

Executive Registry
11-8380

15 September 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Comments on Khrushchev's Article in Foreign Affairs

1. In response to your request for comments on Khrushchev's article, I am submitting two papers prepared by members of SRS:

a. Comments on the article itself by [redacted] 25X1A9a

b. Notes on the background and significance of "peaceful coexistence" by [redacted] 25X1A9a

I believe that these cover the principal points suggested to this Staff by this challenging piece.

2. My only additional comment would be that Khrushchev, by entirely ignoring the world conquering objectives and the incessant subversive activities of International Communism as a movement, has provided an almost classic example of the "double track" approach: the dialectic of "peaceful" state-to-state relations and of immutably hostile Communist Party penetration. I do not believe that Free World and especially American consciousness has fully absorbed the implications of the basic Communist theorem: "Peaceful coexistence between nations and states is the matrix of implacable ideological political and economic struggle." The rigor of this proposition is not concealed in Khrushchev's article, but it is glossed over with sophistry, which, as 25X1A9a [redacted] points out, may not be perceived by many wishfully oriented readers in socialist and neutralist circles abroad. For this reason, I 25X1A9a agree with [redacted] that this is a dangerous piece which deserves a direct and authoritative response in the same medium. I would raise the question whether the President, himself, should not make the reply. If this were deemed undesirable, possibly President Hoover or President Truman might appropriately do so. SRS would be glad to make further suggestions in connection with this proposal.

25X1A9a [redacted]

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Encls.

Chief, SRS/DDI NO CHANGE IN CLASS. I
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CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C

NEXT REVIEW DATE:
DATE: 28 MAY '82 REVIEWER: 103430

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Senior Research Staff on International Communism

"On Peaceful Coexistence" by Nikita S. Khrushchev

Khrushchev has utilized his opportunity to place before a selected audience a forceful exposition of several main facets of Soviet foreign policy. Writing with seeming candor and avoiding the repetitive logomachy characteristic of the usual Moscow utterances, he restates well-known positions and attitudes.

The article is simple in outline. First, Khrushchev propounds a number of familiar Soviet tenets - the danger of war, the possibility of coexistence between states with different social systems, the inherently peaceful nature of "socialist" society, the necessity of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states, the intention to "outstrip" the United States in economic competition, the unity of people, party and government in the USSR, and the growing strength of the "peace" forces in the world. Secondly, he discusses the specific issues of disarmament, Germany, and West Berlin. On disarmament, he blames the lack of progress on the West's refusal "to meet us half-way," but he writes hopefully of an agreement to ban nuclear tests. On Germany and West Berlin, Khrushchev claims that the Soviet positions are realistic and reasonable; agreement would be possible except for Western concessions" to Chancellor Adenauer, who is pursuing a military policy, the policy of the German revanchists." Khrushchev concludes his article with a statement of the conditions for peaceful coexistence. They are basically the Western acceptance of "the irrevocable fact that the historic process is irreversible" and the recognition that "extensive and absolutely unrestricted international trade" must be practiced.

Omitted from the discussion are a number of subjects which affect "peaceful coexistence" - Far Eastern and Middle Eastern issues, the United Nations, propaganda warfare, and the activities of Kremlin-directed Communist parties and front organizations. Communist China is referred to only in Khrushchev's vague statement that the respective friends of the USSR and the US should also have amiable relations with the two super powers.

It could be expected that Khrushchev would respond to the opportunity offered by Foreign Affairs by presenting a strong defense of established Soviet policies and attitudes. He was unlikely to suggest in advance of the coming high-level talks that Moscow's positions on disarmament and German problems were anything less than reasonable. He undoubtedly wished to reassure any skeptical elements in the Kremlin and the leaders of other states of the Bloc that no change in policy was contemplated.

One may conclude from the article that Khrushchev believes that continued tension between the power groups is dangerous; but that he is unprepared or unable to concede any points that might improve relations. He emphasizes the gravity of the German problem, but he offers no solution except the Western acceptance of the Soviet formula. It is plain that Western refusal to accept Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe as a permanent, de jure condition is very irritating to the Communist leader and that a change in Washington's attitude on this subject is a sine qua non to better relations. One may also deduce that controls on trade with the Bloc countries are an annoyance, but it is improbable that Khrushchev thinks greatly expanded commerce is as important to relieving tensions as he makes out. Finally, there is no suggestion that he wishes to reinsure with the West against a future menace in the form of an aggressive Communist China. On the contrary, he breathes confidence that if the Western powers do not accept peaceful coexistence, Soviet-style, the USSR can maintain its position until the rising strength of the "socialist camp" transforms the balance of world forces.

Although the speciousness of much of Khrushchev's argument will be apparent to a large proportion of Free World leaders and to the more sophisticated students of international affairs, the article will undoubtedly impress a certain number of people with influence on public opinion in foreign countries. The author almost certainly had in mind that he was writing as much for neutralists, some socialists, anti-American nationalists, pacifists, and other susceptible elements as for readers in the United States. Khrushchev, the man of peace, will be quoted as endorsing many of their views. The distortion of Western positions and the ignoring of Communist responsibility for international tensions will be skipped over or rationalized

away. This use of Khrushchev's authoritative pronouncement indicates the necessity for clear, forceful restatements of Western policy. The meaning and implications of "peaceful coexistence" must constantly be exposed to view.

25X1A9a



SRS/DDI