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# ARE BUREAUCRACIES IMPORTANT? (OR ALLISON WONDERLAND)

*by Stephen D. Krasner*

Who and what shapes foreign policy? In recent years, analyses have increasingly emphasized not rational calculations of the national interest or the political goals of national leaders but rather bureaucratic procedures and bureaucratic politics. Starting with Richard Neustadt's *Presidential Power*, a judicious study of leadership published in 1960, this approach has come to portray the American President as trapped by a permanent government more enemy than ally. Bureaucratic theorists imply that it is exceedingly difficult if not impossible for political leaders to control the organizational web which surrounds them. Important decisions result from numerous smaller actions taken by individuals at different levels in the bureaucracy who have partially incompatible national, bureaucratic, political, and personal objectives. They are not necessarily a reflection of the aims and values of high officials.

*Presidential Power* was well received by John Kennedy, who read it with interest, recommended it to his associates, and commissioned Neustadt to do a private study of the 1962 Skybolt incident. The approach has been developed and used by a number of scholars—Roger Hilsman, Morton Halperin, Arthur Schlesinger, Richard Barnet, and Graham Allison—some of whom held sub-Cabinet positions during the 1960's. It was the subject of a special conference at the RAND Corporation, a main theme of a course at the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton and the subject of a faculty seminar at Harvard. It is the intellectual paradigm which guides the new public policy program in the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard. Analyses of bureaucratic politics have been used to explain alliance behaviour during the 1956 Suez crisis and the Skybolt incident, Truman's relations with MacArthur, American policy in Vietnam, and now most thoroughly the Cuban missile crisis in Graham Allison's *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, published in 1971 (Little Brown & Company). Allison's volume is the elaboration of an earlier and influential article on this subject. With the publication of his book this approach to foreign policy now receives its definitive statement. The bureaucratic interpretation of foreign policy has become the conventional wisdom.

My argument here is that this vision is misleading, dangerous, and compelling: misleading because it obscures the power of the President; dangerous because it undermines the assumptions of democratic politics by relieving high officials of responsibility; and compelling because it offers leaders an excuse for their failures and scholars an opportunity for innumerable reinterpretations and publications.

The contention that the Chief Executive is trammelled by the permanent government has disturbing implications for any effort to impute responsibility to public officials. A democratic political philosophy assumes that responsibility for the acts of governments can be attributed to elected officials. The charges of these men are embodied in legal statutes. The electorate punishes an erring official by rejecting him at the polls. Punishment is senseless unless high officials are responsible for the acts of government. Elections have some impact only if government, that most complex of modern organizations, can be controlled. If the bureaucratic machine escapes manipulation and direction even by the highest officials, then punishment is illogical. Elections are a farce not because the people suffer from false consciousness, but because public officials are impotent, enmeshed in a bureaucracy so large that the actions of government are not responsive to their will. What sense to vote a man out of office when his successor, regardless of his values, will be trapped in the same web of only incrementally mutable standard operating procedures?

## *The Rational Actor Model*

Conventional analyses that focus on the values and objectives of foreign policy, what Allison calls the Rational Actor Model, are perfectly coincident with the ethical assumptions of democratic politics. The state is viewed as a rational unified actor. The behaviour of states is the outcome of a rational decision-making process. This process has three steps. The options for a given situation are spelled out. The consequences of each option are projected. A choice is made which maximizes the values held by decision-makers. The analyst knows what the state did. His objective is to explain why by

NEW YORK TIMES
19 APR 1972


# Intelligent Use of Intelligence

By ADAM YARMOLINSKY

WASHINGTON—One of the least attractive postures for a Government official in public debate is "If you only knew what I know. . . ." It has always seemed to me that Government performance should be able to stand the scrutiny of public examination and judgment based on no more than a careful reading of the daily newspapers, and that it is no proper defense to take refuge in what you cannot tell your critics.

Nevertheless, there are several kinds of materials produced by the Central Intelligence Agency that can be extremely useful, particularly in making —or evaluating—detailed decisions on the development of weapons, the deployment of forces, and the provision of military assistance.

To take these materials in descending order of importance, the most valuable first, I would begin with order-of-battle information, which can be and is quite precise and informative, particularly when it covers a period of several years. Without getting into highly classified matters, it is safe to say that advanced technology has considerably increased the accuracy and completeness of this data over the last decade.

Next in importance I would put the detailed accounts of the political and economic situations in particular countries or regions. These accounts provide a degree of contemporary detail that is simply not available in the open literature.

The third, and perhaps least important kind of information is the flow of news bulletins that are, many of them, the grist of the daily press and the broadcast media. This material is, or was when I last knew it, published in daily compilations, edited at several degrees of security classification.

There are a number of problems that arise in trying to make effective use of intelligence materials—including some dangerous temptations. To begin with there is the problem created by the sheer volume of available material. The signals are there, but they cannot be heard above the background noise, or distinguished from it.

