DES MOINES, IOWA
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New Man for CIA

Only a few insiders have much basis for judging the work of the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and they rarely talk. But there are a few hints along the way about the meaning of President Nixon's decision to name James R. Schlesinger CIA director and make the present director, Richard Helms, ambassador to Iran.

President Nixon has not been satisfied with the performance of the U.S. "intelligence community." In late 1969 he cut CIA personnel abroad by 10 to 12 per cent. He ordered a study of the CIA and intelligence generally by James Schlesinger, then a military and international specialist in the White House Office of Management and Budget, and by K. W. Smith, a National Security Council aide.

Their report came out in May, 1971. It recommended pulling intelligence together either by giving CIA Director Helms more authority over the five other U.S. agencies beside the CIA that gather intelligence, or by setting up a new cabinet-level Department of Intelligence.

In November, 1971, the White House ordered a reorganization of intelligence activities to give Helms more leadership over the rival intelligence agencies in the State and Defense Departments, the Atomic Energy Commission and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Now the President pulls Helms out and puts in one of the authors of the report — Schlesinger.

One complaint that the President is said to have against the CIA under Helms is that the CIA often has been realistic about Vietnam. For example, the CIA didn't think bombing North Vietnam would be effective, or that it was effective after it started.

Ousting Helms for being right is wrong.

On the other hand, Senator J. William Fulbright's Foreign Relations Committee has been hassling the CIA for its private wars in Laos and Cambodia, which either violate U.S. law or come close to it. Ousting Helms for making war against the will of Congress would be proper — but it is clear Helms was only carrying out Nixon's policy there.

James Schlesinger is an economist who spent 12 years in the RAND Corporation, an Air Force think tank, then three years as a Nixon appointee in the Bureau of the Budget and the White House Office of Management and Budget, then a year as Nixon's choice as chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission. His record in government is good, but he is a weapons man and a hardliner.

WASHINGTON POST

29 DEC 1972

Chalmers M. Roberts

[redacted]

Helms, the Shah and the CIA

THERE IS A CERTAIN irony in the fact that Richard Helms will go to Iran as the American ambassador 20 years after the agency he now heads organized and directed the overthrow of the regime then in power in Teheran. The tale is worth recounting if only because of the changes in two decades which have affected the Central Intelligence Agency as well as American foreign policy.

Helms first went to work at the CIA in 1947 and he came up to his present post as director through what is generally called the "department of dirty tricks." However, there is nothing on the public record to show that he personally had a hand in the overthrow of the Communist backed and/or oriented regime of Premier Mohammed Mossadegh in 1953, an action that returned the Shah to his throne. One can only guess at the wry smile that must have come to the Shah's face when he first heard that President Nixon was proposing to send the CIA's top man to be the American envoy.

The Iranian affair, and a similar CIA action in Guatemala the following year, are looked upon by old hands at



1953: *Teheran rioting that overthrew the government left the United States Point Four office with gaping holes for windows and doors.*

the agency as high points of a sort in the Cold War years. David Wise and Thomas B. Ross have told the Iranian story in their book, "The Invisible Government," and the CIA boss at the time, Allen Dulles, conceded in public after he left the government that the United States had had a hand in what occurred.

IRAN IS NEXT DOOR to the Soviet Union. In 1951 Mossadegh, who confused Westerners with his habits of weeping in public and running government business from his bed, nationalized the Brit[illegible] Oil Co. and seized the Abadan refinery. The West boycotted Iranian oil and the country was thrown into crisis. Mossadegh "connived," as Wise and Ross put it, with Tudeh, Iran's Communist party, to bolster his hand. The British and Americans decided he had to go and picked Gen. Fazollah Zahedi to replace him. The man who stage-managed the job on the spot was Kermit "Kim" Roosevelt (who also had a hand in some fancy goings-on in Egypt), grandson of T.R. and seventh cousin of F.D.R., and now a Washingtonian in private business.

Roosevelt managed to get to Teheran and set up underground headquarters. A chief aide was Brig. Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf, who, as head of the New Jersey state police, had become famous during the Lindbergh baby kidnaping case. Schwarzkopf had reorganized the Shah's police force and he and Roosevelt joined in the 1953 operation. The Shah dismissed Mossadegh and named Zahedi as Premier but Mossadegh arrested the officer who brought the bad news. The Teheran streets filled with rioters and a scared Shah fled first to Baghdad and then to Rome. Dulles flew to Rome to confer with him. Roosevelt ordered the Shah's backers into the streets, the leftists were arrested by the army and the Shah returned in triumph. Mossadegh went to jail. In time a new international oil consortium took over Anglo-Iranian which operates to this day, though the Shah has squeezed more and more revenue from the Westerners.

In his 1963 book, "The Craft of Intelligence," published after he left CIA, Dulles wrote that, when in both Iran and Guatemala it "became clear" that a Communist state was in the making, "support from outside was given to loyal anti-Communist elements." In a 1965 NBC television documentary on "The Science of Spying" Dulles said: "The government of Mossadegh, if you recall history, was overthrown by the action of the Shah. Now, that we encouraged the Shah to take that action I will not deny." Miles Copeland, an ex-CIA operative in the Middle East, wrote in his book, "The Game of Nations," that the Iranian derring-do was called "Operation Ajax." He credited Roosevelt with "almost singlehandedly" calling the "pro-Shah forces on to the streets of Teheran" and supervising "their riots so as to oust" Mossadegh.

TODAY THE IRAN to which Helms will go after he leaves the CIA is a stable, well armed and well oil-financed regime under the Shah's command which has mended its fences with Moscow without hurting its close relationship with Washington. The Shah has taken full advantage of the changes in East-West relations from the Cold War [illegible]

While Iran and Guatemala were the high points of covert CIA Cold War activity, there were plenty of other successful enterprises that fell short of changing government regimes. Today the CIA, humiliated by the 1961 Bay of Pigs fiasco it planned and ran, has withdrawn from such large scale affairs as Iran, save for its continuing major role in the no longer "secret war in Laos." The climate of today would not permit the United States to repeat the Iranian operation, or so one assumes with the reservation that President Nixon (who was Vice President at the time of Iran) loves surprises.

The climate of 1953, however, was very different and must be taken into account in any judgment. Moscow then was fishing in a great many troubled waters and among them was Iran. It was probably true, as Allen Dulles said on that 1965 TV show, that "at no time has the CIA engaged in any political activity or any intelligence that was not approved at the highest level." It was all part of a deadly "game of nations." Richard Bissell, who ran the U-2 program and the Bay of Pigs, was asked on that TV show about the morality of CIA activities. "I think," he replied, that "the morality of . . . shall we call it for short, cold war . . . is so infinitely easier than the morality of almost any kind of hot war that I never encountered this as a serious problem."

PERHAPS the philosophy of the Cold War years and the CIA role were best put by Dulles in a letter that he wrote me in 1961. Excerpts from his then forthcoming book had appeared in Harper's and I had suggested to him some further revelations he might include in the book. He wrote about additions he was making: "This includes more on Iran and Guatemala and the problems of policy in action when there begins to be evidence that a country is slipping and Communist take-over is threatened. We can't wait for an engraved invitation to come and give aid."

There is a story, too, that Winston Churchill was so pleased by the operation in Iran that he proferred the George Cross to Kim Roosevelt. But the CIA wouldn't let him accept the decoration. So Churchill commented to Roosevelt: "I would be proud to have served under you" in such an operation. That remark, Roosevelt is said to have replied, was better than the decoration.

Helms doubtless would be the last to say so out loud but I can imagine his reflecting that, if it hadn't been for what Dulles, Kim Roosevelt and the others did in 1953, he would not have the chance to present his credentials to a Shah still on the peacock throne in 1973.

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WASHINGTON STAR

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U.S. Civilians Dying Unheralded in Laos

By TAMMY ARBUCKLE
Star-News Special Correspondent

VIENTIANE — Some Americans killed in Indochina combat do not appear in the U.S. Indochina death toll which stands at latest count at 45,915.

These unacknowledged combat deaths are of American civilians performing military duties normally carried out by U.S. Air Force or Army personnel.

As they are civilians the U.S. military does not include them in the death toll when they are killed in action.

For example, U.S. officials this weekend announced two American military deaths. They said U.S. Air Force Capt. Harold L. (Skip) Mischler of Osborne, Kan., was killed Saturday when his light observation plane was shot down by small arms over the embattled South Laos town of Saravane. U.S. officials said a second American was lost over the plain of Jars area but were unable to indentify him until next of kin were notified.

On Friday, Dec. 15, however, at a town on the South Laos' Bolovens Plateau called Paksong another kind of death occurred. John Kearns of Alvaredo, Tex., was listed as killed by North Vietnamese mortar shells which hit the command post of the Lao irregular unit he was advising.

Killed at Saravane

An embassy spokesman described Kearns as "American contract personnel attached to an irregular Lao unit." Irregular Lao units are handled by the Central Intelligence agency. Kearns was the third American adviser to irregulars killed in action since September.

Another American was killed when Lao irregular units launched a heliborne attack on Saravane on Oct. 19.

He was aboard one of eight U.S. Air Force helicopters which carried Lao irregulars into the Saravane airstrip under intense enemy fire. The American was hit just before the helicopter touched down.

Six of the U.S. helicopters engaged were hit by Communist fire but none crashed. A third American adviser to the irregulars was killed during an operation which failed to retake the Plain of Jars in North Laos in September.

Air America officials say about twenty of their American crew members have been killed in Laos since March 1970.

Air America is a private contractor to the Central Intelligence Agency and other U.S. government agencies and as air crew personnel are civilians.

They are not carried on the military death toll.

Air America engages in resupply drops to irregulars often under intense enemy antiaircraft fire and in infiltration and exfiltration of irregular intelligence and commando teams behind enemy lines. Another company, Continental Airlines, has lost some American personnel in similar operations in Laos.

American officials say roughly 800 Americans were killed or are missing in Laos since May 1964 when the United States first shouldered a greater burden of the Laos war. This figure includes all categories and is mostly military.

The unheralded paramilitary deaths in Laos indicate a trend which may start to show in South Vietnam as American military wind down the war there and various private American civilian companies are poised to move in to take over paramilitary chores.

Deaths Unreported

Increasing use of disguised paramilitary organizations will allow the U.S. military to put out figures of zero American casualties on the ground as they do now in Laos, as it will be "civilians" who are being killed, not U.S. military personnel.

As in Laos most of these civilians will be former members of the Special Forces and similar units contracted to the Central Intelligence Agency or other U.S. government agencies.

The U.S. failure to announce a list of paramilitary deaths in Laos, however, is one of the few faults which mar these operations.

In Laos, instead of having thousands of Americans as the Pentagon has poured into South Vietnam, the war is run just as effective if not more so by 500 to 600 Americans.

Small Group Functions

While Hanoi fields four, and in the dry season, five weak divisions of some 40,000 combat troops in Laos, the United States has only between 30 and 40 men on the ground at the most in combat areas throughout the country.

In the past eight years an estimated 31 of these Americans been killed. This figure includes some technicians caught flatfooted on the ground in 1968 at Phou Pathi, a supersecret installation in North Laos which the North Vietnamese overran.

About 60 Air America crewmen of American nationality are believed to have been killed in the same time period.

The small number of Americans with the irregulars are essential to insure good Lao leadership and lack of corruption. Poor leadership and non-payment of troops severely weakened Royal Lao regular forces throughout the war.

It has been suggested, however, that U.S. Embassy officials should admit it when such Americans are killed in action instead of trying to pretend they are "American personnel in management" as happened initially in the Kearns' case and these American deaths should be included in military casualty figures released weekly in Saigon.

U.S. plans prolonged role in Vietnam

By Richard E. Ward

Despite press speculation a peace agreement for Vietnam may soon be concluded, there is concrete evidence indicating the U.S. is planning to prolong the conflict and will attempt to subvert any peace accords.

U.S. procrastination in Paris, intensified bombing and the huge shipments of arms to Saigon, among other developments, are all indicators that the White House has no desire for true peace and has not abandoned its neo-colonial designs in Indochina.

An even more ominous proof of U.S. intentions of maintaining its puppet regimes in Indochina, was the apparent effort by presidential envoy Henry Kissinger to press Saigon's "demands" in Paris at the end of November, which would have virtually scrapped the agreement reached in October by Kissinger and Le Duc Tho of the DRV.

There have been various hypotheses put forward in the Western press concerning Kissinger's seeming about-face on behalf of Saigon, after proclaiming in October before the world that "peace is at hand." Nearly every possible explanation has been proposed by the pundits except the most plausible one. The U.S stalling in Paris does not represent any deference to its Saigon puppets, but rather it is for the purposes of U.S. policy and the Saigon regime is merely an instrument. U.S. expressions of "support" for Saigon's policies, now as in the past, to the extent they are not fictions for deceiving American opinion, are fundamentally expressions of the aims and designs of the U.S.

Gain time

In essence, American procrastination in Paris has been an effort to gain time for augmenting Saigon's war machine and setting up a huge clandestine network of "civilian advisors" which will attempt to prolong the struggle in Vietnam, as well as in the rest of Indochina, even if peace agreements have been reached.

"Even as the U.S. military is packing up for its expected exit from Vietnam, American officials here are secretly planning a major postwar presence of U.S. civilians in Vietnam, with many of them doing jobs formerly done by the military," wrote Fox Butterfield in a report from Saigon in the Nov. 27 New York Times.

Without alluding to the delay in Paris, Butterfield noted that the U.S. is in the process of augmenting its "civilian advisory" force in Vietnam, from 5000 to 10,000, its peak level at the stage of maximum U.S. military presence in Vietnam. But it should be apparent that this "advisory" apparatus could not be assembled overnight, anymore than the enormous flow of U.S. arms could be brought to Saigon in a day. Saigon's air force was increased two-fold, from approximately 1000 to 2000 aircraft during the past two months, to give only one item of U.S. supply effort.

To place recent developments in their proper perspective, it must be noted that there has been a major shift in U.S. strategy set in motion last spring in the wake of the long-sustained offensive by the Liberation Armed Forces in South Vietnam.

Despite administration efforts to play down the strength of the offensive, it is evident that once again the whole U.S. strategy for victory in Vietnam was smashed. Only the most drastic U.S. measures of the war prevented the complete collapse of the Saigon regime and its armed forces: the blockade of the DRV, the greatest aerial escalation against the DRV and liberated areas of South Vietnam (while heavy bombing of Laos and Cambodia was sustained), and unprecedented aerial tactical and logistics support for the Saigon forces.

The augmentation of the U.S. air logistics support for Saigon's forces during the offensive surged from a monthly average of about nine million pounds of cargo before the offensive to 60 million pounds in May. Augmented U.S. "support" for Saigon after the offensive began, raised total U.S. expenditures on the war by an annual rate of approximately $10 billion or nearly double the rate prior to the offensive.

The Nixon administration concealed this augmentation by requesting additional war funding only for the period ending Sept. 30. At about the same time the administration presented Congress with a request for these funds in June, Air America and Continental Air Services, the CIA contractual "civilian" airlines, began stepping up recruiting among Air Force personnel in Indochina, according to a Dec. 1 report of Dispatch News Service, by John Burgess. He quoted from a confidential recruiting brochure which, among other points, stated:

Clandestine warfare

"The flying is non-military; in other words, civilian flying. You are flying for the U.S. government, that is government agencies such as USOM, USAID, USIS, etc. While these agencies may be under CIA direction, you don't know and you don't care. The government agencies direct the routings and schedulings, your company provides the technical know-how and you fly the airplane."

The brochure makes it clear that "civilian flying" is merely a cover for clandestine military activity: "Although flights mainly serve U.S. official personnel movement and native officials and civilians, you sometimes engage in the movement of friendly troops, or of enemy captives; or in the transport of cargo more potent than rice and beans! There's a war going on. Use your imagination!"

In what Burgess describes as a "hastily"added postscript, the brochure states: "Foreign aid situation unclear pending outcome military situation in RVN (Republic of Vietnam), but it looks as if we'll finish the war (and peace terms favorable for our side); if so, it is expected that a boom among contract operators will result. . . ."

In other words, here we have the first concrete indication that the White House was implicitly admitting defeat of its "Vietnamization" program and reverting to a less costly program of clandestine warfare. The U.S. strategy shift was probably equally dictated by a desire to further diminish the political impact of the war on American opinion and finally by a desire to diminish the blow to U.S. prestige in the event of ultimate failure, that is the collapse of the puppet regimes.

The U.S. is clearly trying to stave off this development as long as possible, but it also wants to avoid the impression of being engaged in direct and large-scale U.S. intervention at the time, which sooner or later Nixon and Kissinger must know is inevitable.

Even if they cannot face this reality, they are now in deadly earnest about maintaining support for the puppet regimes, regardless of any peace agreement. If the U.S. honestly adhered to a peace agreement, Saigon's political collapse would quickly follow. That is why the U.S. is stepping up clandestine support for the Saigon regime, military aid disguised as civilian "contractual" aid, provided mainly by U.S. private military contractors.

There is a relationship between the U.S. arms build-up Indochina and the program for secret contractual aid. Before the October peace agreement, the U.S. made little effort to keep the program secret. In testimony before the Senate Appropriations Committee on Sept. 13, Air Force Maj. Gen. Joseph R. DeLuca explained in detail U.S. plans for contracting for personnel to train Saigon Air Force members. In the area of maintenance alone, the U.S. was planning to make contracts for $54 million of one to three years to train Saigon personnel, according to DeLuca.

continued

WASHINGTON POST
17 DEC 1972

Thailand Approves U.S. Headquarters

BANGKOK, Dec. 16 (UPI)—Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn said today that he has given the United States approval to move its military headquarters from Saigon to a remote base in Thailand only 60 miles from North Vietnam when a cease-fire goes into effect in Vietnam.

Thanom confirmed the planned move to isolated Nakorn Phanom Airbase, 380 miles northeast of Bangkok. The base, which formerly served as a major center for close air support of government and CIA-sponsored troops in Laos, was the jumping-off point for the unsuccessful commando raid on North Vietnam's Sontay POW camp in 1970.

It is the closest base to both Laos and North Vietnam, lying about 60 miles from North Vietnam at the closest point.

LOS ANGELES TIMES

19 DEC 1972

[redacted]

Reds Shell CIA's HQ at Long Cheng

VIENTIANE (UPI) — The headquarters of the Central Intelligence Agency in Laos at Long Cheng has come under Communist artillery fire for the first time since early September, American officials said Thursday.

The North Vietnamese shelling took place Tuesday night, the officials said. They said about 30 rounds of long-range 130-mm. artillery and 10 rounds of shorter-range 85-mm. artillery hit the western end of the airstrip and damaged several houses at the mountain base.

No casualties were reported.

Long Cheng, about 80 miles north of Vientiane, is headquarters for the CIA-sponsored "secret army" led by the Meo hill tribesmen's Maj. Gen. Vang Pao. In addition to Vang Pao and his soldiers, a number of CIA advisers stay overnight at the base.

WASHINGTON STAR
18 DEC 1972

[redacted]

Air America: Flying for U.S. and Profit in Asia

By JOHN BURGESS
Special to The Star-News

BANGKOK — "The flying is non-military; in other words, civilian flying. You are flying for the U.S. government, that is government agencies such as USOM, USAID, USIS, etc. While these agencies may be under CIA direction, you don't know and you don't care. The government agencies direct the routings and schedulings, your company provides the technical know-how and you fly the airplane."

Thus an unnamed American pilot describes "civilian flying" in Southeast Asia for Air America and the lesser known Continental Air Services — both private companies on contract to the U.S. government. The pilot's comments are part of a confidential, 16-page brochure available at certain Air Force personnel offices. It is shown to Air Force pilots interested in flying for one of the companies upon completing their military service.

The brochure lists no author or publisher, but it offers an illuminating view into the internal operations of Air America, which has played a crucial role in the Indochina war theater since the 1950s. Air America, along with the other companies, has airlifted troops, refugees, CIA agents, American politicians, war material, food and occasionally prisoners all over Southeast Asia.

Extravagant Salaries

The brochure, dated June 29, 1972, boasts that Air America ranked as one of the most profitable corporation in the United States in 1969, a year when most of the world's airlines lost heavily. Air America's customer is the U.S. government.

It employs about 436 pilots, according to the pamphlet, of which 384 are working in Southeast Asia. The center of Air America's operation is Laos, where the presence of military or military-related personnel is prohibited by the much-abused Geneva Conference of 1962.

Air America's profits are high despite the somewhat extravagant salaries it pays for flying personnel. According to the report, a pilot with 11 years experience flying a UH-34D helicopter based at Udorn air base in Thailand an average of 100 hours monthly, will take home $51,525. All salaries are tax free.

A newly hired pilot flying a C-7 Caribou transport based in Vientiane, averaging 100 hours flying time monthly, would earn a minimum $29,442. The U.S. commercial pilot average is $24,000.

Also available to Air America personnel, in addition to a liberal expense account, is life and medical insurance, two-weeks leave, tickets on other airlines at 20 percent normal cost, PX and government mailing privileges and educational allowances for dependents. Many Air America pilots are retired military men receiving military pensions.

'Good' Investment

Americans can also become "air freight specialists", commonly called kickers. Their job is to push cargo out over drop zones. Salary is $1,600-$1,800 per month. Qualifications: American citizenship, air borne training, experience with the U.S. Air Force preferred.

Air America, Inc., is owned by a private aviation investment concern called the Pacific Corp. Dunn and Bradstreet's investment directory places its assets in the $10-$50 million category, and rates it "good" as an investment risk. Air America itself employs altogether about 8,000 persons, ranking in size just below National Airlines and above most of the smaller U.S. domestic airlines.

Formerly called Civil Air Transport (CAT), Air America was organized after World War II by General Claire Chennault, commander of the American fighter squadrons in Burma and China known as the Flying Tigers. CAT played a major role in post-war China supplying Nationalist troops. CAT also supplied the French during their phase of the war in Indochina.

Air America is commonly considered an arm of the CIA. In Laos, the CIA for the past 10 years or more has maintained an army of hill tribemen, mainly Thai and Lao mercenaries. Most of the air supply and transport needs for this army have been handled by Air America.

Military Assistance

Though the brochure does not mention opium explicitly, it hints at the subject of contraband:

"Although flights mainly serve U.S. official personnel movement and native officials and civilians, you sometimes engage in the movement of friendly troops, or of enemy captives; or in the transport of cargo much more potent than rice and beans! There's a war going on. Use your imagination!"

