

26 DEC 1970

Much Policy, Little Intelligence

By HARRY HOWE RANSOM

NASHVILLE--During the height of the Middle East crisis, President Nixon relied for information exclusively on his intelligence bureaucracy. He did not watch television and no more than scanned the morning newspapers. His information came from the intelligence establishment.

That a President can be the prisoner of the intelligence community and that it can sometimes lead him disastrously astray is illustrated by the Cambodian intervention last spring. The President announced to the world that his principal purpose was to destroy the "central headquarters" of the Communists in the area invaded by American forces. No such headquarters were found. One must assume that his intelligence was in part erroneous.

Textbooks on American government fail to inform us that for foreign and defense policy, secret intelligence is far more powerful than Congress and the Department of State. It can be more influential than the Chief Executive. The intelligence bureaucracy exercises a pivotal role in policy making but is not effectively accountable to responsible officials.

A President begins and ends his day viewing a picture of the outside world painted by secret intelligence. So the President is its potential prisoner. If he is insensitive to this danger, the nation could become its captive. A President might try to bring the intelligence system's efficiency under closer surveillance. But none has moved effectively to do it since the Central Intelligence Agency was created in 1947. The Cold War spawned mammoth military intelligence agencies: the National Security Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency. They supplemented C.I.A., State Department, Atomic Energy Commission and F.B.I. No President from Truman to Nixon has shown awareness of the problems posed by these enormous intelligence machines.

Dean Acheson says he advised President Truman when the C.I.A. was created that neither the President, the National Security Council, nor anyone else would be in a position to know what it was doing or to control it. President Eisenhower regretted that the fateful U-2 flight in May, 1959, had not been canceled. President Kennedy confessed that "no one has dealt with C.I.A." President Johnson ignored the C.I.A. problem. He rarely questioned basic intelligence assessments of world politics and America's interventionist role.

Vietnam became a major battlefield because of a colossal intelligence blunder. Intelligence misinterpreted the

nature of the Vietcong. Consequently, Presidents and Congresses were persuaded to believe that impossible objectives could be attained in Southeast Asia with military force. Moreover, Presidents were misinformed about how the Vietnam war was "progressing." There is a classic hesitancy of intelligence men to bring their leaders bad news. When bad news is sometimes reported, one must suspect that intelligence officials may be pursuing their own preferred foreign policy, which they tend to develop independently. Note that dire warnings by the C.I.A. of heavy Communist infiltration in South Vietnam's government were recently leaked to the press.

What is the nature of this secret machine on which policy makers have so often, so willingly and so dangerously relied? One certain answer is that nobody knows all about it, its organization, its methods. And no one controls it. Not even the President.

The vast and highly compartmented intelligence system costs more than \$5 billion a year to operate. The annual price tag on military intelligence alone has been disclosed as around \$3 billion, with more than 130,000 employees not including tens of thousands working for C.I.A. and other secret agencies. A high government official recently admitted that no inventory existed of total intelligence resources. So no one knows the exact total costs.

More than two decades ago it was assumed that the whole world must be brought under American intelligence surveillance. A vast network of secret agents, front groups, electronic, sensing and photographic devices was spread all over the globe. They map, record, and intervene anywhere searching out every nation's state secrets, and often muddle in politics, under the banner of deterrence and self-defense.

In the process, the C.I.A. has gained for the United States a tarnished name. In many parts of the world, the C.I.A. has become, in the words of Arnold Toynbee, "the bogey that Communism has been for America." Toynbee adds: "Wherever there is trouble, violence, suffering, tragedy, the rest of us are now quick to suspect the C.I.A. has had a hand in it."

One wonders why, from the record, any President depends so heavily upon the intelligence system. The Bay of Pigs expedition was launched on the basis of patently bad information. Then came the Cuban missile crisis. Kennedy and Khrushchev stood on the brink of nuclear war. This occurred shortly after intelligence had advised the President that the Soviet Union would not replace missiles in Cuba. National intelligence estimates have caused us

to build nuclear bomb shelters, to fear bomber gaps, missile gaps, and next, submarine or new missile gaps. They have made us assume a Russian military threat to Western Europe in the past and a ballistic missile defense crisis in the future. Intelligence estimates have come to control our lives by dominating the allocation of national resources.

Because America's highest government officials do not adequately monitor secret operations, the intelligence establishment exerts undue influence on policy. A vast bureaucracy, has grown up in great confusion over its purpose and functions. The effect is that the government does not always know what it is doing in the intelligence field. Duplication is rampant. Opportunities abound for bureaucratic self-serving.

Technology promises that intelligence operations will continue to expand in scope and increasingly will influence, and in some circumstances control, decision making. This brings seriously into question the survival of the democratic ideal of responsible, accountable government. What can be done?

Serious attention must be given, possibly by a Presidential commission, to problems of intelligence policy, organization and control. Total expenditures on intelligence could be cut in half, after reorganization of the system. Covert political action and espionage, now directed from C.I.A.'s "Department of Dirty Tricks," should be used rarely and removed from C.I.A.'s jurisdiction. Meanwhile, the President, Congress and State Department must supervise more effectively the secret intelligence establishment.

Harry Howe Ransom is Professor of Political Science at Vanderbilt University and author of the recent book, "The Intelligence Establishment."

BEST COPY

Available

*THROUGHOUT
FOLDER*

6/24/98

WHEELING, W.VA.
NEWS-REGISTER
DEC 11 1970
E - 30,102
S - 59,244

About This . . . And That

THERE ARE INTERESTING items in the news that we would like to comment on when they appear but the press of more important events cause them to be passed over. At the moment we have an accumulation of such items which were clipped when they appeared in the paper and before cleaning off the desk we thought it well to offer the following commentary:

First, wouldn't it have been nice for a change if the great scientific minds just once didn't have an explanation for everything? Take that weird sea monster that washed up on the beach recently at Scituate, Mass. At first we all thought it was an unknown sea monster but before one could say, "Chiller Theatre" some brain announced that the ugly creature was a basking shark, the largest species of shark in the Atlantic.

Then there was the announcement from the Department of Transportation that starting in 1973 it wants all cars to be designed to operate no faster than 95 MPH and to contain a built-in system that will flash headlights and sound the horn at speeds above 85 MPH. If speed is the major culprit in car accidents then why hasn't such an idea been adopted before this?

Another item we found intriguing had to do with the recent U.S. commando raid on a North Vietnamese POW Camp. It was noted that the CIA was not consulted on this mission and while no American prisoners were found, the commandos luckily got out without anyone getting killed.

We recall how in 1961 when President Kennedy gave the green light for the invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs a prime mover in this tragic fiasco was the CIA. As it turned out most of the Cuban exiles in the landing party were either killed or taken prisoner. We don't know for sure what that proves about the CIA but it must mean something.

BROWNSVILLE, TEX.

HERALD

DEC 3 1970

E - 12,705

S - 12,809

Rescue Mission, Even Futile, Not Total Loss

Foes of the war in Vietnam already have labeled the abortive attempts to free American prisoners of war near Hanoi the Nixon administration's "Bay of Pigs."

But the daring mission, even in its futility, may not have been a total loss.

There is no reason to doubt that the rescue attempt, conducted simultaneously with retaliatory bombing raids in North Vietnam, was initiated on the basis of intelligence advice, pinpointing the location of the POW camp.

It is also apparent that the report was sadly out of date. The prisoners reportedly had been whisked away two weeks prior to the raid.

If successful, the mission would have been hailed as a dramatic response to Hanoi's refusal to abide by the Geneva convention or to negotiate for release and treatment of POWs.

Space here Frank Borman, now a special representative of President Nixon on prisoners of war, told Congress that prisoners are beaten, dragged through villages, tortured. They are fed a diet barely sufficient to sustain life. Medical care is "designed to barely avert death rather than to promote health."

The former astronaut, who recently completed a fact-finding trip to Southeast Asia, said, "Time after time, as we dealt with the governments around the world, I heard the comment that the North Vietnamese consider our prisoners there a trump card in negotiations."

The prisoners of war, Borman concluded, are in fact, political hostages.

Thus, the motives of the United States are clear. In addition to being a humane action, the sharply executed helicopter landing in enemy territory, if successful, would

drive Communist propaganda forces from their arrogance.

But it was not successful and intelligence sources are being blamed—just as the Central Intelligence Agency was rapped for misleading President John F. Kennedy in the Bay of Pigs fiasco in 1961.

There the similarity ends. The Bay of Pigs operation was envisioned and conducted by Cuban refugees—with CIA help—in an effort to win back the island nation from Fidel Castro's Communist regime.

Last weekend's escapade in North Vietnam was planned by Americans, executed by Americans, and intended to benefit Americans.

The delighted chirping of congressional doves over the discomfiture of the President and Defense Secretary Melvin Laird is unseemly under the circumstances. Public acknowledgement of the raid—and its disappointing results—by Laird will put the Communists on guard against future rescue efforts.

Laird had little choice, of course. Administration foes soon would have got wind of the raid and "exposed" the "invasion."

Now would be a good time for members of Congress, including those concerned over the bomb damage to Communist strongholds in North Vietnam and over a North Vietnamese threat to boycott the Paris peace conference, to recall Borman's words.

Borman pleaded that they "remember the people the U.S. citizens, who are prisoners, and . . . not to forsake your countrymen who have given so much for you."

The Americans who are being murdered or allowed to die in Communist POW camps must be our first concern.

The raid, if it accomplished nothing else, has again focused world opinion and world awareness on the blatant disregard for decency displayed by North Vietnam.

BRISTOL, VA.

HERALD-COURIER

DEC 2 1970

M - 23,619

S - 30,172

OUR OPINION

No Total Failure

Foes of the war in Vietnam already have labeled the abortive attempt to free American prisoners of war near Hanoi the Nixon's administration's "Bay of Pigs."

But the daring mission, even in its futility, may not have been a total loss.

There is no reason to doubt that the rescue attempt, conducted simultaneously with retaliatory bombing raids in North Vietnam, was initiated on the basis of competent intelligence advice, pinpointing the location of the POW camp.

It is also apparent that the report was sadly out of date. The prisoners reportedly had been whisked away two weeks prior to the raid.

If successful, the mission would have been hailed as a dramatic response to Hanoi's refusal to abide by the Geneva convention or to negotiate for the release and treatment of POWs.

As space hero Frank Borman reported to Congress just two months ago, some American prisoners have been held longer than any other prisoners in the history of this country — some for more than six years.

Borman, now a special representative of President Nixon on prisoners of war, told the lawmakers that prisoners are beaten, dragged through villages, tortured. They are fed a diet barely sufficient to sustain life. Medical care is "designed to barely avert death rather than to promote health."

The former astronaut, who recently completed a fact-finding trip to Southeast Asia, said, "Time after time, as we dealt with the governments around the world, I heard the comment that the North

Vietnamese consider our prisoners there a trump card in negotiations."

The prisoners of war, Borman concluded, are, in fact, political hostages.

Thus, the motives of the United States are clear. In addition to being a humane action, the sharply executed helicopter landing in enemy territory, if successful,

would have jolted the Communist propaganda forces from their arrogance.

But it was not successful and intelligence sources are being blamed — just as the Central Intelligence Agency was rapped for misleading President John F. Kennedy in the Bay of Pigs fiasco in 1961.

There the similarity ends. The Bay of Pigs operation was envisioned and conducted by Cuban refugees — with CIA help — in an effort to win back the island nation from Fidel Castro's Communist regime.

Last weekend's escapade in North Vietnam was planned by Americans, executed by Americans, and intended to benefit Americans.

The delighted chirping of congressional doves over the discomfiture of the President and Defense Secretary Melvin Laird is unseemly under the circumstances. Public acknowledgement of the raid — and its disappointing results — by Laird will put the Communists on guard against future rescue efforts.

Laird had little choice, of course. Administration foes soon would have got wind of the raid and "exposed" the "invasion."

Now would be a good time for members of Congress, including those concerned over the bomb damage to Communist strongholds in North Vietnam and over a North Vietnamese threat to boycott the Paris peace conference, to recall Borman's words.

Borman pleaded that they "remember the people, the U.S. citizens, who are prisoners, and . . . not to forsake your countrymen who have given so much for you."

The Americans who are being murdered or allowed to die in Communist POW camps must be our first concern.

The raid, if it accomplished nothing else, has again focused world opinion and world awareness on the blatant disregard for decency and international law displayed by North Vietnam.

SAN ANTONIO, TEX.
LIGHT

NOV. 29 1970

E - 116,344
S - 148,838

Intelligence Gap?

POW Raid Debated

By HARRY KELLY

The Light's Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON — American intelligence operations have once again moved out of the shadows and back into the headlines and under the critical eyes of Congress.

The operation that led a daring team of U.S. commandos to risk their lives to rescue American prisoners of war from a camp that had been vacated "several weeks ago" has started a crackling debate over whether it was an intelligence failure.

Vice President Spiro T. Agnew said it was. Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird said it wasn't.

SOME QUESTIONS

"Under the circumstances there will be some questions," said Rep. William E. Minshall, of Ohio, a senior Republican on the House group that allocates funds for military and intelligence activities.

The hawkish appropriations subcommittee became so concerned two years ago about what it regarded as a string of intelligence disasters—the Israeli attack on the U.S. intelligence ship Liberty, the North Korean capture of the Pueblo and the Viet Cong Tet offensive—it sent its own investigators into the Pentagon's defense intelligence offices.

To underscore its displeasure and concern, the subcommittee further took the unusual step of making many of its findings and criticism public instead of cleaning the harsh words and tones from the testimony.

FORMER MEMBER

Before leaving Congress to become secretary of defense, Mel-

vin Laird was a senior member of the same appropriations subcommittee.

And since becoming defense chief, according to former colleague Minshall, Laird "has kept the DIA (Defense Intelligence Agency) under his thumb because as a member of the committee he knew what a sorry state the intelligence committee was in."

The defense intelligence Agency was created in the Pentagon in the intelligence reorganization, after the Bay of Pigs failure was blamed on the Central Intelligence Agency.

When the appropriations committee investigators—usually borrowed from the FBI or possibly from the CIA in this case—probed the Defense Intelligence Agency they found, to the congressmen's chagrin, that an eight-day backlog of 517 linear feet of intelligence information from Southeast Asia had been awaiting analysis in drawers at the time of the Tet offensive.

TOO MUCH INFO

"So far as I know, from the Liberty, Pueblo and Tet offensive," recalled Rep. Jamie L. Whitten, D-Miss., another subcommittee member, "we did not suffer from lack of information. We suffered from so much information and there were so many ways to get it out that it never got where it was needed in time to do any good."

In testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee this week, Laird denied there was any intelligence failure in the rescue attempt. And Chair-

man John Stennis, D-Miss., of the Senate Armed Services Committee agreed the intelligence "was just as good as possible."

Sen. William F. Fulbright, D-Ark., chairman of the dovish Senate Foreign Relations Committee and often a critic of U.S. intelligence efforts, said the United States spent \$4 billion to \$5 billion a year for intelligence—including military, CIA and the National Security Agency. He expressed doubt the country was getting its money's worth.

CAN'T FAULT IT

However, Laird said, "I can't fault the intelligence. We don't have men on the ground in North Vietnam" nor an airborne camera "which can see through the rooftops of buildings."

One member of Congress familiar with intelligence operations said he would be "very surprised" if the United States did not have any intelligence agents in North Vietnam.

On the other side of the coin, he recalled the Central Intelligence report that Vietnamese Communists had infiltrated more than 30,000 agents into the South Vietnamese government.

That study, according to published reports, acknowledged, however, that the United States and South Vietnamese had nothing remotely comparable although it did not contend that the United States had no agents at all in North Vietnam.

CIA go home

To the editor:

Portland State University facilities are being used for recruitment to the Central Intelligence Agency. This is an example of how the university is used to further the government's attempts to crush popular revolutions and to deny self-determination to various peoples of the world by interfering in their affairs. An agency which denies this basic right of self-determination cannot be allowed to defend its recruiting activities under the guise of "free speech." Nor should an agency which produces instruments to crush self-expression be allowed in an institution of "education."

The role of the CIA is well known throughout the world for its intervention in all areas. Perhaps it is best known for training ex-Cubans for the invasion of Cuba. Or perhaps people are more familiar with the complicated history of the CIA's involvement in the Dominican Republic. This agency is also known for its aid in coups and king-making in the Middle East, notably in Iraq and Iran. Some of us can remember the summer of 1965 when the Prime Minister of Singapore produced evidence of the CIA's having attempted to bribe him with \$3.3 million. The list of countries in which the CIA is involved continues on and on through Latin America, Asia, Africa - indeed one suspects that no country is left untouched.

We demand an end to any cooperation between the institutions of learning and the Central Intelligence Agency.

We are also interested in the


Vanguard's position on this matter.

The Student Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam

(Ed. note: Richard Rankin, associate placement director, says that the relationship between the CIA and the placement service is no more cordial than "normal

to be an imperialist if he desires to be one.



The Vanguard also believes that rather than questioning the moral righteousness of each recruiter, students should examine the role of the placement service on campus.)





employer-placement service relations."

Rankin says that a CIA representative will not be to the placement service to recruit. However, he does say that the placement service acts as a "point of contact and referral" for PSU students interested in joining the CIA. Students must walk downtown to see the CIA recruiter.

The Vanguard believes that any PSU student should have the right



Battlefield ruins at Cuba's "Day of Pigs" (1951) raised questions of how far CIA should be allowed to go in making policy.



THE SHOW USUALLY STARTS LIKE THIS: There's this super-agent type, sec, and he's playing a recording. From it comes an impersonal voice explaining the need to "zonk" someone in some faraway part of the world. The job is going to be difficult, the voice warns coldly, and if anyone is caught, the whole story will be denied. Then— whoosh!—the recording disintegrates in a puff of instant air pollution, and a battery of secret agents is off on another hour of derring-do.

Exciting? Suspenseful? A real spy swashbuckler? *Mission Impossible* may be all of these, but it's also fiction, pure fiction. Any resemblance to real people or places or government institutions, living or dead, is, as they say, coincidental.

Some discrepancies between fiction and fact:
Fiction: Spies are superhuman men and women who frequently hide behind rubber masks, false mustaches, and similar disguises.

Fact: Most intelligence workers are fairly ordinary men and women—scholars, language specialists, and other well-trained people. They usually live very ordinary lives—without benefit of disguises.

Fiction: The main job of most spies is to handle difficult and delicate assignments which take them on exciting journeys to mysterious places.

Fact: The main job of most intelligence specialists involves a day-by-day sifting through printed material—newspapers, magazines, government documents, transcripts of radio broadcasts. This is done in an effort to spot social, political, and military trends and movements in foreign countries. This job is difficult and sometimes delicate, but it usually takes workers no farther than a nearby office.

in common with their real-life counterparts. Both do much of their work in secret. The reason for the secrecy is obvious: information that reaches the public also reaches potential enemies.

Most American secret agents work for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). That's the agency charged with gathering information about possible enemies abroad. Few outsiders know what goes on within the plain-looking eight-story building that houses the CIA's headquarters in Langley, Va. For that matter, few know what goes on in CIA offices anywhere in the world.

ID resident Dwight Eisenhower once summed up the secret nature of CIA work: "Its successes cannot be advertised. Its failures cannot be explained. Its heroes are undecorated and unsung, often even among their own fraternity."

What does the CIA actually do? One explanation of its scope and purpose is to be found in a pamphlet put out by the agency itself: "In international affairs, intelligence is knowledge and foreknowledge—fact and estimate. In peace, it is that knowledge of the world about us that is essential to the preservation of peace. In war,

TABLE 24.—PRETEST AND GAIN SCORES FOR ALL ADVANTAGED CHILDREN (BY QUARTILES)

[1-169]

Table with columns for Test and subtest, and four quartiles (Q1 N=16, Q2 N=31, Q3 N=57, Q4 N=65). Each quartile has sub-columns for Pretest and Gain, with Mean and SD for each. Rows include Grand total, Body parts total, Letters total, Forms total, Numbers total, Matching subtest, Relational terms total, Sorting total, Classification total, Puzzles total, Peabody raw score, Peabody mental age, Hidden triangles total, and Which comes first total.

ADDITIONAL COSPONSOR OF AN AMENDMENT

AMENDMENT NO. 1041 TO H.R. 19590

At the request of the Senator from Wisconsin (Mr. PROXMIRE), the Senator from Maryland (Mr. TYDINGS) was added as a cosponsor of amendment No. 1041 to H.R. 19590, the Department of Defense Appropriations bill.

NOTICE CONCERNING NOMINATION BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

Mr. EASTLAND. Mr. President, the following nomination has been referred to and is now pending before the Committee on the Judiciary:

Robert C. Mardian, of California, to be an Assistant Attorney General, vice J. Walter Yeagley, to which office he was appointed during the last recess of the Senate.

On behalf of the Committee on the Judiciary, notice is hereby given to all persons interested in this nomination to file with the committee, in writing, on or before Monday, November 30, 1970, any representations or objections they may wish to present concerning the above nomination, with a further statement whether it is their intention to appear at any hearing which may be scheduled.

ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS OF SENATORS

WE SHOULD RESUME DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH CUBA

Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Mr. President, in November, 1958 I was elected U.S. Sen-

ator. Ohio voters generously gave me a majority of approximately 153,000 over Senator "Honest John" Bricker, who had never been defeated for office in my State. Senator Bricker had served as attorney general of Ohio and for three terms as Governor of Ohio. In 1944 he was the Republican nominee for Vice President of the United States.

So feeling very good I dissolved my law firm, took the sign off the door, and decided to go to Florida and possibly to Cuba. Shortly before Christmas Day in 1958, I was vacationing in Florida, in celebration of my election victory which very few persons except myself had anticipated.

In the cocktail room of the Yankee Clipper where I was staying while gossiping with the bartender and others, I was told that the guerrillas in the Sierra Maestra mountains were overcoming the corrupt dictatorship of Fulgencio Batista, a former sergeant of the Cuban Army, whom the United States had been supporting. I was informed that our Central Intelligence Agency had been keeping Batista in power in Cuba despite the fact that he was a corrupt dictator and was despised by millions of poverty-stricken Cubans. Then also at a party at the Trade Winds I was told that Fidel Castro's guerrillas were winning the revolt there and the tyrant Batista, who had taken over by force, was abandoned by his followers and would be out before the New Year. Yet, the CIA and our Government officials in Washington seemed to have no intimation until suddenly Batista fled from Havana to rendezvous with his unlisted bank accounts in Switzerland. He then commenced the life

of affluence and ease in gorgeous exile on the sunswept, fashionable beaches of Spain along with other ex-dictators, kings and emperors.

It was startling news to the CIA, officials in the White House, and the American public when bearded Castro and his tattered followers triumphantly paraded in Havana and took over the government of this island of nearly 8 million people 90 miles from Key West. His regime has lasted and thrived from late December 1959 to this good hour.

The fact is that the Central Intelligence Agency from its Director right down the line to CIA operatives on the staff of our embassy in Havana were supporting the corrupt dictator, Batista, and were surprised and humiliated when suddenly Batista took off from Havana with his personal entourage.

The late great President John F. Kennedy directly following the Bay of Pigs debacle said:

That CIA, I would tear it into bits and throw it to the four winds.

This was a CIA operation from the outset, including training in Guatemala for invasion of Cuba and overthrowing the Castro regime with our air support.

Mr. President, the time is long past for the United States to resume diplomatic and trade relations with Cuba. The fact is that today 50 nations, including our neighbors, Canada and Mexico, recognize the Castro regime and enjoy a thriving international trade with the Republic of Cuba.

We might as well face the fact that the Castro regime is firmly entrenched. To our knowledge, no rebellion or guer-


Soldiers

by Ward Just

STATINTL

"If you believe the doctors, nothing is wholesome; if you believe the theologians, nothing is innocent; if you believe the soldiers, nothing is safe."

—Lord Salisbury



MACHINES

The machine stood on a vacant knoll, its foreshortened gun pointed north. There were deep ruts in the stony earth, and the land fell away and then came up steeply in a rise two miles distant. This was Fort Hood in East Texas, and the machine was a Sheridan tank.

The sergeant was brisk. He was explaining the machine, how it worked, what the equipment did and how it did it. He touched and patted the machine as he spoke, pointing to the huge treads and kicking them, and then looking at the gun and smiling, patting the armor plate. There was no trouble with this vehicle, Sergeant Rosario said. It is the best vehicle he has had in twenty years in the Army. We looked at it, dark green against the sandy earth, squat and lethal, permanent as the sphinx or some other rough beast. The sergeant opened a flap at the front end and extracted a canvas cover, then unhooked other flaps to show how the canvas could be deployed so that the machine could float, could move through the water like a fish. But it was not really meant for water warfare, because the guns did not work well in water. It was designed to act in support of the cavalry scouts, the armored personnel carriers; the cav was the spearhead, the reconnaissance element, of an armored

WASHINGTON CLOSE-UP

CIA Is a Masterful Entangler

By FRANK GETLEIN

You can always count on the CIA to come to the rescue when things look glum.

Back in the Kennedy administration, it looked as if the tyrant Castro would hold Cuba in his grip forever. But the CIA devised the Bay of Pigs invasion, the Cuban people rose, as predicted, to welcome the counter-insurgents, and Cuba has been peacefully democratic and pro-American ever since, as is well known.

Earlier still, the intelligence community and the military community were shaken by the possibility of peace breaking out at a meeting between Eisenhower and Khrushchev. Again, the CIA rushed in, dispatched a U-2 spy plane over Russia, lied to the President so that he would, in effect, lie to Khrushchev about it, and in no time at all the dread threat of peace was laid to rest for the remainder of the Eisenhower years.

Now the spooks have done it again and just in the nick.

For some months now, those same communities have been worried about Richard Nixon. The ancient anti-Communist warrior, the man who exposed Alger Hiss and thus saved China from going Red, the man who exposed Helen Gahagan Douglas and thus saved Hollywood from going Red, that valiant crusader seemed himself to be going soft on the commies.

He was talking about peace in Vietnam and about letting the South Vietnamese government do its own fighting with its own troops. He was sounding like a regular Fulbright or even an Aiken; he was just lucky Vice President Agnew didn't hear about his new soft-

ness: It would have been all up with Nixon, a natural nattering nabob, if ever there was one.

Month by dreary month, the troops began coming home, with loose talk about another 40,000 out by Christmas and the whole crowd, perhaps, out by next year sometime. If that happens, there goes the war. Spooks can't be expected to fight it themselves; they need troops.

★

At just that dark hour, the CIA composed a report for the President, and it may well be the thing that will turn the tide. The South Vietnamese government — our guys — said the CIA, has been infiltrated by 30,000 enemy agents. The newcomers are mostly Cong rather than Northerners; they are all over the police and the army; and they are so efficient that none of them above the rank of lance-corporal has been apprehended.

That last note is particularly important. It anticipates and rejects the understandable desire of the President or the press to have a look at some of the 30,000. If one could not be produced, the untrusting might have concluded that was because they don't exist. Now everyone knows in advance it's because the 30,000 Cong infiltrators are smarter than the Thieu-Ky democratic government and also smarter than the CIA itself, which can count the infiltrators but can't lay hand on them.

The report, filed last May but leaked to the press only last week, contends that the Cong made a strategic shift as a result of American and South Vietnamese victories in

the field and determined to win by infiltration what they could not by arms. Clearly, the report concludes, once the Americans are entirely out of South Vietnam, the country is a goner for the cause of freedom so well served by the two military men now in charge.

The real conclusion is that Vietnamization will have to be abandoned, for every acre of ground we turn over to our gallant democratic allies we are, for all we know, really turning over to the Cong infiltrators.

Therefore, back to the boon-docks, you Yankee fighting men, and enough of this pusillanimous palaver about pulling out, you puerile presslords and pussyfooting professors.

Having charted this mass move of the enemy from the field to the bureaux, the CIA will surely be able to reverse the alarm should that become necessary. If we keep our troops in Vietnam now in order to protect the South Vietnamese government from the South Vietnamese government, eventually, no doubt, the CIA will learn to catch the infiltrators they now can only count. Once more, the Americans will begin to hope for peace in our time, or perhaps our children's time, or at any rate some time.

★

And once more, the CIA will file a report: Discouraged by the cleansing of the government — or purges — conducted by Thieu and Ky, the Viet Cong will pull its infiltrators back to the combat zones and the Americans will have to stick around to fight them.

With proper adjustment, there is no reason in the world the war can't last forever.

REVIEW *and* OUTLOOK

STATINTL

The New Regime in Chile

The cold war era has had the discomforting effect of shaking up many long established assumptions of international relations. The leftward turn in Chile—where, despite yesterday's violence, a Marxist with Communist Party support is expected to be named president—leads to some thoughts on how our assumptions have changed in hemispheric politics.

For years, the old Monroe Doctrine seemed a bedrock element in thinking about inter-American relations. Under it, the U.S. maintained that there is a historic "special relationship" between the U.S. and the independent republics of Latin America. And so for partly strategic and partly moral reasons, the extension of influence by a non-hemispheric power over other hemispheric nations would be considered a threat to the security of the U.S., and resisted as such.

As a concept, the Monroe Doctrine has proved surprisingly durable, though its force has often varied with power realities and the preoccupation of Washington with other foreign or internal problems. It sometimes became the pretext, rightly or wrongly, for U.S. intervention in Latin affairs, on the theory that otherwise outsiders would intervene or take advantage of a Latin country's instability. Monroe Doctrine thinking emerged most recently when Lyndon Johnson sent troops to intervene in the Dominican Republic's uprising of 1965.

By that time, however, it was beginning to grow clear that the days of the Monroe Doctrine were numbered, at least in the absolute form it had taken for so many years. This had been well demonstrated by the previous Kennedy Administration's dealings with Cuba.

At the Bay of Pigs, John Kennedy balked at the prospect of committing the U.S. to overt support of an armed effort to unseat a Castro who had fallen in with the Soviet Union. In the cold war context, the risk of an open confrontation with the Russians seemed too great.

But when the Russians then proceeded to establish offensive missile bases in Cuba, the threat seemed far more serious and immediate. Kennedy took a resolute public stand—focused more on the Soviet missiles, it must be noted, than the Cuban government. The Russians removed the missiles

and Kennedy agreed to leave Castro alone.

In retrospect, it looks as if the Kennedy experience may have indicated a new direction for the politics of hemispheric security. In a polarized, nuclear armed world, it no longer was practical to judge a Latin government as a threat in itself because of its ties to hostile powers. Like it or not, the U.S. would have to tolerate it so long as it posed no specific threat to the hemisphere. Only when it did pose such a threat could the new risks involved in a U.S. reaction be considered acceptable.

This shift in some ways reflects the fact that other Latin governments do not view communism in itself as seriously as Washington does, perhaps because, as Mr. Anderson suggests in a book review on this page, they sometimes tend to view a turn to communism as an act of disillusionment with the U.S. rather than an immediate embrace of the Soviets. At the same time, the Latin nations still retain a considerable interest in the protection afforded by alliance with U.S. power.

Thus Latin nations have often seemed unenthusiastic about U.S. concern over Castro. But Latin support for Kennedy during the missile crisis was unanimous. Cuban-based missiles which could threaten the U.S., after all, were a threat to other Latin nations too.

It is against this background that the emergence of a Marxist Chile should be regarded; it means that, however nerve-racking, the Nixon Administration's choice of a wait and see policy is the only practical course.

To be sure, the strategic dangers Dr. Allende's election in Chile poses should not be underestimated nor should its sobering implications for the future of the hemisphere. Despite his assertions that his coalition government will not succumb to either local Communist Party domination or Soviet control, other developments leave room for doubt. For example, it's reported that Soviet technicians and advisers have been flooding into Chile ever since Dr. Allende's victory began to look secure.

But at the same time, the realities of hemispheric security politics have changed, for reasons the U.S. never could have controlled. And failure to recognize such a fact of international life can only lead to worse trouble.

14 OCT 1970

HOW CUBA TRAINED U.S. RADICALS

'We Threw Bombs . . . and the Whole Society Stopped'

BY GEORGIE ANNE GEYER and KEYES BEECH

Exclusive to The Times from the Chicago Daily News

The beach at Jibacoa, Cuba, stretches out from Havana like a pearly white arm, and at night when the moon comes up over the Caribbean and a gentle breeze blows, it is a romantic place.

In the old days of rum, Batista, Mafia and gambling casinos, American tourists loved this beach. But under Castroite socialism, it has belonged to a new type of American—one dedicated to overthrowing the "corrupt" American system.

Four years ago, a typical meeting was held on the beach under a Cuban moon.

Among the American students who sat and lay in rapt attention on the sand were several who later became key members of the radical Weatherman faction of the Students for a Democratic Society.

They listened as a Cuban who had been a guerrilla during the revolution against the dictator Fulgencio Batista told them "what it was like."

Next to the speaker in the moonlight lounged a revolutionary commandante, dressed in the rumpled, informal khakis that symbolize these "new men" of Cuba.

"When we wanted to demoralize the Batista regime," the guerrilla was saying, "we threw bombs at guardhouses and in public places, and eventually the whole society stopped . . ."

"Show them how you did it," the commandante interjected.

"It's easy," the guerrilla said. "You just take a bottle and . . ."

"Somebody get him a bottle," the commandante interrupted again.

In a few minutes, the young American radicals—fascinated by the intricacy of the one revolution that had defeated the same "establishment" they wanted to defeat—were being shown precisely how to make a Molotov cocktail.

A few minutes later, the guerrilla was showing them how to de-pin a grenade safely.

"We were never told to do this," an observer at these meetings said, "but we were constantly told how the Cubans had done it. The Cubans gave no tactical advice. They always turned everything around—they'd ask, 'Now, how would you do it?'"

"None of the American kids came for less than a month," reported another person who attended some of these meetings. That was the minimum the Cubans felt necessary to win over American young people. By the time they left, they understood perfectly what they should do (in America) without having been specifically told.

It was in this indirect and subtle, yet effective, manner that the Cubans have steadfastly and systematically indoctrinated a malleable, revolution-prone American youth.

Technique Not New

The technique was not new. A dispassionate analyst of Marxist methods said: "This is precisely the way the Russians did it when they were indoctrinating foreign revolutionaries in the '20s and '30s. The only difference is that the Russians were far more selective. A man had to be a proven revolutionary before they would take him."

Why the indirect approach to indoctrination? Fidel Castro and his men have always dreaded giving the United States any excuse for another invasion.

Thus, white American radicals were taken on tour of the island and then "entertained" at the Jibacoa "recreation camp" or another camp in the

American blacks, on the other hand, got hard-core guerrilla and intelligence training in Castro's military camps. The Cubans looked upon the blacks as more dependable revolutionaries and less susceptible to CIA or FBI infiltration.

Some whites, highly radicalized before they went to Cuba, received only a revolutionary, psychic "shot in the arm" there. Others, such as radical leaders Mark Rudd and Jerry Rubin, have said they first "saw the light" in Cuba.

But all look upon Cuba as the inspiration, the model, the ideal. Since 1963 Cuba and the American radical movement have been so sinuously intertwined that it is hard to separate them. Nearly every leading radical in the United States has been in and out of Cuba.

Mexican Photograph

If they go through Mexico, they are photographed by the Mexican police, who work with American intelligence. But the visit can go unrecorded if they go through Madrid or Prague—or by such underground means as the Cuban fishing boats that stop at places like Isla de Mujeres on the tip of Yucatan.

Of the estimated 4,000 Americans who have visited Cuba since 1959, probably between 1,000 and 1,500 could be considered radicals dedicated to overthrowing the government of the United States. It was these who were carefully indoctrinated, influenced and even funded.

In Cuban policy toward American radicals, four general stages stand out: 1959 through '60, when almost anybody came and anything went.

1961 to 1963, when Castro encouraged American radicals to visit but still had some hopes of a rapprochement with President John F. Kennedy.

1963 to 1967, when he began to grasp the idea that "revolution" was an actual possibility in the United States.

1967 to the present, during which he has been taking an active, deadly serious hand in promoting a revolution in America.

Castro's interest in American minority groups at first was largely idealistic and without particular objective. Some funds were passed to civil rights groups involved in sit-ins through the network of Cuban consulates that remained open in the United States until the break of relations Jan. 3, 1961.

But as time went on Castro began to see the American dissidents as more than people he was morally bound to support. More than a means of spreading the word of the Cuban revolution. He saw them anew as a kind of protection against American attack.

An America unable to deal with its domestic problems, floundering in internal chaos, would be an America unlikely to seek an adventure in Cuba—an invasion.

The man chosen in the very beginning to be in charge of the all-important "department of export of the revolution" can be seen even today lurking about the busy lobby of the Havana Libre Hotel, the former Hilton.

A short, heavyset man, he wears the khaki uniform of a Cuban commandante. He has green eyes and a blazing red beard. It is hard to overlook Manolo Pinheiro, affectionately nicknamed "Barba Roja" or "Red Beard."

Pinheiro is an intelligent, sophisticated, witty man from a wealthy Cuban land-owning family who knows Americans well. He likes American women, so much so he married one, a former Communist Party member and ballerina.

Pinheiro, like Castro and most of the other revolutionaries, feels he has good reason to hate the United States. The roots of the hatred are deep and twisted and bitter.

continued

11 OCT 1970

STATINTL

No peace on the

campus front

By WILLIAM WORTHY

I. The Violence

A decade ago, in the tense period leading to the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba, reporter Laura Berquist of *Look* magazine was interviewing Che Guevara in Havana. Despite Washington's tightening of the economic noose, Fidel Castro had not yet taken his country into the Soviet camp and he was still making speeches critical of communism.

Miss Berquist wanted to know how far to the left the Cuban revolution was going to go.

Che's reply was direct: That question should be directed "to your own government in Washington. The Cuban revolution will go as far to the left as it is pushed."

In the minds of Middle Americans banking on the thousand new FBI agents, National Guard and stiff new laws to repress campus upheavals, the history of revolutionary Cuba since Che's remark should give pause. Hard-nosed counter-revolutionary solutions seem to have dubious long-term effectiveness in this final third of the Twentieth Century. For another six or seven years the Cuban government held open the door for normalization of relations with the United States. But around 1967, as a result of the Vietnam war, Mr. Castro finally decided there could be no reconciliation with the colossus to the North until, as he put it, there is a complete change in our system.

Am I implying that rebellious college youth, at some point in the 1970's, will in large numbers give up entirely on the land of their birth? Any thoughtful answer requires a sober backward look at the extraordinary, cumulative and accelerating record of passionate violence and turbulence on and off campuses, in the short space of three years:

1. This year, there have been nearly 340 bombing incidents in the United States, according to the Justice Department. Campus bombings have numbered 26, with another dozen near a campus or in a college town. The figures do not include arson (by which many Reserve Officers Training Corps and other campus military buildings have been destroyed), or attempted arson or attempted bombings.

2. In July, the California chief deputy attorney general told a Senate subcommittee that the number of bombings in the state alone had risen, since June, to

nearly 20 a week. Leftists, he said, had stolen 5 tons of explosives from a California dam construction site over a period of years without the contractors being aware of it, while right-wing Minutemen had stolen 1,400 pounds of dynamite from a construction site in 1965.

3. Last spring, when students fire-bombed a Bank of America branch near the Santa Barbara campus of the University of California, policemen seized 94 pounds of military C-4 plastic explosives and 39 grenades from area residents.

4. Since October, 1967, 432 war protesters have admitted responsibility for 22 separate draft board raids in which more than a million nonduplicated draft files have been destroyed. During the same period, a growing number of top-drawer corporations with military contracts, including Dow Chemical, General Electric, International Telephone & Telegraph and Standard Oil of New Jersey, have been hit with disruptive and records-destroying actions.

5. Most recently, eight persons not only destroyed all I-A draft files in Rochester, N.Y., but also invaded at night the hitherto sacrosanct offices of the FBI and the United States Attorney. (Five years ago, what American, young or old, would have even thought of a political raid on J. Edgar Hoover's "awesome" precincts? The fact that the unthinkable is frequently now happening is perceptively analyzed in a brilliant article on the new youth culture and consciousness in the September 26 issue of *The New Yorker*.) The raiders, who were caught by the merest chance when a beat patrolman happened to pass the federal building, obtained lists of informers and information on FBI procedures against the Black Panther party and other revolutionary groups. After being held in \$100,000 bail each, the eight are being rushed to trial this month. The government obviously does not want the defendants touring campuses and discussing the fruits of their raids.

II. The Students

Prior to the September 26 release of the report of the President's Commission on Campus Unrest, Chairman William Scranton met with a group of correspondents and revealed that the commission had found that in the past year, the number of bombings of the country's campuses, a million are

demonstration-minded, and that the trend is to "steady growth" in the number of dissenters. The commission complained in its report to President Nixon that "an increasing number [of students], not terrorists themselves, would not turn even arsonists and bombers over to law enforcement officials."

To the dismay of many middle-class

Mr. Worthy, a correspondent of the Baltimore Afro-American and a former Nieman Fellow, is a free-lance journalist who has been published in *Esquire*, *Ebony*, *Ramparts*, *Christian Century*, *Midstream* and *Life* magazines.

The future comes with the same degree of violence which is used against it.

—Barrows Dunham in "Heroes and Heretics."

parents, their sheltered children can leap from a generally conservative position to bomb-throwing activism during one short academic year.

Not all students or others being hotly pursued by the police and FBI know the route into, or avail themselves of, underground escape channels. Revolutionary violent acts are "decentralized," locally planned and autonomous; there is no national directorate or national coordinating apparatus. But there does exist an effective North American network for hiding and protecting revolutionaries and for getting them out of this hemisphere to countries "where the FBI can't go," as Pete Seeger put it in his 1962 song about Robert Williams's flight from North Carolina to Cuba.

In the case of revolutionaries, including Weathermen, who are opposed to going into exile, the FBI has a poor track record; their "wanted" pictures remain on Post Office walls month after month, certainly a strong encouragement to others inclined toward revolutionary violence. The country is so large, youth and student disaffection is so vast that, after dramatic and well-publicized bombings, one has the distinct impression in most cases that the FBI doesn't know for whom to look. The three White Panthers were the only ones to be arrested. The bombing of a Central Intelligence Agency office in Ann

"WHAT IS TO BE DONE?"

