandal breaks out, both are brought to a police-station, the case is investigated for 2-3 hours and at least the victim of the assault is set free. In the meantime the perquisition is brought to an end. The agent-representative rings up the police station and the agent-bandit is set free. Though this method is very mean and cynical, nevertheless it is rather often applied by the NKVD men.

The first group of special agents work without pay and exclusively under compulsion, but the agents-criminals get their rewards. The same group comprises cheats, prostitutes, jugglers etc. These "useful services" of the criminal underworld to the operative agencies of the NKVD are partly responsible for the fact that these "socially-close" elements are granted different privileges and advantages in the prisons and camps, and they are even promoted to different administrative posts, including that of camp commanders. The USSR is the only country in the world where burglars and murderers command the imprisoned professors, engineers, actors and writers.

A. Agent of internal observation. This is a non-active agent recruited from the immediate environment of the "figurant" (very often from his own family), but who is not registered with the "tint", marking the registration card of the "figurant". As such an agent may serve the sister of a Trotskyist, who is in permanent contact with him and knows or may know more about him than anybody else or may help in carrying out some measures that would lead to the activation of his "elaboration". Such persons are recruited after a very careful study, and usually some very important material, mostly of private character, is applied; the fear of revelation forces these persons to work for the NKVD. Thus, these people are simply victims of blackmail. If such material is not available, it is prepared artificially. Very often such a



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candidate for an agent is persuaded that he must work in this branch for the sake of safety of the very person, who has to be the object for this special observation.

For instance, the sister of the "figurant" is summoned to the NKVD, where forged papers are shown to her while she is being told, that the NKVD agencies are aware of the fact that somebody wants to recruit her brother or half succeeded in doing this. But this is not so important, they say, - "We know that your brother is a good man, but we must take hold of the persons, who want to entangle your brother into their dirty meshes. You must help us in this respect for the sake of safety of your brother" ... The unfortunate woman gives her consent and, not knowing herself, helps the NKVD to ruin her own brother. Such plotting led and leads to many terrific personal tragedies, but the people "who are guarding the conquests of the revolution" are not at the least embarrassed by them.

The work with such kinds of agents is very delicate and requires a lot of tact and shrewdness. Therefore, it is usually entrusted to experienced operative agents-representatives or even deputy chiefs of the branches. Such agents are usually rewarded for their work, but not necessarily with money or material goods. A frequently applied form of reward is a promise to facilitate the fate of relatives or intimates of such an agent.

5. Secret informer. This is the most widespread and the less specialized species of NKVD-MGB agents. When millions of agents of the Soviet secret police are mentioned, one refers just to this category. Secret informers are recruited by the NKVD-MGB organs out of all strata of population, whereby no distinction of age and sex are made. According to a secret instruction, issued at the times of Yagoda (1934-1937), only children below the age of 12 cannot be recruited for this work - they do not stick to conspiracy. As to all the rest of the population of the Soviet Union, the NKVD-MGB agencies consider it to be a gigantic reservoir for recruiting secret informers. This recruiting is usually done by means of blackmailing, threats, bullying and, in less frequent cases, mostly when young people are concerned, by

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influencing their patriotic feelings.

As strange as it may seem, but directly this miserable figure of a secret informer, terrorized and despising himself, is essentially supporting Stalin's dictatorship. Experience has shown that Stalin cannot trust either workers or peasants, or army, or even his party - all hate him and would sacrifice all to overthrow his odious tyranny. He can fully rely only upon this miserable secret informer. Of course, the latter also hates "the beloved leader", and may be even more than anybody else. But he has nowhere to go - he is entangled in the NKVD meshes, he constantly walks with a loop around his neck and therefore, even against his will, he is forced to carry out the orders of his tormentors. There are millions of secret informers - they are recruited among workers, party members, intellectuals, collective farmers, students, pensioners, housewives. The overwhelming majority of them work out of fear and do not get any rewards. Their exact number is unknown, but legion is their name.

6. Secret informer for lodging. This special category of secret informers has only the task of controlling who enters a certain house or lodging, when, how long he stayed and what happened then in the lodging. Besides that, such an agent may be entrusted with getting letters, things etc., from a person, who lives close by and is "elaborated" by the NKVD. This category includes first of all housemasters and house-managers, whose duty is to notify the NKVD in a regular way about all events, happening in their houses. But frequently some lodgers of "communal" i.e. common lodgings are recruited for this purpose, especially housewives and pensioners who spend much time in their lodgings. In many cases domestic servants are recruited to spy <sup>upon</sup> their masters. They are usually paid for this kind of service.

Quarrels and squabbles among families occupying common lodging are frequently used by the recruiting of these agents. In some cases such agents get a reward, but in most cases they give their information with the wish to do an ill turn to their

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neighbour who lives in a better room, has better food, tunes in the radio late at night etc. Soviet conditions of life create ideal grounds for recruiting such agents, but all their information has to be carefully filtrated, for it often bears strong traces of personal feelings.

2. Tenant of a Conspirator's Quarters. Usually he is a Communist, a Komsomol or at any rate a person who was well checked up. The principal requirement - limited circle of connections (all of them have to be checked up) and a lodging, suitable for conspiratorial meetings with residents or agents. Such a tenant is regularly paid. All members of the family have to sign a promise of silence. If there are any children, conspirator's quarters cannot be established.

Every operative worker must have at least two such conspiratorial quarters; one of them may serve for meetings with agents and informers, the other - only with residents (for the sake of conspiracy). Usually for meetings agents two or even three lodgings are available, but agents suspicious or even dangerous as to double-dealing are usually seen in hotels. As a rule, operative workers and residents see no agents at home and do not conduct any work there.

The former chief of the American Military Mission in Moscow, General John H. Dean, describes in his book "The Strange Alliance" some of his meetings with leading officials of the NKVD Foreign Administration, General-Lieutenant P.M. Pitin and Major-General A.P. Ossipov. The purpose of this meeting was to establish a working arrangement between the American O.S.S. and the Soviet Intelligence agencies. The American general was greatly puzzled by the fact that these two leading workers of the Soviet secret intelligence never met him at the same place twice and always took the greatest precautions when arranging these meetings. Once the driver of the NKVD car who had to bring him to this meeting, arranged a true race along the Moscow streets trying to lose the private car of the American general, the Russian driver of which was following the NKVD car at the heels.

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Obviously in this case Fitin and Ossipov did not want to give up the usual principles of their work, and besides they probably had instructions to arrange these meetings without any supervision by the agents of the "external observation" (L-EN) of the 2nd Special Division of the GUGB NKVD and "SMERSON" administration, whose agent was, probably, was the private Russian driver of the American general. The circumstances under which these meetings took place greatly surprised the American general, but they were typical for the NKVD principles of work. In this case Fitin and Ossipov met their American counterparts under the same circumstances, as an average NKVD operative agent-representative meets his residents and agents. There can be no doubts that all this had been done deliberately and after some serious discussion in the highest quarters of the NKVD. What was the secret aim of all these tricks - is hard to say, but there had to be one.

#### Recruiting of Agents

As a rule, the recruiting of an agent is preceded by checking with data of the 1st Special Division, and, in more important cases, with files of all operative divisions and their special archives. Enquiries are invariably sent to : 1) place of birth - about the social origin of the parents and their background; 2) NKVD agency, "accommodating" the region where the candidate lives; 3) NKVD agency, "accommodating" the industrial or any other object, where the candidate works. Besides that secret characteristics of the candidate are demanded from the local party organization (this is very often camouflaged so as if these characteristics are asked for by the regional military commissariat, police-station etc.), then a "setting" ("ustanovka"), i.e. checking up is made in his place of residence - usually through house managers, house-masters and other "agents for lodging". All these data are used as basis for a "Report for recruiting".

The recruiting of a resident must be sanctioned: in regional administrations - by the chief of the division or administration; in Moscow - by chief of the branch of the division in question.

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The recruiting of an agent is sanctioned in the same way. If the agent has been picked out of the number of "figurants" of a certain "elaboration", for which, of course, he is recruited, his recruiting is sanctioned by the deputy chief of the NKVD administration. Recruiting of other categories of agents are sanctioned and approved by less responsible officials, usually by chiefs of the branches or sections.

The "report for recruiting" must contain the data for the "setting" of the recruited person (i.e. the conclusions drawn from the materials dealing with his person); besides it must be mentioned where and how the actual recruiting will take place, who is recruiting and for what purpose, and also what steps will be taken providing the recruited person will refuse to work for the NKVD.

The actual recruitings are usually based either on the so-called loyalty to the Soviet regime (residents, tenants of conspiratorial quarters, in some cases - secret informers) or on some compromising material which is either available or artificially created. If a "figurant" is recruited out of a certain "elaboration", he has usually to choose: either work for the NKVD or arrest with all its consequences. If the material is created artificially and the recruiting is based on blackmailing, some additional material of this kind is usually available which is used if the first method of recruiting fails. If the candidate still persists in his refusal to work for the NKVD, he must sign a promise of keeping silence about the negotiations and then he is recorded as an "antagonist", thus being put in the same level with oppositionists and sectarians. The refusal of work for the NKVD is usually followed, some time later, by the arrest of the unyielding candidate.

There are cases when agents that have been recruited, either commit suicide or perform some other desperate deeds. So, for example, in 1937 L. Krasotina, relative of late Pobedonostsev, the former attorney general of the Holy Synod, took

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poison in Moscow, after having signed her consent to work as an agent of "internal observation", i.e. for spying against her closest relatives. In 1941 a Hungarian girl K. threw herself out of the window of her lodging after having given her consent to work against her fiancé. Such tragedies occur for the most part when a certain person is recruited to work inside his or her own family. Both these cases, mentioned above, were thrashed out on the operative conferences of NKVD divisions, and the Chekists who actually carried out the recruiting in these cases, were dismissed and sent to some less responsible work - as punishment for "want of skill in recruiting" but not as murderers of the innocent human beings. As far as it is known, the operative workers are always punished in some way for failure at the recruiting.

Curiously enough, according to the NKVD materials, the most difficult categories for recruiting consist of former Social-revolutionaries (Ks-er), Mensheviks and churchmen. The most easy task is considered in the NKVD to recruit agents out of the number of Trotskyists and Rightists.

While being recruited, the candidate has to sign his consent, and, if he is supposed to be an agent, he is immediately asked to give his first material. Secret informers are gradually introduced into the course of their future activity. At first, their contributions are limited to the information bearing general character, and only after some time they receive definite and concrete tasks. But there are no firm rules in this respect, and in every separate case the operative worker himself must find individual ways of approaching agents and secret informers of his team as he thinks it best.

Special registration cards are filled in for every recruited person and forwarded to the 1st Special Division of the corresponding regional NKVD-MGB administration and to the 1st Sector of the 1st Special Division of the center, in Moscow. The 1st Special Division of the NKVD-MGB regional administration sends a numbered case for the agent or secret informer which is

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further carried on under a special anonymous sobriquet as "Bel-shevik", "Master", "Fighter", "Ivan" etc. All "Agenturaya rasrebetka's" (agent elaboration) and "Service-list cases" are also conducted under sobriquets.

### Work with Agents

As a rule, operative workers of the NKVD are in direct contact only with residents and agents (of all three categories). The work with ordinary secret informers and "secret informers for lodgings" is usually carried on by the residents. But also here no general rules can be applied, and from time to time the operative workers who are on the staff of the NKVD-MGB, see themselves the secret informers (usually in the presence of the resident, to whose team they belong).

The operative worker gives regular instructions to his residents according to his own materials as well as in conformance with requirements of the higher quarters. All operative workers have weekly time-tables for meeting agents, and they are obliged to give a copy of such a time-table to the chief of their section or branch, so that he may know where (in which conspiratorial quarters) his subordinates are at a certain moment. From time to time the chiefs of the branches have to see agents together with their operative workers in order to control them.

The residents meet their mass net-work of secret informers usually somewhere near their places of work or residence, but here is also no general rule, everything depending on local conditions. But this is always done according to a schedule the copy of which is being sent to the operative worker who may sometimes control such meetings.

The encounters with the agents are arranged in the conspiratorial lodgings or, depending on the circumstances, in various places: in the streets, in squares and gardens, out of town etc.

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The NKVD premises may be used only for seeing residents (rather infrequently) or "itinerant agents". The latter denomination is used for a special group of agents employed by the Secret-Political administration of the NKVD. This group is being recruited from a certain "tint" and is supposed to travel in the domain of their "tint". Such agents are usually informed by phone that they must visit a certain person, and then the encounter is arranged in some of the NKVD quarters. But even in these cases the encounters do not take place in the very premises of the NKVD regional administration, but in some less conspicuous, though subordinate to that administration, place.

The general principle of Soviet work with agents may be expressed in few words - "No stone must be left unturned to achieve the aim". Any lies, any provocations may be used for recruiting agents, and any crimes may be staged for the same purpose. All this is called in the NKVD slang "agenturnaya kombinatsiya" (agent work combination) and is carried on according to approved plans. It is also the principal subject in the course of training NKVD officials in special schools - in the Central NKVD School in Moscow, in inter-regional NKVD schools in different cities of the Soviet Union and in the Higher School for Border Guards NKVD in Moscow.

Note: The authors once more call the attention to the fact that the theme concerning NKVD agents was worked out in connection with the work of the 1st Special Division therefore as this problem is common for all divisions and administrations of the GUGB NKVD USSR. All operative work with agents, including recruiting and training, is carried out by the operative organs of the NKVD-MGB, while the 1st Special Division is only concerned with the operative-statistical recording of agents and supplies the People's Commissar (now Minister of State Security) or the Chief of the NKVD-MGB administration it belongs to with operative-statistical information of all kind. It may also give similar information to other NKVD agencies and to the



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Party, but only according to the indications of the secretary of the NKVD People's Commissar or the Chief of the NKVD regional administration this particular 1st Special Divisions belongs to, and only in the wording wished by the above mentioned NKVD institutions. The same order was preserved when the GUGB NKVD was transformed into the Ministry of State Security.

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## CHAPTER V

### THE SECOND SPECIAL DIVISION OF THE OUGB NKVD USSR

#### Diagram No 2

The activities of all organs of the State Security of the USSR, or, strictly speaking, their operative work with agents, is based, upon the whole, on four principal foundations, mentioned below according to their succession :

1. Operative recording;
2. Agents;
3. Operative technique;
4. Inquest.

These are, so to say, four corner stones of the whole NKVD-MGB system supporting the entire practical work of its operative agencies or "organs" (using the Chekist terminology). The operative recording gives a full, manifold and detailed picture of how and where the real or potential centers of resistance to the Communist dictatorship are disposed throughout the country. An intricate and manifold network of agents, that knows no bounds in attaining its purpose, gives full possibility of locating beforehand the centers of such a future resistance, defining its forms, and exposing its participators and possible leaders. The organization and functions of these two first elements of the Soviet state security have been discussed in the previous chapter in connection with the analysis of the structure of the 1st Special Division of the OUGB NKVD USSR.

The inquest is the final stage of the whole complicated work, performed by the organs of state security of the USSR, and will be discussed in the following chapters of this manuscript.

