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STATINTL

Pentagon papers get special handling

By Margo Miller
Globe Staff

The Globe's lead story yesterday morning began taking shape about 5 p.m. Monday, and by 1:45 a.m. Tuesday it was on the street.

The six-column headline read, "Secret Pentagon documents bare JFK role in Vietnam war."

On Page One and spread over four pages inside were 36 columns of type and photographs.

The Globe became the third American newspaper to report on a 7000-page analysis tracing this country's growing involvement in Indochina from World War II through mid-1968.

The material made available to The Globe covered a wide range of events from 1961 to the end of the study. Nowhere were the papers marked "secret," or "top secret" or confidential."

The staffers who were to put the story together gathered at 5 p.m. Monday in a locked room away from the Globe City Room. Preparations for the project were handled by John Driscoll, assistant to the editor The City staff went about its usual business of putting out the early edition of the morning paper.

The special staff began reading.

"Then everybody there began suggesting possible stories," recalls Matthew V. Storin, metropolitan editor for the morning Globe. Storin had until recently been a member of The Globe's five-man Washington bureau.

Storin would eventually write the main news story. It began: "Unpublished portions of the 47-volume Pentagon history of the Vietnam war were made available yesterday (Monday) to the Boston Globe." The story included a summary of the material The Globe was publishing and the history to date of US Government actions against the New York Times, which had begun excerpting the Pentagon documents on Sunday, June 13, and the Washington Post, whose excerpts began June 18.

So that the Globe material would not duplicate what the Times and Post had published [illegible]

nized edition of those papers.

After listening to story suggestion, Globe editor Thomas Winship and the paper's assistant managing editor, Crocker Snow Jr., decided what the stories should be and who would write them. Snow's story on Page One bore the headline, "Tet Offensive turned Johnson toward Vietnamization policy."

Charles Whipple, chief editorial writer, began work on his piece. Wrote Whipple: "The Nixon Administration's campaign in court to stop the publication by the N.Y. Times and Washington Post of secret Pentagon documents on the war in Vietnam continues without let-up—but also without too much success so far. For the truth has a way of emerging always into the clear light of day."

Robert Healy, who is both the Globe's executive editor and political editor, wrote the story about the Kennedy era. The headline was "Kennedy OK'd covert action."

"The material the Globe had split up very easily," Healy said. "We had the advantage of knowing what the Times and Post had published. The interesting stuff left was the Kennedy era, the last phase of the Johnson Administration and some very early material in the Eisenhower years."

Healy describes the material in the Pentagon documents as "not so startling—except that it's all there. It's a very stark thing. You don't have to editorialize. It's all there for the reader to see."

There was no standard way the authors of the Pentagon study wrote about an era, said Healy. Some sections use the memo style, some use paraphrase. Some of the material is arranged in chronological fashion, other parts are written in narrative fashion, Healy notes.

Two stories — carried on inside pages in The Globe — were written [illegible] respondent, Darius S. Jhabvala. "Soviets refused to carry peace feeler to Hanoi" was the headline about a 1965 diplomatic effort. Jhabvala also wrote a story on the Honolulu conference in June 1964, headlined, "CIA played down US domino theory" was the headline.

One Globe staffer, Martin Nolan, chief of the paper's Washington bureau, was not in the locked room. He had a prior engagement — to speak on "Government and the Media" to students at American University in Washington.

Committed to this date — to scrub it might have tipped off the Globe's publication — Nolan delivered his talk. In the question period which followed, he was asked: "Is competition among newspapers as much of an influence as it was always said to be?"

Nolan replied that he knew and liked Neil Sheehan, the Times reporter credited with obtaining the Pentagon study. "But I would have broken both his legs to get the story first," Nolan told the students.

Nolan took a late evening plane from Washington to Boston. A fellow passenger was Stuart Loory, who covers national security for the Los Angeles Times. The Los Angeles Times led its edition yesterday morning with a story based on the Globe material, which had been made available via the wire services after publication in the Globe.

"I look at Loory and Loory looks at me, and we both know we're up to something," Nolan said.