GIGANTISM IN WASHINGTON

By John Franklin Campbell

AMERICAN foreign policy is changing, but the machinery of government is not changing with it. As we try to enter what President Nixon has called an era of negotiation, it is time to ask whether the nation is well served by the immense foreign affairs bureaucracies that have grown up in Washington over the past quarter-century. Could institutional reform give new coherence to our foreign policy? How these questions are answered may well determine the success or failure of American diplomacy in the seventies.

In 1902 Lenin asked, in an essay on the organizational problems of Russian Social Democracy, "What is to be done?" and offered this curious answer: "Liquidate the Third Period." The advice is timely, though in a different way than Lenin intended. America in 1970 also confronts an unsatisfactory third period which it wants to liquidate. We are living out the three-part drama of our postwar foreign policy, which opened with the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan in 1947, continued in the Eisenhower and Kennedy years with a global elaboration of these policies, and reached its tragic climax in Vietnam during the Johnson administration. Though our last President was hissed from the stage, the third act of the play continues in anticlimax. It is being "liquidated" slowly as troops come home from East Asia and commitments are reduced elsewhere. It has even received official burial, for President Nixon reported to Congress last February 18 that "the postwar period in international relations has ended." But it will be hard to turn that truism into effective action as long as rigidities built into the bureaucratic process undercut the President's announced policy.

Washington has not one but many foreign offices, autonomous organizations chartered in the late 1940s to wage the cold war on separate fronts. Besides the State and Defense Departments, there is a United States Information Agency (USIA) for propaganda work, a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) for clandestine operations and research and an Agency for International Development (AID) for economic subvention. Four dozen other units of the executive branch have foreign staffs and pro-

THE INTELLIGENCE ESTABLISHMENT STATINTL

by Harry Howe Ransom

Harvard University Press, 309 pp., \$9.95

Reviewed by Miles Copeland

"The intelligence operation," a Central Intelligence Agency instructor tells his pupils, "is in two parts: first, attaining the objective; second, concealing the fact that the objective has been attained. Usually we must also conceal the fact that we have made any efforts to attain the objective." In other words, when an espionage operation is successful the victim goes on about his business in happy ignorance of the fact that his secrets are known to the CIA. When a "political action" operation is successful the government against which it was conducted seems to have disintegrated or come to an end solely through natural causes.

"And if there is any danger at all of failure," the CIA instructor continues, "it is almost always better to leave the problem unsolved rather than risk failure or discovery." Theoretically, there should "almost always" be no failures.

But there have been failures: the Bay of Pigs, the U-2 incident, and one or two others. Taking into account the CIA's policy towards caution, it would seem reasonable to assume that for every failure there have been, say, ten or more successes. Reasonable people may be forgiven for suspecting the CIA of having brought about the downfall of Nkrumah and Sukarno, of having installed the military junta in Greece, of having thrown out Sihanouk. And, since the CIA—not only because of its bloopers but because of official admissions by its senior members—is known to have a capability for "political action," can the public be blamed for believing that the capability is activated now and again?

Reasonable or not, the public does so believe; the public's thirst for stories about international political intrigue being what it is, there has inevitably been a flood of trashy speculations purporting to reveal the true inside story. One of them, an encyclopedia of misinformation called *The Invisible Government*, stayed on the best-seller lists for several weeks. Others, notably some three or four books by Washington columnist Andrew Tully, have been less successful in sales but have made substantial contributions to the popular notion that the CIA is a law unto itself that interferes in the internal affairs of

sovereign nations, and that it overthrows anti-American governments, even democratically elected ones, to install anti-communist governments—with a special preference for non-democratic anti-communist governments.

Fortunately, such books have been weak in logic and unclear in rhetoric, and the mere fact that they have come under the heading of sensational journalism has tended to rob them of credibility. But one wonders. A *Washington Post* editorial writer spoke for many of us when he said, "It is obviously impossible for anyone who is not himself deep inside the intelligence community to write a comprehensive book about it, but won't someone please at least give us a basis for using common sense to judge what he hears?"

Harry Howe Ransom has provided such a basis. *The Intelligence Establishment* supplies exactly the background we need to understand why we must have an "intelligence community," what we can expect of it, and where its real dangers and weaknesses are. The late Allen Dulles, while he was director of CIA, used to keep a copy of Mr. Ransom's *Central Intelligence and National Security*, on a shelf behind his desk. Richard Helms, the present director, would be well advised to do the same with *The Intelligence Establishment*, which has been revised and enlarged from the earlier book. Although it is far from complimentary, at least the book sets forth the faults with which Mr. Helms is trying to grapple rather than the non-existent ones of which the Agency is accused. *The Intelligence Establishment* is, in fact, the only up-to-date serious study of the organization and effectiveness of our country's intelligence system.

Why have an "intelligence community" at all? This question, which seems so absurd to those who are members of it, has in fact been asked by Congressmen and journalists to whom "intelligence" connotes spies, saboteurs and political activists, and it deserves an answer in depth; even those who understand "intelligence" in its proper light do not often appreciate exactly why it is indispensable. Whether he gets it from the newspapers, from briefings by his subordinates or reports from consultants, any chief-of-state or president of a large corporation or head of any other kind of organization must have intelligence in order to fulfill his responsibilities. The primary function of the CIA has been to coordinate the whole intelligence effort, or twelve separate services, to ensure

that, in the words of Allen Dulles, "it gives our Government's top policy makers exactly the information they need, no more and no less, in order to make the right decisions."

"Information"—or "raw information," as intelligence analysts call it—may be good or bad, accurate or inaccurate, relevant or irrelevant, timely or out of date; "intelligence," on the other hand, is information that has been evaluated, correlated, boiled down to manageable dimensions, and put into reports which can be quickly and easily read. CIA's main function is to supervise the process. No one who understands management can question the assertion that some one agency must have this function; few question that it should be the CIA.

"A 'pure' doctrine of intelligence," says Mr. Ransom, "demands that intelligence officers 'present the facts' and play no role in policy choice." But he goes on to show how those who decide what facts to present are in a special position of influence. Indeed, "a 'pure' theory of decision making insists that if 'all the facts' are known, the optimum choice becomes apparent." (President Eisenhower used to insist that "all the facts" pertinent to a particular problem be presented to him in a report no longer than one page; he would then make his decision. A wag on his staff used to say, "If I could get in a position to write these one-page reports I could run the country.") It is this position of influence, rather than the occasional embarrassments we suffer from exploded clandestine operations, which draws Mr. Ransom's attention. Espionage and "special operations" services can cause occasional embarrassment, but they are dangerous only when under the direct control of an agency which can influence, if not actually make, policy.

With the eye of a management expert, as well as of a political scientist, Mr. Ransom sees a vast intelligence bureaucracy, topped by the CIA, which has grown up in great confusion over its purpose and functions, with the effect that "the government does not always know what it is doing in the intelligence field." He gives us the historical development of intelligence, including a chapter on British intelligence and our use of it as a model (the author spent a whole year in Britain gathering material), and then he gets down to how intelligence relates to decision making at top levels of our government, how the breakdown of decision-making responsibility at these levels results in the proliferation of agencies under the CIA umbrella, how the com-

STATINTL

CIA - Cuba - Bay of Pigs

THE INTELLIGENCE
ESTABLISHMENT

by Harry Howe Ransom

Harvard University Press, 309 pp., \$9.95

Reviewed by Miles Copeland

□ "The intelligence operation," a Central Intelligence Agency instructor tells his pupils, "is in two parts: first, attaining the objective; second, concealing the fact that the objective has been attained. Usually we must also conceal the fact that we have made any efforts to attain the objective." In other words, when an espionage operation is successful the victim goes on about his business in happy ignorance of the fact that his secrets are known to the CIA. When a "political action" operation is successful the government against which it was conducted seems to have disintegrated or come to an end solely through natural causes.

"And if there is any danger at all of failure," the CIA instructor continues, "it is almost always better to leave the problem unsolved rather than risk failure or discovery." Theoretically, there should "almost always" be no failures.

But there have been failures: the Bay of Pigs, the U-2 incident, and one or two others. Taking into account the CIA's policy towards caution, it would seem reasonable to assume that for every failure there have been, say, ten or more successes. Reasonable people may be forgiven for suspecting the CIA of having brought about the downfall of Nkrumah and Sukarno, of having installed the military junta in Greece, of having thrown out Sihanouk. And,

since the CIA—not only because of its bloopers but because of official admissions by its senior members—is known to have a capability for "political action," can the public be blamed for believing that the capability is activated now and again?

Reasonable or not, the public does so believe; the public's thirst for stories about international political intrigue being what it is, there has inevitably been a flood of trashy speculations purporting to reveal the true inside story. One of them, an encyclopedia of misinformation called *The Invisible Government*, stayed on the best-seller lists for several weeks. Others, notably some three or four books by Washington columnist Andrew Tully, have been less successful in sales but have made substantial contributions to the popular notion that the CIA is a law unto itself, that it freely interferes in the internal affairs of sovereign nations, and that it overthrows anti-American governments, even democratically elected ones, to install anti-communist governments—with a special preference for non-democratic anti-communist governments.

Fortunately, such books have been weak in logic and unclear in rhetoric, and the mere fact that they have come under the heading of sensational journalism has tended to rob them of credibility. But one wonders. A *Washington Post* editorial writer spoke for many of us when he said, "It is obviously impossible for anyone who is not himself deep inside the intelligence community to write a comprehensive book about it, but won't someone please at least give us a basis for using common sense to judge what he hears?"

Harry Howe Ransom has provided

such a basis. *The Intelligence Establishment* supplies exactly the background we need to understand why we must have an "intelligence community," what we can expect of it, and where its real dangers and weaknesses are. The late Allen Dulles, while he was director of CIA, used to keep a copy of Mr. Ransom's *Central Intelligence and National Security*, on a shelf behind his desk. Richard Helms, the present director, would be well advised to do the same with *The Intelligence Establishment*, which has been revised and enlarged from the earlier book. Although it is far from complimentary, at least the book sets forth the faults with which Mr. Helms is trying to grapple rather than the non-existent ones of which the Agency is accused. *The Intelligence Establishment* is, in fact, the only up-to-date serious study of the organization and effectiveness of our country's intelligence system.

Why have an "intelligence community" at all? This question, which seems so absurd to those who are members of it, has in fact been asked by Congressmen and journalists to whom "intelligence" connotes spies, saboteurs and political activists, and it deserves an answer in depth; even those who understand "intelligence" in its proper light do not often appreciate exactly why it is indispensable. Whether he gets it from the newspapers, from briefings by his subordinates or reports from consultants, any chief-of-state or president of a large corporation or head of any other kind of organization must have intelligence in order to fulfill his responsibilities. The primary function of the CIA has been to coordinate the whole intelligence system, consisting of some ten or twelve separate services, to ensure that, in the words of Allen Dulles, "it gives our Government's top policy makers exactly the information they need, no more and no less, in order to make the right decisions."

"Information"—or "raw information," as intelligence analysts call it—may be good or bad, accurate or inaccurate, relevant or irrelevant, timely or out of date; "intelligence," on the other hand, is information that has been evaluated, correlated, boiled down to manageable dimensions, and put into reports which can be quickly and easily read. CIA's main function is to supervise the process. No one who understands management can question the assertion that some one agency must have this function; few question that it should be the CIA.

"Intelligence," says Mr. Ransom, "demands that intelligence officers 'present the facts'

STATINTL

THE JFK TAPES: HOW IT WAS

"A lot of this stuff is poetry, pure poetry," said Dave Powers, the irrepressible Irishman who greeted John F. Kennedy's visitors at the White House ("Hi 'ya, pal") for three years. "Some of it is going to raise the hackles of the people who were involved," said John F. Stewart, a young historian who never worked for Kennedy but knows the stuff of controversy when he sees it.

Both Powers, now the official curator of JFK memorabilia, and Stewart, acting director of the yet-to-be-built John F. Kennedy Library, were right about the lode of history they made available to scholars and journalists last week in the Federal Records Center at Waltham, Mass. There is some poetry—mostly in 409 boxes of fan mail—in the 7.5 million pages of "official" papers of the Kennedy Administration now cleared for inspection by qualified researchers. (Another 7.5 million pages, including all those dealing strictly with foreign affairs, are still restricted.) There are also new glimpses of President Kennedy—some of them sure to stir fresh controversy—in the transcripts of tape-recorded "oral history" interviews with some 300 of his former friends and enemies. (Another 500 tapes have yet to be transcribed and released.)

The official papers include a previously unpublished testimonial from President Kennedy's No. 1 adversary, Nikita S. Khrushchev, predicting that history would judge JFK "an outstanding statesman." Khrushchev wrote his tribute in July 1964—three months before he was deposed as Soviet Premier—in reply to a letter from Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy.

The taped interviews, reports NEWSWEEK's Charles Roberts, are far more candid than the official correspondence. When all the interviews have been made public—some now have portions deleted and others, at the request of the donors, are under lock for as long as 50 years—Kennedy partisans may conclude that the oral history project itself, launched in 1964 by Robert Kennedy and President Kennedy's widow, now Mrs. Aristotle Onassis, turned up more than they bargained for.

In the meantime, the tape-recorded recollections are clearly a windfall for historians. Some prime examples:

George A. Smathers: A longtime JFK crony, the Florida senator told of a proposal to assassinate Castro when interviewed in 1964. "I don't know whether he [JFK] brought it up or I brought it up," he said. "We had further conversation on the assassination of Fidel Castro, what would be the reaction, how would the people react, would the people be gratified."

Smathers, who declined to run for reelection to the Senate in 1968 for health reasons, recalled that Kennedy "was

questions—he was certain it could be accomplished—I remember that. But the question was whether or not it would accomplish that which he wanted it to, whether or not the reaction throughout South America would be good or bad.

"And I talked with him about it, and, frankly, at this particular time I felt and later on learned that he did, that I wasn't so much for the idea of assassination, particularly where it could be pinned to the U.S." Smathers said he also discussed with the President the notion of provoking an incident at the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo Bay "which would then give us an excuse to go in and do the job."

Smathers, who had urged JFK to take a hard line against Castro during the 1960 campaign, recalled that by 1962 Kennedy had tired of discussing Cuba with him. He quoted JFK: "I like to visit with you, I want to discuss things with you, but I don't want you to talk to me any more about Cuba." When Smathers again raised the subject of Cuba, while Kennedy was preparing an informal dinner in the White House, the President "took his fork and just hit his plate and it cracked and he said, 'Now, dammit, I wish you wouldn't do that. Let's quit talking about this subject.'" The Florida senator said he wouldn't bring up Cuba again, "and I never did."

Dean Acheson: Acheson, who was President Truman's Secretary of State, told his interviewer he learned from Clark Clifford before the 1960 Democratic convention that Truman was about to go on TV and be "very extreme in his opposition to Kennedy." Acheson called and persuaded HST not "to say something which later on he would regret."

After his election, Kennedy called on Acheson in Georgetown and indicated he was considering appointing Sen. J. William Fulbright as his Secretary of State because the Arkansas senator "ran the [Foreign Relations] Committee pretty well and seemed to know a good deal about foreign affairs." The former Secretary advised against Fulbright, he said, because "he was not as solid and serious a man as you needed for this position. I've always thought that he had some of the qualities of a dilettante. He likes to criticize—he likes to call for brave, bold new ideas, and he doesn't have a great many brave, bold new ideas." Acheson then recommended a man Kennedy didn't know, Dean Rusk, as "strong and loyal and good in every way."

Kennedy, according to Acheson, favored Eugene Black, former president of the World Bank, for Secretary of the Treasury. Acheson told him that would be a very considerable mistake. He would turn out to be "the George Humphrey of the Administration. It prevailed on that one, but tried and failed to talk Kennedy out of appointing his brother's brother Attorney General

In March of 1961, Acheson said, Kennedy led him into the White House Rose Garden and outlined his Bay of Pigs plan. "I remember saying that I did not think it was necessary to call in Price, Waterhouse to discover that 1,500 Cubans were not as good as 25,000 Cubans. It seemed to me this was a disastrous idea."

David McDonald: The former president of the United Steelworkers related that early in 1962, before steel-wage negotiations began, Kennedy called him and U.S. Steel president Roger Blough to the White House for "a little talk" about holding down wage demands and steel prices. McDonald agreed to stay within the Administration's 3 per cent productivity guideline, but Blough, he said, "never made one commitment on prices, not one commitment. He talked around the mulberry bush." When McDonald offered to sign an agreement in Kennedy's office, Blough declined.

Then on April 12, after returning home from the opening-day baseball game in Pittsburgh, McDonald got a call from the White House. "The President came on. He said, 'Hi, Dave.' I said, 'Hi, Mr. President. How are you?' 'Fine,' he says. 'Dave, you've been screwed and I've been screwed.' Those were his exact words." Kennedy then related that Blough had just called on him to inform him that U.S. Steel was raising its prices by \$6 a ton. "He [JFK] was really, really angry," McDonald said—until Inland Steel forced a rollback of steel prices.

In August 1963, the next time Kennedy confronted both McDonald and Blough in his office—this time to discuss steel imports—"the President was a little bit, shall we say, not too friendly with Roger." A call came through for McDonald from California. Kennedy quickly picked up the phone and answered, "This is John Kennedy, Dave McDonald's assistant."

In another oral history interview, Thomas J. Watson Jr., chairman of International Business Machines, related that Arthur Goldberg, then Kennedy's Secretary of Labor, decided to resign over the steel-price crisis. Watson, then JFK's best friend on the Business Council, quoted Goldberg as telling Kennedy: "Look, I've made this settlement with the labor side of things, and that implied that this thing was going to be controlled. I think we've let you down, and I'm going to resign." JFK's reply, according to Watson: "Oh, my God, Arthur, you certainly can't resign."

Other Voices: U.N. Secretary-General U Thant, the late President Sukarno of Indonesia, Princess Grace of Monaco, former British Ambassador David Ormsby-Gore (Lord Harlech), astronauts John Glenn and Alan B. Shepard Jr., admirals, generals, CIA officials, journalists, college classmates and rulers of a half-dozen smaller African and Asian lands are among the hundreds of contributors to the oral-history files.

LBJ and the Kennedys

STATINTL

by KENNETH
O'DONNELL

There have been many stories circulated since the 1960 Democratic Convention about why John Kennedy gave the Vice Presidency to Lyndon Johnson. Surprisingly, the real story has never come out. On that hectic Thursday morning, when Bobby Kennedy and I were trying to recover from the shock of his offer to Johnson, John Kennedy told me his reasons.

The Kennedy suite in the Biltmore Hotel in Los Angeles was filled with a throng of Northern Democratic leaders, the old pros like David Lawrence and Bill Green of Pennsylvania, Mike DiSalle of Ohio, John Bailey, Abe Ribicoff, Dick Daley, all of them milling around Kennedy and congratulating him for offering the Vice Presidency to Johnson. Jack was saying that he had just talked with Lyndon, and Lyndon wanted a little time to think it over but it looked as though he would take it. "Johnson has the strength where you need it most," David Lawrence was saying to Kennedy. I could have belted Lawrence. I was vehemently against the Johnson selection because it represented precisely the kind of cynical, old-style politics we were trying to get away from. I also knew our liberal friends would be appalled by it.

When Jack Kennedy saw the expression on my face, he beckoned to Bobby Kennedy and me to follow him into the bedroom. The bedroom was crowded with people, too, and realizing that I was about to explode, Jack said to Bobby, "I'd better talk to Kenny alone in the bathroom." We went into the bathroom and closed the door behind us.

"This is the worst mistake you ever made," I said to him. "You came out here to this convention like a knight on a

League college guy who's promising to get rid of the old political ways. And now, in your first move, you go against all the people who supported you. Are we going to spend the whole campaign apologizing for Lyndon Johnson and trying to explain why he voted against everything you ever stood for?"

He became pale, livid with anger, so upset and hurt that it took him a while before he was able to collect himself.

"Wait a minute," he said. "I've offered it to him, but he hasn't accepted it yet and maybe he won't. If he does, let's get one thing clear."

I never forgot what he said next.

"I'm 43 years old, and I'm the healthiest candidate for President in the United States. You've traveled with me enough to know that. I'm not going to die in office. So the Vice Presidency doesn't mean anything. I'm thinking of something else, the leadership in the Senate. If we win, it will be by a small margin and I won't be able to live with Lyndon Johnson as the leader of a small Senate majority. Did it occur to you that if Lyndon becomes the Vice President, I'll have Mike Mansfield as the Senate leader, somebody I can trust and depend on?"

That thought never *had* occurred to me or, incredibly enough, to anyone else around John Kennedy. Bobby had wanted Henry Jackson for Vice President; I had been for Stuart Symington. I had never heard anyone even mention Johnson's name. But Kennedy saw it differently, and the way he explained it sounded like an elementary history lecture.

He reminded me that Congress was still in ses-

The Long Shadowy Hand Of America's CIA

Since every action of the United States Central Intelligence Agency is top secret it is hard to ferret out the facts, but over the years fragments emerge which throw some light on its activities.

