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Senior Research Staff on International Communism

CHINESE COMMUNISM AND LATIN AMERICA

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Abstract

For several years the Chinese communists have been devoting much attention to Latin America. They regularly link the peoples of the area with those of Asia and Africa as similar victims of imperialist exploitation and oppression.

In their concern with Latin American affairs, the Chinese communists are chiefly motivated by a wish to frustrate the policies and weaken the position of the United States in an area of prime security importance. Lately Cuba and Panama have particularly aroused their solicitude. Another motive is a desire for diplomatic recognition in the one region of the world where no success has been registered. Communist zeal is also involved, since political and social conditions in a number of Latin American countries appear favorable to advancing the movement. Hope of increasing the small volume of trade with the area is probably a minor motive.

The Chinese communists are showing their interest in Latin America by a variety of means. They beam 21 hours of Spanish-language broadcasts to the area weekly. The flow of propaganda publications has risen rapidly. Latin American visitors to mainland China numbered more than 350 in 1959, with 135 of them attending the 10th Anniversary celebrations in Peking as expense-free guests of the Chinese Peoples Republic. A considerable proportion of the invited travelers have been non-communists prominent in politics and the professions. Return visitors have been fewer; a touring acrobatic troupe, a journalistic group, and a labor delegation have accounted for most of them. The Communist parties of Latin America are receiving doctrinal instruction and tactical advice in meetings with Chinese leaders, through the supply of the written works of Mao Tse-tung and his lieutenants, and by the training of cadres.

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The Chinese communists are probably well-satisfied with the Latin American response to their approaches. The leaders of the Latin American Communist parties have found their Chinese comrades to be sympathetic counselors and the CCP's advice relevant to their "semi-colonial" conditions. From non-communists have come compliments on the "progress" of the CPR and support for diplomatic recognition and increased trade and cultural relations.

Chinese communist interest in Latin America is being exhibited along with rising Soviet attention to the area. There is no evidence of rivalry in party relations or governmental policy on the part of the two communist powers; rather they have a common interest in weakening United States influence in Latin America. Although a rupture of the Sino-Soviet alliance would trouble the Latin American Communist parties, they would almost certainly remain loyal to their long-established ties with the Kremlin.

The likelihood is strong that Communist China, both as a state and as a source of influence in the international movement, will be increasingly a more prominent factor in Latin American affairs. The CPR will not impede the rising Soviet influence in the area but will supplement the communist threat to the security of the Latin American republics.

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CHINESE COMMUNISM AND LATIN AMERICA

INTRODUCTION

1. Seeking to project their influence to all quarters of the globe, the Chinese communists have devoted a great deal of attention during the past several years to Latin America, a region with which China has had few historic connections, cultural affinities, or trade relations. They regularly link Latin America with Asia and Africa in expressions of solicitude for peoples suffering from imperialist oppression. Thus, Liu Shao-chi declared in the political report to the VIII Party Congress in September 1956 that Peking's foreign policy was "to oppose colonialism and help all struggle against colonialism and in defense of national sovereignty in Asia, Africa, and Latin America." This objective has been repeated daily in the propaganda emissions from Communist China. Kuo-Mo-jo, chairman of the China Peace Committee, during his speech at a mass rally held in Peking on 25 November 1959 "to support the Congo people and all the African people in their struggle for national independence, and in opposition to imperialism and colonialism," digressed from his main topic to include a few standard paragraphs about Latin America. "Let us, at this mass rally," he exhorted, "pay our sincere respects to the Latin American people who are fighting courageously in defense of their national independence, for democracy and freedom, and against the American aggression and plunder."¹

2. Peking's interest in Latin America is reflected in the space given to the region in the domestic Chinese press. Latin American affairs are regularly discussed on the "foreign

¹ FBIS Far Eastern Daily Report, 27 November 1959, p. AAA5 (OUO).

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page" of the People's Daily, with the Cuban situation being a particularly popular topic. The Santiago conference of foreign ministers in August 1959 was considered worth about a third of all space devoted to non-Bloc events by the People's Daily, and for several issues the theme of Latin American indignation over the "trap" being laid by Secretary Herter was prominently played.