The problem of volume, or noise, is further complicated by the difficulties of proving a negative. During the period after the Cuba missile crisis of 1962 there were (understandably) a number of reports of suspicious cylindrical objects observed in Cuba. Each of these was painstakingly checked out by the agency until the analysts were satisfied that the report was in error, or that what had been seen was a SAM air defense missile, not an MRBM or an IRBM. But the agency could not prove there were no offensive missiles in Cuba. And the general availability of these reports to the Congress might tempt some individuals to issue inflammatory statements.

It is not only immediately current intelligence that can be misused by irresponsible recipients. If this legislation is enacted, a special responsibility will attach to the recipient committees to police the dissemination of the materials received.

Careful control is essential for two reasons: in order to avoid the foreign policy consequences of public disclosure, and in order to protect sources. The issue of protection of sources is one on which I have no special expertise to offer the committee, except to point out that there are matters on which one nation is willing to have another nation gather information about itself, by covert or clandestine means, so long as there need be no official recognition that the veil of official secrecy has been pierced. The point is one that in its nature makes examples inappropriate.

The greatest danger is that Congressional overexposure of intelligence materials might lead the executive to curtail the flow of information to itself as well as to the Congress, or to attempt to tamper with the impartiality of intelligence reporting. That would be a major tragedy. I do not suggest the possibility as an argument against the proposed legislation, but rather as pointing to even greater need for an effective system of self policy.

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*Adam Yarmolinsky is professor of law at Harvard. These remarks were made before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.*

17 APR 1972

# Chile blast at U.S. 'not news'

By VIRGINIA PREWETT

As expected, Chile blasted the U.S. at the current Organization of American States assembly. It took the news play, to the virgual exclusion of everything else said, tho it was no more than a repetition of charges of U.S. intervention and general mistreatment previously made by Chile and thus was, strictly speaking, now news.

The impression left with the U.S. reading public, and on Capitol Hill, was: "There they go again, those Latin Americans, whacking the U.S. even tho we've poured out billions of tax-payers' money to help them."

Our neighbors know that U.S. economic cooperation in recent years has been mostly loans tied to the purchase of U.S. goods. But this never comes thru to our public.

Many things were said as the OAS Assembly opened that are of substantive interest and concern to our public. Tho you would never guess it from the coverage, other countries got lambasted there as well as our own.

Guatemala raked Great Britain over the coals in their current dispute over British Honduras (Belize), in which Britain sent naval units into the Caribbean.

And Fidel Castro, whose cause was pushed by Peru, was both directly and indirectly lambasted by a number of nations' representatives.

## HITS AT CASTRO

Venezuela's statement very clearly hit at Castro, without naming him, in condeming the kind of "interventionism" he practices. Costa Rica condemned "the acts of intervention aimed at creating violence and terrorism as the path to power thru the destruction of political liberties" — a clear shot at Fidel. Paraguay named Cuba as "the only vassal state in the hemisphere — the vassal of Russia." Colombia charged Cuba with "permenent intervention" in aiding subversive groups thruout the hemisphere. Argentine, in an indirect reference, deplored the "use of violence, whether from the left or the right, to get political power."

Quite apart from Chile's plaints, our country was criticized for failing to live up to promises of economic cooperation. Trinidad-Tobago brought up the imposition of the 10 per cent tariff surcharge, which tho rescinded, still rankles.

And Mexico gave what was clearly an important warning in saying that the issue of U.S.-Latin American economic cooperation is the issue of peace in the continent.

## APPROVED BY MANY

Colombia suggested that Latin American countries restrict expenditures on armaments, and this was approved by many speakers. This can be a historic step forward in the hemisphere and deserved notice. It was not judged newsworthy in face of Chile's blast.

If the news play reflected things said at the Assembly one-sidedly, the Assembly itself poorly reflected realities in Latin America.

For example, even as it deliberated, the Tupemaros in Uruguay began what is called "virtual civil war."

The Tupemaros are Castro-type urban guerrillas whom Fidel Castro encouraged openly from Santiago, Chile, during his long visit there. Responsible U.S. newsmen have it from CIA and other top-level sources that Fidel Castro's Chilean embassy is helping the Yupemaros, as well as guerrillas in Bolivia. Yet Chile escaped all mention in the matter.

BALTIMORE NEWS AMERICAN
14 APR 1972



[redacted]

JACK ANDERSON

# Kremlin to Pay for Revolutions

The Kremlin has asked Cuban dictator Fidel Castro "to try to regain control over Latin American revolutionary movements" and has promised "to pay all the costs involved."

This is the secret finding of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), which has put together the jigsaw pieces from its agents in Europe and South America.

In an earlier column, we reported that Castro had moved his Latin American liberation center from his embassy in Paris to his embassy in Santiago, Chile. His ambition, according to the CIA, is to stir up "revolution everywhere in Latin America."

This clandestine operation, says the CIA, will be financed by the Soviets.

CITING INFORMATION that came indirectly from Cuban intelligence officer Enrique Benavides Santos in Paris, the CIA reports:

"Benavides said that through Cuba, the Soviets will support armed revolution or political struggle, whichever was deemed appropriate in given countries throughout Latin America.

"According to Benavides, the Soviets have told Cuba they will 'pay for everything' in helping all revolutionary groups, even Catholic radical groups.