Its budget is split among a 100 items in the United States' multi-billion dollar defence appropriations. Only two or three Senators and Congressmen, members of a watchdog committee, are privy to its size.

The CIA itself reports to another super-secret body, the National Defence Council, which for the record says virtually nothing. Even its membership is secret.

But it can be said that the CIA budget rivals that of many medium-sized nations, and it employs tens of thousands of agents throughout the world — probably more than Russia.

The CIA is quick to point out that it operates only outside the limits of the continental United States, its work internally being done by the FBI. Each foreign post has a "Resident" who controls the activities of his men in the field. Often the Resident operates out of the United States Embassy in the nation concerned, much to the disgust of regular diplomats who call CIA men "spooks," sometimes to their faces.

Control

Controlling and co-ordinating these world-wide operations is a huge staff in CIA headquarters at Langley, Virginia — a massive concrete building tucked away behind a grove of trees just off a super-highway a few miles from Washington, DC.

A coy direction sign announces it as the Public Works Department for the District of Columbia.

CIA critics say this piece of cloak-and-dagger nonsense which deceives nobody is typical of the theatrical amateurism of the entire CIA operation.

The CIA's most spectacular failure was, of course, the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba.

Despite its protestations at being only an external agency, CIA agents were active in Miami, Florida, recruiting Cuban refugees to fight.

The agency's advice to the Pentagon and White House on the degree of support Prime Minister Fidel Castro had in his own country proved completely erroneous. Many liberal Senators claim that the agency is so paranoid about Communists and Communism that its collective judgements are often seriously distorted.

Certainly the record indicates that the CIA is more likely to be friendly to right-wing politicians and military men than anybody else. They have been accused, often with convincing evidence, of interfering on the side of the generals in several Latin American and Caribbean countries, notably Guatemala, Colombia, Argentina, and Brazil.

Mainstay

The agency has been a mainstay of President Ky's military regime in South Vietnam, and there is no doubt that it had a big hand in toppling the neutralist

government of Prince Sihanouk in Cambodia.

Perhaps its most sickening intervention was in Greece, where the colonels oligarchy boasts of the support of the United States Government as it imprisons and tortures its democratic opponents.

The evidence indicates that the CIA uses all classic tools of a spy organisation — assassination, murder, bribery and blackmail of key officials, etc. Last year Green Beret troops in Viet-

nam who were charged with the murder of a Vietnamese national, said to be a double agent.

Another agency, little-known outside of the United States that plays a key role in supporting CIA activity is the National Security Agency (NSA), not to be confused with NASA, the space agency.

Headquartered in a

Security

sprawling complex at Fort Meade, Maryland, some 30 miles from Langley, the NSA's security arrangements are, if possible, even tighter than those of the CIA. It bristles with Marine guards and anybody walking around the building without conspicuously displaying his identity will instantly have a

gun barrel at his head.

NSA's principal task is to crack the diplomatic and military codes of every other nation on earth. It employs some of the most sophisticated computer equipment ever assembled.

The results of this work are useful to the CIA and the National Security Council. But several allied governments have expressed annoyance over the exercise.

The growing criticism is making it more difficult for the CIA to recruit suitable personnel. It is said that they are more and more turning to men with a law

Almost without exception, military coups around the world in recent years have brought charges of involvement by America's Central Intelligence Agency. Recently King Hussein has hinted at CIA interference in Jordan. What is this shadowy organisation and how does it work? R. W. Cocking investigates for Gemini News Service

enforcement background, as opposed to the more free-wheeling Ivy League college graduates who used to make up the core of their key people.

One problem is that men resigning from the CIA often find that employment at Langley offers real obstacles to getting a new job.

A well-publicised case occurred in Washington recently when a CIA employee resigned to return to university teaching. He was on the short list for a plum appointment, but when it became known he had been a researcher for

the CIA his name was dropped from consideration.

Defenders of the agency argue that every major power must be in the intelligence business as a matter of self-protection.

On the charge of amateurism, one CIA man told me: "Sure we make a lot of mistakes. After all, the United States has been running the world for only a little more than 25 years. Before us, the British were doing it for nearly 300, which gave them plenty of time to learn how to run an intelligence network."

STATINTL

NO. 2 MAN AT BAY OF PIGS

District Hires Cuban Leader

By WILLIAM BASHAM
Star Staff Writer

The second in command of the Cuban invasion force at the Bay of Pigs in 1961 has been hired by the District government to work on programs affecting the city's Spanish-speaking community.

He is Erneido A. Oliva, now completing a six-month job as a consultant for the Senate Judiciary Committee's subcommittee on refugees. He was hired by Phillip J. Rutledge, head of the District's Department of Human Resources.

Oliva, now a District resident, will work in the city department's state technical assistance agency, reviewing federal grants to the city, particularly as they affect Spanish-speaking residents. He also will assist in establishing a city advisory committee in this field.

The 38-year-old Cuban has been a close friend for years of



ERNEIDO OLIVA

the Kennedy family. He was particularly close to Sen. Robert F. Kennedy. The chairman of the Senate subcommittee Oliva

is leaving is Sen. Edward M. Kennedy, D-Mass.

As a subcommittee aide to Kennedy, Oliva traveled around the country, interviewing Cuban refugees to see how they have done in the United States since they fled Cuba after Fidel Castro took over in January 1959.

In April 1961 Oliva was one of 1,500 Cubans in Brigade 2506 who invaded Cuba with battle plans laid out by the Central Intelligence Agency. The attempt failed after three days of fighting, and the surviving members of the brigade were imprisoned.

After he was released on Christmas Eve 1962 from a Cuban prison for a ransom of \$500,000, personally set by Castro, Oliva entered the United States Army, as did most of the brigade members freed at the same time. He served several years, reaching the rank of major, and was a member of the U.S. military force in Santo Domingo in May 1965.

Oliva resigned his Army commission to work with Cuban exiles in Miami, remaining there until he was asked to join Kennedy's subcommittee in January.

Oliva's letters of reference have been written by prominent American figures. They include Cyrus Vance, deputy secretary of defense under President Johnson; Retired Adm. Arleigh Burke, former chief of naval operations, and Joseph A. Califano Jr., a former special assistant to President Johnson.

Rutledge confirmed that Oliva has been hired and should be on the job next week.

STATINTL



CHICAGO, ILL.
TRIBUNE

M - 775,416
S - 1,045,176

JUN 29 1970

Drug Ring Broken by Wiretaps

BY RUDOLPH UNGER

Court approved wiretapping of telephones was the key weapon in last week's smashing of a large, highly organized cocaine and heroin ring operated in Chicago by Cuban exiles, according to government prosecutors.

William P. Cagney, and Douglas Roller, assistant United States attorneys, said that the Chicago ring, part of a nation-wide Cuban exile narcotics operation, could not have been cracked by federal narcotics agents without the use of electronic eavesdropping to develop evidence.

Some Trained by CIA

The prosecutors said that some of the 28 persons arrested here, as well as others among those arrested in Miami, New York, and Los Angeles, had participated in the ill-fated Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba in 1961, and had been trained by the Central Intelligence agency in guerrilla warfare and counter-intelligence.

The 50 agents in the Federal Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, who worked six months to infiltrate the Chicago ring, frequently found themselves under counter surveillance as they spied on ring

members and later made drug purchases from them.

The government, which is expected to return indictments against ring members this week, has refused to disclose just how many wiretaps were employed in cracking the Chicago ring. Agents accused Leonides Suarez, 37, of 3527 Shakespeare av., a clothing company salesman, of being the Chicago ring's leader.

Bond of \$500,000

Suarez was one of two arrested whose bond was set at \$500,000 by United States Commissioner James T. Balog, when he set total of \$4,290,000 in bonds for the 28 suspects, most of whom are aliens.

Cagney and Roller said it was Suarez' contacts in Miami who supplied the cocaine and heroin handled by the ring in Chicago.

In their investigation here, agents placed a wiretap on the telephone of one of the 28 arrested, Alonzo T. Perry Sr., 45, of 8614 University av., from June 9 to June 19. The action was authorized by Judge Richard B. Austin, of federal District court.

Monitor His Calls

Spanish-speaking agents monitored conversations between Perry, a Negro described by

prosecutors as a large south-side narcotics distributor, and a man they identified as Mario Duquesne, 45, of 6846 Jeffrey av., a Cuban exile also arrested last Sunday. Agents said Duquesne supplied Perry with cocaine and heroin obtained from Cubans operating in the north side.

Agents said that Perry, an avid golfer who drives a white Cadillac and lives in a modest-looking but well-furnished home, frequently told Duquesne he was wary of using the telephone in their conversations.

"Telephone Is Useless"

"Listen, Mario, on the phone we cannot do anything . . . the telephone is useless . . . it is for nothing," the agents reported him as saying in one recorded conversation. In another, he remarked, "You know the telephone is no good . . . come by here tomorrow."

Thru wiretaps and surveillance, the agents said they learned how Perry purchased heroin from Duquesne on June 15 for a man named Curtis, described by investigators as a major narcotics distributor in Indianapolis. After the purchase, agents trailed Curtis and five others as they drove back

to Indianapolis in Curtis' Cadillac with the drugs.

On June 18, agents said they listened and watched as Duquesne delivered to Perry what Duquesne described as "tremendous cocaine." The agents then followed a black Mustang whose driver agents saw bring the cocaine to Duquesne. The car was followed to a home at 6113 N. Seeley av.


Driver Later Arrested

The driver, identified as Gilberto A. Althonso, 31, was arrested on June 20, when, with another man, he sold four kilograms of cocaine for \$58,000 to undercover agents. Althonso is being held on \$350,000 bond.

Agents here last Sunday, of the 28 arrested were armed, under the direction of John Evans and Irving Swank, did not have to fire a shot in and New York city tried to shoot it out with agents and three suspects were wounded. During the investigation leading to the raids on the Miami operation, agents narrowly escaped death when a suspect opened fire on them with a submachine gun and splattered their auto with bullets.

SAGA
June 70

SAGA penetrates the veil of
secrecy and gives you, for
the first time anywhere,
an inside look at



THE CIA'S WORLDWIDE KILL SQUADS

By Roy Norton

23 MAY 1970

The Prensa Latina Story/2

By Lionel Martin
Guardian staff correspondent
Second of two articles

Havana

From founder Jorge Masetti to present director Manuel Yepe, the orientation within Prensa Latina, the Cuban news agency, has been to avoid political "adjectivization" and propagandistic phraseology prevalent in the news agency releases of some socialist countries. Prensa Latina considers that its partiality is in accord with a truthful representation of reality. To be partial means to present news and analysis that highlights the struggle of peoples and nations for national liberation and a better life. This must be done objectively in strict accord with the truth. There have been times when unnecessary editorialization and propagandistic wordiness have crept into PL releases. However, this is recognized as a failing and more and more Prensa Latina meets the standards it has set for itself.

When it became clear that Prensa Latina would not fold of its own accord, as many pundits had predicted, the opposition press controlled by Latin American oligarchs and U.S. elitist interests, unleashed an all-out offensive against the agency.

These attacks were especially malicious in 1960. Prensa Latina was accused of being an official spokesman for "Castro-Communism." One Venezuelan columnist freely linked PL personnel with the Soviet Union and called the agency the "Kuban-TASS." John O'Rourke, editor of the Washington Daily News sent out a personal letter to fellow editors all over the world warning against the use of Prensa Latina material. Shortly afterwards, the Guatemalan government, on whose territory the CIA was to prepare the Bay of Pigs invaders, closed down the Prensa Latina office. A month later, a false story circulated in the Mexican press that Prensa Latina was using a clandestine radio transmitter in Mexico City. In October, Jules Dubois, chairman of the "freedom of the press committee" of the

bourgeois Inter-American Press Association, declared Prensa should be considered as an "instrument of international communism" and a "propaganda agency of the Cuban government."

Gun in one hand; pen in the other

A few days after Jorge Masetti arrived in the Sierra Maestra in 1957 he witnessed an air-raid by the Batista air force. As he stared at a dead child, he related later, he asked himself: "What am I doing here with a pencil in my hand when I should be pulling the trigger of a machine-gun." The implication was clear: Masetti felt that his job was to take up arms in the fight.

In 1961, after covering the Bay of Pigs invasion, Masetti left Cuba and went to visit the battlelines of the National Liberation Front then fighting the French in Algeria. He stayed with the FLN for several months and witnessed the victorious conclusion of their struggle. When he returned to Cuba he began writing a book on Algeria. The book was never finished. Other activities attracted Masetti. He asked himself: "What is left now but the sacred obligation to practice what I have learned?" In the final months of 1961 Masetti disappeared from sight. From time to time items would appear in the world press about the presence of guerrillas operating in the province of Salta in Argentina near the Bolivian frontier. Salta was the domain of enormous land holdings like that of Tabacal belonging to the "patron" Costa. It is also a region rich in petroleum, lumber, sugar cane and cattle and even has steel mills like that of Zapla and Jujuy.

The guerrilla band never had a chance to consolidate itself. It was wiped out by Argentine forces in March and April 1964. "Comandante Segundo," the leader of the group was never heard from again. Comandante Segundo was the nom de guerre of Jorge Masetti.

Masetti's legacy

Masetti left behind an agency that was already a "going concern." Again and again it was the victim of calumnies, economic pressures and legal maneuvers. It survived each test.

Prensa Latina has also been victimized by the United States government in a direct way.

During its first four years, Prensa Latina operated a bureau in New York. About two weeks before the second anniversary of the Bay of Pigs invasion, a policeman appeared at the office and announced that he had been sent to warn PL that a "visit" by Cuban exiles was imminent. After first refusing its protection, the New York Police Department acceded, but only for a few days. The day after guards were withdrawn, six counter-revolutionary Cubans armed with pistols entered the PL office, tore the place up and injured one of the employees who was sitting at the desk of the absent bureau chief.

Perpetual harassment

The constant threats and absence of protection decided Prensa Latina to move its bureau within the confines of the United Nations where greater security existed. Shortly afterwards, the Federal Reserve Board told Prensa Latina that its expenses would be curtailed to \$5000 a month, a sum which greatly limited the agency's activities. Prensa Latina had formerly spent up to \$10,000 a month for the New York operation. The U.S. government also restricted PL's activities outside the walls of the United Nations. Prensa Latina was told by Washington that it could only use its teletype at the UN for the transmission of news concerning that organization.

In Havana, both UPI and AP had accredited correspondents who operated without any financial limitations or travelling restrictions. In 1969 the Cuban government asked the AP correspondent to leave because of news reports it considered false and which tended to damage relations between Cuba and a friendly neighbor, Mexico. UPI also ceased operations in Havana.

1 5 MAY 1970

MICHAEL HARRINGTON

Cambodia Brings Out 'the Old Nixon'

Some years ago I talked to a prominent conservative before debating him and he told me of how the Right felt that Richard Nixon had betrayed it. When he came to Washington, he said, Nixon was looked upon as a potential leader of the Taft wing of the Republican party, but he quickly sold out to Eisenhower and the Eastern establishment in 1952.

But when the phone finally rang in the middle of the night with the Cambodia crisis, the President who answered it was none other than the old Richard Nixon. The intemperate, patriotically simplistic and military-oriented leader who responded to the events in Southeast Asia was everything his old rightist friends might have wished him to be.

I am, of course, appalled that Nixon has decided to take the nation down that same slippery slope which all but destroyed the Johnson administration and the internal peace of the society along with it. His actions threaten the future of this nation at home and the peace of the world abroad.

But I am particularly concerned here with one aspect of the problem: The difficulties, and dangers, confronting a civilian commander in chief.

After the Bay of Pigs fiasco, John F. Kennedy talked of how hard it was for a President to reject the unanimous advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In theory, the generals and admirals know more than the chief executive about war.

An Eisenhower could veto their advice, as he did in 1954 when the Pentagon and then Vice President Nixon wanted to intervene with nuclear weapons on the side of the French in Indochina, but only because he wore five stars.

But now the President and the public must get over this notion. War, and particularly wars of the Vietnamese and Cambodian type, are too important to be left to the generals.

Consider the evidence. The military men encouraged Kennedy to move into Vietnam when a much wiser civilian, John Kenneth Galbraith, then our ambassador to India, told him to stay out. The Joint Chiefs and the CIA proved themselves ludicrously ignorant of conditions in Cuba when they advised support of an invasion which was not only immoral, but stupid as well. In 1965 and 1966, it was

the optimistic report of the Pentagon on the early end to the war in Vietnam that caused Lyndon Johnson to unbalance his budget by \$10 billion and start our current inflation.

More recently, the campaign of 1958 revealed that the man who had been entrusted for years with our strategic air power, Gen. Curtis LeMay, was a rightist of such powerful and eccentric views that George Wallace, whose running mate he was, suddenly seemed almost moderate.

In saying these things, I have no intention of demeaning the courage and devotion of the military, but only their ability to make decisions in wars which are increasingly political in nature.

The generals and the admirals believe, of course, in force and violence. But, as the bombing of North Vietnam under Johnson proved, it is im-

possible to shoot a population into submission. Where the sources of a war are both nationalist and social, as in the case of Vietnam, there is a profound limitation upon what guns can do. But the factors that must thus mitigate, and even overrule, the military judgment are the ones which the Pentagon is least able to understand.

But now the old Richard Nixon has taken the most tragic step of his administration. As usual, he has depicted himself as a brave, idealistic leader who has refused the cheap and easy solution and who has recognized the terrible complexities of our plight.

That, I submit, is nonsense. Nixon has accepted the patriotic simplifications of those same generals who have caused so much tragedy, both national and international, in their quest for Operation Total Victory in Vietnam.

JACKSON, MISS.
NEWS

E - 46,751

MAY 13 1970

Castro Crows As Coverup

Fidel Castro is making a big thing of what appears to be a minor infiltration of Cuban exiles from the United States. The Cuban dictator gave the funeral oration for five of his soldiers said to have been killed in a battle with the invaders, in which two of the latter reportedly were killed and three captured. The funeral was held on the ninth anniversary of the Bay of Pigs fiasco.

Tying President Nixon, the CIA and the Pentagon to the recent "invasion," Castro sought to build it up to Bay of Pigs proportions. The latest intruders, he said, will receive a defeat more humiliating and crushing than that of the Bay of Pigs group.

Perhaps the CIA is involved to some degree in the harassment from time to time of Castro's regime by exiles from Florida. But

certainly President Nixon and the Pentagon have more than enough problems in Southeast Asia, the Middle East and elsewhere. It would be against all logic for them to undertake at this time anything like the Bay of Pigs attack that gave President Kennedy so bad a time.

It seems strange for Castro to make so much of what cannot be a serious threat to his rule. The explanation may lie in his reference to reports that invaders would land to sabotage the sugar harvest. He has called for the harvest of 10 million tons of sugar this year to give Cuba a record return in foreign exchange. But recent radio reports have indicated the goal may not be reached. Stirring the people up with charges of Yankee wickedness may get them out in the fields to cut the rest of the cane.

8 MAY 1970

Exiles Report Landing on Cuban Coast

MIAMI (UPI)—The Miami-based Christian Nationalist Movement, a Cuban exile organization, announced last night it had staged another landing of commandos on Cuba.

There was no indication of how many men participated in the raid. The group said the landing party was able to go inland in Cuba "without making contact with the enemy."

It also was disclosed that there was an attack on the Uruguay-Cuban Cultural Institute in Montivideo, but there were no details.

The report came three weeks after another landing party from a Miami-based group, Alpha 66, went ashore on the eastern tip of Cuba on April 17, the ninth anniversary of the Bay of Pigs invasion.

The Castro regime reported there were only 13 men in that guerrilla force and that 4 were killed and the other 9 captured. Alpha 66 has disputed the Castro claims.

Nine Years Later

U.S. Still Pays Price for 'Bay of Pigs' Failure

By PAUL BETHEL

On April 17, nine years ago, 1,347 members of Cuban Assault Brigade 2506 landed at the Bay of Pigs. But as they saw the dim outlines of their country on the horizon, the ingredients for success had been withdrawn. Because Castro's air force was not destroyed in advance, they were subjected to vicious, crippling air attacks. Nevertheless, Brigade members fought well and achieved most of their objectives, including the capture of Giron air strip on which Central American-based fighters were to have been based.

They fought well despite the fact that two of their transports had been sunk by an air force which was supposed to have been destroyed on the ground. These transports carried radio equipment to alert the Cuban people and solicit recognition of the outside world. The ships also contained rifles for detectors.

The World War II B-26s of the Freedom Fighters were no match for Castro jets, British Sea Furies and the more heavily armed B-26s. Stripped of tail guns to accommodate auxiliary gas tanks needed for the flight from Central America, the planes of the Freedom Fighters were sitting ducks once Castro's planes got on their tails. Their vulnerability was another reason why Castro's air force was to have been knocked out on the ground.

Yet, of 48 sorties proposed to carry out the destruction of Castro's air arm, President Kennedy permitted only eight to be flown.

