

WE

Draft No. 2

GENERAL

A. NSC Policies:

There is a requirement for a national strategy determined by top national military, economic, and diplomatic planners on the basis of feasible and practical allocation of world-wide U. S. military and economic resources.

Generally speaking, because overt manifestations of United States policy have a direct effect on consistent covert operations, it is imperative that the U. S. adopt a firmer attitude and pursue a more aggressive policy which would force the Soviets to resort to defensive rather than offensive tactics. *non sequitur*

CIA is hardly in a position to state its policy requirements until there is a national strategy designed with policy guidances which are capable of being translated into effective national actions. To date, current policies have rarely been spelled out in the detail required to guide the development of programs to attain U. S. objectives.

When courses of action for achieving national objectives are established by the U. S. at the top government level, then CIA can develop internal policies leading to actions designed to achieve the general U. S. objectives. *ibid*

There is need for a policy to provide specific responsibility for planning and executing strategic deception plans and operations in the promulgation of the national psychological warfare programs.

Specifically, there is a need for a reevaluation of that portion of NSC 10/2 which states that U. S. participation must not be indicated. In some cases this particular requirement is unrealistic and detracts from a forceful positive approach. ✓

A review of NSC 10/2, Paragraph 4, is required to spell out the command relationships of covert assets generated by CIA in concert with Allied nations during peacetime for military wartime use. Many of these assets are basically Allied assets developed through tripartite and multilateral agreements. No mention is made in the existing NSC 10/2, Paragraph 4, as to who shall command and use these covert assets in wartime. ✓

On the basis of

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On the basis that clandestine effort is designed only to support the national policy, an unequivocal and definitive statement of U. S. foreign economic policies is necessary in order that CIA can provide a more effective covert support. For example, it is not clear whether the U. S. favors trade in peaceful goods with the Soviet orbit or whether it should place an embargo on shipments of all kinds to the Soviet orbit.

After establishing definitive statements of U. S. foreign economic policies, delineations should be made within that part of the foreign economic policies which are the concern of economic warfare.

There is a requirement for policy authorization for the use of "Titoism" (defined here as the particular deviation from Stalinism of the Communist Party in Yugoslavia) on a world-wide basis by the covert offices of CIA as a wedge in splintering the Communist forces located in any part of the world.

B. Inter-Departmental Policies:

It should be emphasized as a policy that covert programs cannot conceivably operate unilaterally with any expectation of success, and accordingly, CIA's covert capability should not be considered a determining factor in devising U. S. strategy or in developing U. S. programs in pursuance of that strategy.

Clear-cut policy guidance on certain basic problems is required, such as the extent to which preclusive buying operations may be employed, resort made to sabotage, or the degree of violence, as instruments of control.

A need exists for determination of priority on objectives in clandestine war planning between ~~retaliation~~ and stay-behind organizations, which include escape and evasion nets. The same assets can not be used for both purposes and official assets for both purposes are not available. The conflicting requirements tend to confuse Allied national intelligence services.

A policy need exists for the coordination of target selection and priority determination by CIA and the Military, and the establishment of a target designation authority for assigning targets requiring use of covert assets.


A statement of policy is desired concerning clandestine paramilitary planning for the South Atlantic and Southeast Asia areas to include CIA relationship with [redacted] Indonesia and to indicate whether planning and operations should be on a unilateral, bilateral, tripartite, or multilateral basis.

PC - these activities should specify what is meant by defense

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A clear cut

A clear-cut assignment of the responsibility for economic warfare should be made to one government agency. While MDAC has the



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WESTERN EUROPE

A. NSC Policies:

The U. S. Government would enhance its national psychological warfare programs if it covertly provided policy guidance for political, military, and economic leadership in those evolutionary movements engaged in developing the political and economic integration of European States and the preservation of peace and security.

B. Inter-Departmental Policies:

There is a policy requirement to establish a basic tie between the present Spanish government and the U. S., as well as with other U. N. nations, which would assure an evolution of economic and social structures within Spain to the point that they would be admitted into international organizations such as the Council of Europe, NATO, and The Organization of European Economic Cooperation.

C. Internal Agency Policies:

Policy approval is required for the following actions toward Spain:

1. Establish facilities to influence radio and press reports favorably oriented toward the U. S.;



25X6 4. Establish contact with non-Communist, anti-Franco groups in and outside Spain to promote U. S./U. N. objectives;



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SPP

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TO—	ROOM NO.	DATE		OFFICER'S FULL NAME	COMMENTS
		RECEIVED	FORWARDED		
1.	WE-3	5012	100.7	[REDACTED]	<p>In general, this branch does not feel an acute need for restatement of broad substantive policies. It is our opinion that clarification of existing policies and interpretation of policy changes inevitably must continue to be sought largely on an ad hoc basis. The need, therefore, is for closer, more effective liaison between policy-making and operating echelons, rather than for a summary statement of policy objectives, which, even if formulated, would not necessarily be valid for a long period. It is believed that clarification, if needed, of such questions as relations with Spain, Titoism, and attitude towards economic warfare, should be requested in the context of specific planned operations.</p> <p>In the opinion of this branch, useful and lasting policy statements could be enunciated concerning allocation of responsibility among agencies.</p> <p>Marginal comments have been made concerning specific minor points.</p> <p>WTR</p> <p>Attached is a copy of a memo dated 12 June 1952 from the Deputy Under Secretary of State concerning European unity which is illustrative of our belief that policy statements require constant review and revision. An earlier statement (WE/C-2) was inadequate for a planned operation, and it was necessary to obtain the attached revision.</p>
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