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STATUS AND PROSPECTS OF
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM

The Dialectic of Crisis and Stabilization

CIA / SRS-6

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
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STATUS AND PROSPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM

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This is a speculative study which has been discussed with US Government intelligence officers but has not been formally coordinated. It is based on information available to SRS as of 1 September 1957.

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I. INTRODUCTION

1. The entire history of the movement known as International Communism may be described as a dialectic or interplay of dynamic advance, of crisis and of efforts to achieve stabilization as a basis for further progress toward an unchanging goal. During the four years following the death of Stalin, the elements of crisis accumulated, reaching a peak in the second half of 1956. Two sets of factors dominated this process: the continuing rise in power of the Soviet Union, and the emergence of new forces within International Communism which called for a revision of the directing role hitherto monopolized by the CPSU, whether under temporary "collective leadership" or, as appears normal to it, under an autocratic General or First Secretary.

2. The crisis of the USSR, as was made clear by the purge of June-July 1957, consisted both of a struggle for the mantle of Stalin, and of a conscious attempt to modify the basis of "Stalinism" as a system of government. Thus a naked power conflict was played against the counterpoint of a fundamental policy reappraisal. It was a grim battle, partly fought under a gangsters' code with deadly blows delivered and received in stoical silence, partly conducted in an almost ritualistic manipulation of public actions and statements, charged with meaning for the initiate but largely incomprehensible outside the ruling circles of Communism.

3. The crisis of International Communism came to a head in 1956 in two major developments creating grave confusion among Party ranks throughout the world. The denigration of Stalin at the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU shattered the myth of infallibility, and the rebellions in Poland and Hungary proved that Stalin's system could no longer be administered in its full rigidity, except with the sanction of military force.

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4. The crisis of 1956 also demonstrated that a new power had arisen in the movement: Communist China. Accorded a titular role in the leadership of the "socialist camp" as early as 1955, Peiping has emerged as a force within the Bloc, sharing in considerable measure the hegemony of the Soviet Union. At the same time, Tito and Gomulka have successfully demonstrated that Communism can no longer be completely "unicentric"; some measure of diversity, of "polycentrism" - a concept introduced by the Italian Communist leader, Togliatti - must henceforth be reckoned with by the hitherto unchallenged Moscow leaders.

5. This study attempts to interpret the post-Stalin years in terms of Communist dialectics, rather than of Western thought. It seeks primarily to establish the thesis that the leadership of the USSR and of International Communism, faction-ridden though it may be, has consistently struggled to achieve unity of action in the name of the Marxist-Leninist dispensation. Whether this campaign be interpreted as a sheer power struggle - "Kremlinology" - or as the attempt to actualize an ideological vision, it has the force of a world-conquering movement, a crusading "secular religion", or, as it has been called, a "Twentieth Century Islam". Whether it will triumph, or maintain its present strength, or go down in defeat is problematical and depends as much on the countering dynamism of the Free World as on its own.

6. The terminology used in this paper may require some clarification. The term "stabilization" has been adopted, rather than others such as "consolidation", "compensation", "readjustment", etc. because it seems best to convey the sense of that process which the Communist leaders have sought to further during the period under review. As indicated in the subtitle, this form of stabilization is dynamic rather than static. It is implicit in the Marxist concept of dialectics as the basic principle of social evolution. Classic Marxism insists on the Hegelian cliché: thesis-antithesis-synthesis;

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Peiping in its "rectification campaign" has stressed the role of "contradictions" under the formula: unity-criticism-unity. This paper adopts a slightly different triad: stability-crisis-stability. The sense of these different formulae is believed to be the same.


7. It is recognized that this "dialectic" approach, if applied too rigidly, raises numerous difficulties. But it conveys the belief, developed in the truly revolutionary phase of Bolshevism and nurtured by the epigoni of that "heroic" era, that the road to Communist victory can progress only through the confrontation and resolution of crises. Obviously, such a process cannot be uniform. Crises can arise from either external or internal factors, or from both simultaneously. They can be major or minor, with long or short range implications. Similarly, the resolution or stabilization of these critical situations may require different approaches in different parts of the world, even though the basic Communist goals remain unchanged. The dedicated Communist knows that crises will occur and that they must and can be overcome through efforts commensurate in their strenuousness with the gravity of the threat presented. These efforts constitute for him the supreme personal fulfillment.

8. Thus, while in a sense this paper is perhaps little more than an analysis of the broad course of events in the Communist world since the death of Stalin, it seeks to deepen this analysis by filtering it through a basic facet of Communist thought and action habit. The formula of "stabilization" embraces such diverse factors as a continuing power struggle at the fountainhead of World Communism, a major historic phase of the Bolshevik Revolution, an unprecedented drive toward world dominance, and an endeavor, both fumbling and bold, to steer a modern state through turbulent and uncharted economic and social waters. It is obvious that such a pattern defies terminological tidiness, and this paper makes no claim to have achieved such an effect. It is intended

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solely as a contribution to the immense effort of research and speculation which will have to be made in order to comprehend the threat posed to the Free World by International Communism.

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II. THE BACKGROUND

9. By the time of Stalin's death, it had become apparent that his post-war rule had ended in sterility. Although Stalin had imposed himself on World Communism as the sole interpreter of Marxism-Leninism, he had progressively distorted the "pure" doctrine. Within the Soviet Union, his absolute dictatorship had sapped the power and authority of the Party and had pauperized and demoralized large segments of the population. In the Satellites, little Stalins had followed his example with similar results. Outside the Bloc, Stalin's insistence on Soviet supremacy had exacerbated mounting national sentiments. His contempt for small nations and his mistreatment of national minorities had disturbed even convinced Communists, who remembered the more realistic approach of Lenin. His rigid, blustering foreign policy had alarmed the Western Powers, rallying them to a common defense against the threat of Communist aggression, and leading to the creation of NATO, SEATO and the Baghdad Pact. Against this background of Communist losses, the fact that Stalin had forged the USSR into a great industrial and military power, dominating a mighty World Communist movement, was played down by his successors. The "collective leadership" which, on the surface, appeared to have closed ranks after the elimination of the threat from Beria, seemed inclined to reduce Stalin's memory to proper proportions, while it moved toward the correction of his excesses.

10. The three years between the death of Stalin and the 20th Party Congress reflect the cautious and tentative groping toward a new policy by the badly divided "collective" leadership. In 1954, under Malenkov's guidance, a "New Course" was launched in both the USSR and the Satellites, emphasizing a relaxation of coercive methods and police terror and holding forth the prospect of a general increase

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in consumers' goods. Execution of the "New Course", however, was sluggish and uneven. After Malenkov's demotion in early 1955, the absolute priority of heavy industry was vigorously reaffirmed, albeit without repudiating the promises of improvement in living standard which he had made. Throughout the Satellites, Stalinism was still rampant, and most of the CPs of the Free World continued to display the pattern of autocratic personal leadership.

11. By the end of 1955 it must have become apparent to the Soviet leadership that, however difficult to agree upon under the circumstances of a deadly power struggle, a major redefinition of policy and strategy was required. The central feature gradually became clear, the attack on the "personality cult" of Stalin and the proclamation of a "return to Leninism". The Twentieth Congress of the CPSU (February 1956) provided the setting for this weighty drama which culminated in the sensational "secret report" of Khrushchev. Whether this bold iconoclasm was conceived and directed primarily by Khrushchev, whether it proceeded according to plan or was from the outset fraught with improvisation, may still be debated. Certainly, the reaction of the Congress to the first tentative attacks on Stalin by Mikoyan forced the pace and perhaps dictated the form of the full, smashing denigration. Khrushchev is reported to have confessed, several months later, to a foreign Communist leader, that, had he foreseen all the consequences, he would have handled the entire affair quite differently. Be that as it may, the decision to topple the Stalin idol must have been taken with full awareness by all members of the Presidium that its consequences would be, at the very least, unsettling to the Communist world.

12. The first phase of the inevitable crisis reached a climax in the month of June 1956. The publication by the United States government of the text of Khrushchev's secret speech produced a wave of uneasiness among CPs throughout

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the world, and led to pointed questions and even, in the case of Togliatti, to doubts concerning the "system" itself. Everywhere there was a demand - which seemed almost concerted - for a "Marxist explanation" of the deplorable Stalinist record. The Kremlin reacted quickly in the 30 June Resolution, followed by a series of interpretive articles in Pravda. The effect of these statements was gradually to play down the denigration of Stalin, and to curb the libertarian interpretation of the Twentieth Congress theses - in short, a "harder" Leninist line.

13. On the surface at least, this complex maneuver was successful. Most of the foreign CPs accepted the "Marxist explanation" without reservation. Even Togliatti, after receiving a mild wrist slapping, acknowledged the 30 June Resolution as a "contribution" to an "explanation", and from then on, troubled with repercussions in his own Party, he hewed to the Moscow line which for more than 25 years he had always faithfully followed. The alacrity with which the foreign parties took up the Kremlin rationalization suggested to some observers that the whole turmoil had been part of a "master plan". This appears to impute too much prevision to the Soviet leaders, especially in view of their internal differences. In any case, whatever their intentions and their tactics, they had set in motion long suppressed national fermentations among the Satellites which were not easily to be contained. Stimulated by the reactivation of the Leninist formula of "different roads to Socialism", which began with the Khrushchev-Bulganin visit to Belgrade in May-June 1955, CPs and front organizations on both sides of the Iron Curtain were boiling with heresies and "deviations".

14. While the Soviet leaders were trying to cope with this agitation which they had started, events in Poland and Hungary flared up with revolutionary violence. In the eyes of many in the Free World, this turmoil looked for a moment like the beginning of the end of the Communist movement. But

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in the face of the greatest peacetime threat since the 1917 Revolution, the Soviet leaders, following their time-tested principles of counter-attack, launched a major world-wide effort to recoup their losses and re-establish their control. With the qualified support of Communist China, they set out to restore their position as the uncontested leaders of International Communism, to solidify the USSR as the base of Communism, to wipe out tendencies toward "national Communism", and to consolidate their hold over the non-Orbit parties and the fellow-traveling organizations - all within the framework of "peaceful coexistence".

III. NATURE AND OBJECTIVES OF COMMUNIST STABILIZATION

A. General Considerations

15. Communist ideology does not regard permanent stability as an end achievable in the present stage of "socialist construction". Only in the ultimate stage of the world revolution, the achievement of full Communism, will this dynamic process come to rest in a classless society, the state having withered away, and with it all conflicts and "contradictions". Until then, the Communist Party must wage unending struggle to maintain its course toward the predetermined goal.

16. Stabilization, in Communist terms, thus involves a constant process of shifting, a perpetual adjustment of sail and rudder. The line between strategy and tactics often becomes indistinguishable. Within an integrated concept, specific goals are striven for, usually by a combination of specific methods, some of which may even appear to be self-contradictory, or to have more than one end in view. The campaign is conducted simultaneously, but flexibly, along all fronts: ideological, political, socio-economic, diplomatic,

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military, propaganda. It is the totality of the effort which constitutes the unique aspect of Communist stabilization. Because it is the very principle of their being, Communists, at least the leaders and the dedicated cadres, do not tire or despair in this quest for equilibrium, precedent to further advance. They need fear only stagnation, which dulls the edge of militancy, and isolation, which removes the possibility of engaging the enemy.


