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This is a speculative study which has been discussed with US Government intelligence officers but has not been formally coordinated.

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
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Foreword

This paper was originally prepared as a contribution to a long-range planning study on measures to counter International Communism. Hence its organization as the discussion of a number of questions concerning the character and control of the movement in 1965. Because these questions deal with matters of general interest in the consideration of the future development of International Communism, the paper is being disseminated beyond the primary recipient.

It is recognized that many statements of the paper are debatable, both interpretations of evidence and predictions offered. Moreover, in a world of rapid change, speculation about a global movement as vigorously propagated and as strenuously opposed as International Communism runs the risk of being falsified by all sorts of fortuitous circumstances and by trends and changes of dynamics whose importance cannot currently be evaluated. In awareness of these limitations, this essay is offered as a best "guess" on the questions discussed.



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INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM IN 1965

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The condition of the International Communist Movement in 1965 will depend upon the progress which the Bloc countries have made in achieving their economic goals and in extending their political and cultural influence. If the world escapes a major war before that date, it is probable that the USSR, Communist China, and their satellites will have registered significant economic advances, both absolutely and relatively to the Free World. The increased strength of the Bloc will certainly enhance the importance of the two principal Communist states in world affairs; it will probably enlarge their influence in the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

2. International Communism will be a beneficiary of the growth of the Bloc in power and prestige. Many national parties in the Free World will be stronger in numbers and influence, becoming in some countries the principal opposition to the party or coalition in power. A number of outlawed Communist parties will probably have improved their subversive potential by taking advantage of the presence and aid of Bloc missions and the deterioration of effective repression. Trimmers, neutralists, and unwary nationalists will be trapped into a collaboration of benefit to the local Communist Party.

3. The Communist fronts will have their ups and downs during the period from 1959 to 1965, but in the latter year a good many can be expected to be in a flourishing condition. The advances of military technology, the probable lack

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of any important progress in arms limitation, and the expansion of the nuclear weapons "club" will give an urgency to peace movements that the Communist-directed societies will exploit to the full. Friendship committees will be active, aided by the growing power of the Bloc countries and their well-financed efforts at cultural penetration. The present array of organizations - global and regional - for doctors, lawyers, journalists, writers, scientists, and other professional categories will be espousing the Communist line in conferences and publications. Youth organizations will probably be generously supported with a view to capitalizing on the vision of a new society being constructed in the USSR, Communist China, and the other countries of the Bloc. The Afro-Asian committees and societies will either have been brought firmly under Communist control or have been split into warring organizations. In brief, it is believed that all the present tools and methods of International Communism, overt and clandestine, will be in active use in 1965 and that, in general, their potency and efficacy will have been increased by the material progress of the Bloc countries.

4. There is the possibility, of course, that between now and 1965 the movement will experience troubles which would seriously impair its expansionist capabilities. For example, it remains to be seen whether the Peking communists have exorcised from China the age-old scourge of flood and famine. Some calamitous occurrence in the Soviet Union or Eastern Europe might serve to dampen the Kremlin's militancy. Khrushchev's death, sudden or lingering, might cause a temporary wavering of power and direction in the headquarters of International Communism. Even success brings its problems. As the communist powers get involved more and more in the affairs of the underdeveloped countries they may find that issues become increasingly complicated and that the price of winning one client may be two enemies. Unpredictable developments such as these punctuate human history, and one or more conceivably could

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interrupt the course of communist expansion. They may give the non-communist world opportunities which are not evident in a speculation based on recent trends and the current situation.

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II. DISCUSSION

A. In what areas of the world is Communism likely to have achieved the greatest success?

5. While it is probable that by 1965 Communism will be a stronger force in almost all the underdeveloped areas of the world, three of them appear to be particularly vulnerable to serious inroads. These are South Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America.

6. The key to the South Asian situation is India. In 1965 the third five-year plan of industrialization and general development will be coming to a close, and by that time it should be apparent whether the state-directed but essentially mixed economy of India is still in the race with Communist China. Both countries are seeking to construct a heavy-industry base and to raise agricultural production in order to feed a rapidly expanding population. If Communist China has made what seems to many literate Indians to be significantly greater progress, the methods and practices of Communism will be highly attractive.¹ The Indians will not indulge in scientific comparisons and then come to rational decisions; they will be moved by some real facts and by many impressions, shaped in large part by ignorance and propaganda. In despair and desperation, the impoverished masses may be led to try Communism.²

¹ It is possible that the Indian and general Asian sense of outrage over Communist China's repression of the Tibetan revolt will have yielded to the passage of time, especially if the effort to eliminate "reactionary serfdom" and to bring Tibet into the 20th century has been successful.