When Nolan arrived he began writing from the Pentagon papers and finished writing about 1:30 a.m. Tuesday, his story making the "replate" edition. The headline: "Clifford sought massive shake-up in Viet regime." Because the story was

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CHICAGO SUN TIMES

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Text of memo on aiding coup to oust Diem

TEXT OF THE MEMO

Following is the text of an Aug. 30, 1963, memorandum from Asst. Sec. of State Roger Hilsman to Sec. of State Dean Rusk recommending the United States encourage and assist a coup against South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem and his brother-in-law, Ngo Dinh Nhu:

The courses of action which Diem and Nhu could take to maintain themselves in power and the United States responses thereto are as follows:

1. DIEM-NHU MOVE: Pre-emptive arrest and assassination of opposition military officers and/or Vice President Nguyen Ngoc Tho.

U.S. RESPONSE:

(a) We should continue to pass warnings to these officials about their danger.

(b) CAS (code label for the Central Intelligence Agency) should explore the feasibility of prompt supply of a warning system to these officials.

(c) If several general officers are arrested, we should invoke aid sanctions to obtain their release on the ground that they are essential to successful prosecution of the war against the Viet Cong.

(d) Encouragement of prompt initiation of the coup is the best way of avoiding arrests and assassinations of generals.

2. DIEM-NHU MOVE: Sudden switch in assignments of opposition generals or their dispatch on special missions outside of Saigon.

U.S. RESPONSE: We should recommend that the opposition generals delay in carrying out any such orders and move promptly to execution of the coup.

3. DIEM-NHU MOVE: Declaration of Ambassador Lodge and/or other important American officials in Vietnam as *personae non gratae*.

U.S. RESPONSE:

(a) We should stall on the removal of our officials until the efforts to mount a coup have borne fruit. This situation again shows the importance of speed on the part of both the U.S. and Vietnamese sides. We should also suspend aid.

(b) Should the GVN (South Vietnam) begin to bring physical pressure on our personnel, we should introduce U.S. forces to safeguard their security.

4. DIEM-NHU MOVE: Blackmail pressure on U.S. dependents in Vietnam, such as arrests, a few mysterious deaths or—more likely—disguised threats (like Nhu's recent threat to raze Saigon in case of a coup).

U.S. RESPONSE:

(a) We should maintain our sang-froid with respect to threats.

(b) We should urge American personnel to take such precautions as avoidance of unnecessary movement and concentration of families. We should also issue arms to selected American personnel.

(c) We should demand the release of any Americans arrested and should insist for the record on proper protection of Americans by the GVN. (GVN failure to furnish this protection could serve as one of the justifications for open U.S. intervention.)

(d) We should evacuate dependents and other nonofficial personnel at the earliest possible moment that Ambassador Lodge considers it consistent with the over-all operation.

(e) We should intervene with U.S. forces if necessary to protect Americans during evacuation and to obtain the release of those arrested.

5. DIEM-NHU MOVE: Severance of all aid ties with the U.S., ouster of all U.S. personnel (except for a limited diplomatic staff), and demand for removal of all U.S.-controlled military equipment in Vietnam.

U.S. RESPONSE:

(A) We should stall in removing U.S. personnel and equipment from Viet Nam. This move by the GVN would again, however, underscore the necessity for speed in our counteraction.

(B) If Diem-Nhu move to seize U.S.-controlled equipment, we should resist by all necessary force.

6. DIEM-NHU MOVE: Political move toward the DRV (North Vietnam) such as opening of neutralization negotiations, or rumors and indirect threats of such a move.

U.S. RESPONSE:

(A) Ambassador Lodge should give Diem a clear warning of the dangers of such a course, and point out its continued pursuit will lead to cessation of U.S. aid.

(B) Encourage the generals to move promptly with a coup.

(C) We should publicize to the world at an appropriate moment any threats or move by Diem or Nhu toward the DRV in order to [illegible] and help justify publicly our counteractions.

(D) If the DRV threatens to respond to an anti-Diem coup by sending troops openly to South Vietnam, we should let it know unequivocally that we shall hit the DRV with all that is necessary to force it to desist.

(E) We should be prepared to take such military action.

7. DIEM-NHU MOVE: Appeal to De Gaulle for political support for neutralization of Vietnam.

U.S. RESPONSE:

(A) We should point out publicly that Vietnam cannot be effectively neutralized unless the Communists are removed from control of North Vietnam. If a coalition between Diem and the Communists is suggested, we should reply that this would be the avenue to a Communist takeover in view of the relative strength of the two principals in the coalition. Once an anti-Diem coup is started in South Vietnam, we can point to the obvious refusal of South Vietnam to accept a Diem-Communist coalition.

