

STATINTL

Secret U.S. Papers

By Sanford J. Ungar
Washington Post Staff Writer

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Syndicated columnist Jack Anderson, in a major challenge to the secrecy surrounding U.S. policy in the Indo-Pakistani war, last night gave The Washington Post the full texts of three secret documents describing meetings of the National Security Council's Washington Special Action Group (WSAG).

The documents indicate that Henry A. Kissinger, President Nixon's national security adviser, instructed government agencies to take a hard line with India in public statements and private actions during last month's war on the Indian subcontinent.

Anderson released the documents after Kissinger told reporters Monday during an airborne conversation en route to the Western White House in San Clemente that the columnist, in stories based on the materials, had taken "out of context" remarks indicating that the administration was against India.

Among the significant statements bearing on U.S. policy in the documents were the following:

- "KISSINGER: I am getting hell every half hour from the President that we are not being tough enough on India. He has just called me again. He does not believe we are carrying out his wishes. He wants to tilt in favor of Pakistan. He feels everything we do comes out otherwise."

- "Dr. Kissinger said that whoever was putting out background information relative to the current situation is provoking presidential wrath. The President is under the 'illusion' that he is giving instructions; not that he is merely being kept apprised of affairs as they progress. Dr. Kissinger asked that this be kept in mind."

- "Dr. Kissinger also directed that henceforth we show a certain coolness to the Indians; the Indian Ambassador is not to be treated at too high a level."

- "Dr. Kissinger . . . asked whether we have the right to authorize Jordan or Saudi Arabia to transfer military equipment to Pakistan. Mr. (Christopher) Van Hollen (deputy assistant secretary of state for South Asian affairs) stated the United States cannot permit a third country to transfer arms which we have provided them when we, ourselves, do not authorize sale direct to the ultimate recipient, such as Pakistan."

- "Mr. (Joseph) Sisco (assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern and South Asian affairs) suggested that what we are really interested in are what supplies and equipment could be made available, and the modes of delivery of this equipment. He stated from a political point of view our efforts would have to be directed at keeping the Indians from 'extinguishing' West Pakistan."

- "Mr. Sisco went on to say that as the Paks increase their military strength, we are getting emergency requests from them . . . Dr. Kissinger said that the President may

want to honor those requests. The matter has not been brought to Presidential attention but it is quite obvious that the President is not inclined to let the Paks be defeated."

After getting the documents from Anderson, The Post decided to print the full texts in today's editions.

Anderson said he would make the documents available to other members of the press today, and he invited Sen. J. W. Fulbright, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, to use them as the basis for an investigation of U.S. policy in South Asia.

Fulbright, out of Washington during the congressional recess, could not be reached for comment.

The columnist also suggested that other members of Congress might wish to investigate government security classification policy.

Most of the significant statements in the three documents released last night had already appeared in Anderson's column, which is distributed to 700 newspapers, including The Washington Post.

The Justice Department acknowledged yesterday that the FBI is investigating the nature of the security leak that led to the disclosures.

But Anderson, who said he will write several more columns based on the documents, pointed out that no government agent had visited him and that he had received no request to halt publication. The Post has not received any such request either.

Pentagon sources said another investigation is underway by military security agents. They said the scope of their investigation would be narrow because "very few people" have access to minutes of the meetings.

Anderson, in an interview with The Post, said he also had copies of cables to Washington from the U.S. ambassa-

dors to India and Pakistan, as well as numerous other documents bearing on American policy.

He showed this reporter a briefcase with about 20 file folders, each containing some of the documents.

Anderson declined to name his sources, but suggested that they occupy high positions in the Nixon administration.

"If the sources were identified," he said "it would embarrass the administration more than it would me. It would make a very funny story."

Since the controversy last year over release of the Pentagon Papers, a top-secret history of U.S. policy in Vietnam, Anderson said, his sources had become more, rather than less, willing to disclose classified material.

The texts obtained by The Post provide substantial details of the back-and-forth at Special Action Group meetings among representatives of the White House, State and Defense departments, Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Council, Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Agency for International Development.

The three texts are:

- A "memorandum for record" about a WSAG meeting in the Situation Room of the White House on Dec. 3, by James H. Noyes, deputy assistant secretary of defense for Near Eastern, African and South Asian affairs. It was approved by G. Warren Nutter, assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, and was printed on his stationery.

- A memorandum for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on their stationery, concerning a meeting on Dec. 4, by Navy Capt. Howard N. Kay, a JCS staffer.