² The magnitude of the problem is indicated by the conclusion of a recent Ford Foundation study that "India is heading for disaster unless she can increase her food output by 57 percent during the next seven years." It was the opinion of the study team of American agricultural specialists that: "If elementary

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7. The Indian political situation could also have an important influence upon the progress of Communism in that country. The current crisis in the state of Kerala may prove to be merely a passing event, or it may have decisive long-range consequences. There is a good chance that the Congress Party, at present exhibiting the weaknesses of its disparate character, will break up after Nehru passes from the scene. If the result should be two major parties around which other democratic movements and factions could coalesce, Indian politics might be revitalized. If, however, the Congress Party dissolved into a number of groups, it is not inconceivable that the Communist Party would emerge as the largest, best organized, and most purposeful force in India. Whether or not India has "gone" Communist by 1965, the CPI will very probably be a bigger and more influential party than it is today, controlling much of the organized labor movement, penetrating the military and civil services, and directing a chorus of fronts and supporting organizations.

8. The course of affairs in India will greatly affect Communist prospects in other parts of South Asia. An India still essentially democratic and making some progress in improving living standards would help to hold its neighbors within the ambit of the Free World. A Communist India would add such a weight to that being exerted now by China and the USSR that the whole area of South and Southeast Asia would almost certainly succumb to Communism.

9. Recent trends in the Middle East indicate that a basic contest is developing in the area between communism and Arab nationalism. Having joined hands to expel Western "imperialism," the protagonists of the two movements are squaring off to battle for dominance. The Communists have

wants such as food and clothing are not satisfied, other freedoms may be sacrificed for the promise of food enough." (New York Times, 21 April 1959).

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a number of advantages. They have a well-developed ideology to oppose to the vague principles of Arab nationalism. They have popular slogans to excite the poor and oppressed. They have organizational methods and trained cadres for use in countries where soundly constructed political parties have never existed. Finally, they have the backing of the Communist Bloc which can support the local parties in a number of effective ways.

10. The Arab nationalists have some assets on their side. They lead a movement with deep historical roots and wide appeal to all classes of people in the Arab countries. They have a genuine desire to be independent. They are skillful in the region's time-honored methods of conspiracy, bribery, and assassination. They can enlist the forces of Islam against a godless ideology.

11. It would be rash to predict how the struggle between Arab nationalism and communism will eventuate. The qualities of the two movements are just being put to the test. For example, the peasants and tribesmen of the Arab lands can undoubtedly be aroused to oppose communism as a threat to their Islamic religion, but it is questionable if the city-dwellers can be similarly stimulated by religious appeals. Many of the latter seem to view Mohammedanism as outmoded and irrelevant to the modernization of their countries, and even if they are attached to their faith, they are often prepared to accept Soviet and Chinese claims that Moslem minorities in the Bloc suffer no molestation on religious grounds. It appears unlikely, therefore, that Islam will prove to be an unbreakable barrier to the spread of communism in the Middle East. With contending forces of such great but uncertain potency, the contest between Arab nationalism and communism may well be undecided in 1965. The struggle will almost certainly have been characterized by revolts, coups d'état, the union and fracturing of countries, and other manifestations of violent change.

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There will be grave risk that one of these occurrences will bring the great powers into open conflict, a risk that will increase as more and more communist interests and prestige are committed in the area. Should such warfare develop, the struggle of Arab nationalism versus communism will be submerged in a much larger conflict.

12. The conditions which are likely to prevail in much of Latin America during the next few years offer good prospects for the growth of communism. Old social patterns are cracking under the impact of industrialization, rapid communications, and expanding populations. Urbanization is creating concentrated masses subject to more effective political organization and manipulation. The strains of economic development are opening opportunities for all sorts of radical appeals to people still largely illiterate. Strong nationalistic sentiments are easily turned into resentful attacks on American and European capitalism.

13. Communism has been growing in this soil, and it is likely to continue to do so. It has allied itself with nationalist causes and in some countries has won a measure of respectability. The disciplined strength of local parties tempts non-communist politicians to court them. In several countries even the outlawed parties are factors in the political equation. Although it is unlikely that any Latin American country will be taken over by communists by 1965 - or that the United States or the OAS would stand idly by under such circumstances - it is probable that the movement will be more of a threat than it is now. The communist cause will be aided by vigorous economic and cultural offensives on the part of the Bloc countries.