Air America works hand-in-hand with the U.S. Air Force. At Udorn air base in Thailand, Air Force mechanics repair the airline's transports and helicopters, many of them unmarked. The Air Force has reportedly leased giant C130 transports when the planes were needed for operations in Laos. In the section on Air America's benefits, the brochure lists in addition to normal home and sick leave: "Military leave will be granted appropriately" — an apparent acknowledgement that there are military people working directly with Air America.

One should not conclude, however, that the salaries, excitement and tax advantages mean that Air America pilots hope the war will continue. As the brochure's author notes in a typed postscript:

"Foreign aid situation unclear pending outcome military situation in RVN (Republic of Vietnam), but it looks as if we'll finish the war (and peace terms favorable for our side); if so, it is expected that a boom among contract operators will result when implemented, due to inevitable rehabilitation and reconstruction aid in wartorn areas. . . . Job market highly competitive and you'll need all the help you can get."

According to Pacific News Service, the following men sit on the Air America board of directors:

Samuel Randolph Walker — chairman of the board of Wm. C. Walker's Son, New York; director of Equitable Life Assurance Society; member of Federal City Council, Washington, D.C.; member of Action Council for Better Cities, Urban America, Inc., and life trustee, Columbia University.

William A. Reed — chairman of the board of Simpson Timber Co.; chairman of the [illegible] Co.; director of Crown Simpson Timber Co.; director of Seattle First National Bank; director of General Insurance Co.; director of Boeing Co.; director of Pacific Car Foundry Co.; director of Northern Pacific Railroad; director of Stanford Research Institute.

Arthur Berry Richardson — foreign service officer in Russia, China and England from 1914 to 1936; chairman of the board of Cheeseborough Ponds, Inc. from 1955 to 1961; director of United Hospital Fund, New York; trustee of Lenox Hill Hospital.

James Barr Ames — law partner in Ropes & Gray, Boston; director of Air Asia Co., Ltd., director of International Student Association; member, Cambridge Civic Association and trustee of Mt. Auburn Hospital.

[redacted]

STATINTL

NEW YORK TIMES
12 DEC 1972

STATINTL

ENEMY HITS HARD AT LAOS POSITIONS

Start of Drive on Key Base Near Plain Is Indicated

By MALCOLM W. BROWNE
Special to The New York Times

VIENTIANE, Laos, Dec. 11—Communist forces mounted heavy attacks on Laotian Government positions near the forward base supporting operations on the Plaine des Jarres over the weekend in what may be the start of a new drive to overrun the base.

The attacks, which were believed to have overrun two Government positions, increased pressure on Long Tieng, the Government's forward base in the mountains southwest of the Plaine des Jarres.



The New York Times/Dec. 12, 1972

Heavy Communist attacks were reported near Long Tieng (1). Laotians were driving eastward in the Dong Hene area (2).

The plain itself is occupied by strong North Vietnamese forces, and Long Tieng serves as a base for air operations and Government guerrilla attacks against the plain. The base, which lies in a rugged valley, is the headquarters of Gen. Vang Pao and the irregular Meo troops he commands.

Laotian forces in the area are supplied, advised and in some cases commanded by officials of the United States Central Intelligence Agency.

Two of the positions believed [illegible] shelling and ground attacks Friday and Saturday were close to the southern tip of the plain. A third position attacked and believed overrun was only five miles east southeast of Long Tieng, military informants here said. Contact with the Government unit there was lost and many of the defenders are believed to be missing.

Long a Focus of Fighting

In another action near the plain, Communist commandos reportedly attempted to set off explosive charges against defenses at the eastern end of the Long Tieng valley, but were repulsed.

The Long Tieng base, which is supplied by air, is surrounded by mountains in which strong Communist forces frequently operate. Military officials here say the Communists could probably take the base any time they choose, provided they were willing to pay a high cost in casualties.

But a military source said today that the situation there was not regarded as "any worse than usual" and that the several thousand military dependents living at Long Tieng were apparently not seeking to leave.

The Plaine des Jarres, a plateau surrounded by mountains, has been fought over for more than a decade by Communist, neutralist and rightist forces, changing hand frequently.

In official disatches it is frequently referred to as "strategic," but there are increasing doubts among military observers here as to its real strategic value.

"Obviously we would like to get it back if only because the refugees who left there when the Communists took over would like to go home," an American officer said. "It is important to the Meo tribesmen whose home is there. But in terms of deciding the war in Laos the plain has long been overrated."

In recent months General Vang Pao and his Meo troops have made several attempts to regain a toehold on the plain, but have been driven off each time.

Drive in South Continues

In southern Laos, Government forces were reported today to be continuing their [illegible] recently recaptured market town of Dong Hene past Muong Phalane and toward the Ho Chi Minh Trail network bordering South Vietnam.

The Vientiane troops were said to have recaptured a large cache of Communist mortar and rocket shells in a clash seven miles southeast of Muong Phalane. Street fighting was reported continuing in Muong Phalane against North Vietnamese bunkers.

Elsewhere in southern Laos, 10 clashes or shelling attacks were reported around Saravane, which has changed hands a number of times during the last month. Government troops have a precarious hold on the abandoned and shattered town, but Communist pressure remains intense, and a North Vietnamese counterthrust is expected.

PHILADELPHIA, PA.
BULLETIN

E - 634,371
S - 701,743

DEC 10 1972

Lao Irregulars Get More Aid Than Regulars

By JOHN EVERINGHAM
Special to The Bulletin

Phou Dum, Laos — The twin antennae of a small U.S. communications transmitter sticks up from a lonely mountain top 10 miles northwest of the village of Luang Prabang in northern Laos.

According to a Thai civilian employed by Air America (under contract to the CIA) to maintain the installation, it provides the U.S. military with communications between northern Laos and the U.S. air base at Udorn, Thailand.

Pro-Communist Pathet Lao forces control everything north and west of the mountain, beginning just a few hundred meters from the transmitter.

Not 'Irregular'

The 400 Lao Teung (mountain Lao) "irregulars" at the installation are among the 30,000 mountain villagers who form the backbone of the CIA's no longer secret army in Laos, an army that is virtually independent of Laotian control.

Officials refer to them as "irregulars," but they are fulltime, highly trained troops. The Special Guerilla Units (SGU) are given credit for the Vientiane government's not having lost control of the whole country. Communist forces occupy three-fourths of Laos.

How did these mountain soldiers wind up in an American army?

"Money," I was told over and over again on a recent overnight visit to the mountain. (Chances of a journalist being given a lift aboard the American helicopter that serves the mountain are about nil. The hike through the mountains took 10 hours.)

They Want Out

They said they were really fighting more than to escape the SGU and the war, return to their villages and families, and grow rice.

The deterrent to escape was the Royal Lao Army — 26 years in the Royal Lao Army. Military service is compulsory for all males of 15, though if a 13-year-old is big enough to hold a gun he will be drafted. And once a soldier, the only way out is bribery or serving until you're 40. Twenty-six years in the Royal Lao Army is risky at the very best odds.

Army recruiting teams reach even remote villages, getting in by helicopter where trucks won't go.

It isn't hard to see why those who had the chance opted for being an "American soldier" instead. "American Army" pay begins at 12,500 kip per month ($15); Lao army at 4,500 per month ($5).

Food too, I was assured, was far better and more plentiful, chiefly because the Americans deliver it themselves. Even big jars of local firewater whisky are occasionally given out.

In battle, SGU troops have access to superior weapons and a more reliable flow of ammunition than their brothers in the Lao army. Air support comes faster and their wounded are evacuated more swiftly, said Lieutenant Ohn See, the company commander.

More Respect

The Lao Teung speak of the "American bosses" with more respect than do the Meo SGUs with whom they share these highlands.

Before CIA militarization of the two mountain tribes, the Meo had a firmly established social-political structure which the CIA brushed aside. But the Lao Teung were disorganized and scattered, and the CIA had no need to interfere with their traditional leadership.

The Lao Teung's economic position has always been well below that of the Meo. Their crops were less carefully tended and their livestock fewer.

Now CIA militarization has [illegible] the Lao Teung. But the once prosperous Meo have been decimated by the CIA's military programs.

The tens of thousands of unwilling and unknowing tribesmen helicoptered up to the Plain of Jars each dry season since 1968 have been cut to pieces by communist guns and shelling.

Barely 10 percent of the Meos survive in their traditional mountain-top homes. As their villages fell behind Communist lines, they were bombed by the Americans.

Dispatch News Service International

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STATINTL

BALTIMORE SUN
10 DEC 1972

U.S. aid is still pouring into Laos

By ARNOLD R. ISAACS
Sun Staff Correspondent

Vientiane, Laos—The United States role in the Indochina war may have diminished—but not in Laos.

No longer top secret but still partly concealed from public view, the American war effort in support of the Lao government remains as large as ever. Without it, U.S. and Lao officials agree, the war against the Pathet Lao and its North Vietnamese allies would collapse not in months but possibly in days.

"They might last a couple of weeks without us," said an American officer with long experience in Laos. He grinned, but he wasn't joking. A Lao colonel, asked how long it would take with continued outside aid for the Lao Army to be able to defend itself, said seriously: "Eight or 10 years".

In support of the government's war effort, the U.S. is providing direct miliary aid of $350 million a year. This is about 10 times the whole Lao national budget, and almost twice the country's gross national product.

The aid totals do not include the cost of American bombing, which is mounted from outside Laos. Although the present extent of bombing in Laos is not known, fighter-bombers and B-52's have at times in the past reached sortie rates over Laos exceeding the highest ever reached over North Vietnam.

U.S. aid to Laos began in the 1950's. During the confused warfare preceding the Geneva Conference of 1962, the Americans supplied nearly half a billion dollars for militar, salaries and equipment, administering the military assistance through a mission misleadingly called the Programs Evaluation Office and manned by military officers in civilian clothes under the guise of "technicians"—an operation that foreshadowed later clandestine efforts.

When the Geneva Accords banned foreign military aid, the Americans conscientiously withdrew 666 military advisers. Only 40 of the 10,000 North Vietnamese believed to be in Laos withdrew under International Control Commission supervision, though others may have faded across the border. The war quickly resumed, and so did American support.

In 1964-1965, when the Americans launched full-scale air war in Indochina and the North Vietnamese increased their commitment of men and arms to the battles in South Vietnam, the Laos war took on a pattern that has remained essentially unchanged ever since.

The U.S., seeking to impede the flow of Communist troops and supplies down the Ho Chi Minh trail complex in eastern Laos, stepped up its support of Lao government troops in return for diplomatic silence on U.S. bombing of the trail. The North Vietnamese in turn increased their aid to the Lao Communist forces in northern Laos, committing thousands of their own men to keep Lao government troops pinned down safely away from the approaches to the trail and North Vietnam's border.

In the ensuing years, both Washington and Hanoi attempted to hide the degree of their involvement in Laos. The North Vietnamese have never acknowledged the presence of their troops in the country—now estimated to number about 20,000. The Americans, though feeling their aid was justified by North Vietnam's violation of the Geneva agreement, apparently felt it would be embarrassing to intervene openly while Hanoi continued to deny its role.

Though an effort as large as the U.S. war in Laos could not really be kept hidden, official secrecy was maintained for a long time. It was not until March, 1970, that President Nixon publicly acknowledgd American aircraft were bombing Laos, though the facts had been known long before.

Few details

Though the bombing is now officially admitted, few details are made available. The number of missions each day, for example, is not disclosed, nor are weekly, monthly or even yearly totals. Presumably this is not for security reasons, since the Americans have for years released fairly precise information on the number of air attacks each day in North and South Vietnam.

It is known, though, that the bombing has been very heavy. In 1969-1970, a period in which most bombing of North Vietnam was suspeneded, the sortie rate over Laos was reported to have been 400 a day—a higher rate than has ever been reached over North Vietnam.

In the ground war, American Embassy officials, military attaches and Central Intelligence Agency personnel are deeply involved in war planning. The U.S. Embassy spokesman in Vientiane, gives a military briefing for correspondents at 11.30 every morning.

The briefings are quite detailed except on U.S. operations. Though the spokesman will often refer to air strikes, for example, he will not say whose planes were flying them.

All supplies

On the ground, the U.S. furnishes all the weapons, ammunition and supplies for the 56,000-man Royal Lao Army—which, despite the U.S. aid, still is regarded as poorly trained, badly led and largely ineffective except for defensive garrison duty.

The main American effort has been with the irregular units, originally organized, trained, paid and in many cases directed by the CIA. The irregular forces have grown to about 30,000 men, and many of them are only very loosely controlled by the Lao military command—a fact which is now giving some concern to the government and to U.S. officials looking ahead to a possible cease-fire.

The origins of the irregular forces are still shrouded in secrecy, but the information available suggests that the Americans did not intend, in the beginning, to create what has become a parallel army. The first units apparently were formed by the CIA to wage guerrilla warfare against the Ho Chi Minh trail—an activity that might have embarrassed the Lao government, which has always regarded the war in Eastern Laos as the affair of the Americans and North Vietnamese.

An American official said, the irregular units "just grew"—partly because many Americans felt the Royal Lao Army was simply too inept to be made into a capable fighting force.

"Has evolved"

"The situation has evolved," said an American officer, speaking of the formation of the irregular units, "and I'm not sure our policy has evolved along with it as it should have."

Along with the irregular units, the U.S. pays and equips battalions of "volunteers" from Thailand. Almost everything about the Thai units is classified, because both the Lao and Thai governments are sensitive on the subject. There are said to be about 12,000 Thai troops in the country now, almost double the number present a year ago.

Working with the Lao forces, according to the U.S. Embassy, are 320 U.S. advisers, which does not seem a large number but actually represents a far higher ratio of American advisers to local troops than has existed for years in South Vietnam.

It is not known how many Americans working for "the annex"—local slang for the CIA—are directly involved with military or paramilitary units.

Between 300 and 400 Americans provide logistical support for Lao forces, mostly through Air America, the CIA-financed charter airline that flies troops and supplies throughout the country. Air America's helicopters and transport planes, some of them with the company's insignia but most unmarked, can be seen at virtually every airstrip in Laos.

NATION

4 DEC 1972

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War & Heroin—an Expensive Habit

THE POLITICS OF HEROIN IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. *By Alfred W. McCoy, with Cathleen B. Read and Leonard P. Adams II. Harper & Row. 464 pp. $10.95.*

BRUCE M. RUSSETT
Mr. Russett teaches political science at Yale University.

Most Americans used to think that the costs of an interventionist foreign policy were low. For relatively small expenditures of foreign aid money, arms, or occasionally the presence of American troops, one could build bastions of the Free World all around the globe. Anti-Communist governments in the underdeveloped countries could be supported or created, and anti-Communist politicians subsidized. Indeed, as in the Shan states of Burma or the Indonesian islands, separatist forces could be encouraged—if the ruling government could not be overthrown, or at least persuaded to move in desired directions. Some of these efforts might also bring enlightened governments and policies to the countries in question. Others would succeed at the cost of strengthening or imposing corrupt, oligarchic, reactionary governments. Many others would fail, at the cost of death and misery for the peoples who lived in those distant countries. But the costs to the United States would be minimal, easily tolerated by the world's richest power. And those small costs to us seemed far preferable to living in a world of Communist or neutralist-nationalist states.

Our innocence about the costs of an interventionist foreign policy has been lost in the wake of Indochina. Even if we could (as many still would) ignore the costs of our war to the wretched peoples of that area, we now have felt some substantial costs to ourselves. Fifty-six thousand young Americans dead, $200 billion spent, an economy and foreign trade balance badly out of kilter, intense strains on our domestic, social and political system—these we now recognize as part of the price we pay. In this new book Alfred McCoy and his associates show us another cost, very possibly the grimmest of all, resulting from our addiction to interventionism: the heroin plague.

Drug addiction has of course been a curse of men for many centuries, and the United States has had thousands of heroin addicts since about sixty years ago. Neither the CIA nor Dean Rusk nor Henry Kissinger invented heroin addiction. But every designer, executor, or enthusiast for an interventionist foreign policy (and that includes me and probably you in our less-enlightened days) contributed by failing to know or to care much about the more subtle consequences of that policy.

As McCoy points out, there were around 20,000 addicts in the United States in 1946; the best estimates are that the figures then grew to about 57,000 in 1965, 315,000 in 1969, and 560,000 in 1971. The avalanche of addiction was made possible by an evil combination of supply and demand. Demand means the ability of American drug consumers to pay high prices, social conditions feeding the desire for an escape, and the enthusiasm of pushers prepared to distribute free samples generously. Under such circumstances the market will grow as fast as supply will permit. The supply comes from abroad: formerly from Turkey and Iran, now largely from Southeast Asia—60 to 70 per cent of the world's illicit opium from the "Golden Triangle" of Burma, Laos and Thailand. It is grown by peasants, shipped to the United States and distributed by Corsican and Mafia underworld gangs, and moved from the peasants to the gangs with the assistance of such friendly Freedom Fighters as Gen. Phoumi Nosavan of Laos, and Ngo Dinh Diem and Air Marshal Nguyen Cao Ky of South Vietnam. After enormous and carefully documented exposition McCoy finds that the United States:

> . . . has acquired enormous power in the region. And it has used this power to create new nations where none existed, handpick prime ministers, topple governments, and crush revolutions. But U.S. officials in Southeast Asia have always tended to consider the opium traffic a quaint local custom and have generally turned a blind eye to official involvement. . . . However, American involvement has gone far beyond coincidental complicity; embassies have covered up involvement by client governments, CIA contract airlines have carried opium, and individual CIA agents have winked at the opium traffic.

This important book should not be interpreted as a piece of yellow journalism or as an exposé of scandals in the CIA. It details none of the classic sort of corruption for personal enrichment on the part of CIA men or of any other U.S. Government officials (though there is plenty on the part of the locals). The corruption is of a more subtle sort, stemming from the enthusiasm of "good" men for doing a good job. The job was defined as halting communism; the choice of means or of allies was not so important. One worked with the tools available. If this meant Corsican gangs in Marseilles, the Mafia in Sicily, or opium runners and their accomplices in Southeast Asia, that was just the way it had to be. In any case, it usually seemed to be the citizens of the countries far away, not Americans, who paid the price of such alliances. Until 1970, for instance, opium grown in the Golden Triangle stayed almost entirely in Southeast Asia for Southeast Asians. Only in that spring did the great flood of heroin to GIs in Vietnam begin, and only later still did it start to flow directly to the United States. And it was not until that time that senior officials in the U.S. Government decided that the Southeast Asian heroin trade should be suppressed.

McCoy and his colleagues show us, convincingly, that the heroin trade grew with the acquiescence and sometimes with the assistance of men in our government. Without our government's history of single-minded anti-communism, and of meddling in the politics of foreign lands, our government and our people would now have a heroin problem of much smaller proportions: Official American complicity in the drug trade has to stop. No matter how much some cold-warrior leaders may like the foreign policy of a particular foreign government, if that government is condoning heroin traffic, American military and economic aid should be withdrawn. The

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continued

STATINTL

FEDERATION OF AMERICAN SCIENTISTS NEWSLETTER
Dec 1972

THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY: TIME FOR REVIEW?

The intelligence community, and its budget, pose many problems of traditional concern to the Federation of American Scientists: governmental reform, morality, proper use of high technology, and defense expenditures. In the last quarter century, intelligence agencies have proliferated. The United States has established an agency which goes beyond intelligence collection and, periodically, interferes in the internal affairs of other nations. Technology suited to the invasion of national and personal privacy has been developed apace. And the $4 to $6 billion being spent for intelligence might well be termed the largest "unreviewed" part of the defense budget.

Twenty-five years after the passage of the National Security Act of 1947, it seems a good time to consider the problems posed by these developments.

Of least concern in terms of its budget but of over-riding significance in its international political impact, is the Directorate of Plans of CIA, within which clandestine political operations are mounted. This is the issue discussed in this newsletter. More and more, informed observers question whether clandestine political operations ought to be continued on a "business as usual" basis. In the absence of an investigation, a secret bureaucracy—which started in the Office of Strategic Services during a hot war and which grew in the CIA during a cold war—may simply continue to practice a questionable trade.

Clandestine "dirty tricks" have their costs not only abroad but at home, where they are encouraged only too easily. And is not interference in the affairs of other nations wrong?

Two decades ago, as the cold war gained momentum, one of America's greatest political scientists, Harold D. Lasswell, wrote a comprehensive and prophetic book, "National Security and Individual Freedom." He warned of the "insidious menace" that a continuing crisis might "undermine and eventually destroy free institutions." We would see, he predicted: pressure for defense expenditures, expansion and centralization of Government, withholding of information, general suspicion, an undermining of press and public opinion, a weakening of political parties, a decline of the Congress, and of the courts.

Today, with the Cold War waning, it seems in order to reexamine our institutions, goals and standards. Which responses to the emergency of yesterday can we justify today? □

The National Security Act of 1947 created the Central Intelligence Agency and gave it overall responsibility for coordinating the intelligence activities of the several relevant government departments and agencies interested in such matters. Today, a quarter century later, CIA is reported to have a budget of about $700-million to $1-billion and a staff of perhaps 18,000 people, or about 8,000 more than the Department of State! (This advantage in size gives CIA an edge in interdepartmental meetings for which, for example, others may be too rushed to fully prepare or not be able to assign a suitable person.)

The National Security Act authorized CIA to:

"perform for the *benefit of the existing intelligence agencies* such additional services of common concern as the National Security Council determines can be more effectively accomplished centrally;

"perform such other functions and duties *related to intelligence* affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct." (italics added)

These clauses clearly authorize clandestine intelligence collection but they are also used to justify clandestine political operations. However, overthrowing governments, secret wars, assassination, and fixing elections are certainly not done "for the benefit of the existing intelligence agencies" nor are they duties "related to intelligence." Someday a court may rule that political activities are not authorized.

In any case, at the urging of Allen Dulles, the National Security Council issued a secret directive (NSC 10/2) in 1948, authorizing such special operations of all kinds—provided they were secret and small enough to be plausibly deniable by the Government.

Even this authority has been exceeded since several impossible-to-deny operations have been undertaken: the U-2 flight, the Bay of Pigs invasion, the Iranian Coup, the Laotian War, and so on.

The National Security Act gave the CIA no "police subpoena, law enforcement powers, or internal security functions . . ." But another secret Executive Branch document evidently did give the CIA authority to engage in domestic operations related to its job. It was under this authority that such organizations as foundations, educational organizations, and private voluntary groups were involved with the CIA at the time of the National Student Association revelations (1966).