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CHINESE COMMUNIST MOTIVES

3. Undoubtedly the chief motive behind the attention bestowed on Latin America is Peking's desire to frustrate the policies and weaken the position of the United States. The Chinese communists have seen in Latin America opportunities to carry the propaganda and subversive offensive into the backyard of their principal enemy. Here is a region of vital security importance to the United States, of heavy economic investment and extensive trade relations, and of traditionally close political alignment. It is also a region affected by the strong nationalistic currents in the world, beset by many social and economic problems, and containing influential groups who are jealous and resentful of United States power and influence. Aware of these factors, the Chinese communists have logically pointed a good share of their campaign of hostility to the United States in the direction of Latin America.

4. A second motive is to win international recognition. The Western Hemisphere is the only major region in which the Peking regime has failed to gain acceptance by some

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countries as the de jure government of China. Its prestige suffers to that extent, while the claim of the Republic of China on Taiwan to be the legitimate repository of Chinese sovereignty is strengthened. Removal of the present outcast status in the Western Hemisphere by obtaining diplomatic recognition from a number of Latin American states would represent a major victory for the Chinese Peoples Republic. It would almost certainly lead to admission to the United Nations and the prospect of the transfer of the Security Council seat from the Taiwan to the Peking regime. The Chinese communists believe that by cultivating influential groups they can encourage the strong neutralist sentiments in several Latin American countries and reduce the bloc of adverse votes in the UN Assembly. Cuba's abstention on the 1959 vote and the restiveness displayed by other governments on the admission issue indicate that this belief is well founded.

5. An additional motive for attention to Latin America is the desire to hasten the spread of Communism. Mao Tse-tung and his followers have the missionary zeal of communists in a virulent form. As they see the situation, there are Communist parties in nearly all the Latin American countries that deserve to be helped. The times are propitious for such aid. Latin American revolutions, traditionally the deposing of one oligarchic clique by another, are more frequently taking on the character of deep social convulsions. The prospects for communist advances are thus improved, and to this favorable situation the centers of the movement cannot be indifferent.

6. Postulating the establishment of communist regimes in Latin America, some long-range planners in Peking may envisage a Chinese orbit spanning the Pacific. Should migration become one necessary solution to China's population problem, the comparatively open spaces of South America offer possibilities more favorable than either the densely populated

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or the arid regions of Asia. Such geopolitical ideas, if entertained in Peking, would provide a subsidiary motive for the support of Latin American communism.

7. Finally, as a minor motivating force, there is Peking's interest in increasing its foreign trade. The prospects in this regard are not great. As two generally underdeveloped areas and exporters of raw materials for the most part, Communist China and Latin America do not have much to exchange. An average annual trade of about \$7 million can probably be increased by Chinese purchases of sugar, copper, wool, and certain other products, but the vistas held out by communist propaganda are certainly illusory. To the Latin Americans' misfortune, coffee-drinking is not as yet a popular habit in the Far East.

THE MEANS OF CHINESE INFLUENCE

8. The Chinese Communists direct twenty-one hours of Spanish language broadcasts to Latin America each week. Besides extolling the achievements of the CPR, the burden of these broadcasts is the iniquitous behavior of United States "imperialism" and its "exploitation" of Latin America. A common feature of the programs is a recorded interview with a Latin American visitor. These follow a pattern: enthusiastic reports of visits to factories, schools, and communes; praise for the happy, friendly Chinese people; denunciations of Yankee imperialism; calls for diplomatic recognition and UN membership; predictions of the benefits to be reaped by increased trade and cultural relations. Almost standard is a comment about the transformation of the "Shanghai of bandits and prostitutes, which the imperialists had attempted to represent as a symbol of a depraved and humiliated China . . ." ¹ A good deal of Latin

¹ Recorded address of Luiz Carlos Prestes, secretary-general of the Brazilian Communist Party, 1 December 1959. FBIS Far Eastern Daily Report, 1 December 1959, p. AAA 22 (OUO).

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American "news" with a strong anti-United States flavor broadcast by Peking apparently derives from a working arrangement between the New China News Agency (NCNA) and the recently organized and Cuban sponsored press service, Prensa Latina.

9. Considerable quantities of printed material are sent to Latin American countries. Some items are Spanish translations of the works of leading Chinese Communists, such as Como Ser un Buen Comunista (How to be a Good Communist) by Liu Shao-chi. Others are books and pamphlets designed to impress non-communists as well as party members. On 1 January 1960 the Chinese Communists began publishing a Spanish-language edition of their propaganda magazine, China Reconstructs. Subscriptions will be accepted, according to the Peking radio, by distributors in Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Advertisements calling attention to the availability of Chinese communist publications are appearing in newspapers throughout the region.