14. The African continent will certainly be a region of growing interest to the communist states. Unless by 1965 there has occurred a major shift in world power alignments

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or the Middle East has succumbed to communism, it is unlikely that the movement will have made serious gains in the North African region, except those of more extensive diplomatic representation and trade relations. South of the Sahara communist efforts at penetration will probably not be spectacularly successful. There will be several more independent states, internally weak, neutralist in attitude, and jealous of their independence. They will probably establish diplomatic relations with the Bloc countries and accept offers of economic assistance, and they will tolerate a good many activities by communist front organizations. Communism will be one of several competing forces in an area which probably will be characterized by highly disordered international relations. Again, unless there has occurred a major shift in the alignment of world power, communism is not likely to have gained permanent control over any significant area of Africa below the Sahara.

B. Will the control of International Communism still be centralized in the CPSU? If not, where will the control be?

15. It can be predicted with considerable confidence that the control of International Communism will still be centralized in the CPSU. The other possibilities with respect to the movement seem unlikely.

16. One would be the development of a sort of dual control by the CPSU and the Chinese Communist Party. There have been a good many indications that Peking is taking considerable interest in nurturing and advising foreign communist movements, not only those in Asia but also in Africa and Latin America. For instance, the connections between the CCP and the Communist Party of Australia have become markedly closer in the past few years. More than sixty Australian communists have received training for several months in China, and

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the doctrinal works of Mao and his associates are prescribed texts in study courses at home. Through front organizations and trade unions the CPA has promoted a number of visits to and from China by students, workers and "cultural" groups. As another example, leaders of the Latin American parties who visited Communist China after the XXI CPSU Congress received counsel from Mao Tse-tung on important matters and were instructed to report back to him. Whether relations like these have the Kremlin's unqualified approval cannot be determined at this time. It may be presumed that the CPSU, recognizing the interest attaching to Mao as a senior ideologue of the movement, does not object to Chinese initiatives that advance the cause but would frown on liaisons of which it was not fully informed. In the case of the Australian party, consistently an orthodox organization, Moscow is probably confident of its loyalty to "proletarian internationalism" as understood by the CPSU, and looks upon the relations with the CCP as not only suitable because of geographical proximity but also valuable for the reciprocal influence exerted in strengthening the movement. During the period under consideration, we do not believe that the Chinese Communists are likely to challenge the Kremlin's commanding position in the direction of International Communism. The solidity of the Bloc will still be highly important to them, and furthermore few communists in Free World countries would want to connive at relations behind Moscow's back. Should Communist China achieve a "leap forward" of really startling dimensions, the Chinese model might attain such prestige that Peking would receive a de facto recognition as the directing center of communism in the Far East. Even this sharing of directing power is unlikely, however, since by 1965 Communist China's development can scarcely outshine the progress, economic and military, being registered by the USSR.

17. Another possibility might be a kind of regional decentralization of the movement with the CPSU assuming

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control in, say, Eastern Europe and the Middle East and Africa; the CCP in the Far East and South Asia; the French or the Italian party in Western Europe, and the Argentine party in Latin America. This seems a highly improbable line of development. Except for the CCP, none of the other non-Soviet parties is likely to wield sufficient power or prestige to control the movement in a major geographical area. There will no doubt exist the kind of subordination of some parties that is believed to have been practiced from time to time, as for example, the supervision of some parties in the Arab world by the Communist party of Italy. However, any real or permanent decentralization on a regional basis is improbable.

18. A third possibility might be the establishment of a new international organization, a Comintern in whose management and direction the non-Soviet parties would have representation according to their strengths. In another study,¹ SRS has analyzed this possibility, and concluded that in the field of inter-party relations, the CPSU is likely to proceed cautiously in re-establishing any institution which bears the visible imprint of central control in the tradition of Stalin. Since the dissolution of the Cominform in 1956 there has been considerable speculation about the creation of a new Communist International. We may assume that the Soviet leaders, including Khrushchev, would favor some form of organization which would give unity and monolithic stability to the movement. But it has become apparent that a number of Communist parties - notably the Chinese, the Polish and some in the Free World - would be opposed to such an institution. As a result, the steps which have been taken by the Bloc leaders have been tentative and limited. The so-called

¹The "Socialist Commonwealth of Nations": Pattern for Communist World Organization, CIA/SRS-10 (18 June 1959).

