

Korea's CIA Role Seen as Dictatorial

BY DONALD MIRK

Far East Correspondent

Chicago Tribune Press Service

SEOUL, Korea, Oct. 14—The CIA is everywhere.

It's in the newspaper offices, on the campuses, in big business—maybe in the wiring of your hotel room.

Not the American CIA. The Korean Central Intelligence Agency, the main arm for the strength and security of the regime of President Chung Hee Park.

The Korean CIA is so powerful that only its director, silver-haired, wealthy Lee Hu Rak, could negotiate and sign the July 4 communique in which South and North Korea agreed to bury their differences by talking rather than fighting.

Others Faced Arrest

If anyone else had signed such a document, according to diplomatic analysts and local politicians, the CIA would have arrested him for spying, betraying the national cause, and selling out to the enemy.

Lee Hu Rak may not have supplanted President Park as the nation's "strong man," as some critics allege, but he certainly ranks as Number Two. Former secretary general of Park's staff, he appears to have the complete confidence of the president in stifling any signs of political opposition or even mild dissent.

"The president wants to present a united national front in talks with the enemy," explained a professor, who asked that his name not be used for fear of arrest and questioning by the CIA. "He thinks that any meaningful political activity against him will provide the North with an advantage in the talks."

of political repression actually began well before the first secret contacts between North and South Korean officials last year.

While the regime had always been noted for its tough police techniques, the level of anxiety began reaching its highest peak in 1971 with a presidential election in which Park's main opponent, Kim Dai Jung, shocked almost everyone by winning 46 per cent of the vote.

"Now none of the papers may report my speeches," said Kim, a member of the National Assembly. "The CIA is paying off spies in my own party and arresting people for supporting me. There is no more democracy in Korea."

1st Sign of Discontent

Kim's surprising showing in the 1971 election was just the first of a number of signs of nationwide discontent, culminating in student riots late last year against military training programs. The riots inevitably evoked memories of much more violent demonstrations a decade before resulting in the overthrow of the previous regime led by the aging, dictatorial Syngman Rhee.

"There's an old saying that no regime can stay in power more than 10 years," recalled the publisher of a small magazine, often banned or confiscated for running critical material. "In a period of 10 years, the mountains and rivers change their shape."

"The society is more and more regimented," observed an editorial writer on one of the city's leading dailies. "They control everything."

Journalists Arrested

By "they," said the editorialist, who also lectures at a university, he meant the central government in general—

man comes to visit the newspaper office," he said. "The CIA wants to know the contents of every story and often advises against using articles on political topics. Usually the editor knows what not to use without the CIA man's advice."

The editor alleged that journalists are often arrested, held without charges and questioned. If they talk freely, as they are released. If they are particularly stubborn, they are beaten, placed in solitary confinement, perhaps sent to a "mental hospital"—a common practice in the Soviet Union and other Communist countries.

"Their CIA people are a nuisance," said a veteran reporter on one of the papers. "They sometimes recommend killing stories right on deadline. We try to argue with them—not on political but on technical grounds. We say we don't have time, it's too late. In the end, we have to do what they say."

Less: the CIA doesn't exercise quite that much power. President Park last Dec. 6 issued an "emergency declaration," and the National Assembly two weeks later passed an "emergency powers" bill at a post-midnight session attended only by members of Park's own party.

Powers Listed

Under the bill, Park has the authority to issue decrees controlling wages, trade, production, collective bargaining—as well as the press. In fact, however, Park rarely finds it necessary to invoke these powers.

"The CIA operates without any legal sanction at all," explained a diplomatic source here. "It has so much extralegal power that it's not necessary to issue decrees. It can just intimidate and threaten people illegally."

In the final analysis, according to journalists and politicians here, Park probably hopes to perpetuate his own form of dictatorship at least thru the 1970's.

Constitution Amended

Limited by the constitution to only one four-year term, he had it amended in 1969 to enable him to run again for his third term last year. Politicians now expect him to have it reamended in 1973, so he can run for a fourth term in 1975.

