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*Office Memorandum* • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Dr. H. S. Craig

DATE: June 17, 1955

FROM : Charles H. Taquey *HT*

SUBJECT: Critique of the Quantico Papers.

1. Strategy.

It is recognized that this set of papers does not pretend to reflect an organized strategic plan for the Summit Meeting, but limits itself to the listing of tactical moves designed "for exacting from the enemy genuine concessions without sacrifice of deterrent strength". Besides, many items listed in the summary and the bulk of the supporting briefs relate to long-range steps well beyond the purview of the Conference. The views of the Quantico experts should, therefore, be discussed point by point in an attempt to show what they contain which is really useable for the preparation of Summit (see paragraph 3, page 3 of this memorandum.) However, since there appears to be a general philosophy, or an absence of philosophy, underlying the conclusion of the group, it is important to clarify this undercurrent of thought and motivations in order to throw some light on the validity of the proposals. Clearly, the group has recoiled from the idea that the U.S. should make any concession to the Soviet Union. In other words, it has adopted the attitude that anything short of unconditional surrender on the part of the Soviets amounts to appeasement on our own. An uncompromising attitude featuring the monosyllable "no" and exposés of Soviet turpitude can be justified, but in the present circumstances it presents two grave dangers. Even if the Conference had not raised expectations - and it has - this attitude would be in contradiction with the fact that the U.S. and its allies have called the Conference together. The result of inflexibility would be a loss of strength. On the other hand, it is incompatible with the dignity of the office of the President to make proposals which we know the enemy will reject, and such proposals can only create dissensions among allies and weaken our position. Most important, if we fail to propose a carefully considered list of acceptable concessions, we may be trapped into making some which will not be of our own choosing. The "mock" negotiations outline in the paper on Germany - useful as the latter is - gives a good illustration of the point which I am trying to make. Because it envisages "no concessions" at the start, it ends up with accepting in certain cases a "neutralization" of Germany which is certainly not acceptable. All the art of diplomacy consists in securing from the opponent concessions greater - in fact and not in appearance - than those which we make. The effect of reciprocal concessions on the respective accumulation of power of the two parties in the course of time must be carefully considered. This requires first and foremost a study of the type of concessions we desire from the opponent, and an even more

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careful one of the concessions which we are ready to make. Instead of avoiding any mention of concessions, we should keep them at the center of the preparatory work. This of course does not mean that we should show our hand at the beginning of the negotiations. At that point, we should obviously introduce maximum demands. The difficulty in the present case is that negotiations will be divided in two stages, the first one being limited to the identification of topics by the Chiefs of Government. If the President accepts to place on the agenda a certain item, this may indicate that we are ready to make concessions on that item. This pitfall may be avoided by letting one of our allies introduce the item or waiting until the Soviets mention it. The existence of the pitfall is one more reason in favor of an identification of the areas of negotiation in terms of potential concessions, an identification on which agreement should be reached with our allies prior to the Conference. For this purpose, concessions should be examined from the following points of view: Are they capable of determining substantial reciprocity? Are they compatible with the national interest? And are they acceptable to public opinion? A few such areas have been indicated in this collection of documents, but quite incidentally. I will refer to them in paragraph 3, page 3.

## 2. Position of strength.

Another assumption which seems to have confused the thinking of the group is that we are in an overall position of strength. If we are really in a position of strength, what is important is to maintain this position at any price, to perfect the internal conditions of this strength and to lull the opponent into a false sense of security by showing a spirit of conciliation. A position of strength is incompatible with a frantic search for a "solution", with the grave risk of firming up the will of the opponent by trying to exact advantages which ~~he~~ is determined not to give. To quote the London Economist: "It is one of the enduring ironies of politics that whenever a firm and resolute attitude produces undreamt of concessions, the reasons why these concessions were made are always apt to be overlooked, while the hunger for more leads men to exchange firmness for imprudence". We should take this warning very seriously, and if the members of the group did not do so, it may be because, subconsciously, they are much less certain of our "position of strength" than they appear to be. In fact the bulk of the paper points out a decreasing edge of U.S. military power over Soviet military power since 1945, and a net Soviet superiority by 1960, especially in the field of technology. The balance of U.S. elements of strength and weakness on page 6 of the "Report" does not appear to be overwhelmingly in our favor. Surprisingly enough, our key advantage in the negotiations, namely: "a desire in the free world that the U.S. should not withdraw its forces from Europe" is barely

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mentioned. <sup>1/</sup> Little more than a qualified judgment about the balance emerging from a comparison of our present advantages and disadvantages in the cold war can emerge from a more careful analysis. The truth is probably that these various elements: manpower, technology, alliances, psychological motivations are shifting, difficult to grasp, and, above all, without common measure. If this is true, there cannot be any overall position of strength or weakness, only specific instances of superiority or inferiority, and therefore any reasoning based on the assumption of an overall position of strength is vitiated ab initio.