10. Besides the broadcast and printed word the Chinese Communists have sought influence through exchanging visits. From January to November, 1959, 355 Latin Americans had traveled to the Chinese Peoples Republic, a considerable increase over the 115 in each of the two previous years. Approximately 135 of the 1959 visitors attended the 10th Anniversary celebrations in Peking.¹

11. The Latin American visitors to Communist China fall into three general categories. First, there are the active members of Communist parties. They are invited to be present at congresses of the CCP or to visit China after attending meet-

¹ Department of State Intelligence Information Brief No. 226, 25 November 1959.

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ings in other Bloc countries. Some spend several months attending Chinese Communist Party schools. The second category consists of fellow-travelers - politicians, journalists, lawyers, union leaders, and authors. A good proportion of these visitors are active in communist front organizations, such as the World Peace Council and the International Union of Students. The third group is composed of non-Communists, including politicians, businessmen, and journalists.

12. The Chinese communists have been generous in paying the expenses of their Latin American visitors. The transportation of most, if not all, of the delegates invited to the 10th Anniversary celebrations in Peking was paid by the CPR, and they were guests of the government during their stay in China. The money to pay the fares of the Chilean delegation was reportedly transmitted to the Communist Party of Chile, which made the selection of persons invited. The Chinese declined to provide tickets for the wives of male delegates but offered them expense-free visits after arrival if they paid their own way. A group of members of the Colombian Congress who traveled in the Bloc last summer journeyed on to Peking where they had an interview with Mao Tse-tung; their expenses were reportedly paid from Paris and return by the countries they visited.

13. So far the exchange of visitors has been heavily in one direction. Late in 1958 and early in 1959 a Chinese acrobatic troupe toured South America, performing in all countries willing to grant visas. Several were not. The director of the touring party, Chou Erh-fu, utilized his presence in Latin America to establish contacts with local communist leaders. Six non-performers reportedly visited La Paz, Bolivia, after the troupe was refused visas. A group of four Chinese newsmen opened an office of the New China News Agency (NCNA) in Havana in June and visited other Latin American capitals seeking to employ correspondents for their

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service. They succeeded in hiring several, according to reliable reports. In late November 1959, three fraternal delegates and an interpreter arrived in Santiago, Chile, to attend the Second National Congress of the Chilean trade unions, the Central Unica de Trabajadores de Chile (CUTCh), meeting from 5 to 8 December. This Chinese group appeared in Caracas on 23 December as guests of the Venezuelan Labor Confederation (CTV). The delegation said the purpose of the visit was to get "to know Venezuela and to establish closer relations with the Venezuelan labor movement" as a means of "contributing to world peace." The Chinese were received by leading labor leaders at the Confederation headquarters and entertained by the organizing committee of the Association of the Friends of China. The United States Embassy commented: "In the absence of countervailing evidence, CTV invitation and sponsorship of the Chinese Communist delegation must be adjudged as a significant achievement of Venezuelan Communists in the labor movement."¹

14. Communist Chinese cultural associations have been established during 1959 in Bogota, La Paz, Caracas, and Montevideo, adding to those already existing in cities of Chile, Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico. The one in Bogota was utilized to extend invitations to three prominent non-communist Colombians to attend the 10th Anniversary celebrations.

15. The Peking regime has additionally shown its interest in Latin America by undertaking to advise visiting communists and train party members. From the time the Chinese Communists consolidated their political power in 1949 there has been a growing amount of ideological and tactical instruction communicated by the CCP. In general, the CCP has

¹ American Embassy Caracas, Joint Weeka No. 51, 31 December 1959 (CONFIDENTIAL).

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emphasized to the Latin American communists the alleged similarity between many conditions in their "semi-colonial" and "semi-feudal" countries and those in pre-1949 China, the relevance of Chinese methods in developing "socialism," and the importance of the "national independence movement" in liberating states from imperialist oppression.

