

TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE 4 Nov 58
TO: Mr. Robert Amory, Jr. <i>RA</i>		
ROOM NO. 354	BUILDING Admin	
REMARKS: The attached comments of [REDACTED] were prepared at our request in one day. As a quick reaction to a current crisis, they indicate, in our judgment, the depth of his knowledge and insight. We are eager to get the benefit of his thought and research in support of our longer range studies. <i>DBD</i> DBD		
FROM: Chief, SRS/DDI		
ROOM NO. 304	BUILDING 2210 E St	EXTENSION 2455

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FORM NO. 241
1 FEB 55

REPLACES FORM 36-8
WHICH MAY BE USED.

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(47)

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4 November 1958

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH: Deputy Director/Intelligence
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SUBJECT: Comments of [REDACTED] on the Pasternak Affair
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1. The attached comments were prepared on short notice

[REDACTED]

2. The views fit in with our memorandum of 30 October 1958, but go considerably further. We agree that the role of the Tashkent writers' conference is very important, and that the pending Congress of Soviet Writers will be a major event in the buildup of the 21st Party Congress in January.

3. The suggestion in paragraph 7 may seem rather extreme, but it is worth pondering. We would be inclined to assume that the Soviet leaders had reckoned for some time with the possibility of a Nobel Prize award for Pasternak, and had prepared a powerful campaign to cope with it. Vilification has been a classic weapon against dissident intellectuals, especially in France and Italy, and has generally had a much more devastating effect on the victim and on other Communist intellectuals than the Free World usually attributes to it.

4. L'Unità and L'Humanité have strikingly soft-pedaled the affair, reflecting the sensitivity of the French and Italian CPs to the problem of the dissident intellectuals. Nevertheless, even here, the Kremlin is probably not greatly concerned by the adverse reactions which its brutal action will arouse, and probably anticipates that a tightening of the party discipline will result.

5. It occurs to us that the role of Italian publisher Feltrinelli in this whole affair is rather dubious, and might deserve closer investigation by the Agency.

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3 November 1958

Comments of [REDACTED] on the Pasternak Case

1. The Pasternak case should be examined exclusively in its relation to the CPSU general political line.
2. Pasternak is the last prominent representative of the group of Russian literati influenced by the West (Blok, Gorki, Tolstoi, Essenin, etc.). Pasternak's distinguishing features reflected in his literary art are Christian humanism, individual idealism, and personal independence. Pasternak's influence on Soviet literature has been considerable and was on the ascendant.
3. Should Pasternak be evicted from the USSR, this would signify a return of the CPSU to Lenin-Dzerzhinski methods applied in 1921-24 toward a number of Russian writers and scientists (Bunin, Berdyaev, Melgunov, etc.). The only difference in the two instances is that at present the decision is ascribed to the "anger of the people."
4. The general strategy of the Lenin-Stalin period was founded on the principle of the shift of the world center of the revolution from the West to Russia. At the present stage the CPSU in view of the continued revolutionary trend eastwards is making every effort to retain its vanguard position as a leader of World Communism supported by the revolutionary potentials of Asia and Africa.
5. In order to achieve this objective it is necessary for CPSU to present the USSR as a center of Eastern (Asiatic) literature and art and to give the peoples of the East a more prominent position in the cultural field. The Tashkent Asia and Africa Writers' Conference (October 7-13, 1958) formulated theoretical premises for the enunciation of a principle that the culture of the East is superior to that of the West. The pending Third Congress of Soviet Writers may draw further conclusions from these premises.
6. The Pasternak case is planned to serve as a warning to Soviet writers and artists still oriented toward Western culture. The tactical "thaw" period of 1953-1957 has apparently weakened internal discipline in the ranks of Soviet "art workers" and the Leninist principle of "Party subjugated science and art" may have lost in effectiveness.

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7. The granting of the Nobel prize to Pasternak comes at a most suitable moment as far as the CPSU is concerned and it might prove interesting to verify whether and to what extent it may have been directly or indirectly inspired by Moscow.

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