"Benavides strongly emphasized that Cuba has not changed its line but still favors armed revolution everywhere in Latin America."

THE NEW liberation center in Santiago, says the CIA, "will receive Soviet funds via Cuba and play a large role in the new Soviet-Cuban strategy for Latin America.

"Representatives of Latin American revolutionary groups now in Chile," the CIA adds, "are currently preparing a campaign of increased revolutionary activity with the support of Cuba."

At least one revolutionary group, according to another CIA report, is receiving funds directly from the Soviet Union. A source inside the Guatemalan Communist movement told the CIA that "the Soviets were giving $100,000 per year to the Guatemalan Communist Party (PGT)."

From a member of the Cuban delegation at the United Nations, meanwhile, the CIA learned that at least some Cuban leaders "are doing some rethinking on basic revolutionary tactics.

"There is some theoretical opposition to the 'Che Guevara' theory, which favors supporting native insurrectionists and anarchists in poor countries," reports the CIA.

"Instead, support is growing for the Chilean formula, which maintains that traditional democratic procedures are the best means of socialist power in weak, backward countries.

"It is in countries like Brazil," the CIA quoted the Cuban delegate as saying, "that stronger active measures should be taken."

WHEN A self-styled consumers group in New York City tried to keep Sen. Frank Moss, D-Utah, from talking about "no-fault" insurance at their inaugural meeting, Moss angrily cancelled the speech.

The "consumers group" is made up of wives of members of the American Trial Lawyers Association. The Association is busily lobbying against "no-fault" because it will reduce lawyers' fees by an estimated $1 billion (b).

But the wives have agreed to back product safety bills which don't cut into their fur coats and their husbands' Cadillacs. So they wanted Moss to speak.

Footnote: "No-fault" is scheduled for secret hearings in a few days before the Senate Commerce Committee.

WASHINGTON POST
14 APR 1972

**The Washington Merry-Go-Round**

# Kremlin Financing Latin Revolution

*By Jack Anderson*

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## Soviet-Cuban Strategy

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WASHINGTON DAILY NEWS
12 APR 1972


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STATINTL

*Chile prepares for attack*

# Battle brews at OAS meeting

By VIRGINIA PREWETT

BATTLE lines of a sort are already drawn for the Organization of American States Assembly, which began a ten-day session here yesterday. Chile has told the United States it "cannot ignore" Washington's (alleged) scheming in 1970 to prevent the election of Dr. Salvador Allende to its presidency, as tenuously revealed in the Anderson-ITT scandal.

The U.S. delegation to the OAS Assembly is prepared to assume a "statesman-like, dignified attitude," but if attacked hard will "reply in kind."

The Nixon Administration, from the highest level, has signaled to Dr. Allende what weapons it has. But it is also clear the White House wants to avoid a knock-down-and-drag-out fight at the OAS with Chile. Our side has had good success getting complaining Latinos down to work in committees and may do this again at the Assembly, where such meetings are closed.

Our Secretary of State, William Rogers, obviously does not want to become involved. After entertaining the visiting delegation heads at a luncheon today he will leave for a visit to Canada tomorrow.

## LOUD, CLEAR SIGNALS

The signals launched by the Nixon team to Chile on the Assembly eve have been loud and clear. They tell Santiago that Washington has detailed proof that President Allende is harboring a Cuban embassy now trying to upset governments in both Bolivia and Uruguay.

On Friday, April 7, the New York Times' roving columnist on foreign affairs published leaked information aimed at both Castro and Allende. It revealed that Bolivian exiles in Chile now marshaling to "communize Bolivia" are directed by a Cuban mission in Santiago. Dr. Allende is pointedly tied into the affair by the revelation that the Cuban who heads the mission is a Castro intelligence officer named Luis Fernandez Ona, "married to Allende's favorite daughter, Beatrice."

## AID TO GUERRILLAS

Earlier, an even more detailed leak of CIA information to Jack Anderson on March 30 had given chapter and verse on the way the Cubans in Castro's Santiago embassy and the Allendista Chileans are working to help guerrillas trying to overturn governments in Bolivia and Uruguay.

Latin American sources had long since revealed this to me and it comes as no surprise to the well-informed. But the timing of the leaks, especially the one to columnist Sulzberger, indicates the White House holds a strong hand and wishes it to be known.

But this same White House, at the moment, is in a bind on the issue, one it will not be free of until after President Nixon visits Moscow in May, if then. The Nixon-Kissinger team wishes to keep its options wide, if possible. Depending on how Moscow is willing to deal, the team might later want to make a 180 degree turn, specifically on Castro's Cuba.

Other complaints against the United States besides Chile's, will be heard at the OAS assembly, echoing those sure to be voiced at this weeks' Santiago meeting of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). And these complaints may become deeply involved in our domestic, election-year politics. For none other than the longtime Nixon critic, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman, Sen. J. William Fulbright, is meeting with the Latinos on April 14.