17. The history of the Soviet Union reveals a sequence of internal and external crises and of stabilization efforts hardly paralleled in any other modern state. When Lenin introduced the New Economic Policy (NEP) in the early twenties, he was countering an economic and political dislocation, the aftermath of "War Communism", which threatened the survival of the Revolution. This was followed in the late twenties by a profound power struggle, resolved by Stalin's ruthless elimination of Trotsky, Bukharin, Kamenev and Zinoviev. His position as dictator established, Stalin took the first steps in his grandiose design of "building Socialism in one country": the bloody suppression of the Kulaks and the forcible collectivization of agriculture as a prelude to industrial expansion on an unparalleled scale. In the early thirties the international position of Communism was threatened by the triumphal advances of Hitler and Mussolini, forcing the Comintern to reverse the anti-Socialist ("Social Fascist") line which it had pursued under Stalin's orders and to woo the Socialists into United Fronts against the common enemy. This relatively successful external campaign was combined with major political, economic and cultural consolidation within the USSR, of which the 1936 Constitution is a symbol. This phase, however, led directly into the bloody purges - the Yezhovshchina - which nearly incapacitated Russia for facing the Second World War. The Hitler-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939, shattering faithful Communists far more than the Hungarian uprising, was a desperate effort to restore temporary stability so as to strength-

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en the militarily weakened state. The devastation and depopulation of the War, whose full magnitude (probably 40 million deaths) was only revealed in 1956 by the publication of the vital statistics of the USSR, was partially compensated by the satellization of Eastern Europe, providing the booty from which the Soviet economy was restored. The hard aggressive line followed after 1947 - the civil war in Greece, the seizure of Czechoslovakia, the expulsion of Tito from the Cominform, the Berlin Blockade and the Korean war - brought about that rallying of Free World resistance, which, together with other factors, impelled the Soviet leaders to launch the present stabilization campaign. Whether it will prove more enduring and fruitful than earlier efforts, or whether it, too, will issue in abrupt reversals and new crises, cannot, at this time, be predicted with confidence. The history and dynamics of Communism, however, suggest a somber projection which is set forth at the end of this paper.

B. Goals of Stabilization

18. Strengthening the Position of the USSR as the Fountainhead of Communist Power. It is an unshakeable premise of the Soviet leadership that the USSR must remain the base and the citadel of World Communism. The political and organizational health of the Soviet Union, its Government and its Party, demands unquestioned priority. Replacing the "cult of personality" with the refurbished Leninist tenets of "collective leadership" and "Socialist legality", the Kremlin seeks to retain the principle of monolithic totalitarian authority and to restore the power of the CPSU, which had tended under Stalin to become his personal instrument. The 2 July 1957 Communique of the Central Committee, with its accompanying rallying cry in Pravda, affirmed that unity has been achieved and the Party is triumphant. The subsequent actions of Khrushchev have been calculated to reinforce this claim.


19. Reinvigoration of Marxist-Leninist Doctrine. Communist doctrine or ideology is the bond which holds together the parties of the "Socialist" camp and the Communist parties and front organizations throughout the world. "Marxism-Leninism" (Stalinism has been dropped, though many of its features are retained with attribution to Lenin) is literally the gospel of a "secular religion". Whatever role this gospel may play in determining concrete courses of action (a point of perennial dispute among students of Communism), its commandments and doctrine must be held inviolate and purged of heresy. Thus the present stabilization campaign has some of the aspects of a "Reformation", a return to a traditional orthodoxy which had been corrupted by the aberrations of a "Babylonian" pontiff and a few of his disciples. The fact that another false pope, Tito, has been propagating a persuasive heresy further emphasizes the need for doctrinal concentration. "Under the banner of Marxism-Leninism" held aloft by Moscow, widely separated peoples are called upon to rally in a common course of action.

20. Strengthening the Economy of the Bloc. Basically, this goal centers in strengthening the economy of the USSR. Lenin recognized at the outset that this backward country must be wrought into a highly industrialized modern state, if Communism was to advance throughout the world. Stalin, repudiating the Trotskyite program of simultaneous revolutions in many countries, set about the "construction of Socialism in one country". "Socialism" or a facsimile thereof was "constructed" - on the graves of millions and the forfeited happiness of a generation - but a new goal has been superimposed on the original one of fortifying the base of World Communism. A competitive, emulative motif has been increasingly stressed: outstripping the economies of the West, particularly that of the United States. Here, too, it is the strength of the Soviet Union and the ultimate material well-being of its citizens which is held forth as the incentive to increased productivity.

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21. Reaffirming the Military Might of the USSR.

Ever since the end of World War II, the Red Army has been the silent but visible partner, strengthening the hand of the Soviet diplomat and propagandist in the Cold War. Prior to 1956, the West gradually came to accept the Satellite military establishments as a substantial component of the Bloc's power agglomeration. Hungary dispelled the myth of Satellite reliability, probably for years to come, and thereby redressed somewhat the balance of conventional armed force between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. The USSR probably considers that the role of its military might as an instrument of its power politics must again be accented. Although nuclear deterrence and disarmament negotiations (see below, paras. 35-36) have complicated the exploitation of this instrument, the Kremlin clearly views the reaffirmation of its military prestige as a significant goal of stabilization.

22. Strengthening Control of the European Satellites.

Prior to the events of Poland and Hungary it was generally estimated that the USSR regarded the maintenance of effective control over the European Satellites as vital to its security, and would, if necessary, use force and face the risk of general war to that end. The suppression of the Hungarian revolt confirmed that estimate. Nevertheless, Moscow appears to have concluded that tactics less coercive than those of the Stalin era may be more productive, and may, if flexibly and imaginatively applied, make possible the eventual political, economic and military integration of the Satellite area into the USSR itself. Stabilization in this area is sought by a judicious balancing of concessions with reaffirmations of essentially Stalinist principles. Formal instruments of this process are the Council of Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA) in the economic field and the Warsaw Pact in the military. To these may eventually be added a political organization replacing the Cominform (see below, Para. 66).

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23. Strengthening Communist China. The USSR appears firmly determined to keep Communist China within the Orbit, sharing with it, to whatever degree required by circumstances, the leadership of the "Socialist camp". To this end, Moscow is continuing to help China's military and economic buildup and to maintain strong ideological ties, despite Mao's methodological "deviations". Presumably the Soviet leaders discount, at least for the time being, the possibility that Mao will assume the role of a greater Tito, a prophet of "national Communism". The moderating role which China appears willing to play was set forth authoritatively in the 29 December 1956 statement "More on the Historical Role of the International Proletariat", a document subtly permeated with ambivalence, but basically acceptable to the Kremlin as a manifesto of stabilization and solidarity.

24. Restoring a Favorable Climate of Foreign Policy. The "relaxation of tensions" and establishment of "mutual confidence", which the Kremlin had successfully advanced in 1955, were jeopardized as tactical instrumentalities by the crisis of 1956. The resumption of Cold War polarization, largely as a result of Hungary and Suez, threatened to cancel much that had been gained by International Communism through the Summit Conference, the rapprochement with Yugoslavia, the Austrian State Treaty and other conciliatory moves. A mounting curve of indicators during the first months of 1957 pointed to the urgent need for restoring prestige, allaying fears, and cancelling the memory of Soviet brutality in Hungary. Above all, it was essential to consolidate the area of "neutralism". The Twentieth CPSU Congress had hailed the emergence of a great "zone of peace" alongside the "camp of Socialism", comprising for the most part the former "colonial and semi-colonial" countries of Africa and Asia. Resentful of Western domination, vibrant with nationalism, these lands seemed ripe to the Kremlin for geopolitical manipulation and subversion. A major tactic is, through offers of economic,

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technological and military assistance, to encourage "non-alignment" or "positive neutrality", advancing Soviet imperialistic aims by denying trade, raw materials and military bases to the Western alliance.

25. Restoring Free World Communist Parties and Fronts. The Twentieth CPSU Congress presented the thesis that Communism might be achieved in certain countries by "parliamentary means". Although the areas in which this was to take place were not specified, it was presumed that countries with unstable democratic coalitions, notably France and Italy, were included among the possibilities. In the spring of 1956 a vigorous campaign was undertaken to lure the Socialist parties into a United Front. De-Stalinization, Poland and Hungary, administered a sharp setback to these efforts. Initially at least, parties and front organizations were demoralized and lost many members and supporters. The extent of this reverse, however, should not be exaggerated, since leadership, hard core membership, and organization remained largely intact, and in general, also, electoral support in the countries where mass parties were flourishing. In the numerous countries of Western Europe where the Communist followings have traditionally been small, losses were probably accepted with a philosophical shrug; the usefulness of these parties had long been rated low by Moscow. Nevertheless, a compensatory effort was clearly required and has been undertaken. Its aims are probably limited: rekindling enthusiasm for Marxism-Leninism, reaffirmation of the leadership of the USSR in "proletarian internationalism" and maintenance of the principle of class struggle. Although the Kremlin probably entertains few illusions concerning the prospects of the minor Western European parties, it cannot afford to neglect them as assets in its broad drive against NATO and US influence in Europe.

26. The international front organizations of Communism are probably considered of great, though uneven, value

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by the Kremlin. The stabilization campaign, therefore, must include a major effort to check losses and restore initiatives among the fronts, especially in countries where there is little prospect for the development of a revolutionary situation, and where the local parties need support from ostensibly non-Communist quarters.

C. Ideological Premises

27. Although the period since the death of Stalin, and particularly the year 1956, presents the aspect of an ideological Sturm und Drang within World Communism, the basic thought structure of Marxism-Leninism has remained intact. The dropping of "Stalinism" from the classic Bolshevik doctrinal triad, and the emphasis on "Leninism" as the "pure" extension of basic Marxism were clearly intended to restore and reinvigorate the Communist gospel. Prior to the 20th Party Congress a process of "liberalization" - a doctrinal as well as a political, social and cultural "thaw" - was allowed to develop without specific ideological underpinning. The tactical modifications, known as the "New Course", implied a dissociation from the harsher features of the Stalinist era. When, as we have noted above, it became apparent that this course was not achieving the anticipated results, and indeed was leading to confusion, divided counsel and exacerbated struggle for power, the Soviet leadership decided that a reinterpretation of doctrine was required; the Twentieth Party Congress attempted to provide the authoritative formulation. The convulsions which this event produced throughout the body of Communism, especially the violent repercussions of the Khrushchev secret speech, convinced the Soviet leaders that they had gone too far. Apparently without even a meeting of the Central Committee Plenum, the 30 June Resolution was drafted in haste, ushering in a phase of doctrinal retrenchment. At the same time a vigorous campaign was launched to raise the quality and the intensity of ideologi-

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cal indoctrination and to combat the danger of "revisionism". It may be said that the actions taken during the last twelve months constitute a progressive stabilization of the dialectic between the "liberalizing" platform of the Twentieth Party Congress and the corrective restrictions which were required to prevent "Stalinist" or "revisionist" excesses.

28. The program of ideological stabilization, as it developed since the Twentieth Congress, can now be seen distinctly under its shibboleth, "back to Leninism". To restore the supreme authority of the Party, which had become identified with the personal will of Stalin, the Leninist principle of "democratic centralism" - which was undeniably "central" but far from democratic - was refurbished. The "cult of personality" was denounced as foreign to Leninism, but the cult of Lenin in effect replaced that of Stalin. Other Leninist concepts were modified: war was no longer "fatally" inevitable, and Communism could come to power through parliamentary means. "Peaceful coexistence", often propagated by Stalin, was reaffirmed by Khrushchev. After the East European uprisings it was described by Shepilov (12 February 1957) as "a political struggle, an economic struggle, an ideological struggle". Lenin's implacable battle against "imperialism" was pledged anew. The revolutionary sine qua non remained class conflict and the "dictatorship of the proletariat" led by the "vanguard" of the Communist Party. "Different roads to Socialism" were declared legitimate, while simultaneously the immutability of "proletarian internationalism", with its Stalinist implications of Soviet supremacy over World Communism, was proclaimed. Nationalism was treated ambivalently; its "bourgeois" form was condemned as "idealism" but that of the neutralist countries was hailed as a progressive force, which could be used to advance the cause of "socialism". "National Communism", after some hesitation, was openly attacked as a capitalist invention or as "opportunism", and Tito was alternately cast into limbo or vigorously denounced. In sum, a complex tactic has been elaborated around the central theme of "different roads to Socialism", involving persuasion and inducement, admonition and threat;

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the ideological legacy of Lenin is freely manipulated in the interest of Communist hegemony and raison d'etat of the Soviet Union.

D. The Psychological Climate

29. Although the validity of the concept is denied by both Communists and their Catholic adversaries, the phenomenon of World Communism (as we have noted above, Para. 19) may appropriately be called a "secular religion". Organized Marxism, in its Leninist and Stalinist form, is not a political movement in the Western sense. Nor is it merely a manifestation of classic imperialism with a different ideological base. If it were, its objectives would be far more limited. The militant goal of a Communist world imperium has been regarded as the fulfillment of ancient Russian messianic universalist dreams or as the vision of a "Twentieth Century Islam".

