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pragmatic rather than theoretical in their approaches to problems. It is for this reason, perhaps, that we have overlooked the advantages that can accrue from a well designed ideological campaign.

5. The Soviets, in contrast, have made ideology a prime weapon. The basic strategy of Communist ideological warfare, contends 25X1A s simple.

"They are throwing the book at us. Long ago they adopted the sound principle that ephemeral types of propaganda, such as radio, pamphlets, newspapers, are ineffective unless they are related to a philosophic frame of reference embodied in a permanent literature. They have recognized that this literature must be in book form, scholarly in tone, that it should refer constantly to philosophy and history. . . By its very quantity, this permanent literature creates the impression of validity and growing strength. By vigorous promotion, it gains the glamour of inspiration and enthusiasm. A Soviet broadcast may be pegged to the news, but it is intimately related to the basic philosophy developed in the permanent literature of Communism. The fact that our radio broadcasts are forced to reply to this without reference to any universally available literature of our own, only adds to the significance of theirs. It is proof to the world that we are on the ropes."

6. The shattering effect of the Titoist propaganda line is a good illustration of Soviet vulnerability to ideological attack. What Tito has been doing is to throw the original book back into the Kremlin, using all channels including the Kremlin's own networks to get it across. There is a good deal that can be learned from an analysis of Yugoslav propaganda beamed both at the Kremlin and at the other Satellite parties in Eastern Europe. An indication of the ideological inroads which the Titoist heresy has made in Eastern Europe was the arrest of former Minister Clementis and other Communist leaders on charges of trying to turn their country into "another Yugoslavia." Likewise, the abortive split in the Italian Communist Party was primarily an example of

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ideological defection, and had there been a proper ideological base for the defectors to go to, the chances of this split being magnified would have been considerable. These examples indicate the necessity of giving proper place and respect to the power of ideas in the current struggle. It has become commonplace to attribute only strategic and military significance to the Yugoslav struggle against the Soviet leaders and to dismiss as unimportant the great and profound struggle of ideas which has shaken the Communist world. Those accustomed to gauging policies purely in terms of alliances and airplanes have little stomach for what they believe to be a debate between the Yugoslav and the Stalinist Communists.

7. In order to place the ideological weapon in proper focus, attention should be paid to the high regard with which the Kremlin has always regarded the ideological factor. To the Kremlin, the ideological theory behind an event is a matter of vital concern -- as important in the framing of their political decisions as a formula for designing a span is to a bridge designer. The Soviet leaders never ignore theoretical principles. The following brief quotations from Soviet publications illustrate the importance the Soviets attach to the ideological foundation: "The superiority of the Soviet world outlook over the bourgeois world point of view is a manifestation of the superiority of Socialism over capitalism. The unfailing faith of the Soviet people in the rightness of our great effort, in its final victory, comes from a correct, scientific understanding of events..... There can be no breathing space in ideological warfare. On the ideological front we must and we shall fight not by passive resistance but by an active and unceasing attack on our enemies; this is what the Party of Lenin and Stalin teaches. This is in accordance with our traditions... Let the enemy consider us nasty people. From the mouth of the enemy this is praise.... In teaching and training youth, it must never be

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forgotten that every science and its teaching cannot be separated from the policy of the Party, which forms the vital base of the Soviet regime... The objectivism and apolitical character of the work of certain teachers must be resolutely overcome. This first commandment of the Soviet teacher is to be guided constantly in his teaching by the Leninist-Stalinist doctrine of the Party character of science and ideology, not forgetting for a moment Lenin's statement that 'the school outside of life, outside of politics, is falsehood and hypocrisy'."

8. The validity of their ideology is a matter of crucial importance to the Soviet regime. In the first place, many of the top believers actually believe in the basic theory. Some of them may be purely power-seeking opportunists, but even these cloak their actions with moral justification derived from their ideology. All of them are to a very large degree conditioned by it, whether consciously or unconsciously. This more true of the Soviet elite than it is of the mass of the Soviet population. Moreover, the Soviets are stuck with it. The validity and justification of everything they do is tied to an ideological foundation.

