

WORLD OBJECTIVES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM

DBD

Address to the Inter-American Defense Board, December 9, 1958

Gentlemen:

In providing a summation of the World objectives of International Communism, I shall attempt to place before you the perspectives which the communists themselves see. Eschewing Western and Free World points of view as completely as my western origin permits, I shall endeavor to analyze the tasks which the Communist leaders see before them, and to project into their minds in order to fathom their own evaluation of their prospects of success. This requires an effort of detachment and imagination which is not easy for us who have grown up in the discipline of freedom and democracy. But we must try, if we are not to succumb to the dangers of complacency and misplaced optimism.

As the preceding lecturer has shown, we can no longer assume that we are confronted by a single-headed enemy--the Soviet Union. Rather, we see a substantial body of states led by two great powers, working in broad harmony, we must assume, at least as far as their implacable hostility to ourselves is concerned. China has been accepted to senior partnership with the Soviet Union, and while Peiping itself is scrupulous in acknowledging, and indeed insisting on the leadership of Moscow, the latter has been equally punctilious in praising the creative contributions of Mao Tse-Tung to the theory and practice of socialist revolution, and has in effect assigned China a major role as a model for socialist revolution in the so-called areas of "national liberation." This duality of leadership in International Communism is not without significance for your own area.

Borrowing the communists' own terminology, and accepting it as representative of their beliefs, we find ourselves confronted by a united "system" of socialist states, comprising about one-third of the world's population. This "system" which had been developing ever since the creation of the Comintern (1921), emerged clearly in the wake of World War II, and may be said to have reached its full dimension about the time of Stalin's death in 1953. To the Soviet Union, which until the War represented the only country engaged in the process of "building socialism," have been added first the "Peoples' Democracies" of Eastern Europe, or as we call them, the satellites, all of which took their rise under the conquering wing of the Red Army and then China. The long, bloody counter-offensive of Mao Tse-Tung from the caves of Yen-an reduced the once triumphant Kuomintang to what the Communists scornfully describe as the "Chiang clique," hopelessly protracting the

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civil war on the island of Formosa. North Korea and North Vietnam completed the periphery of the "Peoples' Democracies."

This group of 12 states, from which Yugoslavia has been excluded for a second time, constitutes the "socialist system." It is described generally as a "camp" (in Russian, the Germanic word "lager"), a monolithic, disciplined and militant unit. On the other hand, and particularly since the Twentieth Party Congress of February 1956, the system has also been described as a "commonwealth." The Russian word, "sodruzhestvo," has as its root the word for friendship (given world circulation by the endlessly incanted slogan of the Moscow Youth Festival of 1957 - "mir i druzhba" - peace and friendship). The "commonwealth" is presented as a loose association of equal, sovereign and independent states, united under the Five Principles of Bandung in the spirit of brotherly friendship and mutual assistance. "Camp" and "commonwealth" are clearly related in Soviet propaganda as the dual aspects of the single system. "Camp" is used when the theme is militancy and resistance to capitalist-imperialist "aggression." "Commonwealth" is used to enhance the benign, peaceful, respectable aspect which Communism seeks to present both to itself and to the "vast zone of peace" into which it lumps what the West often refers to as the "uncommitted areas." It is not accidental that the communists have appropriated a term which has played a historic role in the transformation of what was once the British Empire. By taking it unto themselves, they seek to accomplish the dual purpose of discrediting the concept of Commonwealth as a Free World association and crediting their own association with the voluntary and beneficial connotations which the British Commonwealth has earned for itself.

As might be expected, there is a greater ring of conviction in their use of the defiant word, "camp", and it is perhaps worth noting that it predominates over "commonwealth" in their propaganda in ratios ranging from five up to ten to one, or more. Nevertheless, "commonwealth" is an instrument of great potential for them, and they are careful to keep it in a position of active reserve. Thus, it figured prominently in the fulsome expressions of mutual regard and friendship on the occasion of Gomulka's visit to Warsaw, and it was stressed by Mikoyan in his ceremonial speech on the 41st anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution (November 6, 1958). It is worked into Khrushchev's Theses for the 21st Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, to be held in January, and we may be sure that it will figure in the proceedings of that Congress.