30. This secular religion is based upon a unique atheistic revelation; it has evolved its own "theology" which displays some of the characteristics of a scholasticism. It purports to be "scientific", yet it encompasses the domain of morality and appeals to human passions and desires. It hypostatizes Matter, and seeks, not without success, to derive from that abstract principle the power-charged forces of enthusiasm, sacrifice, and dedication. The inherent duality of "scientific" objectivity and mass emotion, of myth and reality, of theory and practice, creates a psychological condition which almost automatically favors the practice of "doublethink". The state of mind revealed in Shepilov's statement that "peaceful coexistence is struggle" is extended in many characteristic Communist distortions: "democracy" is rule of the working class; "patriotism" is dedication to the motherland of socialism, the USSR; "international proletarianism" is patriotism; "idealism" is used by the exploiting class to repress the proletariat, etc.

31. Communist materialism, going far beyond pragmatic, mechanistic or deterministic concepts, negates not only Christian,

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but all non-Communist spiritual values. Implanted by unremitting indoctrination, it achieves a single-mindedness which is extraordinarily efficacious in promoting the ends of power. Utilizing frustrations and persecution complexes it creates a new reality, which is not that of the Western mind. A certain political paranoia is formed, which is impervious to reason, logic, or evidence. Even more striking than the effect on the individual is the collective impact. The Movement binds its members in a "collective passion", instilling in each "a good social conscience". True Communists are in a sense addicts or devotees who see in their secular religion only the good, beautiful, true - and scientific. Despite heretical inroads and confusion, forty years of orthodoxy have produced a state of mind which "confers certain neurotic characteristics upon all its new adherents, no matter what their individual predispositions may be".¹ Those who may emerge from this spell are faced with the dilemma of cynical resignation or defection, real or virtual. The tragedy which this presents can only be grasped inferentially by those who have not experienced it.

E. The "Operational Code"

32. The Communist leaders are governed in action by what has been called an "Operational Code".² This is a complex set of principles derived from the writings and experience of the early revolutionary leaders, which are seldom given explicit formulation, and are followed almost instinctively. Three of these principles have been conspicuous in the motivation of the Kremlin in the present stabilization campaign:

¹ Cf. Jean Monnerot, Sociology and Psychology of Communism (Boston, 1953) pp. 139-144.

² Nathan Leites, The Operational Code of the Politburo (N. Y. 1951).

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(a) The Communist expects to encounter setbacks in the struggle, and he reacts to adversity positively and with vigor; (b) tactical retreat is a normal maneuver in the face of overwhelming odds; there is no need to be ashamed of it; (c) compromise and temporary "relaxation of tensions" must be employed whenever necessary to prepare for a new counterattack.

33. The following quotations from Lenin are still valid and significant guide lines of Communist operational behavior.

" . . . compromises are often unavoidably forced upon a fighting party by circumstances, and it is absurd once and for all to refuse 'to stop at intermediate stations'. The task of a truly revolutionary party is not to renounce compromises once and for all, but to be able throughout all compromises, when they are unavoidable, to remain true to its principles, to its class, to its revolutionary purpose, to its task of preparing the way for the revolution and of educating the masses for victory in the revolution. "

- V. I. Lenin,
Selected Works,
Vol. VI, p. 208.

"Only one thing is lacking to enable us to march forward more surely and more firmly to victory, namely, the full and completely thought out appreciation by all Communists in all countries of the necessity of displaying the utmost flexibility in their tactics . . . The strictest loyalty to the ideas of Communism must be combined with the ability to make all the necessary practical compromises, to tack, to make agreements, zigzags, retreats and so on . . . "

- V. I. Lenin,
Selected Works,
Vol. X, pp. 138-145.

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F. Organizational Considerations

34. A principal problem for the Kremlin in launching the stabilization program has been how to exercise control over Communist parties outside the Orbit. The most effective instrument of International Communist control, the Comintern, had been dissolved in 1943, ostensibly as a gesture to Russia's allies in the War, but in reality because it had outlived its practical usefulness. Its successor, the Cominform, operating less authoritatively through its Journal (For a Lasting Peace! For a People's Democracy!) had likewise been abolished - in 1956. Even before Stalin's death it was a moribund rump organization, and its abolition was timed to please Tito and to demonstrate Soviet goodwill. Since the dissolution of the Cominform, the principal means of coordinating International Communism has been the extensive use of bilateral meetings and contacts. As we shall see below, the proliferation of such arrangements has been remarkable. Direct contacts, at this stage of the stabilization campaign, have probably been more effective than an international organization such as the Cominform would have been. Nevertheless, there have been several calls from foreign CPs for the establishment of some international roof organization, or at least for a central, authoritative periodical to guide World Communism. But even if Moscow were in favor of such a move, it may be presumed that several important parties, including probably the Polish and the Italian, opposed it, and the attitude of Peiping has almost certainly been negative. It seems likely, however, as the stabilization campaign proceeds, that the matter will again be raised.

G. Stabilization and the "Nuclear Stalemate"

35. The advent of the era of mutual deterrence from war through parity of nuclear armament has probably been a decisive factor impelling the Kremlin to seek "peaceful co-

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existence" with the great Western powers. The Soviet leaders almost certainly recognize that only within this framework can their struggle be conducted, unless the very future of civilization is to be put in jeopardy. In the past the official Communist line on nuclear warfare has seemed hesitant and confused. It may be questioned whether Stalin had grasped its reality; in any event, he appears to have been unable to find a plausible Marxist-Leninist explanation of its significance. His successors, after some sparring among themselves, now probably agree that nuclear war would not spare socialism from the devastation it would inflict on capitalism. Rather lamely they suggest that the socialist remnants of such a holocaust would be preferable to the capitalist ones. They probably impute to the West the same unwillingness to risk destruction, which they themselves feel. Hence, the Twentieth Party Congress advanced as a principal doctrinal innovation the modification of the Leninist thesis that "imperialism, the highest stage of capitalism" would lead inevitably to war; war is no longer "fatally" inevitable.

36. It may be questioned whether the Communists have in fact abandoned the conviction - deeply rooted in their Leninist tradition - that the final settlement between Communism and its foes cannot be achieved without violence. In a sense the Communist doctrine of war is not a part of the basic gospel, but is a tactical concept, subject to sharp alteration under strategic pressure. Nevertheless, it is possible that, perhaps for the first time, planning of the Soviet leaders has taken into account the nuclear stalemate. Although Moscow now claims the possession of the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile - the "ultimate weapon" - it must expect that the US, too, will have this weapon in short order and thus, in spite of its atomic war of nerves, Soviet policy appears likely to remain cautious. To be sure, force as an instrument of international "diplomacy" is not made obsolete thereby, but the threats which can be brandished in the shadow of nuclear weapons have become less substantial. The recent series of menacing notes to certain NATO powers contemplating the acceptance of atomic arms appears to reflect a note of real alarm and to constitute an experiment in a novel form of

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nerve-warfare. Despite the firmness with which these threats have been brushed aside, the Soviet leaders may feel that they have established a deposit of apprehension which can be drawn upon profitably in the future, perhaps with hidden increments. In any case, they are challenging the Free World in the field of nuclear diplomacy with the same elan they have displayed in developing the material instruments which impose the engagement.

IV. STABILIZATION MEASURES TO DATE

A. Within the USSR

37. The primary object of the stabilization campaign is to strengthen the USSR as the base of World Communism. Central to the effort, since the death of Stalin, has been the disposal of his estate. As we have seen, this involved in part a struggle for the mantle of power among contending heirs, in part an inventory of the assets and liabilities which he had left in considerable disorder. Both of these appear now to have been carried out. The succession has been determined, at least for the time being; liabilities have been partially liquidated; and assets are being consolidated. The estate has been shown to be rich, both actually and potentially, but the heir confronts a host of problems. In the following sections, these are examined both as general tasks of the entire Communist leadership and as specific undertakings of the new dictator, Nikita Khrushchev, who must establish both successful policies and personal popularity.

38. Political Stabilization. The first requirement for stabilization within the USSR was to restore a firm base of government. This could only be achieved through a resolution of factional conflict in the leadership and a reinvigoration of the CPSU, which, as we have noted, had declined under Stalin to an instrument of his personal will, a lesser one, at that,

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than the Soviet State. It was necessary, after the Stalin regnum, to restore weight and significance to the "legislative" bodies of both Party and State - the Central Committee, the Party Congress, and the Supreme Soviet - to convene them more often and to create at least the illusion that they were being consulted by the executive - the Presidium of the Party - and were free to discuss the measures which it proposed. As early as 1955 Khrushchev undertook to hold more frequent plenary sessions of the Central Committee, and this has in fact been done.¹ Discussion has been permitted and even "encouraged", albeit within sharply circumscribed limits and, to all appearance, by prearrangement. In short, "democratic centralism" still means the application of the rubber-stamp.

39. More important than the formal consultation of Party organs has been the effort to infuse new spirit throughout the hierarchy. Soviet political exhortation, whether at the theoretical level (Kommunist), the practical (Partiinaya Zhizn) or the purely agitational (Bloknot Agitatora), has incessantly hammered the old Leninist themes: "creative" contact with the masses, flexibility, concreteness, and harmony of theory and practice. Tact and persuasion are stressed, and bureaucratic arrogance and "formalism" are severely reproved. To an outsider, this didactic reiteration seems eminently sterile; to an initiate it may be somewhat inspiring. At the least, it may help to convey to the mass of party functionaries the sense of personal worth and purpose which Stalinism had killed.

40. But the renaissance of "partyism" cannot be accomplished merely programmatically. There are deep currents of skepticism, boredom, indifference and cynicism in the Soviet Union. A wave of protest has swept through

¹ This policy repaid handsomely when the CC plenum (June 22-29, 1957) supported Khrushchev against the "anti-party" group which tried to destroy him.

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recent literature: V. Dudintsev's Not for Bread Alone ignores the Party altogether, D. A. Granin's The Seekers scorns it, A. Yashin's The Levers shows how party functions turn human beings into mechanical instruments. These dissident expressions (which before the July purge must have had some tolerance if not encouragement from on high) are being more and more sharply criticized by the orthodox and have recently been reproved by Khrushchev himself. It is possible that the purge of the "Stalinist" elements in the Presidium may further the political "thaw", but it seems more likely that new lines will be established beyond which the sanctity of the Party may not be touched.

41. Parallel to the stabilization of the Party, the position of the nationality elements within the Soviet Union has also been at least partially corrected. Historically, the Soviet Union was welded together from a conglomerate of national and ethnic groups of highly uneven size and development, in a federation dominated by Great Russians who constitute about half of the population. Much of the work of "colonization" had been accomplished under the Czars, but it was extended and consolidated by the Bolsheviks. Officially treated as equals, the minority nationalities, including the lesser Slavic "brothers" of the Ukraine and Byelorussia, have been in fact second class members of the Union. With the death of Stalin, who had favored only his native Georgia among the non-Russian Republics, the aspirations of the nationalities found new defenders against the "Great Russian Chauvinists". Beria, himself a Georgian, in his brief bid for power, took up their cause. Khrushchev, a son of the Ukrainian-Russian frontier, has systematically emphasized the rights of the national minorities. In January 1957, by a dramatic gesture, five minority groups which had been deported under Stalin, were rehabilitated and permitted to return to their homelands. By a decree of June 1956, greater judicial autonomy was granted to the individual Union Republics. The climax of this reaffirmation of the federative basis of the Soviet Union was reached in July 1957,

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when the Presidium, purged of its Russian Stalinists, was reinforced with no less than five representatives of non-Russian republics, all, of course, personal protégés of Khrushchev.