Among the last messages sent out by Brigade 2506 was this one:

"To Base. Do you people realize how desperate the situation is? Do you back us, or quit? All we want is low jet cover and jet close support. Enemy has this support. I need it badly or cannot survive. Please don't desert us. Out of bazooka and tank ammunition. Tanks will hit me at dawn."

That self-inflicted defeat in 1961 remains an open wound for the United States, and the Soviet lodgement in Cuba remains one of our most serious foreign policy problems.

Today, Cuba hosts hundreds of American radical youths and trains and exports an estimated 10,000 Latin guerrillas yearly. The return of U.S. youths is attended by bombings, arson, campus disturbances, the unfolding of urban guerrilla warfare in its many guises. In March, Abbie Hoffman, convicted in the "Chicago 7" trial, journeyed to Puerto Rico while under bond and there led a Castroite mob against the University of Puerto Rico—one girl shot, \$53,000 damages, the ROTC facilities destroyed, school shut down.

American and Western diplomats are kidnapped and murdered by Castroite terrorists in Latin America. Castroite gangs held up 40 banks last year in Brazil, getting away with \$1.5 million to finance their subversive activities.

Several apparently coordinated events which took place the first week of April demonstrate the growing strength of Russian-Cuban subversion:

- Count Karl von Spreti, German ambassador to Guatemala, was kidnapped, then murdered by Castro's Revolutionary Armed Forces.

- Castroite "Tupamaros" in Uruguay pulled off the most audacious robbery in the history of that country, hitting the Horacio Mailhos tobacco firm and fleeing with \$250,000. (The same group kidnapped a banker and held him for ransom.)

- An American vice consul ran his car over would-be abductors in Porto Alegre, Brazil.

- A Venezuelan army patrol was ambushed and four soldiers killed.

- A Castroite guerrilla band in Colombia captured a village, executed its police chief and made off with the entire police arsenal.

Argentina intends to take extreme measures to stop the kidnapping of diplomats. Gen. Julio Alsogaray had this to say about the Von Spreti murder: "If there is a 'revolutionary war' under way, and it is apparent from everything coming out of Havana that there is, then we must adopt counterrevolutionary measures." If the general has his way,

he would threaten execution of terrorists under custody whose release is demanded in exchange for the life of a foreign diplomat. Most observers of the Latin American scene (including a surprising number of U.S. foreign service officers) believe that should this threat be carried out—just once—that would end the kidnappings.

The Cuban-based African, Asian, Latin American Solidarity Organization took a giant step forward in coordinating subversive activities for a continent-wide push on April 7. The AALAPSO, as it is known, published what it calls a "Minimanual for the Urban Guerrilla."

The pamphlet's 20,000 words, written by Carlos Marighela, a Brazilian Castroite recently cut down in a shoot-out with police, carry the blueprint of future Communist-inspired guerrilla activities. The manual teaches how to pull off a successful kidnapping, proposes the "physical liquidation" of government leaders and "attacks on imperialist enterprises" and holds up the cold-blooded murder of U.S. Army Capt. Charles Chandler as an example of the perfectly executed Castroite crime.

The "Minimanual" is illustrated by pictures of how to make Molotov cocktails, how to use guns, explosives and the like to best advantage. "The urban guerrilla's reason for existence, the basic condition in which he acts and subsists, is to shoot," it declares.

A version of Marighela's terrorist philosophy also appears in a recent issue of "Leviathan," a publication of the "Weatherman" faction of the Students for a Democratic Society, put out in San Francisco.

That same first week of April, a high-level functionary in Bolivia's Ministry of Interior confirmed reports that leaders of Castroite terrorist organizations from 12 countries met in La Paz "to unfold a continent-wide liberation movement." The countries marked for attack are: Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Colombia, Chile, Guatemala, Ecuador, Mexico,

The Secret Team and the Games They Play

by L. Fletcher Prouty

"The hill costumes of the Meo tribesmen contrasted with the civilian clothes of United States military men riding in open jeeps and carrying M-16 rifles and pistols. These young Americans are mostly ex-Green Berets, hired on CIA contract to advise and train Laotian troops." Those matter-of-fact, almost weary sentences, written late in February by T.D. Allman of *The Washington Post* after he and two other enterprising correspondents left a guided tour and walked 12 miles over some hills in Laos to a secret base at Long Cheng, describe a situation that today may seem commonplace to anyone familiar with American operations overseas, but that no more than 10 years ago would have been unthinkable.

To take a detachment of regular troops, put its members into disguise, smuggle them out of the country so that neither the public nor the Congress knows they have left, and assign them to clandestine duties on foreign soil under the command of a non-military agency—it is doubtful that anyone would have dared to suggest taking such liberties with the armed forces and foreign relations of the United States, not to say with the Constitution, to any President up to and especially including Dwight D. Eisenhower. Indeed, the most remarkable development in the management of America's relations with other countries during the nine years since Mr. Eisenhower left office has been the assumption of more and more control over military and diplomatic operations abroad by men whose activities are secret, whose budget is secret, whose very identities as often as not are secret—in short a Secret Team whose actions only those implicated in them are in a position to monitor. How determinedly this secrecy is preserved, even when preserving it means denying the United States Army the right to discipline its own personnel, not to say the opportunity to do justice,

was strikingly illustrated not long ago by the refusal of the Central Intelligence Agency to provide witnesses for the court-martial that was to try eight Green Beret officers for murdering a suspected North Vietnamese spy, thus forcing the Army to drop the charges.

The Secret Team consists of security-cleared individuals in and out of government who receive secret intelligence data gathered by the CIA and the National Security Agency and who react to those data when it seems appropriate to them with paramilitary plans and activities, e.g., training and "advising"—a not exactly impenetrable euphemism for "leading into battle"—Laotian troops. Membership in the Team, granted on a "need to know" basis, varies with the nature and the location of the problems that come to its attention. At the heart of the Team, of course, are a handful of top executives of the CIA and of the National Security Council, most notably the chief White House adviser on foreign policy. Around them revolves a sort of inner ring of Presidential staff members, State Department officials, civilians and military men from the Pentagon, and career professionals in the intelligence services. And out beyond them is an extensive and intricate network of government officials with responsibility for or expertise in some specific field that touches on national security: think-tank analysts, businessmen who travel a lot or whose businesses (e.g., import-export or operating a cargo airline) are useful, academic experts in this or that technical subject or geographic region, and, quite importantly, alumni of the intelligence service—a service from which there are no unconditional resignations.

Thus the Secret Team is not a clandestine super-planning board or super-general staff but, even more damaging to the coherent conduct of foreign affairs, a bewildering collection of temporarily assembled action committees that respond pretty much ad hoc to specific troubles in various parts of the world, sometimes in ways that duplicate the

23 April, 1970

Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-0

STATINTL

Theatre of Delusion

I. F. Stone

I

The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) now reopening in Vienna may best be seen as the latest in a series of fumbling attempts by mankind to pick up the pieces in the wake of Hiroshima. A month after that first atomic bomb dropped, Einstein said what is still the last word of wisdom on the subject, though we are as far as ever from applying it. To a UPI reporter who tracked him down in a forest cabin near Lake Saranac, Einstein said "the only salvation for civilization and the human race" now lay in "the creation of a world government. As long as sovereign states continue to have separate armaments and armament secrets," he warned, "new world wars will be inevitable."

This idea, like so much else in the repetitive and frustrating history of the struggle against the arms race in the last hundred years, was not new. It appeared at least as early as 1913, in a novel by H. G. Wells, *The World Set Free*. Wells predicted the splitting of the atom—by some stroke of luck or intuitive genius placing the event in 1933, when it actually occurred. He also forecast the use of nuclear energy in a world war so catastrophic it shook men and nations out of their accustomed habits and led them to form a world government as their only assurance henceforth of survival.¹

For a fleeting moment since forgotten, the dropping of the first bomb did push the American government in the direction of world government. The horrors of Hiroshima and then Nagasaki, the realization of what a third and nuclear world war would do to mankind, shocked American political leaders and scientists into a project whose novelty and magnitude began to be commensurate with the peril they foresaw. But the Baruch-Lilienthal-Acheson plan for the international control of atomic energy they then presented to the United Nations proved to be the first of four lost opportunities since the war to bring the nuclear monster under control; the SALT talks represent another chance, and I fear it too will be lost.

The Baruch plan, as put forward in 1946, would have set up a kind of world superstate for the nuclear age. Unfortunately, the plan seems to have passed through three stages, in which the original idealistic impulse was suc-

cessively revised to make it more "practical" politically. In the process it also grew less magnanimous. It ended up looking—from Moscow's point of view—like a plan for domination of the world and the economy of the Soviet Union by the United States, as Acheson now admits in a section of his newly published memoirs which has escaped attention.²

Dean Acheson, then Under Secretary of State, was chairman of a committee appointed by President Truman after the war to draw up a plan for the international control of atomic energy. This committee in turn set up a consultative group of scientists and big business executives³ under David E. Lilienthal and including J. Robert Oppenheimer. The original sketch for a world authority to take over all sources of uranium and to control all nuclear production facilities came from the Lilienthal group.

This was at least twice revised before publication by the Acheson committee. The others on his committee were General Leslie R. Groves, who headed the Manhattan Project which built the bomb; Dr. Vannevar Bush, who organized science for war in World War II; Dr. James B. Conant, then president of Harvard; and John J. McCloy, Assistant Secretary of War under Henry L. Stimson. Stimson recognized very early that the secret of the bomb would soon vanish and had best be shared while it might still be used to build a more stable world.

The main drawback in the original Acheson-Lilienthal plan was that it asked the Soviet Union and all other countries to hand over control of their uranium deposits and open themselves to geological survey at once in return for a promise at some unspecified future date to cease our own production of bombs and hand over their secret to an international authority—if Congress did not change its mind when the time came.

The hedges not only became more onerous but began to seem deliberate pitfalls by the time the plan was revised again by Bernard Baruch, whom Truman named in March, 1946, as US representative on the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission. The group Baruch chose to work with him in revising the Acheson-Lilienthal

plan for presentation to the UN contained neither liberals, idealists, nor scientists. It was the earliest official postwar collection of cold warriors: John Hancock of Lehman Brothers; Ferdinand Fberstadt, another Wall Street banker with strong military ties; Fred Searis of Newmont Mining, a concern of imperial dimensions and world-wide cartel connections; and Herbert Bayard Swope, the journalist who had become Baruch's personal public relations man.

The Baruch plan, as it became known when it was submitted to the UN, must have seemed to Moscow the blueprint for a world capitalist superstate in which the US would retain its atomic monopoly behind the façade of an international organization under US control. In *Present at the Creation*, Acheson discloses publicly for the first time that he felt the plan as transformed by Baruch contained provisions "almost certain to wreck any possibility of Russian acceptance" because Moscow would see them "as an attempt to turn the United Nations into an alliance to support a US threat of war against the USSR unless it ceased its efforts" to develop an atom bomb, too.⁴

Even the earlier pre-Baruch version would have been hard to sell a ruler of Stalin's ferocious suspicions and primitive Marxist views. The Baruch plan was enough to have frightened off even a gentle Menshevik. It would have eliminated the veto in the UN Security Council to assure, in Baruch's words, "swift and certain punishment" of any violator. It would have thrown the war-torn and terribly weakened Soviet Union open to Western inspection, and at the mercy of a US-led majority in the Security Council. Baruch was no fool and he knew the Russians well. His rhetoric in presenting the plan matched the occasion. The choice, he told the UN, is "world peace or world destruction." But his draftsmanship ensured a Russian *Nyet*. So the first opportunity was lost.

In retrospect the failure transcends the personalities who took part. Mankind just was not ready. The US was not generous enough. The Soviet roles had been reversed, it is hard to believe that the Russian regime, self-

DES MOINES, IOWA
REGISTER
APR 21 1970

M - 246,841
S - 514,496

Fiery Speech by Castro Blames U.S. for Invasion

HAVANA, CUBA (REUTERS) — Prime Minister Fidel Castro accused President Nixon Monday night of ordering the Pentagon to organize mercenary forces for new attacks on Cuba.

He made the charge as Cuban troops continued to hunt counter-revolutionary forces which landed in eastern Cuba last Friday.

Castro, in an angry speech at the funeral of five soldiers slain in clashes with the invaders, warned that the new invasion attempts would suffer worse defeats than the ill-fated Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961.

"Nixon has now assigned the Pentagon, sadly known for its crimes in the world, the organization and recruitment of mercenaries for new aggressive plans against our country," the Cuban leader said.

It was Castro's most vicious attack on the United States since early 1968. He claimed Cuban exiles in the U.S. were speaking openly on radio and television of the new landings. He described the landings as part of "imperialistic plans" against Cuba.

'Spread Crime'

The new invaders were "mercenaries who come from the country which spread crime throughout the world," Castro said.

If Mr. Nixon "and the band of criminals composing the Pentagon and the CIA" have not learned from the beating they received in Vietnam and Laos, they will learn in Cuba, he said.

"Here they (the U.S.) will have defeat more shameful, more crushing than they received at the Bay of Pigs," the premier said.

Castro spoke at the funeral which was nationally televised.

The slain Cubans included an Army lieutenant, a private and three members of a mountain militia unit from a small village on the eastern tip of the island.

The five were killed in a clash Saturday evening following the landing early Friday. The landing came nine years to the day after the abortive Bay of Pigs landing in 1961 by Cuban exiles backed and equipped by the United States.

No Indication

Castro still refused to give an indication of the size of the invading force, and revealed no new details of the operations against them.

But his silence appeared to indicate that there had been no further clashes since Saturday. Observers speculate the mercenaries are still being hunted in the heavily-wooded Sierra Bel Pural mountain range.

So far the invaders are reported to have had two of their party killed and three captured.

A television program Monday night showed strong, steel-helmeted troops and militamen, armed with automatic weapons and backed by helicopters, fanning out to surround the guerrilla band.

Castro was pictured during the broadcast at the headquarters of Maj. Raul Menendez Pomasevich, commander of Cuba's eastern army. Pomasevich is directing the "search and destroy operation," examining what were described as U.S.


army AR-15, AR-16 and AR-18 automatic rifles.

Earlier Monday, Alpha 66, a militant anti-Cuban exile organization, claimed responsibility for the Friday landing.

Start War

A spokesman for the Miami-based group, which has reportedly been involved in several past raids on the communist island, said invading forces landed on Cuban shores in an effort to start a guerrilla war in the same area where Castro's own revolution began during the 1950s.

The landing party consisted of the same group of men who were forced to find refuge in



early January at the U.S. Guantanamo naval base in Cuba after a planned infiltration was thwarted by rough seas, the Miami News reported Monday.

Capt. Vicente Mendez, 39, who had led the unsuccessful invasion in January, was reportedly heading the latest operation.

Reports also indicated the raiders had been trained at a secret camp in the Florida Everglades.

7 APR 1970

CUBA REVISITED**HOW TO
SEE HAVANA
WITHOUT
GETTING
HIJACKED**

WE WERE SITTING—my wife and I and two Cuban friends—in the office of the earnest black director of the new “Rosafé Signet” provincial artificial-insemination center south of Havana. The center is named after a mighty Canadian bull who died of overwork two years after reporting for duty. We had been visiting with his numerous progeny, admiring the shiny new French lab equipment, and we were sipping warm Russian champagne and listening to the director’s vision of a Cuba one day self-sufficient in meat and dairy products—thanks to Rosafé Signet, his heirs and the Revolution. Enormous cigars were passed around, and I was handed an aluminum ashtray inscribed, “Made from a U.S. plane shot down over the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.” “Well,” said one of our companions with a diplomatic smile, “at least America has contributed *something* to our revolution. . . .”

Later, we were sitting amid the abstract paintings in the Casa de las Americas with the poet and editor, Roberto Retamar, who once taught at Yale. “U.S. policy has been vital to the success of our Revo-



AFTER ELEVEN YEARS, CASTRO'S REVOLUTION
STILL LURCHES ALONG
ON FAITH, HOPE AND BLUFF.
A SURPRISING EYEWITNESS REPORT
BY LOOK'S EDITOR IN CHIEF,
WILLIAM ATTWOOD.

WASHINGTON OBSERVER NEWSLETTER
1 April 1970

STERN GANG

A strong independent ticket in Connecticut this year would upset the old-line political parties in that state and probably capture a few elective offices, according to competent political observers. Due to political divisiveness and turmoil, there are more announced and unannounced candidates in Connecticut than ever before.

Inflation, high taxes, racial turbulence, Vietnam War and an industrial complex hard hit by a flood of cheap imports have finally come home to roost and created a back-wash against the controlling Democrat Party in this small but wealthy state and may set an election pattern for other New England states.

Connecticut is known as a swing state due to its large independent vote — 519,000 independent voters; the Democrats outnumber the Republicans by 475,000 to 400,000.

Last year, the Democratic state administration levied the largest tax increase in the state's history — \$539-million. The big tax boost created so much protest that the popular Democratic Governor, John N. Dempsey, decided to not run for a third term. Added to the turmoil was the inability of the Democratic Mayors of Hartford and New Haven to cope with Negro riots and street crime.

Lawyer-lobbyist John M. Bailey, long-time Democratic Connecticut machine boss, will manipulate the Senatorial and gubernatorial nominations at the Democratic state convention in June. Incumbent Senator Thomas Dodd is an under-dog in a race for renomination, but he vows that if he gets the essential 20 per cent vote in the state convention he will force the first senatorial primary in the state's history. Dodd, an ex-FBI agent and Federal prosecutor, as vice chairman of the State Internal Security Subcommittee, conducted a lengthy investigation of the State Department's role in helping Fidel Castro to come to power in Cuba and the setting up of a Communist bastion 90 miles offshore from Florida. Dodd, thereby incurred the everlasting wrath of the liberals.

The State Department's security gumshoe men purloined the Federal income tax returns of Senators Dodd and Eastland and the committee's chief counsel, Jay Sourwine and turned them over to the late Drew Pearson. Then Dodd's top aide, James Boyd became the recipient of emoluments from the tax-exempt Stern Family Fund foundation. Boyd subverted five other Dodd employees to join him in a conspiracy to discredit their employer. They filched Dodd's office files at night and surreptitiously delivered hundreds of stolen

documents to Pearson's legman, Jack Anderson. Then all six of his disloyal employees signed affidavits against Dodd for Pearson.

Pearson carried on a six months' vicious smear campaign against Dodd, charging Dodd with secret payoffs from lobbyists. The liberal press orchestrated Pearson's charges and published thundering editorials demanding that Dodd be impeached by the Senate. Unable to withstand the publicity pressure buildup, the reluctant Senators censured Dodd in 1967.

The Soviet garrison in the State Department accomplished its mission. The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee is virtually immobilized. And the subversives in the State Department and CIA now enjoy immunity from all investigations on Capitol Hill.

Dodd's disloyal aide, Jim Boyd, awarded grants from the Stern family foundation, is busy concocting new scandals against Conservative Members of Congress. Congressman Emilio Q. Daddario (D-Conn) who aspires to the Governor's chair or a seat in the U.S. Senate, will soon become the victim of a smear. Jack Anderson has written four articles linking Daddario with the Mafia. The scandal will break when it will politically hurt Daddario the most.

The Shreveport Councilor says: "The Stern Family Fund was established by Edith Rosenwald Stern and her late husband, Edgar Stern. Edith is the daughter of old-line communist financier, Julius Rosenwald, of Chicago. She is also a financial angel of Louisiana's highly controversial governor, John McKeithen. She is also a former sister-in-law of the communist spy, Alfred Stern, who fled behind the Iron Curtain after indictment in New York as a Soviet Spy.

"The Stern Family Fund has managed to keep its tax exempt status despite its forays into politics." Philip M. Stern was Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs at the time the Cuban Bay of Pigs invasion debacle was planned, and sat in on the planning conferences; his top aide was the Negro leftist, Carl T. Rowan, whom he later has appointed Director of the U.S. Information Agency. Philip Stern's uncle, Alfred Kaufman Stern, the indicted Soviet spy, who fled behind the Iron Curtain, has been in Cuba helping Castro train Negro revolutionist, espionage agents and saboteurs, according to intelligence reports."

The tax-exempt Stern Gang, with such cohorts as Jack Anderson and Jim Boyd, is now trying to knock-off patriotic candidates in Connecticut and elsewhere.

LIBERTY LOWDOWN

A CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON REPORT SUPPLIED ONLY TO LIBERTY LOBBY PLEDGED

STATINTL

C.I.A.

April 1970 STATINTL

Number 86

THUNDER OVER THE POTOMAC

At Great Falls, a few miles above the Nation's capital, the Potomac is a narrow shining ribbon of water twisting and winding between its palisades as seen from 20,000 feet. It is here that the great procession of mighty thundering jetliners begin their descent as they head toward National Airport. It is challenging to a pilot to keep in the narrow twisting corridor above the river, where he is required to remain because the thundering roar of his aircraft is unwelcome to the residents of the District of Columbia and Virginia on the land below. Apparently the residents of Georgetown in the District of Columbia have more political influence, for as a result of their complaints pilots make sure that when they stray from over the river, it is on the Virginia side. As the planes thunder over Langley, Va., passengers look out upon the roof of a tremendous office complex, a massive white building with two gigantic bean-shaped parking lots--the imposing headquarters of the Central Intelligence Agency (C.I.A.).