At the age of 53, Park appears to have reached the height of his career. An austere, personally incorruptible man, educated at the military academy of the Japanese Imperial Army before World War II, he entertains the dream eventually of uniting both Koreas thru negotiations and retiring as the founder of a nation reborn.

Yet many observers—professors, diplomats, and journalists, as well as opposition politicians—believe that eventually the machine that Park has created may destroy him. Since its founding in 1961 for the ostensible purpose of investigating Communist infiltration and subversion, the CIA has inveigled its way into leading industries, banks, trading firms, and real estate companies.

CIA Needed Money

"The problem was the CIA needed more money to carry out its activities," said a long-time resident here. "It was modeled originally after the American CIA, but it assumed an internal security function that made it entirely different. CIA officials needed much more money than formally allocated under the national budget."

So the CIA grew into the nation's richest agency and biggest employer after the Defense Ministry. From a sprawling headquarters shielded by tall trees and barbed wire fences, it spends millions of dollars on thousands of operatives in every major private business and every government office, major or minor.

If government critics cannot write or speak publicly as they please, they do not hesitate to talk privately—on the understanding that their names will not be used in print. [One notable exception was a Protestant minister who was ordered not to talk to this correspondent after having agreed by telephone to meet for an interview.]

Doom Inevitable

"This government cannot go on forever," said a professor, when asked if he thought Park would soon become "president for life." The professor cited festering, unchecked opposition to CIA "police state" tactics as one of several factors that may undo the regime.

Representative of President Park's campaign

Seoul's Hired Guns

by James Otis

THE AMERICAN SOLDIERS who work with them in Vietnam speak respectfully of the "ROK Marines." Technically, ROK indicates their place of origin—the Republic of Korea (South Korea). But the Americans utter the term as if it were "Rock," and as though it referred to their physical conditioning and the state of their sensibilities: as soldiers they are brutal, licentious and they get results. Militarily, they are trusted by the American high command, which—in the current fighting—has assigned them the responsibility of keeping the vital An Khe Pass open and preventing South Vietnam from being split in half. Some 37,000 of these troops are presently engaged in South Vietnam. Referred to pretentiously as "allies," their involvement is said to arise from ideological commitment to the cause of freedom, national self-interest, or some other self-serving platitude. In fact, they are latter-day Samurai, hired guns of the Orient, who have sold their services to Washington for the duration.

To be specific, the normal salary of a ROK army private is \$1.60 a month. But if that private elects to serve in Vietnam, he can earn 23 times that amount, or \$37.50 a month. In one day, he earns almost as much as he would have made in a whole month had he remained in his homeland—courtesy, to be sure, of the American taxpayer. The middleman of this operation is the government of South Korea, which receives a kickback of well over \$300 million per year for the service.

Such "allies" are to mercenaries what a "protective reaction raid" is to an unprovoked strike and what an "incursion" is to an invasion—namely, the same thing.

For some time now, persistent reports have linked these mercenary Koreans to brutalities in Vietnam which would make Rusty Calley blush. In June, the *Alternative Feature Service* (AFS) of Berkeley, California released a heretofore secret study by the RAND Corporation. "Mention of Korean Troop

Activities in RAND Interviews," and thereby made public what the American government has known for at least six years. The 1966 document is replete with these stories of barbarity which Americans have learned how to take in and ignore:

- "When they came to the VC-controlled areas . . . they raped the women in those areas. There were times they killed the women after they had raped them. I heard just recently women were raped and killed. The people were so frightened of the Korean troops, they didn't dare to stay in their homes but moved away." (from a National Liberation Front deserter)

- ". . . only 50 villagers still lagged behind. Most of them were women, children and elderly people. The Korean soldiers rounded them up in one place. The people thought that they were to be evacuated to the GVN-controlled areas by helicopters. . . . The Koreans suddenly pointed their guns at the crowd and opened fire. Only two babies of two and three survived. They crawled on their mothers' bellies." (from a refugee)

- ". . . when the Korean troops came, they called all the old women and children down in the trenches to come up. Then these people were told to sit in circles. Afterward, the Korean troops, machine-gunned them." (from an NLF prisoner)

- "Everybody agreed that the Koreans were barbarous. They went on operations without interpreters going along. They killed at random without distinguishing between the rights and wrongs. Some people said it was because the VC mixed themselves with the villagers, and thus the Koreans couldn't help making a mistake. I don't think their reasoning was right. I don't

see why the Koreans should kill the children. Kids of two, three, or even five or seven years weren't VC. They also burned the paddy and the people's houses. They burned the cow pens and the animals inside too. Cows are certainly not VC!" (from a refugee).

