

Working Paper
Policy Additions
3 October 1952

A. NSC Policies (General)

*0-07 document
problem*

The U. S. is not making significant progress in the psychological field toward its objective of reduction and retraction of Soviet power as laid down in NSC 20/4. Further progress toward the development and implementation of an agreed overall strategic concept for our national psychological program, an effort can take place only in conjunction with a corresponding development of capabilities and resources and an accompanying adjustment of basic national policies and programs designed to have a deterrent effect on the Soviet Union. The distortion and exploitation by Communists of anti-American propaganda are occasioning resistance instrumentalism and charges of aggressiveness of our psychological effort.

(Middle East)

An impediment to U. S. capabilities in the Middle East is found in the disparity of our attitudes toward Israel and the Arab States despite a stated policy of impartiality.

(Eastern Europe)

A U. S. policy on Czechoslovakia is desired. Policies on Czechoslovakia are tenuous and not substantive.

(SR)

Policy clarification is required concerning U. S. position with respect to the future status of the peoples of Russia.

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B. Inter-Departmental Policies (General)

Headline publicity about U. S. atomic prowess is a very questionable line of policy. The most that seems to be required at this time is an occasional guarded but reassuring statement to the effect that U. S. national interest, with respect to atomic weapons, is being effectively safe-guarded.

*Atomic Energy Com
problem*

The Department of Defense raises two major points for resolution: (1) It requests clarification of the role and obligations of the military establishment in psychological operations, and (2) It states the opinion that the nations military establishment can render more effective support to the national psychological program if its war-time potentials are exploited to the maximum during the cold-war period. An appropriate authority is suggested for a reexamination of the entire question of inter-departmental coordination mechanisms for achieving national psychological objectives.

*Dept of Defense
problem*

(Far East)

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CIA regards coordinating machinery between civilian and military authorities in the field of psychological warfare as inadequate in certain respects. A coordinating mechanism [redacted] was set up, for example, but failed to include the operations of USIE services in Korea. Close cooperation with the military exists in the field on intelligence and tactical psychological warfare measures. However, a completely effective coordination of two major strategical plans with respect to Korea has not been realized with respect to command and logistical support, but steps are being taken to remedy the situation.

*Co-ordination
problem*

*This is not
policy -
or do the
the situation
problem.*

(General)

The excessively aggressive and militaristic tone of some of the statements made by U. S. Government officials which play directly into the hands of the Soviet Peace offensive calls for the establishment of a strong policy on this matter.

*State Dept
problem*

The U. S. Government should provide a firm and clear policy on specific issues relating to colonialism because of the exigencies of the European alliance system.

Included

(Eastern Europe)

The State Department has indicated reluctance to countenance any activity which could be construed to support a separatist tendency.

~~There is no separate policy with respect to the non-attributability clause. Policy which may vary from the interests of the host government should invoke the non-attributable clause.~~

As a matter of policy, India and its peripheral ~~national~~ countries should be organized as a separate Area Division.

~~There is a requirement for a policy agreement within the Agency for the delineation of responsibility in connection with the psychological warfare aspects of the [redacted], with specific division and assignment of responsibility for more effective utilization of [redacted].~~

to apply existing policies

25X1C

D. International

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Inter-Departmental

D. International Policies

Propaganda Activity

there is a trend

the propaganda activities are required among

Policy coordination and delineation of responsibility between USIE, MSA, and CIA ~~is required in the new development of the trend which is taking place from overt U. S. information activities in MSA and State Department, and the corresponding development of covert propaganda activities in the gray fields. State and MSA feel that they can handle the gray field securely, and for that reason, CIA should not be involved in these activities. This new emphasis on gray activities requires greater coordination and "cutting in" of CIA by MSA and USIE.~~

Policy guidance to deal with the exploitation of the racial issue in the U. S. by the Communists is needed.

Policy guidance on tariff structure to expand international trade and expand the ability of foreign countries to export to this country.

(General)

Policy modification is requested on NSC 10/2 with respect to broadening its utilization in reference to attribution of our government with respect to certain aspects of CIA operations, so that during high-level operations, discreet reference may be made to indicate some measure of U. S. support.

Tunisia

The U. S. Government should take a firm and clear stand on specific issues relating to colonialism, such as the Tunisian case.

Southeast Asia

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D. International Policies (General)

Burma

Jmc
Because of Burma's disapproval of America's present policy of laying the foundation of effective guerrilla activities in the event that this country may be overrun by the Communists, some leaders in Burma are reluctant to cooperate with the U. S. fully. CIA is governed by a policy limitation which precludes any action which would seriously prejudice U. S. relations with the government in Burma.

Satisfactory progress has been impeded by the lack of overall national policy and by State Department policy toward personnel support of developmental projects which has precluded sufficient staffing for programs laying the ground work for future operations in Burma.

Indochina

mc
CIA has been unable to lay the foundation for effective guerrilla activity because it has not received a policy authorization to do so and because the French have been unwilling to cooperate in this matter.

Even though there are severe policy limitations, considerable progress has been made in psychological warfare activities and some progress in the [REDACTED]


*OK include
NSC [unclear]*

25X1C

~~SECRET~~
SECURITY INFORMATION

FAR EAST

General NSX1C



Interdepartmental

There is need for a ~~clear cut~~ statement of policy, and implementing directives as to the relocation and exploitation (for 10/5 purposes) of refugees from the China Mainland.

FAR EAST

There is need for a ~~clear cut~~ statement of overall and psychological objectives with respect to China and the Overseas Chinese.

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~~SECRET~~
SECURITY INFORMATION

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