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Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties, which convened in Moscow to celebrate the 40th Anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution (November 1957) has been described as the successor - through an unbroken lineage - of the Comintern.¹ A new theoretical Journal, Problems of Peace and Socialism, has been established to aid in the coordination of the communist line throughout the world.

19. Whether or not a new Comintern is organized, any diminution of the control of the CPSU over the international movement is not probable. The "leading role" of the Soviet party is so much a part of the character of International Communism that any "democratization" of the movement would be revolutionary. To raise the question would almost certainly bring down on a party or leader charges of revisionism, the gravest threat to the movement by communist admission. The CCP is the only party in a position to challenge a dominant Soviet voice in an international organization, and its attitude toward the "leading role" principle indicates that it would be unlikely to do so. The premium which Peking places on Bloc unity, its scorn of Tito's pretensions, and China's dependence on the USSR all point to CCP agreement to continued Kremlin dominance in the movement.²

¹ Cf. US Senate Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act: "The Revival of the Communist International and Its Significance for the United States" (May 1959), passim.

² In the field of government or state, as opposed to Communist Party organization, it is possible if not probable that a closer integration of the "world socialist system" in the form of a "commonwealth" or sodruzhestvo will emerge by 1965. This possibility is analyzed in SRS-10.

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C. What is likely to be the nature and the degree of control of International Communism over national or regional Communist parties?

20. The control of International Communism over national parties means fundamentally the control of the Kremlin. The rulers in Moscow may tolerate a measure of autonomy for tactical reasons, but they are not disposed to permit a serious challenge to their authority. The period from the XX CPSU Congress in February 1956 to the 40th Anniversary celebration in November 1957 is instructive on this point. The Congress, the Polish disorders, and the Hungarian revolution shook all the Communist parties; there were defections and calls by dissidents for "national roads to socialism." The Kremlin, with the willing aid of its loyal lieutenants in the national parties, embarked on a program of stabilization. By the end of 1957 this had been so successful that a Communist "summit" meeting could be held in Moscow to proclaim the unity and cohesion of the international movement.

21. As to the nature of the Kremlin's control, it will almost certainly be exercised by keeping the national communist parties in the hands of thoroughly loyal adherents of Moscow. Within the Bloc, this condition will be assured by utilizing all the powerful levers of both party and state power. A revisionist faction within a national communist party will be given no opportunity to develop an influential position; it will be isolated and rendered harmless by the tactics at which communists are adept. The fading influence of the "liberal" elements in the Polish party since the October days of 1956 shows that in a communist state the advocates of orthodoxy hold the winning cards. In the parties outside the Bloc it is only the leaders and factions enjoying Moscow's endorsement who have any survival prospects. After the exposure of Stalin's crimes and the suppression of the Hungarian rebellion, a number of these parties - for instance, in the

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United States, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and Denmark - were seriously riven by dissension and defection, but Moscow accepted losses in membership and in the parties' meager political standing in order to keep control in loyal hands.

22. The degree of control will be that amount adequate to guarantee subservience to the touchstone of International Communism, namely, recognition of the leading role of the CPSU in the movement and endorsement of the current line of the Kremlin on world issues. Beyond these the Kremlin will permit some tactical autonomy. In the case of the CCP, the latitude will be considerable, for the CPSU undoubtedly recognizes that the problems of "building socialism" in China are so vast and different from those in the USSR that what amounts to a "national road" is necessary. This inevitable latitude poses difficulties in the Sino-Soviet party relationship which will probably move through varying degrees of warmth and fraternal feeling. A reader of the CCP's major doctrinal pronouncement of 28 December 1956, "More on the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat," might detect a slightly patronizing tone in the advice being offered by the Chinese to their Soviet comrades, then troubled by conditions in the satellites and in the Western parties. The first ideological explanations accompanying the commune drive almost certainly annoyed the Kremlin. One would be safe in predicting that there will be periodic rifts and misunderstandings between the two Communist giants, probably more than foreign analysts detect from the scanty evidence of the party relations. Nevertheless, it is believed that through 1965 the means of Soviet power and the Chinese Communists' need for Bloc solidarity will be quite adequate to insure Peking's cooperation. This will be publicly registered from time to time by Chinese acknowledgment of the "leading role" of the CPSU and the primacy of Soviet experience in the building of socialism.

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D. In what areas will revisionism have made greatest progress?