16. Since late 1957 three major events in the Communist Bloc have provided occasions for the assembling of party leaders from all over the world, and Latin America has been well represented at each. After the first, the 40th Anniversary celebration in Moscow and the concurrent meeting of the Communist and Workers Parties, a number of Latin American leaders traveled to Peking where they sought the counsel of Mao Tse-tung and his colleagues. The XXI Congress of the CPSU was another occasion for a gathering of the communist elite, and again some Latin Americans visited Peking on their homeward journey. The third occasion, the 10th Anniversary celebrations of the Chinese Peoples Republic, provided an opportunity for numerous intimate contacts between leading Latin American communists and their CCP comrades.¹ On 5 October 1959, the Latin American group met with Mao Tse-tung, Liu Shao-chi, and Chou En-lai. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Mao "emphasized the importance of Latin America, and especially the Cuban revolution."² On 25 October the Brazilian Communist Party delegation, led by its secretary-general, Luiz Carlos Prestes, had a private session with Mao and other CCP officials.

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The attendance of delegates from Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela was announced by Radio Peking. Representatives from El Salvador, Honduras, and Panama reportedly were present also. [REDACTED]

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17. Small numbers of Latin American communists have been traveling to China for training since at least 1952. Rafael Echeverria Flores, a leading theoretician and officer of the Ecuadoran party, received training in both the Soviet Union and Communist China in 1958 and was recently reported to be directing a "special political-military orientation course to be given to twenty select Party leaders, as a first step toward the formation of Communist revolutionary cadres in Ecuador."¹ Blas Roca, Cuban communist leader, was said to have been a "classmate" of Echeverria during instruction given by P'eng Teh-huai, Chinese commander during the Korean War. Several members of the Costa Rican Partido Vanguardia Popular (PVP) attended a CCP school in 1958, and the party was offered six places for a course to begin in April 1960. The Panamanian party was offered two places in this course and reportedly given \$1,400 by the CPR Ministry of Foreign Relations (sic) to cover travel expenses. The Latin American training candidates were advised to allow two months for the course, one month for more specialized instruction, and two months for travel, presumably in Communist China.

THE LATIN AMERICAN RESPONSE TO COMMUNIST
CHINESE INTEREST

18. The Latin American communists have apparently responded eagerly to the overtures of their Chinese comrades. Every party seems to have sent delegates to the 10th Anniversary celebrations and, in the case of the larger countries, to have cooperated in insuring the attendance of non-communists. Many Latin American communists have accepted invitations to visit China following attendance at congresses or training schools in the USSR and the East European satellites. Opportunities extended by the CCP for party schooling have been gratefully accepted. The Communist press in Latin America

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devotes considerable space to Chinese affairs and the pronouncements of the Peking regime; much of this material is popular because of its strong anti-American tone, but it also caters to a lively interest in developments in the CPR.

19. There is evidence that a good many Latin American communists have subscribed to the view that Chinese experience is highly relevant to their problems. Chinese programs with respect to land reform, the expropriation and expulsion of foreign business interests, and mass education are accepted as apposite to the Latin American situation. The tactic of a "democratic front" in which peasants, the small bourgeoisie, and the nationalist intelligentsia are organized by the communists seems a practical method for the Latin American parties. A consideration in the receptivity of the Latin American communists to Chinese models and instructions is almost certainly the prestige of the Peking leaders as genuine revolutionists, men who only a few years ago were bearing the red flag in battle.

20. Interest among Latin American communists in the Chinese example was considerably increased by the line of the XX CPSU Congress (1956) on different roads to socialism. Dutifully loyal to the Kremlin, Latin American communists saw in this doctrinal statement an approval to study and apply Chinese experience to their "distinctive" local conditions.

21. The Latin American communists who have been in contact with their Chinese comrades seem to find them agreeable in both personal and party relations. Some of the Latin Americans contrast the gracious manners of the Chinese with a hard and arrogant approach of Soviet communists. The Latin temperament appears to find the Peking official atmosphere more congenial than the Moscow, and the ready access to top leaders pleases the visitors. The Brazilian party delegation to the 10th Anniversary celebrations was obviously flattered

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by its reception, being treated, according to the account of Prestes to some Central Committee members, as representatives of one of the most important Communist parties outside the Bloc.

22. The Chinese propagandists probably are well satisfied with the response to their blandishments in non-communist circles of Latin America. They have elicited a considerable volume of favorable comment about their regime and its policies from the fellow-traveling and radical intelligentsia, and they have obtained the endorsement of several well-known political figures. For example, former President Lazaro Cardenas of Mexico lauded the Peking government in a 10th Anniversary celebration arranged by various communist and leftist organizations in the Mexican capital. Invitations to visit China have been accepted by persons influential in forming public opinion. The Colombian delegation to the Peking celebration consisted not only of several communists and sympathizers but also of the sons of two former presidents of the republic, both directors of newspapers. Another Colombian delegate was a prominent businessman and rancher who writes extensively on agricultural economics. The Argentine delegation included four legislators, three national and one provincial. Among the Chilean delegates was the president of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Chamber of Deputies. A Bolivian visitor was the former president of the Chamber of Deputies, Dr. German Quiroga-Galdo. A number of the 10th Anniversary delegations included one or more journalists.