NATION
3 APR 1972 STAR-NEWS

# CIA: THE PRESIDENT'S

**VICTOR MARCHETTI**
*Mr. Marchetti was on the director's staff of the CIA when he resigned from the agency two years ago. Since then, his novel* The Rope-Dancer *has been published by Grosset & Dunlap; he is now working on a book-length critical analysis of the CIA.*

The Central Intelligence Agency's role in U.S. foreign affairs is, like the organization itself, clouded by secrecy and confused by misconceptions, many of them deliberately promoted by the CIA with the cooperation of the news media. Thus to understand the covert mission of this agency and to estimate its value to the political leadership, one must brush myths aside and penetrate to the sources and circumstances from which the agency draws its authority and support. The CIA is no accidental, romantic aberration; it is exactly what those who govern the country intend it to be—the clandestine mechanism whereby the executive branch influences the internal affairs of other nations.

In conducting such operations, particularly those that are inherently risky, the CIA acts at the direction and with the approval of the President or his Special Assistant for National Security Affairs. Before initiating action in the field, the agency almost invariably establishes that its operational plans accord with the aims of the administration and, when possible, the sympathies of Congressional leaders. (Sometimes the endorsement or assistance of influential individuals and institutions outside government is also sought.) CIA directors have been remarkably well aware of the dangers they court, both personally and for the agency, by not gaining specific official sanction for their covert operations. They are, accordingly, often more careful than are administrators in other areas of the bureaucracy to inform the White House of their activities and to seek Presidential blessing. To take the blame publicly for an occasional operational blunder is a small price to pay in return for the protection of the Chief Executive and the men who control the Congress.

The U-2 incident of 1960 was viewed by many as an outrageous blunder by the CIA, wrecking the Eisenhower-Khrushchev summit conference in Paris and setting U.S.-Soviet relations back several years. Within the inner circles of the administration, however, the shoot-down was shrugged off as just one of those things that happen in the chancy business of intelligence. After attempts to deny responsibility for the action had failed, the President openly defended and even praised the work of the CIA, although for obvious political reasons he avoided noting that he had authorized the disastrous flight. The U-2 program against the USSR was canceled, but work on its follow-on system, the A-11 (now the SR-71,) was speeded up. Only the launching of the reconnaissance satellites put an end to espionage against the Soviet Union by manned aircraft. The A-11 development program was completed, nevertheless, on the premise that it, as well as the U-2, might be useful elsewhere.

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continued under improved cover. A few of the larger operations went on under almost open CIA sponsorship, Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty and Air America being examples. And all the while, the CIA was conducting a $500 million-a-year private war in Laos and pacification/assassination programs in Vietnam.

The reorganization of the U.S. intelligence community late last year in no way altered the CIA's mission as the clandestine action arm of American foreign policy. Most of the few changes are intended to improve the financial management of the community, especially in the military intelligence services where growth and the technical costs of collecting information are almost out of control. Other alterations are designed to improve the meshing of the community's product with national security planning and to provide the White House with greater control over operations policy. However, none of that implies a reduction of the CIA's role in covert foreign policy action. In fact, the extensive review conducted by the White House staff in preparation for the reorganization drew heavily on advice provided by the CIA and that given by former agency officials through such go-betweens as the influential Council on Foreign Relations. Earlier in the Nixon Administration, the Council had responded to a similar request by recommending that in the future the CIA should concentrate its covert pressure tactics on Latin American, African and Asian targets, using more foreign nationals as agents and relying more on private U.S. corporations and other institutions as covers. Nothing was said about reduc-



continued

THE ECONOMIST
18-24 March 1972



# On the flip side

THE LAST OF THE GIANTS
By C. L. Sulzberger.
*Weidenfeld and Nicolson. 1,067 pages. £6.*

FALLEN OAKS
By André Malraux.
*Hamish Hamilton. 123 pages. £2.*

Conversations with the great tend to produce better anecdotes a year later than weighty reporting the next day. When the great are seriously selling a line they are invariably dull and unpersuasive; when they are not selling a line they much prefer to talk about the past or people of the past, and so say things that are glad and sad by turns but are not history, and are not immediately printable if the journalist wants to be asked back again.

So Mr Sulzberger's anecdotes of everyone from de Gaulle and Churchill to forgotten diplomats and Africans is a highly readable and enjoyable flip side to his staid, responsible, ask-me-back columns in the New York Times. To M. Malraux no cliché uttered in his presence, far less one by himself, is devoid of philosophical importance. So he is a trifle high-falutin'; but since not many people got to hear de Gaulle's last table talk his recollections, too, are entertaining: a sort of flip mandarinese.

Mr Sulzberger's Churchill is almost in a half-world: Chartwell had a visibly declining owner whereas the Boisserie never quite seemed to, even at the end. Churchill in 1956 has three glasses of wine, two of port and two of brandy at lunch, reads his books aloud, plays with his carp and defends Stalin (who "never broke his word to me"). But although his lucidity no longer has a dynamo to keep it going, he seems more at peace with destiny than Malraux's report of de Gaulle, living with his cat, two television sets, his trees and the stars. The general is profoundly pessimistic, surviving "consciously at the end of a civilisation," watching "the funeral procession of a world." Nixon is popular "because Asia still believes peace to be possible." But that is a Pandora's box:

> I don't believe the United States, in spite of its power, has a long-term policy. Its desire, and it will satisfy it one day, is to desert Europe. You will see.