The "white" part of CIA is, in a sense, a cover for the "black" side. CIA supporters and officials invariably emphasize the intelligence, rather than the manipulation function of CIA, ignoring the latter or using phrases that gloss over it quietly. The public can easily accept the desirability of *knowing* as much as possible. But its instincts oppose doing abroad what it would not tolerate at home. And it rightly fears that injustices committed abroad may begin to be tolerated at home: how many elections can be fixed abroad before we begin to try it here? The last election showed such a degeneration of traditional American standards.

The present Director of Central Intelligence, Richard Helms, is working hard and effectively at presenting an image of CIA that will not offend. In a recent speech, he said:

> "The same objectivity which makes us useful to our government and our country leaves us uncomfortably aware of our ambiguous place in it. . . . We propose to adapt intelligence to American society, not vice versa."

Even construed narrowly, this is no easy job, and adapting clandestine political operations to American ideals may well be quite impossible.

At the time of the Bay of Pigs, President Kennedy gave serious consideration to breaking CIA into two pieces: one piece would conduct operations and the other would just collect intelligence. The dangers were only too evident

GUARDIAN

29 NOV 1972

Laos: New facts on secret war

By Richard E. Ward

Second of a series

Clandestine sabotage, combat and espionage missions have been conducted in Laos and Cambodia by U.S. military personnel, despite White House denials and contrary to congressional prohibition.

Such missions are top-secret actions directed by the Studies and Observations Group of the U.S. Army Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, located in Saigon and generally known by its initials, MAC-V SOG. The most comprehensive picture of these activities available, based on testimony of former participants in these missions, known as Command and Control operations, is contained in a series of three articles by Gerald Meyer, published in the Nov. 5, 10 and 12 issues of the St. Louis Post Dispatch.

Unless otherwise indicated all material in this article is based on the articles by Meyer, a regular staff member of the Post Dispatch, who interviewed former Special Forces members, helicopter pilots and others who took part in the Command and Control operations during the 1960s and into 1972.

The Post Dispatch's informants, whose names were not revealed to protect them from possible prosecution, stated that the clandestine commando raids were still in progress as of August. One informant said that in August when he left Bien Hoa, one of the Command and Control bases, more than 100 Army Special Forces were stationed there and reinforcements were being sent from Okinawa.

The commando raids in recent years, utilizing Army personnel who generally command teams composed of mercenaries from Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam, were also sent into North Vietnam and liberated areas of South Vietnam. There is evidence that the Air Force has operational jurisdiction over a similar program based at Nakon Phanon, Thailand, just across the Laotian bord

Commando raids were ordered by Washington against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in the early 1960's, as documented in the Pentagon Papers, but which provided few details. The present program, apparently undergoing a partial "Vietnamization," is an outgrowth of the original escalation of CIA-Special Forces missions in Indochina ordered by the Kennedy administration.

Although the Post Dispatch does not mention the CIA, it is clear that Studies and Observations Group is a CIA operation. The informant most knowledgeable about SOG, a Special Forces officer, was described by correspondent Meyer as fearful of being jailed or fined, saying: "If I talked to you and got caught, I could get 10 years in prison and a $10,000 fine."

The Special Forces officer said that the connections between Command and Control and the 'MAC-V SOG' organization in Saigon were so highly classified that we would not risk commenting on them," wrote Meyer.

Despite his reluctance to talk the officer explained that the Command and Control operations were "formally" under the direction of the Fifth Special Forces Group until January 1971, when the Fifth Special Forces officially was described as having been withdrawn from Vietnam. Actually, according to Meyer, "numerous Fifth Special Forces were left behind at Command and Control bases throughout South Vietnam" and various efforts were employed to conceal their continued presence. They were forbidden to wear the green beret and Special Forces insignia while they remained in Indochina.

Symbolic of the Command and Control operations, was a gestapo-like insignia, used by one of the units, a green-bereted skull with blood dripping from its teeth. This was the emblem of Command and Control Central. There were at least two other main units, Command and Control North and Command and Control South. The North, Central and South referred to the base areas of the commando teams.

Apparently most of the operations under the Command and Control program, at least in recent years, took place in southern Laos. However, after the U.S.-Saigon invasion of Cambodia and subsequent Congressional prohibition against use of U.S. ground troops in Cambodia, it is safe to assume that the secret U.S. missions were increased in the latter country.

Airborne bandits

Typically, Command and Control missions comprised several U.S. officers or NCO's commanding a mercenary team which would land in Laos or Cambodia, and "aimed at taking prisoners, gathering information and disrupting communist activities." The commandos would be transported in four helicopters, while four helicopter gunships would provide air cover, at least initially. Two other aircraft, one serving as a command post and a second as the forward air controller, were also involved in missions.

One Special Forces veteran, who participated in Command and Control raids from Danang, said he had taken part in missions in North Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. "He said they were for the purpose of gathering intelligence, rescuing other American missions threatened by North Vietnamese forces, destroying supplies and disrupting enemy communications facilities."

Command and Control Central, operating out of Dakto and Kontum, near the tri-border area of South Vietnam and Laos and Cambodia, was used for raids deep within the two latter countries.

"A Special Forces soldier formerly assigned to Command and Control Central said that the group's missions were handled by about 150 Americans and from 300 to 400 Montagnard tribesmen. Men participating in missions first were transported to Dakto and then sent by helicopter across the borders, he said.

"The missions were rotated among the men and casualties were severe, the man said. . . . Such teams usually included two or three American leaders and about half a dozen Montagnards.

"Dakto was the starting point also for large 'hatchet forces,' with larger numbers of Americans and Montagnards. . . .

"Less frequently—apparently only about once every six months—very large groups of Americans were sent across the borders on so-called Slam (Search, locate and annihilate) missions. More than 100 men sometimes participated in such missions. . . .

"Some penetrations into Laos apparently were quite deep. Both the Special Forces (two of Meyer's informants) said the U.S. operated a radio relay station on a mountain top about 30 miles inside Laos.

"This station, called the 'Eagle's Nest,' was used to transmit messages between South Vietnam and Command and Control teams operating beyond the mountain top in the Laotian countryside."

The radio station, whose exact location was not specified, could have been located near the Bolovens plateau, in Southern Laos, where the Pathet Lao told this correspondent in 1970 there was a secret U.S. base. The Pathet Lao liberation forces captured

[redacted]

THE AMERICAN MERCURY
WINTER 1972

Is the Government a Partner in Red China's 'Death Trade'?

For some mysterious reason, the Nixon Administration is lying to the people about imports of opium and heroin from Red China

BY KENNETH JOHNS

HOW MUCH of President Nixon's re-election was engineered by "blood money" from the Red Chinese narcotics "death trade?" This is the question that many observers are asking as they speculate about the sources of the large sums of money contributed to Nixon's campaign committee whose donors were not publicly identified.

The informed guess is that these sums were payoffs from those who control the traffic in opium. Several Washington correspondents pointed out that the "missing item" not discussed by President Nixon and Chinese Communist leaders during the meetings earlier this year was the question of stopping the deadly shipments of heroin and its source material, opium, from the China mainland.

The rapidly growing number of dope addicts is considered by experts to be the number one danger to this country's health and internal security.

Extremely suspicious also is the repetition of statements about stopping the flow of opium from Turkey. This country grows only a small part of total world production, about 400 tons, compared to 1,000 tons in Southeast Asia and an estimated 10,000 tons in Red China.

A substantial part of world production ends up in the United States to supply its estimated 600,000 heroin addicts. Yet, the Nixon Administration and its spokesmen constantly play down or deny the existence of large imports, especially from China.

Noteworthy also is the fact that while official pronouncements are made deploring the "evil" from President Nixon down, the Nixon Administration has assigned *only ten agents to all of Asia* to intercept shipments. As one expert put it, "If he's [Nixon] really interested in stopping the flow he would see that the CIA, FBI and other agencies assign 500 to Hong Kong, 500 to Bangkok and 500 to Saigon. These are the major trans-shipment points to the U.S. This would make a dent in the supplies reaching the U.S."

See No Evil, Hear No Evil . . .

Preposterous as it may sound, the Administration's *official policy is that no heroin or opium comes from Red China.* Why this outright lie in the face of what all experts and foreign government officials know is not so?

Red China's involvement in the opium traffic has been known to informed people, both in and out of government, for years. One of the first government experts to point out the existence of the "death trade" was Harry J. Anslinger, director of the Bureau of Narcotics from 1949 to 1962. In 1955 he told the Senate Judiciary Committee

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THE ELIZABETH, N. J. DAILY JOURNAL
27 Nov 1972

N.J. Ex-Green Beret Admits Killing Triple Spy

(Former Green Beret Capt. Robert F. Marasco and seven other Special Forces members were involved in one of the major controversies of the Vietnam War in 1969 when accused of murdering a triple agent. Now a civilian in Bloomfield, he spent many hours being interviewed by Daily Journal reporter Thomas Michalski, recalling events surrounding the assassination that he says never were made public).

By THOMAS MICHALSKI
Journal Staff Writer

Former Green Beret Capt. Robert F. Marasco said he and other Special Forces personnel were involved in clandestine cross-border intelligence operations in Cambodia as far back as 1968.

That fact is actually irrelevant, however, in that small units of U.S. military and the Central Intelligence Agency have been operating "unwritten about" sorties into both Cambodia and Laos for several years previous to 1968.

But Marasco and seven other Green Berets were accused by the Army with the June 1969 "elimination" of Thai Khac Chuyen, a triple agent who jointly served the U.S. North Vietnam and South Vietnam governments as a spy. This came directly as a result of "out-of-country" operations.

Chuyen, Marasco told The Daily Journal was not "properly checked out" by American intelligence officials

First of 3 articles

before his assignment as a principal agent for the Fifth Special Forces Group in Cambodia and Laos during 1968-69.

The case blossomed into an emotion-laden controversy that touched Congress, the secretaries of the Army and Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency and President Nixon himself.

Marasco was charged with pumping two bullets into Chuyen's head before his body was dumped into the shark-infested South China Sea. It was an act which Marasco has since freely admitted.

The case, however, was dropped after a public outcry and CIA refusal to provide witnesses for a proposed Army court martial of the seven.

That announcement came in September 1969 from then-Secretary of the Army Stanley R. Resor and, according to White House Press Secretary Ronald L. Ziegler, the decision was "approved" by President Nixon.

Marasco, said he "no longer feels constrained from making disclosures which will clear the facts and show that all of us involved acted with honor and in the best interests of our country."

With the war in Southeast Asia now apparently coming to an end, Marasco disclosed in detail several incidents leading up to Chuyen's assassination.

He spoke of the highly secret "Project Gamma," how and why the Berets were charged with murder and conspiracy, the reasons why they were eventually set free, and of an incredible escape plan.

To begin this story one must understand Marasco himself. Now 30, a mod dresser, and a partner in his father's Bloomfield insurance agency, Marasco is quiet, intelligent, cool and calculating.

"I am not and never was a killer," he says. "What I did in Vietnam was a job . . . for the best interests of my country."

Marasco's first wife was a college professor, "a staunch anti-war, but not necessarily anti-Vietnam war type. She was a pacifist. And a leader of the anti-war movement at her university at the time. To be married to a Green Beret, it just didn't go together.

"Of course," he said, "just having been in the service alone didn't go. Being a Green Beret compounded it and then, of course, the 'incident' compounded it more."

After his graduation from Bloomfield High School, Marasco went on to Fairleigh-Dickinson University where, in 1962, he earned a business administration degree.

Marasco went into the insurance field to get background in underwriting, claims adjusting and sales.

"I ultimately wanted to work for my father," he said, "But I wanted to be able to offer something to his agency, not just being the boss' son."

In 1966 Marasco, at 24, received his Army draft notice.

"I went to the recruiter and had him convince me why it would be worth my while to enlist and give him an extra year," he explained. "We came to an agreement that I would go into the counter-intelligence corps as an enlisted man."

Marasco admits today that he enlisted "because I wanted to stay out of the infantry."

He went to Fort Dix in March 1966 where he was called "Pappy" because of his age. "I was older than my drill sergeant," he recalled.

The next stop was Fort Holabird in Baltimore for counter-intelligence training. Marasco then volunteered for Officer's Candidate School and went to Fort Benning, Ga.

"After six months at OCS I didn't want to go back to intelligence," he said. "I felt the Army was taking the best officer candidates and putting them in the soft branches like intelligence, transportation and the quartermaster corps.

"The best men were going to all other fields, and it seemed like they were putting the worst officers in the infantry," he said. "This should not have been because the infantry is the most important branch in the Army."

Despite his feelings voiced only moments earlier about serving in the infantry, Marasco said at this point, "I thought I could be a good infantry officer . . . I just wanted to stay in the infantry . . . they (the Army) wouldn't let me because of my central intelligence training."

In April 1967 Marasco was commissioned a second lieutenant and went back to Fort Holabird for additional training. He then was assigned to an intelligence unit in Washington.

"I met the assignments captain there," Marasco recalled. "I prevailed upon him to send me to Vietnam because that was the only way you could get out of any unit at the time."

Before going to Southeast Asia, Marasco went to parachute school and other schools required by the Special Forces.

"My assignment was to Fifth Special Forces Group (Green Berets) in South Vietnam," Marasco said. "But I was diverted to the 101st Airborne Division where I stayed for six or seven months."

PARIS, LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR
27 Nov - 3 Dec 1972

[redacted]

HEROINE : LES POURVOYEURS

Michel R. Lamberti et Catherine Lamour ont fait le tour du monde pour remonter toutes les filières qui mènent aux vrais patrons de la drogue

« *Si nous ne venons pas à bout de ce fléau, c'est lui qui viendra à bout de nous* », s'exclamait, le 17 juin 1971, le président Nixon devant des dizaines de millions de téléspectateurs. Les Etats-Unis ont, en effet, le triste privilège de compter le plus grand nombre d'héroïnomanes du monde : plus d'un demi-million actuellement, dont trois cent mille pour la seule ville de New York. Plus de 50 % des crimes perpétrés dans les grandes villes sont directement liés à la drogue : on tue pour se procurer l'argent nécessaire à l'achat d'une dose d'héroïne.

Le phénomène n'est pas seulement américain : tous les pays européens voient croître à une vitesse vertigineuse le nombre de leurs héroïnomanes. En France, où la pénétration de la drogue n'a été sensible qu'à partir de 1968, on en compte déjà vingt mille. Et le ministère de la Santé estime que le pays pourrait compter cent mille héroïnomanes en 1976.

Couper la source

La drogue n'est plus un simple problème de police. Partant du principe évident, exposé dernièrement à un journaliste américain de « U.S. News and World Report » par l'ancien directeur des Douanes américaines, Myles J. Ambrose, et selon lequel « *on ne peut pas devenir toxicomane si l'on ne trouve pas de stupéfiants* », Washington a décidé de remonter à la source, c'est-à-dire à la production même de l'opium, dont l'héroïne est un dérivé.

Couper la source d'approvisionnement des trafiquants, c'est intervenir dans les affaires des pays producteurs : de policière, la lutte contre la toxicomanie est devenue politique. Se posant une fois de plus en « gendarmes du monde » mais, cette fois, pour une cause dont personne ne songe à discuter le bien-fondé, les Etats-Unis se sont lancés dans une croisade que d'aucuns jugent d'avance vouée à l'échec.

On produit, en effet, chaque année, dans le monde, assez d'opium pour approvisionner les cinq cent mille héroïnomanes américains pendant cinquante ans : deux à trois mille tonnes, dont la moitié seulement est destinée à l'industrie pharmaceutique. Le reste passe sur le marché entre les mains des trafiquants qui approvisionnent les fumeurs d'opium et les héroïnomanes.

Les trafiquants peuvent se fournir à deux sources différentes :

● 1) Les pays dans lesquels la culture du pavot est légale et contrôlée par l'Etat, mais où une partie de la récolte échappe aux autorités administratives.

● 2) Les pays dans lesquels la culture du pavot est en principe interdite, mais qui n'ont pas les moyens matériels et politiques — ou le désir — de faire respecter cette loi.

La Turquie, troisième producteur mondial, entrait dans la première catégorie. Jusqu'à ce que le gouvernement d'Ankara décide de proscrire la culture du pavot sur tout le territoire turc à partir de 1972, 25 % de la production d'opium était détournée vers le marché clandestin, alors qu'elle aurait dû, en principe, être entièrement achetée par l'Etat. Ce pays n'est pas le seul à connaître pareil problème, une enquête effectuée par le service stratégique des renseignements du Bureau des Narcotiques américain (B.N.D.D.) donnait, pour 1971, les chiffres suivants :

	Production (1) écoulée sur le marché licite	Production écoulée sur le marché clandestin
Turquie	150	35 à 50
Inde	1 200	250
Pakistan	6	175-200
Iran	150	?
U.R.S.S.	115	?
République populaire de Chine	100	?
Yougoslavie	0,83	1,7
Japon	5	—
Triangle d'or (Thaïlande - Birmanie - Laos)		750
Afghanistan		100-150
Mexique		5-15

(1) En tonnes.

Contrairement à ce que l'on pourrait penser, les « fuites » ne sont pas proportionnelles à l'importance de la production licite ni à celle des superficies cultivées en pavot. Elles dépendent du plus o moins grand sous-développement administratif du pays concerné et de la capacit des autorités locales à exercer un contrôl effectif sur les paysans, au moment de récoltes.

Pourtant, même des contrôles rigou reux ne suffisent pas à éviter les détou nements, compte tenu de la différence de prix pratiqués sur le marché officiel et su le marché clandestin. L'exemple de l'Inc le prouve, où, en dépit d'un système d contrôle gouvernemental cité en exemp par toutes les instances internationales, l fuites s'élèvent à 18 % de la productio totale. La Yougoslavie laisserait échapp près de 70 % de sa production. Le Paki tan, enfin, qui produit légalement six to nes d'opium, contribuerait pour près d deux cents tonnes à l'approvisionnemer des trafiquants.

Le pavot partout

Dans une deuxième catégorie de pay la production de l'opium est illégale. n'existe évidemment aucun organism d'Etat chargé de contrôler une productio qui, en principe, n'existe pas. Clandestin la récolte d'opium est entièrement écoul sur le marché parallèle. Selon le B.N.D.D ces pays contribueraient pour huit cent ci quante à mille tonnes à l'approvisionn ment du trafic.

D'autres régions, sur lesquelles on possède absolument aucune informatio produisent de l'opium en quantité appr ciable : le Népal et, probablement, la Sy et le Kurdistan irakien. On signale au l'apparition de champs de pavots en Am rique du Sud. Contrairement à ce que l' a souvent affirmé, la culture du pavot requiert pas de conditions géographiqu ou climatiques exceptionnelles. Elle réclar seulement une main-d'œuvre abondante bon marché car la récolte demande bea coup de soins et de minutie.

Nombre de pays qui ne sont pas d producteurs traditionnels d'opium pou raient, s'ils le voulaient, se mettre à culti du pavot. C'est le cas tout récent du pon. La production d'opium a, de ce f tendance à croître en fonction de la d mande et pourrait encore augmenter con dérablement. Des indices nombreux m

NEW YORK TIMES
26 NOV 1972

STATINTL

Enemy Military Leaders, to Show 'Respect,' Bow to a King at a Fair in Laos

By MALCOLM W. BROWNE
Special to the New York Times

VIENTAINE, Laos, Nov. 25 — There were ferris wheels and Charlie Chaplin movies and horse races and canacn dancers and a one-legged American stunt pilot to entertain both royalty and revolutionaries at the That Luang Fair.

The annual fair, which ended today, is a two-week festival just outside Vientiane, in which this little country's citizens gather to reaffirm their faith in Buddhism and fealty to the King.

It is also an occasion for spectacular displays of the kind of fraternizing between enemies that has led some outsiders over the years to conclude that the war in Laos is not to be taken seriously.

It was taken for granted this year that the Communist-led Pathet Lao delegation currently in Vientiane would join enemy military leaders of the Vientiane Government in prostrating themselves before King Savang Vatthana, and the public was not disappointed.

Asked why the Pathet Lao had participated in the annual profession of loyalty to the King, their spokesman, Set Petrasy, replied:

"We participate in religious festivals because of our wish to show respect for the customs and religion of our country."

Nine nations contributed small pavilions to the fair this year, mainly to show photographs of life in those countries.

The French pavillion offered a juggling act and dancing the Soviet pavillion showed movies of World War II on an outdoor screen and the South Vietnamese displayed lacquerware, nuoc fish sauce and other products.

But as King Savang Vatthana and the royal entourage, accompanied by the Premier, Prince Souvanna Phouma, made the rounds of the pavilions, the first stop was at the relatively elaborate American pavilion.

Inside, there were movies of astronauts, recorded music and a model of Niagara Falls. The King paused politely before each exhibit as it was explained by Ambassador G. McMurtie Godley. The diplomatic corps that followed the King into the pavilion did not include the Russians or Chinese; they waited outside.

As the King emerged, the Americans treated him to a show that captured the attention of most of the tens of thousands of people on the fair grounds.

Roaring out of the sultry low overcast was a tiny white biplane that pulled up just over the King in a spectacular display of aerobatics.

The King, the crown prince and the Premier seemed to be enjoying the show, but for some of the spectators, the show was not without embarrassment.

Word was spread that the pilot of the plane was James H. Rhyne, a pilot of Air America, the quasi-military airline operated by the Central Intelligence Agency.

WASHINGTON STAR
16 NOV 1972

B52 Raids Called 'A Signal to Hanoi'

By EDITH M. LEDERER
Associated Press

SAIGON — U.S. B52 bombers continued their heaviest raids of the war over North Vietnam yesterday.

The North Vietnamese Foreign Ministry issued another statement condemning the bombing attacks, and American military sources indicated the raids were a signal to Hanoi that the United States will not stop its bombing below the 20th Parallel until a peace agreement is reached. The peace talks have gone into recess until Dec. 4.

U.S. officials disclosed that a second B52 was damaged in a surface-to-air missile attack last week that claimed the first B52 combat loss of the Vietnam war. None of the six crewmen on the damaged plane was injured but two of the six crewmen on the downed aircraft were hurt.

U.S. officials in Vientiane, Laos, also disclosed that an Air America C7 Caribou cargo plane flying in support of Laotian irregular forces, was shot down by enemy antiaircraft fire Thursday, killing two Americans, a Thai and a Lao. Air America is backed by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.