8. DIEM-NHU MOVE: If hostilities start between the GVN and a coup group, Diem and Nhu will seek to negotiate in order to play for time (as during the November, 1960, coup attempt) and rally loyal forces to Saigon.

U.S. RESPONSE:

(A) The U.S. must define its objective with crystal clearness. If we try to save Diem by encouraging negotiations between him and a coup group, while a coup is in progress, we shall greatly increase the risk of an unsuccessful outcome of the coup attempt. Our objective should, therefore, clearly be to bring the whole Ngo family under the control of the coup group.

(B) We should warn the coup group to press any military advantage it gains to its logical conclusion without stopping to negotiate.

(C) We should use all possible means to influence pro-Diem generals like Cao to move to the coup side. For example, Gen. Harkins could send a direct message to Cao pointing to the consequences of a continued stand in support of the Ngo family and the advantage of shifting over to the coup group.

(D) We should use, or encourage the coup group to use: military measures to prevent any loyal forces outside Saigon from rallying to Diem's support. For example, we can jam radio communications between Diem and these forces and we can encourage interdiction of transportation by blowing up bridges.

(E) We should encourage the coup group to capture and remove promptly from Vietnam any members of the Ngo family outside Saigon, including Can and Thuc who are normal[illegible] in Hue. We should assist in this operation

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Pentagon papers portray stern U.S. face

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Second in a series on the substance of the Pentagon documents on the origin and the escalation of the Vietnam war.

By Courtney R. Sheldon

Staff correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

The disclosures of covert United States actions, directed both at friendly Saigon and hostile Hanoi, show a stern Washington face the public seldom sees distinctly.

Throughout the Vietnam war era, presidents have approved a string of secret military and diplomatic subversions. They were, those in command at the time insist, necessities of the times.

Not knowing of these clandestine operations until long after the event, the public and Congress are seldom in a position to challenge them on moral or political grounds.

The Pentagon papers, now being filtered out through the New York Times, Washington Post, the Boston Globe, and Rep. Paul N. McCloskey Jr. (R) of California, give an unparalleled glimpse of life behind Washington curtains.

Without the current disclosures, misleading and incomplete as they may be in some instances, most of the stories would have had to await normal release times, usually some 20 years hence.

Scolded by Taylor

Here are some of the clandestine or subsurface operations the Pentagon papers and their interpreters confirm or allege that the United States sponsored or engaged in in the Vietnam war period:

• While U.S. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge was counseling South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem in 1963, U.S. authorities were plotting the Nov. 1, 1963, coup which ousted him (per Mr. McCloskey, who adds, "We were in it up to our eyeballs").

• Later, when more coups got in the way of successful prosecution of the war, Ambassador Maxwell Taylor called young South Vietnamese military men to the embassy and "read them the riot act."

"Do all of you understand English?" the Ambassador impatiently asked the Vietnamese officers (according to a cable included in the Pentagon papers). "I told you clearly at General Westmoreland's dinner we Americans were tired of coups. Apparently I wasted my words. . . . Now you have made a real mess. We cannot carry you forever if you do things like this."

• As early as May 11, 1961, when the American public knew only that the U.S. had advisers in Vietnam, President Kennedy was dispatching underground agents to sabotage and harass the Communists in North Vietnam.

• President Johnson sanctioned similar attacks in the months which preceded the North Vietnamese attack on U.S. destroyers in the Gulf of Tonkin.

Justification for attacks

It is not known whether the North Vietnamese thought at the time the destroyers were part of or supporting the pattern of attacks being made against them.

But it is a fact of history that the Johnson administration used the attacks on the destroyers to sell Congress the Tonkin Gulf resolution which was later to be cited as legal justification for the war.

In retrospect, it appears that the American public knew far less about the actions of their government than did the enemy in Hanoi.

The North Vietnamese Foreign Office issued a white book on the war in July, 1965. It discussed position papers of various U.S. officials which, in light of the Pentagon papers, sound eerily as if Hanoi had a pipeline into official Washington.

William L. Ryan, foreign affairs expert of the Associated Press, analyzed the white book and concluded, "There is evidence the North Vietnamese and their Viet Cong allies in the South knew a good deal about U.S. plans, operations, prospects, and weaknesses."