That is the authentic voice of gaullism all right, and it explains the despair of the Americans Mr Sulzberger writes about who had to deal with de Gaulle in his prime. M. Malraux can be as superficial as the next man: spotting a plough, he is instantly reminded of the Cincinnatus indoors. But then he hits the essence of gaullism in the next sentence:

> Perhaps the clue to his character was not simply the impulse to say "No," but that he was at ease only when he said "No."

So there is great contempt for the Pompidous of the world who believe things can be solved by getting people to lunch together. That, of course, would never do for journalists, Mr Sulzberger among them. Not much misses his eye or ear: Tito pouring claret into his champagne (learned from King Paul of Greece), Prince Bernhard drinking only bourbon because the Germans had robbed him of his scotch, an ill Dulles saying "the hell with it" in Paris and taking two portions of lobster bisque.

There are, naturally, many unguarded remarks. George Brown declares Gaitskell "is always away when troubles comes." Macmillan admits on the common market in 1962 that he has no alternative policy: "I have always made it a rule in my life to avoid fall-back positions. When you have a fall-back position, you always fall back." Allen Dulles of the CIA boasts: "The Russians are too smart to put bases on Cuba." Dean Acheson muses on Dulles and Selwyn Lloyd: "They're a pair of slick lawyers trying to outsmart each other." And Randolph Churchill and Julian Amery will not mention Eden in July, 1956, except as "the jerk."

NORFOLK, VA.
PILOT
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# Intelligence and the Colleges: A Study

By Don Hill
The Virginian-Pilot Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON.

THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY—The CIA, dreaded, accused, and abused on seven continents—has joined the college PR lecture circuit.

But unlike its fellow campus crawlers among government agencies and special pleaders, the CIA wants its public relations program kept hush-hush.

Secret publicity? This tricky exercise was attempted last month at Hollins College, Roanoke, Va., at a weekend conference entitled—honest—"Freedom and Thought Control in America."

A senior CIA official made a speech to more than 100 students, at least one newspaper reporter, and a girl with a tape recorder.

The handsome, gray-haired speaker —who had been identified in advance publicity only as "John Maury, federal employe"—was introduced to the open audience as a spokesman for the Central Intelligence Agency.

Maury actually is a high CIA official, in charge among other duties of the agency's congressional liaison.

His remarks, Maury told the mixed-bag group confidentially, should be "kept in the family."

The girl with the tape recorder said afterwards she planned to make transcriptions for anyone who wanted them.

Maury subsequently protested that news reports of his foray would require the CIA to "review its efforts" at "trying to maintain some sort of communication with the academic community."

Queried for this report, he said last week, "Well, we wouldn't want to be accused of going around propagandizing on college campuses."

It's hard to see what else the CIA was doing. According to Dr. Henry Nash, chairman of Hollins' department of political science, Maury told him the Hollins visit was a kind of trial project to see whether the CIA can speak to student groups to try to sort of refurbish its image.

In his talk, Maury painted a glowing picture of CIA operations.

The agency, he said, is "the eyes and ears of the policy makers and it is our job to collect enough information so that they will not blunder into dangerous situations."

Later over cocktails, Nicholas Von Hoffman, the Washington Post's impassioned leftist columnist, who was a fellow conference participant, twitted Maury about that.

Von Hoffman unkindly mentioned the Bay of Pigs, as "one of the agency's triumphs."

The agency, Maury responded, only gathers information; it doesn't make policy.

The speaker had some titillating tidbits for the audience. It is little known, he said, but the senior Russian intelligence officer on duty the day Francis Gary Powers was shot down, May 1, 1960, was working with American intelligence. The officer was later caught and executed.

Von Hoffman apparently didn't take time to note that some circles don't consider the 1960 U2 incident an American intelligence triumph either.

The CIA, however, Maury said was able with accuracy to determine the extent of the Russian long-range missile threat and this information helped President Kennedy triumph in the Cuban missile crisis.

There was some heckling from Maury's audience, according to people who were there. A woman told Maury she'd lived in Athens a year and was appalled at the CIA's role in supporting the military "colonels coup" in that country.

Maury shot back that he'd been in Greece for six years and had been Athens agent at the time of the coup. Some of her statements were inaccurate, he told the woman.

After the speech session, Maury, Von Hoffman and others retired to the home of Hollins' publicity director, Mrs. Virginia Carter, for cocktails and more heckling.

Despite the criticism to which it is subjected, Maury said in his speech, the CIA's activities are directed and scrutinized by a number of federal organizations and the Congress.

How about the CIA's subsidizing of the National Student Association, an international scandal when the story broke, Von Hoffman asked Maury over drinks.

There was no other way to provide the money for those students to get to international conferences, Maury said.

But, Von Hoffman asked innocently hadn't congressional committees already decided not to appropriate funds for this purpose? Didn't the CIA thus thwart the will of Congress?