10th Lost in 5 Days

The Air America plane was the 10th American aircraft lost in Indochina in five days, one of the heaviest tolls in several months. Six Americans were killed, 11 rescued and three are missing in the crashes.

As reports circulate in Paris of serious differences between U.S. and Hanoi negotiators, the North Vietnamese Foreign Ministry said the B52 attacks "laid bare the deceitfulness of the Nixon administration's professed desire to end its military involvement and restore peace."

In South Vietnam, tens of thousands of marchers demonstrated along a 50-mile stretch of Highway 4 in an anti-Communist protest to show that the government is in control of the main road through the Mekong Delta.

The marchers carried flags and banners demanding that North Vietnamese troops get out of South Vietnam and declaring that "coalition with the Communists is suicide."

During the 24-hour period ending at noon yesterday, the U.S. command reported 14 more B52 missions against North Vietnamese targets below the 20th Parallel. Sources said that brought to more than 200 the number of missions against the North in the last five days, the heaviest B52 raids of the war in the North.

The U.S. command said the attacks were centered on supply caches awaiting shipment to Laos and South Vietnam. But the North Vietnamese claim the Stratofortresses are bombing populated areas and causing heavy civilian casualties and damage.

President Nixon halted bombing above the 20th Parallel Oct. 23 in a move administration officials described as a good-will gesture following announcement of the draft cease-fire agreement.

Less than three weeks later, air strikes were intensified below the 20th Parallel to counter what American officials described as an intensive North Vietnamese supply buildup.

Heavy Ground Fighting

Since monsoon rains have sharply curtailed strikes by smaller fighter-bombers, the B52s have undertaken the burden of the bombing mission in North Vietnam's southern panhandle.

On the ground, heavy fighting continued in the central highlands 15 to 20 miles southwest of Pleiku City. Shellings were reported at Dalat in the highlands and at Cu Chi base camp 18 miles northwest of Saigon. No casualties were reported.

The Air Force credited the pilot of the downed B52 with saving top-secret electronics equipment from falling into North Vietnamese hands.

The Air Force praised Capt. Norbert J. Ostrozny, 30, of Lackawanna, N.Y., for guiding the crippled bomber from North Vietnam into friendly territory before it crashed.

U.S. officials said a SAM missile exploded 150 feet off the right wing of Ostrozny's aircraft near the North Vietnamese port of Vinh. Fragments of the Soviet-built missile set two outboard engines afire. They fell off and the two inboard engines then failed, dooming the big aircraft.

BLITZ (India)
25 Nov 1972

CIA & drug traffic in South-East Asia

By BOMAN H. MEHTA

FORTY YEARS AGO, the students in Berlin shrieked: "We spit on freedom". That attitude of mind of the German nation enabled Adolf Hitler to bamboozle the electorate and seize power.

In 1972, another facet of the diseased human mind led Mrs. Patricia Nixon and her hen-witted daughter, Julie Eisenhower, to proclaim in defence of Richard Nixon's Vietnam policy that they were willing to immolate themselves on behalf of the Saigon stooge, Thieu.

THAT EXPLAINS TO A CERTAIN EXTENT WHY THE AMERICAN ELECTORATE BROUGHT ABOUT A LANDSLIDE VICTORY FOR RICHARD NIXON, THE MOST CONTEMPTIBLE, THE MOST UNLOVED FIGURE IN AMERICAN POLITICS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY.

BLACK RECORD

Richard Nixon's re-election as President of the US proves complete erosion of moral values in American society. What has been the record of this man as President of the US in the last four years?

Notwithstanding the pantomime mimicry of Dr. Kissinger's secret negotiations with Hanoi, Nixon has intensified the Vietnam War. He has devastated North and South Vietnam with fifteen million tons of bombs and a million Asians dead. And one is inclined to agree with I.F.Stone, the celebrated American columnist, that the Vietnam War may go on until 1976.

Richard Nixon has lowered the respect for the United States Supreme Court by appointing non-entities ready to carry out their master's will.

He has bullied the national press into subservience and with his secret electoral funds of £45 million, provided by the military-industrial complex, bought television to portray him every night as a man of peace hijacking his way to Peking and Moscow.

He has employed electronic devices to spy on his political opponents. The list can go on.

Two tons of opium and morphine were seized aboard a junk in Hong Kong harbour. This was the second biggest seizure. The two-million-dollar worth of contraband narcotics is part of the CIA-masterminded drug traffic to South-East Asian countries to lull them into submission to the American will.

One would have thought that this repulsive record was enough for any decent man to renounce Nixon in disgust. However, the American ballot box turned out to be another idiot box. And the most affluent society in the world showed itself as the most sick society. Consequently one must say farewell not only to the American Dream but to freedom at large.

SICK SOCIETY

To advance my thesis I must turn to The New York Review of Books of 21 September, 1972, the sea-mail copy which has just arrived in Bombay. Before doing so I may be permitted a pertinent aside.

In the midst of all this, the "White Russians" of Indian society are up in arms as their originals were trying to attack and dislodge Lenin. The Indira Government is subjected to the most vicious attacks from the deshi "White Russians." They seem to forget that drought is not an Indian phenomenon only. It prevails in the Soviet Union and in Maoist China as well as in India. It has compelled Russia and China to buy American wheat worth billions of dollars in hard cash.

Drought is not the only Indian calamity. Corruption at all levels in our society has brought about a state of affairs which can only end in chaos. We are a corrupt and degraded lot. There is no doubt about it. But who is there in our country today to replace Indira Gandhi?

The alternative to her seems to be chaos and not revolution. For revolution we require character and integrity. Alas, we cannot boast of these characteristics and we witness the dismal spectacle of politicians who blatantly defend the CIA activities in our country.

POLITICS OF HEROIN

It is in this connection I give below a summary of the account which has appeared in The New York Review of Books of 21 September 1972. A book entitled The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia by Alfred W. McCoy was to be published by the well-known publishers, Harper & Row.

On June 1, 1972, Cord Meyer, a CIA official, visited the New York office of Harper & Row and requested the management to provide him with a copy of the galley-proofs of McCoy's forthcoming book.

THE REASON WAS THAT IN THIS BOOK MR. McCOY WAS SHOWING THE COMPLICITY OF THE CIA AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT IN ORGANISING SOUTHEAST ASIAN DRUG TRAFFIC SINCE 1950.

At this very time the author, Alfred McCoy, was testifying before the Senate Appropriations Committee his findings into the Southeast Asian drug traffic. McCoy's researches included during 18 months of study more than 250 interviews with heroin dealers, police officials and intelligence agents in Europe and Asia.

It was Cord Meyer's contention that Mr. McCoy's book would be full of inaccuracies. It would embarrass the United States government and perhaps involve the publishers in libel suits. (As a CIA official, Cord Meyer had been in the past in charge of providing financial subsidies to organisations such as the National Students' Association, Encounter magazine, and the Congress for Cultural Freedom.)

CIA CENSORSHIP

The publishers got in touch with the author and informed him that they had decided to let the CIA examine the galley-proofs. The reasons given by the publishers were two:

continued

BEST COPY

Available

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600120001-5

[illegible] Shore [illegible]

By John Schmadeke
Dover Bureau Chief

These hadn't been easy weeks, Durell recalled. You were tested for leadership and ingenuity in dozens of grueling ways.

There were no rules of fair play at The Farm. Every dirty trick in the book was [illegible] on you. You trusted no one—not your fellow candidates, who would cajole you into friendship, nor the instructors, who could use a friendly attitude to suddenly [illegible] up and slide a knife [illegible] your throat.

This description of The Farm is from a spy thriller by Edward S. Aarons—"Assignment: Madeleine." The protagonist is one Sam Durell, the best spy in the super-secret K Section of the Central Intelligence Agency.

The Farm, according to Aarons' long series of books on Durell, is located somewhere on the Eastern Shore of Maryland. It's a place where the CIA trains its best agents.

"A thin rain was falling, [illegible] the Chesapeake, [illegible] beyond the village of [illegible] John (fictitious) in Maryland, into a dimpled [illegible] of sullen gray steel.

"[illegible] had driven over from Washington for breakfast [illegible] Padgett, with a [illegible] weekend ahead [illegible] here, just the [illegible] of them," Aarons writes in "Assignment: Budapest."

THE Farm is also supposed to be a place where over-[illegible] K Section agents go for [illegible] and recuperation.

But does it really exist?

In 1962, the Soviet government released Francis Gary Powers, the American U-2 [illegible] pilot, from prison. It [illegible] that the CIA had [illegible] in Talbot County [illegible].

Considering that it took [illegible] for the American public [illegible] that the CIA was [illegible] it would seem unlikely that The Farm would be listed in Maryland tourist guidebooks.

BUT if it exists, it's a 68.24 acre piece of land nestled along the Choptank River about 15 miles southwest of Easton.

It's on a spit of land known as Benoni Point. A red brick mansion, a pier and a few outbuildings can be seen from the air. Nothing but a mailbox with no name on it and a "no trespassing" sign can be seen from the road.

The land lies along a dirt road which has no name and is not included on official Maryland highway maps. It forks to the right off the road leading to the Bellevue-Oxford Ferry.

From the air, one can see small boats pulled up along the tree-lined shore. There are trees all around the place; nothing but trees all around the place; nothing but trees can be seen from ground level.

If Aarons is to be believed and if K Section ("an agency so secret that even the government doesn't know about it") has a hand in the place, curious reporters aren't likely to get the red-carpet welcome.

FIRST things first, however. If one is on a mission looking for a secret hideaway, one must be careful how one handles oneself.

"I'm looking for a list of all federal land in Talbot County," one begins by saying to the clerk in the county courthouse.

"We don't have too much," she says pulling open a drawer stuffed with tax maps.

She talks about a Navy laboratory and a historic monument of some sort.

Then, just as the reporters are about to leave, the clerk remembers something. In true spy novel fashion, she finds a dusty map at the bottom of the drawer.

"The government owns some land here, but they won't let you in," she says. One [illegible] the eye of the other [illegible] nals a "that sounds like what we're looking for" with a quick wink.

After a few more minutes of laying out a route, the newsmen are off.

DRIVING down the unmarked road, one sees farmers (agents in disguise?) working in fields. There are signs everywhere in the area that say "No Trespassing. Survivors will be prosecuted"

Using the highly trained reasoning powers a reporter must have, one figures out that the place with no name on the mailbox and the simple "no trespassing" sign must be the government land.

The lane into the place also has that well policed appearance characteristic of military-type land.

Next-door-neighbor George Lewis Jr. (another agent? one wonders) is pleasant when asked about the place.

"I've been over there," he says, noting that he knows the "caretaker."

"They've got some big dogs over there," his wife says pointedly.

BELIEVING the old saw about discretion being the better part of valor, one decides it might be safer to get a look from the air.

"You government men?" the pilot asks.

We finally confess that we're reporters. He says everyone in the area assumes the place is a CIA rest camp.

Perhaps a phone call to the CIA might answer some questions.

"351-1100," the receptionist answers in a conspiratorial voice. Even though the number is listed under the Central Intelligence Agency in the Washington, D.C., phone book, no one every mentions the name.

ONE feels that in the best interests of national security, one should refrain from mentioning the name also.

"I'm calling about some land in Maryland you, er, your agency, I guess, owns."

At first they say they don't know anything about the land but promise to check. A while later, a call from a "spokesman" comes back.

It turns out the CIA does own the land. "It's used for management seminars it's training, but on the management side, the "spokesman" says.

"It's not a spooky place at all," he says reassuringly. "It's not used for guerrilla warfare."

Then how about a look at the place?

The CIA has a standing policy of no tours through any of its establishments, the spokesman says cordially.

[redacted]

continued

NATIONAL GUARDIAN
15 NOV 1970

[redacted]

Cambodia, Laos — a different problem

By Richard E. Ward

First of a series

Will a truce in Vietnam bring an end to the fighting in Laos and Cambodia as well?

And if there is a truce throughout Indochina within the near future, will that bring genuine peace to any of the three countries?

These are crucial questions of the day in Indochina. But as long as the U.S. refuses to conclude a peace agreement for Vietnam, where the escalation of the U.S. airwar has reached an all-time high, the prospects for truces in either Laos or Cambodia will remain very slender. The U.S. is continuing its aggressive military operations against these two countries and it is still using them as bases for U.S. operations against Vietnam.

Peace in Laos or Cambodia, as in Vietnam, depends in the first instance on whether the U.S. is willing to cease its military intervention and aggression. A lasting peace will also hinge on whether the U.S. will cease its overt and clandestine efforts to maintain its puppets and mercenaries in these countries.

For Laos and Cambodia, equally victims of unprovoked U.S. aggression, the question of a peace settlement must be resolved separately in accordance with the sovereign rights of the two countries, their respective military and political situations and the programs of the patriotic and liberation forces, now in control of about four-fifths of their national territories.

The present Laos peace talks began Oct. 17 between representatives of the U.S.-supported Vientiane regime and a joint delegation of the Lao Patriotic Front—Pathet Lao and the Patriotic Neutralist forces. The discussions are proceeding on the basis of the five-point political solution for Laos proposed by the Pathet Lao in March 1970 (which will be outlined in detail below).

These talks represent the latest effort by the Pathet Lao to resolve the struggle in Laos by political means, a goal which the U.S. has consistently sabotaged since the 1954 Geneva agreements on Indochina. Since that period the U.S. has taken increasing control of the Vientiane government, financed mercenary and foreign forces in Laos and subjected the country to increasingly savage air attacks—all in an effort to crush the revolutionary movement and resistance forces and to prevent their integration in a free and democratic political system.

Growth of Pathet Lao

Despite the massive U.S. military operations, the Pathet Lao has grown from a relatively small force controlling two provinces in 1954 to the present when, together with the Patriotic Neutralist forces, it has liberated no less than four-fifths of the country. Because of U.S. bombings of the liberated zone, however, a large portion of its population has been forced to flee to the Vientiane zone, where these persons are maintained in "refugee" camps which for all practical purposes are camps of detainment.

In the early 1960s the deterioration of the pro-U.S. forces was proceeding so rapidly that the U.S. had to agree to a settlement in which the Laotian parties established a tripartite government. This settlement was followed by an international conference on Laos, an agreement signed in Geneva in 1962, to which the U.S. was a signatory, guaranteeing Laotian neutrality and prohibiting foreign military intervention.

But while the U.S. at Geneva was agreeing to respect Laotian neutrality and to cease all military intervention, clandestine CIA programs were underway in Laos attempting to sabotage the

It was at this period that the U.S. established a mercenary army, headed by Gen. Vang Pao, a former soldier in the French colonial forces. Vang Pao's army operated virtually independently of the Vientiane regime and in reality was directly under the supervision of the CIA, which financed the entire force, numbering approximately 30,000 at its peak.

At the same time, the U.S. also literally bought out neutralist elements of the Vientiane government including its head, Prince Souvanna Phouma, who sanctioned the clandestine U.S. operations. Some prominent Patriotic Neutralists who resisted the lure of huge U.S. bribes, including Foreign Minister Quinin Pholsena, were assassinated by CIA hirelings. Realizing their turn was next, the Pathet Lao and Patriotic Neutralists then moved into the liberated zone, already under attack by the U.S.-financed military forces, including those of the Royal government.

In April 1964 there was an extreme rightist coup in Vientian which brought the government under full control of a group squabbling reactionary cliques, united primarily by their depe dence upon U.S. support. Souvanna Phouma remained as head this regime, thus publicly indicating his abandonment of neutralis that he had previously abdicated behind the scenes.

The succeeding years witnessed intense fighting, as the U.S. tri to encroach on the liberated zone and actually succeeded establishing secret bases at a number of isolated points within t liberated areas. By early 1970, despite the greatly intensified U. bombing of Laos following the 1968 bombing halt in the Democrat Republic of Vietnam, the tide had definitely turned and the Path Lao defeated the largest offensive mounted by the pro-U.S. force whose depleted ranks were already being filled by Thai me cenaries. During the following year, the Lao liberation forces fac their greatest test and routed the U.S.-supported invasion by Saig troops.

U.S. recourse to Saigon troops and increasing numbers of Th mercenaries, the latter under CIA control, signified the U.S. w reaching the end of the road in Laos, but it has been unwilling cease its genocidal air war or its support of mercenary elements a refused to allow the Vientiane regime to participate in meaningf discussions with the Pathet Lao.

The liberation forces, having no choice but to continue t resistance war in Laos, set siege to Long Cheng, the main CIA ba and headquarters of Gen. Vang Pao, in December 1971. Both t CIA and Vang Pao, whose forces have been reduced to ine fectuality, have been retreating since.

The CIA headquarters is in its second location since retreati from Long Cheng. It is now located at Vang Vieng, about midw between Vientiane and Luang Prabang, the administrative a royal capitals. Route 13 between the two cities is already partially Pathet Lao hands. And according to the latest report, Pathet La rocket shells were fired into the Luang Prabang airport on Nov. 1 damaging at least five military planes.

At the same time, Thakhet, further south along route 13, cam under attack by liberation forces. Thakhet is just across t Mekong river from the secret U.S. air base in Nakhon Phano Thailand, one of the most important U.S. installations for guidi U.S. bombers in Indochina.

Route 13 which goes from Luang Prabang, Vang Vieng, Vie through the [illegible] of southern Laos near the Th border is considered the "heartland" of the area under the contr

PHILADELPHIA, PA.
INQUIRER
M - 463,505
S - 867,810
NOV 19 1972

[redacted]

Civilian Advisory Corps Recruited in Saigon To Replace GIs Who Are Being Pulled Out

By JAMES McCARTNEY
From Our Washington Bureau

SAIGON. — An ad in the English-language Saigon Post Saturday read:

"NHA Inc. has an immediate requirement for 200 additional aircraft technicians . . . due to contract expansion; and skills are needed NOW."

At the bottom were the words: "U. S. citizens only."

The ad was one of the first open indications here of plans for an American civilian advisory corps to remain in South Vietnam after a ceasefire.

NHA INC. — one of the larger American contractors here — is seeking maintenance men for South Vietnamese aircraft, both fighter planes and helicopters.

The ad represented only a portion of the advisory corps' iceberg.

The United States is developing plans in many fields for advisers to maintain sophisticated equipment, run computers, supervise economic assistance — and a good deal more.

The force could easily surpass 10,000 — and that figure could be an underestimate.

"YOU CAN BET that the Joint Chiefs of Staff can do more for South Vietnam than just help out technically. They'll want 10,000 snake-eaters in here for sure," one source said.

A "snake-eater" in Saigon military jargon is a member of the Green Berets, Army specialists in secret warfare.

The draft peace agreement negotiated by Henry Kissinger and the North Vietnamese in Paris calls for withdrawal of all U. S. military forces from Vietnam within 60 days, but says nothing about civilian advisers.

It does say that the United States will not "intervene in the internal affairs of South Vietnam."

AS NEARLY as can be discerned from various sources here, all of whom would prefer to talk of the advisory corps in whispers, the civilians would fall into at least three major categories:

—U. S. CONTRACT personnel, working for companies that sign up to do specific jobs, such as NHA's aricraft maintenance work.

—ADVISERS to the Saigon government in each of South Vietnam's 44 provinces, from the Mekong Delta to the demilitarized zone.

—MEN TO KEEP an eye on the hundreds of millions of dollars worth of economics assistance that is expected to pour in here to help rebuild South Vietnam.

What all this adds up to is perhaps 5,000 to 6,000 contract people; 500 to 1,000 advisers, most of them outside Saigon; and a few thousand overseeing the spending of huge sums in American money.

COVERT MILITARY operations — perhaps in the pattern of Laos, where the CIA has been running the Laotian war for years — would be another possibility.

No one is willing to talk about that, and decisions may not yet have been made in Washington on a covert ballgame. Such decisions may be held back until U. S. officials determine whether Hanoi violates a ceasefire.

In Laos, plainclothes CIA military advisers have been attached to the U. S. Embassy in Vientiane as military attaches.

One big civilian contractor in Vietnam is Air America — a CIA-controlled airline which has played a key role in the Laotian War.

"THE BIGGEST contracts are going to fall in the area of maintenance and logistics," said one official.

"The South Vietnamese are going to need help in keeping our sophisticated equipment going. They do a pretty good job, overall, but there are just some things they can't yet do — at least do well enough."

In logistics, they'll need help primarily in running U.S. computers, to keep track of mauntains of equipment and of military units. And they are used in intelligence work.

GOVERNMENT advisers will be organized along the lines of the present "CORDS," the U. S. "pacification" effort. (The initials stand for "Civil Operations and Rural Development Support.")

A U. S. officer said it will probably operate largely out of USIAD (U. S. Agency for International Development).

AID, headed by former Michigan State University president John A. Hannah, has been used as a cover for covert military operations in Laos — much to Hannah's distress.

CORDS has maintained advisers to South Vietnam's 44 province chiefs and to its 272 districts. If a ceasefire agreement is signed, plans call for continuing U. S. advisers at only the province level. Still, they would travel extensively.

CORDS has about 1,500 advisers in Vietnam. That number will probably be cut.

PRIMARY NEEDS in Vietnam, according to experts, will be in agricultural advice, public health and engineering.

DAILY WORLD
18 NOV 1972

Our readers say--

EDITOR
THE DAILY WORLD
205 WEST 19th ST.
NEW YORK 10011

PREMATURE OBITUARY

Newsweek and Time this week prematurely buried the war in Vietnam as over. The theme was that it is all over except for final details. Of course, that is Nixon's pre-election propaganda line. Whether they fell victim to that propaganda line or consciously joined in the deception is still to be discovered. The main fact at this point is that they did it.

As for Nixon, his strategy is obvious. In addition to all that the Daily World has already written exposing that strategy, there needs to be added that not only is Nixon not winding down the war, he is once again shifting the basis of operations to continue it at a new level.

Not only is he beefing up the Thieu mercenary regime, but U.S. advisers will continue to "guide" Thieu and pull other strings from behind the scenes as the CIA has been doing in Laos for years. Tricky Dick has lost none of his adeptness in deception of the people.

—ROSS MALCOLM, Queens, N.Y.

NEW YORK TIMES
16 NOV 1972

INTENSIVE ATTACK MADE BY U.S. JETS ON SUPPLY ROUTE

300 Fighter-Bomber Strikes and 11 B-52 Raids Focus on Panhandle Region

By JAMES P. STERBA
Special to The New York Times

SAIGON, South Vietnam, Thursday, Nov. 16—The United States command reported yesterday that American bombers had staged one of the heaviest days of raids of the war on the southern panhandle of North Vietnam.