- Another memorandum by Kay on JCS stationery about a meeting on Dec. 6. The first of the three meetings was held on the opening day of full-scale hostilities be-

Kissinger: 'I Am Getting Hell... From the President'

Following is a typescript of the secret documents turned over to The Washington Post yesterday by Syndicated columnist Jack Anderson.

SECRET SENSITIVE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301
Refer to: 1-29643/71
DOWNGRADED AT 12
YEARS INTERVALS
(Illegible)
Not Automatically
Declassified
INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS
MEMORANDUM FOR
RECORD
SUBJECT: WSAG Meeting
on India/Pakistan

Participants: Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs—Henry A. Kissinger
Under Secretary of State—John N. Irwin
Deputy Secretary of Defense—David Packard
Director, Central Intelligence Agency—Richard M. Helms
Deputy Administrator (AID)—Maurice J. Williams II
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff—Admiral Thomas Moorer
Assistant Secretary of State (NEA)—Joseph J. Sisco
Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)—G. Warren Nutter
Assistant Secretary of State (IO)—Samuel DePalma
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)—Armistead I. Selden Jr.
Assistant Administrator (AIDINESA)—Donald G. MacDonald
Time and Place: 3 December 1971, 1100 hours, Situation Room, White House.

SUMMARY:

Reviewed conflicting reports about major action in the West Wing. CIA agreed to produce map showing areas of East Pakistan occupied by India. The President orders hold on issuance of additional irrevocable letters of credit involving \$99 million.

further action implementing the \$72 million PL 480 credit. Convening of Security Council meeting planned contingent on discussion with Pak Ambassador this afternoon plus further clarification of actual situation in West Pakistan. Kissinger asked for clarification of secret special interpretation of March 1959 bilateral U.S. agreement with Pakistan.

KISSINGER: I am getting hell every half hour from the President that we are not being tough enough on India. He has just called me again. He does not believe we are carrying out his wishes. He wants to tilt in favor of Pakistan. He feels everything we do comes out otherwise.

HELMS: Concerning the reported action in the West Wing, there are conflicting reports from both sides and the only common ground is the Pak attacks on the Amritsar, Pathankat, and Srinagar airports. The Paks say the Indians are attacking all along the border; but the Indian officials says this is a lie. In the East Wing, the action is becoming larger and the Paks claim there are now seven separate fronts involved.

KISSINGER: Are the Indians seizing territory?

HELMS: Yes; small bits of territory, definitely.

SISCO: It would help if you could provide a map with a shading of the areas occupied by India. What is happening in the West—is a full-scale attack likely?

MOORER: The present pattern is puzzling in that the Paks have only struck at three small airfields which do not house significant numbers of Indian combat aircraft.

HELMS: Mrs. Gandhi's speech at 1:30 may well announce recognition of Bangla Desh.

MOORER: The Pak attack is not credible. It has been made during late afternoon, which doesn't make sense. We do not seem to have sufficient facts on this.

KISSINGER: Is it possible that the Indians attacked first, and the Paks simply did what they could before dark in response?

MOORER: This is certainly possible.

KISSINGER: The President wants no more irrevocable letters of credit issued under the \$99 million credit. He wants the \$72 million PL 480 credit also held.

WILLIAMS: Word will soon get around when we do this. Does the President understand that?

KISSINGER: That is his order, but I will check with the President again. If asked, we can say we are reviewing our whole economic program and that the granting of fresh aid is being suspended in view of conditions on the Subcontinent. The next issue is the UN.

IRWIN: The Secretary is calling in the Pak Ambassador this afternoon, and the Secretary leans toward making a U.S. move in the U.N. soon.

KISSINGER: The President is in favor of this as soon as we have some confirmation of this large-scale new action. If the U.N. can't operate in this kind of situation effectively, its utility has come to an end and it is useless to think of U.N. guarantees in the Middle East.

SISCO: We will have a recommendation for you this afternoon, after the meeting with the Ambassador. In order to give the Ambassador time to wire home, we could tentatively plan to convene the Security Council tomorrow.

KISSINGER: We have to take action. The President is blaming me, but you people are in the clear.

SISCO: That's ideal!

KISSINGER: The earlier draft statement for Bush is too evenhanded.

SISCO: To recapitulate, after we have seen the Pak Ambassador, the Secretary will report to you. We will then decide on the Bush.

KISSINGER: We can say we favor political accommodation but the real job of the Security Council is to prevent military action.

SISCO: We have never had a reply either from Kossygin or Mrs. Gandhi.

WILLIAMS: Are we to take economic steps with Pakistan also?

KISSINGER: Wait until I talk with the President. He hasn't addressed this problem in connection with Pakistan yet.

SISCO: If we act on the Indian side, we can say we are keeping the Pakistan situation "under review."