23. There seem to be several explanations for the response which the Chinese have achieved among non-communists. One is certainly the existence of great curiosity about what is happening in the Far East, a Latin American echo of 18th century Europe's vogue of chinoiserie. Expense-free tours do nothing to diminish this curiosity. Journalistic enterprise accounts for the interest of a good many publishers,

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editors, and reporters who have traveled to Communist China and have publicized its developments. The leftist inclinations which are strong among journalists in some Latin American countries sharpen their professional interest in things Chinese. A wish to demonstrate their independence of Washington's attitudes is also involved in the response of non-communist Latin Americans. There is at least a slight element of bravado in having associations frowned on by the United States.

THE QUESTION OF SINO-SOVIET RIVALRY

24. Peking's interest in Latin America has been displayed during a period of rising Soviet attention to the area. Overt manifestations of this attention have been proposals and negotiations with several Latin American states for trade, loans, and technical assistance; the establishment in Moscow on 22 January 1959 of the USSR Association for Friendship and Cultural Cooperation with the Countries of Latin America; numerous invitations to visit the Soviet Union; offers of university scholarships; tours by Russian athletic and musical groups, and increases in radio broadcasting beamed to Latin America.¹ The Soviet exhibition presented in New York in the spring of 1959 was transferred to Mexico City and opened there in November by Deputy Premier Anastas I. Mikoyan. In February 1960 it was presented in Havana along with a festival of Soviet films and musical artists, and Mikoyan made another well publicized trip to inaugurate the exhibition. In many of their contacts Soviet officials suggest to Latin Americans that more fruitful relations could be expected if diplomatic recognition were expanded beyond the three missions presently established -

¹ In October 1959 Radio Moscow doubled its Spanish-language broadcasts to Mexico and Central America from 7 to 14 hours weekly, and raised its Portuguese-language service to 14 hours weekly. Its Spanish-language broadcasts to South America remained unchanged at 21 hours weekly. The satellite radios support the Soviet output by sending 43 hours to Latin America.

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Argentina, Uruguay, and Mexico.

25. There is no reason to believe that Soviet attention to Latin America has been increased in a competition for influence and popularity with the Chinese communists. On the contrary, the two communist powers appear to be conducting a cooperative campaign, with the East European Satellites adding their bit.¹ Such evidence as exists suggests that both in communist party affairs and in governmental policies the Peking and Moscow regimes are rendering each other support rather than promoting rivalry.

26. The long-established Latin American parties have always been faithful servants of the Kremlin. In spite of occasional troubles with revisionists, deviationists, and Trotskyists, orthodoxy has held the field. There were repercussions in Latin America of the 1956 events that shook European communism - Khrushchev's "secret" speech and the crises in Poland and Hungary - but the parties regained their equilibrium and suffered few defections. The Latin American parties receive regular guidance from Moscow which interprets the international situation, indicates propaganda lines, and prescribes tactics in local situations. Major gatherings in the Soviet capital, such as CPSU congresses, are the occasion for extensive discussion between Kremlin officials and Latin American delegates. This kind of instruction is supplemented by the frequent visits of Latin American party leaders and officers of Communist front organizations to Moscow and the Satellite capitals.

¹ The Satellites maintain diplomatic relations with the following Latin American countries: Czechoslovakia - Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Mexico, and Uruguay; Hungary - Argentina; Bulgaria - Argentina and Uruguay; Rumania - Argentina and Uruguay. A Czechoslovak consul-general is located in Bogota, Colombia.

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Advice and directions are also conveyed by and through the diplomatic missions of the Bloc countries.

27. Although over the past several years there is discernible a moderately strong Chinese influence in the programs and tactics of the Latin American Communist parties, this appears to be complementary to the Kremlin direction and not contrary to it. It is believed, for example, that Mao and his colleagues advised several Latin American communist leaders, who visited Peking after the XXI Congress, that their parties should establish illegal apparatus, a recommendation previously made to them in Moscow. At the time of the 10th Anniversary celebrations Mao is reliably reported to have warned the Brazilian party delegation against rightist as well as leftist deviation, a caution repeated to the group when consulting later with CPSU officials. Probably all such advice, as well as briefings on international developments, is delivered with a special Chinese flavor, but it generally conforms to the line issuing from Moscow.