As to the operative technique of the NKVD, it is a system, not less intricate and manifold than the operative recording

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and network of agents. One can have a judgement about the term "operative technique", applied to the NKVD-MGB, only if one takes into consideration that the Stalinist dictatorship is the only and exclusive master of all material and technical resources of this vast country and that the organs, securing the safety of this dictatorship and preventing the outbursts of hatred of the enslaved people, may at any time use any of these unlimited material and technical resources. The NKVD may also fully dispose of such extensive technical means, and has in its hands such an elaborate and complicated apparatus for making the most of them, that the punitive organs of all other countries cannot even dream of anything like it.

From the operative point of view, the whole of this diverse and exceedingly intricate apparatus, including various technical means, is the concern of the 2nd Special Division of the GUGB NKVD (now MGB) and of its subdivisions in all republican, regional and area administration of the NKVD-MGB.

Formerly the functions of the 2nd Special Division comprised also the protection of the Bolshevik leaders and this task was entrusted to the 1st subdivision of the 2nd Special Division. But by the end of the thirties this subdivision was reorganized into the so-called 1st Division of the GUGB NKVD, the structure and functions of which will be discussed in Chapter 7. However, as regards the operative functions, the 1st Division is still closely connected with the 2nd Special Division, and their fields of operation are so interlink<sup>ed</sup>, especially in Moscow, that in many cases it is difficult to draw a line of demarcation between them. The importance of the 2nd Special Division is revealed by the fact that in the period of the "Great Furge" it was headed by Kruglev, who occupied the post of the 2nd Deputy to the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR in 1939-1941, and was appointed Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR after the war.

The operative or special technique which is the concern of the 2nd Special Division of the GUGB NKVD is usually denominated

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in NKVD-MGB documents as "letter" ("litera"). The most important of such "letters" are :

- NH - ("narushnye nabliudeniya") - external observation;
- F - photography;
- M - membrane - control of the telephone network;
- K - eavesdropping, i.e. listening in by means of special devices and microphones;
- PK - ("perliustratsia korrespondentsai") censoring of letters;
- P - ("palengatsiya") - control, search and location of illegal radio receiving and transmitting sets;
- Sh - ("shifrovaniya") - ciphering;
- RSh - ("rasshifrovka") - deciphering.

Sections and subdivisions that are concerned with all these branches of operative and special technique, are usually denominated by the abbreviations, mentioned above, while letter "L" (abbreviation from the word "litera" - letter) is added to them. Thus, for example, a subdivision, concerned with censoring of letters, is named "L-PK". Each of these subdivisions is, if it possible to say so, something like a trust, comprising a series of very cumbersome and therefore nearly independent industrial objects.

Let us take a closer view of some of these "letters".

"L-NH" - External Observation or Outside Surveillance.

The task of this service is the securing of an all-day-round, constant and persistent observation of all persons who are at this period of time "elaborated" by the NKVD. In Moscow this is the concern of the 2nd Special Division of the NKVD People's Commissariat, in provinces - of the 2nd Special Divisions of NKVD regional and area administrations, in the capitals of Union Republics - of the 2nd Special Divisions of republican NKVD-MGB. For this purpose a special brigade of agents of external observation is created for trailing after every "figurant". A car, a motor cycle if necessary, is assigned to this brigade, and it is equipped with technical means, needed in every concrete case. The observa-

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is extended not only upon the "figurant" himself, but upon all persons he may meet and speak to in the streets or in public places. According to the Chekist terminology this is called the "setting of the figurant's connections" ("ustanovka svyazei figuranta").

The "setting" means that every person, whom the "figurant" greets or addresses, is followed by an agent - member of the brigade, whose task is to establish the identity of this person, his place of residence, his profession and place of work. In the Chekist slang it is called "to bring the connection up to Loke". Then the agent makes a short report about the results of his observations, and this report is called the "setting". Later on, such a "setting" is forwarded to the 2nd sector of the 1st Special Division where it has to be checked whether this person has been especially recorded and what is his "tint". If the answer is a positive one, these data are copied in the "setting", which is then filed with the "figurant's" case. But even if such a "setting" does not provide any compromising material, nevertheless it is filled for the purpose of "mounting" in case of need. The usual proceedings are as follows: by the end of the day the SAVO-man, heading the brigade, compiles a "summary of external observation of the figurant", fixing to it all "settings" with data obtained after the checking up with the 1st Special Division. An agent on duty (in especially important cases there may be several agents) is posted near the dwelling of the "figurant". This agent has to spy on all persons, coming in and out, and make "settings" for them.

Besides "figurant" the external observation invariably extends upon all foreigners.

Service "L-SN" does not include spying after the "figurant" at his places of residence and of work as well as in the quarters of his friends. This is the task of a network of secret informers or agents belonging to the team of the operative NKVD official or resident who is concerned with the "elaboration" of this

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"figurant". "L-MN" ("narushka" in the Chekist slang) is not even informed about the essential part of the case of the person under their constant observation. Usually the activity of the brigade is directed by the operative NKVD official who is entrusted with the "elaboration" of the "figurant" in question. But if the "figurant" is a foreigner or came from some other town, the whole work of observation is performed by the "L-MN" subdivision, and only the results of the work are reported to a certain NKVD division or administration.

It is very difficult, and may be even impossible, for a simple mortal to imagine the scope of work of the "L-MN", for instance, in Moscow. This "Moscow MN" means, that many hundreds of "figurants" of different "elaborations" are secretly watched day and night, while this secret observation is entrusted to a brigade of 3-4, and sometimes more, persons in each case. Besides, posts of external observation are needed for watching several dozens, and sometimes hundreds, of conspicuous "figurants", coming to Moscow on their business. These "figurants" are being "elaborated" by different regional administrations and republican NKVD People's Commissariats, who often notify the 2nd Special Division about the necessity of watching certain "figurant" just on the day of his arrival to Moscow.

But that is not all: according to a special instruction of the NKVD People's Commissar, a constant external observation has to be carried on every member of foreign missions, embassies, consulates, all military attaches and their employees, all foreigners coming from abroad, and especially all correspondents of telegraphic agencies and foreign newspapers. It seems that foreign tourists give the least trouble to the organs of "L-MN" as they are always following established routs and are invariably accompanied by an Intourist interpreter who is always an agent or even an official on staff of the organs of state security. At any rate, the special section of the Intourist, and not the "L-MN", is responsible for the behaviour of foreign tourists and for their intercourse with Soviet citizens in the streets and public places.

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But some foreigners give a lot of trouble to the 2nd Special Division.

So, for example, before the war the secretary of the Japanese military attache, a certain Kembo Sasaki, was in the habit of going for a quotidian walk. Evening was his favourite time for this purpose, and he usually followed the same route - down the Okhotny Klad and along the Gorky Street to the Pushkin monument in the Boulevard Ring. He used to have an unlit cigarette in his teeth and asked every man he met for light. Thus he addressed 30-40 persons during his walk, besides he came up to different stalls, flower girls etc., and everywhere entered into short conversations. It is difficult to imagine how many agents were needed to compile a "setting" for everyone he had talked to. Summary of external observation of this Sasaki alone included daily up to 50-60 "settings", checked up with special records. It was well known in the center that it was sheer mockery from the part of Sasaki who tried his best to give as much trouble to the NKVD as possible, but nevertheless the external observation of Sasaki persisted in the same scope.

Germans, as well as representatives of the neighbouring countries of the Eastern Europe, did not give too much trouble, but the Americans were at first a true plague for the "L-MS". Usually, having not the slightest notion about the real state of things in the Soviet Union, and enjoying full liberty back at home, the Americans strived to preserve all their habits in Moscow and persistently tried to study the life of the Soviet Union applying the same methods that were habitual for the study of all other countries. They visited all public places, were in a hurry to make private acquaintances, and desks of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs were piled with their applications to get the permission of travelling all over the Soviet Union. Not taking into consideration all other reasons, this peculiarity of Americans, that annoyed the NKVD so much, could be explained by the fact that the USA established the diplomatic relations with the USSR nearly 15 years later than all other great powers, and the American

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representatives tried to get into "contact" with Soviet citizens directly at the time when the main point of the NKVD activity was just to cut off any connections between the Soviet population and the foreigners.

It was not easy for the "L-M" to handle William C. Bullitt, the first ambassador of the USA in Moscow (1933-1936). He was very fond of sports and often attended the "Dynamo" stadium where he tried to make acquaintances with Soviet sportsmen. By the way, Mr. Bullitt was the first who taught Soviet officers to play polo. Thus, taking into consideration such habits of the American ambassador, a special intensified brigade of the external observation was required, and several dozens of "settings" were compiled every day. To make the work of the NKVD easier two special agents were attached to Mr. Bullitt: a record runner and a tennis player that has represented the USSR at international games in France, an exceedingly slender woman whose good figure attracted general attention. But the combination with the tennis player did not pass. When the winter came, Mr. Bullitt started skiing out of town, and this drove to despair agents, attached to him, who could not ski well. At the time he, like other Americans, was often discussed by the NKVD men, for there were piles of NKVD "settings", trying to fix his connections. The NKVD could breathe freely only when Mr. Bullitt "nibbled" at an attractive bait - the renowned ballet dancer Lepeshinskaya, agent of the 2nd Special Division, purposely sent on a secret message, and spent all his free time exclusively in her company.

Besides all the above mentioned objects, the external observation is carried on for all agents of the Foreign Administration of the NKVD and of the Intelligence Administration of the General Staff of the Soviet Army, during their stay in the USSR. Many of the Comintern workers were exposed to such a control observation, which is periodically extended even on the NKVD-MGB men, to check their behaviour and their connections.



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All these various tasks explain the fact that only in Moscow there are many thousands of "L-AM" agents. An exception in all other countries of the world, this extensive "external observation" is a daily practice in the USSR, the usual routine of the "L-AM" section of the 2nd Special Division of the NKVD-MGB.

#### "L-F" - Photographing

Letter "F" comprises not only the photographing of objects and persons, but also the preparation of photostat copies of documents, drafts, projects and even complete books. Microphotography and photomounting, i.e. preparation of one picture out of several ones, are also within the province of this branch, supplying first-rate "proofs" for lawsuits, recruiting of agents etc.

A classical example of applying such forged photographs is the well-known action against the "Industrial Party" ("Prompartiya) in 1930, when, during the lawsuit, "secret instructions" of the French 2nd Bureau, mounted from the documents dating back to the period of the First World War, were produced. As another colourful example of applying such "proofs" in the USSR may serve a widespread trick of producing to the accused, denying his acquaintance, let us say, with some leader of the antistalinist opposition in the Communist Party, a photomounting, on which he is represented conferring with Trotsky or Bukharin.

The team of the "L-F" includes also a special sub-unit, the printing one, that is able to prepare any certificate or visa in any language, with any stamps or signs. So, for example, during the reception of Molotov in the British House of Commons, in 1942, the galleries for guests were invaded by armed British communists, who used cards that had been forged in Moscow for the purpose of entering the House. The same team may forge any technical draft or calculation in an extraordinarily short time.

Let us again turn to examples: once, in summer 1937, an agent of the Secret Intelligence Administration of the People's Commissariat of Defense, who was at the same time employed on the staff of the Japanese military attache in Moscow, informed his administration about the necessity of an urgent interview. The

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latter took place in the same evening, approximately at 22.00 in the neighbourhood of the Timiryazev Agricultural Academy. During the interview the agent stated that the assistant of the military attache had just received a parcel with the following stamp: "All-Union Communist Party (bolsheviks), Central Committee, Military Department", and locked it in his safe. The agent was ordered to bring this parcel. Approximately at 1 a.m., a second interview took place and the agent handed the parcel to the official of Intelligence administration.

Some 20 minutes later the parcel was passed to the 2nd Special Division of the NKVD for an urgent preparation of forged documents to be returned to the safe of the Japanese attache. At 6.30 in the morning, at a third interview, the agent received the parcel back, and did not even suspect that he got a copy, which had been considerably changed in comparison with the original. This forged copy was passed off for the use of the attache. The envelope contained some ten documents, including 3 drafts, which had been approved by the People's Commissar for Defense Industry, the deputy People's Commissar for Defense, and by the Chief of the Military Department of the Central Party Committee. The matter was in the switching of a giant plant on the production of a new type of the anti-aircraft guns. Forged calculations and drafts were prepared for the disinformation of the attache. The signatures were made so well that they did not call out any suspicions, but in the case of a graphological analysis they would not be identical and the document would be considered as a sample of forgery, made by the foreigners.

By the way, it has to be mentioned to the credit of the Japanese Intelligence Service, that the military attache got into the possession of the documents only one hour and a half later than the director of the plant, who received them personally from the secretary of the Military Department and acknowledged their receipt with his signature.

The "L-F" functions include also copying and changing of letters, compiling of forged diaries, different forgeries in financial

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accounts etc. For instance, a letter from a certain Prof. Kluchnikov was sent to the address of his acquaintance, a lawyer Kolchenovsky, employed in the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, who was at that time being "elaborated" as a conspicuous "figurant". In this letter Kolchenovsky was invited to call on the professor and pick the book he was in need of. This letter was intercepted at the post-office by a "L-PK" agent and forwarded to the "F" branch where it was changed and then posted again. This time the letter requested the "figurant" to take an English book from the library of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs and give it to Kluchnikov's domestic worker, who would come especially for this purpose from the summer cottage of the professor. Two days later Kolchenovsky was summoned to the NKVD where he was told that a secret document of the Commissariat, employing him, was found in the book which he sent to the professor. This document was even shown to the panic-stricken Kolchenovsky, and soon thereafter he was recruited as a NKVD informer and gave detailed statements about his business conversations with Soviet Foreign Commissar Maxim Litvinov and his deputy Karakhan, both of whom were also under secret "elaboration" of the Secret-Political administration of the NKVD.

Such forgeries do not embarrass in the least the pontiffs of the Soviet "justice", and are systematically studied in all NKVD schools as examples of "operative work combinations".

"L-PK" - Censoring of Letters. The scope of work of this branch is so extensive that it is impossible to give a detailed description of its functions. Covering themselves with the formal guarantee of inviolability of private correspondence, stated in the "Stalinist Constitution", the "L-PK" agents constantly open, read and even make photographs of the correspondence of the Soviet citizens with their relatives or friends abroad, as well as of the whole correspondence of those categories or "tiers" of the population which are being "elaborated" by the organs of the State Security at this period of time. In the course of mass purges and

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repressions or at some particular moments of international or internal tension, the "L-PK" agents read all letters in the USSR.

All major post-offices (up to the district ones) have special officials who are censoring the correspondence. But the post-office chiefs are not aware of this fact, at least not officially. Usually it is done in such a way : the chief of the special branch "recommends" to the head of the Regional Administration of Post and Telegraph to appoint ~~some~~ "Comrade X." as a telegraphist or as a clerk to a certain post-office. This man appears before his new chief showing simply a paper from the provincial office of Post and Telegraph. For some time he carries on the usual work of an ordinary clerk and is completely subordinate to the chief of the post-office. Then he is instructed to get into contact with a certain group of employees of this post-office, and proceeds to his special tasks, not reporting about them to the chief of the post-office. Usually this work is entrusted to letter-carriers, employees sorting out the correspondence or taking the letters out of the letter-boxes.