42. Social Stabilization . We may assume that the Soviet leaders after the death of Stalin, however much they may have been divided on other issues, were agreed that certain excesses of his regime must be speedily corrected. Perhaps their nearest approach to unanimity lay in the recognition that the powers of the secret police must be decisively curbed. At their level, this reflected not so much a concern to do away with coercion and terror among the masses, as a simple and overwhelming desire never again to live under the nightmare of Stalin's arbitrary power. The elimination of Beria reduced the "state within the state", constituted by the MVD-MGB apparatus, to a manageable instrument. Some of the benefits of relaxation which the leaders had won for themselves were passed on to the people. "Socialist legality" was proclaimed. The power of the secret police appears to have been greatly curtailed, though the massive central archives of the MVD are still fully staffed and the informer system has not been dismantled. Prison camps were almost depopulated by amnesties affecting millions, and ceased to be a major factor in the Soviet economic system. The worst of Stalin's harsh labor laws were relaxed by the simple process of announcing that they would no longer be enforced, and in mid-1956 many were formally revoked.¹ Workers were no longer persecuted for leaving enterprises without permission nor savagely punished for tardiness and absenteeism.

¹ The de facto non-enforcement of the most severe laws had begun as far back as 1949-50.

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43. Although the benefits of these measures to the common man were real, their impact was strongest at the level of the Soviet elite. Under Stalin, every category of leadership and management had been victimized by arbitrary arrest and punishment. This was particularly resented by the class of industrial managers who were subject to disgrace, fine, imprisonment and even worse, for failure to meet output quotas or for other shortcomings, condemned as sabotage or neglect of the people's interest. The fact that their failures were often the result of a planning blunder at a distant desk in Moscow aggravated the sense of injustice. As a group, the industrial managers were determined to win at least some of that legal protection which cushions the impact of business failure in the "capitalist" world, and this they have achieved.

44. It is frequently argued that the progressive emancipation of the managerial elite in the USSR is a favorable development, leading toward the transfer of power from party autocrats to a group of practical technicians who would be amenable to "reasonable alternatives" to the tyrannical system of Stalin. Concerned primarily with their enterprises, they are sometimes compared to enlightened American industrialists who have come to understand the important role of human relations and of incentives to higher productivity of labor. The "managerial revolution" is said to be at hand, bringing with it the prospect of more "normal" relations with the non-Communist world. Unfortunately, there is little evidence to support this optimistic view, at least in the rather extreme form in which it has usually been presented. It is probably true that vested interests in an expanding economy are being developed which will work for a more stable society and resist "adventurism" which might lead the Soviet Union into war. But this does not mean a withering away of the supremacy of the Communist Party nor an abatement of the drive to extend its dominion to the ends of the earth. Although two hierarchies stand side by side, they are not

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mutually exclusive or hostile. Party functionaries and economic technicians have interlocking careers and complementary interests. It will remain a major concern of the leadership to see that this continues to be the case. Factional instability resulting from conflicting interests of "technocrats" and "apparatchiks" hardly seems to constitute an exploitable vulnerability of the Soviet state.

45. Throughout society, then, forces of stabilization have been at work, and the regime of Nikita Khrushchev is committed to further them. The loyalties and morale of workers will be strengthened by the reform of the wage structure which has been initiated. A new pension plan will improve the condition of retired workers; sickness benefits are being extended and shorter work hours have been promised. Although housing remains deplorable throughout the Soviet Union, serious efforts are being made to improve it, especially in critical industrial areas such as the Donbas and in the "virgin lands" developments. The prospects for an improved diet and for an increase in consumers' goods are probably not so rosy as Khrushchev has painted them, for heavy industry retains its overriding priority. But the average Soviet citizen, especially in the cities, feels that he is already better off, and, so long as some improvement is registered, he will not complain unduly. Even the recent virtual repudiation of the compulsory state loans appears hardly to have provoked any discontent.

46. Other significant stabilization moves have been undertaken in the social field. The vast expansion of secondary and higher education, which was spurred by the need to compensate for the slump in the demographic curve resulting from World War II, is being consolidated at an advanced, though slightly lower, level. Although the primary goal has been to train scientists, engineers and technicians, heavy political indoctrination has remained constant. It is true

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that there have been manifestations of student unrest, some of a rather startling nature, which must cause considerable concern to the regime. On the whole these have been countered, not violently, as they would have been under Stalin, but firmly. Indoctrination is to be intensified, not only in quantity but in quality. Restive students have been punished relatively mildly, usually by expulsion. Greater emphasis is placed on the "creative" role of youth, appealing to its enthusiasm, idealism and spirit of sacrifice, stressing the expanding economic frontiers open before it. To what extent these appeals will counteract the note of boredom, disillusionment and cynicism which has recently become apparent remains to be seen. It will be particularly interesting to determine the long-range impact of the World Youth Festival in Moscow, which had as a major objective the rededication of Soviet youth to the strengthening of "socialist construction" in the USSR.

47. Other steps have been taken in the field of education. Special boarding schools have been opened on the initiative of Khrushchev. While it was first believed that these would be a civilian version of the military Suvorov schools, reminiscent of the Nazi Ordensburgen, they now appear intended to become the basis of universal education.

48. In the cultural field, the liberalizing trend, described by the title of Ilya Ehrenburg's novel The Thaw, has done much to release the tensions of the intellectuals, built up during the Stalin era. Here, too, stabilization is being sought in a balance between creative freedom and discipline. The norm of art, the principle of "Socialist realism", remains in force, but deviations from it are met with reproach and temperate criticism rather than with repression. The office of censorship, Glavlit, remains intact. The bureaucracy of the Soviet Writers' Union wields vast powers to reward or disgrace. But these organs of control themselves appear, at least until recently, to have been affected with a certain hesitation, reflecting perhaps the division of counsel

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within the Party leadership. There have been alternations of "hard" and "soft" lines. The revision of Soviet history, which was ordained at the Twentieth Party Congress, after a rather lively start, appears to have been temporarily halted, pending the establishment of an authoritative new "line". There is an understandable reluctance on the part of critics, historians, philosophers, indeed of all categories of intellectuals, to take exposed positions; too often in the past they have proved disastrous. Indeed, many in whom the stirrings of hope for a genuine "liberalization" have been aroused must suspect from bitter experience that the whole "thaw" is nothing but a clever move of entrapment. The recent experience of "rectification" in China will hardly reassure them on this point.

49. Even in the field of religion, a certain effort of stabilization has been required. In 1954, a Presidium decree instructed party functionaries to observe moderation in propagandizing the official atheistic line, and to refrain from outright persecution of the Church. This tactic has not been altogether successful. Party journals complain of the lack of atheistic militancy, especially among the youth who are described as flocking to church festivals, largely as a reaction to the boredom of party indoctrination. The classic remedy is prescribed, intensification of the indoctrination effort, with emphasis on quality rather than quantity. It would appear that the party leaders have little fear of the Church as an organization or of religion as an anti-Marxist doctrine, but they cannot ignore the social challenge which it presents.

50. Economic Stabilization. Despite its impressive expansion in the past and its great potential, the Soviet economy has been increasingly plagued with difficulties. As a result of the demographic catastrophe of World War II, a serious manpower shortage looms for at least the next five years. The pressing demands for an increase of agricultural

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production, which Khrushchev has undertaken to satisfy promptly, will further limit the possibility of expanding the industrial labor force. For years, Soviet economic planners have been mortgaging future assets, ignoring the "capitalist" principles of obsolescence, replacement and modernization. The day of reckoning, as they have now been forced to admit, is at hand. Increments of labor productivity are harder to extract. Planning has proved overambitious, with the result that many grandiose projects have had to be quietly shelved. Basic Marxist economic principles have recently been cast in some doubt, and there is currently being held in Soviet economic journals a sort of Marxist "Great Debate" on the role of price, commodity and market under "socialism", the outcome of which may be sweeping changes. Heavy additional strains have been laid on the military budget by the demonstration of Satellite unreliability and NATO firmness in the armament race. The Satellite economies are in disorder, especially in Poland and Hungary, and the demands of China are unremitting. The opportunities for economic diplomacy in the underdeveloped areas present a constant challenge to increase commitments, while necessitating a certain prudence in the face of growing domestic demands.

51. The aggregate of these strains, pressures and demands has compelled the Soviet planners to lower their goals for 1957 and probably for the entire Sixth Five Year Plan. Yet the fanatical determination to equal and surpass the economic level of the West, especially the US, so as to maintain a powerful base for World Communism, seems stronger than ever. Whereas earlier, the competitive drive to outstrip the US had centered in the expansion of heavy industry, since 1955 the emphasis has shifted, at least in part, to the renovation of agriculture. Khrushchev, having launched (1950) an abortive scheme to merge villages into agricultural towns, the agrorods, has recently turned to other novel ideas, notably increased production of corn. The visit of the Soviet agricultural delegation to the US in 1955 probably contributed

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to the prestige of this new fad. Even more important, it brought home to the Kremlin the possibility, by adopting American methods, of greatly reducing the amount of manpower involved in agriculture without loss of output. In the meantime, the opening of the "virgin lands" - now claimed at about 90,000,000 acres, an area greater than the entire wheat growing section of Canada - offered the prospect of a quick rise in output, linked, however, with a long-range climatological gamble which might prove disastrous. Finally, in the first half of 1957 Khrushchev threw out still another seemingly impulsive challenge; he boasted that the USSR would outstrip the US in the per capita production of meat, butter and milk, not in the distant future as in the case of heavy industry, but within two or three years. The immediate target of this demagogic program is surely unrealistic; the ultimate goal probably is not. In any case, the recent decision to cease forced collections from the private plots of peasants will certainly facilitate its achievement. Small though these plots are (under 1/2 acre), they have accounted in some important areas for as much as a quarter of the deliveries of meat, milk and vegetables. The gratification of the individual peasant in relief from even a fraction of the pressure of the state will be a potent incentive for increase of production.

52. Even more impressive than the "virgin lands" gamble is the industrial reorganization scheme developed by Khrushchev in theses presented to the Plenum of the Central Committee in February 1957. It aims at nothing short of the eradication of the evils of bureaucratization and over-centralization which have proven endemic in the planned "Socialist" economy of the USSR. The need for a major step in this direction was indeed apparent. During forty years of Bolshevism, Moscow had become what William Cobbett called London a century and a half ago, the great "Wen". As though under an iron law of bureaucratization, a web of administrative nerve lines converged on a vast ganglion of desks in the capital. Economic ministries proliferated, despite periodic recombinations. The

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looseness of the ministerial structure, in turn, required the improvisation of higher coordinating agencies, which, like the ministries, were merged, dissolved, reintegrated, combined and placed under different leadership without any real gain in efficiency. Thus a situation had come about which no mere juggling of Moscow mechanisms could put in order. Radical decentralization appeared to be the only solution.

53. The reorganization scheme was presented as a challenge to the entire people. That it was bitterly opposed by a faction within the Presidium, and was a crucial issue of the power struggle, is now apparent. After much "discussion" by regional deputies at the May Plenum, followed by a characteristic "Bolshevik decision", the implementation was carried out at a brisk tempo. By the target date of 1 July, 105 regional Councils of the National Economy (Sovnarkhozny) had been established with staffs ranging from about 800 to 3,000. Of some 35 all-Union Ministries in the industrial field, 27 have been reorganized or abolished, leaving intact only 8, devoted primarily to defense production. The USSR Council of Ministers has been reshaped and slightly expanded, including the Chairmen of the 15 Union Republic Councils of Ministers. Decentralization of authority to the regional Councils has been kept within bounds by the retention of substantial powers of review, planning and control at the center, exercised through the greatly strengthened USSR Gosplan.

54. It is too early to assess the prospects for this massive reorganization. A number of deputy ministers have already been moved out of Moscow to the capitals of the larger republics. There is considerable resistance to rustication (30-40,000 persons are involved), but the regime has confidently asserted that certain "inducements" will overcome this inertia, perhaps in the form of additional perquisites. The great danger is an upsurge of "localism", connivance between

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officials and managers at the regional level at the expense of the national economy. According to recent reports, as yet unconfirmed, many individual enterprises are at a standstill, capital equipment has been sold or hoarded and excessive stockpiles are being accumulated. In the absence of the accustomed strong central direction, a mild form of economic chaos may be expected. Basic waste and inefficiency resulting from the forced draft pursuit of heavy industry expansion will not be eliminated by the reorganization. Moreover, the initial organizational changes within the government will necessarily be followed by others in the Party structure, the trade unions and the supporting mechanisms of technological and scientific training and research. Indeed, as the discussion of the Soviet price system (para. 50 above) shows, the entire Marxist concept of "socialist" economy is in flux. New modifications, planned and spontaneous, will almost certainly emerge, in forms which are as yet unpredictable.