STATINTL ✓

MYSTERY FOR A SHROUD

Intelligence is generally thought of as a cloak and dagger hush-hush business, shrouded in mystery, and much is made of how secret the C.I.A. operation is. But the iceberg has a big tip--the building in Langley, the recruiters on college campuses, and operations such as the U-2 overflights of Russia, and the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba. ✓

Most people recognize the need of governments for accurate intelligence, necessary for the protection of their nationals. Things that are really subject to question by the layman are the concept of this operation being a world wide network, computerized, and mass-produced with a massive bureaucracy, and the quality and orientation of the personnel involved. Of course, the size of the budget to sustain all this should be a justifiable question for taxpayers. This is particularly important as the budget of the C.I.A. is secret--even the Congressmen who vote the funds are not supposed to know the amount of the agency's budget. The allotments are concealed in appropriations for other agencies of government. If, however, the C.I.A. gets the reputed amount of \$4 BILLION a year, and this amount can be hidden in the budget, it would certainly cause taxpayers to wonder if the federal budget is not leakier than the New York City water system.


One thing is certain--anybody who recruits on college campuses should know what he is hiring--for the students who get honors these days are those who please their

TRUE
APRIL

STATINTL

THE MAFIA VS THE CIA

STATINTL




For seven years, our two invisible governments have been fighting for control of the small, impoverished Caribbean nation of Haiti. The outcome is still in doubt.

BY ANDREW ST. GEORGE

ILLUSTRATED BY DAVID STONE MARTIN

STATINTL



GAINESVILLE, FLA.
SUN

E - 21,088
S - 22,112

MAR 24 1970

Cuba and Guatemala

No two situations are ever quite alike, so the "lessons of history" are tricky. But there is a certain parallel between U.S. actions in Guatemala and Cuba. The United States tried to overthrow the Communist-led governments in both places by an invasion of exiles bankrolled by the United States Central Intelligence Agency. The effort succeeded in Guatemala in 1954 and it failed in Cuba in 1969.

Cuba is more Communist than it was in 1961, heavily subsidized by Russia and its Communist allies. It got away with confiscating a billion dollars' worth of private property of Americans. Yet already it has largely lost elsewhere in Latin America. It is no longer regarded as much of a danger, by Latin American governments or by Washington.

Guatemala has had a bumpy history since 1954: very little economic or social progress, recurring violence, free elections which do not seem to settle much. The Communist guerrillas were supposedly wiped out in savage fighting in the mountains in

1966-68 (and several times earlier).

But they still exist as an urban underground, strong enough to kidnap the Guatemalan foreign minister, the United States labor attache, and a prominent Guatemalan banker in the last few weeks.

In 1968 they killed two U.S. military attaches in January and the U.S. ambassador in August, right in the capital.

In Cuba the United States has no diplomats, but in Communist countries where it does have, the worst that happens to them is an occasional "spontaneous demonstration" with broken windows.

Is the fragmented "world Communist movement" ahead by having a costly weak sister like Castro's Cuba? Is the fragmented "free world" ahead because the United States once "saved from communism" a backward weak sister like Guatemala? It's hard to tell, but a reasonable hypothesis is that Cuba is a net drain on world communism and Guatemala is far from an asset to the U.S.

SUN HERALD
22 Mar 1970

*The ousting of Prince
Sihanouk had all
the hallmarks of the
C.I.A. at its best*



C.I.A. chief Richard Helms . . . more powerful
than ever

STATINTL

AFTER several years of waiting in the shadows, America's Central Intelligence Agency may be fully operational again. This week's incredible coup in Cambodia, which will have such far-reaching consequences through the entire Asian theatre, had the stamp of the C.I.A. at its most professional.

Of course, there will be no official detail on the C.I.A. role, but it would be naive in today's world to assume that Prince Norodom Sihanouk's overthrow was just a lucky accident for the United States.

Way back in 1966, the agency was accused by some watchdog American Senators of supporting Cambodian rebels who opposed the Prince — an accusation that was widely trumpeted about South-East Asia, where the C.I.A. is credited with having spies in every town and in every Government.

It probably does. While the super-spy agency has made grotesque mistakes over the past 10 years, it has also scored some brilliant successes and, under the enthusiastic support of President Nixon, C.I.A. director Richard Helms and his world-wide network of spies are doubtless more powerful than ever.

Charges that they had meddled far too much in Asian politics caused the C.I.A. men to lie low for some time, but it was obvious even to a reporter on a brief visit to South-East Asia this month that the C.I.A. was "gung-ho" again.

Transport and passenger planes of Air America Inc., which is run as a C.I.A. subsidiary, are to be seen in Thailand, Laos and South Vietnam, and it is common knowledge that these aircraft are used to move agents and weapons for secret projects.

**THE SPOOKS
ARE BACK
IN BUSINESS
IN ASIA**

**From PETER
MICHELMORE
in New York**

continued

President of Nicaragua Spreads 'Action' Around

STATINTL

By JEREMIAH O'LEARY
 Latin America Writer of The Star

MANAGUA, Nicaragua—Gen. Anastasio Somoza Debayle, president and proprietor of Nicaragua, has become by any standard the biggest wheeler-dealer in Latin America.

At 44, Somoza seems to operate by the rule that what is good for him is good for Nicaragua. By and large, he is right.

Nicaragua is virtually a private estate of the Somoza family but the incumbent chief is smart enough to spread things around so that almost everybody has a piece of the action.

It would be difficult to say what the Somoza family does not own or run. There is a small merchant fleet, a national airline, a meat-packing plant, a cement factory, sugar cane fields and estates—and a newspaper.

"Tachito"—as Somoza is known—inherited all this from his father, Gen. Anastasio Somoza, who was assassinated. Young Anastasio became head of the clan when his older brother, Luis, died a few years ago.

Tachito was well trained for the job. He graduated from West Point in 1944 and earned a reputation as a hard-working student. He was a far cry from another dictator's son, the late playboy Ramfis Trujillo. Old Tacho gave his son an allowance of only \$5 a week while he was at West Point. He emerged a competent officer and a good chemical engineer.

Somoza is also an excellent political engineer. After the death of a figure-head president, Rene Schick, he won election as the Liberal party candidate for president.

The Somozas have ruled Nicaragua since the middle thirties and there is no broad national dissatisfaction with their stewardship.

The average Nicaraguan can recall no other leadership and by local standards has no special motivation for rocking the boat. In purely relative terms, Nicaraguans are well enough off, and Somoza is careful not to squeeze them.

Violent People

This is not to say that there is not dissent in Nicaragua nor that Somoza does not have enemies. Nicaraguans are a violent people; the second highest number of deaths by homicide—mainly in shoot-outs,

machete fights or feud-induced ambushes that are rooted in a combination of fire-water consumption and personal affronts.

Somoza has two types of opponent. The most dangerous to him personally but not to the regime are what are called the Sandinistas, a limited number of hot-headed Marxist youths operating as urban robbers and rural guerrillas.

Somoza's tough and dedicated Guardia have held the Sandinistas well in check, although the rebels occasionally explode a bomb or stage a gun battle. They would love to kill Somoza but his security is, to put it conservatively, excellent.

His other opposition is more political than violent. The leading figures are Dr. Francisco Aguero, 51, of the Conservative party, and a dissident Conservative, newspaper publisher Pedro Joaquin Chamorro. The most significant thing about Aguero and Chamorro is that they are prone to spend more time verbally attacking each other than they are Somoza. The President finds this vastly amusing.

It is unusual that Chamorro is swerving off to identify with the small Social Christian party since his family has been for generations a rival of the Somoza-Sacasa group and similarly leaders in the Conservative party.

The real issue for any party in Nicaragua is Somoza—and when the opposition can't agree on its anti-Somoza stance, Tachito really has no problem except his own constitution. This prohibits a president from succeeding himself and Tachito's elected term is up in 1972.

He will not say what his plans are but it is known that he is trying to decide whether to have the constitution changed so he can be elected again or whether to run a figure-head Liberal candidate.

Yet it really doesn't matter much. Since Tachito is chief of the armed forces, the name of the next president of Nicaragua has little bearing on control of the country. Barring a coup or a revolution, neither of which appears likely now, the Liberals will win in 1972 and Tachito will be in charge, one way or another.

With his tenure as secure as any dictator's can be, Tachito is free to work at what might be called statesmanship in Central American terms. He has never been adverse to some Byzantine plotting, meddling and power politics.

In 1961, for instance, the Somozas made Nicaragua's isolated port of Puerto Cabeza available to the CIA as the jumping off point for the exile invaders of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs. As one who hates everything Castro stands for, Somoza probably would have joined the United States and Guatemala in the Bay of Pigs venture for nothing.

He may have gotten some pay-off and he was allowed to keep all the small arms ammunition that was assembled at Puerto Cabeza to back up the defeated invasion force. The last of the weapons were quietly removed from Nicaragua by the United States within the past two years.

These days, Tachito is deeply involved in the hostile confrontation between El Salvador and Honduras. Tachito spends a lot of time on the telephone with President Osvaldo Lopez of Honduras, President Fidel Sanchez of El Salvador, Trejos in Costa Rica and Gen. Omar Torrijos in Panama. He says he does not know President Julio Cesar Mendez Montenegro of Guatemala.

Before, during and after the June-July war between El Salvador and Honduras, Somoza seems to have acted responsibly. His intelligence service, which is the best in Central America, detected signs that the Salvadorans were ready to attack Honduras. Somoza tried to stop the attack by personal persuasion with Sanchez, and he passed on the information to other powers, including the United States, so they could try, too.

He warned Sanchez that the Organization of American States would not let him remain on Honduran soil (if the good Salvadoran army was successful) and would punish El Salvador with rough economic sanctions.

But his soundest advice was that an advance across the border would prevent any hope of peaceful settlement for years to come. He

even implied that if Salvador had to attack, it would be wise to make one quick strike and then back off.

When Honduras asked for arms, Somoza refused. But he did let it be known in Central American capitals that if the Salvadoran army got within 10 miles of his northern frontier he would pitch in to aid Honduras.

He anticipated he would have to get involved in the war, and he wanted to

continued

STATINTL

MIAMI BEACH, FLA.
SUN

E & S - 15,507

MAR 20 1970

Where Was the CIA???

The developments in Cambodia must, by necessity, raise that question. To wit: Did the Central Intelligence Agency, which has plenty of men in the field, FORESEE what might happen or did it PRODUCE the happenings?

Quite likely, it did the latter, hoping to give Mr. Nixon a hand in the struggle in Vietnam for which he promised a solution while campaign-

ing without ever fulfilling that promise.

The idea may have been — on the part of the CIA — to get another nation involved in the battle against the Vietcong. The only trouble is that the scheme is more apt to misfire. In the manner in which the CIA-sponsored "invasion" of Cuba misfired. And so we will be fighting in Cambodia too.

What a catastrophe!

BOSTON ADVERTISER
15 Mar 1970

Senate Feels Role for CIA In Need of Some Protection

By WILLIAM TIEHS
Chief, Sunday Advertiser
Washington Bureau

Analysis

WASHINGTON — Is the public debate over the Central Intelligence Agency's military role in Laos jeopardizing its primary information-gathering assignment in this big — still bad — world?

Has the time been reached when Senate and other critics of the Laotian involvement should more carefully define their terms and targets?

Should somebody, perhaps

even the President, help clear confusion in the public mind about CIA operations, without compromising its vital tasks?

★

The feeling in the Senate today is that the big intelligence agency, created after World War II to improve this important and largely secret function of government, should not be

carelessly, perhaps inadvertently damaged.

CIA director Richard A. Helms, a career official, has made staunch friends on Capitol Hill by his candor and cooperation. Most lawmakers recognize that some clandestine operations are necessary and that such operations don't remain secret if talked about.

But, remembering the CIA-run Bay of Pigs fiasco in Cuba, those most concerned are determined to make sure the agency is not misused.

Finally, there appears to be some feeling that formal or informal limits or guidelines should be adopted in the CIA-Laos debate.

Senate Democratic leader Mike Mansfield, an Asian expert long concerned about U. S. involvement in Laos, is one who thinks "some terms ought to be defined."

★

The Foreign Relations committee man is quick to defend the fundamental role of the CIA, while regretting its apparent military operational assignment in Laos.

"I have great faith in Dick Helms," Mansfield said. "Not to criticize clandestine operations as such; it is too bad they are being undertaken in Laos. They represent a counter-effort against counter-forces which have stayed in Laos regardless of the Geneva Agreement."

Sen. Albert Gore (D-Tenn.), also a Senate Foreign Relations Committee member, said he had found Helms and the CIA "completely candid."

He reflected an understanding in the Senate that the civilian agency has been performing essentially a military task on orders of the National Security Council.

Helms briefed members of the Foreign Relations Committee Friday in a closed session on CIA activities in Laos. Chairman J. William Fulbright (D-Ark.) told reporters that the use of CIA members in the U. S. foreign aid program in Laos was a long-standing policy established by the National Security Council.

Fulbright, speaking for himself, said the policy was laid down before Helms took office.

Sen. Jacob K. Javits (R-N.Y.) said that the Foreign Relations committee has been "having trouble getting certain information." One thing that is "not acceptable," said the former World War II officer, is "operating without a mission."

Javits also said he felt that the ground rules affecting CIA activities should be disclosed except when the "paramount national interest" is involved.

Mansfield points out that the North Vietnamese have long had forces in the northeastern areas of Laos, along the Ho Chi Minh trail, along which the Communists move troops and material into South Vietnam. And he notes that because the U. S. has been bombing that area, both countries have in effect been ignoring the 1962 Geneva Accord.

What some senators do not say, but what is generally accepted as fact, is that a small group of their colleagues who constitute a CIA "watchdog" subcommittee have been informed all along about the agency's Laotian role.

And the CIA's training activity in the struggle to keep Laos from being overrun by the Communists has been widely reported in news dispatches.

STATINTL

13 MAR 1970

Cuban Exile Sentenced in Five L.A. Bombings

A Cuban exile who claimed to have been trained by the U.S. government "to combat the Communist menace" was sentenced to prison Thursday for a term of one to five years.

Hector M. Cornillot, 31, convicted for his part in five anti-Castro terrorist bombings here in mid-1968, said he thought he was "striking a blow for freedom." He unsuccessfully sought probation

from Superior Judge Malcolm M. Lucas.

Cornillot did not explain his statement, made in a letter to the court, that he was trained by the government.

However, during the County Grand Jury inquiry which led to his indictment, two FBI agents testified that the explosives used by Cornillot and others in the bombings came originally from

the Central Intelligence Agency.

They said they learned the information from Cornillot after his arrest and said he also told them he was trained by the CIA to use explosives when he was part of a military unit preparing for the Bay of Pigs invasion.

Denying that he was a "fanatical terrorist," Cornillot said he participated in the bombings only because he believed it to be his duty "to combat the enemies of Cuba in the United States."

He said his basic crime was being overzealous in wanting to see his country free from oppression and dictatorship.

He now realizes, Cornillot wrote the court, that he did his cause more harm than good, although he compared his actions to those of American patriots during the Revolutionary War.

The series of bombings occurred during a 2-hour and 20-minute period July 19, 1968, at the offices of the Mexican National Tourist Council, Shell Data Processing Center, Air France and Japan Air Lines.

A codefendant, Juan Garcia-Cardenas, 31, who like Cornillot is from the Miami area, previously was convicted and sentenced to prison.

Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RD

ROCHESTER, N.Y.
DEMOCRAT & CHRONICLEM - 144,697
S - 221,661

MAR 13 1970

CIA Muffs Some, But It's Still Needed

By MIKE NAUER

The Central Intelligence Agency and all of its activities are absolutely essential to the security and survival of the United States, says a former U. S. spy.

"Without it, America would be doomed overnight," Dan Tyler Moore, author, lecturer and former chief of the U.S. counter-intelligence service in the Middle East, said yesterday.

Moore was in Rochester yesterday to speak at an Ad Club luncheon in the Chamber of Commerce.

Moore said America's spy mechanism is far superior to any other nation's. "We are

far ahead of the rest of the world in the spy business, just as we are in industry and technology."

Asked if maybe the CIA isn't too powerful, and able to shape foreign policy apart from Congress and the White House, Moore said emphatically, "No, absolutely not.

"The CIA is rigidly controlled by Congress and the President. Congress knows what the CIA is doing, and can shut off the agency any time it so wishes."

There is a distrust of the CIA because Americans do not know what it does, but "obviously the secrecy is necessary. It is hard to tell the U. S. people what it is doing without telling the rest of the world," he continued.

The result, is that the American people only hear the negatives about the agency, when a story such as the Green Beret or Bay of Pigs incidents break in the press, he added.

"I see no shortcomings in our intelligence gathering system, but I do think some of the publicity is disturbing the operation," he said.

Spying activities throughout the world have intensified a hundred fold since the advent of nuclear weapons. "The bomb is the ultimate weapon, and countries are scrambling around spying on each other so

that no one develops a defense against it first.

"If a country was able to develop an adequate defense against the nuclear bomb or missile, it would control the world."

The CIA has made its mistakes, Moore admitted, and said the Bay of Pigs debacle was the "classic."

Many of the reports the CIA was receiving before the invasion were negative, and the plan should have been scrapped, Moore said. "It was known that the operation would never come off."

But many of these negative reports were swept under the rug by the agency, he said.

On the spy himself, Moore said one of the main jobs is to stay alive, "so you, can continue to do your work. The spy gets used to danger.

"The one thing he never gets used to is the confusion of leading a double life. Like holding two jobs and having to explain mysterious absences and activities.

"The international spy is like a violent con man. The difference is that the con man never uses violence, while the spy uses it at the drop of a hat. The counter spy is essentially a killing machine. It's his duty to destroy the enemy intelligence network," Moore concluded.

11 MAR 1970

Henry J. Taylor / Vietnam link



I FLEW over the Bay of Pigs recently in a flight across Cuba. There another of history's "if only's" creeps in—surely the most fateful, incredibly fateful, "if only" in the history of the United States.

Far below the plane waves were rolling onto the beach, carrying their bright mercury of the sea under a scudding

three-quarters moon. It was an eerie and awful feeling to realize that there, exactly down there at this pinpoint place, the U. S. debacle not only shattered our ancient Monroe Doctrine forever, it led directly to our combat horrors in Vietnam.

Within a year and a half after the Bay of Pigs, Russia had been so encouraged that she placed her troops and missiles in Cuba. This required President Kennedy to "confront" the U.S.S.R. He ordered the Cuban blockade, inexplicably lifted it within less than 30 days and also inexplicably did not put the blockade back when the Soviet defaulted on the on-site inspection he demanded.

All over Latin America Castro's subversion rose like a black gas and within another year this was so damaging that President Kennedy was forced to make a trip and tell protesting leaders in the southern hemisphere that there was nothing he could do to help it.

Six elected Latin-American governments promptly fell, including Dr. Juan Bosch's Dominican Republic government, and the die was cast for the Dominican intervention requirement President Johnson inherited.

SUCH intimate Kennedy chroniclers as Theodore C. Sorensen agree that after the Bay of Pigs debacle President Kennedy searched for

something to distract our public's mind and that the embarrassed President contrived for that purpose a glamorous trip abroad.

The headlines would be about a glittering banquet at Versailles, a reception at Buckingham Palace, a Vienna visit — everything except Cuba. Cables were rushed to a totally surprised Charles de Gaulle, the Queen of England and even Nikita S. Khrushchev, Mrs. Kennedy would accompany the President. The press corps left Washington in droves.

Editorials throught our country commented that, the Bay of Pigs fiasco having driven U.S. prestige so low, this was obviously the wrong moment for Mr. Kennedy to meet Khrushchev. They said all was sure to get worse as a result, and it did. But how could they dream that the worse would include President Kennedy trapping the United States in Vietnam?

JAMES RESTON of the New York Times was in Vienna. He states: "A few minutes after President Kennedy left Khrushchev he told me that apparently Khrushchev had decided that 'anybody stupid enough to get involved in that situation (the Bay of Pigs) was immature, and anybody who didn't see it thru was timid and, therefore, could be bullied!'"

Mr. Reston says President Kennedy then ordered the first American combat troops (16,000) into Vietnam as a face-saving operation to offset Khrushchev's opinion of him in his Bay of Pigs performance, even tho this violated all his repeated promises not to allow the United States to fight another Asian land war.

All was quiet below the plane. The shore was abandoned. There was only one small light, very faint, at the far curve of the Bahia de Cochinos. There were not even hulks on the chain of shoals. But our great United States of the free world will never again be the same.

GARDEN CITY NEWSDAY
9 Mar 1970

STATINTL

CIA Goes Casual

By Marilyn Berger

Newsday Diplomatic Correspondent

The popular image of the CIA operative usually comes straight from the movies: a slightly soiled trench coat, a turned-up collar, sunglasses. But in Laos, at least, the reality is apt to be less James Bond and more a clean-cut fellow in a sport shirt.

For years now, the Central Intelligence Agency has played a covert role

in the twilight war of Laos. (Some call it a nonwar in a noncountry.) For years, the agency's undercover activity has been known, but its role has somewhat changed.