9. It is impossible to believe that the Soviet leadership would so severely curtail the effectiveness of scientific research, which is vitally important to their survival, unless they felt that maintenance of the validity of dialectical materialism was of even more crucial importance to the regime. In none of the basic theories of modern science -- those of natural scientists Newton, Maxwell, Gibbs, Einstein, or Max Planck -- is matter exhibited as obeying the dialectic. There is no question but that on this point, Communist theory is unequivocally false. Yet unless this false concept of nature is insisted upon as truth, one does not have the basic factor in Marxist philosophy; namely,

dialectical materialism. In these and many other ways basic Communist theory and various deductions from it can be shown to be false.

10. Any discussion of any part of the regime's basic theory will be of direct interest to the Soviet elite and will affect them in many ways. If the ideological foundation can be shown to be false -- as it can be -- it will stimulate a guilt complex among the Soviet leaders. It will create the impression that the whole cruel fantastic experiment may have been in vain. A fundamental tenet of Marxism is the historical inevitability of the dialectic process. For this reason the validity of the concept must be maintained at all cost or otherwise all sorts of fears of failure will enter and undermine their faith in ultimate triumph.

11. Are we exploiting this ideological weapon? In fighting the cold war we have carefully examined every single possible, available tool for coping with the Soviets. We have tried agent operations into the Soviet and satellite areas. We experimented tentatively with economic warfare and have done enough in this field so that we know that the technique is difficult. The broad propaganda offensives addressed to the mass of the Russian people have so far made only a slight dent in the problem. The reason for these failures is that these techniques of non-military warfare rely on our organizing entirely by ourselves a communications system which will extend into the USSR. Unfortunately, the Soviets have been able to prevent us from effectively doing this. It is necessary to try to find a technique which will utilize, at least in part, their communications net and their communications systems. The only technique of non-violent warfare that we have not tried is the ideological tool which fortuitously is the very one which does not demand that we organize a communications system. With this technique our material will be picked up by the Soviets themselves,

put in their channels and funneled to their collating machinery, which is probably located directly under the Party Central Committee. Their intelligence net far exceeds ours in the number of collectors. But because they do not trust their people they use few intelligence collators and these are located close to the top. Hence the ideological attack will be delivered where it counts.

12. The implications of this analysis can be seen in a comparison of psychological and ideological warfare. Psychological warfare must always concern itself with concrete events and is therefore circumscribed by our lack of concrete intelligence and our media. We cannot, for example, promote friction between the factory foreman and one of the workers in some Russian city unless we know all the internal details of the particular plant operations and have some means of getting our message to the people in the plant. But in the ideological field we can be certain that our message will always reach the heart of the Soviet system. A discussion of Lenin's and Stalin's views on the nationalist question, for example, or of Lenin's concept of the Communist state operating without special apparatus for compulsion would certainly strike home. In effect it does not matter what medium we use if we can be certain that they will receive it. The gradual insertion of ideas designed to promote ultimate doubt in the Communist elite as to the validity of their whole system can be accomplished by a gradual process. Since in the ideological offensive we are not trying to reach the masses, we can deal in abstractions. Why have they veered so far from pure Leninism, for example? Such questions could be made very disturbing to the elite and if raised and insisted upon could create profound cleavages.

13. Every society ultimately rests on a moral foundation. If this can be undermined, the whole order will tumble. Beck and Godin's book, RUSSIAN PURGE,

vividly portrays the Russian fear that their "faith" in Communism may be faith in a monster. "The loyal or 'convinced' Soviet citizen, as he calls himself, may be dissatisfied with Soviet rule and hurt by it, but losing faith in it, would mean losing faith in himself. In his faith lies his salvation. Every Communist must sacrifice his conscience, his natural moral feelings, to the Soviet ideal. What would become of a believer in Moloch who lost his faith in his idol after sacrificing his only beloved son to it?"

14. Can we undermine Communist faith in their religion? According to Truman Smith we can regard "the Cominform as the organized expression of the 'Communist religion.' This religious aspect of Communism has been generally recognized by students of Marxist and Leninist theories. The fervor and fanaticism with which its adherents have propagated its doctrines, are strikingly similar to the fervor and fanaticism with which the early followers of Mohammed propagated Islam. History teaches us, however, that religions have an Achilles' Heel. They are one and all subject to schism. Mohammedism suffered severely from the Shiah schism, Roman Catholicism from the Lutheran, Calvinist, and Anglican schisms. Communism too has shown the same weakness. During the thirty years which have passed since Lenin gained power in Russia, successive heresies have developed within Communism: the Trotskyite, the Zinovief-Radek, and most recently, the Titoist. Though to date of these heresies only the Titoist has made its effect in a power sense, there is no reason seen why it should be the last of Communist heresies. Already we are hearing rumblings of a Nosaka heresy in Japan which, indeed, may be but a double echo of a Mao schism with the Cominform."