23. Before the Russian revolution, a revisionist was a communist who opposed the revolutionary principles of Marxist doctrine and advocated evolutionary development. Since the establishment of the Soviet state, a revisionist has been in practice a professing communist who dissents from one or more tenets which the CPSU declares to be doctrinally orthodox. It happens that revisionists have historically been advocates of a more "liberal" course and non-Russians; champions of a harder line have had other epithets reserved for them, and Soviet oppositionists have been charged with anti-party activities, deviationism, intrigue, and even treason, but never revisionism. Some cases of revisionism arise out of true ideological divergences; others are so designated although a conflict of power interests is the basic matter at issue. Tito's quarrel with the Kremlin falls partly in the latter category. Although branded a fascist when he first rejected the position of satrap in Stalin's empire, the Yugoslav leader was later termed a revisionist, and his continued insistence on national independence and his refusal to recognize "the leading role of the CPSU" in the field of ideology have thwarted Khrushchev's attempts to patch up the quarrel. Some leaders of other parties have deviated on internal issues from Marxism-Leninism as interpreted by Moscow, but they have not challenged the authority of the CPSU to control the international movement or to determine the communist line on foreign affairs.

24. Revisionism, it is believed, will be a problem for the communist world in 1965 as it is today. It will probably be most serious in Eastern Europe, because the conflicts between Soviet and national interests constantly put a strain on the unity of the satellite parties. These parties must seek a measure of popular consent, yet to court this among people

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who are in large part anti-Russian admits the risk of straying from the current Moscow orthodoxy. Because of indoctrination and the realization that they have no future without Soviet support, the satellite leaders are willing servants of the Kremlin, but they have the task of governing people who would overthrow them if opportunity offered. This uneasy situation leads to policy differences within the parties and, among other results, to accusations of revisionism. Unless or until the populations of the satellite countries accept their place in the communist empire, revisionism will be endemic in the national parties. It is unlikely, however, to assume proportions serious enough to threaten Soviet control.

25. If in 1965 Yugoslavia is still an independent communist state, it will be regarded by Moscow as a center of revisionism and the Belgrade regime will continue to be the target of attack by all communist parties. One can only speculate about the situation which will arise with Tito's demise. His successors, not enjoying his personal prestige, might find the embrace of the Bloc more comfortable than the independent role he has essayed. If they made their peace with Moscow, this center of revisionism would be removed, and the Soviet leaders would probably be willing to tolerate a good deal of Yugoslav individuality in "building socialism" to achieve such a result. Gomulka's Poland is likely to stay within permissible boundaries of ideology and to escape charges of revisionism. Some of the practices of the Polish communists, in agriculture for example, probably bother the ideologues in the CPSU, but they can be tolerated for the time being because the Warsaw regime has been increasingly orthodox on the essential tenets.¹ Although tardily for a satellite leader, Gomulka finally echoed the approved interpretation of the Hungarian revolution, spoke less equivocally about the leading

¹ Gomulka has recently shown signs of moving back cautiously toward the goal of agricultural collectivization, sugaring the pill and delaying its administration.

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position of the Soviet party, and found fewer friendly words for the erring comrades in Yugoslavia.

26. In 1965 revisionism will almost certainly be a problem in a number of the communist parties in Free World countries. Some issue or personal rivalry will cause a leader or a faction to criticize Moscow's dominance and advocate a more nationalistic program for the local party. However, in the absence of a crisis comparable to the Hungarian revolution, such schismatic movements are not likely to accomplish much. The support of the international movement, and especially the endorsement of the CPSU, are so important that orthodoxy is almost certain to triumph over revisionism. Moreover, the way of the revisionist is usually hard. Unless he is a person of exceptional talents, he will fade into obscurity, rejected by former comrades and democratic socialists alike.

27. It is unlikely, therefore, that by 1965 revisionism will constitute a basic threat to Sino-Soviet Communism. Revisionist factions will be an occasional problem for satellite and Free World parties, but the cards are stacked against their ability to present a serious challenge to what the CPSU pronounces as the true doctrine.

E. What is likely to be the relative importance of Fronts, economic operations, political action, and insurrection in the promotion of International Communism? The estimates are in terms of areas with particular attention to the underdeveloped regions.

28. Judgments concerning the relative importance of the various means for advancing communism depend heavily upon estimates of the future situation in various countries and areas. The communists will be flexible in tactics, although their doctrinal rigidity in appraising situations will, on occasion, lead them to choose ineffective and even self-defeating means.