3. Proposals recommended for consideration.

Regardless of the basic approach, the group has hit upon the three main areas where there exist some freedom for maneuver: trade; exchanges of persons and information; Germany.

a) Trade: The proposal is listed on page 2 of the summary: "The U.S. should be prepared to make a series of proposals concerning exchange of ... goods ... covering: a. An agreement for the expansion of East-West trade". Unfortunately, there is no development of this key recommendation in the supporting papers. A great deal of thought must be put in the drafting of a U.S. position on trade. It is unfortunate that the CFEP studies on East-West trade were not completed before the present meeting of the three Foreign Secretaries. Allied planning on this very important matter will be deprived of the necessary background information. However, without exhausting the subject a few liminal points can be made: (1) At the proper stage of the negotiations we need not offer more as a concession than accepting the principle of relaxing restrictions on East-West trade; (2) We can make this relaxation conditional upon progress in disarmament plans or plans for the reunification of Germany; (3) Trade among allies must be liberalized before East-West trade is, and the U.S. must give tangible proofs that it wants to liberalize its own restrictions on free world trade. This means the prompt passage of a tariff simplification act; a firm attitude of the Executive on the Escape Clause, and an

<sup>1/</sup> With regard to the means of improving our position further, there is an excellent proposal in the supporting briefs for pooling NATO technical knowledge in order to boost our rate of progress. Although this is a long-range step, it might have a bearing on the Conference if before that Conference we were to start consultations in that direction with the Continental powers, especially the French. The French are particularly sensitive to what they consider a U.S. slight of their inventiveness and scientific ability, and some recognition given to them in this field would strengthen their support at the Conference. More generally, I think that we will have to examine seriously without delay all possible methods of strengthening the Western Alliance in the fields of science, culture and trade. Time is too short now to give detailed attention to these things in the preparation of the Conference. I alluded to them in a previous paper.

immediate start of tariff negotiation under the new Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act. This must be accompanied by a deliberate effort to use all possible financial and monetary devices to quicken the pace of the circulation of goods in the free world. <sup>1/</sup> (4) The U.S. view of East-West trade is that the scarcity of goods available for exchange in the Soviet orbit is a greater deterrent to trade than Western restrictions. This position is sound and cannot be abandoned. However it tends to minimize the value of the concessions which we could make and therefore it should be held in reserve at this time. (5) In any discussion about trade with Soviet orbit representatives, we must remember that, due to the trade monopoly in Communist lands, trade between East and West can not be conducted on an equal basis unless Western trade submits itself to some form of organization. Such an organization does not need to be and should not be as rigid as the COCOM - it can be most informal and still binding. In order to preclude future Soviet protests against the establishment of such an organization, we must include in any trade agreement with the East a provision that trade will be conducted on an equal basis, or on conditions of equality, or some like formula which permits us to organize vis-a-vis the Soviet trade monopoly. (6) Consumers goods must be included in trade agreements. An increase in trade of non-strategic items between East and West should obtain prior to negotiations covering those items now considered strategic. (7) Revision of the international lists should be considered, but only when relations have already improved. Incidentally, we must accustom ourselves to the idea that such a revision will be necessary at some point, and we must ascertain whether, in view of Soviet technological advance and in view of the lead time on scientific developments, trade in items which were in the past considered sensitive may now be harmless or even of indirect benefit to us.

b) Exchange of persons and information.

Listed page 2 of the summary: "The U.S. should be prepared to make a series of proposals concerning exchange of persons, information ... covering: ... b) An agreement greatly increasing the freedom of persons to travel anywhere in the world for peaceful purposes; c) A convention providing for free and unhampered international communications for the exchange of information and ideas, conditioned on conclusion of an anti-jamming agreement". There are negotiating possibilities in these fields, and we should not recoil from them for security reasons. Increased exchanges produce in fact better opportunities for police control of subversive activities than the present restrictions. In order to take full advantage of police control we should of course simultaneously improve

1/ I will not go into the politico-economic rationale for maximizing free world trade before going into a substantive relaxation of East-West control. Briefly said, East-West trade presents dangers which can be countered only by an expansion of trade among the nations of the free world.