15. Our task is to deepen these ideological rifts within Communism, to strengthen the heretical forces. The problem of attacking ideologically

Communism at its world-wide ideological voice, the Cominform, must be treated differently within and outside the Soviet orbit. The difference is between "contained" areas (the Soviet Empire) and the "free" areas. In the contained or closed areas the masses are pinned down and our job is to free them. In the free areas where the masses are on the move for reforms, good or bad, the Kremlin seeks to exploit them against us; our job is to channel their notions toward us and against Bolshevism.

16. If we succeed in unchaining the masses of the Soviet Empire, history will pronounce a death sentence on the Kremlin. On the other hand, "Bolshevism's" ideological and organizational infiltration into the free or "open" world to the extent that it weakens, neutralizes or paralyzes our efforts, weakens the whole effort.

17. Our enemy's strength is based on organized ideological warfare. The lure (idealism) he holds forth is the abolition of all "evils" past and present and the economic salvation of the "have nots" and hence the salvation of humanity as a whole. It is by "ideology" based on material interest that the masses are hooked onto his chariot and eventually led to disaster. "Illusions are the children of our dreams," and civilizations from time immemorial have built on great illusions, but never illusions based on materialism. Rather they were based on the inner urges which constitute the ennobling elements of man and make civilizations possible. Bolshevik ideology is inferior, and a successful attack against it can soften up, disintegrate Bolshevik organization -- the keystone of the whole enemy structure.

18. The ideological factor is the Achilles' Heel of Bolshevism, a system put together to impose an artificial ideological pattern. Communism is vulnerable to a counter-ideological attack because whatever moral sanction there is

behind the "elite" of Bolshevism is based on ideology. The more we puncture that ideology in the minds of men, the easier the rest of the job we have set ourselves to do. If we do an effective ideological disintegration job, ~~much~~^{of} that now looks forbidding may become easy.

IV. Possible Content of Ideological Warfare

19. Our basic aim is to neutralize and paralyze the effectiveness of Soviet ideology without at the same time doing harm to our own. We should not release ideological forces that might in the long run be destructive of our basic spiritual and social concepts. This guiding principle implies that we should have several ideological campaigns in process simultaneously with a varied treatment given to each major offensive.

20. Against the Stalinists our ideological warfare should be entirely negative in aim, although not in character. We should hit the essential weaknesses of their ideology; i.e. those aspects which are in contradiction to the very deepest human desires and aspirations as demonstrated by their historical validity. Two chief forces that Soviet ideology has attempted to muzzle are: (a) a belief in some sort of a Divine Being and hence a purposeful moral universe beyond the material (the Soviets' system actually has a moral imperative, but it is based on a material rather than a non-material foundation); and (b) the Soviets have tried to throttle the basic and instinctive desire of human beings to own property. It is this instinct which Lenin suggested the Communists had to "beat to death."

21. John W. Hazard makes these two pertinent points about this latter aspect of Communist ideology:

a. The first, and most important, is that production can be maintained at an adequate rate only if planned. Capitalism is wasteful because of

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the duplication of effort.

b. The second basic tenet is that planning is impossible if property is privately owned. Only after production is adequate can there be any extension of individual freedom.

22. These so-called necessities of Communist ideology run counter to the beliefs, sentiments and urges of the Russian people. These, in turn, are the accumulated product of generations, if not centuries, and it takes equally long to modify and uproot them. The basic craving and "belief" of the peasant to have his own land and work it in behalf of himself and his family cannot be shaken by "decrees" no matter how "clever" they may be. Nor can his "belief" in certain simple spiritual values which have been with him from the dim past and which he associates with his other beliefs. To shake these beliefs, even a little, the Bolsheviks would have to come forward with something demonstrably superior. Mere words, no matter how "intellectual" could never do it. The same thing in different degrees holds good even for Communists whose subconscious urges are in line with those of the masses and hence potential deserters from Stalin's rule. Following their instinctive and ingrained "belief" the Russians want to "call their lives their own" and not the State's. The Russians, of course, also want the tools that go with it, which we call "rights" -- property, etc. That does not mean that they want the old factory or land owners back. Not at all, and we would make a capital mistake to in any way associate our ideological attack with such notions. On the contrary, these ghosts of the past must be laid to rest. Death, attrition and Communism have cleared the tables for us. Hence the forces of today that must be encouraged, individually and collectively, to own and possess what has been created.