The introduction to the document notes that "no effort has been made to ascertain the veracity of the statements made by the interviewees." And AFS quotes former RAND analyst Melvin Gurtov as saying that the report was "a draft circulated for comments . . . as opposed to a published study." It would be a mistake to surmise, however, that this report outlines the full extent of the U.S. government's information about South Korean murders in Vietnam. On the contrary, American officials have received at least three other major reports on the subject.

On January 10, 1970, A. Terry Rambo, a graduate student at the University of Hawaii, told the *New York Times* that he had reported the extensive killing of civilians by South Korean troops to U.S. Army officers in Vietnam in 1966, but the information had been suppressed. Rambo and two colleagues, Jerry M. Tinker and John D. Lenoir, were researchers for Human Sciences Research (HSR), Inc., McLean, Virginia, on a refugee interview project for the Pentagon's Advanced Research Projects Agency.

Rambo took the atrocity information to American officials in Vietnam. He briefed a "group of ranking American officers in Saigon about the report." The result: Rambo was "ordered by a general officer of the MACV [Military Assistance Command, Vietnam] staff to cease investigating the Koreans—and no mention of it was to be made in our reports."

The Rambo team prepared two reports, one without atrocity information, one with it. This was done, according to Tinker, because they "knew that if our report contained anything about murders it would be classified

ported. Repair, the durability of which is uncertain, cost an average of \$170-\$20 more than the average trade-in value of a 1965 model.

Last Nov 16, after the safety agency made an initial finding of a safety defect, GM said it would send a voluntary safety-defect notification—but refused to bear the cost of correction.

Starting Dec. 5 GM mailed out 756,000 notifications. As of two weeks ago, Douglas Toms told a Senate Commerce Committee hearing, only 32,000 Corvairs had been taken to Chevrolet dealers for correction and repair. Some 68,000 letters were returned as undeliverable, 84,000 recipients said they were not Corvair owners, and 23,000 owners said they will not take their Corvairs in.

Toms said he is favorably inclined to the Nelson-Mondale bill. The Commerce Department opposes it.

INTELLIGENCE: OUT OF CONTROL

Mr. SYMINGTON, Mr. President, an interesting, thought-provoking article entitled "GI Spying: Out of Control?" written by one of the better informed newspapermen on the subject of military matters, George C. Wilson, appeared in the Washington Post last Sunday.

The article could well have been entitled "Intelligence: Out of Control."

In a box adjacent to the article, Chairman ELLENDER, of the Senate Appropriations Committee, is quoted as stating, "it is criminal" to spend so many billions of dollars to gather too much information for anybody to read; and I was glad to note that this box also states that Representative NEZDI, of the House Armed Services Committee, is planning "a review of government intelligence operations this year for the House Armed Services Committee." Such a review is long overdue.

I ask unanimous consent that the article and two letters written to me by former members of the military who were involved in intelligence matters and who were interviewed by Mr. Wilson in connection with the article be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the items were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Washington Post, Feb. 27, 1972]

GI SPYING: OUT OF CONTROL?

(By George C. Wilson)

One night late in August, 1967, an American submarine surfaced off the North Korean coast to launch a South Korean spy in a rubber boat. His mission was to establish himself as a permanent resident in North Korea and send back coded observations to the South.

Someone on the submarine watched the agent paddle toward the North Korean shore. Then the sub submerged out of sight again. The agent was heard from for only a brief period after landing in North Korea, presumably because he was captured. If he was indeed captured, it was likely the North Koreans tortured him.

Was that agent's trip necessary? Did Congress at the time know that the United States was supporting hundreds of South Koreans spying missions against North Korea? And was this American involvement part of the reason North Korea snatched the USS Pueblo off Wonsan in 1968?