Copies of the letters that are characteristic in any way are forwarded to the district section of the NKVD, and in provincial offices - to the chief of the 2nd Special Division of the NKVD administration for this region. Depending on the "general line" of the Party and on the NKVD instructions, the utmost attention may be paid to "alien elements", to persons connected with different kinds of opposition, to "corrupt elements" in the army etc

In the army this system is completed in such a way that every military unit has its own letter-box, and all soldiers and junior officers are obliged to use it for mailing their letters (officially it is done to have the letters posted free of charge). All these letters are read by the officials of the NKVD Special Section ("Osobiy Otdel") or of the political section of the military unit. During the war such a system accounted for the fact that a letter sent through the field post at Pulkevo (five miles from Leningrad) reached the addressee in Leningrad only in ten days.

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All correspondence of "figurants" of special "elaborations" is under a constant control of "L-PK", and summaries of this control are being separately forwarded to the 2nd Special Division. The "L-PK" team sometimes includes special agents, controlling the work of the "L-PK" men. These agents belong to the group "sp/ag" - special agents - and are specially paid. Ordinary "L-PK" men usually work as secret informers, i.e. without pay, but from time to time they may get some rewards.

As a result of this complex system of all-round and selective censorship without informing the chiefs of the post-offices, the letters in the USSR often disappear or reach the addressees with a considerable delay. This system creates most favourable conditions for abuses on the part of post officials, with an obvious purpose of facilitating the work of "L-PK" agents, long before the war in the USSR an obligatory rule was introduced that the address of the sender had to be written on the obverse side of the envelope. In all telegrams the address of the sender had to be invariably mentioned.

"L-M" - Membran. The "Letter M" branch is in charge of controlling the telephone conversations. The center of its activity in Moscow is the special section of the central telephone station, in the capitals of the Union Republics and in regional centers - special sections of local telephone exchanges.

The operative technique "M" may be considered as one of the most popular means of the "elaborations". Usually the number of the "figurant" is taken for control, and any call, even from the automatic telephones, is easily checked up. The number of the phone is automatically recorded after the conversation by means of the operative technique "M", and therefore the "M" summary always shows on which telephone the call was made and where this telephone is situated, if the call was made from a booth with automatic telephone. There is nothing new in such a method, and it is regularly applied by the police agencies of other countries, but there, in the time of peace, it is used only for the exposition

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and seizure of particularly dangerous criminal offenders, while in the USSR it is a constant and exceedingly regular system for assisting the Party in its daily struggle with all elements of opposition in the country.

The operative technique "M" is particularly often applied for the "elaboration" of prominent "figurants", as the bureaucratic circles of the Soviet Union make a broad use of the telephone network. The Soviet people know very well that the telephone conversations are tapped, and therefore they get accustomed to use <sup>an</sup> a code for their telephone calls. But exactly this codified character of the simplest telephone conversations is necessary for the NKVD, being just the proper thing for the "elaborations", blackmailing and bringing charges, sometimes of a phantastic and improbable nature.

The case of the former head of the Central Council of "Osoaviakhim" (the semi-military organization for development of aerial and chemical defence of the Soviet Union) General R.P. Eideman, who was executed together with Marshal Tukhachevsky in 1937, may serve as a characteristic example of the work of "L-M" branch. It was known in the circles of the leading NKVD officials that at the moment when the Tukhachevsky plot had been exposed, no compromising material was available for Eideman who had only <sup>aroused</sup> some suspicions. Eideman was a close friend of General Kork, the Commanding Officer of the Frunse Military Academy, who was also executed later on for having been involved in the Tukhachevsky plot. The following trick was used to expose Eideman: an NKVD agent rang him up through a local telephone exchange of the "M" branch, and, calling himself Kork, "warned" him of the impending danger of an immediate arrest. An NKVD man was selected for this conversation, whose voice had exactly the same timbre as that of Kork. The well informed NKVD officials mentioned afterwards that Eideman took immediate steps to disappear and was arrested at the moment when he was ready to get into his car.

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Some time afterwards, the official of the Secret-Political Division of the GUGB Zacharev who was present at the inquest of Eideman, told his intimate friends that Eideman immediately started to make confessions after having been directly asked where he wanted to flee and what were the reasons for his flight. When Eideman gave an evasive answer, probably to gain time, he was asked without beating around the bush: did he receive a warning about an impending arrest? When Eideman answered in the negative, the investigator declared that he was lying, that the apparatus of the control telephone station was used for this communication and that he spoke with a NKVD man and not with Kork.

Then Eideman confessed that such a conversation had really taken place, and that having been warned he decided to flee, but did not know where. After that he was questioned about the reason of his denying the call and the warning (all persons, examined in the NKVD, have to sign all their answers without any delay) and he had to explain, why he, a person without any sense of guilt, decided to leave his summer cottage near Moscow and to flee not knowing where?

Thus, such a measure provided the investigator with concrete material, and on its base, one hour later, Eideman gave detailed depositions; still later, the same Eideman convicted others, including Kork, at the cross-examinations.

The listening-in of telephone conversations is called "passive measures" in the instruction about the operative technique "M". But the "M" tasks of the 2nd Special Division include also the column "active measures" where following steps are enumerated: "to cut off the conversation", or "in case of a conversation about some appointment to make it one hour later, urgently notifying the section ..." or "to switch off the telephone from... till.. " etc.

Besides "figurants" the "L-M" constantly taps the following categories of subjects:

- a) foreign embassies and consulates;
- b) private telephones of all foreigners;

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- c) all telephones of such hotels as "Moscow", "Metropol" and "Sevey";
- d) all telephones of People's Commissariats of Foreign Affairs, of Defence, of External Trade and of the Executive Committee of the Communist International (Comintern).

As to the governmental telephone network, the so called "Kremlin Automatic Telephone Exchange" (or "whirligig" in the Chekist slang), the "L-M" control does not extend upon only very few of the highest leaders of the USSR. They are put on the list by Stalin himself and the list is forwarded through the special Sector of the Central Party Committee. This sector is supervised by the member of the OGBuro Shkilyatov.

"L-P" - Relocation or Radio Location. The tasks of this branch comprise sending of ciphered radiograms from the central NKVD administrations in Moscow to every corner of the Soviet Union, receiving of such ciphered radiograms from local NKVD agencies, discovering the presence of underground radio-stations on the USSR territory and locating them, as well as muffling of all undesirable broadcasts what ever their origin may be.

The section "L-P" has its own radio-stations and radio location posts as well as other devices for carrying out these various and complicated tasks. Before the war the Central NKVD radio-station was located in the hamlet Monino near Moscow, but in October 1941, when the German troops drew nearer to the Soviet capital, it was partly evacuated and partly destroyed by the demolition detachments of the NKVD. The authors of this manuscript are not informed about the location of this radio-station after the war.

Already before the war, the functions of the "L-P" acquired such a scope that it became necessary to bring into effect a fundamental reorganization of the whole branch.

So, for instance, the new functions of the "L-P" included the propaganda broadcasts in foreign languages which were received and re-broadcasted further through secret radio-stations of local



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Communist parties. A great stress was put on this work in relation to the Latin-American countries (Cuba, the region of the Panama Channel, Brazil, Chile etc.). The habitual time for such broadcasts was the period from 1 a.m. till 5 a.m. (Moscow time). The so-called "white spots" appeared for that period in the regular broadcasting program of the Moscow radio-committee, and nothing was officially known about these "spots".

The using of the short-wave stations of the USSR for current instructing of the foreign agents of the Foreign NKVD Administration, the Intelligence Administration of the General Staff, and the Communist International (now Cominform) is another function of the "L-P" branch. Usually a code is used for such transmissions. Anyhow, in a series of cases - for example, instructions to the Spanish guerilla in Asturia in 1939-41 (and now, undoubtedly, to the Greek guerillas), - such broadcasts were made openly, but, of course, in the name of the Central Committee of the corresponding Communist party. So, for instance, it is known, that the order for the dismissal of Harry Pollitt (British Communist party) <sup>as</sup> the result of his tactical error at the moment of the declaration of the war, came through radio directly from Moscow.

The information intended for the agents is usually received by the ciphering branch of the Soviet embassy or of the Soviet commercial representation with the help of "PPM-38" radio set, and is transmitted further in the same way, i.e. to the receiver of the agent, which has, as a rule, only one wave for transmissions, thus making possible the control of the setting from some other point.

The scope of work for deciphering or simply for tapping of foreign broadcasts and radio-telephone communications was also increased in an unusual way. Already before the war, a special section for recording the radio-telephone communications between the Foreign Departments of London and Washington was organized in the "L-P" branch. There are also some evidences that the first successful attempts to intercept the transatlantic talks between Churchill and Roosevelt took place in 1940.

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Finally, the "L-F" was transformed into a huge organization with international staff of workers. These were mostly members of foreign Communist parties who were sent to Moscow as the result of a secret mobilization which was personally performed by the secretaries of the Communist parties abroad. The old premises in the Malaya Lubyanka Street were too small for this department, and in 1941 it was transferred into a spacious building in Lenin Hills by Moscow. The whole central Comintern apparatus had been transferred there from the Sapozhkov Square somewhat earlier, in 1940. As to its organization, the "L-F" still belonged to the NKVD system but practically it was subordinated to the Special Sector of the All-Union Communist Party Central Committee.

"L-E". The work of this branch consists in overhearing the conversations in different premises with the help of special devices. The central Moscow hotels are the principal field of operations of this branch, for they usually give shelter to foreigners and most prominent party men, coming to Moscow from the provinces.

The most habitual method of listening-in is the installation of special membranes-dictophones into the switches, ventilators, clocks, table legs etc. Hidden wires go from these membranes through the intensifying sub-stations to the Control center (in Malaya Lubyanka Street 7).

The "L-E" branch pays even more attention to the buildings of foreign embassies, missions, consulates and different commercial and cultural representations. But this portion of work belongs first of all to the field of operations of the NKVD Foreign and Counter-Intelligence Administrations and will be discussed in more details in the corresponding chapters of this manual book.

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Such are the manifold and intricate functions of the 2nd Special Division of the GUBB NKVD USSR. The specific features of its work account for the fact, that each of its branches has a considerable independence and the Chief of the Division only co-ordinates the functioning of different kinds of operative technique. Like the 1st Special Division it does not perform any

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operative work of its own and is intended to assist all operative divisions and administrations of the NKVD wherever such an assistance might be needed. This is true for Moscow and for all NKVD regional administrations, each of which has its own 2nd Special Division, subordinated to its territorial NKVD administration and to the 2nd Special Division of the Moscow NKVD headquarters.

Formerly the functions of this division comprised also the protection of leaders, but some years before the World War II this task went over to the newly created 1st Division of the OGPU. The 1st Division of the NKVD USSR exists only in Moscow, and the protection of all provincial leaders is still entrusted to the 2nd Special Division, or, to be more exact, to its "L-NN" branch.

The majority of the workers of the 2nd Special Division are the NKVD staff officials and they naturally are on the NKVD pay-roll. This division usually hires "special agents" for the needs of operative NKVD divisions and administrations - thieves, burglars, pick-pockets, specialists in kicking up a row in the street, and other criminals.

The abundance of technical devices in this division and their complexity accounts for the fact that this branch is one of the most expensive in the NKVD system. According to some data the "technique" absorbs up to 50% of official budget appropriations for the NKVD needs.

The organization of the 2nd Special Division is shown on the diagram No 9.

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**CHAPTER VI****THE INQUEST DIVISION  
OF THE OGPU NKVD USSR****Diagram No 10**

It has already been mentioned above that the work of the NKVD organs is based on four principal foundations: operative recording, agents, operative technique and inquest. To avoid a gap in the unity of exposition, we place the analysis of structure and principles of work of the NKVD inquest organs immediately after the analysis of structure and functions of the 1st and 2nd Special Division and previously to the study of the activity and structure of purely operative agencies of the NKVD.

First of all, let us call to our mind that by a normal legal procedure the inquest is the preliminary stage for the exposure of the circumstances of the crime and for the establishment of the identity of persons who might have possibly committed it, and the conclusions of the investigator are in no way obligatory for the decision of the court. The investigator cannot take part in the proceedings of the court or influence them in any way. The body of the crime has to be irrefutably proved, and only under this condition the verdict of guilty may be passed. Furthermore, the court cannot be influenced only by indirect proofs and evidences when passing in a verdict. An inward conviction of the jury that the accused really committed a certain crime, not substantiated by any proofs, cannot be a reason, sufficient for passing a sentence. These elementary rules of legal procedure are obligatory for judicial organs of normal countries but not for those of the Soviet Union.

In order to understand the role of Soviet inquest organs and methods of their work, it is necessary to dwell upon the principles of judicial proofs in the Soviet law. The most detailed consideration of this problem is found in the back of the

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former Attorney General of the USSR, now Minister of Foreign Affairs A.I. Vishinsky "Theory of Judicial Proofs in the Soviet Law" (first edition - Moscow, 1941; second - 1946). Vishinsky was awarded the Stalin premium of the first grade (200,000 rubles) and the title of the regular member of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR for this work. This book served also as an initial point for the compilation of new criminal and civil codes of the USSR (this work was begun in 1947). Vishinsky does not set out any new standards or regulations in his work, but he lays down in very plain and precise terms the fundamental regulations of the Soviet legal procedure already used in practice.

These fundamental regulations may be briefly formulated as follows :

1. The Soviet jurisprudence is permeated by party-spirit and is based upon the Marxist-Leninist methodology.
2. The Soviet state (i.e. the Communist party) is the begetter of the Soviet court which is flesh and blood of the new Socialist society.
3. The inward conviction of the Soviet judges is connected with their socialist interpretation of the law, with their communist conception of law based upon the social-political world outlook of the working class. The sentence passed by the court is based upon this conviction of the judges, but this conviction has to be persuasive being supported by the Marxist-Leninist principles of the Soviet juridical science.
4. If there is a lack of direct proofs or if they are insufficient to state the body of the crime, the decisions of the Soviet court may be based upon indirect proofs or evidences.

These four regulations make the Soviet court a simple tool of the ruling party, one of the organs of the Stalinist dictatorship. The Soviet court may condemn a person even if the direct proofs of his guilt are lacking - and this is its principal peculiarity. Analyzing numerous facts, supposedly selected out of practice of Soviet courts, Vishinsky rather cynically states that if the indirect proofs are applied correctly, the court-

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examination may be absolutely reliable and the results, thus achieved - veritable and persuasive. This statement of Vishinsky is nothing but an attempt to lay a theoretical foundation for iniquity and club-law of the NKVD-MGB "judicial boards", "special councils" and "troikas".

In the Soviet Union the system of public legal procedures - with their pleadings, debates, with leaving the accused the right of defending himself, with citation of witnesses etc. - is practically reserved only for "People's Court" ("Narod") that considers only criminal offences, unimportant misdemeanours or litigations, and controversies between separate citizens or institutions. At the trials of these insignificant offenders the Soviet courts adhere to the usual standards of legal procedure, and this enables the Soviet government and its numerous naive or dishonest friends abroad to demonstrate the fairness, legality and even democratic character of Soviet justice.

However, in all cases when the Soviet government itself or the Communist party plays the role of the accuser - and this happens in the absolute majority of cases and leads to the most drastic sentences, - this normal standard of legal procedure is not followed, the trial takes place behind closed doors, even without the accused and his defenders, and is practically reduced to the approval of accusing materials or "notices", that had been prepared by the investigator beforehand. We have already dwelt on this procedure when we mentioned the Special Council attached to the People's Commissar of the NKVD. This kind of "trial" is nothing but mockery at all norms of legal procedure and at the very conception of justice. But namely this was the practice of condemning millions of innocent citizens of the Soviet Union to execution, long years of imprisonment or deportation. In all these cases special NKVD-MGB "courts" have passed their verdicts on the basis of indirect proofs, as in majority of such cases the NKVD investigators are usually unable to discover any direct proofs of the "guilt".