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29. Western Europe. Assuming that in 1965 conditions in this area are largely the same as at present, it is probable that front organizations will be the chief tool in the promotion of International Communism. Peace committees, friendship societies, and labor, professional, youth, and women's organizations will be promoted to advance the communist causes. Economic operations will probably be attempted against any soft spots that develop in particular national economies, and a major effort may be made to frustrate the development of the Common Market.¹ Political action, other than labor strikes of opportunity, and insurrection are not likely to be regarded by the Kremlin as profitable methods.

30. Latin America. Since this area will be characterized by the political and social strains associated with efforts at rapid economic development, there will be opportunities for Moscow to employ all the weapons of the communist armory. Fronts of all kinds will be important. They will endeavor to capitalize on the strong nationalistic trends present in many of the Latin American countries and on the frictions and dislocations attendant on rapid social change. Attempts at economic penetration through trade and aid proposals are certain to be made, and a number of deals will probably be consummated. Nevertheless, communist capabilities in this field are limited, and the Latin American governments are likely to realize that their aspirations will best be attained in cooperation with traditional trading partners. There will probably be more opportunities for political action and insurrection by 1965 than today. With increased

¹ A sign pointing in this direction is the Soviet proposal, submitted to the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, for the creation of an all-European trade organization to "counteract the trend toward the dividing of Europe into closed economic groups." (New York Times, 10 April 1959).

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political consciousness on the part of organized workers, peasants, and students, Latin American revolutions will have more elements of social upheaval and struggle than the traditional palace coups in which one ruling faction replaces a similar one. Penetration of labor unions, the armed forces, the police, political parties, and student organizations will enable the Communist parties to exploit revolutionary situations to their advantage. The communists' prominence in the Venezuelan and Cuban revolutions is probably an indication of their role in future troubles in the Latin American area. Their success in dominating revolutionary movements will be limited by the capabilities of the national parties, by the area's remoteness from the centers of communist power, and by counter-actions of the United States and the OAS.

31. The Middle East. In 1965 this area will probably still offer opportunities for the full range of communist operations. The contest between Arab nationalism and communism may result in the communists' front efforts being less productive than in some other areas; issues of control and direction are likely to split these organizations into groups allied with one movement or the other. With a good start on economic penetration, the Bloc will probably be utilizing this tool on an expanded scale. It will be difficult for the Middle Eastern countries which have developed extensive economic relations with the communist states to disentangle their affairs should they wish to do so. Having directed large parts of their trade toward the Bloc, become involved in long-range industrial and improvement projects, and replaced Western technicians with communist personnel, they have created a dependent relationship which cannot be easily broken. The communists are not likely to be forbearing in exploiting this relationship. Political action and armed insurrection must be considered probable communist tactics in the Middle East. The area, of course, is as accustomed today to the methods of conspiracy and violence as in the days of the original

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Assassins. To the traditional means of promoting or obstructing a cause, the communists have merely added refinements drawn from their long experience in clandestine operations. It is probable that by 1965 the recent history of the area will be a record of coups, insurrections, and civil wars between armed "resistance fighters." In these, communist parties and supporting organizations will be participants.

32. South Asia and the Far East. In the arc from West Pakistan to Japan the communists are likely to rely principally upon "peaceful" means for advancing the movement. Front organizations will endeavor to capitalize on widely-held sentiments - anti-colonialism, Western imperialism, fear of nuclear war, and peaceful coexistence. Given the neutralist feelings in the area, the fronts will probably be able to carry on some successful campaigns and enlist a good deal of support. Their activities will be complemented by vigorous cultural programs by the communist states - delegations, exhibitions, scholarships, publications, and so forth. The economic operations of the communist countries are likely to follow the pattern of the past few years. There will be offers of low-interest loans for major development projects, trade agreements, and the supply of Bloc personnel as advisers and technical experts. By 1965, the export by Communist China of cheap manufactures may be a serious problem in the area. If this export is carried out in ways to disrupt local economies and traditional trade relations, the benefits of low cost merchandise may be lost. In the communists' economic operations in the area the overseas Chinese will probably be utilized in many ways. Political action will be resorted to whenever conditions are favorable - and they frequently will be. The communist influence in labor unions, particularly in India, Singapore, and Indonesia, will certainly be employed to advance political causes. The communist parties in such parliamentary bodies as are functioning in 1965 will use their power to frustrate the will of the

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democratic majorities and generally to discredit constitutional processes. The penetration of all official strata, civil and military, will be pushed by the party commands. Although the communists are not likely to invite strong retaliatory measures, insurrection must be expected under favorable circumstances. For example, the communists in Singapore might resort to violence in an effort to seize power or to provoke the British to rescind the grant of self-government. In the main, however, the communists will probably rely upon the disillusion created by weak governments, faltering economic systems, and the passing of the bright promise of independence to bring closer their day of victory.