U.S. involvement in the political affairs of the South Vietnam Government have been apparent all along even to the unsophisticated eye. Hanoi calls South Vietnamese leaders puppets. Washington publicly says it is giving advice and assistance, but not interfering in internal politics.

In one of the New York Times summaries of the Pentagon papers, it reports that "during another heated meeting on July [1964], General Khanh asked Ambassador Taylor whether to resign [from the premiership]. The Ambassador asked him not to do so. . . ."

In early 1965, one of the Pentagon papers reported McGeorge Bundy, special assistant for national security affairs, as not agreeing with Ambassador Taylor that General Khanh "must somehow be removed from the . . scene."

Three weeks later, the Pentagon papers reported that some young Turks in the South Vietnamese Army were determined to get rid of General Khanh.

The authors of the Pentagon report said General Khanh "made frantic but unsuccessful efforts to rally his supporters" and finally submitted his resignation, claiming that a "foreign hand" was behind the coup.

Thus it is not surprising the difficulties the U.S. has today in convincing the Hanoi government that it is keeping hands off in the October presidential elections in Saigon.

The Central Intelligence Agency seems to come off quite well in the papers that have thus far been published. Its forebodings have proved too accurate.

However, it is hard to forget that only on April 15 of this year the present director of central intelligence, Richard Helms, was saying in a public speech:

"We [the CIA] cannot and must not take sides. When there is debate over alternative policy options in the National Security Council . . . I do not and must not line up with either side."

'Must hit harder'

Yet here is an excerpt from a 1965 memorandum from John A. McCone, director of CIA, to other officials:

". . . It is my judgment that if we are to change the mission of the ground forces we must also change the ground rules of the strikes against North Vietnam. We must hit them harder, more frequently, and inflict greater damage. Instead of avoiding the MIGs, we must go in and take them out. A bridge here and there will not do the job. We must strike their airfields, their petroleum resources, power stations, and their military compounds.

"This, in my opinion, must be done promptly and with minimum restraint. If we are unwilling to take this kind of decision now, we must not take the actions concerning the missions of our ground forces. . . ."

Another official whose advice was not heeded was Undersecretary of State George Ball. Tucked away in one of his memos was a confirmation of how U.S. governments act without the public's knowledge.

Speaking of how best to get a U.S. peace proposal to the Hanoi government, Mr. Ball said:

"The contact on our side should be handled through a nongovernmental cutout (possibly a reliable newspaperman who can be repudiated)."

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HERALD-POST

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How Good a Study?

In all the shouting over the Pentagon papers on U.S. involvement in Vietnam, one major point is being overlooked: Just how good a study is it?

The question is important because politicians are already seizing on bits and pieces of the leaked papers to "prove" this or that self-serving assertion.

The other day, for example, Kansas Sen. Robert J. Dole, Republican National Chairman, charged that the papers showed "eight years of deception and escalation" by the Democrats. And Senate majority leader Mike Mansfield hit such "sniffing" at the report "for political profit."

One danger, we think, is that the public may be misled into thinking that a definitive history of the Vietnam war has been disclosed. This could only help those political lynching parties now trying to hang the rope of Vietnam around their opponents' necks.

Fortunately for the cause of fair play, a good appraisal of the Pentagon study exists. It was written by Leslie H. Gelb, the former government official who headed the task force that produced the 43-volume history.

With commendable objectivity, Gelb makes clear the project's shortcomings, deficiencies and handicaps. He notes that his team had complete access to Defense Department papers, only limited access to State Department and CIA material, and no access to files in the White House, where final decisions were made. Nor could his men interview top officials.

"The result," writes Gelb, "was not so much a documentary history, as a history based solely on documents . . . pieces of paper, formidable and suggestive by themselves, could have meant much or nothing.

"Perhaps this document was never sent anywhere, and perhaps that one . . . was irrelevant. Without the memories of people to tell us, we were certain to make mistakes . . . this approach to research was found to lead to distortions and distortions we are sure abound in these studies."

His staff, Gelb continues, was "superb—uniformly bright and interested." He concedes they were "not always versed in the art of research," and adds:

"Of course, we all had our prejudices and axes to grind and these shine through clearly at times, but we tried, we think, to suppress or compensate for them."

Also, Gelb recalls, his men came from the armed forces, the State Department, the "think tanks" and were constantly being yanked back by their superiors before they could finish their work.

"Almost all the studies had several authors, each heir dutifully trying to pick up the threads of his predecessor," he says.