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international police cooperation in the free world. The most severe treatment of domestic Communists is not incompatible with improved relations with the Soviet Union. The cases of Nazi Germany and India show that a crackdown on the domestic brand is in fact a pre-condition of an improvement of relations with the Kremlin and never a subject for complaint on the part of the latter. It should be well understood before we reach agreement, but it need not be spelled out in the agreement, that any activity within the territorial border of a State is fully subject to the police power of that State. The Soviet Union has traditionally adhered to this position. In order to prevent the subversive effort of the diffusion of Soviet literature, the proper authorities can ask our nationals to subscribe a statement that such literature is needed for research purposes. This makes available the name of the bona fide recipients, and renders automatically suspect anyone who chooses not to disclose his interest. As far as exchange of persons is concerned, the starting gun of "relaxation" should be an invitation to top Soviet leaders to visit the United States. This can be represented as a great concession on our part, and at the same time we can expect interesting results from formal and informal contacts of which these leaders have been deprived for a long time. Technicians should afterwards be invited in increasingly large numbers. We would benefit from reciprocity, and also from the influence our own people will exert on those technicians during their stay in this country. International communication is therefore the optimum field for negotiations. We will derive benefit from the concessions of the opponent, as well as from our own. In a contest between a Communist ideology, rudderless since the death of Stalin, and our free criticism, we are bound to win. Moreover, we can use these negotiations in the communication field to regulate parallel negotiations in the field of disarmament, for instance, on the sound theory that no progress is possible in reaching political or even technical agreement until some basic semantic differences between the Soviet Union and ourselves have been reconciled. Such things as "coexistence" or "reduction of tensions" have different meanings in Soviet and Western parlance, and no progress can be made toward a goal defined by a common understanding of these terms until this common understanding has been achieved. Such a consensus cannot be reached by negotiations, which will always be vitiated by the mental reservations of Soviet representatives, but only by a free exchange of ideas. Even if we consider with skepticism the possibility of narrowing the gap between Soviet and Western approaches, the slim hope which remains of doing it rests on free flow of information. A clear U.S. position in favor of the latter would not only enhance our prestige in the world, show our self-confidence, but might also in the long term help progress on other fronts.

c) Germany: Appendix C II, "U.S. Guidelines for a German Settlement", indicates a gradual approach to the question of Germany's reunification. Not only a gradual approach has considerable merit, but it is probably the only practical approach. We must put time on our side. A serious criticism is addressed to the hypothesis on page 9, according to

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which a strongly rearmed and neutral Germany might be acceptable to us "provided the Soviet Union evacuates the territory of the European satellites and commits itself not to interfere in the political affairs of the reconstituted satellite governments." Obviously such a neutralization of Germany would take us back to the 1910's and to the 1930's. The resulting imbalance in Europe would produce a new world war as surely as the two preceding World Wars were the result of a similar imbalance. Moreover, a Soviet commitment to non-interference in domestic affairs of the new Eastern governments would be meaningless. Such commitments are easily disposed of by the Communist argument that subversive activities <sup>inspired by them</sup> in the territory of <sup>sovereign</sup> independent states are justiciable <sup>"allegedly"</sup> a concern of the police of these States, that they are not the concern nor the responsibility of the Soviet State. In spite of what the authors of the document say, the Soviets may well advance a proposal for Germany's neutralization con rearmament, but such a proposal would be against U.S. interests. I think that as far as Germany is concerned, we should insist that there is no way back from a European community, including the whole of Germany, that this community of economic interests and culture exists potentially, that East Germany is a logical part of it, that it cannot be dismantled, that the only aspects of it which are subject to negotiation are the security aspects. If this leads us to consider a "European security pact" between the Western European defense organization and the Eastern defense organization, and although such a pact might constitute one of the Soviet proposals, I do not think that we should reject the entire concept without having seriously considered it in the preparation of the Conference. Non-aggression or security pacts among groups of powers of approximately equal strength might be a useful expedient at this time. It is surprising that no discussion on this subject is reflected in the Quantico papers.

4. Critiques and suggestions relating to other points of the summary.

a) Berlin highway tolls. "The U.S. should insist that the Soviets lift the Berlin toll blockade prior to the Conference". There is apparently no harm in mentioning informally the highway toll robbery to the Soviets, but it would be a mistake to make this a pre-condition of the Conference. If we seem to attach so much importance to the toll blockade, the Soviets will either refuse to act and "justify" their refusal on the basis of GDR's autonomy, in which case we have lost our move since we can ill afford to follow up on our threat not to go to Geneva. Moreover we will have given the Soviets a clue for reaffirming the principle of GDR's autonomy, a principle which we do not recognize. On the other hand, if the Soviets direct a lifting of the blockade, our attitude will permit them to represent this as a great concession for which payment will be expected. Such a move will place us in a weaker, not in a stronger position. On the other hand, the Soviet directive would be evidence of the GDR Government's subservience to the Soviet Union, a fact which could be exploited at the Conference. In order to maximize our advantage and

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minimize our potential loss, we must therefore raise the toll question most informally at San Francisco and without seeming to attach too much importance to it.