33. Africa. The speed with which African nationalism is sweeping away political colonialism has probably surprised the Kremlin as much as Western capitals, and undoubtedly the communists are busily engaged on schemes to exploit the new situation. By 1965 native regimes of authoritarian cast are likely to be in power in a good part of Africa south of the Sahara. Their leaders will probably be preoccupied in holding power, maintaining internal order, and maneuvering for influence in the confusing and conflicting patterns of the new African scene. The Kremlin will be engaged in trying to establish communist strength in countries where the movement has been virtually unknown. It will operate with certain advantages in this task. In the first place, the communist states are accepted by many in the African governing classes as disinterested friends, hostile to colonialism and free of racial prejudice. This receptive attitude will be reinforced by the Africans' desire to pursue neutralist foreign policies. Secondly, expanded trade relations and aid programs of various kinds will bring representatives of the Bloc countries into increasing contact with the peoples of Black Africa. The work of these representatives will be facilitated by the belief of many African leaders that collectivist economies are best suited to their conditions. A

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third advantage will derive from the techniques of organization, both overt and clandestine, which communist functionaries can introduce into societies evolving from the primitive to the outwardly civilized.

34. The communists will also face some obstacles. Africa is remote from the centers of communist power, and neither Soviet nor Chinese emissaries can exploit ethnic and cultural bonds as they do in Asia. The economic relations of Africa with the Western world will be less easy to sever than the political ties. New and more positive policies by the "colonial" powers to promote economic development and "commonwealth" ties may gradually disarm "anti-imperialist" hostility. Furthermore, the new African states will be jealous of their independence and wary of exchanging a new imperialism for an old.

35. In trying to expand in Africa from points of penetration, International Communism will use a full range of tactical weapons. Probably founding parties where they do not presently exist will be given a high priority. The Kremlin will want to take advantage of the favorable climate in several of the new African states to establish local CP's. A party may have to go underground as the native regime becomes more authoritarian or outlaws undemocratic organizations, but even so a useful foothold will have been secured. Front organizations will play a prominent part. The communists have already seen the benefits to be gained from drawing Africans into their student, labor, and cultural organizations, and they will expand these efforts. They will employ the flattery of office and of platform appearances with prominent communists and fellow-travellers, as well as travel expenses; to attract promising African figures to participate in the activities of national, regional, and worldwide front organizations. The economic operations of the Bloc countries are likely to be of the publicity-gaining type already

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practiced in Asia and the Middle East. Trade delegations with attractive wares will be busy on the African circuit, and the USSR will probably be making offers of loans and technical aid for major development projects. Opportunities for political action will be numerous by 1965. There is little evidence to date of communist influence in the native-European troubles of East and Central Africa, but Moscow is unlikely to ignore the openings which these offer. In these areas communist-trained organizers can be expected to try to give the social and political unrest a revolutionary direction. The penetration of labor unions will lead to strike action for communist political objectives and to a considerable sabotage capability. It is not likely that by 1965 the communists will be able independently to stage coups against established governments or to carry on insurrections but they probably will be participants in political action plotted and started by others. In such situations the question of trained leadership becomes important. The Kremlin may well be counting on supplying the organizing and directing skill for millions of Africans whose rapid propulsion into the modern world is almost bound to be tempestuous.

36. To draw a conclusion, there is a good prospect that in 1965 communism will be more of a factor in African affairs than it is today and that, in addition, it may be on the threshold of a period of rapid expansion. This latter condition could come about if the rather considerable numbers of Africans being trained in the Bloc gain influence and control in parties, unions, cooperatives, schools, and other organizations, for their communist indoctrination is apt to give them advantages in the rather disorderly development that will characterize Africa during the next few decades.

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- F. What changes are developments in mass communications and transportation likely to have made in the organization of International Communism and communist parties and in the degree and nature of their control over individuals and groups?