This little excursus on terminology is by no means academic. For it sets the framework within which we must view the objectives of International Communism. Put in another context, the two terms reflect certain differences between the era of Stalin and that of Mao and Khrushchev. For Stalin, the world was completely polarized; the

socialist "camp" was white, the capitalist black. Any country which he was not able to bring under absolute control lay in the camp of the capitalist enemy. There was no area of neutrality. The strategy of the Khrushchev era, as we have observed, recognizes an intermediate area, "the great Zone of Peace," which is the happy hunting ground of communist maneuver and infiltration, both political and economic. The approach has shifted from insistence on absolute control to the subtler manipulative tactics of persuasive influence. Of course the ultimate goal is still control, but the means of achieving it are not predicated upon absolute hostility and coercion.

What, then, are the objectives of this system? The classic answer, of course, is world domination. But this is not a very helpful answer. It presents an image of a world power imperium, within which the writ of the Kremlin would have universal currency seconded, perhaps, by that of Peiping's Forbidden City. But is that actually the vision which Khrushchev and Mao see for their successors?

Let us shift the ground from the sphere of power politics to that of ideology. Here, I believe, we must assume that Mao and Khrushchev, if not the lesser communist leaders, have something like a common motivation, even though their basic personalities differ sharply. Both are Marxist-Leninists to the core of their being. They are the pontiffs of what has been described as a "secular religion," a movement which denies the spiritual base but affirms the dynamics and idealism of a crusade. This movement also has been aptly described as the "twentieth century Islam," and like Islam, it will surely unfold and expand by doctrine and by force until it is finally halted by something equally powerful.

It is not necessary here to recapitulate the doctrinal elements which give this "secular religion" its expansive thrust; the claim of historical materialism to scientific truth, the dialectical interpretation of nature and history and so forth. These may be taken for granted as the inner springs of motivation which imbue the communist leaders with that sense of confidence which strikes all Free World observers who come into direct contact with them.

What we are concerned with is the translation of these inner dynamics into a strategy, and this strategy into an infinitely complex pattern of tactics. We must bear constantly in mind that these tactics are governed by a code of action with certain fixed principles. These include many almost instinctive attitudes and habits of manipulative action, which have been described in detail by Nathan Leites (A Study of Bolshevism) under such illuminating headings as, "the fear of annihilation," "the expectation of setbacks," "the retreat to avoid futile loss," "the advance through struggle," "pushing to the limits," and "from agreement to overt conflict."

Let us restate, then, the over-all objective as follows: under conditions of never-ending struggle against the hostile world of capitalism, to expand the might of the socialist system, building socialism within all

the member states, and proceeding, first in the USSR and subsequently in other countries, to the construction of a communist society, at which stage capitalism will have disappeared, having lived its appointed historic stage, and the entire world will have reached the millenium of a classless society, in which a new and transformed type of man will produce according to his abilities and receive according to his needs.

Now, this is a tall order, and the communists have only a rather hazy vision of the end of the process. I think we can say that the present leaders, like Moses overlooking the Promised Land, are content to leave the entrance into Communism to generations yet unborn. They do indeed indulge in some double talk about achieving communism within the 20th century, but it is probably safe to assume that Khrushchev and Mao will settle for reasonable progress during the ten to fifteen years in which they can hope to play their role.

Their immediate task may be broken down into the following components:

- a) Establishing the security of the territorial base of the socialist system;
- b) Insuring peace as a condition for the strengthening of the socialist system;
- c) Completing throughout the "system" the process of "building of socialism";
- d) Expanding the economic base of the USSR during a transition period to a breadth which will support the superstructure of communism;
- e) Creating, through education and discipline, a new type of man who can be the bearer of the mission of communism;
- f) Simultaneously with the above, hastening the overthrow of "capitalist imperialism" and promoting the "national liberation struggle" throughout the world.

This, as I have indicated above, is a task which Khrushchev apparently feels can be substantially accomplished by the USSR in his own time. China, in his view, will take considerably longer. On this point, Mao may have his reservations.

Let us examine these components one by one, seeking, as I have proposed above, to weigh their feasibility in Communist judgment.

a) Establishing the security of the territorial base of the socialist system.

movement must consolidate a central area on an impregnable basis as a prelude to outward expansion. In the beginning of a movement, the base may be small and precarious, as was that of Mao in Yen-an. It may be little more than a guerrilla hideout in a jungle, or it may be a vast territory such as the USSR has been ever since the quick triumph of the Bolshevik revolution. As it is now shaped, the base of communism is nothing less than the north Eurasian land mass from Korea to the Elbe, within which there are two inner citadels, Moscow and Peiping, which must be defended by concentric outer rings, a series of glacis extending throughout the satellites.