"You don't understand," Von Hoffman says Maury replied.

It's not really a secret that the CIA long has attempted to maintain contact with college campuses. That, after all is where it must recruit the bright young minds that will don the cloaks and wield the daggers of the future. That also is where the scholarly studies and overt information gathering that are the basis for 90 per cent of intelligence are centered.

Maury had noted in his speech that the CIA reaps some of its criticism because it's a facet of American morality "that we feel that anything done in secret must be a little naughty."

Like secret publicity maybe?

Maury also had said that intelligence workers "learn from mistakes and failures."

There may have been a lesson at Hollins. The newspaper reporter was drawn to the Maury speech because of advance publicity sent out by the college. It said that a "federal government employe" would discuss intelligence activities. CIA agents often describe themselves to acquaintances simply as "federal employes." "That just meant CIA to me," the reporter said.

"I know," said Jane White, the student chairman who arranged the conference. "That's why we put it that way."

WASHINGTON STAR
19 MAR 1972



# Memoir of a Major, but Humorless, Journalist



By BURT HOFFMAN
Star Staff Writer

One of the curses of newspapermen today is that too many of them too often take themselves too seriously.

And Herbert L. Matthews, in this often impersonal and generally humorless memoir of his 45 years with the New York Times, takes himself more seriously than most.

Yet it is hard for one newspaperman to fault another who says of his work: "To be where history is made; to survive danger; to get off a whacking good, first-hand story for one's newspaper and get it off in time — this is what makes journalism a great and attractive profession."

Matthews, whose chief claim to fame now rests with the interviews he had with Fidel Castro in his mountain hideaway in 1957, was an editorial writer for the 17 years preceding his retirement in 1967. His other 28 years with The Times were spent in a variety of assignments, mostly overseas, including stints in Paris, Rome, Madrid, New Delhi and London. He covered the Abyssinian campaign

BOOKS

of Mussolini, the Republican side of the Spanish Civil War, the Allied battle in Italy in World War II and the amphibious landing on the French Riviera.

HIS ACCOUNT OF those years, particularly the years in Spain and his visits to Cuba, is the account of a dedicated man who cares passionately about his profession, his newspaper, the events he saw and the stories he wrote. It is this passion, and his admitted bias for "truth" as he defined truth, that brought him into conflict with many others at The Times as well as with portions of the public, including some officialdom.

As a young reporter covering the Loyalist side of the war in Spain from 1936 to 1939 he proved indefatigable and courageous — Hemingway, who was there with him much of the time, described Matthews as "brave as a badger." Matthews was at or near the front lines of most major engagements and he has justifiable pride in what he wrote.

He does not, however, have pride in what The Times printed. "The truth suffered," says Matthews, because editors handling his stories would not believe his reports and mangled them or did not print them. Matthews contends that his colleague from The Times who was covering the forces of Franco suffered no such problems and was believed even though he wrote only what was handed to him at headquarters and rarely ventured forth to see what was going on.

Much of the antagonism toward his dispatches is attributed by Matthews to the Catholicism of the editors in The Times "bullpen" who were responsible for the handling of his stories. These editors, he writes, opposed the Republican government and the support it was getting from the Communists.

Similarly, Matthews expresses much bitterness at the antagonism toward him by some of his Times colleagues and the lack of understanding of Castro and Matthews' attempts to tell the true story.

His initial interviews in the Sierra Maestra created the legend of Castro. They gave the impression that Castro, who at the time had something like 18 followers, was in fact winning his revolt against Batista. The effect was to raise Castro's morale by making him an international figure and to rally supporters to his side.

While Matthews' stories exaggerated the extent of Castro's support, they did provide an accurate impression of his political aims—aims which could be accepted by anyone who believes, as Matthews does, in justice and equality. Much dispute arose in later years over whether Castro at the time he met Matthews was a Communist. Matthews' critics contend that Castro deceived him and thus Matthews deceived the world. Matthews himself and others have pretty convincingly demonstrated that Castro's communism followed his ascendancy to power.

AN INCIDENT IN October, 1962, during the Cuban missile crisis, tells much about Matthews' relationship with The Times and with Castro. Matthews was in Mexico City with a visa to Cuba and a seat reserved on what turned out to be the last plane that left for Havana after President Kennedy's quarantine speech. His plan to visit Cuba had been the subject of a conversation between Matthews and Kennedy at the White House the previous July. Kennedy had asked Matthews to report back to him after the visit.

While awaiting the flight, Matthews also discussed his trip with Thomas E. Mann, then U.S. ambassador to Mexico, and arrangements were made for him to talk to representatives of the Central Intelligence Agency to find out what the CIA wanted to learn in Cuba. But the day before the plane left, John Oakes, editor of The Times editorial page, contacted Matthews "with orders from on high that I was not, under any circumstances, to go to Havana."

In a subsequent memo for Times editors, Matthews wrote: "I was in the peculiar position of being trusted by the White House and the State Department, but not by my own newspaper." The moral of the incident, writes Matthews, "is that journalism is sometimes too important to be left to editors and publishers. I presume that there was some element of concern for my safety . . . but I suspect it was much more a case of the embarrassment that would have been felt — and the criticisms from obvious quarters — at the New York Times having an editor in Havana — and me, of all people — during such a crisis."