More than 300 tactical strikes by fighter-bombers were reported concentrated Tuesday in an area from about 20 miles south of Thanhhoa down to the demilitarized zone that straddles the border between North Vietnam and South Vietnam. This total, a substantial increase from the 220 reported Monday, was higher than the average number that formerly was flown over all North Vietnam.

Biggest Raids in 3 Weeks

In addition, 11 three-plane missions by B-52 heavy bombers were flown over the panhandle.

The raids, aimed at blocking the North Vietnamese supplies being rushed to Communist troops in South Vietnam before any ceasefire, were the heaviest since President Nixon restricted bombing of the North to the area south of the 20th Parallel on Oct. 23.

Ground fighting, meanwhile, continued to be below average levels, with 45 North Vietnamese shelling attacks and only 20 ground actions reported in the 24 hours ended at dawn yesterday.

Ground Fighting Light

Fighting in the northernmost province of South Vietnam, Quantri, also tapered off, according to Saigon military spokesmen.

A total of about 90 rounds of mortar hit positions held by Suth Vietnamese marines and airbrne rangers about one mile north of Quangtri city. This compares with about 1,000 enemy mortar artillery and rocket shells that fell in the area earlier this week.

Only light ground fighting was reported elsewhere. Military officials said they would have to study the pattern of fighting a few more days before concluding whether it was related to reports from high level American military sources Tuesday that some North Vietnamese units had pulled back away from the fighting.

In a delayed report, the South Vietnamese command said the bodies of 50 people that it described as the "enemy" were discovered in Quantin Province south of Danang. They were killed by an American B-52 raid, the command said.

The UUnited States command said that "preliminary bomb damage assessment reports" on the results of the bombing of North Vietnam on Tuesday indicated two transhipment points, two airfields two fuel dumps, 38 trucks, 11 warehouses, an antiaircraft gun, four supply caches, six supply storage areas, seven boats, 15 bridges, 20 railroad cars, nine artillery guns and a railroad spur were damaged or destroyed.

American pilots, meanwhile, continued raids on Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam. Twenty-two B-52 missions and 217 tactical airstrikes by fighter-bombers were flown over South Vietnam,mostly in Quangtri Province, the command's news release said.

Cambodians Report Road Open

PNOMPENH, Cambodia, Nov. 15 (AP)—The Cambodian high command said today that its troops had recaptured the district capital of Trapeang Kraleng and had reopened a 37-mile stretch of the road connecting Pnompenh with the sea.

The road, Route 4, from Cambodia's sole deep water port of Kompong Som, was cut two weeks ago when the enemy seized Trapeang Kraleng.

The command spokesman, Col. Am Rong, said the 13th Brigade met no resistance today upon entering the town. He said, however, that two to three miles of the road from Trapeang [illegible] were still held by the enemy.

Meo Said to Retreat

VIENTIANE, Laos, Nov. 15 (AP)—A United States military spokesman reported today that Gen. Vang Pao's army of Meo tribesmen, which the American Central Intelligence Agency finances, had been pushed off the southern edge of the Plaine des Jarres. He said North Vietnamese forces shelled a force of several battalions for six hours Monday night and then made a ground attack Tuesday. The Meos retreated after suffering "moderate" casualties and were trying to regroup to the south, the spokesman said.

Saigon Desertions Reported

Special to The New York Times

PARIS, Nov. 15—The Vietcong delegation to the peace talks here asserted today that there had been substantial desertions from South Vietnamese forces last month, and Vietcong battlefield victories.

A statement issued by the delegation said 1,640 South Vietnamese soldiers, including "hundreds of the Saigon Seventh Division" deserted in the Mekong delta province of Mytho in October. It said this was the result of an organized campaign of 50,000 people who "marched on enemy posts to call on their sons, husbands and brothers to return home."



The New York Times/Nov. 16, 1972

U.S. stepped up bombing of southern panhandle of North Vietnam (1). Fighting waned near Quangtri (2). Cambodians retook [illegible] (3). In Laos, enemy gained on Plaine des Jarres (4).

WASHINGTON POST
16 NOV 1970

Agreement May Be Nearing in Laotian Peace Talks

By Michael Morrow
Dispatch News Service International

Peace negotiations in Laos seem to have reached a higher plateau since the recent talks in Vientiane between Phoumi Vongvachit of the Communist Pathet Lao and Prince Souvanna Phouma, the Laotian prime minister.

Phoumi and Prince Souphanouong, Prince Souvanna's half-brother who is titular leader of the Pathet Lao, served in the first Laotian coalition government in 1957.

Negotiations had shown steady improvement since Souvanna's acceptance earlier this year of a five-point Pathet Lao plan as a basis for negotiations. The talks between Phoumi, the real power in the Pathet Lao, and Souvanna may indicate that the Communists now are willing to compromise on these five points instead of insisting on them as the final settlement.

If substantive discussions should move forward, stumbling blocks still exist. Only the second of Souphanouong's five points poses no problem. This calls for Laos to observe the principles of peaceful coexistence in the 1962 Geneva agreement—principles to which nearly everyone in Laotian politics pays at least lip service.

The other four points are less simple. The first proposes that the United States must totally withdraw from Laos and halt all bombing of Laotian territory. The United States has agreed—in presidential adviser Henry Kissinger's nine-point peace plan—to withdraw its forces when North Vietnam withdraws its troops. That pact is still unsigned. Since the Pathet Lao lists this point first, it may insist that this be a condition for further negotiations.

The third point calls for establishment of a democratic coalition government. Vientiane and the Pathet Lao, however, disagree on what happened to the coalition government established by the Geneva agreement of 1962.

The Pathet Lao claims that it was dissolved by a military putsch in 1964. Souvanna and the United States maintain that the putsch was unsuccessful, and that the government of 1962 remains in power in Vientiane. Pathet Lao cabinet seats, says Souvanna, are still empty for them to reoccupy.

This difference pits the concept of a new, reconstituted coalition government against the idea that the old tripartite (leftist, neutralist, rightist) coalition can be restored. Souvanna's legitimacy is thus called into question—the Pathet Lao no longer refers to him as the prime minister—as well as the rightists' privilege of participation in the coalition.

The Pathet Lao has long regarded the rightists as unacceptable in a new coalition. The rightists are, in general, members of the military and of the rich and powerful Champassak and Sananikone families.

Although the Pathet Lao does not question Souvanna's participation in a new coalition, it probably would not accept him as a neutral leader of a tripartite agreement, since the current government is heavily dominated by rightists.

The fourth Pathet Lao point proposes a provisional coalition government pending elections. The Pathet Lao is likely to oppose participation of the rightists and press for representation for the Patriotic Neutralist Faction, a splinter neutralist group which is considered friendly to the Pathet Lao.

The fifth point calls for pro-American forces — for example, the CIA-backed mercenaries and Thai troops —to withdraw from illegally occupied territory. It also demands that refugees be compensated and returned to their native areas pending unification through consultations.

Redrawing the old Geneva cease-fire lines will be easy, but deciding who is to control what territory and what population will be a knotty problem. The Pathet Lao, with North Vietnamese help, has taken considerable territory, and U.S. bombing has forced large numbers of refugees into camps that are under Vientiane's control.

The speed with which negotiations in Laos are begun in earnest will be influenced by military developments there and by agreements reached between Washington and Hanoi.

Laos is still a sovereign state—but barely so.

NEW YORK TIMES
14 NOV 1972

51 Rockets Hit Laotian Capital's Airport

By MALCOLM W. BROWNE
Special to The New York Times

VIENTIANE, Laos, Nov. 13 — Communist forces fired 51 large rockets into the airport of the royal Laotian capital of Luang Prabang today, damaging at least five military planes.

The rocket attack was the first directed at the airport in nearly a year and reflected the increasing intensity of North Vietnamese pressure in the area.

A military spokesman said Soviet-made 122-mm. rockets damaged two T-28 propeller-driven fighter-bombers of the Laotian air force and three light observation planes. An ammunition dump was reported demolished and a military compound damaged.

Two Laotian soldiers were said to have been wounded.

Attack Before Dawn

The attack occurred before dawn today, which is the 65th birthday of the Laotian King, Savang Vatthana.

Laos is governed from its administrative capital at Vientiane, but the home of the King and the traditional royal capital is Luang Prabang to the north. The two cities are connected by a road that is subject to frequent enemy ambushes.

Political experts felt that an infantry attack on Luang Prabang is unlikely because the Communist-led Pathet Lao nominally accept the King as chief of state. However, Communist forces seem intent on ringing Luang Prabang and eliminating nearby Government strongpoints.

Yesterday, the Government troops were forced to abandon a position eight miles southeast of Luang Prabang in the face of heavy shelling.

Elsewhere, a North Vietnamese force of about 500 men reportedly launched a heavy attack on Thakhek, a Laotian town on the Mekong River bordering Thailand. Just across the river is Nakhon Phanom, a Thai base operated by the United States Air Force as its main surveillance headquarters for activity along the Ho Chi Minh Trail network.

The attack on Thakhek was reported mounted from three sides. An American plane was called in to strafe the attackers.

The North Vietnamese reportedly withdrew from Thakhek after some fighting in the town. Military sources said the enemy attack may have been reconnaissance as a rehearsal for a future large-scale attack.

Town Reported Taken

In another part of southern Laos, Government troops reported having completed the capture of Dong Hene Saturday after nearly a week of fighting. The town, 30 miles east southeast of Savannakhet, had been in Communist hands since last year.

Military sources said that when Government forces entered the village of Bung Kha, one mile from Dong Hene, Saturday, they found the bodies of 42 North Vietnamese soldiers.

Heavy fighting was reported over the weekend in a wide arc in the mountainous region surrounding the Communist-controlled Plaine des Jarres.

Clashes were reported near Khang Khay, east of the plain, in which at least 18 Communist soldiers were reported killed. But south of the plain, Government troops were forced to abandon a position nine miles east of Long Tieng, forward headquarters of a force created and equipped by the American Central Intelligence Agency for operations on the Plaine des Jarres.

AUSTIN, TEX.
STATESMAN

E - 31,388
NOV 1 0 1972



THE 'SECRET' ARMY' — The CIA sponsors a small air force in Laos, waiting at Long Cheng to drop these 250-pound bombs. Beyond are converted T-28 planes flown by Meo pilots against the North Vietnamese in northern Laos. (NEA Photo)

DAILY WORLD
10 NOV 1972

[redacted]

STATINTL

Youth

Fight drugs by creating jobs

By DONNA RISTORUCCI

Use of drugs—marijuana, "soft drugs" and heroin—is rampant in New York City's secondary schools, according to the Fleishmann Commission, a special commission formed to make an overall evaluation of the NYC school system.

The commission's report, recently released, estimates that nearly half of NYC high school students and approximately one-fifth of the junior high school students use drugs of some sort.

Will Riggan, the commission's associate director of research, said the students' use of drugs is generally more than "occasional."

Fifty percent of "inner city" crime in the United States is said to be heroin-connected.

Recent reports have estimated that the number of drug addicts in the nation has reached 600,000, arguing that previous surveys underestimated the extent of drug addiction.

The National Industrial Conference Board of New York said last year that a survey of 222 companies showed 53 percent reported some drug abuse among employees.

Despite claims by President Nixon last month that Federal anti-drug funds increased elevenfold since 1969, that arrests doubled in the same period and that a recent sharp increase in heroin prices on the East Coast suggests that the "supply is drying up," drug usage and addiction have dramatically increased, particularly among youth.

John Finlator, who retired last January as deputy director of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, charged that "we are in worse shape in the war against drug abuse today than on the day the present Administration took office."

Jarvis Tyner, national chairman of the Young Workers Liberation League and candidate for Vice President on the Communist Party ticket, has commented often on the apparent inability (or unwillingness) of the FBI, the CIA, local police departments and the entire Nixon [illegible] to crush organized crime and put a halt to the billion-dollar drug trade, while they seem to have no trouble harassing and arresting thousands of Black, Chicano and Puerto Rican youth for no reason and disrupting and intimidating movement organizations and leaders.

The role of the CIA and the military in the drug smuggling trade, particularly from Thailand, Laos and Burma has been established, as has police cooperation in drug pushing in cities like New York. This must be stopped.

Equally important, however, is the need to get rid of the causes of drug usage among youth.

A basic cause, Tyner has pointed out, particularly among Black youth, is unemployment. The Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs says the majority of young drug addicts are without steady employment.

"Lack of jobs turns large numbers of ghetto youth towards drug addiction," Tyner says. "People's spirit can take but so much without working for long periods of time. Some youth have come out of school and have never had a job. You can understand how drugs seem like a way out."

He added, "We believe this is a conscious policy on the part of the Administration."

Yet, jobs programs and guaranteeing that youth and young ex-addicts are given jobs with meaning and a decent salary, are not a major part of a drug rehabilitation or drug prevention programs.

It was recently revealed in a survey commissioned by the Labor Department that the question of jobs in relation to drug rehabilitation has been largely ignored by the drug treatment programs and employers.

"Employers are actively excluding people with a history of drug problems from the labor force in the belief that these people constitute bad business risks and endanger the productivity of the company," the report said, and added that "drug programs do not see vocation training or job placement as playing an important role in the rehabilitative process."

The program of the YWLL and the election platform of the CP advocate, in addition to establishing a massive drug-abuse education program in the schools, getting to the root of the drug problem. The program calls for a massive construction of decent low-cost housing, medical centers, schools, recreation and cultural centers which would create millions of jobs for youth and at the same time meet their basic social needs. The funds for this would come from ending the Vietnam war, dismantling U.S. military bases all over the world and generally drastically reducing the military budget. Along with education and drug rehabilitation programs, this would greatly contribute to ending drug addiction and the widespread drug usage that is plaguing youth.

NEW YORK DAILY NEWS
7 NOV 1972

IN THE WORLD

He Likes the French

Paris, Nov. 6 (AP)—Prince Souvanna Phouma, the premier of Laos, said today would like to see the French military mission bolstered when peace returns to Indochina and regain the importance given it by the 1954 Geneva agreements on Indochina. Souvanna Phouma discussed the matter with Premier Pierre Messmer. The French mission was authorized under the Geneva agreement on Laos. Its importance gradually diminished as United States military aid and Central Intelligence Agency operations took over more and more of the military functions in Laos.

Messmer

SAN DIEGO, CAL.
UNION

M - 139,739
S - 246,007
NOV 5 1972

Heroin Traffic Examined

THE POLITICS OF HEROIN IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. By Alfred W. McCoy, Harper & Row, $10.95).

Heroin didn't always have a bad name. Around the turn of the century it was hailed as a "miracle drug" and approved by the AMA for general use. In fact, it didn't even have a name until Germany's Bayer chemical combine invented "heroin" as a brand name and put it on the market as a cough medicine.

But this fascinating bit of drug lore is only incidental to the central theme of this devastating book; that because of its commitment to contain communism in Southeast Asia, the U.S. government helped create a generation of junkies.

Southeast Asia's "golden triangle" — where Laos, Thailand and Burma meet — has been an opium-growing area for centuries. But what McCoy and his fellow authors are concerned about is how within the last 20 years the "triangle" has expanded its production until today it accounts for 70 per cent of the world's illicit supply of heroin.

For this the authors hold the United States responsible. They specifically charge that in their clandestine war against the Communists, U.S. agencies, notably the CIA, allied themselves with elements known to be engaged in the drug traffic; ignored and even protected the activities of known drug traffickers, and allowed American military aircraft to be used to transport drugs

The charges are difficult to refute because, in the main, they happen to be true, McCoy has done his homework. Critics may quarrel with some of his facts and dispute many of his judgments, but he convincingly demonstrates, for example, that the G.I. heroin epidemic in South Vietnam could not have happened without the active participation of greedy generals and government officials who owed their jobs to the United States.

U.S. involvement in the drug traffic was, as the authors contend, an "inevitable consequence" of our involvement in Southeast Asia, where opium was a way of life. But it did not become an "American problem" until it touched American lives.

The book is not quite the scholarly work that it pretends to be. It is as much an indictment of the Vietnam war as it is a documentation of the drug traffic. The authors suggest that all will be well if President Nixon is defeated and the United States pulls out of Southeast Asia lock, stock and barrel.

Maybe so. But the sad thing is that the book's chief victims are a handful of dedicated CIA men who went to Southeast Asia to do a job. That job was to fight communism, not reform a society.

—Chicago Daily News

[redacted]

DENVER, COLO.
ROCKY MT. NEWS
M - 192,279
S - 209,887
NOV 5 1972

New book delves into problem

Airline accused of shipping opium

By JIM MORRELL
For Pacific News Service

A doctoral candidate in Chinese History at Harvard University, Jim Morrell has previously written for scholarly journals in the Asian Studies field.

WASHINGTON, D.C. — "It's a damned lie. You can say THAT!" We were asking Arthur Berry Richardson of New York, about reports that his airline, Air America, was one of the biggest opium shippers in the world. "We've discussed them at our board meeting, these scurrilous articles. There's no substance to them."

Last month Harper & Row published Alfred McCoy's long-awaited book, "The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia." The heavily documented book is based on some 240 interviews with CIA agents, Bureau of Narcotics officials, top Laotian military commandos, and opium-growing Meo tribesmen. And it presented striking evidence that Air America has been flying Meo-grown opium out of north- and northeast Laos ever since 1965.

When asked specifically about McCoy's interviews with the Meo opium farmers whose harvest was flown out on Air America, all Arthur Richardson would say was: "Some guy thinks he's clever. Just take my word for it. Goodby!"

Interviews with the publicity-shy directors of Air America tend to be brief but emotional affairs. For years Air America, the CIA's "private" charter airline in Southeast Asia, has indignantly denied any involvement in the Southeast Asian heroin traffic. This year, though, fewer people than ever seem inclined to take their word for it.

MOTTO IS NO IDLE BOAST

Air America's motto is "Anything, Anytime, Anywhere — Professionally" and it is no idle boast. From dusty airstrips in the Meo hill country they have been airlifting the raw opium to laboratories in Long Chieng or Vietiane where it is refined into No. 4 heroin (90 to 99 per cent pure), then smuggled abroad by Corsican gangsters or Laotian diplomats for ultimate disposal in U.S. markets.

The Opium Trail leads from the poppy fields of the Southeast Asian "Fertile Triangle" (of Burma, Thailand, and Laos which now produce over 70 per cent of the world's opium supply) to Saigon, Hong Kong, or Marseilles, and then right to the waiting arms of America's estimated one million heroin users.

In separate interviews, Laotian Gens. Ouane Rattikone and Thao Ma both told McCoy that Air America began flying opium to markets in Long Chieng [illegible] 1965. [illegible] Rattikone was until last year owner of the largest heroin refinery in Southeast Asia. Gen. Thao Ma is former commander of the Laotian Air Force.

After several more interviews in Vientiane, McCoy told us he took a bus out of Luang Prabang, hitched a ride in a government truck and, when the road gave out, started hiking over the mountains. By nightfall he reached a small village, spending a sleepless night under a thin thatched roof.

"There was always the sound of a plane somewhere," he said. "Sometimes it was far away and sometimes it seemed right overhead. And every so often you would hear the sound of its mini-guns going off—600 rounds a minute at who knows what, anything that sets off its infrared detectors, anything that moves or breathes or gives off warmth."

The next morning McCoy and an interpreter walked down from the mist-enveloped mountains into the village of Long Pot, 10 miles west of the Plain of Jars. There, under the shadow of 6,200-foot Mt. Phou Phachau, which dominates the entire district, McCoy had reached the head of the Opium Trail.

TRADITION OF POLITICAL POWER

The village of Long Pot is a Meo community of 47 wooden dirt-floored houses. It is one of 12 Meo and Lao Theung villages that make up Long Pot District. One of the oldest Meo villages in Northeast Laos, it has a tradition of political power and is the home of District Officer Ger Su Yang. According to Ger Su Yang, the village households produce 15 kilos (33 pounds) of opium apiece. They are guaranteed an adequate food supply by Air America rice drops.

In return, officers of the CIA's "clandestine army" (led by the Meo Chieftain Vang Pao) pay them a high price for the opium. The source of Vang Pao's money, of course, is the CIA.

Long Pot is one of the few remainig areas in Northeast Laos where opium history can still be observed: close enough to Long Chieng still to be controlled by Vang Pao but far enough to escape the fighting. The Meo tribesmen's only cash crop is opium, and the CIA's deal with Vang Pao, badly put, comes to this: you send us soldiers and we'll buy your opium.

The 47 households' harvest of 700 kilos of opium will yield 70 kilos of pure morphine base after it has been boiled, processed and pressed into bricks. Then further processed in one of the region's seven heroin labs, the Long Pot harvest will yield 70 kilos of No. 4 heroin. Worth $500 to the villagers of Long Pot, it will bring $225,000 on the streets of New York or San Francisco.

Formerly Long Pot's opium harvest was bought up by merchant caravans, but these [illegible] and 1965. They were replaced by pony cara[illegible] Vang Pao's men. But the 1969, 1970 an[illegible] 1971 opium harvests were flown out in Ai[illegible] America UH-1H "Huey" helicopters.

RENDEZVOUS IS DESCRIBED

District Officer Ger Su Yang described th[illegible] rendezvous with Air America: "Meo officers with three or four stripes (captain or major[illegible] came from Long Chieng to buy our opium[illegible] They came in American helicopters, perhaps[illegible] two or three men at a time. The helicopte[illegible] leaves them here for a few days and they wal[illegible] to villages over there (swinging his arm in [illegible] semi-circle in the direction of Gier Goot, Lon[illegible] Makkhay and Nam Pac), then come back her[illegible] and radio Long Chieng to send another helicop[illegible] ter for them. They take the opium back to Lon[illegible] Chieng." The pilots were always Americans[illegible] and the Meo army traders did the buying.

The head man of Nam Ou, a Lao Theun[illegible] village four miles north of Long Pot, confirme[illegible] the district officer's account. In 1969 and 197[illegible] Meo officers helicoptered into Tan Son village[illegible] hiked to Nam Ou, and purchased the opium[illegible] harvest, then continued on their way to Nan[illegible] Suk and Long Pot.

The harvest of 1971 may well have bee[illegible] Long Pot's last. In return for the rice drops an[illegible] opium purchases, Vang Pao and the CIA kep[illegible] demanding soldiers. USAID (United States Ag[illegible] ency for International Development) built [illegible] school in the village, and "Mr. Pop" (Edga[illegible] Buell, then the CIA's chief operative in Laos[illegible] had high hopes for the place, but in 1970 Van[illegible] Pao demanded that all the young men in th[illegible] village including 15 year-olds join his army[illegible] fighting the Pathet Lao. Ger Su Ynag complie[illegible] and they were flown away by Air America heli[illegible] copters in late 1970.