55. In sum, the effort at economic stabilization of the USSR, which as we have said is the central problem of the entire campaign, has now entered a critical stage. In favor of ultimate success are the proven strength of the economy, the caliber and experience of the Party and industrial leaders, and their apparent willingness to re-examine classic methods and doctrines with some measure of critical objectivity. Against it are the nature of the system itself, the stubborn ways of bureaucratism, the obsessive concern to outstrip the West, the imbalance of industrial priorities and the failure to provide adequate labor incentives and consumer goods. Over and beyond all these factors lies a general imponderable, the unpredictability of the evolutionary course of any complex, modern super-economy, whether socialist or capitalist. It would be a rash prophet who would undertake to say what the economy of the Soviet Union, of Western Europe, of China or India - not to mention the United States - will look like in 1980. One can only continue to extrapolate existing curves, reserving

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a prudent judgment that, as in the case of the population curve of the 1930s, they will confront us with surprising turns.

56. Military Stabilization. The role of the Soviet armed forces in the stabilization campaign may be considered under two aspects, as object and as subject. On the one hand the Kremlin has had to determine what measures are necessary to maintain a level of military power which will guarantee the security of the base of World Communism, and enable it to conduct its aggressive diplomacy with a decisive trump in reserve. On the other hand, it has also been obliged to reckon with an internal power factor which is far from a passive object of manipulation.

57. The modernization of the Red Army has been a consistent objective of the Soviet Union since the Second World War. The parallel strengthening of the Red Fleet and the tremendous expansion of the Air Force have provided an armed force second only to that of the United States - if indeed it be second! Whether the primary purpose of this weapon, and of the strategy which governs it, be offensive or defensive - and we may conjecture that it is a combination of both in nearly equal degree - its maintenance at peak efficiency is an unassailable premise of Soviet policy, and an inviolable item of the Soviet budget.

58. Against this central theme, a contrasting subject has been developed in elaborate counterpoint: disarmament. Two considerations have been dominant, diplomacy and economy. The Kremlin was quick to recognize that the devastation of World War II and the terror of nuclear warfare have impregnated world opinion with a desire for peace, perhaps at any price. On the other hand, it has also been forced to acknowledge that the cost and manpower demands of modern armament, pushed to the ultimate, are perhaps not more than any economy can bear, but are nonetheless incompatible with the fulfillment

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of desires that all people hold. Compounding factors, especially the inscrutable destiny of humanity under nuclear fall-out, make the prospect of an armament race universally unpopular. It was inevitable that the Kremlin should seize on disarmament as an issue, desirable as an end in itself but susceptible of almost infinite spinning out in tantalizing negotiations.

59. It is not within the scope of this paper to evaluate Soviet military intentions and capabilities. It is sufficient to point out that the role of the Red Army as a final arbiter of security policy was made clear in Hungary; nothing will be allowed to jeopardize its forward positions and its lines of communications. Indecision and conflict among the Party leaders are pushed aside when vital interests are at stake. Now that the unreliability of the Satellite armed forces has been demonstrated to the world - it was probably always accepted by the Soviet military - the untouchable status of the Red Army and its junior services is more than ever apparent.

60. The role of the military in the Soviet leadership appears thus to have entered a new phase, symbolized by the advancement of Marshal Zhukov to full membership in the Presidium. For some time, it had been conjectured that the military were assuming a new and more potent role in the Kremlin, not in opposition to the Party but as an integral part of it. During the past two or three years, a number of steps have been taken to eliminate the duality of power and influence between the military and the party hierarchies which Stalin fostered as a means of strengthening his control. The era of nagging conflict between the politruk and the line officer appears to have ended. Unity of command is now an unchallenged principle.

61. It remains to be seen how far the extension of military participation in policy decision will go. It is suffi-

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cient at this point to conclude that the course of action under Khrushchev will proceed with substantial involvement of the military as beneficiaries of increased concern with defense, as arbiters of disarmament negotiations and as active collaborators in extending the Soviet and Communist imperium.

B. Stabilization of the Satellite Area.

62. As we have noted above, stabilization of Soviet control in the European Satellites - a vital strategic and economic area for the USSR - has been one of the primary goals of the present campaign. The need for such an effort was recognized almost immediately by Stalin's successors, but a profound difference on method divided them from the outset: whether to intensify the harsh tactics of the Stalin era or to adopt a more liberal and less coercive approach. We may tentatively accept the view of Tito that "Stalinism" has lost the battle, while reserving our judgment as to whether it has lost the war.

63. The first phase of Satellite stabilization covered the period from the death of Stalin and the execution of Beria to the Twentieth Party Congress. Under the "New Course" of Malenkov, beginning in 1954, political terror and economic exploitation were relaxed, and the more obvious forms of Soviet overlordship were concealed or removed. In certain countries, especially Hungary, National or Patriotic Fronts were constituted, invoking the support of thoroughly tamed non-Communist elements. Efforts were made to correct the gross imbalances in the economic plans, to cut back extravagant and unrealistic expansion of heavy industry, to restore a measure of health to agriculture and to provide more consumer goods. There was a moment of hope among the Satellite populations, but it soon faded. The "little Stalins", while paying reluctant lip service to the New Course, either tacitly sabotaged it or did little to implement it. Factionalism developed in the parties, and "National Communism" began to emerge in outlines which Moscow could not be expected to tolerate, let alone approve.

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64. In the second phase of stabilization, initiated at the Twentieth Party Congress, the Kremlin reaffirmed the thesis that "socialism" might be approached by "different roads". The main purpose of this thesis probably was to placate Tito and Mao, and to curb the excesses of Stalinist party leaders throughout the world. The impact of the doctrine in the Satellites, accompanied as it was by the destruction of the myth of Stalin's infallibility, was not reassuring to the Kremlin. The Poznan riots and disturbing manifestations in Hungary and other Satellites indicated that Tito's more liberal interpretation was contagious. The 30 June 1956 CPSU Resolution, besides providing a "Marxist explanation" of de-Stalinization, was also designed to convince the Satellites that they must not flirt with "National Communism". The Kremlin leaders, on the one hand, attempted to persuade Tito to drop his role as heresiarch, and on the other, to expose him as such to the Satellite faithful. Both efforts were unsuccessful. The secret CPSU letter of September to the Satellite leaders, denouncing Titoism, soon became public, exacerbating relations with Yugoslavia, and in the meantime ominous clouds were gathering in Poland and Hungary. On 30 October, Moscow issued a "Declaration on the Foundations for the Development and Further Strengthening of Friendship and Cooperation between the USSR and Other Socialist States". The Declaration professed a conditional willingness to consider withdrawal of Soviet forces from Poland, Hungary and Rumania. It did not avert bloodshed in Hungary, but, although its sincerity may be questioned, it may have contributed to the more moderate resolution of the Polish crisis. In any case, it did not appease Tito, who in his November speech at Pula broke sharply with the doctrinal position of the Kremlin, resuming a polemic which has continued - decrescendo indeed - to the present. The chief practical consequence of the 30 October Declaration was to lay the foundation for the Soviet interpretation of the Hungarian Revolution as "counter-revolution" and to reaffirm the inviolability of the Warsaw Pact commitments imposed on the Satellites.

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65. The third phase of stabilization, following the bloody pacification of Hungary, is still in progress and has grown in intensity since the July purge. Its theme has been the incessant reiteration of "proletarian internationalism", and denunciation of "National Communism". This theme has characterized the continuing bilateral party and governmental meetings and visits, exchanged between the USSR and individual Satellites and among the Satellites themselves. The same theme has been echoed in many bilateral meetings of Communist parties and front organizations outside the Bloc. At no time in the history of International Communism has there been such feverish "getting together".

66. Whether this experiment in coordination by bilateral meetings has been satisfactory to the Kremlin may be questioned. In the past, Moscow has usually had at its disposal an international instrument to convey its orders, whether by authoritative direction, as through the Comintern, or by propaganda guidance, as through the Cominform. The decisions to do away with these instruments were dictated by overriding considerations of political appeasement: in the first case, of Russia's wartime allies, especially the United States; in the second case, of neutrals such as Tito and Nehru. The dissolution of the Cominform likewise served as a gesture of "relaxation of tensions" at a moment when that policy enjoyed tactical priority. Moreover, both organizations, at the time of their demise, had outlived their usefulness.

67. The complexity and inconvenience of the bilateral system and the confusion experienced by some CPs have already led to calls, within International Communism, for the reconstitution of a central organization. The views of the individual parties, however, vary considerably on the advisability of such a step. Within the Bloc, China and Poland almost certainly oppose it; the "Stalinist" parties such as those

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in Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria appear to favor it. Abroad, many of the Party leaders, especially in Western Europe, would probably welcome the restoration of a visible guiding hand to aid them in stabilizing their restless following. Even in the Italian Party, whose leadership was cool to the idea, at least some high officials would not be averse to this principle. The balance of advantage would appear to lie, from Moscow's viewpoint, in the re-establishment of an agency, which could provide a loose multilateral association of alleged equals, while at the same time the CPSU maintained tight bilateral relations with individual CPs.

68. Whatever the outcome, the Kremlin does not lack means to enforce its will on the Satellites. Politically, it continues to control the leadership of the local parties directly and indirectly. Economically, the USSR, while continuing to develop a network of bilateral agreements among the Satellites, still maintains basic coordination through the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA). This mechanism, which was set up under Stalin, has performed its tasks with relatively little publicity, and there are differences of judgment concerning its effectiveness. It is doubtful whether the Satellites have found much "mutuality" in CEMA's operations, which seem to have been directed to the long range goal of fully integrating their economies with that of the USSR. Finally, in the military field, the Warsaw Pact affords the continuing justification for maintaining advanced positions in Eastern Europe, essential both for the strategic defensive and offensive posture toward NATO and for the internal security of the puppet regimes. The 30 October 1956 Declaration and the suppression of the Hungarian revolt have indicated unmistakably that the Satellites may not secede from this Pact.

69. The course of the stabilization program during the past nine months shows marked differences among the individual Satellites. Poland stands at the extreme of the

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"liberalization" scale. Yet, even here, the Kremlin - and Gomulka himself - have imposed limits which must be respected. Poland lies athwart Soviet lines of communications to East Germany, and the Red Army will risk general war, rather than let them be cut. Polish fears of Germany act as an internal counter to hatred of Russian domination. The Polish economy, milked by the USSR through virtually forced deliveries at artificially low prices, clearly demands some relaxation of pressure, which Moscow has been obliged to grant. Something like an NEP détente, reversing collectivization and restoring a measure of private enterprise, has been allowed to go unchallenged. The Polish Party, divided into several factions, is held in balance by the reluctance of Gomulka and the Kremlin to force a showdown between the "liberals" and the Natolin group. Criticism from the intellectuals has been curbed but not eliminated. A hopeful eye has been kept on the "rectification" campaign in Communist China, but neither Moscow nor Warsaw has been able to lure Peiping into an unequivocal support of its position, and the latter's own troubles in maintaining stability may restrict its moderating influence. In sum, although it is clear that, from the Soviet point of view, Poland has not as yet been completely stabilized, it has passed beyond the stage at which an eruption of the Hungarian type is to be feared.

70. In Hungary, the Kadar regime, established with the backing of Soviet tanks, has sought to achieve stabilization primarily by coercive measures; the objective, indeed, has been pacification rather than stabilization. There is no immediate prospect that Hungary will be allowed to find its own "road to Socialism". It will be excluded from a more generous interpretation of the Twentieth CPSU Congress theses until the rebellious spirit of its people has been broken. If it cannot be broken now, it will be kept under a regime of strict repression in the hope that a new generation will be more submissive. The economy of the country, badly distorted by years of unrealistic planning and further shaken by

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the uprising, can only be restored in complete dependence on the dictates of Moscow and CEMA. Hungary's armed forces, such as remain, will not be trusted for a long time to come. In a speech before the National Assembly on 9 May 1957, Kadar presented a picture of the achievements of his regime, which was certainly exaggerated. Nevertheless, from the Kremlin's viewpoint, his progress may seem satisfactory and direct Soviet intervention has been kept at a minimum.