Eight former Army intelligence agents who have been pondering these and related questions since leaving the service decided to speak their mind in hopes of forcing re-

forms—or at least some public dialogue. They argued in interviews with The Washington Post that right now there is not enough public accountability for Army military intelligence operations overseas. The consequences, they said, range from wanton waste of life to gross inefficiency.

While such specific charges cannot be proven by hearing only their side of the story, the former agents did show in their interviews that Army intelligence operations overseas go far beyond the battlefield. Similar disclosures of the extent of domestic surveillance by the Army aroused wide public criticism in 1970-71.

"Some of the programs of Army intelligence are morally outrageous," said Robert J. Donia, 26, a former high school teacher who served as a sergeant in the Army's military intelligence branch from 1969 to January, 1972. He now attends the University of Michigan graduate school.

"The scope of military intelligence operations should be a matter of public record." (When queried by The Post, the Army refused to tell how much it is spending now or has spent in the past on its military intelligence activities.)

Donia—limiting himself to completed operations in hopes of staying within the bounds of security—said that "in the mid- to late 1960s" there were 50 to 200 American-supported infiltration attempts from South to North Korea every year, with the submarine mission one of the most dramatic. Most of them were across the demilitarized zone separating North and South Korea.

Donia said the sources for those figures were the records he studied while attached to the 502d Military Intelligence Group in Seoul. The same records, he said, showed very few South Korean agents came back.

"One operational plan that I saw," said Donia in contending that the high-risk missions seemed to have little military value, "called for the agent to infiltrate through the DMZ. Once he got over the DMZ, which took him three or four days, he was to move to a headquarters element of a North Korean battalion; enter a BOQ (bachelor officers quarters) clandestinely; steal a North Korean major's uniform, and return back across the DMZ."

Such missions, Donia said, were coordinated through the U.S.-Republic of Korea Combined Operations Group. He added that South Korean agents often were told to undertake such dangerous missions to clear themselves of suspicion of disloyalty or criminal charges.

North Korea complained vociferously about such spying missions, both at Panmunjom and in radio broadcasts. In what the former Army agents believed was a response to these complaints, Gen. John H. Michaelis, commander of the U.S. Eighth Army headquartered in Seoul, suspended American support of such activities in August, 1970. According to an Army agent who just returned from Korea, that order has been lifted. But he said getting missions approved is more difficult than in the Korean spying heyday of the mid-1960s.

BREAKING A PROTEST

James S. Sensenig, 23, of Lancaster, Pa., said he was dismayed to see the U.S. Army showing the same avid interest in the surveillance of civilians in South Korea as it had displayed under its own domestic surveillance program in the United States. Sensenig had served as a sergeant in the latter program before working for the Eighth Army Intelligence Group in Korea in 1971. The difference, he said, was that the South Korean Army and CIA collected the information and turned much of it over to the U.S. Army.

"I was shocked to see the U.S. Army routinely collecting information on South Korean students even though they posed no imminent danger to the U.S. Army," he said.

"When the very first student voiced his anti-Korean government feelings—or anti-

American for that matter—MI (military intelligence) was right there getting information from the ROK police," Sensenig said.

The Eighth Army's Military Intelligence Group also collected biographical data on South Korean politicians and kept track of their comings and goings, according to the former Army agents.

Similarly, U.S. Army intelligence-gathering in South Vietnam encompassed such domestic activities as anti-war groups. Keith W. Taylor, 25, also a graduate student at the University of Michigan, said he learned this to his horror while running a net of intelligence agents from his cover office (the door was labeled Economic Research Team) in Gladinh, Vietnam. Taylor's outfit was the 525th Military Group, 5th Battalion. His identification there was GS-9 civilian working for the Army.

Taylor, a sergeant fluent in Vietnamese, learned through his net in February, 1970, that a pacifist group headed by a woman Buddhist lawyer, Ngo Ba Thanh, was going to hold a meeting in Gladinh 10 days hence. He wrote up the report for his American commander, only to learn the information got into the hands of Saigon government riot police, who brutally smashed the meeting.