b) Austrian Treaty: "Suggestions should be made to the USSR, to the U.K. and France, that they should be prepared to exchange ratification of the Austrian Treaty on the occasion of the Conference". This approach plays into Soviet hands since the latter would make propaganda hay out of such an exchange. U.S., U.K. and France should expedite the ratification of the Austrian Treaty and the implementation of measures undertaken under the Treaty. If the Soviets lag behind this will give us a talking point at the Conference.

c) Control of armaments: The discussions and the recommendations overlook the main point, namely, that the Summit Conference is not called upon to "solve" the problem of "control of armaments", but to "make arrangements for subsequent negotiations". This raises two questions. In the first place, the Soviet omnibus proposal involves a broadening of the concept of disarmament and lifts it from the technical to the political plane by introducing elements such as "dismantling of foreign military bases", "ban on war propaganda", "settlement of Far Eastern problems by the nations concerned". The first question is, therefore, whether or not the UN Commission or the Subcommittee are empowered to discuss these questions. Since they are probably not competent, a great deal of discussion at Summit will be devoted to the aspects of a new machinery. Many points will be involved, such as Germany's participation, which should be carefully considered before the Conference. The second point is whether or not the U.S. should make a new disarmament proposal at Summit. In view of Adenauer's insistence, this point deserves serious attention. If such a proposal is desirable, it could hardly be purely technical in nature and limited to such questions as "inspection", "overflight of aircrafts", and "meeting of a scientific conference on fallout", as proposed in the paper. A purely technical plan will certainly not "captivate the mind of men". Two courses therefore are possible. We might propose to circumscribe the discussion on disarmament, and, as we did at Berlin in 1954, propose to start with the less controversial items, going progressively into the more controversial ones. If we follow this course, we should, however, pick up some new non-technical subject, such as discussion of "war propaganda", in order to dress up the proposal. Another course is to bring a whole new proposal along the lines of the President's speeches of April 13 and December 8, 1953, taking into account the need for a "moral and economic substitute for armaments".

d) Far East: "a) Take steps to put strains on the Moscow-Peiping alliance; b) Keep the Japanese fully informed of progress at the Conference". The first proposal is based on a closely reasoned paper by Professor Linebarger, but unfortunately vitiated by wishful thinking. There are no evidences of exploitable strain between Moscow and Peiping. It is highly doubtful that we should renew the Yalta experience ~~to~~ negotiating

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Chinese matters with Russia. There are, however, some interesting remarks in Professor Linebarger's paper, and the line which he indicates is not fundamentally inconsistent with the approach which I will recommend in the next paragraph. As far as Japan is concerned, I agree that we should give Japan a sense of participation, but we must remember that the internal situation of Japan and the status of their present negotiations with the Soviet Union do not permit us to take them completely in our confidence. We should certainly keep them informed of the progress of Summit, and possibly consult them, but not without taking precautions.

5. Recommended approach.

It is not sufficient to state that we should test the Soviets during the Conference. It is necessary to indicate along which line, on the basis of which principle we will test them. I propose to revert here to an old standby of American policy, namely, the question of respect of treaties. Pacta sunt servanda. The type of "coexistence" which can obtain as a result of the forthcoming negotiations is admittedly limited in space and time. The Soviet Union will not cease to believe in the ultimate triumph of Communism, will not abandon war as an instrument of revolutionary policy, but may accept for a period of time certain limitations on aggressive actions which will simply formalize the limitations which they have already accepted to apply de facto to their conduct. Substantial changes in the world situation are ruled out, but the world expects to be reassured. We are working under conditions of peace psychosis, and this is what obliges us to make concessions. Our success will be measured by our ability to obtain a maximum of advantages for a minimum of concessions on our part. I have indicated that the best method for avoiding excessive concessions was to determine very carefully in advance the areas where we can afford to be flexible. But an intent to be flexible on certain points should not be revealed too soon. On which basis can we present maximum demands for negotiation purposes without showing an inflexibility which would alienate the opinion of the world? I think that this basis is the pacta sunt servanda adage. Since this is the first meeting of heads of governments since the post war period, there are good reasons for basing our demands on wartime and post war agreements which the Soviets have conspicuously violated. Surely no "coexistence" can take place even for a limited time, if treaties are not observed and what chance is there that agreements reached in 1955 will be observed if the post-1945 violations are glossed over? It is by reference to the 1945 agreements and treaties that we can keep the Soviets on the defensive when such matters as the status of the satellite countries, or the Far Eastern tensions are mentioned. We should, for instance, find an opportunity for asking the Soviets which they intend to do about their Yalta commitment for free elections in Poland, and what they intend to do about the August 14, 1945 Chinese-Soviet Treaty. We should not hesitate to mention or threaten to mention such things as the Katyn massacre and the violation of the treaty with the Republic of China in Manchuria. Without asking for unconditional surrender, we can maneuver the Soviets into a position where, with only a little face saving, they will make such "concessions" which they have most probably already resolved to make.