KISSINGER: It's hard to tilt toward Pakistan if we have to match every Indian step with a Pakistan step. If you wait until Monday, I can get a Presidential decision.

PACKARD: It should be easy for us to inform the banks involved to defer action inasmuch as we are so near the weekend.

KISSINGER: We need a WSAG in the morning. We need to think about our treaty obligations. I remember a letter or memo interpreting our existing treaty with a special India tilt. When I visited Pakistan in January 1962, I was briefed on a secret document or oral understanding about contingencies arising in other than the SEATO context. Perhaps it was a Presidential letter. This was a special interpretation of the March 1959 bilateral agreement.

Prepared by:

/s/initials

James H. Noyes
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern, African and South Asian Affairs

Approved:

Illegible signature
for G. Warren Nutter
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security affairs

STATINTL

Anderson Releases Papers On Secret U.S. Policy Sessions

By ORR KELLY

Star Staff Writer

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Syndicated columnist Jack Anderson has made public "SECRET SENSITIVE" minutes of three White House meetings dealing with the India-Pakistan War.

The documents show the government was secretly favoring Pakistan in the war while saying publicly that it was not taking sides.

Anderson used extensive quotations from the documents in recent columns and then released the dull text as a deliberate challenge to the government's system of classifying information.

After the Anderson columns appeared, the White House began coordinating a broad-scale investigation to learn who leaked the documents to him.

Material Confirmed

The White House today refused to say whether the published material is authentic. But a State Department official who asked not to be identified said there is no question of the authenticity of the documents.

Anderson released the documents after Henry A. Kissinger, presidential adviser for national security affairs, told newsmen yesterday he was quoted out of context in excerpts from the documents printed earlier by Anderson.

Anderson gave the documents to the Washington Post last night, and the paper printed them today. The Star obtained its own copies of the documents.

Anderson said in an interview last night that his column prepared for release tomorrow would carry excerpts from secret documents dealing with relations between the United States and Japan. The column will appear on the same day President Nixon meets with Japanese Prime Minister Eisaku Sato in San Clemente, Calif.

"I Am ... Getting Hell"

One of the documents released by Anderson quoted Kissinger as telling a White House meeting on Dec. 3 that:

"I am getting hell every half hour from the President that we are not being tough enough on India. He has just called me again. He does not believe we are carrying out his wishes. He wants to tilt in favor of Pakistan. He feels everything we do comes out other wise."

The documents provide more detail on the meetings than had been made public previously, but many of the essential details had already been used by Anderson in his syndicated column.

He did not release what he said were "dozens" of other documents giving what he called a complete picture of the government's decision-making process during the India - Pakistan War.

Meetings of WSAG

The papers released by Anderson covered meetings of the Washington Special Action Group at the White House on Dec. 3, 4 and 6. The WSAG is a top advisory committee to the National Security Council.

All the documents are marked "SECRET SENSITIVE" and one paper, covering the Dec. 4 meeting, says: "In view of the sensitivity of information in the NSC (National Security Council) system and the detailed nature of this memorandum, it is requested that access to it be limited to a strict need-to-know basis."

The documents appeared to have come from two different offices in the Pentagon—although it is quite possible that copies of the minutes also would be available in the other areas of the government.

Anderson says he has even more such documents. The disclosures amount to a major leak of sensitive government papers—in some way even more disturbing to high government officials than the release of the Pentagon Papers earlier this year.

In that case, the documents covered essentially a period of history ending about 1963.

The papers published by Anderson, on the other hand, cover a current international crisis.

The minutes of the meeting of Dec. 3 were made by James H. Noyes, deputy assistant secretary of defense for Near Eastern, African and South Asian Affairs, and approved by his boss, G. Warren Nutter, assistant defense secretary for international security affairs.

The minutes of the Dec. 4 and 6 meetings were prepared by Navy Captain H.N. Kay, who works in the office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the Pentagon.

Government sources said an investigation of the source of the apparent leak to Anderson was being coordinated from the White House and involved security agencies at the State and Defense Departments as well as the Secret Service. Contrary to earlier reports, the Federal Bureau of Investigation has not been called into the case so far.

Officials at the State and Defense Departments seemed to be most concerned about two aspects of the case.

The Concern

Several officials called attention to a column published by Anderson on Dec. 28 describing a secret intelligence report in which Emory Swank, U.S. ambassador to Cambodia, gave an unflattering assessment of top Cambodian officials. Publication of the report, the U.S. officials said, will greatly complicate Swank's task in dealing with the Cambodian government.

Anderson acknowledged that an argument could be made that the cables of an ambassador to his government should be classified.