Taylor saw no military threat to the U.S. Army nor anybody else to justify the suppression. Instead, he saw the meeting as "a cry of anguish from the hearts of all these people whose lives had just been totally destroyed by this war just going on and on." Taylor said he wrote no further reports on such protest groups. "I sympathized with these people completely," he said.

"I really believed inside me that everything we were doing in Vietnam was wrong," said Taylor of his service there from December, 1970, to July, 1971. "And if you can speak of morality anymore, it was immoral."

He told of buying South Vietnamese spies who needed the money to live because the war had driven them from their farms and into the cities where they drifted as street people; of agents he knew who infiltrated the Vietcong but were found out and killed long after they had unsuccessfully asked to be rescued; of "Catch 22" type missions which both the American dispatcher and the South Vietnamese agent knew to be just that.

On that last point, Taylor cited an agent sent to plant and activate a disguised radio beacon when Vietcong were sighted moving rockets through the countryside. American bombers, alerted by the radio beacon, would raid the spot. "The agent knew as well as we did that the bombers would drop their bombs before he could get away. The job never came off."

South Vietnamese spies working in the countryside outside Saigon were paid between 300 and 400 piasters by the Americans for every item the Army military intelligence office deemed important enough to type up as a report. "I decided," said Taylor, "since nobody read the reports we did get from the countryside, that I would publish all of them so the farmers working for us would get their money. That was my humanitarian contribution."

If Taylor was against the war, found his intelligence work immoral and so empathized with the Vietnamese people that he wants to spend the rest of his life teaching their history—why didn't he quit his Army job on the spot?

"I did my job in MI out of loyalty to my friends in the Army," Taylor answered. "That was the one thing that bound me in."

Now that he is out of the Army, Taylor wants to make amends somehow. In that sense, he and the other seven agents who bespoke their fears are Vietnam war casualties of a special kind, looking for relief through expression.

THE PHOENIX PROGRAM

Of the eight former Army agents, four let their names be used, including one of the

WILMINGTON, DELA.

NEWS

M - 44,027

Shopping cart raid uses CIA training

By ROBERT A. WRIGHT
New York Times News service

LOS ANGELES—Just after midnight a caravan of two dozen trucks, led by a South Korean trained in espionage, pulled up to a lot in Burbank, Calif. Men furtively jumped from the truck and began loading their booty—shopping carts.

The men conducting the raid were employes of supermarkets that owned the carts and a company hired to retrieve them. They captured 402 carts.

The great cart raid of August 1970 was an exceptional event, but it points up a growing problem for supermarkets, a factor in increased food costs and an increasingly casual attitude of Americans toward theft—if it happens to be a shopping cart.

SUPERMARKET managers say the bulk of the cart losses—between 15 and 25 per cent of their stock a year—is attributable to "little old ladies" who borrow them and "forget" to return them. But professionals operate, corralling herds of carts, which they sell in a black market, many of them to smaller independent markets at bargain prices.

Rising cart thefts have led supermarkets to invest in a number of mechanical devices designed to prevent carts from being removed from stores, and they have created a new industry, the cart return service.

It was the Cart Return Service Company of Los Angeles that led the raid on the Burbank lot. The company, owned by Jung San Kim and his wife, Sally, has been in business for five years. Starting with one pickup truck, they now have 15 a day. They charge their more than 100 supermarket customers \$6.50 a pickup. The carts are worth \$30 to \$40 each.

The raids led to the conviction of Joseph N. Stay, who had leased the lot, on five counts of grand theft of shopping carts. Stay regarded himself as a competitor of Cart Return Service and charged supermarkets for retrieved carts. But his trial brought out evidence that Stay found the carts in hard proximity to supermarkets parking lots. He was fined \$1,000 and put on probation.

IRONICALLY, it was Stay who gave Mrs. Kim the idea of getting into the business, when she saw him on a television talk show discussing his business.

"My husband has a doctorate in economics and worked for the Central Intelligence Agency in South Korea," Mrs. Kim said. "But he had to work as a bus boy here because of his poor English. When I heard about the cart problem, I thought, 'why not?' everybody laughed at us but we bought a truck with \$250 down and were able to pay it off in three weeks."

to store managers. One manager in Los Angeles said that he regularly gives a return service driver \$10 from petty cash to get carts in a hurry. "I know he gets them from the store down the street, but when you need carts, you need carts."