In his conclusion, Gelb states:

"Writing history, especially where it blends into current events, especially where that current event is Vietnam, is a treacherous exercise."

Amen.

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NATIONAL GUARDIAN

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War secrets indict imperialism

By Richard E. Ward

A top-secret 7000-page Pentagon study on the history of U.S. intervention in Vietnam and Indochina was described in lengthy articles, accompanied by government documents drawn up by high-level U.S. officials, that appeared in the New York Times June 13-15. Publication of the two final installments of a projected five was interrupted by a temporary federal court injunction handed down June 15 in New York at the request of the Justice Department.

The published material, an unprecedented public disclosure of high-level government discussion on the formulation of U.S. policy and directives for its implementation, provides an irrefutable record of the unprovoked, unilateral U.S. aggression in Indochina.

The documents printed by the Times before the injunction was issued dealt with events in 1964-65, clearly exposing the lies of the Johnson administration by the words and papers of its highest officials. "Hoisted by his own petard" was the observation of one of the Pentagon's unnamed historians about the discrepancies between Johnson's words and policies.

Normally documents of this sort might never see the light of day again, or at least they would remain classified for decades. Thus the circumstances of their disclosure takes on significance equal to the revelations themselves.

The Pentagon history, actually about 3000 pages in length with 4000 pages of documentation from the U.S. embassy in Saigon, the defense secretary, the CIA and the National Security Council, among other sources, was being summarized by a team of Times writers headed by Neil Sheehan, who worked on the series for three months. The history itself was begun under the tenure of Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara but not completed until some months after his resignation.

Record of U.S. difficulties

The Pentagon study was a symptom of policies that were in deep trouble, an effort to find the source of U.S. difficulties. But there is no evidence that it made any impact upon the Johnson administration, whose logical calculus was predicated on a blind infatuation with American power and which never questioned the right of U.S. intervention in Indochina. The only thing that gave the Johnson administration pause was the fact that U.S. intervention had not produced the desired aims which in November 1964 were described by Sheehan:

"....The minimum United States position [for negotiations] was defined as forcing Hanoi to halt the insurgency in the South and to agree to the establishment of a secure non-Communist state, a position the [Pentagon] analyst defines as 'acceptance or else.' Moreover, talks of any kind with Hanoi were to be avoided until the effects of bombing had put the United States into a position to obtain this minimum goal in negotiations."

If that was the "minimal" position, it is clear that some in Washington were hoping to gain control of Hanoi as well as Saigon, although Sheehan gives no indication of what the Pentagon study says on this point.

However, Sheehan points out that the Pentagon history reveals a continuity in U.S. policy that began with support for the French colonial effort in Indochina. And since the French defeat in 1954 the U.S. had been engaged in "acts of sabotage and terror warfare against North Vietnam," a covert war that was markedly escalated in early 1964 in step with increased U.S. activity in South Vietnam.

The intensification of the covert war against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in 1964 is where Sheehan's detailed account and the supporting documents begin. In February 1964 the U.S. initiated "34A operations" against the DRV. They "ranged from flights. . . .by U-2 spy planes and kidnappings of North Vietnamese citizens for intelligence information," Sheehan writes, "to parachuting sabotage and psychological-warfare teams into the North, commando raids from the sea to blow up rail and highway bridges and the bombardment of North Vietnamese coastal installations."

Behind the Tonkin incident

Under the supervision of McNamara, the 34A raids were expanded in tempo and magnitude in three stages in 1964. In May of that year U.S. bombing and reconnaissance began on a systematic basis in Laos; these activities too were escalated and brought closer to the DRV border in succeeding months with the intention of putting pressure on Hanoi. Finally, a third element in a coordinated U.S. program consisted of intelligence collection by U.S. destroyers that penetrated the North's coastal waters. It was in this context of covert war about which Congress and the American people were ignorant that the "Tonkin incident" occurred.

The Pentagon study shows that getting a congressional resolution that would be later used as the equivalent of a blank check to conduct military operations in Indochina was part of a scenario drawn up before the Tonkin Bay affair.

From Tonkin Bay to full-scale bombing of the North was a small step--and part of the same scenario. The decision to bomb was made in the summer of 1964 just prior to Johnson's denunciations of Goldwater for the latter's advocacy of this, but the program was put on ice temporarily because of electoral considerations, the Pentagon study noted. W. W. Rostow is revealed as the main evangelist of bombing; he and some top military men were certain that Hanoi would crumble quickly under the bombs, or possibly just the threat of them, believed Rostow. Others were less inclined to this

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NEW YORK TIMES
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The War: The Record and the U.S.