In 1963, Matthews did return to Cuba as part of a trip he was taking for background information for his editorial writing. Barred from writing anything for the news department, Matthews attempted to write for The Times Sunday magazine. But, says Matthews, "the pervading American emotionalism about Castro . . . seemed to me to affect Lester Markel, the Sunday editor, more than anyone else on The Times. . . . Since he knew nothing about Cuba, but felt very strongly about it, a barrier was raised that I could not surmount" and an article written for the magazine was rejected.

While Matthews condemns many of the editors at The Times as antagonistic toward him—and thus toward truth—his relationship with Times publishers was more sanguine—at least until Arthur Ochs Sulzberger, the current publisher, took over.

Basic to an understanding of the case Matthews presents against his editors is the historical enmity that exists between reporters and editors on virtually all newspapers. Few reporters ever believe an editor is capable of sound judgment of any sort, and a similar attitude prevails among many editors toward reporters. A reporter is, as he should be, intimately involved in his own story and his own problems. An editor is faced with the problems of many reporters compounded by the limits of space and time. As an editor myself, who has listened to the same sort of complaints Matthews levels against his editors, I nevertheless tend to sympathize with Matthews. It is questionable, however, whether Matthews is fair in ascribing truth and the purest of motives to himself while criticizing the abilities and the motives of many of his colleagues.

Interestingly, perhaps, Matthews has praise for only one Times managing editor, Carr Van Anda, who had left the scene by the time Matthews arrived. Van Anda, writes Matthews, was "the first and thus far only great managing editor that (The) Times has had. . . . I did not work under Van Anda and knew him only by reputation and office gossip."

Unfortunately only about one-fourth of Matthews' book is about Spain and Cuba. Much of the rest is more a series of editorial

A WORLD IN REVOLUTION. A Newspaperman's Memoir. By Herbert L. Matthews. Scribner's. 462 pages. $12.50.

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# CIA: Spies Or Just Data Men?

By WILLIAM KEZZIAH

What is the real Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)?

Is it a super secret spy agency or a fact-gathering agency which daily gives the President a briefing on the world situation of the past 24 hours?

LYMAN B. KIRKPATRICK, former CIA director-comptroller, spoke of both roles Thursday at Akron University.

However, Kirkpatrick revealed little of what goes on behind the walls of CIA headquarters in Langley, Va.

The CIA that Kirkpatrick portrayed has had its successes and failures.

ONE SUCCESS came during Presidential briefings after the high flying U-2 plane photographed Cuban missile placements and set in motion what Kirkpatrick called the high point in the CIA.

"The Cuban missile crisis proved what the CIA could do," he said.

The failure? That was the Bay of Pigs invasion which Kirkpatrick characterized as mistaken and confused intelligence work.

KIRKPATRICK believes the most difficult aspect for any intelligence agency is analyzing and projecting the wide-ranging material it gets.

Getting material is easy.

"Most raw intelligence comes from sources open to the public—such as newspapers and radio broadcasts. In fact, 80 pt. of the material gathered can be seen or heard by anyone and that includes thse in "closed" countries," he said.

Everyone uses spies, he said. But, he added, there are no American spies in the James Bond mold.

# New Light on the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962



## *Former Hungarian Diplomat Here Reveals Some Intriguing Background*



By Chalmers M. Roberts

THE CUBAN missile crisis of 1962 never ceases to intrigue those who lived through it or had anything to do with it. And so two new works that add to the general knowledge are well worth reporting. One is a unique look at the crisis by a Communist diplomat then in Washington. The other is an analytical study by an associate professor at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard.

Janos Radvanyi was the Hungarian chargé in Washington at the time (there was no ambassador), an affable fellow with whom I had much contact. On May 17, 1967, he defected, turning up later at Stanford where he wrote "Hungary and the Super Powers" to be published in May by the Hoover Institution. The book is largely about Hungarian-American relations. But one chapter on the missile crisis will have far wider interest. What follows is from it.

IN SEPTEMBER and October, 1962, Radvanyi reported home that the United States was overreacting to reports of Soviet activity in Cuba. He did so in part because Soviet diplomats here had told him the uproar was part of the American pre-election campaign. But one day he received a copy of a cable to Budapest from Hungarian Ambassador Janos Beck in Havana. Beck "made it a point to discount information he had received from the Chinese embassy in Havana as being provocatively anti-Soviet," Radvanyi writes. But "the Chinese ambassador had apparently told him that according to information he had received from private sources the Soviet Union was delivering surface-to-surface ballistic missiles to Cuba and that Soviet military advisers had come to Cuba not as instructors but as members of Soviet special rocket force units to operate these missiles."

Radvanyi goes on: "Ambassador Beck remarked that his Chinese friends had complained of Soviet unwillingness to disclose any details and had asked Beck whether he knew anything more about the whole affair. Beck argued that the story of the deployment of ground-to-ground missiles had been launched by 'American warmongers' and observed that neither the Soviet ambassador in Havana nor high-ranking Cuban officials had mentioned anything to him about the missile build-up."