The cart theft problem is a big one. On average, supermarkets have a minimum of \$10,000 invested in carts for each store, the National Association of Food Chains has reported. But, although it recognizes cart theft as a national problem, the trade group has not compiled statistics on the volume of losses.

HOWEVER, for all the professionals in the business of stealing carts, amateurs who do not consider themselves thieves—account for the bulk of the losses, stores say.

A security officer for a chain described a typical case:

"We found an elderly lady—a very good customer, who I'm sure would never snitch anything off a shelf—with a cart she had been using for nearly three years. She had kept it well polished and the wheels oiled and had been using it as her personal property for all sorts of errands.

"When we took the cart away from her, as politely as we could, she was very disappointed. She told us that, for a year, she had used the cart from another supermarket, but that it hadn't been nearly as satisfactory."

PHOENIX, ARIZ.
REPUBLIC

STATINTL

M - 166,541
S - 252,975

JUL 3 1971

Ralph de Toledano

CIA plot to kill Chiang revealed



Sometimes it takes years for the news to make Page One. In November of 1963, any well-informed Washington correspondent knew that the Central Intelligence Agency had been deeply

involved in the overthrow of Ngo Dinh Diem, president of South Vietnam. And at the cocktail hour, in the capital's most frequented watering hole, the suspicion was frequently voiced that CIA shared complicity in Diem's assassination. Today, almost seven and a half years later, Americans can read the story over their morning coffee.

There are other CIA stories of some concern to the citizenry, but since they do not touch on the Vietnam war, they will not be found in the batch of classified papers now being pawed over by the nation's press. One such story is so incredible that I have not published it even though I checked it out just as high as you can go in this government without talking to the President. In the general letting-down of hair that has followed publication by the New York Times of the Vietnam papers, there may be some value in reciting my story--if only to use it as a peg on which to hang some questions about CIA operations.

Back in the early '50s, the Central Intelligence Agency decided that it would be a better world if President Chiang Kai-shek, then digging in on Taiwan, would shuffle off his mortal coil. With the Generalissimo gone, all those pesky questions of Red Chinese admission to the United Nations would become moot. The Nationalist regime would collapse, and Mao Tse-tung could move into the vacuum.

Somewhere within the bowels of CIA headquarters, plans for the assassination of Chiang Kai-shek were made. A team was assigned to do the job and \$5 million was allocated--the money to be spent in setting up the operation in Taipei, bribing such officials as could be bribed, creating a cover, etc. I was never able to determine what non-CIA officials--if any--were informed.

But because CIA security at the time was about as water-tight as a colander, the Republic of China's intelligence picked up details of the plot even before the CIA team had unpacked its bags in Taipei. President Chiang was informed. According to my account, however, the Generalissimo refused to give the order to "take care" of the team. "Let's get their \$5 million first," he is reported to have said. The CIA team, therefore, was led down a cloak-and-dagger garden path, never getting within range of President Chiang.

By the time the money was spent, the Central Intelligence Agency had changed its mind--or had it changed by more responsible people in the United States government. The team was recalled.

When I checked out the story, the very important official who confirmed it said, "Sure it's true. CIA had a similar plan to knock off Syngman Rhee (then President of Korea) but we stopped it." In the context of the conversation, the "we" referred to the National Security Council.

That the two operations were scrubbed of course made a considerable difference to Presidents Chiang and Rhee--not to mention the course of history. But scrubbed or completed, the principle remains the same. The Central Intelligence Agency, a secret arm of the American government, had taken on itself life and death decisions which involved the integrity of this nation and which could have generated results touching on war or peace in the world.

CIA, moreover, had embarked on actions which went far beyond the all-too-liberal license it had been given by the Congress in authorizing the agency. And that has been CIA's way in less grisly areas of its endeavor. It compromised the freedom of the press in the '50s by

hiring newspapermen as "consultants," thereby sealing lips and silencing criticism. Whether or not this practice has continued is anybody's guess.