When the actions of the NKVD-MGB follow the line of a new campaign of political terror proclaimed by the Politburo, and

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this is mostly the case, - the inquest is not the preliminary but the final stage of the court-examination (if we can apply this name to the procedure, habitual in the USSR), and it concludes the process, that had its beginning in the operative recording and the so-called "elaboration of the figurant". The "notice" submitted by the investigator to the judgement of the "special board" usually encloses not only the material, provided by the inquest itself, but also the indictment and a suggestion as to the punitive measure, in the form of a certain paragraph of the Criminal Code of the USSR or some other Union Republic. The work of the "Special Council" usually consists only in approving of the investigator's conclusions or in the selection of some other clause of the Criminal-Political Code with the corresponding changes in the punitive measures. The "legal procedure" of the "troika" is even more simplified (See chapter "Regional Organs of the NKVD").

Usually, in the practice of the NKVD work the operative part is not separated from the inquest (especially at the periods of political campaigns and purges). One and the same NKVD operative worker begins the elaboration of the case, i.e. organizes the trailing after the "figurant", collects preliminary data and is very often charged with detaining of this person and making a search of his lodgings. After the arrest of the "figurant" or of a group of persons involved in the same case, the operative worker is temporarily transferred to the inquest department. He personally makes the examination and, having completed the investigation, he reports on the case to the corresponding NKVD court. Having completed and closed the case, the operative worker returns again to his operative unit. This may be illustrated by the following example:

The operative recording of the 1st Special Division encloses a group of tsarist officers, noblemen and other "have-beens" among the lecturers and professors of the Leningrad university. The "elaboration" of this group is entrusted to the operative

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agent-representative of the secret-political division of the Leningrad NKVD regional administration. He organizes the trailing, fixes the network of agents, succeeds in his efforts to secure the expulsion from the party of all persons who "wriggled" into the ranks of the Party, and finally arrests them as "enemies of the people".

Having completed all these preliminary stages, he is transferred to the inquest division of the Leningrad NKVD regional administration and starts to obtain from the arrestees such "confessions" of the crimes which seem to him to be the most suitable ones in this case. Having completed the investigation, he compiles a "reference notice" ("spravka") which is announced at the meeting of the "troika" of the Leningrad NKVD regional administration. Thereafter the case is considered to be closed, and the operative worker in question is again returned to his permanent work in the secret-political division. If the case is brought before the "Special Council", this operative agent-representative, having compiled a "notice" and the indictment, leaves for Moscow and personally reports his material at a meeting of the "Special Council" of the NKVD USSR.

Such an order of carrying on the investigation is especially favourable for the inequity, club-law and fabrication of false cases and forged accusations, as the operative agent-representative carrying on the lawsuit, is personally interested in condemning persons whom he has been "elaborating". This is a kind of a chain reaction and the only possible result is the conviction of all suspected persons.

Practically, a person is convicted already at the moment when his name appears on the registration card of the 1st Special Division. The only question is how long it will take to liquidate him and what forms will this liquidation assume. Having received the order for the "elaboration" of a certain person and being in possession of the data, provided by special recording, the agent-representative must obtain the confirmation of these materials,



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securing the conviction of his victim. <sup>Even at the time</sup> ~~Already when~~ he starts working <sup>on</sup> the case, he is aware of the fact that if he does not get the required confirmation of the data, provided by special recording, the case will not be closed, but passed over to another NKVD man, and he himself will be recorded as a "accomplice" of this "figurant" and will be liquidated sooner or later.

Therefore the question of the real culpability of this man does not exist for the agent. He must be guilty, if the agent-representative wants to be safe and sound. The culpability of the "figurant" is a settled thing for the agent-representative already at the moment <sup>that</sup> when the "elaboration" of this person is being entrusted to him. "The NKVD does not arrest for nothing" - such is the standard answer, given to all, trying to protest their relatives or intimates who got into trouble, and expressing a naive hope that it is only a mistake, a misunderstanding.

From the very beginning of the "elaboration", the suspected man becomes the personal enemy of the operative-agent-representative as the well-being and security of the latter depend on the "success" of the elaboration. The Chekist-spy-investigator-judge persecutes his victim with the obstinacy and fury of a hound trying to hunt him down as soon as possible.

After the arrest of the "enemy of the people" the operative agent-representative assumes the role of the investigator, and he must prove that the arrest and all the accusations of the "figurant" have been justified, otherwise another NKVD man will be entrusted with the inquest, and this operative agent-representative will be punished in some way for his failure, at least losing his official position. In this stage he is not even interested in getting to the bottom of the matter: the accused has to be convicted and the difficulty lies only in the best "mounting" of the case. If several cases have been successfully mounted and their "form" was found to be adequate, this investigator, i.e. the operative agent-representative, will be promoted and rewarded; if the mounting is found to be poor, he will stay without promotion or

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will be even reduced to a lower rank. The NKVD-MGB releases its victims from its deadly grip only in those rare cases when the supreme party organs have some reasons for sending general instructions to reconsider cases of all persons, whose arrests have not been substantiated, and rehabilitate them. This happened, for instance, in 1939, when Beria replaced Yeshev in the post of the head of the NKVD.

The structure of the inquest division is comparatively simple and it reflects in general lines the structure of the NKVD-MGB operative agencies (See diagram No 10).

Each NKVD administration or division has the inquest section or the inquest branch which is subordinated both to this NKVD administration or division and to the inquest division of the center, in Moscow. It is more convenient to make an analysis of this structure using, as an example, the inquest ~~section~~<sup>branch</sup> of the NKVD regional administration. In this case the inquest branch is composed out of several sections, depending on the number of the operative divisions of this NKVD regional administration. Usually it consists of the following sections: 1st - Secretariat; 2nd - "serving" the Counter Intelligence Division (KRO); 3rd - serving the secret-political Division (SPO); 4th - serving the Economic Division (EKO), and 5th - serving the Special Division ("Osobiy Otdel").

Operative workers of each group of the inquest branch are divided in accordance with the number of operative sections accommodated by this inquest group. Thus in 1938-39 the 3rd group of the inquest branch of a large regional NKVD administration consisted <sup>of</sup> at least ~~eight~~ 8 senior investigators, and was organized in such a way that one of them worked with the 1st section of the SPO, the other - with the 2nd etc. In such a way the investigators are specialized on cases of a similar type, and besides it is very helpful in respect to the conspiracy, for only one person is informed about all cases under the jurisdiction of this section.

Usually every section of the provincial inquest branch consists of only one senior investigator with the rank of an operative agent-representative, and of several investigators having the rank of assistant operative agents-representatives. But, as we have seen

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in the above mentioned example of a branch serving the Secret-Political Division (SPO), the number of senior investigators may be considerably increased depending on the attention paid to a certain operative division or administration of the NKVD. This example refers to the period when the essential attention of the Communist party and of the NKVD itself was drawn to the Secret-Political Administration.

The staffs of the branches in the central inquest division in Moscow are much more numerous and the investigators have higher ranks there. Besides, there is a special inquest branch serving the 1st Division of the NKVD USSR, i.e. considering the cases connected with the protection of the members of the Soviet Government, party leaders and the Kremlin.

Every central administration of the GUGB (now MGB) also has its own inquest section or inquest branch which is subordinated to the inquest division of the GUGB NKVD USSR. It consists of sub-sections which correspond to the division of this central administration of the GUGB. Thus, for example, the inquest section of the Economic Administration of the GUGB is composed of sub-sections concerned with all industry, fishing trade etc.

#### Inquest and Methods of Examination

We have already discussed above the particularities of the inquest in the NKVD practice. Its purpose is not the finding out of the fact, under which circumstances the real crime was committed, and not the ascertaining of the persons who have possibly committed that crime, but only the maintaining of decorum in the retribution of the arrested "enemy", who usually has to be liquidated only on the basis of some general instructions of higher Party organs and of the data of the operative recording and of his previous "elaboration" by the NKVD agents. In the overwhelming majority of cases the NKVD-MGB investigators succeed only in squeezing out of their victims the confessions about some crimes they intended to commit, but very seldom the arrestees admit that they have really committed these crimes.

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Formally, the NKVD investigators must stick to certain norms of the legal procedure, but practically they never adhere to them and nobody prevents them from applying any "methods of physical influence", i.e. tortures to their victims. The most horrid tortures the beating and tormenting of arrestees were always practiced by the Cheka-GPU-NKVD-MGB, but they achieved unheard-of dimensions at the times of Yeshov - this period is called the "Great Purge" abroad, but - the "yeshovshina" in the Soviet Union. Yeshov's predecessor on the post of the NKVD People's Commissariat, Yagoda attached a very great importance to the operative technique and to the work with agents. He was an adherent of applying chiefly the psychological and not the physical methods of influence. Just when he was heading the NKVD, a masterly system of trailing, spying, blackmailing and provocations was set to work. He used to say that if the investigator beats or tortures an arrestee, he acknowledges his own utter inability of extorting a confession from this arrestee by any other means. Of course it does not mean that at the times of Yagoda the NKVD investigators behaved like gentlemen with their victims: tortures and beatings always took place but they were not the only or the essential method.

All these "ceremonies with the enemies of the people" were completely rejected in the fearful period of the "Great Purge" and of Yeshov's reign. The deputy to the NKVD People's Commissar Zakovsky behaved with particular brutality. In 1937-38 he introduced a system of mass beatings and murders during the inquest. At the same time Zakovsky held the office of the Chief of the Moscow regional NKVD administration, while prior to that he had been heading for several years the NKVD administration of the Leningrad region. As an illustration of the inquest methods introduced by this dreadful man in Soviet punitive organs may serve the boastful declaration of Zakovsky himself, at a meeting of leading NKVD officials in Moscow, in 1938, that "in six weeks he contrived to draw a confession out of 11 thousands of spies in the Leningrad region". It is very significant that the horrid period of 1937-38, called "Yeshovshina" (Yeshov's reign) by the

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Soviet people, was usually nominated "Zakovshchina" in the Chekist circles.

By the end of this period the number of arrestees was so great, that no spy-work of agents ("agenturnaya rabota") was possible before the beginning of the inquest in prison. People were arrested by hundreds solely on the basis of the data of operative recording or as a result of a libel, squeezed out of some prisoner by means of horrid tortures. For several years an ignorant, cruel and dull investigator became the "NKVD God" while the leg of a chair, the handle of a revolver or simply a boot or a fist, combined with dirtiest swearing and most fearful insults were his "methods of inquest". When "softhearted" Beria replaced Yezhov, he declared: "it is not forbidden to beat, and it is necessary to beat, but not everybody as it was done before".

In all periods of the Soviet regime in Russia the investigators of the punitive organs have acted and still act more according to the principle of "revolutionary consciousness" than according to juridical norms. Besides all reasons, mentioned above, this is also explained by the fact that the investigators (i.e. the NKVD operative agents-representatives) very often have no notion about these norms in general, and if they refer in the end of every case to the clause 206 of the Criminal Code (about the conclusion of the inquest), they do it only because it has been ordered by the office of the Attorney General to do so. They are directed in all their actions by the simple rule that "purpose justifies the means", and if the "enemy" has already been arrested he has to be forced to make his confession by any means. The usual and the most widespread method of the Soviet investigators of screwing real or, much more often, false confessions out of a prisoner, may be briefly represented in the following formula: 1) terrorizing of the prisoner by bringing against him the most phantastic accusations; 2) a systematic exhaustion of all physical and moral strength of the prisoner; 3) arousing hopes and striking of a psychological bargain between the investigator and the prisoner.

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This method ruined the lives of thousands and even millions of Russian people. After the war the same method <sup>was</sup> applied to the new hundreds of thousands or even millions of victims of the Soviet regime in the countries of the Central and South-Eastern Europe. Therefore it deserves to be studied in the most detailed and attentive way.

The authors of this work have interviewed several dozens of persons, former prisoners of Soviet places of detention and concentration camps as well as former NKVD men as to this problem. The picture of the gradual "working up" of the victims of this institution is nearly the same in its principal features though somewhat differs in details. The following method is the most typical :

*Ex. Kirov Case*

For instance, the operative agent-representative of the Secret-Political Division of the Moscow regional NKVD administration is ordered to "elaborate" the economist of the Moscow machine-building plant "Sharikopodshipnik", a certain Ivanov. The NKVD has no incriminating materials for this Ivanov, but a registration card has been filled out for him by the special recording as he was seen in the theatre in the company of Petrov, engineer-constructor of the same plant who had been arrested after having told a <sup>lie</sup> ~~truth~~, connected in some way with the attempt upon the life of Kirov, to other workers of his section. Ivanov was not present then, but owing to this casual encounter in the theatre he was included into the "agentur case" of the <sup>1936</sup> "liar-teller" Petrov, who was sentenced to ten years of banishment for his crime.

By the way, it is worth of mentioning that a wave of arrests, executions and deportations which followed the assassination of Kirov was called by the people "the Kirov recruitment", a similar wave that followed the death of Kuibyshev - "the Kuibyshev recruitment", and the fearful period of 1936-1938, the so-called "Yeshovshchina", was also defined as "the Great Recruitment".

Thus, the operative agent-representative begins the "elaboration" of the economist Ivanov, who, since this very moment, has been transformed in the NKVD files into the "figurant Ivanov".

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The operative agent-representative makes enquiries in the special section of the plant, and the collected information shows that Ivanov is a painstaking and accurate employee, and that during the whole period of his work at this plant he was never reprimanded by his chiefs. But he leads a very reticent life, devotes all his free time to his family (he has a wife and two children), seldom attends meetings, does not display any enthusiasm at the prospect of a new subscription to the loan, evades social obligations and therefore was recorded as a "passive member" by the trade-union organisation. Direct anti-Soviet declarations (criticism of the Soviet regime) were not recorded, but he likes to <sup>read</sup> take from the "Techprop" (propaganda of technical knowledge) American technical magazines, and when the Austrian film "Peter" appeared on Soviet screens, he made the following remark: "At last we shall be able to see a really good film".

But this scarce information does not disappoint the operative agent-representative. He decides to classify Ivanov with the category of "concealed SOE" (socially dangerous elements) and to "create" the material for his "elaboration". Mhashing the old proverb, the NKVD men say in such cases: "Find the man, and you will find the case".

And so a systematic elaboration begins. Through the secret informers at Ivanov's place of work, and through the "lodging agent" at his place of living the operative agent-representative learns little by little all the details of Ivanov's biography, he becomes acquainted with his character, manners, habits, his circle of friends, his way of life.

Meanwhile the NKVD agencies gathered information at his place of birth and his former place of residence. Similar information was also gathered for his wife. It has been found out that his father had a small grocery shop in Saratov before the revolution, and that the father of his wife was "dekulakized" ("razkulachon") in 1930 and deported to the Kazakhstan steppes for colonisation. This information "lawfully" enables the operative agent-representative to consider Ivanov as SOE (socially dangerous element

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(in Russian - "socialjao opasny element?"), for he has concealed both his and his wife's origin. There are still no concrete accusations against Ivanov, but his "case" gradually swells with these and other "indirect proofs", as Vishinsky calls them. When his case is sufficiently voluminous, the operative agent-representative gets an order for the "detention of potentially dangerous and suspicious as to his connections citizen Ivanov".