71. In the other Satellites, the events in Poland and Hungary profoundly stirred the people and alarmed Communist governments and parties, but did not lead to major manifestations of unrest. Since then, the need has been for tranquilization rather than stabilization. In Czechoslovakia the regime, outwardly unperturbed, clung to the "Stalinist" line, avoiding even that degree of "liberalization" which the Twentieth CPSU Congress appeared to encourage. Its "Stalinist" leadership has been emphatically endorsed by Khrushchev as a model of Bloc solidarity. Rumania has remained firmly in the hands of a Muscovite governing clique, and a disturbance among the Magyar minority of the Transylvanian border was quickly suppressed. Unrest in Bulgaria, heightened by unemployment and economic distress, has been met by deportations and police action. Stalinist Albania, apparently oblivious to any change in the Communist atmosphere, at first sharpened its attacks against Tito, and made fulsome protestations of loyalty to the "fountainhead of Socialism", the USSR. Subsequently, the Kremlin appears to have undertaken a rapprochement between the two antagonistic regimes.

72. East Germany has presented a more complex problem. Despite 400,000 occupation troops and the heavy hand of the Ulbricht regime, the danger of an uprising has always been latent. Although the East Germans have learned from their own experience in June 1953, and from that of Poland and Hungary, to respect the limits of the possible,

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they have shown no indication that they are resigned to perpetual Communist domination. Unrest of students and intellectuals has withstood all measures of pacification, although discretion and subtlety in defiance have been the watchword. The Ulbricht government, Stalinist in complexion, displayed signs of uneasiness and sought with indifferent success to align Gomulka with its policies, to establish solidarity with Communist parties outside the Bloc, especially the French and Italian. It awaited with some uneasiness the repercussions of the Kremlin coup but has visibly recovered its nerve since Khrushchev reaffirmed his faith in Ulbricht during the August 1957 visit. The magnet of West Germany, however, continues its unceasing pull on the East German population. It is hard to see how any measures of stabilization can be permanently effective in East Germany except the maintenance in position of Soviet bayonets.

73. The total picture of stabilization in the Satellites up to the present is seen to be uneven. On the whole "Stalinist", or at least "Muscovite" elements have been favored in the Communist parties and governments, and no great pressure has been exercised by Moscow to interpret the Twentieth Party Congress theses "liberally". The effort to neutralize Tito or to persuade him to swerve from his independent ideological and political course has been inconclusive (see below, paras. 77-81). One may speculate that prior to July 1957 the divided counsel within the Presidium, especially the rigid views of Molotov, may have been the main cause of the failure of the stabilization campaign to achieve more than it did. With this division at an end, its prospects have probably improved.

74. With the exception of Poland, where the Gomulka experiment will probably be allowed to continue, the stabilization of the Satellites may be expected to follow the general lines laid down by the Twentieth Party Congress and interpreted in the 30 June 1956 Resolution and other "explanatory" statements. "National Communism" will be sternly rebuffed,

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and the course of "different roads to Socialism" will be plotted largely by Moscow, not by the individual regimes. There will be no autonomy in foreign policy, although efforts will be made to preserve the illusion of Satellite "sovereignty" within such international frameworks as the United Nations. The solidarity of the "Socialist camp" will be maintained with the benevolent support of Communist China. Economically, the USSR will probably continue the efforts of 1956 and early 1957 to abate the more extreme forms of exploitation. The remission of debts (already on the order of one billion dollars), the increase of exports to Eastern Europe (scheduled at over \$600 million) and decrease of imports (\$265 million) may be accompanied by increasing latitude to the Satellite regimes to seek economic assistance or advantageous trade arrangements in the West. The example of Poland's loan from the US will be carefully watched both in Moscow and the Satellite capitals and may have sequels.

75. This broad front stabilization effort will be enveloped in short range agitprop themes, designed to create an atmosphere exuding confidence in the USSR as the bulwark of "socialism", the mainstay of "proletarian internationalism". Concentrated efforts will be made to strengthen local party organizations and to increase the weight of ideological indoctrination. As far as possible, the memory of the Stalin era will be blacked out, and its crimes and blunders will be glossed over as violations of Leninism, rather than as faults inherent in the Soviet system. Such guilt of participation in Stalin's crimes as may be admitted will be imputed to the purged trio, Malenkov, Molotov and Kaganovich. Hungary will stubbornly and patiently be explained, in the face of the highly damaging UN condemnation, as a horrible example of the greatest of dangers, counter-revolution.

76. Such will be the Kremlin's studied effort. It may fail to extinguish coals of the dissidence stirred into flame in Hungary, but it will probably succeed in reducing

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them on the surface to grey ashes of resignation and apathy. Tito and Gomulka and perhaps Mao will be watched hopefully by the Satellite peoples; the Soviet masters will be sullenly hated. Aspirations for liberty and national fulfillment will be cherished by all classes, but in the concerns of the present, the future will be left to take care of itself.

C. Titoism and Communist Stabilization.

77. The improvement of Soviet-Yugoslav relations, which had deteriorated badly under Stalin, must have been one of the most pressing concerns of his successors, and a major source of discord among them. The first and most dramatic initiative was the pilgrimage of Khrushchev and Bulganin to Belgrade in May-June 1955. Despite the transparent and almost undignified efforts of the Soviet leaders to bring about a Party rapprochement, the Yugoslav leader firmly kept the accord on the governmental level. During the ensuing months a number of steps were taken by the Kremlin to promote reconciliation. In February 1956 a substantial loan and commodity credit was granted. The Cominform - which had outlived its usefulness in any event - was abolished, and Molotov, Tito's old adversary, was removed from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Twentieth Party Congress implicitly recognized the right of Yugoslavia to proceed along its own "road to Socialism". It is now clear that this concession, in its full interpretation as a nihil obstat to "National Communism", was intended to be a "Tito exclusive". Tito, for his part, showed no inclination to restrict its application, and began enthusiastically to encourage the other Satellites to free themselves from Stalinism and follow Yugoslavia's example.

78. This was clearly more than the Kremlin had bargained for. Further steps were required to bring the process under control. In June 1956, Tito visited Moscow; friendly communiques were issued which confirmed the reconciliation on a governmental level and acknowledged the ideologi-

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cal independence of Yugoslavia. But almost immediately the Kremlin began a campaign within the Satellites to check the ferment of Titoism; a secret letter, circulated to the Satellite parties and governments in September, warning against following the Yugoslav example of "National Communism" soon became known to Tito, and relations again became frosty. For reasons still not fully apparent, Khrushchev flew alone to Belgrade on 19 September. On 27 September both men flew to Yalta where they were joined by Bulganin and other non-Stalinist officials. Probably much to Tito's annoyance, the former Stalinist, Erno Gerö, who was Hungarian Party Secretary at the time, put in an appearance. Whatever tactics of persuasion or pressure may have been applied, Tito did not retreat from his firm position that the Satellites must be allowed substantial freedom, and the meeting broke up without apparent results. Meanwhile, the growing agitation in Poland and Hungary heightened the tension between Moscow and Belgrade, and even Communist China joined in criticizing Tito for "revisionism" and for splitting the "socialist camp".

79. The climax of estrangement was reached in November. In a major speech at Pula (11 November) Tito drew an ideological line which Moscow angrily rejected. He revealed that a battle was raging within the Kremlin between "Stalinists" and "anti-Stalinists", and predicted that the latter would prevail. It appeared for a time that all the ground gained during the previous months might be lost. Nevertheless, at no point did either side display any real desire to precipitate a total break. After a period of acid exchanges, in which some of the Satellites heartily joined on Moscow's side, the fervor of the engagement gradually simmered down. During the first half of 1957, semi-polite argumentation continued; a situation of stalemate seemed to have been reached, broken by the Khrushchev-Tito meeting in Rumania (1-2 August).

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80. The leadership purge in the Kremlin has obviously reopened the game. Tito and his principal spokesmen, who at least outwardly were surprised by the sudden and complete nature of Khrushchev's triumph, have scarcely concealed their elation. However, if they believe that they now have an opportunity to propagate their example among the Satellites, they may find themselves surprised and disappointed. As noted above, it is most improbable that the new leadership will extend the Leninist theses of the Twentieth Party Congress to embrace "National Communism". Nor is it likely to view with sympathy the Titoist allegation that industrial decentralization, as Moscow has decreed it, resembles, or was influenced by the Yugoslav model. The Soviet leaders, not to mention the "Stalinists" in the Satellites, are especially mistrustful of the Yugoslav economic panacea - the so-called Workers' Councils and Communes - which are heralded as the true expression of industrial "democracy" in the spirit of pure Leninism. The subversive implications of the Workers' Councils were not lost on the Communist leaders at the time of the Hungarian revolt, and by the same token, their appeal in countries such as Italy was clearly seen as a potential deviation from Marxist orthodoxy. It was noteworthy that the Conference of Industrial Workers' Councils, held in Belgrade at the same time that the purge was taking place in Moscow, was given short and misleading coverage in the Soviet press. An important Soviet official attended the conference as an "observer", and a communique was issued stressing "international workers' solidarity" and similar general themes, but the significance of the Councils themselves was systematically ignored in the Moscow treatment.

81. It would appear, therefore, that Soviet policy toward Yugoslavia will not change sharply. The well-mannered Party courtship will probably continue, punctuated with highlights of reconciliation and estrangement. Since,

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however, Tito has shown that he can be wooed but not seduced, Khrushchev will probably not put too much sincerity or strenuousness into the pursuit. The tactic of the Kremlin will be to by-pass Yugoslavia wherever possible, taking such measures as are required to keep Tito from drifting too far toward the West, while relying on his basic faith in the world triumph of Communism to keep him ultimately in the "Socialist camp". Its hope must be that he will soon pass away, leaving no formidable successor, and in the meantime that he can be cut down to the stature of the "forgotten man" of Communism. This, if it could be achieved, would be a major victory for stabilization. But it will not be easy.

D. The Role of Communist China in the Stabilization Campaign.

82. Communist China, like the Soviet armed forces, is both object and subject of stabilization. The internal problems confronting the infant Communist giant concern Moscow as well as Peiping, and the disturbances which have rocked International Communism threaten both and demand joint pacification endeavors. The year 1955 witnessed in China an effort, without precedent even in the Soviet Union, to bring about a total collectivization of agriculture and nationalization of industry and trade. Inevitably such an upheaval would leave in its train a host of dislocations. The current "rectification" drive, in which Mao personally has asserted his leadership, must be viewed not only against this internal background, but against the crisis in the Soviet Union.

83. Peiping's reaction to the Twentieth Party Congress was initially cautious. A marked reticence was displayed toward de-Stalinization, which appeared to indicate that Mao was not pleased with the attack on the "cult of personality". The theme of "liberalization", however, which had been broached even before the Moscow Congress, was gradually developed in a Chinese version of the "road to

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Socialism", with a characteristic - and as it is now clear, a rather ironical - poetic touch in the "hundred flowers" formulation. The Hungarian revolution shook the Chinese from their relative aloofness, and brought them to the defense of the international solidarity of the Marxist-Leninist camp. In the 29 December 1956 statement "More on the Historical Experience of the International Proletariat", Peiping endorsed Soviet repression of the Hungarian uprising while condemning excesses of "great power chauvinism", chided Tito for his deviation, and acknowledged Soviet pre-eminence in World Communism. This was a welcome assist to the sorely troubled Kremlin leaders for which they were probably willing to pay handsomely in continued support of Communist China in the diplomatic, military and economic fields. The stabilizing effects of this pronouncement were reinforced by Chou En-lai's visit to Eastern Europe, where the efforts of Tito and the Poles to enlist his moral support for "National Communism" were tactfully rebuffed or turned aside.


