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SECURITY INFORMATION

POINTS 1, 2 and 3

ISSUES OF CONFLICT BETWEEN THE SOVIET BLOC
AND THE WEST

General

a. The fundamental source of conflict between the Soviet bloc and the West can be attributed to the Kremlin's policy of actively attempting to expand and impose its system and control over the non-communist areas of the world.

b. Reduced to its simplest formula, the source of conflict stems from Soviet policy which has as its ultimate objective the establishment of a communist world under the Kremlin's domination. Such an aggressive policy does not take into consideration the desires of the respective nations but rather attempts to employ all overt and covert means at its disposal for the subversion of national policies and state organizations in the interest of attaining the Soviet ultimate objective. As such, it represents a policy which permits the USSR to concentrate and utilize its political, ideological, economic and military resources to a maximum advantage at any given time or place.

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Specific

Specifically, some of the principal issues of conflict are:

a. Political

(1) Utilization of the Soviet Communist Party organization and channels for the purpose of assisting the development and expansion of communist activities throughout the world.

(2) Establishment of Moscow-dominated Party organizations outside USSR borders and exploitation of such organizations in the interest of Soviet policy.

(3) Establishment of Soviet-supported and directed clandestine underground groups and organizations in the non-communist countries for the purpose of undermining and/or overthrowing the existing democratic systems.

(4) Employment of Soviet foreign policy as an aggressive instrument of political warfare:

(a) Soviet obstructionist tactics and international conferences.

(b) Soviet control over satellite domestic and foreign policies.

(c) Soviet policies and tactics in occupied areas - Germany and Austria.

(5) Employment of secrecy, deception and terror as basic ingredients of Soviet political strategy, both domestic and foreign, for the attainment of its objectives.

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(6) Employment of political and technical controls for the purpose of completely isolating its population from any free contact with the Western World.

(7) Utilization of its satellites and friendly communist regimes for the purpose of exerting maximum political pressure on the democratic world.

(8) Employment of political pressure and terror against the elements of the Soviet population.

(a) Forceful resettlement of ethnic minorities in areas where they will not represent a threat to Soviet security.

(b) Liquidation of large segments of the Soviet population.

(c) Employment of forced labor and exile systems as instruments of political pressure.

b. Ideological

Ideological issues of conflict are closely related to the political. However, for the purpose of this paper, they should be mentioned separately. These issues are:

(1) Utilization of all possible media as overt and covert instruments of psychological warfare for the purpose of promoting Soviet ideology and creating unrest in the non-communist areas of the world. Such activities include:

(a) Deliberate misrepresentation of U.S. policy objectives and a vicious attack against the U.S. and her allies.

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(b) False presentation to the outside world of conditions inside the USSR in order to win support of some elements of the foreign populations.

(c) Support and encouragement of all foreign dissident elements and their exploitation in the attainment of Soviet objectives.

(2) Strict Party control of all information, production, and dissemination channels inside the USSR for the purpose of maintaining rigid control over its population.

(3) Strict censorship, rigid screening, jamming, etc., of all Western sources of information directed into the USSR. This practice makes it possible for the Soviets to shut off its population almost completely from the non-communist sources of information.

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POINT 4

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PRINCIPAL VULNERABILITIES OF THE SOVIET REGIME

a. The Soviet regime, now firmly entrenched in power through its control apparatus, is continually faced with the problem of maintaining this control by force. Such a system, therefore, by necessity must contain within itself a series of weak points which if adequately exploited and developed could seriously weaken the regime and perhaps cause its downfall. The fundamental vulnerability of the Soviet regime is expressed in its policy which ignores or prefers to sacrifice the desires and the basic rights of its people in the attainment of its domestic and foreign political objectives. Periodic purges, forced labor establishments, and the need for an elaborate control system, in spite of the fact that the Soviet population is so largely cut off from any but Soviet sources of information, are eloquent proof of the unpopularity of the regime. In addition to the basic weakness, there are other vulnerabilities which if properly exploited could, in the long run, lead to the weakening of the Soviet control apparatus and perhaps even undermine the Soviet structure of power.

(1) General disillusionment and resentment of the people resulting from the exactions, repressions, and personal insecurity characteristic of the Soviet State.

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Despite the fact that the Russian people have never known true liberty and are inured to despotism, no other people in modern times have been so rigidly controlled and systematically exploited for so long.

(2) The peasants' resentment and resistance to collectivization. The imposition of this system in the USSR required ruthless suppression of all human values. Millions of peasants were either liquidated or exiled to make possible the successful accomplishment of the collectivization program. These repressive measures, however, have not killed the peasants' desire for private ownership of land and the right to cultivate it without any interference from the state.

(3) The hostility of minority nationalities toward the Great Russian domination. Inherent antipathy towards the Great Russian supremacy and strongly developed, deep-rooted national sentiments have produced periodic revolts in areas inhabited by the ethnic minority groups. Despite the Soviet effort to eradicate all national and separatist tendencies, there are some indications that disaffection and even passive resistance to the Soviet regime might still be prevalent in the Ukraine, Baltic States, Caucasus and Central Asia.