At night a car stops near Ivanov's house ... Sleepy and frightened Ivanov, not understanding anything, is roused from his bed. A search is made and Ivanov is stunned by horrifying questions: "Where is the pistol?", "where have you hidden it?", "We know everything, so better confess, it will help you"...

The first task of the operative agent-representative is to frighten his victim with accusation of some most terrific crimes and vicious intentions. Thus, the "working up" of the arrestee begins with terrorizing him. He is brought to the NKVD and is left till morning in the waiting-room jammed with the "night take". Frightened people, not understanding anything, sit or stand around him. While he is still not able to come to his senses, a man in the NKVD uniform approaches him and looking into some papers asks: "You are citizen so-and-so?" The flabbergasted arrestee answers "yes" in a shaky voice and wants to ask why he was arrested, but the man in the uniform mutters: "A fine fellow indeed! It took us a long time to catch you!", -and steps aside.

The legs of the arrestee give way under him. He wants to make the situation clear, he wants to say that he was arrested by mistake, but everybody he addresses, gives the same answer: "Keep silent, it is prohibited to speak here!" In the morning he is summoned for registration, a careful search is made once more, all his personal belongings are taken away and approximately at 10 a.m. he is brought to a overcrowded prison cell.

Immediately he is surrounded by some unshaken, tangle-haired persons in rumpled coats and overcoats. He hears questions: "Why have you been arrested?", "What news are there in the free world?", and so forth. The arrestee decides that he has been put



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into a cell with criminals and timidly clings to the wall. But gradually it becomes known that persons, surrounding him, are also economists, engineers, professors, actors, officers of the Red Army and party workers. He does not put any questions, his instinct of a Soviet citizen tells him that all of them are "enemies" who have been arrested for some real crimes, but he is quite innocent and therefore this misunderstanding will be cleared after the first interview with the investigator. But, of course, he has to shun any contact with these "enemies of the people".

The second stage of the previous "working up" takes place. The arrestee is left in peace, and it seems to him that the investigator has forgotten him. Meanwhile, other prisoners are summoned to the inquest. They are brought back after a long time and in a terrific state. Sometimes they are pushed into the cell being quite unconscious. The new prisoner ( in our case - Ivanov) begins to realize that people do not leave this place, but still he nurses the hope that he will be set free as soon as the "misunderstanding" will be cleared. In the meantime he listens to sad and hopeless tales of other prisoners, who have been arrested in the same unexpected way, but still he refuses to believe them. Gradually all his surroundings create a psychological preparedness for his first interview with the investigator. This preparatory period may be different as to its duration - from one day up to several weeks, depending on the intentions of the investigator and the number of other cases he has at hands at that time.

At last our Ivanov is summoned to the inquest. He is led through long corridors, and on the way he must stand with his face turned to the wall if some other prisoner meets him halfway. He will hear all the time the jingling of a large key, beating against the clasp on the soldier's belt; that is how the warders notify each other that another arrestee is being brought along the corridor, to enable the warder to turn his prisoner with his face to the wall - so that the prisoners might not see each other. But at last he enters the investigator's room. A formal inquest begins, and its purpose is the ascertaining of biographical data

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of the prisoner and his social origin.

"Where were you born, where did you live and work, who are your parents, your grandfather and grandmother, what was their occupation?" - these questions have to be answered in details, day after day, year after year. During this preliminary inquest the investigator studies the prisoner, tries to understand his psychology, and his conclusions as well as the impression, made by the prisoner, will determine the behaviour of the investigator. During this first inquest. Depending on them he will be either polite and obliging, treating the arrestee to tea and sandwiches and offering him cigarettes, or will kucok with his pistol at the table, swear and shout : "I'll kill you like a dog!"

At last the formal part of the inquest is finished. The investigator came to certain conclusions and he proceeds to the "case" as such.

His first question as to this "business part" has normally such a sense though it may vary as to the form :

"Your attitude towards the Soviet regime?" - whereby he adds: "You have to take into account, that we know everything, and you have to make an open-hearted confession, which will prove your complete loyalty to the Party and Soviet Government. In that case we shall not bring you to the trial. But if you persist in denying your guilt, I shall remind you of the words of Maxim Gorky: "If the enemy does not surrender, he is crushed".

By saying this, the operative agent-representative at once shows the prisoner the general direction - denounce yourself as much as possible. But in spite of this all prisoners usually vow that they are absolutely loyal and are ready to sacrifice their life for the Soviet Power and their leaders.

At this moment of the inquest, the investigator comes down upon the arrestee with all his stock of information collected from secret informers. He tells the prisoner about his intimate friends. He shows that he knows who and when paid any visits to the arrestee, he describes the character of these persons and the kind of relations between them and the prisoner. He may even

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describe the colour of the hair of the girl with whom the prisoner had an affair and he may mention a whole series of the most intimate details of the prisoner's life. But he will not say a word about his anti-Soviet actions or crimes, for his informant does not mention any of such actions or crimes. He will only slap the file of the case with the back of his hand, repeating again and again: "You see, we know everything but we would like you to confess sincerely in all your errors. Repent, and we shall forgive you. But if you don't plead guilty, you will be executed as an inveterate class enemy".

Usually, at this stage of inquest such version of the accusation is brought into action which the operative agent-representative (who is now acting as the investigator) invented and prepared during his preliminary "elaboration" of this man. Such versions and combinations greatly vary, and they may be even of <sup>2</sup>fantastic nature: from an attempt to kill Stalin and other members of the Soviet Government up to an intention to blow up a coal mine. This part completely depends on the phantasy and tastes of the investigator. In such cases the very first inquest begins with swearing, threatening and beating.

But in many cases the investigator does not bring any concrete accusation against the prisoner at the first inquest, but simply mentions several names of persons, known to the prisoner, who have been arrested some time before, and affirms, that they have already confessed everything, and that the NKVD knows about the part of the prisoner in their crimes, but he does not mention the crimes as such. From time to time he only puts some leading questions, provoking the prisoner to choose the necessary version.

But notwithstanding the nature of the chosen version, the investigator leads the inquest in such a way that the prisoner has the impression that he is not considered by the investigator to be the chief culprit, but only a blind tool in the hands of some main persons, who have to be brought to light with the help of this prisoner. Thus, from the very beginning, the investigator gives the prisoner a clue for the future psychological bargain,

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while the form and character of this bargain are determined by the investigator in the course of the inquest, depending on the personal qualities of the prisoner, his education, intellectualism, etc.

This first stormy attack of the investigator usually at once sets the prisoner off the rails. He is abashed, he has never expected that all the details of his personal life, his acquaintances and connections, even his own words and thoughts are so well known to the investigator. Nearly every citizen of the Soviet Union has in his past such facts which he carefully conceals from the representatives of the Soviet power. All these facts from his own past or that of his parents, as insignificant as they may be in reality, here, in the investigator's room, acquire in his tormented brain the meaning of a terrible deadly danger threatening him and to his family. Such a state of mind is explained by the "normal" psychology of the Soviet Citizen, terrorised by constant purges, check-ups, self-criticism etc. and this factor is fully taken into consideration by the investigator.

Some of the arrestees "crack-up" i.e. agree to sign anything suggested by the investigator, already during the first inquest, but in the most cases the first violent attack of the investigator does not give any decisive results, and the prisoner keeps on proving his innocence. In such cases the investigator, sprawling on a chair and smoking one cigarette after another, for many hours will repeat his only requirement: "Speak!". In the intervals he will knock at the table with his pistol, swear, stamp with his feet, threaten with tortures and execution and even beat the prisoner, though it is not always done in the course of the first inquest.

The continuance of the first inquest may vary from several hours to several days. This depends entirely on the investigator, his intentions, the character of the material collected during the preliminary "elaboration", on the version of the "crime", prepared by the investigator, on the impression created by the arrestee, on the physical and moral firmness of the prisoner himself.

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The inquests that lasted for several days were especially widespread in the period of "Yezhovshchina" when the lack of material that had to be collected previously, and the abundance of "cases" did not give any possibility to the investigators to pursue a systematic "working up" of the prisoners, and forced them to try "cracking" the arrestees by means of a single furious attack.

In the case of one of the authors of this work, such an inquest in the Special Division of the NKVD lasted for five days and a half without any interruption.

If such method is applied, after some hours of the inquest, when the will of the prisoner is not yet broken but the organism already begins to lose capacity of resisting owing to the fatigue and nervous strain, the investigator usually leaves with the words: "Stand and think!" Here it is necessary to have in view that during the inquests in the NKVD the prisoners are very rarely allowed to sit. Usually the arrestee has to stand all the time he is in the investigator's room. This necessity of standing for many hours and sometimes even for several days is already a cruel torture in itself, and may break the resistance even of firm people; but the chief purpose of this measure is to bring prisoners to a half-conscious state when they lose control over their answers. Sometimes (as in the case with one of the authors of this book) the prisoner under investigation is driven to such a state that, being influenced by the investigator on duty, he begins imagining that the latter helps him and proposes the best version for his defence and the best course to adopt in this situation. But this measure is not included into the category of "physical measures for influencing" and represents the "normal" way of the "work" of the NKVD organs. Depriving the prisoner of food and drink during the inquest, or feeding him with herrings not giving any water afterwards, is also considered to be the usual method. To emphasize this measure, the investigator usually puts a carafe with water and a glass on his desk, and amuses himself from time to time by pouring water into the glass and back again into the carafe.

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And so, the investigator leaves. Instead of him some operative worker in a low rank who is on duty, or a student of advanced course of the Moscow School of the NKVD investigators who is on probation, stay with the prisoner. The orderly NKVD man uninterruptedly speaks with the prisoner, using, as a rule, the most insulting language, trying to humiliate and outrage him. The purpose of such a behaviour is to oppress morally and to tire physically the person under investigation not giving him a single minute of rest. If the prisoner, exhausted by sleeplessness and long inquest, falls asleep while standing, the NKVD man on duty wakes him with a new flood of bad language and sometimes by pushing him. So it goes for a long time. Every six hours the investigators on duty are changed while the man under investigation must keep standing and "thinking". For emphasizing this measure the investigator sometimes draws two lines on the wall near the shoulders of the prisoner or on the floor near his feet, and prohibits to swerve from it or to step over them.

At last, on the next day, the investigator appears again. He has slept well and rested, he is cleanly shaven, even sprayed with eau de Cologne. He is quite ready to begin his normal working day. But the prisoner hardly stands on his feet by this time. The investigator usually begins this second half of the inquest with a violent attack, demanding the prisoner to take a seat and write down his testimony as he had time enough to think them over by night. And usually the investigator adds: "Then you can go and sleep". A characteristic detail has to be mentioned here: almost always in the beginning of the first inquest the investigator addresses the prisoner in the second person of plural ("vy" - the polite form in Russian), but later on he replaces this form by a rude "ty" (the second person of singular), and rarely uses other expressions than "villain", "rascal", "fascist Vermin" etc. while addressing his victim. He returns to the polite form "vy" only when the prisoner agrees to take a seat and write the required testimony.

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In such case the prisoner is always given tea with sandwiches, and a package of cigarettes or of cheap tobacco is put on the table for his use. All arrestees know about it, and after a cramped cell, swarming with bugs, this tea with sandwiches and the possibility of smoking again turn into such an alluring bait that cannot be resisted by many a prisoner.

Here the investigator applies the following, very typical psychological trick. Before closing the night inquest he comes down upon the prisoner with some horrible and even fantastic accusation, as, for instance, the organization of an attempt upon Stalin's life, an attempt of blowing up the plant where the prisoner works or something like that. The prisoner is left for the night to "think over" this terrible accusation, that threatens him with a "pass into eternity". In the course of the night the prisoner gets accustomed to the thought of the impending death and all his mental ability is directed upon attaining only one purpose : to avoid this terrible menacing prospect and at least to save his life. If in the beginning of the inquest the prisoner strove to prove his innocence and wanted to be set free, he has only one wish now - to escape impending death and as soon as possible to put an end to this excruciating inquest. His feet are swollen from the long standing, his brains are inflamed and he has almost lost his capacity for understanding.

The investigator takes into consideration such a state of the prisoner and abruptly changes his tactics. He begins the morning inquest in a soothing tone : " Both of us lost our temper yesterday. Each of us was tired. Your enemies have slandered you a lot. But we know that you are not such a bad man. Everybody may make an error. We do not want to ruin innocent people, we want only to know the truth." - The further harangue is of the similar nature but ends with releasing the prisoner from the most terrible accusation while the prisoner is summoned to sign some "trifle", i.e. the testimony of a "disloyal attitude towards the Soviet power", "petty wreckage" etc. Here the investigator adds with a pretended sympathy to the fate of the prisoner : "Nothing particular will threaten you for that. May be you will be only

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forced to spend a couple of years in a camp. Then the Soviet power will forgive you and you will be free again." After the terrible experience of the last night the prospect of "going to a camp for a couple of years" seems to be almost a blessing to the weary prisoner. Many take the bait of the "compassionate" investigator and ruin themselves and their relatives and intimates.

But if the prisoner is firm enough to refuse signing this "trifle", the investigator uses floods of bad language, and throwing aside all his "compassion" and "sympathy" applies to the prisoner the most cruel "measures of physical influence" in the result of which the prisoner usually loses his senses. Then cold water is poured on him and he is dragged into the solitary confinement cell or back to his ordinary cell, or even to the prison hospital - depending on the wish of the investigator and on the state of the prisoner.

But besides the "physical influence" there is also the following method which is applied very frequently. Being tired out with shouting and having exhausted his stock of curses the investigator declares: "All is finished with you. You are such an incorrigible vermin that there is nothing else to be done with you but to shoot you down. That's enough!"

The prisoner is put into an elevator. He feels that he comes down somewhere. The memories of all his past life pass before his mental sight. But suddenly the elevator stops. The door is opened and the prisoner sees a long corridor, dimly lit by electrical bulbs. Two NKVD men stand by the elevator holding pistols in their hands. The prisoner is ordered to go ahead. Staggering, clinging to the wall, he slowly moves and sees the bullet marks on the corridor walls. The NKVD men gradually fall behind, he hears their steps, echoing hollowly in the stillness of the corridor. ~~Swamps~~  
This is an end ...

But no shots are fired. The prisoner reaches the end of the corridor. Again he is put into an elevator and brought before the investigator who meets him with the words: "Well, have you seen? I was sorry for you and thought you might repent. You have wife and children, then think it over once more! We don't stand upon ceremony with the enemies of the people: one, two and ready!"



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Again the horrid accusation of terrorism, spying activities, diversion etc. appears on the stage, then the investigator again has "pity" on the prisoner, and summons him to sign some "trifle" which will cost him only two-three years in the camp. Variations and forms of the methods used by the investigator may be different, but the argumentation is nearly always the same: "Sign this 'trifle' and the accusation of terrorism and diversion will be taken off, as you will show that you sincerely repent in your errors". At last the worn-out man signs this "trifle" and is sent to some concentration camp for 5-10 years.

However, the investigator rarely achieves his purpose in the course of the first inquest though it may last for several days. An opinion is wide-spread abroad that the NKVD investigators can model anything out of the prisoners as if they were soft wax. Such an opinion was created after the "big processes" of 1936-38 but it is quite a wrong one.