"But I think I had a duty to report his warning that the country (Cambodia) is about to collapse," he said.

Two Key Discrepancies

One of the major discrepancies about the Anderson papers is

that a pattern of leaks now may make government officials reluctant, in the future, to offer proposals that might be embarrassing if they were published, or to be candid in their comments on policies under consideration.

The Anderson documents reveal what appear to be two major discrepancies between what the administration was doing — or thinking about doing — at the height of the India - Pakistan crisis and what it was telling the public.

Anderson suggested a comparison be made between the minutes of the sessions — particularly Kissinger's comment that he was getting hell from the President for not being tough enough on India — and a Kissinger "background" briefing for the press on Dec. 7. Anderson said the comparison would show the government "lied" to the public.

In that backgrounder, Kissinger denied the administration was "anti-Indian."

Arms Transfer Suggested

The other major discrepancy noted by Anderson arises from the minutes of the Dec. 6 meeting in which Kissinger is said to have asked whether the United States could authorize Jordan or Saudi Arabia to transfer American military equipment to Pakistan.

Two State Department officials responded that such a transfer would be illegal and that the Jordanians would probably be grateful if the United States "could get them off the hook" by denying authority for such a transfer.

The government said publicly at that time that it was not providing aid to either country.

Assistant Secretary of State Joseph Sisco said that "as the Paks increasingly feel the heat we will be getting emergency requests from them."

"Dr. Kissinger said that the President may want to honor the requests," he said. "The matter has not

Continued

Columnist Says Nixon Pressed Policy Against India

By TERENCE SMITH
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 3—President Nixon was "furious" with his subordinates during the recent India-Pakistan war for not taking a stronger stand against India, the syndicated columnist Jack Anderson reported today.

Mr. Anderson quoted Henry A. Kissinger, the President's adviser on national security, as having told a meeting of senior Administration officials: "I'm getting hell every half-hour from the President that we are not being tough enough on India."

According to Mr. Anderson, Mr. Kissinger directed that all United States officials "show a certain coolness" to the Indians. "The Indian Ambassador is not to be treated at too high a level," he is quoted as having said.

The quotations in Mr. Anderson's column today were the latest in a series of verbatim reports of secret White House strategy sessions dealing with the crisis that the columnist has published during the last several days.

His column is syndicated to 700 newspapers, 100 of them overseas. Mr. Anderson took over the column on the death of his colleague Drew Pearson in September, 1969.

The publication of the reports, which Mr. Anderson says are classified "secret sensitive," has infuriated the White House and unsettled national security officials.

Government sources confirmed today that an investigation had been started by the White House to determine who leaked the classified documents.

The sources said the new investigation, reportedly being conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, is directed at individuals in the State and Defense Departments and on the National Security Council staff who have had access to the notes quoted by Mr. Anderson.

The quotations published by the columnist are not official minutes of the meetings, but rather notes prepared by representatives of the various departments attending.

In a telephone interview today, Mr. Anderson said he had been given two complete sets of notes of the meetings of the Washington Special Action Group, a high-level strategy committee assembled during

crises, that dealt with the India-Pakistan conflict. The meetings were held in early December.

Notes by Pentagon Aides

The notes he has published so far, the columnist said, are from those taken for the Defense Department and are signed by two Pentagon officials.

Mr. Anderson said he had received scores of other classified documents, including secret intelligence reports and cablegrams, that he intended to publish during the next two weeks.

"I am trying to force a showdown with the Administration over their classification system," the columnist said. "Everything Kissinger does—even the toilet paper he uses—is being stamped 'secret.' That's not in the public interest in a democracy."

Mr. Anderson said neither he nor members of his staff had yet been questioned by Government investigators, but that he had "positive" information that the F.B.I. had already interrogated individuals at the White House and State and Defense departments in an effort to discover who had provided him with the documents.

Aide Declines Comment

Gerald L. Warren, the acting Press Secretary at the White House, declined today to say whether an investigation had been ordered. He also declined all comment on the Anderson columns.

In the column published today, Mr. Anderson quotes from notes taken during the Washington Special Action Group's meetings of Dec. 3, Dec. 4 and Dec. 8.

In the first session, he quotes Richard Helms, director of Central Intelligence, as saying the Indians were "currently engaged in a no-holds-barred attack on East Pakistan and that they had crossed the border on all sides."

"Dr. Kissinger remarked that if the Indians have announced a full-scale invasion," the column continues, "this fact must be reflected in our U.N. statement."

On Dec. 4, Mr. Kissinger is quoted as having said, "On AID matters the President wants to proceed against India only in the area of aid to the Agency for International Development.