Since the capitalist "system" is implacably hostile and still has great military power for aggression, the socialist "system" must retain the aspect of an armed "camp." The highest priority must continue to be the maintenance of an invincible armed force, predominantly a vast land army supported, however, by modern air and naval forces. Throughout the "system" these forces must be maintained at the peak level of strength, discipline and equipment. Hence, the primary task of the Communist leaders will be to maintain parity or superiority in the armament race with the capitalist powers. The effort will range through the gamut of conventional weapons to the highest forms of nuclear arms. A hierarchy of might will be maintained among the various states, ranging from the total armament of the USSR through China, which will depend largely on its manpower organized under the communal militia system, to the satellites whose dependability is questionable and who will, therefore, be assigned only limited missions and equipment.

But the communist leaders will never allow these mighty forces which they have created to develop independent power within their regime. Military discipline is subordinate to party discipline, and the political indoctrination of officers and troops is paramount. The lesson of the Zhukov ouster will probably not have to be repeated in the USSR, nor in China so long as Mao is in control. Throughout the Bloc, the harmony of political and military leadership seems assured.

b) Insuring peace as a condition for strengthening the socialist system.

In communist doctrine, the hostile "contradiction" between the capitalist and socialist systems of the former and the evolution of the latter into communism. Lenin taught that this process will be accompanied by "bloody and terrible wars," but the 20th Party Congress has modified that doctrine, declaring that war is no longer "fatally inevitable." This hopeful innovation is justified, according to Khrushchev, by the emergence of "mighty forces of peace" throughout the world, not only in the intermediate "zone of peace," but among the peoples, especially the working class, of the capitalist countries. Moreover, the approximate parity of nuclear weapons in both camps has made the

prospect of general war intolerable; albeit the communists are careful to insist that their system would survive such a war and that capitalism would be destroyed. Whether they are really very confident in this prediction may be doubted, but it constitutes a necessary factor in maintaining the morale of the Bloc in the face of the anxiety which the threat of nuclear destruction generates in all men, whatever their ideology.

Whatever their innermost feelings, the Communist leaders almost certainly are sincere when they proclaim the need for "peaceful co-existence." They are fully aware that their vast program of construction, first of "socialism" and ultimately of "communism," can only be carried out under circumstances of general peace. War would not only set back any timetable of catching up with the United States and the rest of the capitalist world; it would entail the risk of annihilation or, at the least, the overthrow of their regime.

Consequently, we must impute seriousness to Khrushchev's repeated assertions that the Soviet Union and the peoples and nations of the Bloc do not want war, and that the only competition which is now possible lies in the economic and political field. "Let the best system win," they proclaim.

This, of course, does not mean that they are sincere or honest in their approach to questions of disarmament. They are mindful of the advantages inherent in maintaining their military might in being. It enables them simultaneously to pose as the peace-loving defender of the socialist system against capitalist hostility and to belabor the latter with an almost unlimited arsenal of psychological threats. "Nuclear rattling" has been practiced over the last three or four years in every area of crisis and, while it has usually been met with composure, especially within NATO, it has nonetheless created a substantial fund of anxiety to which increments are being added constantly. This fund is drawn on from time to time, but on the whole it is being allowed to cumulate and compound interest, in anticipation of perhaps decisive drafts in some future crisis.

The intense and even passionate interest aroused in Europe by the Reith lectures of George Kennan, by Henry Kissinger's discussion of limited nuclear war as a NATO strategy, and by the debate over the ultimate question whether surrender is preferable to certain nuclear destruction (Sidney Hook and Lord Russell)--all this reveals the fertility of the soil which Khrushchev and his minions--such as Rapacki--are busily cultivating. It is difficult to foresee whether some genuine surcease to the anxiety of mankind can be achieved through disarmament. Of one thing we can be sure; the communist leaders will not allow it to occur without extracting maximum advantage to their cause.

c) Completing throughout the "system" the process of "building socialism."

Within the twelve countries of the "system" the process of building socialism has gone through various stages, and it is not clear how far it has advanced. The process is still in its early stages, and it is not clear how far it has advanced.

it is held to have been completed some time ago--the actual point of completion is not specified, but in October 1957 Molotov was rebuked and humiliated by the CPSU for a remark made in February 1957, which implied that only the foundations of socialism had been laid. Among the satellites, the progress has been uneven, reflecting in accord with communist theory, the various national peculiarities, such as size and composition of the population and the economy, level of education, determination of the leadership and so forth. In a laconic but nonetheless dramatic fashion, the CPSU announced in October that Bulgaria has been the most advanced of the Peoples Democracies to complete the "building" process, and Czechoslovakia is said to be not far behind. Thus, hope is held out for all the East European satellites that they may soon stand beside the Soviet Union in the triumphant forward march toward communism!