These big processes are called "show trials" or "demonstrative trials" in the U.S.S.R. but in reality they do not demonstrate anything. Only such "enemies of the people" who "chose up", capitulated and agreed to be partners of Brylsko and Vishinsky appear on the platform of the Column Hall of the Moscow Union House. But all those who have courageously endured moral and physical tortures simply get a bullet into the napes of their necks and this is done without any posposity. It is sufficient to mention only the most popular names of those who perished without this comedy of an open trial - the names of Marshal Tukachevsky, Yegorov, Blucher, Army Generals Kork, Uborevich, Zakir, Admirals Panderzhansky and Orlov, ministers of the government and members of the Central Party Committee and even of the Politburo as Kuznetsov, Kossior, Postyshev and others, prominent diplomats as Karakhan and Maslennikov, and what is more important - let us recollect millions of courageous Russians, men whose names and whose very existence remained unnoticed by the foreign correspondents, eager only to find a sensation - millions of patriots and anti-communists, tortured and executed in the secret NKVD places, killed as they could not be curbed or broken.

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The names of generals Vlasov and Malyshekin, Trukhin and Meandrov who were executed in 1946 without witnesses, may serve as a symbol of all <sup>of</sup> ~~these~~ innumerate army of fighters for freedom who conquered the horrors of the NKVD system.

Thus, this monstrous system of moral and physical violence is not always the winner. More often it is conquered by the human spirit, strong in its hate of all evil, in its love of the good, i.e. by those qualities of the people which ~~the~~ Communism was unable to change in the long thirty years of its complete mastery over bodies but not the souls of the Russian people.

The unknown victims of Stalin's dictatorship lead their heroic struggle against their tormentors for long months, though they are denied all human rights and though they are fully aware of the fact that this struggle leads only to their death. Many lose their strength and firmness in this unequal struggle, sign everything they are requested to, and even turn into obedient agents of their tormentors. But still greater number of Russian people remain firm to the very end in spite of all indescribable physical and moral tortures.

The procedure of a gradual influence of the NKVD investigator upon the prisoner's mind, as described above, is often spun out for many months and even years. It happens very often that one and the same investigator is in charge of several dozens of cases, and as a result of this, persons under investigation are called out by him for the inquest once in a <sup>while</sup> way. In 1937-38 it was not infrequent that people were summoned to the first inquest only after 4-5 months of imprisonment, and then they were again forgotten for several months. There were also cases when persons arrested in the very height of "Yeshovshchina", i.e. in winter of 1937-38, had not been called for the inquest until Yeshov himself was dismissed by the end of the year 1938, and then they were set free, "for lack of the body of the crime". These people never learned why they had been arrested and why they had to spend a year in prison. But all these cases have to be considered as exceptions and they cannot be characteristic for the usual methods of the inquest in the NKVD prisons.

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In order to understand the actions of the investigator and of the prisoner in such cases when the investigation is not limited only by the first violent inquest but is spun out for a long period of time, it is necessary to take into consideration the atmosphere of the NKVD prison cell. In the period of great repressions 25-30 persons were crammed into normal cells, designed for four persons. People could sit only by turns, and for the night large wooden shields were brought into the cells and put on the plank-beds across the whole cell. Thus the whole space of the cell was divided into two or three storages the height of which did not exceed one meter. 8-10 and even more prisoners were placed on these storages, so that they were lying tightly pressed to each other and filling almost the whole of the cubature of the cell with their bodies. Those who had to lie on the floor under the plank-beds and the first row of shields were in the worst position. In the Moscow prisons these places were called "subways".

Horrid filth, stench from the close-stool, lice, bugs swarming in plank-beds and in the shields, an impossibility of washing, shaving or combing, a thin soup called "balanda" with a piece of bread for dinner and supper, complete lack of news from outside and the agonizing uncertainty about the fate of the relatives and intimates, shrieks of tortured men, moans of those who have come back from an inquest, the night calls "without things" for execution and deafening roar of automobile motors that had to muffle the sound of shots in the cellars - all this created such an atmosphere in the cells, in comparison to which even the worst concentration camp seemed like a rest home.

In such conditions the investigator had only to create in the mind of the prisoner a certitude that he won't be released under any circumstances and that death is lurking for him. Such a state of mind <sup>is</sup> achieved <sup>as a</sup> result of the most terrible and even fantastic accusations and by means of brutal beatings and tortures during the first inquests. Then, for some time, the prisoner is left in peace. As it is prohibited to speak in a loud voice in the cells, the prisoners talk in a low whisper with each

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other for the whole days, and gradually losing <sup>a</sup> the sense of fear, tell their stories and ask for advice as to their behaviour at future inquests, though each prisoner is aware of the fact that two-three secret agents are normally present among the prisoners of the cell. However, each arrestee tells his fellow-prisoners only a part of the truth - the fear of the investigator is too strong. Therefore, of course, it is impossible to speak about any co-ordinated actions of the inmates of one and the same cell - each of them takes his own risk and acts according to his own plan. The inveterate habit of Soviet people to hide their innermost "I" from the eyes of the strangers is preserved even in the hell of a NKVD cell. The analysis of the conditions in the NKVD prisons is not the purpose of this work, but we are obliged to dwell on the following two points that are of decisive value :

1. Such conditions have been created in the NKVD prisons, in comparison to which any punitive measure (with the only exception of a death penalty) seems to the prisoners a facilitation of their fate.

2. Collective demonstrations, riots, hunger-strikes etc. take place in the prisons of other countries, while in the NKVD prison, as a rule, a duel between the investigator and the prisoner is going on.

Though the circumstances of each separate case may greatly vary, it is possible to state three essential lines in the behaviour of the prisoners, and consequently all political prisoners of the NKVD are divided into three main categories.

The first category embraces those persons who rapidly lose their moral and physical strength, strike a bargain with the investigator, "crack up" i.e. sign everything ~~they are~~ suggested to <sup>them</sup> by the investigator, and in the most cases perish or consent to become NKVD agents.

The second category consists of persons who are strong enough to bear all tortures of the inquest as well as inhuman conditions of their imprisonment, admitting none of the points of the accusation, brought against them by the investigator. Many of them

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perish <sup>in</sup> ~~the~~ result of false testimonies of ~~many~~ other prisoners or friends, colleagues and fellow-workers who have not been arrested but terrorised to bear witness against them. However, a certain number of such prisoners are lucky enough to be released "because of the lack of the body of the crime" after many months of inhuman tortures and at the cost of a colossal strain <sup>upon</sup> of their physical and moral strength. Usually they draw this fortunate lot in such instances when the Kremlin decides, for certain reasons, to reconsider the cases of the prisoners.

The third category is the most numerous and the most characteristic one for the Soviet conditions, though such a category cannot be found among the prisoners of any other countries. It consists of persons who rather quickly come to the conclusion that they won't be able to snatch <sup>themselves from</sup> ~~out of~~ the NKVD clutches, and therefore these people lead their struggle with the investigator not for their freedom, but for applying to their cases such a clause of the criminal code in the indictment which seems to them to be the most favourable one. This is approximately the same course of action, adopted by the advocates of other countries when they see the impossibility of gaining a lawsuit for their client. But here is a principal difference: the defenders of obviously hopeless cases concentrate their efforts on the extenuating circumstances in so far as the fact of the crime is beyond any doubt. The Soviet prisoners of the third category have themselves invented for their "cases" such crimes that <sup>they</sup> have never been committed by them, and direct all their phantasy and mental ability to bring the characteristics and circumstances of these "crimes" in conformance with certain clauses of the criminal code that may threaten them "only" with deportation to a concentration camp.

The tactics of this original "defense" of the NKVD prisoners is approximately the following:

At a certain stage of the investigation the prisoner clearly sees that he won't be released, that his conviction has been decided beforehand by the investigator and his superiors. The atmosphere in the cell and tortures during the inquests gradually

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undermine his will for struggle. On the other hand the absurdity of the investigator's version of his "crime" is also obvious to him in all its details. His brain is painfully and strenuously working in the effort of making this version like the truth, but at the same time taking care that the punishment does not exceed "deportation to the camp for 2-5 years". Usually this way is chosen by persons who have been arrested by the organs of the Economic Administration of the NKVD and charged with "diversion", "economic spying" and "wreckage".

Arrestees begin consulting their fellow-prisoners. In every cell there are always several "specialists" as to the Criminal Code, who know by heart the most frequently used clauses of the Soviet Criminal Code and punitive measures involved by them. The prisoner chooses a clause which seems to him to be the most suitable one, and starts working on the details of his "crime" as well as on the general plan of his "confession". When such a plan is made out, the prisoner comes up to the judas in the door of his cell and asks the warden to give him an interview with the investigator for "giving testimony". Such an interview is normally given without any delay. Being brought before the investigator he declares that he has "realized his errors" and wants to "make an open-hearted confession" and therefore asks for some ink, pen and the files of his case.

Having received all this, the prisoner, in the presence of the investigator, begins working at his own case. The attitude of the investigator is immediately changed into the most sympathetic one and the prisoner invariably gets tea with sandwiches and cigarettes or tobacco. The investigator has by that time fully realized all the discrepancies and even absurdities of his version of the accusation, and he gladly accepts the prisoner's co-operation. He is interested neither in the essential part of the "case" as such nor in the punitive measure, but only in the suitable "mounting" or "framing" of the notice which he has to prepare for the session of the "troika" or "Special Council". The rudeness of the investigator's abuses, blows and tortures

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are immediately stopped at this stage, and the investigator puts on a sympathetic and even good-humoured mask.

This way is usually chosen by intellectuals and specialists. As soon as the prisoner has started writing his "version", he becomes the temporary master of the situation. In such cases he works without hurrying, trying to prolong his "leave" from the cell and enjoy comparatively human conditions. There are cases when prisoners work at their "testimonials" for a week or even more, and they compile a really scientific work, imbued with formulas and calculations. The investigator does not hasten him, and only attentively watches over the prisoner to prevent him from trying to prove his complete innocence. As long as he "confesses" and does not rebut directly the version of the investigator - the latter will not intrude.

Starting this strange and unnatural "co-operation" with the investigator, the prisoner may pursue different objects, but in the majority of cases he strives to facilitate his fate or that of his family. Under the most favourable circumstances such a "detailed confession" may lead to the appointment of a commission for revising his case. But much more frequently the prisoner "goes" to a camp for several years and all his inventiveness serves only for mitigating his fate to a certain extent and somewhat shortening his prison term. This strange work of prisoners for inventing the crimes they have never committed shows in the clearest way how desperate and hopeless the people feel in the NKVD prisons. In fact, it is the same principle of the Soviet "self-criticism" but amounting to absurdity in prison.

Sometimes the wish to escape from the lousy and stinking cell and to go to the concentration camp acquires the character of a real psychosis. Hungry and weary people begin to paint in the brightest colours the pictures of the Siberian taiga (vast forests) and of rivers, abounding in water and swarming with fish. They can discuss for hours and with the participation of all inmates of the cell, how they will fell trees, build their barracks in the desolate taiga, how they will go e-fishing and cook a

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fish-soup. In their imagination the "correctional camp" of the NKVD turns into the climax of the human well-being, and in order to achieve their deperatation as soon as possible, people compile the versions of the crimes, never committed by them but required by the investigator. Such psychoses, very profitable for the investigator, are sometimes provoked by him through his agents in the cell. A lot of people under investigation, especially former soldiers and officers of the Red Army, try to be deported to a camp as soon as possible, while they are still healthy and strong in order to flee from there. On this account there is even a special saying in the prisons: "I go to the camp, - to the green prosecutor..."

There are also cases when the prisoners try to mock quite consciously at their ignorant investigators. So, for instance, in 1957, an inmate of the NKVD prison invented with all details a story how he intended to sink several ships of the Black Sea navy in Armevir, and the investigator put down all this nonsense, not knowing that Armevir is situated 300 miles away from the Black Sea coast. Only on the next day he saw what a trick was played on him by the prisoner, summoned this prisoner to his room and beat him so that he was more dead than alive. Another "participant of an armed revolt on the Lower Volga" signed a testimony that he, being the chief of the auto-repairing shop of the MTS (machine-tractor station), intended to make tanks out of the tractors "Fordson" and armoured cars out of the auto-cisterns in order to secure the success for this "revolt". But more often there are cases when weary and desperate prisoners - this is mostly the case with almost illiterate peasants and workers - ask the investigator to write down exactly what he wants and finds better for them and thus sign themselves their death sentences.

It is absolutely impossible to give a detailed analysis of all methods of the inquest and investigation of the NKVD-MGB in a short chapter of this book. Such an analysis must be a theme for a special work.



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Closing this chapter it is only necessary to point out that the chief weapon of a NKVD investigator is neither the material which has been collected by him during the "elaboration of the figurant", nor the physical measures of influence, but this atmosphere of ultimate despair and complete lawlessness which envelops every prisoner since the very first moment of his arrest, and to which he has been prepared by all his previous life in the "normal" Soviet surroundings. It won't be an exaggeration if we say that the atmosphere of this "normal" Soviet life differs from the atmosphere of an NKVD prison only by a concentration and acuteness of the measures of enforcement as here and there the Soviet citizen has no personal freedom and all his life fate is in the hands of the authorities in power.

The work with the witnesses is of a much simpler nature. The investigator reads to the summoned witness a false testimony of the prisoner, where the latter makes a clean breast of everything. If the witness does not want to say anything that may be of any harm to the prisoner, the investigator declares: "Well, you are such an enemy as he is, even a more dangerous one, for he has confessed and repents openheartedly for what he has done while you want to conceal everything from us".

Having been summoned to the NKVD, the witness cannot leave the premises without the signature of the investigator on his pass. The investigator suggests to the witness to go out into a corridor and think there, while a soldier bids him to stand with his face turned to the wall, and he may be kept in such a position for many hours according to the investigator's order. As a result persons of weak character sign everything given to them by the investigator, only anxious to leave this damned building.

The foreigners often ask: what does the Soviet government arrest such a lot of people for, especially as they are obviously innocent? The usual answer is that it is necessary for the reinforcement of the army of the prisoners who are carrying out the most difficult work without being paid. But this answer does not give an exhaustive explanation of the problem, as the whole population of the Soviet Union already works for the state, i.e. party,

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and gets starvation wages for their labors. And the work of a slave is always less productive than that of a free man, even if his freedom is as ephemeral as it is in the Soviet Union. Therefore, the above question will be more correct if we put the word "why" instead of "what for", used there.

Then the answer will be as following + because being afraid of the people's hatred the Soviet government created a multi-millioned army of jailers, who have to arrest, torture and deport millions of people in order to justify their existence, and because there is no organ in the Soviet Union that could stop on a certain limit the signal, received from the center, for liquidating or "purging" that or another group of the soviet population. Thus the well-known theory of the snow-ball is brought into life. The dictatorship of the Communist party cannot exist without the army of NKVD-MGB butchers, and this army requires millions of victims to justify its existence. This is a vicious circle from which there is no other escape but the making away of both the dictatorship and the butchers in its service.

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CHAPTER VIITHE FIRST DIVISION  
OF THE OGBH NKVD USSR

The task of this division is to protect Stalin and other top ranking leaders of the Party and Government, as the Stalinist oligarchy is officially nominated.

The 1st Division is particularly concerned with the protection of : Stalin, all members and candidates of the Politburo; secretaries of the Central Party Committee, members and candidates of the Orgburo, the chairman and some members of the Commission for Party Control, all Vice-Chairmen of the Sovnarkom ( now - Council of Ministers) of the USSR, and some people's Commissars (now ministers) as well as a series of the highest officials according to a list approved by Stalin himself.