This message apparently was sent in late July or early August. Soviet arms shipments were arriving at that time, though the first medium range missiles did not come until Sept. 8. On Aug. 22 CIA Director John McCone voiced to President Kennedy his suspicions that the Soviets were preparing to introduce offensive missiles, perhaps on the basis of information gathered in Cuba that month by French intelligence agent Philippe De Vesjoli. However, on Sept. 19 the United States Intelligence Board's estimate was that the Soviets would not introduce offensive missiles into Cuba. October would be another story.

On Oct. 18 Radvanyi attended the first of three meetings with Soviet Ambassador Anatolyi F. Dobrynin and the heads of all the Communist embassies in Washington. Dobrynin discussed the meeting the previous day between President Kennedy and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko. After dinner at the Czech embassy Dobrynin "assured his audience that recent reports of Soviet ground-to-ground missiles in Cuba were completely without foundation." As to the Kennedy-Gromyko meeting, "nothing extraordinary had happened"; the German situation had been discussed at length along with disarmament. At this point in his account, Radvanyi states that "it seems highly unlikely to me" that Gromyko had not been "privy to the Kremlin discussions" about the missiles but that "it is altogether possible that Dobrynin may not have been informed."

THE CRISIS became public with the President's Oct. 22 speech. Next day Dobrynin called the diplomats together again, explaining that the purpose was "to collect information and to solicit opinions on the Cuban situation." Dobrynin "characterized it as serious and offered two reasons for his concern. First of all, he foresaw a possible American attack on Cuba that would almost surely result in the death of some Soviet military personnel who had been sent to handle the sophisticated new weapons. Thus by implication the Soviet ambassador was admitting the presence in Cuba of Soviet medium-range missiles. Secondly, he feared that when Soviet ships reached the announced quarantine line a confrontation was inevitable." Dobrynin "explained that any defensive weapon could be labeled offensive as well and dismissed American concern ever a threat from Cuba. The Pearl Harbor attack, he suggested, might have been responsible for this unwarranted paranoia. Everybody agreed that the situation was serious and that the possibility of an American invasion of Cuba could not be discounted." Asked how Moscow intended to deal with the quarantine, "Dobrynin was forced again to reply that he simply had no information . . ."

On Oct. 23 at the Soviet embassy's military attache party Dobrynin told Radvanyi "that the situation was even more confused and unstable . . ." But, as Radvanyi notes, the Soviet envoy did not disclose that before the party he had met with Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy in the third floor of the embassy. It was then that Robert Kennedy told Dobrynin the President knew he had been deceived by assurances from Dobrynin and others that no offensive missiles would be placed in Cuba, as detailed in Robert Kennedy's posthumously published "Thirteen Days."

At another gathering of the Communist diplomats on Oct. 26, this time at the Soviet embassy, they discussed Walter Lippmann's column of the previous day suggesting dismantling of American missiles in Turkey along with the Soviet missiles in Cuba. "The Soviet embassy," writes Radvanyi, "apparently considered the Lippmann article a trial balloon, launched by the U.S. administration to seek out a suitable solution. Dobrynin sought their (Communist diplomats') opinion as to whether they thought the Lippmann article should be regarded as an indirect suggestion on the part of the White House." Only the Romanian ambassador indicated he had some reason to think that it was just that; Lippmann, as far as I know, has never said whether the idea was simply his own. According to RFK's account, Adlai Stevenson on the 20th had suggested a swap involving withdrawal of American missiles from both Turkey and Italy and giving up the naval base at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba. The President rejected the proposal.

AT the meeting on the 26th Dobrynin said he still had no information on how Moscow would meet the quarantine. "I told him," writes Radvanyi, "that according to my information the American buildup for an invasion of Cuba was nearly completed and that American missile bases had aimed all their missiles toward targets on the island. Only a go-ahead signal from the President was needed. The Soviet ambassador concurred with my analysis, adding that the Soviet Union found itself in a difficult position in Cuba because its supply lines were too long and the American blockade could be very effective. (Czechoslovak ambassador) Ruzek remarked grimly that if the Americans invaded, it would definitely trigger a nuclear war. At this point I lost self-control and asked whether it was not the same to die from an American missile attack as from a Soviet one. Dobrynin attempted to assure me that the situation had not reached such proportions and that a solution would no doubt be found . . .

"At the close of the meeting, any last remaining ray of hope I may have had for a peaceful solution was abruptly shattered. Dobrynin now announced that the Soviet embassy was this very moment burning its archives. Shocked at this news I inquired of Dobrynin whether he planned to evacuate the families of Soviet diplomatic personnel. Dobrynin replied in the negative.

"Back once again at the Hungarian legation I rushed off to Budapest a long summary of my latest meeting with Dobrynin, and informed the foreign ministry that Dobrynin had confirmed the information that the Americans were militarily prepared to invade Cuba. I emphasized that unless a quick [illegible] found within the next

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