

12 DEC. 1971

What Price Defection?

by Carol Dunlap

LONDON.

Several weeks ago, Oleg Lyalin, 34, supposedly a member of the Soviet Trade Delegation here, but in reality a captain in the KGB, the Soviet security and espionage apparatus, defected to the West.

Lyalin fingered 105 Soviet officials as spies. He also revealed to Belgian authorities those Soviet officials in Brussels who, under a variety of covers, were also spies.

As a result Britain expelled 105 Soviets for espionage, and Belgium followed suit without revealing the number of expulsions.

What will happen to Oleg Lyalin? What in fact happens to any Soviet defector who betrays his country for asylum?

At this writing, Lyalin is being debriefed by British intelligence under maximum security conditions. When the British are finished with him, our own Central Intelligence Agency will take a turn at interrogation.

But one day the intelligence agents will drain Lyalin dry. Then what will happen to him? The British will "reward" him for his cooperation with some money. They will offer him the services of a plastic surgeon for facial disguise if he so desires. They will suggest "losing him" in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, or some other friendly country. The trials and tribulations of Oleg Lyalin will begin only then, for as the experience of former Soviet defectors reveals, Lyalin's problems in adjusting to a new life will be compounded by the omnipresent threat of KGB reprisal.

Treason, of course, is a capital crime in every society, and the Soviet Union deals harshly and summarily with its traitors. Colonel Oleg Penkovsky, for example, a high-ranking member of the Soviet intelligence apparatus who passed top

Anatole Barzov who flew a Soviet plane to Austria and was then interrogated in the U.S. in 1949 was persuaded by the then Soviet ambassador to the U.S., Alexander Panyushkin, to return to Russia. Panyushkin promised Barzov that the Soviet Union would forgive and forget, that he could be together with wife and son. When Barzov returned to Moscow, Soviet agents grilled him about his American experiences, kept him in prison eight months, then, without ever letting him see his wife and son, shot him.

Trading secrets

Penkovsky and Barzov were caught in the Soviet Union. Most Soviet "traitors," however, like Yurii Rastorov, Second Secretary of the Soviet Mission in Japan, Peter Deriabin, a KGB section head in Vienna, Nikolai Khokhlov in Berlin, and Vladimir Petrov in Sydney—defect while abroad, then trade their secrets for asylum. But they never feel sure of escaping the KGB's long arm of retribution.

The most spectacular case of KGB retribution involves Leon Trotsky, a rival of Josef Stalin. Trotsky, an architect of the Russian revolution and founder of an early Soviet espionage network, chose political exile in 1929 after losing out the power struggle to Stalin. Although Trotsky never "talked," Stalin judged him a potential enemy of the regime, marked him for liquidation by the secret police. For 11 years Trotsky lived in perpetual fear. Finally in 1940 the special terrorist section (Spetsbuuro) of the KGB caught up with him in Mexico, bludgeoned him to death.

A year later the Spetsbuuro assassinated General Walter Krivitsky, former chief of Soviet military intelligence for Western Europe. Krivitsky's "cover" was a relief organization in Geneva named

1937, fearful of being purged by Stalin, Krivitsky defected to the West. Shipped to Washington he was debriefed by the FBI. Four years later Soviet assassins murdered him in his hotel room in Washington.

Network exposed

Some Soviet defectors have managed to elude KGB pursuit. Perhaps the most famous is Igor Gouzenko, cipher clerk in the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa who on September 5, 1945, defected to the West with 130 top secret documents describing in detail the Soviet espionage network throughout Canada. The documents resulted in the arrest of 26 Soviet agents, the conviction of 10, and a Royal Canadian Commission report on espionage which revealed that a distinguished scientist, Alan Nunn May had given the Soviet Union its first samples of uranium and a written report on atomic research.

During the investigation precipitated by his defection, Gouzenko took refuge with his family in military installations under the protection of the Canadian Mounted Police. Eventually, however, the Gouzenkos had to resume some semblance of a normal life. The Canadian Government helped them to erase all traces of their past, providing them with a fictional identity and a permanent bodyguard.

Gouzenko wrote an autobiography of sorts, *The Iron Curtain*, which became a best-seller and was adapted into a Hollywood film starring Dana Andrews. A few years later he penned a successful novel, but subsequently lost most of his book earnings in unwise investments. He and his family currently live in a small Ontario town on \$50 a month for each member provided by the Canadian Government. Gouzenko also receives \$100 a month from a Canadian

Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R

Russ Defectors Often Give Clues in Advance

Survey Made in Europe to Discover Why They Go to West, What Happens to Them

BY RICHARD C. LONGWORTH
UPI Staff Writer

VIENNA—It was 3 p.m. on a sunny Sunday afternoon in Brussels when Anatoli Chebotarev made his move.

Borrowing a blue Scaldia sedan from the Soviet trade mission where he worked, Chebotarev dropped his wife, Margarita, off near the Belgian Royal Palace, then drove 60 miles north to Bruges for a rendezvous.