The most important objects, guarded by the 1st Division, are :

- a) the Kremlin ;
- b) the building of the Central Committee of the Party;
- c) the building of the Sovnarkom in Okhotny Niz in Moscow;
- d) the buildings of the Party Control Commission, of the Executive Committee of the Comintern, that of the Central Committee of Komsomol, and a series of others;
- e) the building of the NKVD USSR - Moscow, Nizhinskiy Square, House No 2;
- f) Stalin's country-house;
- g) Country-houses of all the Politburo members and other persons under protection of the 1st Division;
- h) the road from the Kremlin to the country-houses of the above mentioned persons;
- i) Government villas in the Caucasus and the Crimea;
- j) Government trains, aeroplanes, cars, yachts and other transport means.

Besides these main objects, the 1st Division guards absolutely all places, visited by Stalin and his closest collaborators, as well as all roads, chosen for their routes. For instance, the 1st Division guards the government boxes in the Moscow Art Theater, in the Bolshoi and Maly Theaters, the government hunting estate near Moscow etc.

The strictly specific task of the 1st Division is, naturally, reflected in its whole structure ( see Diagram No 11). Unlike all other organs of the GUGB (now KGB) the 1st Division has no ramifications going downwards, and it exists only in the central apparatus of the GUGB, as its main object is the region of the city of Moscow.

The 1st Division is closely connected in all its work with the 2nd Special Division, especially with its "Lead" branch. In the capitals of the Union Republics and regional centers the functions of the 1st Division as to the protection of local party leaders (secretaries of regional and area committees) go over to the 2nd Special Divisions of the corresponding NKVD administrations in these cities. However, when Stalin and other Moscow leaders visit these cities, they are guarded on their way and during their stay there by the 1st Division, though the latter uses the already existing brigades and groups of the 2nd Special Division of the local NKVD administrations for the exterior observation, regulation of traffic and other purposes.

When Molotov, Vyshinsky and other Soviet "leaders" go abroad they are accompanied by a special reinforced brigade of the NKVD men on the staff of the 1st Division. Two of these men must always accompany the leader wherever he goes, without leaving him alone. They may wear uniforms or plain clothes. Besides, long before the "leader" leaves for a certain country, a special brigade of the 1st Division is sent there (usually under the pretense of sending ahead technical workers of the Soviet delegation), being entrusted with the task of securing protective measures in local conditions. During the whole stay of the leader abroad, all the serving personnel consists of the 1st Division men. So, for instance, during the diplomatic journey of Molotov to San-

Francisco in the spring of 1943, he was accompanied by a whole platoon of guards of the 1st Division, and Kruglov himself, the future Minister for State Security, was entrusted with the general direction of operations for securing the safety of Stalin's leader No 2.

The journey of Stalin abroad is technically impossible. The position of Stalin prevents him from using foreign means of communication, and it would be necessary for the 1st Division to get the exclusive right for guarding everything that has to do with Stalin's route, i.e. the guarding of all roads, railway stations, ports, streets that lie in the Stalin's way, and the government of no country will agree to such a measure. For the last 30 years Stalin formally crossed the boundaries of the Soviet Union only twice : in November 1943, going to Teheran, and in August 1945, leaving for Potsdam. But in both cases he practically moved in the regions, occupied by the Soviet troops, and therefore there was full possibility for the 1st Division to secure his safety according to the strictly set rules.

But even in such conditions, precautions of quite exceptional nature were taken in Teheran and Potsdam. In the first case up to three thousands NKVD men on staff of the 1st Division and Special Sector of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party as well as a battalion of troops, guarding the Kremlin, arrived in Teheran. The conference with Churchill and Roosevelt took place in the premises of the Soviet embassy, and in its course Stalin left the building only twice : for the first time to pay official calls to Roosevelt and Churchill, and for the second - to attend the celebration of Churchill's birthday.

In Potsdam the inhabitants were ousted from all buildings in the streets adjoining the area, where the conference took place, and the whole area was encompassed by the intensified detachments of "SMERSH", "L-SS" and 1st Division. All the way from Moscow to Potsdam was guarded by the NKVD troops, and Stalin arrived at Potsdam in a special train, leaving Berlin aside.

The 1st Division originated as a special organ evidently after the attempt upon Lenin's life in August 1918, but its organizational set-up was not completed during Lenin's life. It is possible to assume that in those times Trotsky, and not Lenin, paid more attention to the development of this organ. It was Trotsky who took for his private use the train that formerly belonged to the Russian tsar, and that was he who introduced special body-guard for himself and other Soviet leaders. This bodyguard was the initial stage of the 1st Division. It is difficult to decide which part was played by Stalin in the creation of this specific organ in that early period of the Soviet power, but it is characteristic that during the defense of Tsaritsyn (Stalingrad) in autumn 1918, Stalin surrounded himself by a detachment of Chekists and under no circumstances parted with this special body-guard.

In the OGPU period the 1st Division was joined with the 2nd Special Division and, according to some information, it was something like a subdivision of the 2nd Special Division, though its functions were highly specialized. On the other hand, the general structure of the NKVD and the nomenclature of its main divisions and administrations make us suppose that the 1st Special Division, the 2nd Special Division and the 1st Division constituted formerly a general 1st Division, which was divided later into three divisions in connection with the complication and specialization of its functions. However, the authors did not succeed as yet in finding a definite answer as to the history of organization of the 1st Division.

In any case there is no doubt that before the war the 1st Division closely coordinated its activity with the 2nd Special Division, and both these divisions were subordinated to the then Deputy People's Commissar of the NKVD, S.N. Kruglov, who was personally responsible for the safety of Stalin and other Moscow leaders. The same Kruglov appointed the superintendent of the Kremlin and checked up all technical workers on the staff of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party, and of the Sovnarkom of the USSR. After the war Kruglov was appointed the Minister for Border Affairs of the USSR.

Unlike other central organs of the NKVD-MGB, the 1st Division is an independent unit, practically subordinated not to the NKVD People's Commissar (Minister), but to the Special Sector of the Central Party Committee, i.e. to the Stalin's secretariat. If Stalin or any other leader leaves Moscow to go to the provinces, all local agencies of the NKVD-MGB are bound to fulfil exactly and with absolute submission all orders of the NKVD men on the staff of the 1st Division, accompanying this leader (of course, only in the questions concerned with the protection of the leader during his stay in a certain republic or region). The chief of the 1st Division is subordinated both to the chief of the MGB and directly to the People's Commissar of Interior Affairs (now to the Minister of State Security or directly to Lavrenty Beria).

According to the information collected by the authors of this work, the 1st Division included the following units :

- a) Operative section;
- b) Inquest section;
- c) Personnel section;
- d) Registration and information section;
- e) Chief of the bodyguard;
- f) Commander of the Kremlin guard with the 1st Commandant's office of the Kremlin guard and the guard division subordinated to him;
- g) Commander of the guard of objects with the 2nd Commandant's office subordinated to him;
- h) Transport section;
- i) the Kremlin supply department;
- k) the MFO section (material-technical provision);
- l) Administrative and maintenance section.

Probably there <sup>are</sup> are a series of subdivisions of this division, not mentioned on our list; on the other hand, it is quite possible that some of the mentioned units have been joined together. The unusual secrecy in the organizational structure of the 1st Division makes very difficult the construction of schemes and the correct denomination of its sections and subunits. This must be the object of further studies.

Probably the field of operations and the character of the activity of these sections of the 1st Division are as follows :

Operative section (probably several of them). Plans the work of the special operative groups subordinated to the 1st Division. The number of persons, constituting these groups may vary as well as the tasks, carried out by them.

For example, Stalin attends some theater performance in Moscow. Several operative groups of the 1st Division will be sent to this theater during Stalin's stay there in order to secure his safety.

If Stalin or someone of his closest collaborators ( the so called "nomenclature workers") leave Moscow, they are protected during their journey by operative groups, specially formed for this purpose. These groups do not include the personal bodyguard of each "leader", which is directly subordinated to the commander of the bodyguard.

Besides these essential tasks the personnel of the operative groups makes arrests carrying out the orders of the 1st Division, and searches the quarters of persons, "elaborated" by this division. Besides all this, the operative groups may carry out other operative tasks which are the concern of the 1st Division.

Inquest section. Is carrying on inquests and inquiries of persons, arrested by the 1st Division. It has to be mentioned here that the whole work of the 1st Division is carried on in close contact with the private secretariat of Stalin and with the Special Sector of the Central Party Committee, more ~~precisely~~ precisely with the so-called "Stalin's battalion". In the period of the "Great Purge", 1936-1938, all arrests of members of the Politburo, the Central Committee and the Sowermon, who were not lucky enough to please Stalin, were partly carried out through the inquest section of the 1st Division. Therefore, it has to be assumed that the field of operations of the inquest section of the 1st Division is not limited only with cases of persons, arrested for breaking the rules, set for the protection of the leaders. Practically the investigators of this section execute the functions of



the investigators for especially important and super-secret cases. So, in 1937-38, arrests of all NKVD bosses, to begin with Lagoda and Keshov, were carried out with the assent of the Special Sector of the Central Party Committee, and the cases went through the inquest section of the 1st Division.

Personnel section. Is concerned with the problem of personnel for the whole 1st Division and also checks up and selects technical workers for the maintenance of the Kremlin, "nomenclature objects" (i.e. government buildings) and private accommodation of all persons under protection of the 1st Division.

The personnel section of the 1st Division is connected in its work with the Personnel Administration of the NKVD USSR but is not bound to carry out all its orders. However, the instructions of Stalin's personal private secretariat as to the selection, checking-up and distribution of the personnel are obligatory for the personnel section of the 1st Division. It is even possible to say, that the Special Sector, i.e. Stalin's private secretariat, if we want to be more precise, is directing the work of the whole 1st Division through its personnel section.

Registration and Information Section. Registers all travels of the persons who have to be guarded and accordingly gives instructions to the operative section and to the commandants. Registers all persons, visiting the Kremlin, who are not in the possession of permanent passes, and carries on all other forms and kinds of registration, necessary for the current work of the 1st Division. Is permanently connected in its work with the 2nd sector of the 1st Special Division (the recording of anti-soviet elements) from which it gets all the necessary information. It is possible to assume that formerly this section was a part of the 1st Special Division. The registration section is also directly connected with Stalin's private secretariat, as well as with the secretariat of the Politburo and that of the Central Party Committee.

According to the data that have not been verified, it publishes a secret information bulletin for the 1st Division. The Record Office of the 1st Division is attached to this section.

The Commander of the bodyguard. Is subordinated directly to the Chief of the 1st Division (and through him to the Special Sector of the Central Committee) and is concerned with guarding Stalin and other persons under the protection of the 1st Division. The corresponding men of the bodyguard of the persons, mentioned above, are subordinated to him.

A special brigade of bodyguards, consisting exclusively of the NKVD-men on the staff of the 1st Division, is attached to each "leader". Two of his bodyguards have always to accompany the "leader" wherever he is and wherever he goes. These men are changed every eight hours. Thus, the brigade of the bodyguards normally consists of 6 guards and one commander. When the "leader" leaves Moscow, the brigade of the bodyguards is reinforced by the operative group. Besides, the country-houses where the "leaders" reside, have their internal and external guard.

Stalin and all members of the Politburo have quarters in the Kremlin and, besides that, country-houses, situated some 25-30 miles from Moscow along the Moshaisk road, on the banks of the river Moskva. All the area around these governmental villas with the radius of 5-10 kilometers has been proclaimed "forbidden zone", and is guarded by a special division of NKVD troops. Every person who enters this forbidden zone without a special pass, has to be arrested without delay, and his identity has to be ascertained through the special recording of the NKVD.

The Commander of the Kremlin Guards. Is concerned with the whole internal and external guard of the Kremlin and is subordinated to the Chief of the 1st Division (and through him - to the Special Sector of the Central Committee). The commander of the Kremlin guards has under him :

- a) the 1st commandant's office of the Kremlin guard,
- b) the division of the Kremlin guards - a division of the Chekist troops - corps d'elite - of the NKVD, armed and manned according to special provisions. This division is entrusted with the service of the internal and external guarding of the Kremlin, carried out together with the students of the special military school, bearing the name of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and situated within the Kremlin walls.

By the way, the commander of the Kremlin guards has not to be confused with the Kremlin superintendent. The latter carries on the administrative and supply duties as to the inner regulations in the Kremlin, receives foreigners of high standing, plans and organizes different receptions at Stalin's, Molotov's and other "leaders", is responsible for the maintenance of order during the sessions of the Supreme Soviet in the Big Kremlin Palace etc.

The Kremlin is undoubtedly the most carefully guarded object of the whole world, though an uninitiated person will hardly notice it. The visitors can enter the Kremlin mainly through the gates of the Spassky Tower, opening on the Red Square. All other entrances to the Kremlin are closed for the visitors, and they may be used only by persons, living in the Kremlin and having a permanent pass for entering it. The Spassky gate is open in the day time, and the way is apparently barred only by two sentries in the uniforms of the Supreme Soviet military school, but it is, probably, much more difficult to pass through this open gate than to get to the American depot where atom bombs are stored.

Foreign diplomats of high standing and foreign guests of the Soviet government, having been invited to visit the Kremlin, pass the Spassky gate almost without any impediments, and they cannot even imagine what it means for an ordinary Soviet citizen to go through the whole procedure for getting a pass to the Kremlin. Such a pass can be got only in the result of a call made by some of the high party and government institutions located there, or according to a personal invitation of one of the leaders. The usual order of issuing a pass is as follows :

The person, calling that or another visitor, sends to the commander of the Kremlin guards a request of the established type, indicating name, patronymic, surname of the visitor, his address, place of work and the reason of his being called to the Kremlin. The commander sends the copy of this request through the registration section of the 1st Division to the special recording sector of the 1st Special Division of the GUM. If this person is a non-resident of Moscow, a ciphered enquiry about him is being sent

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to the 1st Special Division of the regional administration of the NKVD that is concerned with his place of residence or work. If such a person was recorded with the registration files of the ~~and~~ (anti-Soviet elements), the pass will not be issued to him, but neither he, nor the person who submitted the request for seeing him will be informed about the reasons of the denial.

If the answer of the 1st Special Division is a favourable one, the request is being forwarded to the office of the Kremlin superintendent, that summons this person to visit the Kremlin on a certain day and at a certain time. In such cases a car on duty with the transport section of the 1st Division is being sent to bring the man to the Spassky Tower. By this time a pass has already been made out, in four copies and usually of different colors, in the pass office. All these four copies are handed to the visitor and he is told, politely but firmly, to go in a certain direction without stopping anywhere or staring at anything. Some two hundred meters away the visitor is met by a guardman who checks up his passes, leaves one of them with him and directs the visitor to the next guardman with the same instructions. The last guardman on duty accompanies him to the door of the room where he has been called. There he is met by the private secretary of the person calling him, who checks up his documents and instructs the visitor to give a short account of his business, not detaining the chief with unnecessary talk. As soon as the "audience" is closed, the visitor is accompanied exactly in the same way to the exit from the Kremlin.