Taylor: Misleading Documents

By MAXWELL D. TAYLOR

WASHINGTON—I am grateful to The Times for affording me this opportunity to explain why I think the action of the paper in publishing selected portions of the highly classified Gelb study was contrary to the national interest.

In brief, my position is that this action contributes to further misunderstanding and confusion regarding the events portrayed, tends to impair the working of the foreign policy process, and adds to the disunity which is already undermining our strength as a nation. These views are largely independent of the legal aspects of the case, and of the importance or lack of importance of the classified material which has been revealed.

As history, the articles are unreliable and often misleading because of the incompleteness of the basic source material and the omissions and suppressions resulting from the selective process carried out by the Pentagon authors and the editors of The Times. The Gelb group had only limited access to reports from without the Pentagon, whereas the White House, State, C.I.A., and other agencies were key participants in the activities under review.

Starting from this incomplete data base, Gelb's analysts exercised a form of censorship in choosing what data to use, or what to exclude. The Times performed a similar function in deciding what to publish from among the 47 Gelb volumes. Thus, in the final publication, the principle served was not the right of the people to know all about the Government's Vietnam policy, but rather the right of The Times to determine what parts the public should know about it. As one member of that public, I would like to know the criteria employed by The Times in making its determinations.

The resulting literary product is a melange of incidents presented in a disjointed way which makes them difficult to understand and to relate to one another. It is hard to distinguish approved governmental actions from individual views of comparatively low-ranking staff officers. There is often a perceptible antiwar bias in the commentary which suggests that the officials involved were up to something sinister and surreptitious rather than carrying out publicly approved national policy. For these reasons, I am afraid that the articles will confuse rather than enlighten the persistent reader willing to wade through them.

The damage which I foresee to foreign policy is from two sources. If it becomes accepted [illegible] loyal employe of government can find in the press a ready market for governmental secrets, no secret will be safe. In the atmosphere of suspicion and fear of betrayal created within government, one can hardly expect to get forthright opinions and uninhibited recommendations from subordinates who must consider how their views will read in the morning press.

There will be a similar reaction among our international associates. Already we are seeing the embarrassment of allies such as Australia and Canada over references appearing in The Times articles. Other nations are viewing with dismay this latest evidence of internal disarray in the United States and are doubtless reminding themselves of the need for reticence in future dealings with us. Only the propagandists of Hanoi and Moscow find cause for rejoicing. And they are openly enjoying themselves.

My last concern is over the effect of this incident on our national unity, of late a prime target of subversive forces seeking to undermine the sources of our national power. There has been an arrogance in the way The Times has thrown down the gauntlet in challenging the Government's right to identify and protect its secret which assures a bitter public fight. The Times has not only challenged the Government's right to make this determination but has undertaken to substitute its own judgment in deciding what secrets are entitled to protection.

If allowed to continue in its present form, the controversy will provide a further revelation to our enemies of our internal divisions at a time when we need all of our strength and prestige to effect an honorable settlement of the Vietnam war.

There should be ways for reasonable men to reconcile the needs of a free press and of national security without resort to exaggerated classification of documents by the Government or resort to the role of "fence" on the part of the press. Without security a free press cannot long endure, nor can the society and economy which sustain it. Without strong, articulate information media, the Government cannot communicate with the electorate, or win popular support for the needs of national security.

The press should be able to fulfill its secular role of exposing rascals and mistakes in Government without making common cause with the enemies of Government. We must have both a free press and an effective Government capable of defending and enhancing our national interests (against all enemies, foreign and domestic). If we expect to remain a great nation, these are not alternatives.

Incidentally, there has been frequent reference of late to the presumed embarrassment caused by The Times article to the governmental participants mentioned. If anyone is interested, I am not among the embarrassed. In the period covered by these documents, I was working earnestly for peace and security in Southeast Asia, an objective which the Congress had just determined by an overwhelming majority to be vital to the national interest. We toilers in the hot Vietnamese sun took that mandate seriously, and the Gelb study portrays us hard at work in obedience to it.

Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, retired, served as Ambassador to Vietnam, 1964-65, and as a special consultant to the President, 1965-69.

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