This instruction was amplified on Dec. 8, when, according to the column, "Dr. Kissinger stated that current orders are not to put anything in the budget for India. It was also not to be leaked that AID had put money in the budget only to have the 'wicked' White House take it out."

On Dec. 4, the Administration suspended its aid program in India.

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U.S. Task Force Didn't Frighten India

By Jack Anderson

The dramatic appearance of a U.S. naval task force in the Bay of Bengal on the eve of the Pakistani surrender, it now appears, didn't intimidate India at all but merely strengthened her ties with Russia.

In New Delhi, Soviet Ambassador Nikolai M. Pegov gave India secret assurances that "a Soviet fleet is now in the Indian Ocean and... will not allow the Seventh Fleet to intervene."

He also promised, in case of a Chinese attack across the Himalayas, that Russia "would open a diversionary action in Sinkiang." In short, he promised Soviet military action against both the U.S. and China if they intervened on Pakistan's side.

The fascinating story of big-power intrigue during the Indian-Pakistan fighting is told in secret diplomatic dispatches and intelligence reports.

It was precisely this sort of secret maneuvering that got the U.S. deeply embroiled in the Vietnam war before the American people realized what was going on. We believe it is in the public interest, therefore, to publish excerpts from the secret documents.

In earlier columns, we told how presidential adviser Henry Kissinger assured reporters the U.S. wasn't anti-India at the same time he was instructing government policy-

makers to take steps against India.

"The President does not want to be evenhanded," Kissinger emphasized at their secret strategy sessions. "The President believes India is the attacker."

Wrong Side

The State Department's professionals argued that, morally, the U.S. should be on the side of the Bengalis, who wanted their independence from Pakistan. The experts also warned that President Nixon's pro-Pakistan policy would only drive India into Soviet arms.

Kissinger gruffly disputed this, saying of India's Prime Minister Indira Gandhi: "The lady is cold blooded and tough and will not turn India into a Soviet satellite merely because of pique."

Heeding Kissinger and disregarding the professional advice, Mr. Nixon took a tough stand at the United Nations against India and ordered the Seventh Fleet to send a task force into Indian waters.

This was definitely intended as a "show of force," although the flotilla had the additional mission of evacuating stranded Americans from embattled Dacca if the need arose.

Plans were made, meanwhile, to arrange provocative leaks in such places as Djakarta, Manila and Singapore of the task force's approach. By the time the ships had assembled in the Malacca Strait,

both the Indians and Soviets were well aware they were on the way.

This merely served to bring India and Russia closer together. A secret intelligence report, giving a "reliable" account of Soviet Ambassador Nikolai Pegov's conversations with Indian officials, declared:

"Pegov stated that Pakistan is trying to draw both the United States and China into the present conflict. The Soviet Union, however, does not believe that either country will intervene."

"According to Pegov, the movement of the U.S. Seventh Fleet is an effort by the U.S. to bully India, to discourage it from striking against West Pakistan and at the same time to boost the morale of the Pakistani forces."

"Pegov noted that a Soviet fleet is now in the Indian Ocean and that the Soviet Union will not allow the Seventh Fleet to intervene."

Soviet Threat

"If China should decide to intervene," said Pegov, "the Soviet Union would open a diversionary action in Sinkiang. Pegov also commented that after Dacca is liberated and the Bangladesh government is installed, both the U.S. and China will be unable to act and will change their current attitude toward the crisis."

Another intelligence report, giving the secret details of Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vasily Kuznetsov's mission to

India, indicates there had been some Soviet impatience over the pace of the Indian blitzkrieg.

Kuznetsov, after his arrival in New Delhi on Dec. 12, told Indian officials that the Kremlin was "impatient with the Indian armed forces for their inability to liberate Bangladesh within the ten-day time frame mentioned before the outbreak of hostilities."

Kuznetsov pointed out, according to the secret report, that Soviet opposition to a cease-fire "becomes more untenable the longer the war goes on in the east."

"While Kuznetsov said the Soviet Union will continue to use its veto to stall any efforts to bring about a cease-fire for the present, he stressed the importance of quick and decisive Indian action in liberating Bangladesh in the shortest time possible."

"Kuznetsov delayed his scheduled return to Moscow because he is awaiting special instructions from Leonid Brezhnev, general secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, regarding India's request that the Soviet Union sign a defense agreement with the Bangladesh government after Soviet recognition of Bangladesh."

"According to Kuznetsov, Brezhnev was not in Moscow when Kuznetsov sent him the request for guidance."

The American people, meanwhile, are entitled to straight talk from their leaders.

Bell-McClure Syndicate