84. And yet the role of Communist China remains ambiguous. The assurance of tone, bordering on condescension, in the 29 December Declaration and in Mao's speech of 27 February 1957, cannot have been entirely to the taste of the Kremlin leaders. An ideologist of stature unmatched in the Soviet Union, Mao stands as a voice of inspiration for Communist parties throughout the World and particularly in the underdeveloped countries of South Asia, Africa and in Latin America. Subtle but significant differences have been expressed on the theme of "contradictions", hardly contributing to the doctrinal harmony which stabilization presupposes. It would be dangerous to read into such hair-splitting the indications of a Moscow-Peiping rift. The Kremlin is much too heavily involved in practical worries to linger over theoretical shades of emphasis. Communist China, in the throes of "rectification", confronted with a bleak economic situation, cannot afford to indulge the luxury of pontificating

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beyond its means. The ultimate shape of relations between the two great powers is beyond our ken, but it surely contains the potential of diverging interests and perhaps mortal conflict. Neither Party, however, has any present interest in hastening the day of confrontation. China, like the Soviet Union, must help stabilize itself by strengthening its partner, and by seeking a common basis for co-hegemony within World Communism. It would be prudent for the West to assume that this phase will be of considerable duration.

E. The Stabilization of the International Position of the USSR.

85. Between the death of Stalin and the summer of 1956, substantial progress had been made by the Kremlin in stabilizing its international position. "Relaxation of tensions", "mutual confidence and trust among nations", and "peaceful co-existence" had roused hope, and even conviction, in many areas that the Cold War was over. A new style of diplomacy almost persuaded hardheaded Europeans that they "could do business" with the Russians. Even the ugly eruptions during the Khrushchev-Bulganin visits to India and the United Kingdom failed to disturb the increasingly tranquil surface of world politics. As noted earlier, the Twentieth Party Congress proclaimed that war was no longer "fatally inevitable", though it gave no assurance that subversive efforts of the Communist parties throughout the world would be suspended. The most effective weapon of the new diplomacy proved to be one which the United States had invented, economic aid. Unlike that of the US, the Kremlin alleged, Soviet aid was free of political strings and without exorbitant charges. The attractiveness of Soviet proffers disarmed the suspicion of the underdeveloped countries, confronting the US with a challenge against which initially it could do little more than increase its own commitments, protest against aid "blackmail" and utter warnings to use a "long spoon".



86. Hungary and Suez violently interrupted the orderly development of this Soviet campaign. Condemnation by the United Nations in November 1956, reinforced in June 1957, could not be averted. Nehru, whose partisanship in the Suez crisis was matched with some measure of detachment in the Hungarian issue, had ceased to be "neutral in favor of the USSR". The Middle East policy of Shepilov, initially successful in its aim of making trouble, ran into setbacks as the three Arab Kings turned away from Nasser and accepted the Eisenhower Doctrine or US aid. The move of the US Sixth Fleet to the East Mediterranean was a practical show of force which made the Soviet nuclear-weapon rattling of early November seem like an overblown bluff. In all quarters there were indications that Soviet diplomacy had lost its power both to persuade and to intimidate. Efforts to set back the course of European integration, to promote discord in NATO and resistance to the offer of US nuclear arms, to undercut the French pacification in Algeria, these and many others ran into stiffer opposition than had been met since the death of Stalin.

87. In the face of these mounting difficulties, the Kremlin must have realized that it must increase the strength of its diplomatic drive. The first step was to remove Shepilov, against whom more ominous charges than foreign policy failure were in the making; the influence of Molotov had been significantly curbed in the second half of 1956. The next step was to adopt a more flexible stance in disarmament negotiations, playing a game, known to both sides, of volunteering concessions matched with conditions which the other side would be sure to reject, while punctuating "peaceful" gestures with atom rattling. New approaches were made to staunch friends of the Western alliance, such as Pakistan, Turkey and even Greece. Economic and technological aid was again offered, not prodigally, for the Bloc economy could not afford it, but with an air of liberality. Only a

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careful scrutiny revealed that much sharp practice went into this apparently open-handed dealing, not necessarily by design, but as a result of the gaps arising between the phases of diplomatic negotiation and actual implementation. Some countries, notably Egypt and Syria, began to find themselves hopelessly enmeshed in the economic web which Moscow had woven; others, such as Afghanistan, Burma and India, had mixed experiences, but found it expedient to accept the bad with the good. Still others, Indonesia, Tunisia, Ethiopia and other African countries, found it increasingly difficult to withstand tempting offers of capital goods or military equipment. In this steadily broadening campaign, the Satellites have played almost as big a role as the Soviet Union.

88. In the United Nations, the Soviet position needs strengthening. Condemnation of the Hungarian repression will be hard to sidetrack but it will probably do little more than tarnish Soviet prestige, predominantly in Europe. Anticipating this, the USSR has already launched a counter-attack against Western "aggression" in the Middle East and it will almost certainly blame the West for failure to reach a disarmament agreement.

89. On balance, the outlook for stabilization of the international position of the Soviet Union and the Bloc is relatively favorable. A tide is running steadily toward legitimation of Communist China's position: acceptance into the United Nations and removal of trade restrictions. The Satellites are no less "sovereign" than they were before the crisis of 1956. Neutralism has found powerful new voices among the European Socialists. NATO strength and European integration are progressing unfavorably for the Kremlin, at the moment, but continue to display exploitable weaknesses. In the Middle East, Soviet penetration via Egypt, Syria, and Yemen is making noteworthy strides despite sharper Western and Arab reactions. In Southeast Asia,

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the Kremlin may contemplate with some satisfaction the signs of instability in Thailand, Laos and Cambodia and of incipient civil war or at best disintegration of federal ties in Indonesia, with reasonable prospects of a "legal" Communist assumption of power. The economic distress of India offers an interesting field for manipulation. Japan is poised in oscillation between the poles of US and Communist attraction, seeking to find its own exit from these conflicting pulls by projecting itself economically into the vast uncharged area of Southeast Asia.

90. There is no dearth of opportunity for the newly consolidated Kremlin to update the "Cold War". Khrushchev's dramatic essays in personal diplomacy, the New York Times and CBS interviews, the Prague and Berlin visits, show that he can play a versatile and beguiling double role as respectable statesman and guide of Communism's international relations. "Cultural exchange" provides an apt instrumentality for gestures of conciliation and persuasion contrasted with charges that the Iron Curtain is maintained only by the West. And, step by step with the advances of overt diplomacy, the vast apparatus of Communist clandestine subversion continues to extend its encroachments.

F. The Stabilization of Communist Parties and Front Organizations in the Free World.

91. The death of Stalin did not perceptibly affect the CPs in the West. Nor did the proceedings of the Twentieth Party Congress bring about immediate changes. Although Stalin was implicitly denigrated in the public speeches of the Soviet leaders, there was sufficient obfuscation of the issue to leave their intention temporarily in doubt. It was not until the contents of Khrushchev's secret speech began to leak, and the full text was published on 5 June 1956, that the latent crisis was revealed. The first reaction was one



of distress and indignation that the US Government had "scooped" the Kremlin; this was succeeded by doubt and confusion, especially threatening among the intellectuals and fellow-travelers. The question was posed with increasing insistence: what was the responsibility of the Soviet leaders in Stalin's crimes which they had revealed? Nevertheless, as A. Rossi said, there was "no collective revolt, no moral crisis within the Communist ranks as a whole. Public opinion was far more shaken by what had been learned than were the Communists; and it was public opinion rising to fever pitch, rather than the report itself, which jolted and disturbed the Communists".

92. The reaction of the individual parties in the West varied with the temper of their leaders and the degree of discipline of the rank and file. The French CP remained imperturbably Stalinist, paying only lip service to the theses of the Twentieth Congress. It avoided denunciation of Stalin, and indeed praised his achievements. There was some initial loss of members and sympathizers, intensified by the Hungarian Revolution and Thorez' slavish adoption of the Moscow line. As might have been expected in a country where the role of the intellectual is important in political life, there occurred a number of spectacular denunciations of the Party by leading leftist literary figures, notably Jean-Paul Sartre. An atmosphere of scandale, however, counteracted the profound moral indignation of public opinion, and many waverers slid safely back into the ranks. Almost immediately corrective mechanisms were put to work. The virtual unanimity which had been displayed at the rigged French Party Congress in July 1956 was exploited by the Party leaders to maintain discipline. The party membership, which had never been of truly mass proportions (of the order of 300, 000), suffered a decline of perhaps 10% without affecting the hard core of cadres and militants. Indeed, the evidence is rather that militancy, which had



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declined perceptibly in recent years under the erosion of prolonged political isolation, was considerably restored. A Party which had survived the Hitler-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939 with an attendant loss of 22 parliamentary deputies was not destined to be shattered even by Hungary; only one of the present 149 PCF deputies has defected. The ease, amounting almost to virtuosity, with which the PCF can reverse its position has again been demonstrated by its straightfaced acceptance of the purge of the Kremlin's "Stalinists".

93. In Italy, reactions to the denigration of Stalin were harder to contain. Even Togliatti, whether spontaneously or for tactical expedience, in an interview of 17 June 1956, permitted himself to cast doubts on the Soviet "system", not merely the aberrations of its leader. The 30 June Resolution set him right, and if there had been any wavering on his part up to that time, there has apparently been none since. During the summer and early fall of 1956, Togliatti followed the policy of allowing considerable discussion within the Party federations, thereby blowing off steam and quieting the rank and file. The Hungarian uprising provoked a new and more serious crisis which Togliatti skillfully moderated by diverting attention from Hungary to Egypt. By December he was able to face a badly divided Party in its Eighth National Congress, disperse the most serious opposition within the ranks, make gestures of greater "democracy" in the conduct of affairs and launch a campaign of intra-party stabilization. The course of this campaign during the first half of 1957 must command admiration for its resourcefulness. Skillfully exploiting differences between the two Socialist parties which had been edging toward merger in the last half of 1956, he was able to exacerbate a series of mounting strains and tensions within Italian politics, culminating in a prolonged governmental crisis in May and June. There is evidence that the PCI (the largest and only deep-rooted mass Party outside the Orbit - probably about 1,500,000 members) has suffered a considerable drop in numbers and a decline in quality of

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membership, but this has not been accompanied by loss of electoral support. Indeed, in Italy, as in France, the entire crisis has only served to demonstrate that those who vote Communist in protest against real or fancied social injustices at home will not be swayed by the spectacle of vastly greater injustice abroad.

94. Besides playing their appointed roles within their respective countries, the French and Italian parties have contributed actively to the stabilization campaign abroad. French party leaders have paid several visits to Moscow (January, February and August 1957) and have sent delegations to the parties in all the Satellites. The PCI has been equally active. Particularly interesting has been the give and take between the Polish Party and its French and Italian counterparts. The PCF sought to sway Gomulka somewhat away from "National Communist" inclinations. The PCI, influenced perhaps by Togliatti's earlier and somewhat equivocal "polycentric" concept of International Communism, appears to have avoided the exercise of any pressure on the Polish leader, struggling to maintain his shaky equilibrium.

95. The vicissitudes of the minor West European parties reveal a fairly consistent pattern. Nearly all have suffered serious losses of rank and file membership and numerous defections at higher levels. The Belgian and Dutch parties, subject to tutelage by the French party, have gradually drifted back to their status quo. Most of the other minor parties (and this applies to the CPs in the United States and the United Kingdom) still cannot be regarded as stabilized. They tend to persist in their own interpretations of the Twentieth Party Congress line, and have not fully accepted the Soviet explanation of the Hungarian Revolution. Since their importance to the Kremlin is minimal at this time, it is probable that no real effort has been made to bring them fully back in line. However, if stabilization

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should progress favorably throughout the international movement, it seems probable that even the least significant parties will eventually have to face the choice of separating themselves from the Soviet camp or again subordinating themselves to strict Kremlin rule. The reconstitution of an International Communist roof organization (see above para. 67) would probably be decisive in forcing the issue.