28. A good reason for Sino-Soviet collaboration in directing and supporting the Communist parties of Latin America lies in the common interests of Peking and Moscow in the area. Both Communist China and the USSR regard the United States as the major enemy. Latin American communism is a useful instrument in weakening the position of the United States in a region of primary strategic importance to Washington. The two communist powers can join wholeheartedly in measures to combat "Yankee imperialism." Their present satisfaction in the trend of the Cuban revolution indicates that this is a development which they hope to see repeated in other Latin American countries.

29. While the interests of Peking and Moscow with respect to the Western Hemisphere are currently parallel, it is possible that some divergence might arise. Should the Soviet leaders consider it expedient to campaign for a further

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moderation in the international climate, the cold blasts of the Latin American parties might require some tempering. There is some evidence that this is occurring. A few weeks before President Eisenhower's scheduled visit to South America, the secretary-general of the Communist Party of Brazil was reliably reported to have instructed its members that, "given the international situation as it exists today," they should greet the President with friendly demonstrations and seize the occasion "to organize a gigantic campaign for peace."¹ The Chilean party was said to be preparing banners welcoming the President and advocating the prohibition of nuclear arms and testing. The Chinese, while understanding the need and purpose of tactical flexibility in advancing the communist cause, may regard the Kremlin's "peace" line as likely to blur the image of a rapacious, domineering United States which they have been drawing. That this may be Peking's opinion is lent credence by the continued virulent tone of Communist Chinese comment on Latin American events. For example, an NCNA report of the demonstrations in Panama on 3 and 4 November 1959 spoke of "bloody suppression" by "US occupation forces." It was broadcast twenty-eight times by Radio Peking to foreign audiences and was followed on 11 November by a summary of a People's Daily article discussing in scornful language the "unequal" and "forcibly imposed" US-Panama treaty of 1903. Soviet comment, in contrast, was relatively restrained. Both Moscow and Peking have broadcast many charges of external plots and counter-revolutionary activities directed against the Castro regime in Cuba, but the Chinese have been much more explicit in blaming the US Government. So far in the Communist Chinese interpretation of Latin American affairs and Washington's relations with its hemispheric neighbors there has been no moderation in the attacks on the United States.

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30. Although the contrast in the overt treatment of Western Hemisphere developments in Chinese communist and Soviet propaganda appears to be a genuine difference over proper tactics, it may represent the mutual recognition of the advantages of separate themes, with Peking playing the harsh and Moscow the soft notes. This kind of duet is not unusual in communist practice. A risk of confusing some party members is involved, but the well-briefed communist leaders in Latin America will almost certainly understand the tactic and utilize it to exploit antipathy toward the United States while advocating Soviet-style peaceful coexistence.

31. Real Sino-Soviet competition for direction of Latin American communism will arise when and if the two powers divide over more profound issues. One can only speculate about how the Latin American parties would react to a genuine schism between Peking and Moscow. Certainly it would provoke a grave crisis. Many Latin American communists would be strongly attracted to the Chinese pole, particularly if involved in the split was a difference over a détente with the United States. To sacrifice the militant line of the Chinese communists would be a hard choice. Moreover, to cut themselves off from Chinese "experience" would seem to many Latin American communists to be depriving their parties of the most recent and relevant guidance on revolutionary tactics in a semi-colonial area.

32. Nevertheless, despite their unhappiness over being forced to choose, the great majority of Latin American communists would, it is believed, remain loyal to the Kremlin. Moscow's lines to the Latin American parties are long established, and their strength is increased by the growth of Soviet power, a reality as opposed to the Chinese promise. Furthermore, the likelihood that an east-west split of the Communist Bloc would find the European parties adhering to the CPSU would weigh heavily with the Latin Americans since the region's

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ties - political, economic, and cultural - are much stronger with Europe than with the orient.

33. As previously suggested, a more probable problem for the Latin American parties is to adjust to varying themes from the two principal centers of communist power. This they should be able to do, since the leaders will be aware that basic strategy and covert tactics are agreed between Peking and Moscow. Overt activities will be adapted to situations as they arise, not too difficult a task in view of the slight importance which communists attach to consistency.