This announcement highlights a sensitive area, if not of contradiction, at least of tension between the USSR and China. Following the introduction of the system of communes announced last August, Chinese propoganda implied, if it did not actually state, that this was an actual step in the transition to communism. The nature of the transition itself was blurred by the use of a hybrid term "socialism-communism," suggesting that the two phases were not in fact distinct, as Marxism-Leninism requires.

There was a delicate moment for the USSR and the European satellites, in which the communes were noted as an interesting development, but one which was suitable only to China. Then, the Soviet leaders launched a subtle but unequivocal counter-move to downgrade the significance of the communes. It was conceded that they were an interesting and perhaps valuable contribution to the experience of building socialism, but they were definitely not within the frame of communism. To reach the latter, China has a long road ahead, the road to an industrial economy vastly larger and more productive than is anywhere near in prospect now.

Communist China, for its part, has accepted this Soviet braking action with apparent imperturbability. The party line remains as it has been: to catch up with the United Kingdom industrially in 15 years (though there have been hints that this time will be reduced as a result of the Great Leap Forward.). The attainment of a base sufficient to proceed to communism is rather vaguely held out as a goal which the upcoming generation may live to reach, i.e., before the end of the 20th century.

It is worth noting that this interesting by-play between the "socialist competitors" appears to have evoked a new refinement in the Soviet view of the evolution within the "system." As recently as October, an authoritative Soviet journal propounds the thesis that, instead of completing the "building of socialism" in entirely different tempos, the individual countries will do so in groups. Thus, all

the East European satellites will arrive at about the same time and, somewhat later, China and its satellites will do likewise. Presumably, this will result from increasing coordination of the various economic plans of the separate countries, which in Europe is the task of the Council of Economic Assistance (CEMA), the economic institutional form of the "commonwealth" (as opposed to the Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact, which is its political form). China and its dependencies, North Korea and North Vietnam, are invited to take part in the coordinating work of CEMA, but broadly speaking, their line of advance will be in separate phases.

d) Expanding the economic base of the USSR during a transition period to a breadth which will support the superstructure of communism.

This, of course, is primarily an internal objective of the Soviet Union, and the bold Seven Year Plan Theses of Khrushchev for the 21st CPSU Congress sketch the first half (1959-1965) of a process which, as a whole, is expected to take fifteen years. But the internal development of this mighty effort is inseparable from foreign objectives. Thus, the creation of a heavy industry base and the production of a surplus of machine tools and other capital forming goods--surplus in relation to immediate needs--will permit the USSR to aid the other countries of the "socialist system" to complete their building process. It will also provide the wherewithal for the "economic offensive" against the imperialist system. On the one hand, inter-system trade can be promoted, enabling the USSR to hasten such vital projects as the building of a great chemical industry and at the same time promoting its decisive political objectives within the capitalist system. On the other hand, this surplus of exportable capital becomes a sharp instrument in the economic-political war for the allegiance and support of the so-called under-developed countries. The old imperialist maxim, "trade follows the flag," might be changed to "communism follows trade." With its emphasis on developmental credit rather than aid grants, and on freedom from "political strings," the economic high command of the "socialist system" now operates from its own "position of strength." By selective targeting of development loans and liberal use of what is now becoming a surplus of technological talent, the USSR and its more advanced satellites are now in a position to export communist influence into areas where formerly "imperialism" had a virtual monopoly.

The Seven Year Plan, and its projected extension over a total of 15 years, has been received abroad with varying reactions ranging from awe to incredulity. Perhaps the best judgment is that its goals will be realized, but one should reserve the possibility that they may even be surpassed. At any rate, it is presented to the Free World as a momentous challenge, and it should be received as such.

e) Creating through education and discipline a new type of man who can be the bearer of the mission of communism.