But reports of heavy casualties came in an[illegible] the village refused to send more. Ger Su Yan[illegible] described what happened next: "The Ameri[illegible] cans in Long Chieng said I must send all the[illegible] rest of our men. But I refused. So they stoppe[illegible] dropping rice to us. The last rice drop was i[illegible] February this year."

ANSWER TO THE VILLAGERS

Fight or starve — this was the CIA's answe[illegible] to the villagers of Long Pot. Air America flew[illegible] the village's young men away to fight and re[illegible] turned their corpses to the village — profes[illegible] sionally wrapped in sanitary plastic bags.

For the CIA the Meos offered a convenien[illegible] instrument for keeping alive their war in Laos[illegible] but for the Meos their alliance with the CIA an[illegible] Air America has only brought disaster. They[illegible] have been decimated and the survivors have[illegible] fled the hills for the refugee camps around[illegible] Long Chieng.

Long Pot's 1972 opium harvest was destroy[illegible] ed when "allied" fighters napalmed the village[illegible] and three nearby Lao Theung villages. And[illegible] Vietnam's National Liberation Front reporte[illegible] that on Jan. 10, 1972, units of the Lao People'[illegible] Liberation Army took Long Pot.

Because of the fighting, in fact, Laos wil[illegible] only account for a fraction of Southeast Asia's[illegible] estimated 1,000-ton 1972 harvest, and Air[illegible] America may be shipping more dead bodies[illegible] than opium this year.

Revelations like these in McCoy's book[illegible] made the CIA so nervous that they contacte[illegible] the publisher and insisted on a prior review, a[illegible] unprecedented move. After considerable arm[illegible] twisting, Harper & Row reluctantly agreed, [illegible] found the CIA's critique of the book unimpr[illegible]sive and went ahead with publication anyway.

Since the CIA is Air America's major co[illegible]tractor, the trail of responsibility leads dir[illegible]ect to the Executive Branch of the U.S. Govern[illegible]ment. It neatly undercuts all the "law an[illegible] order" statements flowing from the Whi[illegible]

STATINTL

[redacted]

QUINCY, MASS.
PATRIOT LEDGER
NOV 4 1972
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NO SECRET WAR

An Associated Press report yesterday from Saigon that the United States is planning to keep a military advisory group of American civilians in South Vietnam after regular military forces are withdrawn is disturbing.

The report quoted military sources as saying that the advisers would be employed by civilian firms under contract either to the Defense or State Departments.

Whether such activities would be covered by a Vietnam peace agreement or excluded from them remains conjectural. There is as yet no signed peace agreement. The U.S. is insisting upon reaching certain mutual understandings concerning the basic accord that is being worked out.

The implication of this report is quite clear — the continuation of American clandestine operations in Vietnam after the uniformed regulars are withdrawn, the kind of operations being conducted in the "secret wars" in Laos and Cambodia.

Nobody in the U.S. government, of course, is going to confirm that CIA or other agents will remain behind to do what they can secretly to prevent Communist takeovers in Indochina. Obviously a number of American civilian officials will stay in Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam in various capacities.

The New York Times reported this week, for example, "In conversations in recent days with Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma of Laos and others, Nixon has stressed that he would seek to continue American economic and other assistance to Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam because he believed it was important to maintain non-Communist governments in Southeast Asia."

It would be all too tempting to use "civilian" aid officials, for example, for covert operations. It would be naive to suggest that the United States have no intelligence agents in Indochina after a peace agreement. But the U.S. should not shift its involvement in Vietnam from an open war to an underground war waged by agents under cover.

DAILY WORLD
4 NOV 1972

[redacted]

Nixon adopts Thieu stand

Daily World Combined Services

The U.S. has assured Saigon puppet President Nguyen Van Thieu it will not sign any agreement allowing South Vietnam's patriotic forces any participation in governing the country, United Press International said yesterday.

The Nixon Administration move was the latest in maneuvers to back out of the agreement reached Oct. 8 with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam), and in effect was the equivalent of Thieu's rejection of a coalition government.

Reports from the Pentagon yesterday stated that the U.S. is rushing hundreds of new warplanes to Thieu's forces, while UPI newsman Walter Logan quoted a high-ranking U.S. Army officer in New York as revealing that U.S. advisers would remain in South Vietnam even if all U.S. troops are withdrawn.

Logan's story follows:

By WALTER LOGAN

NEW YORK, Nov. 3 (UPI) — A cease-fire in Vietnam will not end the American presence there, even if all U.S. troops are withdrawn, a high ranking U.S. Army officer told UPI today.

The officer, himself a veteran of the Vietnamese army training program, said a large group of civilian advisers would remain after the cease-fire to aid the South Vietnamese armed forces but that the advisory group would consist largely of a brain trust of young West Point graduates working as an unofficial joint chiefs of staff.

The officer said the first of these civilian advisers already had arrived in Saigon and were consulting with U.S. officers and South Vietnamese military officials on the future program.

The program would amount to a continuation of the Vietnamization program but with the American civilians advising the South Vietnamese command not only on warfare techniques but on training programs for the South Vietnamese armed forces, the officer said.

The program would, in effect, put the United States back where it started in South Vietnam. In the early days of American involvement in Vietnam in 1960 there was only a handful of military advisers.

The advisory group in South Vietnam would to a large extent resemble the program carried out in the "secret war" in Laos and to a lesser extent in Cambodia, the officer said. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) trained and equipped the army of Maj. Gen. Yang Pao, Meo hill tribesmen who operated out of a once secret base at Long Tieng.

The CIA-financed group in Laos even has its own airline, Air America, and such an arrangement presumably could be used in South Vietnam and Cambodia.

In recent years West Point graduates expert in training programs and still in the U.S. military service, carried out widespread officer training programs in South Vietnam in hopes the South Vietnamese eventually would be able to handle their own training programs on warfare geared to American weapons.

U.S. military advisers also accompanied South Vietnamese Units in the field and worked directly with the troops, a practice that tapered off. Some advisers are still working with the South Vietnamese, the Army officer said.

The officer was mainly concerned with the South Vietnamese Army but said there presumably would be similar programs of advising the South Vietnamese Air Force and Navy. None of the training programs were mentioned in the cease-fire agreement worked out by Presidential adviser Henry A. Kissinger and the North Vietnamese.

DAILY WORLD
4 NOV 1972

Editorials

Betraying peace

The White House has worked out an immediate program for stalling and sabotaging peace in Vietnam; and a long-range program of neo-colonialism in Indochina, to take up where direct U.S. military action leaves off.

Henry Kissinger's promise of peace within days has vanished. Now, White House officials point, vaguely, a month or more hence. Kissinger said that one more meeting with the representatives of Democratic Republic of Vietnam would seal the pact. Now the White House says that any agreement with the DRV would have to be approved by Nguyen Van Thieu, Nixon's puppet.

Under the short-term program, stalling of the treaty signing is being used, even now, for a massive buildup of the U.S. air fleet and of war materiel in South Vietnam, with the ownership papers made out in Thieu's name.

For the longer range, the White House is now programming the "sale" of arms to Laos and Cambodia, and the shipment of "economic" aid to U.S. puppets in Indochina. For the long haul, too, the White House is planning the continued presence of U.S. "advisers" in Indochina — of para-military forces in mufti, of CIA agents, and of assorted mercenaries.

Last week the White House "leaked" the demand that, in violation of the agreement, the DRV should remove some 35,000 of its troops. Now, days later, the number has been escalated to unspecified dimensions.

Violation of the still-unsigned Vietnam treaty is paralleled by violation of U.S. undertakings in other areas. Thus, the White House has decided to continue the use of the island of Culebra, off of Puerto Rico, as a U.S. Navy gunnery range, in direct violation of Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird's pledge to end such use. The press reveals also that, contrary to Nixon's personal pledges, the U.S. is continuing at the Fort Dettrick, Md., infectious diseases laboratories, preparations for biological warfare.

WASHINGTON STAR
9 NOV 1972 STATINTL

U.S. Civilians Likley To Train Viet Forces

By HENRY S. BRADSHER
Star-News Staff Writer

SAIGON — The thin end of a wedge has appeared here which could lead to a continuing U.S. military advisory program for South Vietnam after a cease-fire.

It consists of plans to use American civilians for military training and maintenance as a continuation of the Vietnamization program after U.S. troops leave Vietnam.

According to the peace plan worked out between Washington and Hanoi, but now bogged down in dispute, all U.S. and allied military personnel must leave South Vietnam within 60 days of a cease-fire agreement.

The terms of the plan made public by Hanoi last week say neither the Saigon government nor the Viet Cong will "be allowed to accept the sending of forces, military advisers, personnel, weapons, ammunition and war material into South Vietnam."

Laos Pact Ignored

The full text of the tentative agreement is still secret, but the published summary is not so tight on advisers or other personnel as the 1962 Laos agreement.

The unsuccessful effort to neutralize that neighboring country contained wording which theoretically would prohibit the kind of plans now being made here.

The Laos agreement was quickly ignored. An American "secret war" under Central Intelligence Agency auspices developed against North Vietnamese violations of the agreement. Whether the seeds of a similar development here exist in the plans for civilian training and maintenance of South Vietnamese weaponry might now depend on how well a cease-fire is observed, once agreed upon.

The United States has been rushing military equipment to South Vietnam against the possibility that agreement might come quickly and further weapons be cut off.

Transports Rushed

Equipment being sent includes items such as F5 jet fighter planes to defend the South against Hanoi's Soviet-made MIG21s and Chinese-made MIG19s. This is simply a speedup of an existing program.

But in at least one case a new item has been added to the Vietnamization program.

This is the C130 turboprop transport plane. Some 30 of them are being rushed here even though South Vietnamese pilots and maintenance men are not trained for them.

According to military sources, they will be trained by American civilians on contract to the U.S. government.

Neither the U.S. Military Command nor the embassy here would comment on this report from well-qualified military sources.

A far broader program than C130 training has been signaled by advertisements in Saigon's only English-language newspaper, the Saigon Post.

One Ad for an unidentified employer is seeking "personnel familiar with U.S. Army methods and procedures" with specialities in armaments, communications and electronics, and other fields. "Positions to be filled no later than 1 January 1973" are available for Americans or third-country nations, the ad says.

"Third-country nationals" usually refers in this context to Filipinos or South Koreans who followed the U.S. war effort to South Vietnam.

Some Veterans Stay On

Another ad, by Lear Siegler, Inc., seeks U.S. citizens for immediate positions that include helicopter and fixed-wing aircraft mechanics, jet and piston engine mechanics, and related specialities.

In the past, American contractors here have hired U.S. servicemen who take discharges in Saigon and stay on doing work similar to their military jobs.

The CIA staffed much of its Laos operations by hiring American servicemen in Vietnam.

North Vietnam had originally sought in peace negotiations to have the United States take all its military equipment home, when it left — taking away from South Vietnamese units the weapons which America had supplied.

Hanoi retreated from this position by agreeing to let existing equipment stay.

As that equipment wears out, the draft agreement says. It can "be replaced on a one-for-one basis by weapons of the same characteristics and similar characteristics and properties," Dr. Henry A. Kissinger explained last week.

Kissinger said nothing about civilians staying behind to advise on that equipment.

Sweeping Prohibition

The 1962 Laos agreement required the withdrawal of all foreign troops and military personnel, with none to be reintroduced. Foreseeing problems, the countries that sought to neutralize Laos added a protocol which said:

"The term 'foreign military personnel' shall include members of foreign military missions, foreign military advisers, experts, instructors, consultants, technicians, observers, and any other foreign military persons, including those serving in any armed forces in Laos, and foreign civilians connected with the supply, maintenance, storing and utilization of war materials."

Applied to South Vietnam, such wording would seem to prohibit the kind of civilian program which the U. S. government is now organizing here.

But the hasty dispatch of C130s to South Vietnam indicates confidence in Washington that it will not be applied.

COMPUTERS AND AUTOMATION
November 1972

The Central Intelligence Agency: A Short History to Mid-1963 — Part 1

James Hepburn

"I never had any thought . . . when I set up the CIA, that it would be injected into peacetime cloak-and-dagger operations. Some of the complications and embarrassment that I think we have experienced are in a part attributable to the fact that this quiet intelligence arm of the President has been so removed from its intended role . . ."

— Harry Truman, President of the U.S. quoted at the start of the chapter

Introductory Note by the Editor

The book "Farewell America", by James Hepburn, was published in 1968 in English by Frontiers Co. in Vaduz, Liechtenstein; 418 pages long, including 14 pages of index. James Hepburn is a pseudonym; the book is reputed to have been written by the French Intelligence, in order to report to Americans what actually happened in the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. Copies of the book may be purchased readily in Canada, and at one or two addresses in the United States. No bookstore in the United States that I know of will order and sell copies of the book. (Inquire of the National Committee to Investigate Assassinations, 927 15th St. NW, Washington, D.C. 20005, for ways to purchase the book.) The twenty chapters are absorbingly interesting.

Information about secret intelligence services and the way they operate is of course not in the open literature. In the two and a half years since I read the book, I have seen no demonstration that any of the information contained in the book is false — and the information does tie in with much else that is known. Perhaps more than 90% of what is in the book is true.

The following article is based on Chapter 15, "Spies", of "Farewell America".

Everywhere — and the United States is no exception — there are criminals who will do anything for money. But it is one thing to murder a creditor, a Senator or a jealous husband, and quite another to assassinate the President of the United States.

Hired Killers

Hired killers are rarely employed by a parapolitical or paramilitary group. They are much too dangerous. Their connections, their morals, and their insatiable avarice pose too many problems for a responsible organization. On the other hand, a number of individuals active in groups like the John Birch Society, the Patrick Henry Association, and the Christian Crusaders would be only too happy to volunteer for an ideological crime. But, although successful assassinations have on occasion been the work of fanatics, serious-minded conspirators would prefer not to rely on idealists. History tells us why.

Fanatic Assassins

The Tsar's Prime Minister, Stolypin, was shot to death in 1911 during a performance of Rimsky-Korsakov's "Tsar Saltan" at the Kiev Opera.[1] The assassin, a lawyer named Dimitri Bogrov, was convinced he had acted in the cause of freedom, and many others before him had sacrificed themselves in the struggle against the Tsars. But fanatics like Bogrov who are prepared to die for a cause are few indeed, and the nihilists lost more men than the imperial families.

Professional Soldier Assassins

Today, professional soldiers and guerilla warriors have taken up where the nihilists left off. They are just as courageous, but often less successful. In Germany, in 12 years of Nazism and 5 years of war, despite the Kreisau Circle and the numerous groups that claimed in 1946 to have belonged to the underground, despite the work of the Allied intelligence services and the plots hatched by several high-ranking officers of the Wehrmacht and the OKW, Hitler was never assassinated. Two officers, however, tried.

The first planted a bomb on one of Hitler's planes, claiming it was a bottle of cognac. The bomb was due to go off in the plane carrying the Fuehrer to the eastern front, but it failed to explode. The assassination attempt was never discovered. It was publicized later by its author, who meanwhile had recovered his "bottle of cognac".

Colonel Von Stauffenberg Against Hitler

The second, more serious attempt was the work of Colonel Klaus Von Stauffenberg. His failure dealt a deathblow to the plot of July 20, 1944. Stauffenberg either didn't dare or didn't care to shoot Hitler.[2] Instead, he placed his briefcase, containing the equivalent of a pound of TNT[3], under the conference table where Hitler was sitting and left the room, claiming he had to make a phone call. The TNT was set off by a detonator a few minutes later.

But Colonel Von Stauffenberg, while a brilliant cavalryman, was a poor saboteur. His bomb would have killed Hitler, and probably most of the other officers present, if the conference had been held, as was usually the case at Rastenburg, in the casement of a cement blockhouse. The closed quarters would have magnified the compression, and the explosion would have proved fatal. On that hot July day, however, the conference was held instead in a wooden barracks with the windows open. Hitler was only knocked to the floor and slightly wounded by the explosion.

Colonel Von Stauffenberg was mistaken in his choice of an explosive. TNT is excellent for blowing up railroad lines and bridges, but for this type of operation [illegible] have used a defensive grenade of the type used by the German

continued

ATLANTIC
NOV 1972

[redacted]

LIFE & LETTERS

HEROIN AND THE CIA

by Flora Lewis

THE POLITICS OF HEROIN IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
by Alfred W. McCoy
Harper & Row, $10.95

One fact is beyond dispute: heroin is flooding into the United States in sufficient quantities to support an ever growing number of addicts. Estimates about the drug traffic are unreliable, but trends are painfully clear in mounting deaths, young zombies stumbling through city streets, crime to the point of civic terror. There are said to be some 560,000 addicts in America now, twice the number estimated two years ago and ten times the level of 1960.

Another fact goes unchallenged: suddenly, in 1970, high-grade pure white heroin, which Americans prefer to the less refined drug more normally consumed by Asians, appeared in plentiful and cheap supply wherever there were GI's in Vietnam. The epidemic was a vast eruption. It took the withdrawal of the troops to douse it, for the fearful flow could not be staunched.

Beyond those facts, the sordid story of drug trafficking has been a shadowy, elusive mixture of controversial elements. It was obvious that there must be corruption involved. It was obvious that there must be politics involved, if only because the traffic continues to flourish on such a scale despite the energetic pronouncements of powerful governments. It takes a map of the whole world to trace the drug net.

Since the United States suddenly became aware of the sinister dimensions of the plague and President Nixon bravely declared war on drugs (unlike the persistently undeclared war in Indochina), it has been customary for U.S. officials to pinpoint the poppy fields of Turkey and the clandestine laboratories of Marseille as the source of most of the American curse. Nobody denied that the bulk of the world's illicit opium (some say 70 percent, some say 50 to 60 percent) is grown in Southeast Asia and particularly in the "golden triangle" of mountains where Burma, Thailand, and Laos meet. But the U.S. government insisted, and continues to insist in the 111-page report on the world opium trade published in August, that this supplies natives and seldom enters American veins.

Not so, says Alfred W. McCoy, who spent some two years studying the trade. And further, it is certain to become less and less so as measures which the United States demanded in Turkey and France take effect in blocking the old production and smuggling patterns. This is of crucial importance for two reasons. One is that firm establishment of an Asian pattern to America means that the crackdown in Turkey and France will be next to futile so far as availability of heroin in the United States is concerned. The second is that focusing attention on Southeast Asia would bring Americans to understand that the "war on drugs" is inextricably involved with the Indochina war, and has to be fought on the same battleground from which President Nixon assured us he was disengaging "with honor."

McCoy, a twenty-seven-year-old Yale graduate student, worked with immense diligence and considerable courage—for the opium trade is dangerous business and the combination of opium, politics, and war can be murderous—to document the facts of the Asian pattern.

A good deal of it has been common gossip in tawdry bars of Saigon, Vientiane, and Bangkok for years. But the gossip mills of Indochina are a long way from the streets of Harlem and the high schools of Westchester County. The general knowledge that the rumors reflected is a long way from precise, confirmed detail. So the Asian pattern had never come through clearly in the United States.

Now, in his book *The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia,* McCoy has set it down. To show how it developed, he had to backtrack. The use of opiates in the United States has a long history. It wasn't until after World War I that widespread opprobrium, added to growing understanding of the dangers, turned the trade into an underworld monopoly. But World War II disrupted the supply routes. Unable to get drugs, American addicts were forced to quit the hard way. The market diminished, and, with a modicum of enforcement effort and international cooperation, might have been wiped out.

A single U.S. official act, McCoy believes, turned that chance around and enabled the creation of a worldwide octopus of evil almost beyond

THE NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE
29 Oct 1972

An American who once picked the targets tells

How we ran the secret air war in Laos

By Seymour M. Hersh

Seymour M. Hersh is a member of The Times's Washington bureau. His latest book is "Cover-Up: The Army's Secret Investigation of the Massacre at My Lai 4."

Jerome J. Brown could easily be mistaken for a typical American businessman living abroad. He's 30 years old, slightly beefy, profane and constantly wears oversized sunglasses. He's now a partner in a management consulting firm headquartered in Malaysia, where he lives with his Indonesian wife and their young son.

Brown has been in Southeast Asia less than seven years, but he knows it extremely well. He should. He was once in charge of bombing parts of it.

For 18 months, beginning in early 1967, Capt. Jerry Brown operated covertly as the chief Air Force targeting official for the secret air war in Laos. He was assigned to Project 404, a still-classified bombing operation personally controlled by the American Ambassador to Laos. And for more than a year before his assignment to Laos, Brown — then a lieutenant — worked as a highly trained photo-intelligence specialist for the Seventh Air Force in Saigon. Later in his career, he was assigned the key job of writing intelligence manuals for Southeast Asia reconnaissance operations.

Because of the secrecy, Captain Brown never wore his uniform in Vientiane, Laos's capital. He dressed instead in another uniform: business suit, white shirt and tie, and he carried papers identifying him as an employe of the Agency for International Development (A.I.D.). He worked in an unmarked building in the center of the city, along with more than 100 other Air Force and Army attachés who were also clandestinely assigned. His job was a remarkable one for a junior Air Force officer—picking targets for a secret bombing war carried out under the direction of the American Ambassador.

Captain Brown left the Air Force in late 1968 and began his business consulting career in Malaysia, but he kept in touch with former colleagues and with the air war. On a recent business trip to the United States—only his second visit since 1968—the former officer agreed to a wide-ranging interview, in violation of his agreement not to disclose classified information, because he felt that an insider has publicly discussed the "secret war."

That war has evolved into a steady procession of rainy-season offensives by the Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese. The other side has gained steadily and now controls at least two-thirds of the territory and about half of the three million population of Laos. In essence, the United States' mission in Laos is still the same as it was five years ago, when Captain Brown first reported for duty in Vientiane. Bombing wasn't working militarily in Laos or in North Vietnam then, and—according to recently published United States intelligence estimates—it still has failed to slow down the Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese operations, despite causing widespread damage and many deaths in both North Vietnam and Laos.

There was little in Brown's background to suggest he would become a maverick. A number of his former colleagues and superiors, while reluctant to discuss specifics, had high praise for him. "He's a very respectable guy in our business," one high-ranking Air Force intelligence officer said at the Pentagon. Another officer said simply, "He's credible." And another privately confirmed many of Brown's facts and specific recollections.