96. In other areas of the Free World, Communist parties have been less sharply affected. In Latin America, after some initial confusion and some dissenting notes in the press, most parties fell into step behind their leaders in support of the Soviet Line. The Brazilian Party, largest in the Western Hemisphere, suffered a major blow in the defection of its treasurer, who came out for "national" Communism and blasted the leadership of the party's faltering "Little Stalin", Luis Carlos Prestes. A new note has been struck in the increasing attention devoted to Communist China as a model of "socialist construction", perhaps better suited to the relatively underdeveloped status of the area than is the Soviet Union.

97. Throughout the Afro-Asian area, the Communist press and leadership reacted slowly and cautiously to the Twentieth CPSU Congress and the denigration of Stalin. Later in 1956, the Suez crisis pushed the Hungarian blood bath into the background. Soviet propaganda maintained an uproar over "imperialism" which obscured the basic issues, with the result that in the entire Afro-Asian area Soviet prestige suffered only a slight setback. Party leadership, for the most part, has remained intact, and Party membership, confused as it often is between nationalist and "socialist" motives, has not been seriously affected. Thus, while this area remains for the Kremlin a prime target of stabilization in the political and economic field, it probably does not require drastic measures in the Party field. The Sino-Soviet Bloc will continue

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to infiltrate countries in the "zone of peace", presenting itself as the champion of their national "independence". Whether it will make unusual efforts to strengthen a local Party, will depend upon the existence of special opportunities not otherwise exploitable. The examples of Egypt and Syria demonstrate that Soviet influence and penetration can be greatly advanced in countries where the local CPs are small, weak or repressed by the government. It is apparent, however, that the USSR must proceed with caution in areas of rampant nationalism, lest it destroy the image which it has created of itself.

98. As noted above (para. 26), the welfare of the International Communist front organizations is a subject of serious concern to the Soviet leadership. In the Free World these fronts are directed predominantly by trained and loyal followers of Moscow, but large sections of their following consist of fellow travelers rather than Party members. The latter are ideologically motivated, but lack the discipline which the Party imposes on its members. In times of Communist success, they are loyal, but in adversity they may weaken. At such times, the firmness of the leadership may be sufficient to hold the fronts together, but their vulnerability remains serious.

99. Although the principal fronts do not appear to have suffered greatly from the 1956 crisis, stabilization efforts appear to be in process, especially in the World Peace Council (WPC), the World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY) and the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU). The leadership of the WPC was split by the Hungarian crisis. At its meeting at Colombo in June 1957, an effort was made to repair the rift; dissenters were not invited to the conference, but the communique indicated that not all differences of opinion were resolved. In contrast to the previous meeting at Helsinki (18-19 November 1956) which had displayed marked caution in advancing the usual

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Soviet themes, sharp attacks were leveled against the 'war-mongering' United States. There is evidence that the organization is to be strengthened by decentralizing its activities. By reorganizing along such lines, the WPC may hope to overcome the serious difficulties that arose as a consequence of its ejection from Vienna (February 1957). It appears to be endeavoring to hide its Communist affiliations behind innocuous "peace" associations such as the "International Institute for Peace" which took over WPC's former Vienna offices. There are general indications that the WPC will play a more aggressive role as an instrument of Soviet-Communist propaganda. In its campaign against nuclear testing, the WPC has succeeded in enlisting a number of non-Communist Asiatic spokesmen, and has already created an impact which is not paralleled in Europe.

100. The WFTU apparently will also be subject to measures of stabilization. It is not easy to determine the effectiveness of its overall international organization in comparison with the National Centers and local affiliates controlled by the Communists. The latter, especially in Western Europe, have shown signs of slipping. In Italy, shop steward elections over the past two years have steadily reduced the strength of the Communist dominated CGIL. The free trade unions, (CISL, Christian Democratic, and UIL, Social Democratic) after an initial lack of success, have recently begun to pick up membership from the attrition of the CGIL. Nenni Socialist (PSI) leaders in the CGIL have defected to the free trade unions, in defiance of discipline by their own party. CGIL leader, Di Vittorio, has displayed marked unhappiness with the political role dictated to him by the PCI, and has sought to check dissidence in the ranks by appearing to avoid a slavish pursuit of Moscow interests. In France the Communist-dominated CGT was badly shaken by the wave of outraged public opinion following Hungary. Shying away from political agitation, it has for some time

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sought, not too successfully, to find labor issues on which it could take common action with the Free Trade unions. Communist trade union influence in countries where the Party is small has generally declined. It is still too early to determine whether this is an irreversible trend. The persistent strength of the Communist electoral vote in France and Italy suggests that labor, also, may again close ranks behind the Party which professes to be its untiring champion.

101. One of the most difficult problems for the WFTU was its expulsion from Vienna. It is not known, at this time, what kind of organization has been set up in Prague but it is believed that the WFTU lost considerable numbers of qualified personnel. In its IV. World Trade Union Congress (October 1957) it probably will announce and discuss a re-organization after which a much more energetic program may emerge.

102. In Asia, the influence of Communist or leftist-dominated unions appears to have been less severely strained by the crisis of 1956. SOHYO in Japan, though not directly Communist-controlled, is dominated by a strong leftist faction working along lines favorable to Communist interest. SOBSI in Indonesia, which is an affiliate of the WFTU and directly Communist-controlled, is a major factor in the startling recent political advances of the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI). Throughout this vast area, the WFTU is assiduously spreading its propaganda, exploiting, wherever possible, Bloc participation in the International Labor Organization (ILO) in Geneva and in other specialized agencies of the UN as evidence of its respectability. The subversive potential of these vast Asiatic unions, subtly stimulated by nationalist and anti-imperialist agitation, must be a prominent target of WFTU strategy.

103. International youth organizations remain a primary concern of Communist stabilization. The denigra-

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tion of Stalin and the troubles of Eastern Europe caused widespread disillusionment, and shook the fabric of the World Federation of Democratic Youth and the International Union of Students. These fronts, however, have displayed extraordinary resilience. The Moscow Youth Festival, which appeared to have been on the point of being cancelled shortly after Hungary, was pushed as the "greatest ever". It was probably, on the whole, a success in the eyes of the Kremlin. Whether it will have satisfied the expectations of its Soviet sponsors cannot yet be determined. In any case, youth is in ferment throughout the Orbit, and strenuous measures have been taken to restore its calm. It seems unlikely that the WFDY can restore its prestige and following outside the Orbit for some time to come, but a successful outcome of the Khrushchev policies, especially if they proceed in the direction of "liberalization", would go far to strengthen its position. With this, as with the other lesser professional and special interest fronts, time will obliterate bitter memories and relieve emotional traumas: success, if it is striking, will restore confidence and dedication.

104. In conclusion, we may cite the tasks which Moscow has outlined for the Free World parties and organizations (Pravda, 1 May 1957). They consist of: anti-militarist movements; actions in defense of economic demands and against exploitation and enslavement; advancement of national Freedom movements and prosecution of the anti-imperialist struggle of the proletariat and peoples in colonial and dependent countries; promoting the demand in social-democratic ranks for abolition of atomic weapons and for the unity of the working class; rallying CPs on the basis of Marxist-Leninist international proletarianism. The article admits that serious blows have been suffered by the Free World parties since the Twentieth Congress, but claims that the onslaught of reaction has been firmly repulsed. It extols creative search in the application of the general principles of Marxism-Leninism to different conditions in various

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countries, and again asserts that parliamentary institutions may be used to reach the goal of socialism.

V. CONCLUSIONS

105. This study has undertaken to show that the period since the death of Stalin may be viewed as a gigantic crisis of International Communism, and especially of the USSR, inextricably bound with efforts to achieve stabilization as a basis for advance toward the goal of world domination. The basic strategic objectives have remained unchanged: the destruction of NATO, SEATO and the Baghdad Pact and the extension of Communist influence, and where possible, control over the Afro-Asian areas, denying raw materials and markets to the West, leading to its eventual economic strangulation and political subversion. Such a strategy requires coordination and unity of purpose throughout the Sino-Soviet Bloc and the "zone of peace", and it cannot be achieved so long as "contradictions" exist among Communist countries.

106. Central to the success of the campaign is the maintenance of a powerful base of world Communist leadership, and there can be no doubt that, in the eyes of the Kremlin, this base is the USSR. Nevertheless, China in some measure now participates in the directing role exercised by the Soviet Union. The potential "contradictions", both within and between, these two forces, already display portents which can no longer be ignored, but the community of interest still predominates and makes the achievement of stability within World Communism a mutually sustaining endeavor.

107. The wider focus of stabilization, including the Satellites and the Communist parties outside the Bloc, centers in "proletarian internationalism". A new and subtle approach has been evolved; "national Communism" is con-

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demned, but "local variations" on the "road to socialism" are approved, always with firm insistence that the Soviet model remains unique and governing. Ideology has been restored to Leninist "purity", accompanied by a stern campaign against "revisionism". The organizational basis of Communist Party strength is everywhere in process of consolidation, and dramatic gestures are being made to reaffirm fraternal solidarity throughout International Communism. Within the Bloc, the coercive instrument of Communist rule, without being dismantled, has been somewhat held in check, and the benefits of "Socialist legality" are extended by measures sometimes real, sometimes spurious. Outside the Bloc, respectability is sought for Communist parties, diplomatic efforts are bent toward restoring the climate of "peaceful coexistence" and "relaxation of tensions", without neglecting the proven techniques of intermittent threats and atom-rattling.

108. The economic thrust of the USSR, consolidated, the Kremlin hopes, by benefits to be achieved from decentralization, has now become a firm implement of its drive to world domination. The campaign to outstrip the West in production, especially of key foods, is almost certainly conceived demagogically. But Khrushchev may believe that it can achieve sufficient success to maintain good morale in the USSR and to provide confirmation of the claim to underdeveloped countries that the economic model of Soviet Communism rather than that of capitalism is alone capable of fulfilling their aspirations.


109. Although this study does not attempt a basic projection of the stabilization campaign, it may appropriately conclude with a generalized consideration of certain hypotheses which should be examined if such a projection is to be made:

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a. The stabilization campaign may stagnate and ultimately fail. It is suggested that this will not come about as the result of any deliberate Kremlin relaxation. In our opinion Khrushchev, and what is left of the "collective leadership" associated with him, will not remit the essential drive of Communism, nor willingly allow erosion of their despotic rule to take place. If their efforts should bog down, it would be not from lack of will and determination, but from the inherent magnitude of the task, which may ultimately prove insuperable. We do not, however, believe that this is a likely outcome, though it must be included among those which are logically possible.

b. The campaign will achieve limited success, permitting International Communism to maintain approximately its present level. It is difficult to believe that Moscow and Peiping have set themselves as a goal the mere restoration of the status quo 1956, except as a temporary measure. It is possible that, anticipating increased Western resistance, they would eschew aggressive measures, involving risk of war, and content themselves with gradual political pacification and economic consolidation. But, even under such a contingency, they would be unlikely to sacrifice any basic Marxist-Leninist principle, and would continue to insist on the unity of "proletarian internationalism".

c. The campaign will be fully successful and lead to a major drive for world domination. It is by no means inconceivable that the current peace and disarmament propaganda, under the mantle of nuclear stalemate, would bring about the era of "peaceful coexistence and competition" which the Kremlin has proclaimed as its goal. The internal stabilization



measures of the Bloc might be fruitful, and the image of a prosperous and powerful "Socialist" congeries of states might prove highly attractive to important areas of the Free World. A new, flexible International Communist organization might succeed in propagating Moscow's influence by persuasion, leading to its ultimate assumption of far broader areas of control or at least subversion.

110. In evaluating the order of probability of these three generalized hypotheses, it would be well to suspend attitudes of even "cautious" optimism. Although the reverberations of 1956 have shaken Communism, and are still perceptible, they are likely to fade rather rapidly as the process of stabilization advances. At a minimum, International Communism seems likely to maintain its present level, and it may proceed to higher levels of power. The undiminished intensity of its drive and will is impressive, as is its resourcefulness in the adjustment of strategy and tactics to vicissitudes and setbacks. It is clear that this dynamic movement can only be contained by a determined, unremitting effort on the part of the Free World.

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