The CIA's original function was to gather intelligence, not to interfere in world politics. There might have been some justification for its activities as one of many participants in Guatemala and in Cuba where it was involved only with the sanction of higher authority. But in the instant cases, CIA was a law unto itself. A thoughtful person might ask: Is it still?

DANVILLE, VA.
REGISTER

M - 10,742
S - 22,644

JUN 27 1971

Ralph de Toledano

Diem's Death Showed CIA Law Unto Itself

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5 MAY 1971

Pak Jung Hi: Traitor to his people

This article, the second of a three-part series on the South Korean President Pak Jung Hi, who stands for reelection this week, was adapted from information supplied by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Following a mutiny among several units of the South Korean army in 1948, Pak Jung Hi, now president, was imprisoned along with 71 other officers by the Syngman Rhee regime. Pak had been cooperating with U.S. Army intelligence and had helped put down military opposition to the growing oppression of Rhee's government.

Thus the reason for Pak's arrest remains unclear. If it was not simply staged, then it is likely that the Rhee regime might have been initially unaware of Pak's liaison with the U.S. and that his earlier "participation" in progressive activities was for the purpose of informing U.S. intelligence.

Other aspects of the arrest are better known. He was shortly afterwards released on bail and then exonerated. In the meantime the trial of the officers was convened in February 1949 and the military prosecutor told the court that the evidence against the accused was contained in a statement by Pak. This was impounded as a secret document, but eventually all the officers with the exception of Pak were convicted, receiving sentences from 15 years to death.

After the trial, Pak became chief of the information office in Army headquarters and also worked with South Korean military intelligence. Reportedly Pak had a hand in the arrest in October 1949 of over 1600 officers and men accused of progressive activities. Shortly after the outbreak of the Korean war, Pak was assigned full-time to intelligence work and during the war he regularly advanced in rank and responsibility.

In 1954, Pak was assigned to the U.S. Army Gunnery School in Oklahoma. Following the advanced training in the U.S. his rise in the ROK military ranks was rapid. By 1957 he was a major general and was commander of the Pusan logistic base in 1960 when popular agitation finally toppled the Rhee regime on April 19 of that

year.

Pak organizes coup

Relatively timid attempts to install a democratic regime and carry out reforms by Rhee's successors met with the hostility of the U.S., which apparently was fearful of where the process might end. With U.S. support, if not guidance, Pak and some associates carried out a military coup on May 16, 1961, and he has retained power since then.

There have been countries where military leaders have adopted an independent course from the U.S. after assuming power. But nothing could be further from the case in South Korea. Pak was an ideal instrument for collaboration with the U.S. because he had demonstrated his ambition, even being willing to put a foreign power's interests above his country in order to advance his career, as had been proven by his service as an officer with the Japanese imperial army during World War II.

Pak's former tie with Japan made him especially valuable to the U.S. since the U.S. policy was to share the burden of "foreign aid" with Japan in the Far East, that is, to encourage Japanese economic penetration in other Asian countries, even if there was growing competition in other parts of the world. The U.S. aimed to provide an outlet for Japanese capital in Asia and thereby give Japan a stake in supporting the counterrevolutionary policies of the U.S.

Immediately following the May 16 coup, South Korea's steps toward a democratic system were halted by Pak's martial law regime. With unusual speed, 23 political organizations and parties along with more than 230 other organizations were disbanded, more than 900 publications were banned and an estimated 100,000 persons were arrested for participation in reformist or progressive activity. All democratic rights were contravened by a succession of repressive laws issued in succeeding months. And in the months and years that followed a number of leading South Korean patriots were executed by the Pak regime.

Initially, U.S. military and civilian officials in South Korea pretended to be unaware of the preparations for the coup, even going so far as pretending to have supported the former reformist government. But the evidence indicates that the CIA not only was not caught napping but had a direct hand in the installation of the military regime.