Brown was born in Newark and attended the College of St. Thomas in St. Paul, Minn., earning a bachelor's degree in 1964. His family, moderately wealthy, now lives in Wilmette, Ill., a high-income suburb of Chicago. Brown's biggest passions, before Vietnam, were golf, baseball and a sports car his father bought him for his 17th birthday.

"When I first came back to the States in 1970," he said, "I wasn't ready to sit down and talk. I don't care now. I think the country's ready for it. Something has to be done."

Brown is convinced that what was wrong with the air war in the nineteen-sixties is still wrong. "The bombing can't work and the senior air officers would never totally present the picture as it really was. The politicians and the ambassadors and the Presidents are continually being lied to," Brown said during the interview, which took place at the Waldorf Astoria Hotel in New York.

He described what he said were the two most important "myths" about the air war: "One, that bombing is accurate" and two, "that when it's accurate it totally destroys targets, which it doesn't."

He cited a number of examples that demonstrated, he said, that the North Vietnamese—despite the heavier bombing and improved reconnaissance technology of the nineteen-seventies—were capable of coping. Among them: their ability to move scores of Russian-built tanks without detection down the Ho Chi Minh Trail in the months before the North Vietnamese offensive this April. The tanks were deployed around the province capital of Anloc, which was later besieged.

"Even the laser bomb can't make a difference," Brown said. "It's an agrarian society. We can knock out a bridge at Thanhhoa [in North Vietnam] and they'll go down river 10 miles and ford it there. We can knock out all the electricity and they'll burn wood. We can mine Haiphong Harbor and they'll send material [illegible] destroy the POL [petroleum, oil and lubricants]

continued

THE DRUG PROBLEM STILL GROWS

HON. CHARLES B. RANGEL

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Friday, October 13, 1972

Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Speaker, the failure of this country to stop or even slow the soaring rate of drug addiction has left it at the mercy of this cancerous habit which knows no mercy.

Heroin addiction is the greatest single cause of crime, and that problem too is worsening—up 33 percent in recent years. Heroin addicts spend more than $5 billion a year on their habit, making criminal narcotics traffic one of America's largest industries. That $5 billion is paid by the victims of the millions of burglaries, robberies and thefts committed by heroin addicts each year. It amounts to a "heroin tax" of $100 a year for every American family of four.

Heroin addiction is no longer isolated in the urban ghetto. It has spread to all parts of society. Nor is heroin addiction an isolated problem of the addicts. It is a serious problem that affects everyone who is a victim of their crime.

Heroin addiction has spread to epidemic proportions. In late 1969, the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs estimated the number of heroin users in the United States to be 315,000. At the end of 1971, the estimate was 560,000.

A year ago the BNDD estimated that 5 to 6 tons of heroin were being smuggled into the United States each year. Today their estimate is 6½ to 10 tons.

A major reason for the failure of the war on drugs has been the Nation's failure to prevent Southeast Asia from emerging as a major source of heroin. One quarter to one third of the heroin entering the United States comes from Southeast Asia. If present trends continue, Southeast Asia will replace Turkey as the major source for heroin entering this country.

The reason that this Nation has been unable to prevent this is that our allies in Laos, Thailand, and South Vietnam are involved in the narcotics trade. The United States does not crack down on them because officials have placed the need for airbases in Thailand, Lao mercenaries and Vietnamese soldiers over the safety of this Nation's population from the drug invasion.

While a law that I authored enables aid to be cut off to countries that refuse to stop contributing to our drug problem, columnist Jack Anderson, in a column which appeared in the New York Post on Friday, October 13, points out that classified CIA documents give evidence that Southeast Asian leaders are either protecting drug smugglers, or are, themselves, participating in the traffic in illegal drugs to America.

More than $200 million in military aid annually goes to the Souvanna Phouma government in Laos. Yet one CIA document quoted by Anderson said:

> A broad spectrum of Lao society is involved in the narcotics business, including generals, princes, high-level bureaucrats and province governors.

Laotian generals, it seems, are providing the transportation for drug smugglers. Ironically, according to the reports in Anderson's possession, the planes and trucks to transport the America-bound narcotics are paid for by the U.S. military programs which Congress has said should be cut off in just this kind of situation.

This secret report goes on to say, according to Anderson, that the difficulty of cutting off aid is great since "the risk of jeopardizing some part of the military is high."

Our $240 million aid to Cambodia goes to help support one of the major shipment points for Southeast Asian heroin and the unstable corrupt government that protects this operation.

Anderson goes on to quote from the report:

> If U.S. aid were withdrawn, the government's ability to withstand Communist aggression would be weakened to the point of collapse.

Are we to believe that the prospect of the collapse of a tiny corrupt government on the other side of the world is more important than the deaths of hundreds of our young people, black and white, because of heroin?

The story is no better in South Vietnam. While the Thieu regime has mouthed promises to stem the flow of heroin from its mountainous areas, Anderson quotes this report as saying, "the corruption among government, civilian, military and police officials, some of whom have been participating in the narcotics traffic themselves" makes the prospects of stopping South Vietnamese heroin traffic without drastic action very dim.

As for these drastic actions, the report is further quoted to say:

> It is not in the U.S. interests to implement an air cut-off, even to punish Vietnam for failure to control drugs.

Thailand and much of South America repeat this same depressing story. Obviously, the war on drugs has become the victim of the war in Southeast Asia.

Up to 100,000 American GI's sent to fight in Vietnam since 1969 became addicted to heroin produced and marketed by our Southeast Asian allies. This same heroin is now taking its toll in our own country.

Claims of impressive seizures, important arrests, and international cooperation can simply not hide the failures. Ridding America of the heroin plague should be a seriously pursued national goal. When we spend $60 billion to fight North Vietnam and less than $1 billion to fight drug addiction, the priorities are anything but correct.

In September 1970, a leading Federal narcotics officer said:

> Every time one addict is cured, more take his place because of the ever-increasing amounts of heroin available.

A year ago, the American people were told that opium production was being phased out in Turkey—which had in the past accounted for 80 percent of the heroin being smuggled into the United States.

For Americans today, this elicits several questions which should be asked.

If opium production in Turkey is being phased out, how can heroin importation—and addiction—be increasing?

And why is the overall problem worse than ever after all the calls for special action?

The answer, again, lies in the region known as the Golden Triangle where the borders of Thailand, Burma, and Laos converge. One year's crop of 700 to 1,000 tons can be refined into enough heroin to supply America's addicts for 10 years. More and more of this heroin is reaching the American market.

Southeast Asia has been a major producer of opium and has had opium addiction problems of its own for some time. But only in 1969 did the white pure No. 4 heroin prized by American addicts begin to be produced in Southeast Asia.

When it appeared, it appeared in earnest. John Ingersoll, Director of BNDD, said:

> Our first indication of the presence of (No. 4) heroin in Southeast Asia came in December of 1969. In 1970, the trickle turned into a stream, and in 1971, the stream turned into a torrent of heroin pouring out of the "Golden Triangle."

Since there was no indigenous demand for No. 4 heroin anywhere in Southeast Asia, its appearance signified an intention to supply the U.S. market. The first victims were our soldiers in Vietnam.

Now that many of our GI's have come home and the market for No. 4 has diminished in Southeast Asia, Southeast Asian heroin is being marketed in America.

The United States has always tolerated corruption on the part of our allies in the war in Southeast Asia as long as they fight at least part of the war and follow at least some of our policies. Black marketeering, stealing U.S. aid, currency manipulation and smuggling are tolerated and all are rampant. Narcotics trafficking has not been treated any differently.

A vast military and political apparatus was built up in Indochina by the United States. We ignored the fact that virtually every link in that apparatus was simultaneously becoming part of a vast opium producing, refining, and smuggling apparatus which today is well on the way to replacing Turkey as the major source of heroin entering the United States.

The basics of the development of the Southeast Asian opium and heroin trade are these:

In Laos, opium is grown by the Meo tribesmen we organized into General Van Pao's "secret army." In fact, once the United States began providing them with liberal food supplies to assure their allegiance, many of them were able to switch to opium as virtually their only crop.

In Burma, opium is grown by the Shan rebels, the biggest opium growers in the world. They are armed with American weapons provided by the CIA or which were acquired by trading opium with government officials in Laos and Thailand for guns supplied by—and stolen from—the U.S. military aid program.

Opium is also grown by hill tribesmen in Thailand.

Opium from Burma is transported into Thailand by remnants of the Nationalist

WASHINGTON POST
22 OCT 1972

[redacted]

STATINTL

Meo Tribesman Is Veteran Pilot at 22

United Press International

LONG TIENG, Laos—Lt. Vang Bee Caikuevang recently chalked up his 500th combat mission as a fighter-bomber pilot. As a veteran of the North Laos air war, this means he has been flying all of eight months.

Vang Bee, 22, is one of seven Meo hill tribe pilots who fly in the mini-air force of converted T28 trainers attached to the CIA-sponsored army of Maj. Gen. Vang Pao, which fights against the North Vietnamese in northern Laos.

It used to be a rule in the U.S. Air Force that pilots earned a ticket home after 100 combat missions in high risk areas in Indochina, and it took most American pilots close to a year to pile up that many.

The Meos average eight to nine missions a day in their little propeller-driven planes when the weather permits, and it does not take long to pile up an impressive total of missions—if the pilot lives long enough.

Between 20 and 30 Meo pilots have been trained in the last four or five years, according to one count. That there are only seven now flying gives an idea of the odds they face when they climb into the cockpit.

"They tend to lead a short but happy life," says one American who knows them well.

The Meos have become the backbone of air support for Vang Pao's guerrillas because the fighting in South Vietnam since March 30 has kept most of the U.S. jets busy in North and South Vietnam.

T-28s carry four 250-pound bombs each, plus .50-caliber machine guns, which are not always effective against dug-in targets. But they can go much lower and slower than the jets, which gives them almost pinpoint bombing accuracy in the hands of a skilled pilot.

That, however, also makes it a lot easier to get shot down. The T-28s were withdrawn from combat at the onset of a North Vietnamese offensive on the Plain of Jars north of Long Tieng last December when sophisticated Communist antiaircraft guns knocked three out of the sky in a few hours.

Like his army, Van Pao's air force is a U.S.-sponsored operation. Americans supervise maintenance of the T-28s and the loading of bombs. When a T-28 is lost, it is replaced from a stockpile at the Udorn air base across the Mekong River in Thailand.

The ranks of Meo pilots at Long Tieng are fleshed out with Lao airmen from the lowlands and, according to some sources, occasional reinforcements from Thailand's air force. Lowlanders are said to like flying at Long Tieng, despite the risks, since the CIA pays better than the Laotian air force.

For the Meos, the risks go beyond antiaircraft fire. They do not know how to fly on instruments so if they get into bad weather, they face the threat of falling victim to vertigo and and losing control.

Vang Bee's immediate boss at Long Tieng is Capt. Vang Sue, one of the first Meo pilots to get his wings. At 27, Vang Sue has been flying four years and beaten all the odds. He says he has flown about 3,150 combat missions.

There were six of the T-28s at Long Tieng as Vang Sue showed some visitors around, but he said only four of them were flyable. The tribesman pointed to the unserviceable aircraft.

"Broken,' he said. What he meant in the case of one plane was that a bullet hole from a Communist machine gun had gone through the wing, slicing through a control cable so that it remained stretched taut by a single strand.

The plane had been damaged on a mission flown earlier that day by Vang Sue's wingman, a grinning tribesman in a yellow polo shirt and baseball cap with a pistol slung on his hip, cowboy style.

"If that cable breaks, he crash," said Vang Sue. "I guess maybe he lucky."

LIFE

20 OCT 1972

STATINTL

[redacted]



A packet of high-quality heroin

LIFE BOOK REVIEW

The book the CIA couldn't put down

THE POLITICS OF HEROIN IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
by ALFRED W. McCOY (Harper & Row) $10.95

One cool, clear January morning in 1970, I journeyed upward through the jungle-covered hills on the Thai-Burma border to interview a contingent of the Kokang Revolutionary Force, a band of Burmese guerrillas, about their revolt against the government in Rangoon. The talk around the campfire that day was not of revolutionary struggle, however, but of smuggling opium. And their chief worry was not the Burmese army but the remnants of Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist Chinese whose gear-wheel flag could be seen floating over Thai territory on the next mountaintop.

Even as recently as 1970 the muddled politics of the opium-growing hill tribes and the American agents who operate among them like white gods seemed the stuff of Eric Ambler novels, a problem for Asians perhaps but not a big worry for Americans. But even then the pure heroin refined from Southeast Asian opium was finding its way into the bloodstreams of American GIs. The infection now shows every sign of following them home.

Alfred McCoy, a 27-year-old Yale Ph.D. candidate, has spent the last two years unraveling this complex situation. It is his thesis that Southeast Asia is rapidly replacing Turkey as the main source of heroin in the U.S. By supporting the very people who are most involved in the trade, moreover, our government has itself become involved in the passage of opium as "simply an inadvertent consequence of its Cold War tactics."

The CIA has given a boost to the book's sales by foolishly asking to read the manuscript before publication. The CIA's lawyers said the book "could create an accepted myth that the CIA has been involved in the drug traffic." Yet their written criticism of the manuscript seemed pathetically thin. For example, the CIA denied any "substantial" contact with the Nationalist Chinese forces in Southeast Asia after 1951. But McCoy puts his sources, including a former CIA operative, on the record to the contrary. The debate breaks down over the meaning of the word "substantial." Again, the CIA denies that Air America, the CIA contract airline in Laos, carries opium. But Air America pilots are contract soldiers of fortune, and, in the bars of Vientiane, they often admitted to it.

One should remember, however, that opium-growing has long been a way of life to the hill tribes, and as such is neither illegal nor immoral. Once the political decision was made to arm the tribesmen in the anti-Communist cause it became inevitable that the agency would become at least tangentially involved in opium. Ironically, the CIA-based clandestine Meo army have been all but run out of the opium-growing areas of northeast Laos.

The book is much more than an exposé of CIA activities, however. McCoy lays out the whole history of the opium trade, going back to colonial and precolonial times, and explains in detail how the system works today. But though he paints a clear picture of governmental corruption in our client states and of the political vacuum in northern Burma, where most of the world's opium grows, it is still difficult to accept his conclusion —that the answer to the problem lies not in curing addiction at home or in smashing the syndicates, but in eradicating production in Southeast Asia. "The American people will have to choose between supporting doggedly anti-Communist governments in Southeast Asia or getting heroin out of their high schools," he concludes.

Unfortunately, the long history of our involvement in Southeast Asia has shown that we seldom have the leverage over our clients required to impose this kind of solution. It is questionable whether even the most intensive economic or diplomatic pressure could completely cut out the deeply ingrown opium business from that region. And if not Southeast Asia, are there not other fields in which poppies can grow? If we have found we cannot be the world's policeman, can we hope to become the world's narc?

by H.D.S. Greenway

Mr. Greenway is a former chief of TIME*'s Bangkok bureau.*

LOS ANGELES TIMES
19 OCT 1972

Laos Air War Leans Heavily on Meo Tribe

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The Meos average eight to nine missions a day in their little propeller-driven planes when the weather permits. And it does not take long to pile up an impressive total of missions —if the pilot lives long enough.

Only 7 Still Flying

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"They tend to lead a short but happy life," says one American who knows them well.

The Meos have become the backbone of air support for Vang Pao's guerrillas because the fighting in South Vietnam since March 30 has kept most of the U.S. jets busy in North and South Vietnam.

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U.S. Supervision

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For the Meos, the risks go beyond antiaircraft fire. They do not know how to fly on instruments and so, if they get into bad weather, they face the threat of falling victim to vertigo and losing control.

3,150 Missions

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HON. JOHN L. McMILLAN

SPEECH OF

HON. CARL ALBERT

OF OKLAHOMA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Friday, October 13, 1972

Mr. ALBERT. Mr. Speaker, I join the distinguished gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. DORN) and other colleagues in the words of tribute they have paid to my friend, JOHN MCMILLAN. JOHN's departure is an occasion for personal regret so far as I am concerned. JOHN has had one of the longest records of public service in the history of this body or of the country. He has served as staff member and Congressman for a combined total of 44 years. He has served on two great committees of the House—the Committee on Agriculture and as chairman of the House District Committee. I doubt one could approximate two more difficult legislative problems than the problems of farmers and the problems of the District of Columbia. A softer man, a man with a lesser sense of responsibility, might have taken the easy way out and simply looked for another assignment.

I myself served on the Agriculture Committee for many years. I know that the problems of farmers have been harsh and difficult of solution. JOHN MCMILLAN represented the PeeDee District, so called from the river that winds its way through the coastal lowlands of his State. Its No. 1 crop is tobacco and it has taken all of JOHN MCMILLAN's power on the committee to represent the needs of his constituency in a time when tobacco growers have faced some of their toughest challenges. As the second-ranking member on the Agriculture Committee, I do not think anyone will dispute me when I say that JOHN MCMILLAN has done an outstanding job of representing the interests which represent the main economic base in his district.

The chairmanship of the District Committee is demanding beyond question. It would be a hard job for any chairman, no matter what his political or philosophical bias happened to be. The economic and political status of the District has been in a state of flux many years. Complex problems have cropped up at every hand. It would have taken a Solomon to have produced solutions to all of them. JOHN MCMILLAN has given the business of the District his best efforts for many years. Many have not agreed with his judgment, many have opposed him, but I do not think anyone doubts that he has acted in good conscience and taken his duties seriously.

As a representative of rural America and also the legislative overseer of a part of America which has had to bring many of its day-to-day administrative responsibilities to Congress, JOHN MCMILLAN can conclude his career with the assurance that he has carried great burdens and has tried to act constructively in two most demanding legislative areas. He has been a devoted and conscientious Congressman. He is a great American and his service will long be remembered in this House. As the Representative of a great State, the State if not the district in which my wife was born, both Mary and I join in wishing JOHN and his lovely wife, Margaret, a happy and fruitful future. The McMillans will always have a place in our regard and affection and in those of the Members of this body.

LET THEM EAT BOMBS

HON. PAUL N. McCLOSKEY, JR.

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, October 17, 1972

Mr. McCLOSKEY. Mr. Speaker, since June of 1970, there has been debate in this Chamber over whether or not it has been an American practice to bomb and destroy the villages of Laos.

Additional evidence on the subject was presented in an eyewitness account by John Everingham appearing in this month's issue of the Washington Monthly. The article follows:

LET THEM EAT BOMBS

(By John Everingham)

(AUTHOR'S NOTE.—From March, 1968, to May, 1972, I made seven treks to the jungled villages of Long Pot District in north central Laos. The district is located approximately 32 miles to the northwest of Long Cheng, headquarters for General Vang Pao's American-trained army, and 30 air miles to the southwest of the now deserted Plain of Jars.

In 1968, Long Pot was made up of slightly less than 2,000 people living in 11 separate villages. Five of these were populated by the Meo clan, five by the Hill Lao, and one by the people of the Mekong River lowlands. Long Pot is the name of the district and also the name of the Meo village serving as district headquarters.)

MARCH 1968

It was a three-day walk to Long Pot village from the nearest motor road. When I first arrived, I saw clusters of thatch and bamboo houses gripping the sides of a man-scraped ridge. The cries of small children scampering on the rust-colored clay mingled with the grunts and squeals of fat pigs rooting in the underbrush. It was a peaceful scene.

I was shown to the home of the district chief. He was a short, vigorous man in his late fifties, with a high forehead and the melancholy dignity of a senior statesman. Gair Su Yang wore loose black pants of traditional Meo cut and a U.S. military fatigue jacket; he wore no shoes.

According to Gair Su Yang, the first helicopter landed in Long Pot in 1960. The pilots were American, but a Meo officer climbed out to talk with him. The officer spoke of an alliance between the Americans and a Meo colonel of the Royal Lao Army named Yang Pao. He said that American officials had made a pact with Vang Pao, promising to build for the Meo their own army and independent state in the mountains. They guaranteed that the tribesman would not fall under the control of either faction of lowland Lao then girding for civil war. The officer painted a picture of future prosperity for the Meo. All they had to do was become anti-communist, helping the Americans to fight the Pathet Lao revolutionaries controlling sections of Laos' northern provinces.

One of the problems that the people of Long Pot had in accepting the deal was that they were not sure who Vang Pao was. But there was a more basic problem—though Gair Su Yang did not inform me of it until sometime later: "If we joined the alliance, the Pathet Lao would have become our enemy and would have threatened our village. . . . I told him that Long Pot would not join Vang Pao and the Americans." According to Gair Su Yang, the officer then became angry and threatened that Vang Pao and the Americans considered those not friends to be enemies, and "enemy villages would be attacked and captured by Vang Pao's men."

"We couldn't do anything," Gair Su Yang later contended, pointing out that only fear of a helicopter-load of soldiers descending upon Long Pot forced him to accept involvement in the war venture.

By the end of 1960, every man in Long Pot village had received an M-1 rifle or carbine. Many had been flown to Long Cheng for three to four months' training by U.S. soldiers. (These were probably U.S. Special Forces, whom it was common to see in small up-country towns of Laos until 1968–69. Thereafter CIA "civilians" were used to train Vang Pao's army.) Long Pot's men were then given rank in irregular battalion 209.

Long Pot had been militarized in defense of "Meoland" nearly eight years when I first visited. It had not, however, gone to war. The M-1s were used for shooting squirrels and birds. Men, women, and children slashed, burned, and planted to reap harvests of rice, corn, and, of course, the opium poppy. Opium was the main cash crop, which from 1960 onwards had been bought by Meo soldiers and transported both by pony caravan and American-piloted Air America helicopters from Long Cheng.

OCTOBER 1970

During the summer of 1969, the Bureau of Public Roads, Laos Division (an arm of USAID), opened war-abandoned Route 13 linking the administrative capital of Vietiane with the royal capital at Luang Prabang. The new road put Long Pot only a half-day walk from motor transport. A companion and myself traveled up Route 13 by motorcycle and walked the rest of the way to Long Pot village. As we arrived, 20 teenage boys in U.S. army uniforms, dragging M-1 carbines and rifles often too big for them, paced through mock-military maneuvers, periodically driving to the ground in a half-hearted manner that would have gotten them killed if bullets had really been flying. A few days earlier, they had returned by helicopter from Long Cheng. There, they said, U.S. soldiers had put them through three months of military training. Another helicopter would arrive that afternoon, they said, and take them off to Moung Soui district, about 30 miles to the northeast, where the Pathet Lao were in the midst of attacking and taking the town.