23. What have we in mounting an ideological counter-warfare to offer to

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the peoples of Russia? To the peasants, and most of Stalin's armies are peasants, it is "land and freedom." To the populations of the cities, who make up the leadership of those armies and the workers, managers, etc., we offer "ownership" of the enterprises and freedom. To the individual, every individual we offer the freedom and security which have been part of us since time immemorial. In short, against the fake Communist concept of "ownership by the people" we offer real ownership and all that this entails.

24. Ideological Justification for Titoism.

a. The purpose of this struggle is to win Communists from Stalin.

The Communist ideology has three basic branches, two of which have a substantial theoretical justification. One is Lenin-Stalinism, which contends that a historical spread of Communism throughout the world is inevitable, but that the spread depends upon the effective development of the USSR as a base for expansion. Trotskyism asserts that a world-wide revolutionary condition is an essential prerequisite for the complete enthronement of Communism. The Trotskyites contend that real Communism is not possible unless this world revolution takes place.

b. The Titoists, on the other hand, contend -- or appear to contend -- that Communism within a given country is possible without either a world-wide revolution or subservience of that country to Moscow. Theoretically, justification for this should have two aims: (1) the encouragement of independence on the part of the satellite and Chinese Communists from Moscow; and (2) the severance of the Communist Parties in Western Europe and other regions from Moscow. These are Yugoslav developments such as experiments with a quasi-free structure that lend themselves to ideological justification.

25. A third major target is the European Marxists who believe that Socialism is attainable through legal methods. They are generally hostile toward any system of cooperative, free enterprise. In the long run the victory for this concept in Western Europe might be detrimental to the United States. Therefore, the task in this area is to show the growing social nature of regulated free enterprise, demonstrating simultaneously the need for rigid Marxist Socialism to accept a greater degree of privately sponsored productivity.

26. A fourth area of concern is the Middle East and Southeastern Asia, which at the present time is neither Marxist nor capitalist, although the Marxists may have their foot in the intellectual door more than we do. For this area we should develop an ideology based on a variation of a communal, cooperative society in which private enterprise, from the very moment of its development, has cooperative ownership and is designed less for maximum profit than it is for maximum service.

27. Finally, there should be an ideological recapitulation designed to put in the best possible light the American System, 1952. We are still having to suffer for the sins of 1850 Capitalism in England, when in reality our system bears little or no resemblance to the laissez-faire capitalism condemned by Mar.

28. These various ideological weapons should be produced in complete synthesis so that they could be put side by side and that the net result of all of them taken together would be to strengthen our society, the American position throughout the world, and weaken that of the Soviets. As a possible means of satisfying this content, attention is directed to Tab A.

TAB A

FIVE IDEOLOGICAL TOOLS

The following books might be developed as our principle ideological tools:

1. A firm, well defined ideology is required which must be Messianic and scientific at the same time -- not purely nationalistic. It is a world-embracing ideology we are fighting and not a regional phenomenon. To solve this problem, a book 500-800 pages, revalidating theoretically the major principles of free society, must be produced. It must be a book of substance, addressed to the thinking elements -- not to the masses -- and while upholding the principles upon which our society is based, be critical of its faults.

2. Another book based on the broad premises of the first one should address itself to the problems of the Russian System, specifically analyze the inferiority of the system as compared with one based on freedom of the individual. The inevitability of its failure and the necessity of its overthrow before millions more perish and life is reduced to more and more slavery, torment and hunger.

3. Book No. 3 should address itself to the Problems of Asia, which are distinct and call for separate treatment -- book No. 3 being based on books 1 and 2.

4. Book No. 4 should address itself to the Problems of the Near and Middle East.

5. Book No. 5 should address itself to the Problems of Europe.