Here, too, the basic program, which is internal to the USSR, has been announced in the preparatory theses for the 21st Congress. But, like the economic program, it also has a bearing on the world objectives of the Communist movement. The educational Theses for the 21st Congress deal largely with reorganization of the educational system, and improvement of pedagogic method and discipline. But they are infused with a burning message to the Soviet people and beyond them to a whole generation throughout the world which communism hopes to capture for its cause. This is the message of the unity of education with productive labor. Communism requires for its realization the creation of a new type of man, and its propaganda increasingly stresses that its values are those of a higher form of humanism. Here again the Communists are seeking to appropriate to themselves terms and values which have been created and developed by the Free World, witness "peace," "democracy," "commonwealth," and even "freedom" itself.

We must not allow this type of action to go unchallenged. Communism claims for itself a higher "morality," developed on an advanced "material and cultural" base, a more dynamic "enthusiasm" and a deeper creative insight into "life itself." That these claims are spurious, being rooted in a materialistic view of the nature of man, does not mean that they are ineffectual. They are persuasive and indeed productive of a certain idealism, however perverted. We must see to it that our own convictions remain firm and that our own conception of human worth and dignity is better.

f) Hastening the overthrow of "capitalist imperialism" and promoting the "national liberation struggle" throughout the world.

Here, the objectives of International Communism depart from the peaceable image which it has sought to create of itself. "Peaceful coexistence" is defined as struggle--ideological, political, economic and social. And it is calmly announced as a struggle to the death. Khrushchev blandly states that, "we will bury you," explaining that this of course does not mean that "we will kill you" in the literal sense. Rather, the sons or at least the grandsons of present day capitalists will live under socialism, having arrived at that happy state as the result of the inherent superiority of the socialist system itself.

But within this competitive process, though it may be relatively free of actual violence on the scale of general war, limited wars remain possible and deep, bitter conflict is inevitable in the non-military fields. The weapons of International Communism are manifold. Some are visible, the overt instruments of trade and diplomacy. Some are partially veiled, the subtler forms of infiltration and sapping propaganda. Others are strictly covert, the subversive machinations of

the illegal apparatus which Communist parties always construct and operate in parallel to their legal system.

Perhaps the best image we can apply is that of a continuum of activity throughout a vast flux of parties, institutions, groups and individuals. The cardinal principle of Bolshevism, relentlessly hammered out by Lenin, is organization. Around the hard core of the Communist Parties, an endless tissue is elaborated, the so-called international fronts covering every aspect of human life--youth, labor, women, the professions and conditions of man. Communist Parties and fronts are interlocked by a bewildering pattern of bilateral and multilateral gatherings. Sympathizers are enlisted from the non-communist parties, and the mirage of the United Front is constantly presented. Great ceremonial occasions, such as the Party Congresses, the World Youth Festivals, the fortieth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution (and next year the tenth of the Chinese triumph on the mainland), all these become monumental fixed points between which the continuum of lesser gatherings is woven. Clandestine coordination meetings are arranged on a regional basis--this took place on a considerable scale in the western hemisphere after the fortieth anniversary celebration, and has been reflected in a wide variety of communist or front meetings and drives held from Argentina and Chile to Canada throughout 1958. One of the most ominous initiatives was the establishment of an Afro-Asian secretariat in Cairo in December 1957, which has been followed by lesser gatherings ranging from the Afro-Asian Writers Conference in Tashkent to the Afro-Asian Economic Conference now meeting in Cairo.

What I have tried to present, then, is precisely the universality of this continuum. Internal and external drives and campaigns are interwoven, and the aim is to achieve maximum participation and involvement ranging from the hard-core fanatics to the well-meaning and sympathetic non-communists who see in the movement the image of a peaceable and benevolent commonwealth.

The true judgment which we must hold is, I believe, a rather pessimistic one. We are confronted with a force which is hostile and which is increasingly powerful; there can be no accommodation with it, yet we cannot wish it away.

But at the same time our pessimism should be--as the participants of the recent Congress of Cultural Freedom proclaimed--dynamic. There are many things that we can do about the threat of International Communism. Most important would be a change in the Western view of international relations. In the past, we have tended to look at these in 19th century terms of Realpolitik, national interest and balance of power. But the challenge of the ideological empire of communism, which calls itself a "commonwealth," requires that we ourselves find some new form of ideological unity within which we

can draw our politics and economies closer together. This means that we must be prepared to make sacrifices in some of our cherished concepts of national sovereignty and also in our personal way of life. Communism is making a bold appeal for the loyalties of vast masses of humanity, offering a promise of material, cultural and even spiritual betterment. We must match this specious bid with a positive reaffirmation of our own higher values, and a resolute effort to give them life and meaning.