In the more free-wheeling days, there was the chance to set up strongmen, polarize political forces and even fill up money bags to buy votes. But now, the CIA, through its agents in their sport shirts, apparently is training and equipping an army of Meo tribesmen.

The fact that the "spies," or "spooks" as they are semi-affectionately called in government lingo, are involved in training an army, a job that might be expected to fall to the Pentagon, is not entirely sinister. Ever since the signing of the Geneva accords in 1962, the U.S. has sought to maintain the fiction that it is abiding by the rules, and that means keeping out American troops. The last four Presidents felt that the accords, which the U.S. accuses Hanoi of being the first to violate, could best be restored if appearances, at least, were observed.

Those within the government who are sympathetic to that view are deeply concerned about the current congressional uproar over U.S. involvement in Laos. They say that congressional leaders, as well as the members of the Senate and House committees dealing with the CIA, armed services and appropriations, have known for years what was going on in Laos. They say that the activity was funneled through the CIA not to keep it secret from the American people but rather to preserve the necessary facade for international diplomacy.

Of course, it was not only for the sake of appearances that the CIA did the job in the old days. In the Dulles-Thouless era, when John Foster Dulles

was secretary of state and his brother, Allen headed the CIA, the agency had a relatively free hand, and in Laos, it did a lot more than gather intelligence and recruit local agents.

It was in 1957 that the agency started exerting noticeable influence on the political affairs of that perennially unsettled country. In an effort to dispel the apathy, dissension and lack of organization among the non-Communist Lao, the CIA apparently helped organize the Committee for the Defense of National Interests. The committee described itself as a mass patriotic organization, rather than a political party, which favored civil service reforms and a "hard" line against the Communist Pathet Lao.

The Communists considered its members "lackeys" to American interests, and it appeared that the organization's dependence on the CIA ultimately lent some truth to that.

The committee became the step-ladder for a future Laotian leader who was so closely tied to the CIA that he was known to its agents as "our boy." That leader was Phoumi Nosavan.

Phoumi was, by all reports, a patriot who genuinely sought to develop the country, but he was not above accepting huge sums from a foreign power. Phoumi was so valuable that the CIA rigged the 1960 election in his favor.


If Laotian politics were confused, there was something of a match within the American diplomatic community in Laos. The ambassador was never sure that he was in charge of his own mission, and in many cases was sure that he was not. The CIA was forever pushing for greater activism. Its agents "free-wheeled it," in the words of one informed source, and engineered a coup. And then another one six months later.

Phoumi had begun to count on the CIA, which had chosen him over Souvanna Phouma. But just when Phoumi really needed help, the CIA began feeling a clampdown ordered by President Kennedy because of the Bay of Pigs fiasco. In Laos, where Winthrop Brown was ambassador, the CIA was forced to argue its cases through channels. Officials say that the reins have been tight ever since.

The U.S. started arming and training the Meo tribesmen as early as 1960. Yet it was the recent disclosure that the U.S. was arming the Meos, tough tribesmen with a particular grudge against the North Vietnamese, that helped trigger the current uproar against U.S. activities in Laos. Many of the 1,040 Americans admitted to be working in Laos scene reportedly are with the tribal army.

The army is headed by Maj. Gen. Vang Pao, a Laotian military commander in northeastern Laos who keeps his people in line by force of leadership and also by having one wife for each of the four tribal areas. The Meos have been successful in their battles beyond any expectation and have become a significant thorn in the side of Hanoi. It is believed that the North Vietnamese have made elimination of Vang Pao and his tribesmen one of the goals in their current Laotian offensive.


The CIA and how it grew in Laos is, in an ironic way, almost a success story which runs from the error of trying to set up a western-type army with a military strong man in Phoumi Nosavan to the arming of a highly able guerrilla warrior, Vang Po. What is happening in Laos now, one informed source said, is what should have been done in Vietnam.



THE CIA, FBI & CBS BOMB

RAW PARTS
March 1970

Inside Cuba: Workers and Revolution



THIS IS THE "YEAR OF THE DECISIVE EFFORT" in Cuba. Everywhere posters exhort Cubans to work "with the same discipline, with the same spirit of sacrifice" as the young men who attacked Fort Moncada in 1956 to begin the rebellion against Batista. The country is mobilized, not for defense, but for the achievement of economic objectives, the most important and immediate one being the ten million ton sugar harvest in 1970 which Fidel has called a "point of honor for this revolution . . . a yardstick by which to judge the capability of the revolution."

The island is austere. Rationing is tight and consumption restricted. Children receive one quart of milk a day, adults, unless a medical diet requires it, none; a loaf of bread and one-fourth to three-fourths of a pound each of rice and beans are allotted to each adult per day. Meat, when available, is rationed to three-fourths of a pound per week, though seafood and pizza, both new in the Cuban diet since the revolution, are more easily obtained. Cucumbers and avocados, though not abundant, are apparently available in sufficient quantities to satisfy the Cuban diet. Other greens are rare, but Cubans, who never ate them before, do not notice their absence now.

Clothing is also rationed, and department stores display few items. Unlike the situation during my visit in 1962, however, when the revolution was going through its worst period

economically—as the effects of errors in planning, inadequate skills, poor transportation and distribution, drought and the economic embargo imposed by the United States had a cumulative impact on production and consumption—the present austerity, say government leaders, is planned. It is the result of the extraordinary and unprecedented rate of investment, 31 per cent of the Gross Material Product (GNP exclusive of services), and of the use of scarce foreign exchange to buy capital goods rather than consumer goods.

Manufacturing plants apparently have no serious shortage of raw materials or spare parts or of technically trained personnel. This was the view of the administrators, technicians and production workers whom I interviewed in seven plants (cement, textiles, agricultural equipment, paper, beer and malt, copper mining and sugar) scattered over five of Cuba's six provinces. (These were drawn from the sample of 21 plants where I had interviewed workers in 1962). All of the plants were working overtime and, their administrators claimed, at close to theoretical capacity.

In the Venezuela sugar production center, British technicians were installing a new automated mill, bringing the number of mills there to four, and East Germans were putting in several new thermoelectric turbines of 3000 kilowatt capacity each, according to Agustin Hernandez, the center's young adminis-

by Maurice Zeitlin

FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF STATINTL
PROGRAM NET Journal STATION WNDT/TV
DATE February 16, 1970 9:00-10:00PM CITY New York

STATINTL

FULL TEXT

MAN: Donny Melcher.

MAN: Joel...

MAN: Charles Culhane.

MAN: Raul Castores.

MAN: Joe Steele.

MAN: Ronald Kuntz.

MAN: John Strawberry.

MAN: Anthony Palmieri.

MAN: ...Russell.

MAN: ...O'Dell.

WOMAN: John Kettle.

WOMAN: Harry Kenny.

MAN: (UNINTELLIGIBLE)

(EXPLOSIONS IN BACKGROUND)

MAN: Ronald E. Robertson.

MAN: When somebody talks about justifying the death of a son in Vietnam, the grief and the sadness and the feeling of being cheated would happen to anybody, but there's no compensation,

FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF STATINTL
PROGRAM NET Journal STATION WNDT/TV
DATE February 16, 1970 9:00-10:00PM CITY New York

STATINTL

FULL TEXT

MAN: Donny Melcher.
MAN: Joel...
MAN: Charles Culhane.
MAN: Raul Castores.
MAN: Joe Steele.
MAN: Ronald Kuntz.
MAN: John Strawberry.
MAN: Anthony Palmieri.
MAN: ...Russell.
MAN: ...O'Dell.
WOMAN: John Kettle.
WOMAN: Harry Kenny.
MAN: (UNINTELLIGIBLE)
(EXPLOSIONS IN BACKGROUND)
MAN: Ronald E. Robertson.
MAN: When somebody talks about justifying the death of a son in Vietnam, the grief and the sadness and the feeling of being cheated would happen to anybody, but there's no compensation,

STATINTL

12 February 1970

Commissar of the Cold War

Present at the Creation:
My Years in the State Department
by Dean Acheson.
Norton, 798 pp., \$15.00

Ronald Steel

"I hope that Mr. Acheson will write a book explaining how he persuaded himself to believe that a government could be conducted without the support of the people."

-Walter Lippmann

The wish has now been granted. Seventeen years after leaving the State Department, Dean Acheson has finally unveiled his memoirs of those tumultuous days. He was wise to wait. The unhappy Truman Administration, embellished by the passing of time and the fading of memories, has taken on a historical patina. The New Left is too young to remember the China White Paper, the Berlin airlift, or the Korean War, and probably never even heard of John Carter Vincent or Owen Lattimore. Cold War liberals hope that most people have forgotten their role in the Truman Doctrine and the rearmament of Germany—two of the capstones of Acheson's tenure as Secretary of State. And the Right, which once, bizarre as it now seems, accused him of being sympathetic to the communists, has found new virtues in the tart elder statesman who defends the Vietnam governments of Rhodesia and South Africa.

As is evident from his prose and his public behavior, Acheson is neither cold nor unflappable. Beneath the urbane elegance and the studied arrogance there is an emotional man whose temper has more than once got the better of him and who likes a good fight even if he has to pick it himself. At several points he describes himself as a would-be schoolteacher, trying to inform the ninnies in Congress and elsewhere on the facts of political life. But the more appropriate word is politician. Acheson was never interested in education. What he wanted was compliance, acceptance, surrender. People were stupid in so far as they opposed him, and enlightened whenever they agreed. Like most other ambitious politicians, he gloried in the manipulation of men and institutions.

As chief architect of American foreign policy under Harry Truman, Acheson had a stormy tenure in the State Department—owing, in no small part, to his own contentiousness and belligerence. Although much abused by headline-hunting right-wing politicians such as Nixon and Joseph McCarthy, he also abused others and suffered from his inability to conceive that his might not be the ultimate wisdom on every issue. His career in public life is the story of a man who was too clever for himself, whose intelligence was often self-destructive, and whose arrogance never allowed him to realize it.

This densely printed volume of nearly 800 pages is a defense of those policies taken when Acheson was a Secretary of State from 1941-45, and at the creation of the post-war world. The prose rolls on majestically and inexorably in a mighty tide of recapitulations, explanations, character sketches, put-downs of those who disagreed or displeased, and self-justifications. It is an impressive but not quite convincing achievement. While one does not expect the memoirs of public officials to be dispassionate, it is unfortunate that Acheson is not able to look back on that period with the objectivity gained from hindsight. Acheson not only knows what happened, but orchestrated the Cold War empire during its formative years. He is singularly equipped to help put that dark period into an honest historical perspective. But what he has reduced to a thing less than the whole truth, not so much false as it is selective.

Much that is relevant has either been omitted or summarily dismissed. Invariably these are items that cast doubt on the wisdom of his judgment or the ineluctability of his decisions. "It could not have been otherwise" is the theme that runs through his account of the famous White Paper on China, as well as of policies of such dubious wisdom as the Truman Doctrine, the rearmament of Germany, the Japanese Peace treaty, and the intervention in Korea. That it could, perhaps should, have been otherwise is apparently, from these pages, not a judgment that an honorable man could have held at the time.

With customary modesty Acheson reminds us that he has a reputation for "not suffering fools gladly." What he seems to mean is that he does not suffer critics, for he records few instances of arguments other than his own as having any merit. He is contemptuous of Congress for daring to infringe on what he deems executive prerogatives, such as undeclared acts of war. He upbraids Senator Kenneth Wherry for suggesting that perhaps Truman should have sought Congressional authorization before sending troops to Korea, and chastises what he terms "the kind of sulky opposition that characterized the last two years of relations between the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the Johnson Administration"—in other words, the Fulbright Committee's hearings on the Vietnam war and the hastily granted and leisurely repented Tonkin Gulf Resolution.

Among the numerous individuals who crossed his path and made his life more troublesome, there is curiously not a single reference to Richard M. Nixon, who first showed his gift for phrase-making by referring to the then Secretary of State as the "Dean of the Cowardly College of Communist Containment." How curious that this episode seems to have slipped Acheson's otherwise retentive mind.

A broker in power, Acheson was fascinated by its use. Like Truman, for whom he expresses so much admiration, he exercised it with a pleasure bordering on the obscene. He favored the unconditional surrender of Japan and never questioned Truman's decision to use the atomic bomb. When Mosadeq nationalized the British-

STATINTL

continued



CHARLOTTE, N.C.
NEWS

E - 65,014

FEB 9 1970

From The Winston-Salem Journal

POLICY BY POLL

If there is one thing this country can do without it, it is another public opinion poll. And if there is a second thing the country can do without, it is the kind of panel led by Arthur J. Goldberg that proposes a system of continuous national polling to tell the President and his advisers what the people are thinking about foreign policy.

"A president," says the panel, "should be continuously aware of what the public thinks and wants and worries about." A president who is so informed, the panel suggests, would stay "in tune" with the American people and avoid some of the mistakes our recent presidents have made in foreign relations.

Frankly, we doubt it. If President Johnson had known what the American people were thinking in 1964 at the time he was weighing his big gamble in Vietnam, it would have helped him not at all. And if President Kennedy had taken every kind of poll in 1961

before the disastrous Bay of Pigs expedition into Cuba, he would have known no more than he did before.

Those two big blunders in foreign policy did not result from a "communications gap" between the president and the people. More likely, they arose from the failure of presidents to consult the pick-and-shovel workers in the State and Defense Departments and Central Intelligence Agency.

Poll-taking has actually become a kind of American vice. Politicians in particular reach for their polls the way a hypochondriac reaches for his thermometer. Candidates for public office read the polls before they dare decide what they think. No wonder there is a drought of leadership.

So we say to ex-Ambassador Goldberg that his proposal is and by right ought to be a non-starter. And we will lend our support to any president who will give the order to "Turn the poll-cats out!"

LANSING, MICH.
JOURNAL

FEB 8 1970
E - 81,637
S - 85,576

Joint Chiefs of Staff Wrongly Blamed for 'Bay of Pigs' Fiasco

By BRIG. GEN. (RET.) S.L.A.
MARSHALL
Military Affairs Analyst

Nine years ago this month President John F. Kennedy launched a plan for the invasion and overthrow of Castro's Cuba. What the public thinks it knows about the Bay of Pigs is stale fiction. Hardly a paragraph has been written on it that is not false in fact or implication. Much information which should have been disclosed has not.



Marshall

Only nine years, and yet most of the cast is dead. Among those who survive, not one has accurately recounted the episode or his own role in it.

Somewhere there must exist the secret report by the four distinguished gentlemen, of whom two survive, purporting to relate who was to blame and in what degree. The report has never been made public. Were it bared tomorrow, its contents would still mislead. The authors of the document worked under the premise that the President's underlings may not criticize him; the document is in effect a "Hamlet" without a melancholy Dane.

REFUSED TO RETRACT

Having agreed to the invasion plan, the President would not retract his OK. Only he and one other could stop it, once it was in motion, and while his household guards might have talked him out of it, they were too spellbound to try. He was the President.

The other man who could have stopped it was President Luis Somoza of Nicaragua. He had the veto power right in his mitt. No only the B-26 bombers used in the air strikes but also the brigade landing force was

Puerto Cabezas. On the Thursday before the attempted invasion, Somoza brooded for hours about blocking it because he felt certain that the changes ordered in the plan by President Kennedy doomed it to disaster. He tried to call the White House and couldn't get through. Then he decided not to interfere. The change Somoza objected to mainly was the moving forward of the air strikes. He figured this action would serve as 48 hours' warning to Castro.

There is no reference to Somoza's fears in published writings on the Bay of Pigs. Actually, Somoza did not fear enough. There is no sound military reason to believe that the last-minute changes altered anything in the long run. The whole scheme was abortive. It lacked sufficient strength in every part. There was not enough bomber power by more than half, the distance from Puerto Cabezas being so far, and not enough air crew by still greater discrepancy. Pilots collapsed from sheer exhaustion.

INSUFFICIENT SUPPORT

As for the brigade landing force, its strength might have survived to the point of a sensible withdrawal, with the aid of offshore bombardment and close air support over the beachhead, of which the marooned invaders had neither.

The United States should have learned in its battle against North Korea that a little huffing and puffing doesn't bring anyone's house down, in particular that of a Communist military dictatorship in full swing. The expectation that anti-Castro guerillas would spring to arms overnight and start marching was little short of lunatic.

The deciding councils were composed mainly of individuals inexperienced in warfare and in amphibious operations. Yet the blame fell mainly on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They

were the older heads, the professionals, a group of ready-made scapegoats. They had tenure. They could take the rap. So they were given direct orders to keep their traps closed about the Bay of Pigs.

Stories in the national journals appeared stating flatly what the JCS had advised, or approved, or authorized. Persons in high position supported these writings with cleverly dropped innuendos, hints and overstatements. What nobody ever bothered to say was that the JCS was not authorized to approve or disapprove anything, but merely to recommend marginal changes. Most of the time the JCS did not know what was going on. The CIA was in the saddle and riding hard. Maybe the JCS should be faulted for not bucking the system. As for a person facing ten years in jail, that's easy to say and hard to do.

RIPON FORUM

FEBRUARY, 1970

VOL. VI, No. 2

ONE DOLLAR

5 - FEB 20
Copy 1970

A Message from the President

Gift Section 4
Exchange and Gift Division
Library of Congress
Washington, D. C. 20540

STATINTL

At a time when many young people fear that their ideas cannot have an impact on American politics, the members of the Ripon Society have effectively proven otherwise. By thinking long and hard about public problems and by arguing its positions in a vigorous and reasonable manner, the Ripon Society has notably enriched our political dialogue. Its research on issues such as revenue sharing, welfare reform and the draft has made an important contribution to the evolution of national policy.

As you may have noticed from time to time, your conclusions usually arouse opposition as well as support. But that is not a bad thing, for intellectual controversy is essential for social progress. Neither the Republican party nor the American government can be effective in the 1970's unless they are vital and venturesome institutions, always receptive to the new ways of looking at public problems. That is why the party and the government welcome Ripon's impatience with the tired approaches of the past and its readiness to explore ideas "whose time is coming."

I have followed with interest the impressive growth of the Ripon Society since I first met with a delegation of its members shortly after its founding. To all who gather tonight to hear my good friend, John Anderson, I extend my warm greetings. And I offer sincere congratulations and best wishes to the members of the Ripon Society as you celebrate your seventh anniversary.

Richard Nixon
Text of a telegram to Ripon's
Seventh Anniversary Dinner
Washington, D.C.
January 17, 1970

NORTH VIRGINIA SUN
26 JAN 1970

Inside Washington

Kennedy Rider Hires Bay of Pigs Leader

ROBERT S. ALLEN
AND
JOHN A. GOLDSMITH

WASHINGTON — One of the top leaders of the ill-fated Bay-of-Pigs invasion force has been put on the payroll of a Senate subcommittee, thanks to some fast footwork by Sen. Edward M. Kennedy years ago and took a job as a Senate clerk, who go back to work today, are aware of it, but Ernesto A. Oliva got his job by act of Congress.

Oliva will work for the Senate Judiciary subcommittee on Refugees and Escapees, which has had a continuing interest in the many emigres from Cuba who have settled in Miami and elsewhere in the United States. Teddy Kennedy is the subcommittee chairman.

Oliva was second in command of "Brigade 2506," which trained for the 1961 Bay-of-Pigs operation in Guatemala. He was later one of several co-authors, with newsman Haynes Johnson, of a book about the unsuccessful attempt to oust Fidel Castro.

Federal law prohibits the hiring of aliens by most federal agencies including Congress. Over the years, general exceptions have authorized most of them to hire from many nationality groups, but the Senate was barred from hiring Oliva, a refugee from Communist Cuba.

Last month, in the final days of the last congressional session, Kennedy quietly asked the Senate appropriations Committee to put a rider in one of its final money bills to clear the way for Oliva. The committee refused, on grounds that it should not further complicate the situation by legislating for individuals.

TEDDY UNDAUNTED — Undeterred, Teddy executed a neat end run. In the early evening of Dec. 19th, a few days before Congress quit for the holidays, Teddy — in his capacity as Senate Democratic whip — moved that the Senate approve a routine, last minute bill "with an amendment. The measure, cleared by the Judiciary Committee, designates this month, Jan. 1970, as "National Blood Donor Month."

The amendment, not explained in the routine Senate procedure, authorizes the payment of Oliva for no more than six months. The odd blood donor bill

package was quickly approved in an almost empty chamber on Teddy's motion.

It passed the House on the following day after Rep. Byron Rogers, D-PICoo., explained to Rep. Charles E. Wiggins, R-UMCal., that the amendment to the bill was designed to help the Senate with a "bookkeeping" problem.

Ten days later President Nixon signed the bill, and Oliva was recently placed on the Senate payroll.

Short-cutting of this sort is not unknown in the halls of Congress. During the routine Senate passage of the bill Kennedy told acting GOP leader Robert P. Griffin, Mich., that the bill had been cleared by top Republicans on the Judiciary Committee.

Sometimes such short-cutting has unpleasant reverberations, however. The very senior members of the Appropriations Committee — Republicans and Democrats — may not be amused.