PROSPECTS

34. There is every likelihood that Peking will devote increasing attention to the Latin American area. Given the expansive tendencies of the Chinese communists, their enmity toward the United States, and the social ferment in a number of Latin American countries, it is almost certain that Peking's activities will take on greater importance in the region.

35. The propaganda offensive will probably continue to mix the harsh and the bland. Denunciations of the United States and gross misrepresentations of Washington's policies will be regular themes for Latin American audiences. A spreading net of press service correspondents will feed the Communist Chinese propagandists with accounts of "Yankee exploitation." Bracketed with attacks on the United States will be glowing reports of progress in the CPR.

36. The present trickle of Latin American visitors to mainland China is likely to rise. A report that, starting in the spring of 1960, a ship from Buenos Aires will provide free passages for 500 tourists eight or nine times a year, seems improbable, but the flow of both party members and

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non-communists will almost certainly increase. Admiring statements about life in the CPR can be expected from many of these visitors.

37. Representatives of Communist Chinese organizations will appear with increasing frequency in Latin American countries. They will come as delegates or observers at Communist Party congresses, at meeting of front organizations, and at trade union and professional conventions. Theatrical and athletic groups can be expected, too.

38. The CCP will almost certainly take an increasing part in guiding the activities of Latin American communists. This growing influence will result partly from the visits of communist leaders to Peking for discussion and advice, the training of cadres at CCP schools, larger quantities of published materials on Maoism and Chinese experience in "building socialism," and from the direct support of party organizations in Latin American countries. Concerning the last kind of influence, a recent reliable report from Panama recounting the acceptance of a Chinese offer to pay the salary and office expenses of an NCNA correspondent who would double as a full-time party functionary discloses a subsidizing formula which will probably be repeated in other strategically important points in Latin America.

39. Growing Chinese influence will also stem from the receptivity of Latin American communists to approaches from Peking. The revolutionary ardor of the CCP appeals to many Latin American communists, and they profess to find much in the Chinese "experience" of relevance to the problems of their countries. The Chinese emphasis on land reform, an important issue in most Latin American countries, will continue to make the CCP's advice and guidance attractive.

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40. Although Peking's influence will grow over the next few years, it will not displace the dominant role of the CPSU in Latin American communism. The historic ties of the Latin American parties to the Kremlin are being strengthened by the rising attention of Moscow to the Western Hemisphere. The Soviet presence, growing through trade and technical missions and through cultural contacts, will almost certainly be more pronounced. Although here or there a Latin American communist leader may anticipate a day when his party's closest ties will be with Peking, the great majority are thoroughly imbued with proletarian internationalism and its recognition of the supremacy of the CPSU in the world movement. These leaders will not promote any schismatic currents in their area. They will be gratified by and will encourage a larger role for the CCP, but their loyalty to Moscow will not be diminished. In this loyalty they will almost certainly be supported by the representatives of the Satellite parties with whom they have contact at home and on their travels in the Bloc and by the officials of the communist front organizations.

41. In addition to the growing influence of Chinese communism through party relations, the Peking regime will be a greater factor in Latin American affairs through the acceptance of the CPR as a state to be recognized and to be dealt with. The speed with which diplomatic recognition and governmental relations advance will be affected by the trend of world affairs and the political developments in the separate Latin American countries, but the signs point to the successful penetration of a currently closed area. Cuba, if the Castro regime survives and continues its present pro-communist policies, may be the first Latin American state to switch its recognition from Taipei to Peking. Once the ice is broken, other governments will probably do likewise. Many of these governments do not wish to incur the displeasure of Washington and fear the encouragement of domestic communism which may result from the presence of more Bloc missions, but they are under strong pressures from assorted groups of nationalists, liberals, and

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Yankee-phobes who see in diplomatic recognition of the CPR a way of asserting their "independence" of United States influence. Trade between Communist China and the Latin American countries is unlikely to grow to any significant proportions. It will be dangled, however, as a prize to be won by closer relations.

42. For the foreseeable future Latin America is going to be subject to communist currents from both east and west. Hoping to capitalize on various circumstances favorable to communism in the Western Hemisphere, the international movement will endeavor to quicken the flow by a variety of pressures - diplomatic, economic, cultural, ideological, propaganda, subversive. The Soviet current will remain the stronger, but from across the Pacific will come a steady and mounting tide that will heighten the threat to the dikes of Latin American security.

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