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5 November 1956

[Handwritten signatures and initials]

MEMO FOR RECORD -

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SUBJECT: Luncheon conversation with [REDACTED]

1. In a rambling discussion of the world situation, the following points seemed worth noting:

a. [REDACTED] said that in his discussion with the Director two weeks ago he had raised the idea of a UN police force or military inspection team for Hungary to consist of troops from India, Finland and Ireland.

b. [REDACTED] had a lengthy conversation with the Polish Director, [REDACTED]. This had been arranged through [REDACTED] someone on the hill". [REDACTED] was most impressed with the caliber of [REDACTED] especially considering his youth, and felt that he had a most unusual insight into the history and background of the Polish Communist party. [REDACTED] raised the question whether [REDACTED] could write a book on the origins and development of de-Stalinization illustrated through the history of the Polish CP. He implied that he would be interested in undertaking to write such a book with [REDACTED] but wondered whether they could find a popular publisher. I suggested that a book written on a middle level - partly popular and partly scholarly - might enjoy a considerable sale if written promptly.

c. [REDACTED] was greatly interested in the news that Nehru had finally come out in sharp criticism of Soviet action in Hungary. He feels that the potential for a leading role by Nehru at this moment is greater than ever, particularly in view of his reported willingness to act jointly with the US.

d. We both agreed that changes in the Moscow set-up should be closely followed. He was more inclined to place any change in the Kremlin leadership some distance off, one or two years, but he did feel that a leadership crisis is definitely in existence.

e. [REDACTED] had some second thoughts on the desirability of attempting to meet and interview Tito, a project which he had discussed last week with the SE Division. He recognizes that Tito's position has considerably changed as a result of the Hungarian developments. My own thought was that Tito had lost considerable initiative as a result of

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
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being forced to come out against the Hungarian rebels and in favor of the Soviet armed action. I felt that Tito's example in the field of "independence" was considerably tarnished and that he emerged in his true colors as a protagonist of world Communism, which could only be achieved in some form of understanding under Russian aegis. [REDACTED] suggested that Tito might attempt to rebuild his bridges with Nehru and with some of the Left Wing European Socialists, especially Nenni and Bevan. It was doubtful how successful he might be in this attempt.

f. Finally I suggested to [REDACTED] that this might be a good moment for him to try his hand at a broad-brush speculative article on the prospects for the Kremlin leadership.

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Chief, SRS/DDI

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