LOBBIED LAWMAKERS — Lawmakers, returning from the holidays at home — especially GOP House members — have been thoroughly lobbied by home-town educators in preparation for the impending fight over the \$20 billion appropriation bill for the Department of Health, Education and Welfare.

That is the bill which contains \$1.1 billion in aid for schools and colleges above and beyond President Nixon's budget.

Local lobbying for the uphill fight to over-ride such a veto was carefully orchestrated here during the congressional recess. The chief coordinator was Charles Lee, a former Senate staff member, who heads the Emergency Committee for Full Educational Funding.

Lee and his aides urged school superintendents, especially those who would get additional funds as heads of federally "impacted" school systems, to get together with college presidents and meet jointly with their own lawmakers during the holidays.

Over-riding a veto is, as recently noted by Senate Democratic Leader Mike Mansfield, Mont., "always difficult." The education lobby is quite a lobby, however. Impacted area money flows into most school systems, and there are few congressmen who

have no impacted area superintendents among their politically aware constituents.

Against this lobbying effort the White House is mounting a furious campaign of persuasion with respect to the veto. Newly returned GOP House members report that even the mavericks, usually ignored by the President's liaison team because they are known to go their own way, are being colored this time and advised to support the President, or else.

E. 6,367

JAN 23 1970

One Man's Profile in Courage

He would have been a fit subject for one of John F. Kennedy's "Profiles In Courage."

Dr. James B. Donovan who died the other day in New York City took his law career in his hands when he agreed "as a public duty" to defend Col. Abel, a Soviet spy.

He was called "a Commie lover" and abused generally so that Chief Justice Warren remarked that "in my time on the Supreme Court no man has undertaken a more arduous and more self-sacrificing task."

Justice Warren commented after Dr. Donovan appealed Abel's conviction on charge of conspiracy and the appeal before the Supreme Court.

Importantly, when Abel had been found guilty, Dr. Donovan asked, before sentence was passed, that possibility of future exchange of condemned spies with the Soviet Union not be disregarded by taking Abel's life. He was sentenced to 30 years.

Five years later, in a cloak and dagger

operation, Dr. Donovan was authorized by the Justice Department to go to East Berlin to explore the possibility of exchanging Dr. Abel for Francis Gary Powers, the U-2 pilot who had been shot down. He was successful and the exchange was made on a bridge.

It was also Dr. Donovan who went to Cuba and arranged the release from Cuban prisons of 1,163 survivors of the Bay of Pigs invasion, of nearly 5,000 relatives of the survivors, other political prisoners and of 35 Americans and their families detained on various charges.

Later on, he was elected president of the board of education in New York City and was president of Pratt Institute at the time of his death at 53.

For his work on the Abel-Powers exchange, he was awarded the Distinguished Intelligence Medal by the Central Intelligence Agency, at the direction of President Kennedy.

In sum, quite a man.

20 JAN 1970

Dr. James B. Donovan, 53, Dies; Lawyer Arranged Spy Exchange

**President of Pratt Institute—
Ex-Board of Education
Chief Ran for Senate**



The New York Times
Dr. James B. Donovan

Dr. James Britt Donovan, the lawyer and educator who arranged the trade of a Soviet spy for the U-2 pilot Francis Gary Powers and negotiated the ransom of prisoners taken by Cuba in the Bay of Pigs invasion, died early yesterday. He was 53 years old.

Dr. Donovan, who had been president of Pratt Institute since Jan. 1, 1968, entered Methodist Hospital in Brooklyn last week for treatment of influenza. He suffered a heart attack at 2 A.M. Monday. His home was at 35 Prospect Park West in Brooklyn.

For 16 years after his admission to the New York Bar, Dr. Donovan's successful legal practice kept him well out of the limelight. But in 1957, his appointment as defense counsel for Col. Rudolf Ivanovich Abel, the Soviet spy, catapulted him into the public eye.

Between the Abel case and his job as the president of Pratt, Dr. Donovan:

¶ Negotiated the exchange of Colonel Abel for Mr. Powers and Frederick Pryor, an American student;

¶ Wrote a book about the experience called "Strangers on a Bridge" (New York: Atheneum, 1964);

¶ Arranged the release from Cuban prisons of 1,163 survivors of the Bay of Pigs invasion, of nearly 5,000 relatives of the survivors and other political prisoners, and of 35 Americans and their families detained on various charges;

¶ Ran an unsuccessful race in 1962 as a Democrat for the Senate seat of Jacob K. Javits, New York Republican;

¶ Served on the Board of Education, to which he was appointed in 1961, first as vice president and then as president.

Dr. Donovan's approach to these assignments was unorthodox and highly personal. He once compared his brand of unofficial diplomacy to playing poker: "You have to know your man and be willing to risk all."

Took His Son to Cuba

On one of his last visits to Cuba, in April, 1963, Dr. Donovan took his 18-year-old son, John, along, ostensibly for the skin diving.

"What I needed was something to make Castro really trust me," Dr. Donovan said, adding, "I was a little worried, but it was worth it."

In a letter to Dr. Donovan after the release of Mr. Powers, President Kennedy called the character of the negotiations "unique." Fordham University, in conferring an honorary degree in 1962, used the word "metadiplomacy" to describe his style of negotiating "beyond diplomacy."

Dr. Donovan entered the public arena as an unpopular figure, the defender of the highest ranking Soviet intelligence agent ever tried in the United States. Although he was appointed to the task by a committee of the Brooklyn Bar Association, Dr. Donovan was subjected to abusive telephone calls and letters addressed to "the Commie lover."

He said he had accepted the assignment "as a public duty," and donated his \$10,000 defense fee to the law schools of Fordham, Columbia and Harvard Universities.

Convicted in 1957

Colonel Abel was found guilty of conspiracy in 1957 and was sentenced to 30 years in prison and fined \$3,000. But before sentence was passed, Dr. Donovan had asked that the possibilities of future exchange of condemned spies with the Soviet Union not be eliminated by the taking of Abel's life.

His plea was to prove prophetic when, five years later, Abel was returned to the Soviet Union in exchange for Mr. Powers.

When Dr. Donovan appealed Colonel Abel's conviction before the Supreme Court in 1959 and lost, Chief Justice Earl Warren said:

"I think I can say that in my time on this court no man has undertaken a more arduous more self-sacrificing task."

The last chapter in the Abel story was undertaken by Dr. Donovan in secret, at the request of the United States Government. After Mr. Powers's U-2 plane was shot down in the Soviet Union, his father suggested the exchange. At the same time, Abel's wife was pleading with Dr. Donovan to secure clemency for her husband.

As a result, the Justice Department authorized Dr. Donovan to go to East Berlin to "explore the situation."

Cited by the C.I.A.

The story leading up to the cold and cloudy February day in 1962 when the prisoners were exchanged is told in Dr. Donovan's book. The sequel came some months later, when Colonel Abel, knowing of his lawyer's extensive collection of illuminated manuscripts, sent him two 16th-century legal volumes, "with gratitude."

For his work on the Abel-Powers exchange, Dr. Donovan was awarded the Distinguished Intelligence Medal by the Central Intelligence Agency, at the direction of President Kennedy.

Several months after his success with semi-official negotiations in the Soviet Union, Dr. Donovan was asked by the Cuban Families Committee for the Liberation of Prisoners of War to argue their case with Premier Castro. In this case, however, the negotiations were entirely unofficial.

For months, Dr. Donovan shuttled between New York and Havana where, he said, "Castro and I talked about everything under the sun; I found him a rather fascinating fellow."

The visits continued during the missile crisis of September-October, 1962, and by December an exchange of prisoners for

baby food and drugs was arranged. The men were released on Christmas Eve, 1962.

Between flying trips to Havana, the State Democratic party nominated Dr. Donovan as its candidate for the Senate in 1962. To the despair of party workers, Dr. Donovan campaigned like a man with more important things on his mind. Senator Javits won by 975,000 votes.

Dr. Donovan continued the flying trips through the spring of 1963, holding all-night conversations with Premier Castro that eventually brought the release of a total of 9,700 Americans and Cubans from Cuban jails.

Named Board President

In December, 1963, the burly, white-haired lawyer was elected president of the Board of Education. He had been appointed in 1961 when a "reform" board was created by the State Legislature.

He became involved in controversy from the day he became president. Civil rights groups said that Dr. Donovan was not committed to integration. He said he was committed, first, to education.

When the school system announced preliminary plans for correcting racial imbalance, the program was severely criticized and Dr. Donovan, as president of the board, drew most of the fire.

The controversy grew hotter when nearly 45 per cent of the city's school children stayed home in a concerted boycott, demonstrators chanted, "Donovan must go!" alternating with "Jim Crow must go!"

By mid-March of 1964 civil rights groups had joined in an effort to force Dr. Donovan's removal or resignation. However, he replied that he had no intention of leaving and eventually the campaign died quietly. His re-election as president was considered a vote of confidence by his fellow members.

At Pratt, Dr. Donovan, like so many of his fellow educators in recent years, had to face campus disruptions over black students' demands and antiwar protests.

At first he threatened to have arrested and expelled any students who committed vandalism or denied others access to classes or incited nonstudents to action. After the 400-member faculty went on strike to protest the Donovan policy, he modified it.

In recent months Dr. Donovan had encouraged student membership on Pratt's administrative council and had begun discussions designed to lead to a new student-faculty senate.

20 JAN 1970

Donovan Dies; Set Up Spy Swap

By JUDSON HAND

James B. Donovan, president of Pratt Institute, former president of the city Board of Education and a colorful and renowned figure in international law, died early yesterday in Methodist Hospital, Brooklyn.

Donovan, who was 53 and lived at 35 Prospect Park West, gained national fame in 1962 when he set up the exchange of Col. Robert I. Abel, a convicted Russian spy, for U-2 pilot Gary Powers, who had been shot down and imprisoned in Russia.

He also arranged the ransom of 1,113 prisoners taken by Communist Cuba in the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion, in addition to the ransom of thousands of their relatives and other political prisoners.

The Cause of Death

Donovan died of a heart attack, according to a member of his family.

He was born in the Bronx, the son of a wealthy surgeon from an old New York family. After graduation from All Hallows Institute, Fordham College and Harvard Law School, he began practicing law in 1940.

In 1943, he entered the Navy as an ensign, serving as general counsel to the cloak-and-dagger Office of Strategic Services. By 1945, he had risen to the rank of commander.

At the Nazi Trials

During the Nurnberg trials of Nazi war criminals, he was an associate prosecutor in charge of visual evidence.

After the war, he returned to his law office as a specialist in international and insurance cases. He was a senior partner in the firm of Watters, Donovan, Dorsey, Burke & Griffin at 161 William St.

In 1957, Donovan was appointed to defend Col. Abel, who was accused of the capital crime of being the head of Soviet espionage in the U.S. Donovan agreed to take the case as a public service.

The jury trial ended with conviction and a 30-year prison sentence for Abel, who had masqueraded as an artist in the city for years.

Donovan invariably was soft-



James B. Donovan
End comes in Brooklyn

spoken, even when angry debate erupted at public meetings of the Board of Education, but he sometimes showed emotion with a stony stare and a flushed face. He angered opponents at times with trenchant remarks, as when he said, in opposition to busing elementary students long distances for integration: "We're running a school board, not a transportation board."

He summed up his public education policy this way: "It is our sacred duty to provide every disadvantaged child the best education possible in a free society, but we don't have the right to accomplish this at the expense of other children in the system."

He Leaves the Board

During school boycotts by militant integrationists in 1964 and 1965, he accused boycott leaders of "cynically exploiting" children by keeping them out of school. He left the school board in 1965 because, he said, of pressures from his law practice.

Donovan became president of

Pratt, a four-year college in Brooklyn, on Jan. 1, 1968. He took a strong stand against student agitators who refused to negotiate, declaring: "Destruction of property, inciting to riot and threats of physical harm are crimes and will be treated as such."

Five years later, Donovan secretly arranged the exchange, on a bridge in East Berlin, of Abel for Powers and Frederick L. Pryor, another U.S. prisoner in Russia.

The Spy Exchange

Donovan began negotiations to free the Bay of Pigs prisoners in 1962 after his name was suggested to the Cuban Refugee Committee by Robert F. Kennedy, then attorney general. A ransom of drugs and baby foods was agreed upon after months of negotiations with Cuban Premier Fidel Castro.

Months later, Donovan again bargained with Castro, this time winning the release of 27 Americans held in Cuba for four Cubans jailed in the U.S.

Donovan was New York Democratic nominee for the U. S. Senate in 1962, but, because of his negotiations with Castro, he had little time to campaign and he was easily defeated by GOP incumbent Jacob Javits.

Becomes Schools Chief

In 1961, Donovan was appointed to the Board of Education, serving as its vice president until December 1963, when he became president. His tenure on the board was marked by heated controversy over school integration and Donovan was attacked by both sides in the argument.

Donovan is survived by his wife, the former Mary E. McKenna to whom he was married in 1941; three daughters, Mrs. Edward Amorosi, Mary Ellen and Clare; one son, John J., and two grandchildren. A Requiem Mass will be offered at 10 a.m. Thursday in St. Patrick's Cathedral.

19 JAN 1970

STATINTL

EXPERT IN SPY CASES

Lawyer James Donovan Dies



JAMES B. DONOVAN

NEW YORK (AP) — James B. Donovan, 53, the lawyer who set up the trade of a Soviet spy for U2 pilot Francis Gary Powers and arranged the ransom of prisoners taken by Cuba in the Bay of Pigs invasion, died early today.

He was a resident of Brooklyn and died in Methodist Hospital there.

The spy trade and prisoner release negotiations in the early 1960s were highlights of a career in which Mr. Donovan also worked on the war crimes trials in Nuernberg and service with the U.S. Office of Scientific Research and Development, which supervised the

development of the atomic bomb.

Mr. Donovan also had a thriving private law career, was president of Pratt Institute and ran unsuccessfully for the U.S. Senate as a Democrat against Sen. Jacob K. Javits in 1962.

A spokesman at Pratt Institute said he died of heart failure.

Mr. Donovan's most celebrated case probably was that in which he defended the Soviet master spy, Col. Rudolph Abel, in 1957 and saved him from the death penalty. The Russian had lived for years in

the United States, masquerading as an artist.

The court-appointed Donovan made the point during his defense that executing Abel might lead to Soviet refusal to exchange American spies held in Russia.

Abel was sentenced to 30 years in prison, but five years later Mr. Donovan's prophecy was borne out when Abel was used to win Powers' freedom.

Powers' piloted U-2 spy plane was downed over the Soviet Union in 1960. His capture gave Premier Nikita Khrushchev the pretext for scrapping a summit meeting with President Dwight D. Eisenhower.

19 JAN 1970

Cutbacks Curb Role

U.S. Disengagement

By Murrey Marder

Washington Post Staff Writer

Among four of the central figures in the high drama of American-Soviet relations, it is sometimes "Bill and Andrei" or "Henry and Anatoliy."

"Bill" is Secretary of State William P. Rogers and "Andrei" is Soviet Foreign

Minister Andrei A. Gromyko. "Henry" is Henry A. Kissinger, President Nixon's national security adviser; "Anatoliy" is the Soviet Ambassador in Washington, Anatoliy F. Dobrynin.

At the outset of the Nixon administration, probably no Republican ideologue could have imagined that Nixon

foreign policy would invoke such camaraderie.

It is hardly that. First names are used only on infrequent occasions, if circumstances allow the men to step out of formal posture in private meetings. That only indicates that the two contesting superpowers find it mutually advantageous at times to touch a human equation in an age of computerized armageddon. There was a similar practice in the Johnson administration.

But there is added reason for dealing in realities now. Both nations are being squeezed by the same inescapable pressures: The strain of the nuclear age on their resources.

More Modest Goal

The Nixon administration hopes to do in the 1970s what no President has accomplished since World War II: withdraw from the dream of an America preserving order throughout the world, and turn instead to the more modest goal of attempting to do only what American popular opinion, military power and money can afford.

This would represent a profound shift in foreign policy.

As the Nixon administration's personalities and ideas have evolved, it now is clear that it is facing squarely that unromantic limitation on foreign policy: money.

A higher potential exists in this Republican administration, in this era, it is claimed, to employ all capabilities to assault this money problem—including political resources.

President Nixon's supporters assert that he cannot be seriously outflanked on the right, thanks to his earlier career of fervent anti-communism. "No one," said a high official, "is going to call Nixon a 'pinko.'"

But this factor cuts both

Liberal Misgivings

Within the administration, there are misgivings among liberal Republicans about President Nixon's tendency, at times of high domestic pressure, to reach back to the narrow conservative political base that provided the launching pad for the presidency.

His appeal to "the silent majority," the use of Cold War phraseology in his Nov. 3 speech on Vietnam, and Vice President Spiro T. Agnew's gibes at the Eastern Liberal Establishment all nourish internal concern about whether the administration can be deflected from its declared course of a less-engaged foreign policy.

If there should be "a bad turn" in United States attempts to disengage from Vietnam, or an unexpected challenge in the Middle East or elsewhere to American pride or honor, these Republican insiders wonder if the Nixon administration would swerve to the right, and the more combative course of policy that "the old Nixon" represented.

Officials claim that no doctrinal differences divide policy-makers in the Nixon administration, that each of the principals is a "pragmatist." But the "pragmatists" differ among themselves.

The four most important men advising the President on foreign policy are Kissinger, Secretary Rogers, Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird, and one who was not very visible at the outset, Attorney General John N. Mitchell, who in his own way may be the most influential of all.

These are joined on all major issues by Richard C. Helms, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.



President Nixon is relying increasingly on the advice of his long-time friend William F. Rogers, but

Foreign Affairs: The Key to All the Trouble

By C. L. SULZBERGER

PARIS—Perhaps the most significant American foreign policy failure over the past decade came neither in Vietnam nor at the Bay of Pigs but in Laos. Had U.S. diplomacy plugged the Laotian sewer already being exploited by Communist guerrillas ten years ago, the sordid drama that subsequently tortured external and internal U.S. relationships might have been avoided.

Laos is a noncountry carved out by French colonial administrators and not a nation state with homogenous population or natural borders. Yet it is exceptionally important as the main military highway from North to South Vietnam.

As long ago as Sept. 30, 1959, Sir Robert Scott, then British High Commissioner for Southeast Asia and later head of the Imperial Defense College, pointed out that it was "militarily impossible for the North Vietnamese to invade South Vietnam across the frontier fixed between the two states" by the Geneva partition agreement five years earlier.

Traditional Invasion Route

However, he added: "The traditional invasion route is southward through Laos and if that

country were to fall Vietnam would be finished and Thailand would rethink its policy. Apparently the Communist bloc" (this was before the Sino-Soviet split) "is trying to probe in Laos to see how far it can go without touching off major reaction."

Scott warned that if Communist Pathet Lao partisans, supported by Hanoi, were not halted, the developing guerrilla war "would be bound to last at least seven years and that is a minimum estimate." He saw Laos as the key to Southeast Asia's future and urged that while SEATO should warn of open invasion, "the essential thing is to get U.N. into the act."

Chinese Outlet

He added that although "in the long run there is only one outlet for future Chinese expansion and that is Russia—some day the Chinese must push into the Soviet prairie lands of Mongolia and Turkestan—there is no evidence yet in this part of the world of any rivalry between Russia and China."

Until 1957 a chance remained to establish a genuinely neutral Laotian Government to balance off Western and Communist influences at an acceptable mini-

mum but Washington sabotaged the arrangement. By October, 1960 the first Russians in history set foot on Laotian soil and Moscow swiftly mounted on behalf of the Pathet Lao the fastest and most efficient foreign aid program it had ever attempted.

When President Kennedy met Khrushchev a few months after his election, a conference had already started in Geneva to try and cool off Southeast Asia. However, the United States was seeking to close the barn door on a horse that had fled.

Its policy was to arrange Laotian "neutrality" but it was too late. Dean Rusk told me at Geneva, May 14, 1961: "We prefer a neutral Laos to a partitioned Laos. We won't sign something that is clearly only designed to gloss over a phony. If there is an agreement that makes Laos genuinely neutral we will take it."

A Bad Deal

But the deal ultimately accepted, under the guise of de jure neutrality among leaders in the so-called Laotian Government, actually accepted a de facto partition of the worst sort, leaving in Communist hands the entire Ho Chi Minh Trail down which North Viet-

nam's warriors are still marching.

Like virtually every important American foreign policy mistake the fault was bipartisan since the original trouble came when the Eisenhower Administration tipped the apple cart in 1957 and failed to right it by 1960. On the other hand, the Kennedy Administration was naive in seeking as the basis for a "settlement" precisely what its adversaries wanted.

Price of Misjudgment

The vital strategic importance of primitive little Laos was insufficiently appreciated. Even in 1961-1962 it was worth trying to arrange de jure partition that would have extended diagonally from northwest to southeast to keep the lower "trail" out of Communist hands.

We have paid for the misjudgment. During the last decade U.S. aid to Laos has totaled possibly \$1.75 billion while all kinds of American paramilitary operations have been mounted there. Nor can any valid settlement of the Vietnamese war ever come until, as President Nixon said on May 14, 1969, Hanoi withdraws its troops from Laos, the "traditional invasion route" down which they march into the South.