If a Politburo member works outside the Kremlin walls, the same procedure is introduced in the institution where he is the boss. So, for instance, when Lazar M. Kaganovich was the People's Commissar for Rail Ways (1935-1942), the pass to the building of the People's Commissariat was issued by the Transport administration of the NKVD, but a special official of the 1st Division issued the passes to the flat where the office of Kaganovich was located. In this case the visitor also received four passes, the last of which he handed to the official of the 1st Division on duty on the

Markon's flat, who showed him the necessary door and instructed him to pass quickly without stopping and looking at the boards on other doors. Two guards in the NKVD uniform, armed with guns were on duty at the door of Kaganovich's reception-room.

The former People's Commissar for Heavy Industry, Soggo Ordshonikidze, <sup>was</sup> the only one <sup>of</sup> all members of the Politburo, who flatly refused to have special guards, and made ~~the~~ access to him comparatively simple. Ordshonikidze protested against the setting up of the bodyguard in such a categorical way, <sup>so</sup> that the 1st Division was obliged to protect him secretly, in a way, not noticeable to Ordshonikidze himself.

Commander of the Guard of Objects is concerned with guarding of the government objects, mentioned above, with the exception of the Kremlin. He has in his subordination the second commandant's office (~~vtorey kommandantskyy komendatura~~) that has <sup>at</sup> its disposal the following units of the NKVD guard troops :

a) special division MUD (regulirovka ulichnogo dvizheniya) - regulation of traffic). This division consists of approximately three thousand NKVD men, that have been specially trained. The division owes its name to the fact, that a considerable part of its personnel wears the militia uniforms with the oversleeve sign "MUD". This division guards the road from the Kremlin to the country residences of Stalin and other persons on the "nomenclature list". Their permanent duties include also the regulation of the traffic and the guarding of all streets between the Kremlin and the buildings occupied by the Central Party Committee, the Central Committee of the Komsomol, the Council of the People's Commissars of the USSR and other objects under protection of the 1st Division. If Stalin or other members of the Politburo visit some plants or constructions in Moscow, the guarding of all streets included in the route is immediately passed from the militia to the MUD division.

b) A special division of night guards is used for guarding the governmental high road in Moscow at night. The posts manned by these guards intensify the protection of this road, already secured by other sub-units. The staff of this division is situated in one of the houses in the Bolshoy Gnezdikovskiy lane.

e) Guard division of the NKVD - manned and armed according to the same standards as the guard division of the Kremlin, is guarding the territory, where persons under protection of the 1st Division reside.

Besides this, a special group of water militia, guarding the part of the river Moskva where it flows through the territory reserved for the residence of the Government members, is obviously subordinated to the 2nd commandant's office.

Besides the two Kommandatura's (commandant's offices), mentioned above, there are other Kommandaturas, concerned with the guarding of other objects under protection of the 1st Division. The authors had no possibility of clearing up the functions and tasks of all these Kommandaturas of the 1st Division, but it is known that the 11th Kommandatura is concerned with the anti-aircraft defense of Moscow.

The protection of Stalin and other high party officials during their daily journey from the Kremlin to the "governmental area" is carried on with utmost care, and even at the time of peace surpasses by far anything that was permitted, for example, by Hitler during the years of war.

According to the general plan of reconstruction of Moscow all streets, included into the daily route of Stalin and his collaborators, required unusual breadth of 40 and even 60 meters, that is practically absolutely unnecessary. The cars of "leaders" run always along the very middle of these streets <sup>which</sup> practically excludes every possibility of an attempt. The inhabitants of the houses along this route are subjected to a special check-up of the 1st Division, and all families that awake a suspicion in any way are immediately ousted <sup>and transferred</sup> into other regions of Moscow.

On the Moshaish highroad all the territory up to the government villas and <sup>beyond</sup> further ahead, for some 60 miles from Moscow, is divided into several Kommandaturas, with an all-day-round duty in the area of each Kommandatura. Before the war these Kommandaturas were manned exclusively by the employees of the 1st Division, and this system has probably been preserved after the war.

Usually these men wore the militia uniforms without any distinguishing features of their special destination. Each section of the road was secured with signal posts and telephones. When Stalin left the Kremlin or the gates of his villa, the "alarm" signal was given to all posts.

As soon as the cortege of Stalin or of some other leader has left the section of one kommandantura, the next one is notified by a special signal about the approach of cars in order to stop any cross-movement. Any person, riding or walking along the highroad at this moment and stopping for any reason (for instance, to pump the tire of a car or a bicycle, etc.) has to present his personal documents for a check-up, and if anything seems suspicious he is arrested and questioned in the inquest section of the 1st Division. One former prisoner of the Ukhta-Pechora "corrective labor camp" told the authors of this work that one of his fellow-inmates was a collective farmer from the environs of Moscow, who was sentenced in 1936 for an attempt upon Stalin's life. This collective farmer came to Moscow on some business. By the evening he had <sup>had</sup> drop too much, and being drunk, fell down to sleep somewhere near the Moshaisk highroad. He woke in the NKVD. During the search a "weapon" was found on him - a kitchen knife of the kind used in the country. Three days later this collective farmer was brought to the Butyrka prison, and the "troika" of the Moscow regional NKVD administration sentenced him to five years of deportation, according to the clause 58, par. 8 - terrorism. Taking into consideration such cases one must not be astonished at the fact, that Moscow citizens try to turn into the side streets as soon as they hear the <sup>beeps</sup> beeps of the approaching government cars.

Stalin's cortege for his journeys in Moscow and along the Moshaisk highroad usually consists of 3-4 cars with the "ZIS-7" trade-mark. These cars are home-made, armoured, their greenish glasses are bullet-proof. A representative of the 1st Division must be always present at their reception from the plant.

The first car in the Stalin's cortege has the task of knocking down all persons crossing the road before the cortege as well



as any car that might be a danger to the governmental cars. Besides the driver, men of the 1st Division are in the first car, keeping an attentive eye on all persons and cars on Stalin's route. Stalin himself is usually in the second or in the third car, which periodically change their place in the cortège. Stalin's car could get to the head of the column only before the very entrance to the Kremlin or directly at the gate of Stalin's villa. The drivers of all governmental cars were without any exception on the staff of the 1st Division as workers of its transport section.

The commandant of the guard of objects is also concerned with guarding the government hunting estates. The so called "preserve" at the station Los of the Northern railway by Moscow, was one of such estates. Elk were among other animals of this estate, though ordinary citizens of the Soviet Union were prohibited to hunt them.

Transport section. Is concerned with all governmental means of transportation.

While travelling over the Soviet Union, Stalin and other Politburo members use their private railway cars. Before the war the Soviet leaders almost never used the airplanes, finding this kind of transport too risky for their precious selves. According to some information, a special, absolutely secret order was issued by Stalin before the war, formally prohibiting to the "nomenclature workers" to use planes without exceptionally serious reasons and without his own approval of every flight. May be, the "great leader" feared that someone of his collaborators might flee abroad!!! As far as it is known, Stalin himself flew only once - from Moscow to Teheran, in 1943.

The former chief of the government train Kislovodsk-Sochi informed the authors about the following details of protecting Stalin and other "leaders" during their railway travels.

Every member of the Politburo has its own private railway car that may be used only by himself and by his family members. As to their outward appearance these cars differed in no way from the usual passenger's cars, but they were exceedingly luxurious inside. So, for instance, mahogany was used for the

interior decoration and furniture of Stalin's car, Karelian birch was used for the same purposes in Kaganovich's car etc. The cars were constructed in such a way that the jerks at the joints of rails were not felt inside the car. For this aim a thick layer of lead, two layers of rough felt and one of cork were put under the wooden planking of the floor which was covered in its turn with a layer of felt, linoleum and a magnificent carpet. Such a personal car was used only for 20-30 days in the year, but nevertheless every year there were obligatory capital repairs, the costs of which amounted to hundreds of thousands of roubles for only one car.

The Soviet bureaucrats of a lower rank travelled generally in sleeping-cars (the so-called "Mitropa" cars) of the usual fast trains; several fast trains were accommodating them: the "Red Arrow" express plying between Moscow and Leningrad, "Lux-Express No 1" - Moscow-Manchuria etc. The governmental train Kialovodsk-Sochi, plying between the groups of spas, was of the same kind.

When Stalin or other members of the Politburo were travelling, their personal car was coupled in the end of the train, and it was followed by exactly the same "covering" car with an NKVD detachment. Such an order existed only for the governmental train Kialovodsk-Sochi; if Stalin or his colleagues were travelling in other directions, a special train was put together for each of them including the personal car of the "leader". Before such person got into the train, the chief of the train had been summoned to the NKVD headquarters of this railroad and <sup>was</sup> signed a special promise of avoiding any leakage about the person of the traveller and his guards.

When the train leaves the station, the chief of the train and the chief of the railroad NKVD get into the locomotive and stay there until the train reaches its place of destination.

A day or two before the arrival of Stalin, a special official of the 1st Division comes to every railroad administration to work out with the chief of the railroad NKVD measures securing the safety of the "leader". Stalin is accompanied only by a small

group of his bodyguard and officials of the 1st Division, coming from Moscow. All the rest of the guards are provided by the chief of the railroad NKVD. The men of the NKVD team always wear plain clothes, and are distributed in a more or less proportional way to stand in the tannours of the whole train, or are mixed up with other passengers of the train. Some men always take a seat in the dining-car to listen<sup>to</sup> the conversations of the passengers. The chief of the railroad NKVD, travelling in the locomotive, is considered to be the chief of the local guards, but besides him, a representative of the 1st Division, is travelling in Stalin's car. Before the train leaves the station, the chief of the train is introduced to him, and the orders of this official of the 1st Division are obligatory both for the chief of the train and the chief of the railroad NKVD.

Besides those three persons nobody else has the right to know who travels in the special car, coupled in the end of the train. But usually the personnel of the train and the station masters guess the rank of the traveller by the character of the protective measures. Such a train stops only at central stations to take water. When the train has to pass, all arrival and departure railway points are tightly closed with spikes at all stations. A pointsman stands together with an NKVD agent-representative of this station at each railway point. The guards wearing NKVD uniforms, operative agents-representatives of the Transport Section of the railroad NKVD, the railway militia stand along the trenches, in tunnels and along the road-bed.

The train is stopped at the departure and arrival platforms in such a way that the ~~gumennik~~ personal car of Stalin or of any other member of the Politburo would be exactly opposite the operative post of the NKVD of this station. Immediately after the arrival of the train the NKVD guards in plain clothes range themselves in lines on both sides of the car, and a group of guards fills in the adjoining part of the platform and in different ways prevents the public to go ahead, though no formal order is given to the people to stop. At first two officials of the 1st

Division alight from the car, then they are followed by Stalin and a couple of NKVD men. All this group passes quickly the NKVD post and gets into some cars, looking exactly the same and waiting for Stalin. Usually the "Buick" cars are waiting for Stalin at the Sochi station. During all this ceremony even the chief of the train cannot approach the Stalin's car. All these measures of precaution are taken in spite of the fact that only the members of the government, the high ranking party officials and some distinguished generals enjoy the right to travel in this governmental train.

In case of any breakage or disrepair in Stalin's car, the master may enter it only accompanied by the chief of the railroad NKVD, and his box with tools is previously inspected with greatest care. A "forbidden zone" with a radius of more than 5 kilometers has been established around the governmental villas between Sochi and Matsesta. But the fear of the NKVD is so intense, that people don't even try to approach this zone. When Molotov, Kaganovich, Voroshilov, Andreyev, Zhdanov and other leaders were travelling, the same precaution measures were taken. The only exception was made by the member of Politburo and people's Commissar for heavy industry, Sergo Ordzhonikidze (died in 1937) who liked to walk along the platform among the public that hailed him. Such a behaviour of the "leader" drove to despair the men of the 1st Division who had to guard him. The second-best "leaders" travelled in general cars of this governmental train, while suddenly spent most of his time in the dining-car, where he took a lot of drinks of different kinds.

Stalin and other Politburo members did not take their food from the dining-car during their travels, as each of them had a kitchen in his personal car, where food for him and the group of persons, accompanying him, was prepared. The normal car of this train had eight two-seated compartments, with a bath-room for each two compartments. Stalin's car consisted of a kitchen, a study, secretary's office, two bed-rooms, a bath-room, a drawing-room and a reserve compartment. All of this was furnished with highest possible comfort and luxury that beat by far the interior decora-

tion of the former tsar's train. It is characteristic that the train of the murdered tsar Nikolai the Second was left on the side-track of Detskoye Selo (formerly Tsarskoye Selo) near Leningrad and its cars could not be used for this governmental train, - not saying anything about using them for Stalin's personal needs, - as they were found to be "unsufficiently comfortable".

The yearly maintenance of only this governmental train gave about a million roubles of dead loss, which was covered out of the special fund of the Sovmarkom of the USSR. Capital repairs of this train were made every year, when absolutely all the equipment of the cars was changed, while all other passenger trains in the USSR are subjected to capital repairs once in six years. And what are the costs for maintaining all (personal cars? There are more than a thousand of them in the USSR for the use of different Soviet and Party bureaucrats, though, of course, they are not furnished with such a luxury, as Stalin's car. It is sufficient to mention that before the war personal cars were assigned, besides the Kremlin aristocracy, to all the secretaries of the regional party committees, all chiefs of the regional MVD administrations, all the commanders of the military districts, all chiefs of the railways, all chiefs of the railroad MVD's etc., etc. That is how the leaders of the "first socialistic state in world" arrange their personal life!

If Stalin's train is stopped on its way even for five minutes, all the personnel guilty of this "crime" is subjected to immediate arrest. Such a case occurred once in 1934 on the way from Moscow to Sochi. A train of tank-cars with benzine was running casually ahead of Stalin's train, and for some reasons or others it could not be put on the side track. As a result of this, the governmental train was stopped before the semaphore of an intermediate station for three minutes. This happened at night, and Stalin did not even notice it, but the man on duty at the station the station-master and even the chief of the railroad were immediately arrested.

All, described above, gives some ideas of the functions and tasks of the transport section of the 1st Division.

The Kremlin Supply Department. Controls all food products received for the use in the Kremlin and in governmental country-houses. Is subordinated to the Kremlin superintendent and to the chief of the 1st Division.

The department consists of sanitary section, laboratory and transport section. The laboratory is concerned with the analysis of all food stuffs coming to the Kremlin, while the transport section of the Kremlin supply department not only delivers these food products to the Kremlin, but also takes care that they may not be poisoned on the way.

So, for instance, if, let us say, milk is being delivered to the Kremlin from the governmental state farms near Moscow, it is accompanied without fail by an official of the transport section of the supply department of the 1st Division.

The MTO section (material-technical provision) is concerned with covering the material and technical needs of the 1st Division, from arms, military and civil clothing and up to the equipment for the auto-transport section.

Administrative and maintenance section. is concerned with the problems of supplying the officials of the 1st Division, of providing them with lodgings, permits for a place in a rest-home and fulfills hundreds of other administrative and maintenance functions, connected with the well-being of the employees of the 1st Division.

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Such are tasks, structure and field of operations of the 1st Division of the NKVD USSR. Let us call once more to our mind that the 1st Division exists only in Moscow, while the protection of provincial "leaders" of the Communist party and Soviet Government is carried on by the 2nd Special Divisions of the corresponding territorial administrations of the NKVD-ussr.

This chapter could not be so complete and exact as it might be desirable, but it is possible to give a complete survey of the activity of the 1st Division only after a long and minute collection