Opening to Japan

Shortly after taking power, Pak began the process of normalizing relations with Japan, which simply meant opening the country to Japanese imperialism. This was

a bitter thing for Koreans who had known nearly four decades of Japanese colonial rule. Perhaps only a military regime could have stifled the popular opposition to this move since anti-Japanese feeling remained very deep-seated among Koreans. In November 1961, following visits of Japanese officials to sound out Pak, he went to Japan for high level conversations, using the occasion also for a reunion with some of his former Japanese military instructors. During the visit to Japan, Pak so openly referred to his former service to Japan, it was even embarrassing to his hosts.

By 1965, relations between South Korea and Japan were fully "normalized" by the conclusion of a treaty between the two countries. What this meant, in part, was reported by a recent study on South Korea which notes: "In keeping with an understanding reached on the basis of the 'normalization,' Japan assigned \$300 million to South Korea as free 'assistance' to be rendered in the course of 10 years, granted it a state loan of \$200 million and commercial credits for \$300 million. . . . According to a report of the South Korean Industrial Bank, published in Seoul in July 1970, at the end of 1969, out of \$2434.2 million invested in South Korea by foreign countries, 21.2 percent, i.e., \$515.1 million, fell to the share of Japan. More than 100 Japanese firms developed activities in South Korea, moreover, on such a large scale that owing to protests from the national bourgeoisie the government had to take urgent measures to limit these activities."

In other words, as with U.S. "foreign aid," Japanese economic assistance to South Korea was simply a vehicle for the promotion of Japanese exports and foreign investment.

Pak's service to the U.S. was even greater than allowing U.S. economic penetration, but extended to the dispatch of a large South Korean mercenary corps to fight on behalf of the U.S. in South Vietnam.

(This and other aspects of U.S.-Korean relations under the Pak regime will be discussed in a concluding article.)

Our choices in Korea

American troops have been in Korea for a quarter of a century.

That is correct. They first entered under command of General MacArthur in 1945 to liberate the Koreans from Japanese imperialism.

Instead, they used Japanese punitive forces and Koreans who served the Japanese in these forces to crush any ideas the Koreans entertained about being independent.

Chung Hee Park, the current President of the Republic of Korea (South Korea), was one of the Koreans who served the Japanese as a policeman against his own people. He took the blood oath of fidelity to Japan and participated in 110 punitive operations against Koreans who wanted to be free from Japanese colonialism.

That was before he became an agent of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency — a post from which he was “promoted” to President of South Korea with the help of the American GIs stationed permanently in South Korea “to liberate” the Koreans.

Chung Hee Park's predecessor, Syngman Rhee, wanted “to liberate” the Koreans in the north as well as those in the south. His ambitions, culminating in the fateful attack across the 38th Parallel on June 25, 1950, cost the United States 54,246 dead and 103,284 wounded GIs, counting battle deaths and others.

Washington's attachment to Rhee and his ambitions also cost the Korean people several million dead and wounded, and the destruction of much of their country. But when the armistice went into effect June 17, 1953, Rhee's ambitions were still unrealized and Washington had been rebuffed.

However, Rhee's ambitions live on in the regime of Chung Hee Park. To fulfill them, Park has arrested and imprisoned more than 100,000 South Koreans, executed hundreds, built up a regular army of 630,000 men, a reserve army of 1,000,000, a Central Intelligence Agency (an arm of the U.S. CIA) of 370,000 agents, a police force of 44,352, and a secret police force of 300,000.

What is more, ever faithful to his blood oath, Park has opened the door of South Korea to Japanese imperialism. Japan's top monopolies, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, Mitsui and Yasuda, are back again in South Korea.

And faithful to his former employer, the CIA, Park has begun a propaganda campaign to keep the 64,000 GIs in South Korea from being withdrawn. Naturally, Park says he wants to be protected from the “Communist threat,” but clearly the real threat to Park comes from South Korea's suppressed and exploited population.

On the other hand, the government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) has offered to sign a non-aggression pact with Park's regime and work out ways for a peaceful unification of Korea — if the American GI's terminate their 25-year-long occupation and go home.

It's really up to us Americans. We pay our money and take our choice. But as experience shows, if we choose the likes of Park and his proposal, we'll continue to pay and pay and pay — and maybe not only in the form of higher and higher taxes.