The next morning, Oct. 4, the Soviet Embassy called the Belgian foreign ministry to report that one of its employes had stolen a car and disappeared. The Scaldia was found later beside a yacht marina at the coastal town of Zeebrugge.

Belgian police believe that Chebotarev left Belgium for Britain aboard a small boat from the town of Nieuwpoort, 35 miles away. It has not been explained how he got there, or who his mysterious contact in Bruges was.

Intelligence Agent

At 38, Chebotarev was a member of the privileged Soviet elite allowed to live and work in the West. His calling card identified him as an official of the trade mission. Less publicly, he also was an agent for the Soviet espionage agency, the KGB, or Committee for State Security—headquarters on Dzerzhinsky Square, Moscow, with offices in all principal cities.

Now, Anatoli Chebotarev is a Soviet defector—one of the small band of desperate men who, by fleeing the Soviet system for the West, have burned all bridges behind them.

Who are these defectors? What makes them defect? How do they do it? What happens to them?

To answer these questions, UPI talked with government officials and diplomats around Europe. There are no full answers—defection is a shadowy world and the men who deal with it cannot tell all they know. But broad outlines emerged.

For a man to defect—to forsake his country forever—is an extreme step under any circumstances. For a Russian, with his exceptionally deep ties to his country, it is traumatic. One Western diplomat compared it to suicide.

"A Soviet citizen knows he can never go back and is cutting himself off from his family, who may suffer because of his act," the diplomat said. "For him, it's a radical step and so comes from an extreme emotion.

"The one — the only — common factor in all defections is that the defector has felt, rationally or irrationally, that all doors had closed behind him, that he had no choice but to defect."

Like many potential suicides, many potential defectors give hints in advance. American diplomats are told to watch out for these clues, but often they go unheeded.

Playboy Symptoms

These clues often take the form of what one insider called "aberrant behavior for a Soviet abroad"—a social life outside the tight Soviet circle, heavy drinking, an obvious taste for the high life, a Western girl friend.

These clues, which often are unconscious, are particularly hard to spot today. The dour, baggy-pants diplomat of the State Department, what is known as the

"smiling Russian" — a smoother, more ingratiating envoy often indistinguishable from his Western counterpart. Of these, the KGB men often are the highest livers, the biggest drinkers, the freest spenders — in short, the playboys.

If a U.S. Embassy has reason to think that a Russian plans to defect, it assigns a diplomat to hover near him at receptions and parties, in case he wants to make contact.

It is assumed by outsiders that both sides use "dirty games"—blackmail, promises of money and other lures—to hook a potential defector. If the West employs these methods, however, no diplomat will talk about it.

Most defectors either go straight to American embassies or ask to be turned over to the Americans. This is partly because defection is a political act—a radical changing of sides—and the United States is as far to the other side as a Soviet can get.

Another reason is that it is easier for a defector to vanish in a vast country with many foreign-born citizens and foreign accents, thousands of miles from Russia.

Most often, defectors show up unexpectedly, either at embassies or at police stations. A leading example was Svetlana Aliluyeva, Stalin's daughter, who marched into a startled American Embassy in New Delhi in 1967 straight from a quarrel with the Soviet ambassador there.

Insiders say there is no set machinery for handling a defector. A Russian who shows up at an American embassy will be passed on to a Central Intelligence Agency man at the embassy, who will take charge of the case.

Some Just Vanish

If the defection takes place in a neutral nation, attempts will be made to get the defector to the United States or an allied

Sometimes the host country will first quiz the defector in a "safe house"—a secure, unbugged location—before passing him on to Washington. Sometimes he will go to Washington directly.

Once in America, some defectors "go public" by writing books or going into anti-Soviet work. Others simply vanish, with a new identity—sometimes even a new face, courtesy of a plastic surgeon.

Homesickness can defeat these precautions. A diplomat said Russians often long for contact with other Russians and eventually join an exile colony, where they are quickly spotted by KGB men who have infiltrated the colony.

In the old days, such a defector risked death. But the last known KGB execution of a defector took place in West Germany in 1959. Today, the defector will be pressured by threats against his family back home in Russia.

Any defection makes waves. At the personal level, the defector's family is bound to suffer. But if he is a KGB man, he may bring with him information that can change history.

Chebotarev is said to have brought a list of 33 agents spying on NATO. Shortly after he vanished, one Soviet newsman and 15 Soviet businessmen abruptly went home. They panicked—none was on Chebotarev's list. But two other men who were have been asked to leave the country.

The most celebrated case this year was that of Oleg Lyalin, 34, a Soviet diplomat and spy who defected in London in early September. Lyalin brought along enough information to enable the British to declare 105 Soviet diplomats and businessmen persona non grata—one of the most sensational mass expulsions in peacetime history.



PENTAGON/SERVICES

Better Deal for Service Spooks?

WHITE HOUSE SOURCES tell The JOURNAL that the intelligence reorganization announced last month by the President means a better deal, not less authority—as the country's press has been reporting—for members of the defense intelligence community.