(4) Deprivation brought about by the Soviet economic system. In order to strengthen its military potential and at the same time allocate sufficient resources for the

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attainment of its immediate and long range political and economic objectives, the Soviet Government has been forced to maintain a low standard of living. The failure of the government to fulfill its promises over the last three decades has left the people with little hope for a better economic future. Whereas during the early stages of the development of the Soviet regime a large majority of the people believed sacrifices were necessary to build up the new economic system, many of them today, particularly those in the older age groups, no longer make sacrifices willingly and consider continued shortages and a lower standard of living are inherent weaknesses of the system.

(5) Disillusionment, both at home and abroad, with the theoretical Marxist-Communist ideology. There has been some disillusionment among the old line Communists, both within and outside the USSR, with Stalin's interpretation and application of the Marx-Lenin theories and practices of Communism. This is largely due to the inability, either real or manufactured, of Stalin's regime to alleviate the fears and sufferings of its own peoples, and to placate the Communists outside the USSR, some of whom are beginning to resent Soviet interference in their national Party affairs and suspect the imperialistic designs of Moscow.

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(6) Party Domination and Control. Party domination which permeates through all strata of the Soviet state, and which subjugates all the major groups within its rigid frame of controls must, by necessity, create certain friction and antagonism between the various elements of the Soviet hierarchy. There are some indications, for example, of the behind-the-scenes struggle going on between the Party and the Military. Although the Red Army represents the principal source of power within the Soviet system, it does not enjoy the privileges and the freedom commensurate with its power. This is largely due to the fact that the Party realizes that the very composition of the Army makes it subject to all the internal and external influences of subversion, and therefore considers it essential to its own security to keep the Army under close political control.

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
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
OVERRIDING ADVERSE FACTORS WHICH MUST FIRST
BE SOLVED BEFORE CIA SHALL BE IN A POSITION
TO SUCCESSFULLY PROSECUTE ANY PROGRAM OF
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

25X1C a. One of the more important problems which faces



operations have to be developed in a police state whose total effort and resources are directed against us. Moreover, the same police state has been able to develop an efficient security apparatus over a period of the last three decades which permeates all strata of Soviet society and ruthlessly suppresses all anti-state activities.]

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
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POINT 6

MAJOR STRATEGIC FACTORS WHICH NOW BLOCK
OR CRIPPLE WESTERN EFFORTS

a. The Soviet Government has had a high degree of success in controlling and ordering all phases of life within the USSR. In addition to the various security measures, the Soviet Government maintains its hold on the people through complete control of the economic system, all organized media of communication and propaganda, and the internal security forces. Of particular importance in connection with CIA activities is the role played by the special security forces which have basic responsibility for maintaining internal security of the Soviet Union, suppressing internal unrest, and guarding against penetration by agents of foreign governments.

4 [An elaborate time-tested system of controls and surveillance covers the activities of every Soviet citizen. The special controls are largely based on the following:

- (1) Documentation
- (2) Travel controls and spot checks
- (3) Border controls
- (4) Informants and agents provocateurs

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EXISTING POTENTIALITIES WITHIN THE USSR WHICH
NEED VIGOROUS REINFORCEMENT FOR MAXIMUM EXPLOITATION

a. Although organized resistance against the Soviet regime is practically non-existent in the USSR, there are some indications that the discontent and dissension prevalent in the areas inhabited by the ethnic minorities could be further intensified and exploited in the attainment of CIA objectives. In the Ukraine, Baltic States, Caucasus and Central Asia unrest and disaffection with the Soviet regime resulted in a series of revolts during the early stages of the consolidation of the Soviet system. During WWII large segments of these nationalities gave active support to the German Armies in the hope that their areas would be liberated from the Soviet yoke. Although reprisals for such action resulted in considerably reducing the native populations in these areas, there are still important elements who hate the Soviet regime and have strong antipathies towards the Great Russian supremacy. Despite the Soviet effort to eradicate all national disaffection, the seeds of passive resistance to the Soviet regime are still prevalent in these areas. Therefore, if our psychological warfare activities are to be successful, we must be able to offer the peoples of the USSR hope for ultimate liberation and provide them with concrete evidence of our desire to assist them, in order to sustain their interest and support in our activities.

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POINT 8

U. S. POLICY


2 ↓
a. In order to take full advantage of the operational potential offered by the ethnic minority groups in the USSR, a clear-cut U.S. position with respect to this question is of crucial importance for the organization of effective resistance behind the Iron Curtain on the broadest possible scale. In this connection, it is imperative that the U.S. adopt a policy which would not only be directed to appeal to the Great Russians but also to the ethnic minorities. Although the principle of self-determination could serve as a compromise measure which would be accepted by the Great Russians as well as the ethnic minority groups, it has never been officially pronounced by the U.S. as a policy which this government now adheres to and will adhere to in the future. Such an official pronouncement should be made and should include a clear-cut explanation of what it means. For instance, although minorities in general would accept such a policy, they would also want to make sure that all those ethnic groups who were forcefully resettled by the Soviets, from their national areas into remote regions of the USSR, would be given an opportunity to participate in deciding the status of their future national areas.

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So far, the Soviets have been in a position to precipitate trouble in the various areas of the world in order to keep the U.S. and its allies off balance and force them to dissipate their strength and resources in attempts to counteract Soviet activities. The time has now come for the U.S. to change this formula by promoting dissension and even uprisings within the Soviet satellite family, thus forcing the Soviets to put out the various fires started by the Western World. Closer coordination of [redacted] [redacted] phases of U.S. activities, and a firmer and more consistent policy directed against the USSR would in the

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long run serve to strengthen the U.S. position vis-a-vis



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