37. There are four developments in mass communications and transportation which bear upon the operations of International Communism. Each plays a part now in the tactics of world communism; by 1965 it will be more important in the Kremlin's operational manuals. The first is the availability of rapid air transportation. This contributes to the methods by which Moscow coordinates, supervises, and controls Bloc affairs and the world movement. Since the dissolution of the Comintern, the Kremlin has relied increasingly upon meetings of communist leaders to plan strategy and tactics. Some of these are large, multi-party affairs; others are bilateral. They total several score a year. This method, a kind of conference system, of directing the affairs of International Communism would scarcely be feasible without fast transportation. It enables the Kremlin leaders to get about their empire on frequent occasions. It also permits the assembly, on fairly short notice, of a general conclave of communist leaders, as was the case with the XXI CPSU Congress. Besides the substantive value of the business transacted at these meetings, the communists get a propaganda increment from their dramatic comings and goings.

38. The second development is the use of radio broadcasting to spread the communist message among the illiterate masses of Asia, Africa and Latin America. Here is a means of reaching primitive peoples who might otherwise never hear of communism and the countries which profess the Marxian creed. While propaganda broadcasting is no monopoly of the communists, it is a particularly useful tool to them. Because their objectives are usually destructive

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of the existing social order, they can play irresponsibly on all the fears, grievances, and aspirations of uneducated and illiterate peoples who have no points of reference for appraising the accuracy of what they hear. It is most probable that in 1965 the Bloc countries will be devoting increased resources to this form of propaganda.

39. Another development to be expected is the extensive use of motion pictures. The communists will employ this medium to reach large numbers in the underdeveloped countries. Its novelty for simple and illiterate people will insure receptive audiences. As in the case of radio broadcasts, these people will frequently have few standards by which to judge the accuracy of the material presented.

40. As a fourth development, it is likely that the major communist powers will be using their air transport capability to heighten the threat of intervention by "volunteers" in crisis situations. The USSR employed the threat effectively at the time of the Suez crisis in 1956 and will certainly try it again when conditions are inviting. By 1965 the Chinese Communists should have an air capability that would give verisimilitude to their threats of intervention. The tactic of threatening intervention by "volunteers" will help the position of communist parties in countries around the periphery of the Bloc. In situations where civil war has broken out or impends, they will be able to claim a supply of reinforcements sufficient to determine the outcome. Like the Kremlin's rattling of nuclear weapons, the vision of swiftly landed "volunteers" takes its place as a tactic to paralyze foes and to give local communists the argument that they represent an avenging power which wicked imperialists and war-mongers may provoke into action.

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III. CONCLUSIONS

41. The discussion of the questions posed for this paper does not pretend to offer a definitive or complete assessment of International Communism in 1965. Nevertheless, it does suggest some general conclusions about the future status and prospects of the movement. They are:

a. The dynamics of Communism will remain as strong as we assess them today. The non-Communist world will still be in competition through the whole spectrum of human activity with an aggressive, ruthless movement.

b. Moscow will continue to be the directing center of International Communism. Communist China will probably be a more assertive partner, but in the major issues dividing East and West the "leading role" of the CPSU will be acknowledged throughout the Bloc. The Communist parties in Free World countries will continue to be pliant tools of the Kremlin.

c. Communist parties will experience dissident movements which the orthodox factions will denounce and combat under the charge of revisionism. The East European satellite parties - particularly those of Poland, Hungary, and East Germany - will continue to be bothered by schismatic tendencies, since the problems of how best to rule largely hostile populations and reconcile national and Soviet interests regularly generate factional differences. In Communist party divisions, leaders and groups loyal to what the CPSU declares to be orthodox will almost always possess superior advantages. Hence, the prospect is not great that the International Communist Movement will be seriously retarded by revisionism or "national" Communism, Tito's continued intransigence notwithstanding.



d. In seeking to weaken opposition and gain objectives, Communism's methods will range, as in the past, from the violent to the bland. There will be the difference that the Soviet Union's growth in military and industrial power, supplemented by a Communist China rising to great power status, will provide a variety and potency of means considerably beyond those employed today.

e. Communist pressure will have mounted against the most vulnerable of the Free World's positions - the underdeveloped countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. By 1965, political and economic crisis plus Communist action will probably have brought several of these countries, especially in Asia and the Middle East, to the crucial decision whether to succumb to alignment with the Sino-Soviet Bloc or continue to seek the realization of their aspirations through means acceptable to Western sources of aid and cooperation. Many others, while still eschewing alliances or political commitments, will be accepting development assistance from both East and West. Even in the areas farthest from the centers of Communist power, the contest for influence will be more critical than it is today.

Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP80-01445R000100160001-0

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