Among the specifics cited:

- More "supergrades" (GS-16 to GS-18 civilian billets) for Defense Intelligence Agency;

- Assignment of top-caliber military personnel to DIA (which in past years has had trouble getting the most qualified military personnel assigned to it and proper recognition for their work in intelligence fields);

- Better promotion opportunities for intelligence analysts (who in the past have seldom been able to advance to top management levels without first breaking out into administrative posts that make little use of their analytical capabilities).

This last point stems from a major White House concern with the nation's intelligence product: "95% of the emphasis has been on collection, only 5% on analysis and production," as one White House staffer describes it. Yet good analysts, he points out, have faced major hurdles in getting recognition and advancement. Moreover, they have been "overwhelmed" by the amount of raw data collected by their counterparts in the more glamorous, more powerful, and better rewarded collection fields.

The supergrade problem has been of special concern to the White House. A high Administration official, who asked not to be named, told The JOURNAL that the "White House [has] pledged to get Civil Service Commission approval" for a GS-18 billet which had been urgently requested by DIA Director LGen Donald V. Bennett. Bennett, he said, first requested the billet more than a year ago. Even though DIA has not

had any authorization for a GS-18, it took almost 10 months for the papers needed to justify the single high-level slot to filter through lower echelon administrative channels in the Pentagon before they could be forwarded, with a "strong endorsement" from Deputy Defense Secretary David Packard, to the Civil Service Commission.

Ironically, just one day after The JOURNAL was told of the White House's determination to help get the billet approved, it was learned that the Civil Service Commission had nevertheless denied the request. Instead, it offered DIA a choice of having an additional GS-17 slot or of having a Public Law 313 post (which would require that DIA first recruit an individual highly qualified enough to justify the appointment).

DIA's supergrade structure, nevertheless, is going to improve dramatically. For at least three years, the agency has been authorized only 15 supergrades, but will get 24 more under a plan just endorsed by Dr. Albert C. Hall, DoD's new Assistant Secretary for Intelligence. The posts are known to be endorsed strongly by both Defense Secretary Melvin Laird and Deputy Defense Secretary David Packard, and apparently enjoy strong backing from the White House as well.

By going from 15 to a total of 39 supergrade billets, DIA will be able not only to recruit higher caliber civilian personnel but to promote more of its own qualified analysts into these coveted, higher paying posts.

Press Misses the Point

Press reports on the intelligence reorganization convey a much different picture than the above highlights and White House sources suggest. In a 22 November feature, *U.S. News & World Report* noted in a lead paragraph that "The Pentagon appears to be a loser in the latest reshuffle." Deputy Defense Secretary David Packard is probably the man most responsible for such interpretations. In a 4 November meeting with Pentagon reporters, just one day before the White House announced that CIA Director Richard Helms was being given new, community-wide responsibilities with authority over all intelligence budgets, Packard said: "There have been people thinking if we just had someone over in the White House to ride herd on this overall intelligence that things would be improved. I don't really support that view. . . . I think if anything we need a little less coordination from that point than more. . . ."

The White House's determination to make the defense intelligence field more attractive for military (as well as civilian) personnel parallels steps taken earlier this year by LGen John Norton, Commanding General of the Army's

Our Outgunned Spies

A QUICK JOURNAL SURVEY of government-wide supergrade authorizations shows clearly that the Service side of the intelligence community, and DIA in particular, has been "low man on the supergrade totem pole" and makes clear why the White House intelligence reorganization is aimed, in part at least, at giving Service "spooks" better recognition and more attractive career opportunities. Here are typical (in some cases, ludicrous) comparisons that can be drawn from Part II of the Appendix to the *Fiscal Year 1972 Budget of the United States*, a 1,112-page tome which gives, by federal agency, a detailed schedule of all permanent Civil Service positions:

- DIA has 3,088 Civil Service employees, but only 15 supergrades—roughly one for every 200 spooks.
- DoD's Office of Civil Defense has 721 Civil Service personnel, but 27 supergrades—one for every 27 employees, a ratio eight-to-one better than DIA's.
- The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, with only 776 civil servants, has 36 supergrades—one out of every 22, nine times better than DIA. The Peace Corps also outguns DIA nine to one, with 52 Foreign Service billets in the GS-16 to GS-18 salary brackets for only 1,188 permanent federal positions.
- The National Security Council staff has a 23-to-one advantage, 73 staffers and nine supergrade (or higher) billets. Even NSC's one-to-nine supergrade-to-staff ratio, however, pales by comparison with the President's Office of Science and Technology, which has 23 superposts but only 60 people!

Here's how the supergrade-to-people bean count for key federal agencies compares with DIA's (where authorized, executive level I through V posts are included in supergrade count):

| | |
|--------------------------------|-------|
| Defense Intelligence Agency | 1-206 |
| Office, Secretary of Defense | 1- 95 |
| Library of Congress | 1- 51 |
| Office of Management & Budget | 1- 78 |
| Office of Economic Opportunity | 1- 54 |
| General Accounting Office | 1- 68 |
| Smithsonian Institution | 1- 60 |
| Civil Service Commission | 1-103 |
| Federal Maritime Commission | 1- 14 |