The boys' eyes revealed their fear and demoralization as they talked about the coming helicopter ride and their destination. And as we all waited, bombs could be heard peppering the hills in the distance, in the direction of Moung Soui. The bomb blasts, though 15 to 20 miles away, shook the hill under our feet and shattered the young soldier's nerve. Several mothers were crying as they fussed over their soldier-boys; lucky charms were stuffed into baggy pockets. District Chief Gair Su Yang was at the center of the gathering handing out new U.S. army uniforms, pep-talking his recruits. But Gair Su Yan's voice was flecked with anger and did nothing to ease the funeral atmosphere.

No, said every boy I asked, they didn't want to go to fight the Pathet Lao. They said their village headmen had chosen them; they must go. And they went. Early next morning, I ran out from breakfast in Gair Su Yang's house as a helicopter finally whoop-whooped in to land. "Air America" was clearly printed down the side of the silver and blue craft. Boys clambered aboard. The helicopter rose

STATINTL

CHICAGO, ILL.
NEWS

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OCT 13 1972

War on Laos opium evokes no hurrahs

By Keyes Beech
Daily News Foreign Service

VIENTIANE, Laos — To the Americans who came to Laos more than a decade ago to fight a clandestine war against the Communists, the poppy was a red paper flower you bought on Veterans Day.

Today, as the United States struggles to extricate itself from the Southeast Asian quagmire, the poppy has quite a different meaning. It is a sinister flower that, if not exactly the root of all evil, has corrupted governments, made heroin addicts of thousands of GIs, tarnished America's image and besmirched the reputation of dedicated public servants.

Now, after what one critic called a policy of "benign neglect" toward Laos' uninhibited opium trade, the U.S. mission here has declared war on all narcotics.

SINCE THE DRUG traffic in Laos was perfectly legal until a year ago, when U.S. officials forced an anti-narcotics law through the national assembly, the campaign has a long way to go.

Already some assemblymen are agitating for repeal of the law because, they say, it has worked a hardship on the opium-growing Meo mountain tribesmen who are America's chief allies in northern Laos in the long-running Central Intelligence Agency-backed war against the Communists.

One tribal leader has three tons of opium to sell and no takers because of the U.S. crackdown. Since opium is, or was, Laos' only cash crop, the tribesmen have a legitimate economic complaint.

WASHINGTON, it is under-



Beech

Asia's drug pipeline

Last in a series

tive buying" of the Laos opium because it isn't altogether happy with the results of its purchases in Thailand and Turkey.

If the United States did buy up Laos' surplus stock, there is no assurance the primitive tribesmen wouldn't regard Uncle Sam as a steady customer and produce more, not less, opium.

Like other U.S. mission chiefs in Southeast Asia, Ambassador G. McMurtrie Godley has felt the heat of President Nixon's global war on narcotics. Here, as in neighboring Thailand, the war on the drug traffic seems to have taken precedence over the war against communism.

"It is as if the United States were fighting two fires at once," said an old Southeast Asia hand, "communism and drugs — and the irony is that the drug problem is a direct result of the fight against communism."

GODLEY HAS come under attack by Alfred W. McCoy, a young Yale graduate, for being "soft" on the drug traffic and allegedly attempting to cover up the sale of ...

Godley has issued a vigorous eight-page single-spaced rebuttal to McCoy's charges as contained in a Harper's magazine article. McCoy is the author of a newly published book, "The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia," the product of 18 months' research.

The CIA is McCoy's chief target. It his contention that the CIA, by working with corrupt local officials who were engaged in the drug traffic, has contributed to America's addiction problem.

THE EMBASSY'S position was not helped earlier this year when French police confiscated a suitcase containing 60 kilos of Laotian heroin. The suitcase belonged to Prince Sopsaisana, newly appointed ambassador to Paris.

The American Embassy was almost as embarrassed as the prince, who returned to Vientiane after the French government refused to accept his credentials. For, as McCoy states, Sopsaisana was widely regarded by the Americans as "an outstanding example of a new generation of honest, dynamic national leaders."

ONE LITTLE-KNOWN fact is that Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma was an opium tax collector in French colonial days. And Gen. Ouan Rathikun, former commander of the Royal Laotian Army, will freely discuss his role in the drug traffic with almost anybody who takes the trouble to go around and see him.

After all, says the general, there was nothing unlawful about it, and opium has been a rich source of personal revenue in Laos since French colonial days. It was also a rich source of revenue for the general, who seems amused by U.S. efforts to stamp out the traffic.

"If somebody wants to accuse us of being shortsighted," said a CIA official with unaccustomed passion, "that is one thing. But to say that we deliberately fostered the opium traffic as a matter of policy is an absolute lie."

BUT ONE FACT is inescapable. The CIA could not ask the Meos to fight on the American side and at the same time demand that they give up their opium-growing.

The handful of CIA men who have worked with the Meos over the years may have felt they were fighting for democracy. But the Meos were fighting for their land — and the right to grow opium on that land.

In their long war with the Communists the Meos have been driven from most of their mountain retreats by relentless Communist pressure. Since opium doesn't grow well below 3,000 feet, production has declined from an estimated 100 tons 10 years ago to 30 tons today.

"The more territory the Communists take, the less opium," said one cynical observer. "That may be the ultimate solution to the drug problem in Laos."

GUARDIAN
11 Oct 1971

[redacted]

LIBERATION FORCES STRENGTHENED IN LAOS

By Richard E. Ward

In Laos the Nixon doctrine of using bombs and dollars to support reactionary forces is suffering serious setbacks.

The bombs which primarily kill and maim civilians have not been able to stop or blunt the liberation forces led by the Lao Patriotic Front (Pathet Lao). And sharply increased U.S. military aid to its mercenaries in Laos has not been able to raise the morale of these forces still experiencing heavy losses annually, especially in recent years.

Once the pro-U.S. mercenary force of 30,000, directed and financed by the CIA, consisted almost entirely of Lao minorities, mainly Meo, led by the Meo Gen. Vang Pao. Now after a decade of operations the Meos have been bled white in the service of the U.S. and no amount of money can replenish their ranks in Vang Pao's forces. The CIA has had to turn to other minorities and to "volunteers" from the military forces of Thailand to fight for the U.S. in Laos.

Thai troops now constitute the majority of Vang Pao's secret army which operates virtually independent of the Vientiane government. Their orders come from the U.S. embassy and in particular from ambassador G. McMurtrie Godley, who relishes informal titles like field marshal and procounsul given to him by the press.

Offensive bogged down

Vang Pao's mercenary troops are now engaged in their annual offensive. This drive, which began in mid-August, is reportedly bogged down and being turned back by the Pathet Lao earlier than ever before, even during the present rainy season when virtually all advantages are with the pro-U.S. forces.

The main CIA-backed operations customarily begin during the rainy season because during that period ground transportation, the only means available to liberation forces, is extremely difficult at best and in some regions even impossible. While the liberation forces must fight under this disadvantage, the CIA's mercenaries have U.S. aircraft providing transport and logistical support as well as tactical and strategic bombing support.

But despite these advantages, Vang Pao's troops are engaged in what is probably their weakest offensive ever. Starting from Long Cheng, the once top-secret CIA base, Vang Pao's troops have moved against the Plain of Jars. Detailed information has been entirely withheld from the press, an indication that the drive is failing, which is the conclusion of few assessments made by Western press sources.

In a report in the Sept. 23 Far Eastern Economic Review, D.E. Ronk, writing from Vientiane, noted the disparity between official U.S. claims that Vang Pao was making satisfactory progress and the reality "that (progress) if any . . . is being made at a snail's pace."

Ronk adds that Vang Pao's forces scattered around the edges of the Plain of Jars are being hit hard, while "progress toward the plain itself has been slow, to say the least; probably it has now stopped." As for the near future Ronk, an experienced observer in Laos, writes:

Precarious hold

"Most observers in Vientiane, including military men, are concerned for the safety of Long Cheng while Vang Pao's best troops are on the offensive. Long Cheng's defenses are being manned by T[illegible] by Communist forces. . . . This year, Vang Pao's grip on the Long Cheng-Sam Thong defense line is precarious, at best, with most of the outer line ten miles north and northeast of the base in Communist hands. Few in Vientiane would be surprised if the Communists managed to sweep Long Cheng-Sam Thong into their control before the end of the current rains, then turned on Vang Pao's isolated forces around the plain 20 miles to the northeast."

Last winter, liberation forces mounted a three-month siege of Long Cheng during which the CIA-mercenary base was evacuated for a period. The siege was maintained in the face of unprecedented U.S. bombing and despite wide deployment of Thai troops who suffered heavy casualties. The heavy losses taken by the reactionary troops, including Vang Pao's Meo forces, has caused serious morale problems among all their elements.

For leading the Meo into disasters year after year, the CIA and Vang Pao are meeting increasing resistance to recruiting among the relatively few able-bodied potential soldiers left among the Meo, who once readily took up arms for relatively high mercenary wages in impoverished Laos. Those still in uniforms are, according to the New York Times correspondent Fox Butterfield, "bedeviled by exhaustion after many years of war. . . ."

Butterfield, in a Sept. 27 dispatch, confirms the dismal outlook for the pro-U.S. forces in a report sent from the Long Cheng headquarters at Vang Pao. Although the general appeared "energetic," Butterfield states that his troops are "reportedly exhausted by last spring's fighting and afraid of the Communists' newly introduced 130-mm long-range guns."

One feature of the current fighting is that the liberation forces did not fall back during the rainy season, leaving many units in place. In past years, Vang Pao's advances and "victories" were generally achieved with virtually no opposing forces on the scene and his forces could entrench themselves before having to face the liberation troops.

Fill the breech

It is doubtful that Thai forces will be able to fill the breech of the depleted ranks of Vang Pao's troops. The U.S. is currently spending at least $100 million to support Thai troops in Laos, but despite their mercenary wages of many times the pay of regular Thai troops, the heavy fighting has reportedly dampened their enthusiasm. One indicator of this is a 30 percent desertion rate among Thai troops in Laos.

Secrecy still enshrouds many aspects of U.S. operations in Laos, apparently in order to disguise violation of Congressional restrictions. Congress has prohibited the U.S. from financing mercenaries recruited outside Laos. The Nixon administration sidestepped that barrier by calling the Thai troops and airmen in Laos "volunteers." The Thai government denies any role although it allows recruiting from the regular armed services and supplies Thai officers to command the CIA units in Laos. The charade is maintained by giving the Thais Laotian names and Laotian military identification cards.

In a preface to a Senate Foreign relations committee report issued in May, Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.) observed that the administration was violating the Congressional ban on the use of Thai troops in Laos. He said that Congress had virtually no control over CIA programs, in part, because of Congressional abdication of responsibility as well as because of administration furtiveness.

"It is a fact," stated Symington, "that not only the American people, but even the proper committees of Congress, have not been given much detail of our use of Thai irregulars in Laos. . . . This is [illegible] millions of dollars of appropriated monies are involved."

continued

Battered Laotian Tribe Fears U.S. Will Abandon It

By FOX BUTTERFIELD
Special to The New York Times

SITE 288, Laos, Oct. 5—Years ago, before the North Vietnamese first shelled this village with their big guns, Yong Dua Mua was a great chief among the Meo people. He had rich rice fields on the high mountains, pigs, chickens and a dozen water buffalo.

'Everything a man needs to live we had," he recalls.

Since then many of the chief's family and friends have died fighting in the Meo irregular army that is supported by the United States Central Intelligence Agency. A quarter of his own people have been lost, and the survivors, encamped in this place that does not even have a name, are refugees dependent on American aid dropped from the air.

Fatigue and Fear

It is a fate shared by nearly 200,000 Meos remnants of a proud race of mountain warriors, because since they took up arms—American arms—to fight the North Vietnamese, they have been driven out of their homeland in Northern Laos and into their series of crowded valleys and ridge tops around Ban Son, about 70 miles north of Vientiane.

The Meos are tired, and they are afraid that the United States will abandon them to their enemy—in Meo the word for "Vietnamese' 'and for 'enemy" are one and the same. The Hanoi radio feeds their fear with daily broadcasts about antiwar feeling in the United States.

"If the Vietnamese attack us once more this year and the Americans do not help us, I will just have to stay here and die," said Mr. Yong, who has been a refugee from his home north of the Plaine des Jarres since 1960. "We cannot move again."

Between the North Vietnamese and the refugee settlements lies only the irregular army's redoubt at Long Tieng, which was partly breached last spring and is considered highly vulnerable.

South of Site 288 there are no more mountains into which to flee, only the hot and humid Vientiane plain that the Meos, accustomed to living at heights above 3,000 feet, find uninhabitable.

Chief Yong and other Meo leaders interviewed in a tour of refugee villages near Ban Son this week believe that their plight is inevitable, as in a classical tragedy.

"When I was young my grandparents used to tell me that the Chinese and Vietnamese had oppressed us and taken our land for generations," said the chief, a tall, heavyset man much bigger than the average short, wiry Meo. "Even if I had known 10 years ago what I know now, I would have made the same decision to fight and not accept the Vietnamese. There was no choice."

As he spoke a flight of United States Air Force F-4 Phantom jet fighters flew over on their way to bomb North Vietnam. In the distance a small Continental Air Services transport, chartered to the Agency for International Development, circled lazily over a nearby village, dropping large burlap sacks of rice.

The agency is feeding most of the people in this area from the relief center at Ban Son, doling our rice, cornmeal, canned beef and cooking oil. Whenever the Meos can settle in one place long enough, they try to grow their own vegetables.

Although Site 288 and the hundred other settlements jammed together near Ban Son are still in the mountains, things do not look right to the Meos.

An Unfamiliar Environment

With all the crowding, there is little left of the luxuriant dark green rain forest on which they have always depended for fuel and building material. There is almost no land to slash and burn to plant upland rice. Traditionally they measured distances by the number of days it took to walk to the nearest village, but they now can hear their neighbors talking.

One of the few signs of progress at Site 288 is the six-year village school, but there are only half as many pupils as there were three years ago, before the last big North Vietnamese drive.

Each settlement also has a small dispensary supplied by A.I.D. Thousands of Meos have caught malaria during their migrations because they had lived at altitudes above 3,000 mosquitoes and had no immunity.

Chief Yong's village originally lay in the rich mountain land halfway between the Plaine des Jarres and the North Vietnamese border. One night in December, 1960, he recalls, the Communists "fired their big guns into our homes" without warning.

"I could not tell you the reason why they did it, I do not know much," he added, holding certain words for emphasis in the beautiful, lilting Meo tonal language. "I cannot read or write."

Volunteers Without Pay

After that, the chief related, almost all the young men in his village went to join the army. "There was no pay in those days, they all just volunteered," he said

The force he referred to was being put together by a young, tough and ambitious major in the regular Laotian Army, Vang Pao, himself a Meo. Now a major general, Vang Pao went into hiding south of the Plaine des Jarres early in 1961 and began recruiting the mountain tribesmen to battle the Vietnamese invaders.

As his force grew General Vang Pao also began receiving arms and training from a small group of Americans known as a "white star team," predecessors of the Special Forces, who landed clandestinely at his headquarters at Padong. Simultaneously, American planes started dropping food to Meo villagers who had been forced to flee.

Meo leaders interviewed this week and the Americans who helped organize General Vang Pao's force deny, as has sometimes been charged, that the United States made a secret deal to get the Meos to fight.

"There was no deal, the Meo wanted to fight and needed arms, we wanted to stop the Communists," said Edgar Buell, the A.I.D. officer who served as the Americans' first contact with General Vang Pao.

Policy Developed 'Gradually'

"At first no one thought the war would last more than six months," he explained. "It was only gradually as the fighting went on that we began to see the need to drop food to them and then to start paying the soldiers. The Meo aren't mercenaries, like people are always saying. If they were, I couldn't have worked with them all these years."

American officials here, many of whom have spent as much as 10 years in Laos, feel a deep sense of responsibility for the fate of the Meos and have knowledge that the arming of the Meos may have helped provoke North Vietnamese assaults.

"Even though it was only a marriage of convenience and we made no promises," a high-ranking official who requested anonymity said, "I personally feel in my heart a deep moral commitment. The problem is, these people are just too pure for the filthy world we so-called developed countries have created for them."



The New York Times/Oct. 11, 1972
Meo refugees are camped in the Ban Son area.

There are no accurate statistics on the number of Meos, civilian and military, who have lost their lives in the war. Estimates of the original number in this country, whose population is thought to be about three million, run from 200,000 to 350,000. Of these 80,000 to 100,000 are believed to be in areas under Communist control, according to Mr. Buell, who has spent more time working with the Meos than any other American.

Hospital Has Been Full

One of the few reliable estimates of military casualties is based on the relief rolls at Ban Son, which, informed sources say, list 4,500 widows of Meo soldiers and 5,000 to 6,000 disabled veterans.

This fall the 260-bed hospital at Ban Son has been full of

continued

U.S. fights Asian tradition in its drug war

Second in a series

By Keyes Beech
Daily News Foreign Service

CHIENGMAI, Northern Thailand — Not long ago a visiting American congressman asked a U.S. narcotics agent in Bangkok if the hill tribesmen of Southeast Asia had any idea of the havoc their product, refined to heroin, was creating in the streets of New York.

For a moment the agent was speechless at the question. Then taking a deep breath, he replied: "Sir, they never heard of New York."

They never heard of Bangkok, either.

The question is indicative of the wall of ignorance that separates most Americans from the history and realities of the drug traffic in Southeast Asia.

FOR FOUR centuries, beginning with the aggressive prodding of greedy European colonialists, Asians have been cultivating the poppy that yields the opium that yields the morphine that yields the heroin that is now finding its way into the United States.

Up through World War II and beyond, every Southeast Asian government had its opium monopoly. Everywhere it was a major source of revenue, like other government monopolies including salt and tobacco.

In the middle of the last century the British fought a war to win the right to sell opium to the unwilling Chinese. Hong Kong had its own opium "farm." And not until 1946 did the British outlaw the drug traffic in Hong Kong.

FOR THE ASIANS opium was, and still is, an escape from the pains of reality just as alcohol is an escape for so many Americans. Some Asians become addicts — a growing number, in fact — just as some Americans become alcoholics.

Opium is [illegible] more ways than one. An American woman may swallow a pill to ease the pain of her menstrual period. The hill tribe woman of Southeast Asia's golden triangle — the upper reaches of Burma, Thailand and Laos — will smoke a pipe or two of opium.

Opium also happens to be the only cash crop of the hill tribe people, their only means of acquiring some of the minor luxuries of the outside world. Their economy is as dependent on opium as the lowlanders are on rice.

DURING all those earlier years, to Americans opium was an Asian affair. But two years ago, when heroin addiction hit epidemic proportions among American GIs in South Vietnam, the Asian narcotics traffic suddenly became America's business.

Now the GI market almost has vanished with the withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam. But the drug problem lingers on — a legacy of the Vietnam War as the heroin traffickers seek new outlets in the United States to replace their lost GI market.

At the same time President Nixon has declared global war on the international drug traffic. As a result, stopping drugs has become almost as important as stopping communism among U.S. objectives in Southeast Asia.

IN AT LEAST three countries — Thailand, Laos and South Vietnam — all the resources of U.S. embassies have been thrown into the campaign to choke off the flow of heroin to the United States.

Embassy political officers, accustomed to routine diplomacy, have been diverted to full time narcotics assignments. "One way or another, we spend at least 50 per cent of our time on narcotics," said a senior embassy officer in Bangkok.

"Hell," said a young foreign service officer recently transferred to narcotics work. "I love it. It's a lot better than shuffling papers."

THE CIA, stung by charges that it has contributed to the drug traffic by collaborating with opium-growing hill tribesmen and corrupt Asian officials, has thrown all its intelligence-gathering resources into the antidrug campaign.

On top of all this, agents of the U.S. Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs have made their appearance in Asian capitals from Tokyo to Hong Kong to Bangkok in increasing numbers.

For 10 years there was one U.S. narcotics agent in Bangkok. Today there are 12 operating in all Thailand, "making cases" in co-operation with Thai police.

SINCE Thailand is the natural conduit for drugs coming from the golden triangle, the biggest effort has been centered there.

"When the heat is on from the White House," said one U.S. official, "you jump. No one questions the desirability of cutting off the drug traffic, although some of us wonder if there isn't an element of overkill in the current campaign."

If there is an element of "overkill" — and that is debatable — the reasons are understandable. Mr. Nixon is running for re-election and the "Asian drug connection" could easily become an explosive campaign issue.

Next: The drug traffic — romantic and deadly.

THE FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW
7 Oct 1972

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

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STATINTL

The CIA has moved to Vang Vieng—a pullback that reflects the fading fortunes of the US-backed Vientiane government's military position

Flight of the CIA

By Frances Starner

Vang Vieng: While the monsoon rain came down in torrents, the combo flown in from Vientiane for the occasion – electronic amplifiers and all – played its way through a broad repertoire of Laotian and American dance music. On the circular concrete floor – colourfully if inadequately sheltered by a blue parachute – dancers shrugged off water as they celebrated into the early hours of the morning. Between numbers, as numerous speakers took note of the occasion, the guests huddled under tin roofs and parachutes set up around the spacious garden. The social and political élite of Vang Vieng – ranking officials, officers of the Vang Vieng FAN (neutralist) garrison, the Operation Brotherhood staff from the Vang Vieng Hospital and two or three American AID officials – were observing an anniversary little noted elsewhere. In August 1964, the neutralist general Kong Le had scored a fleeting victory here; although Kong Le has been long exiled in Paris, the FAN garrison here still finds the event worthy of commemoration.

Vang Vieng is a sleepy little town on Route 13, about half-way between Vientiane and Luang Prabang. Situated on the banks of the Nam Song River and surrounded by jagged mountains frequently wreathed in clouds, it offers some of the most spectacular scenery in Laos. Until recently, however, life was not particularly eventful. For one thing, despite claims several months ago that Route 13 had been secured from its point of origin in Luang Prabang all the way to the south, public traffic north from Vientiane stops here. The only ground traffic from here to Luang Prabang is the military convoy, with both the Muong Kasi and Sala Phu Khoun areas remaining under considerable Pathet Lao pressure. But here, even the war pressures have been scarcely felt.

Although the number of refugees being cared for out of Vang Vieng more than trebled in the first seven months of 1972, the [redacted] this area is insignificant compared with the 136,000 Xieng Khouang refugees being supplied from Ban Xon (militarily, Lima Site 272) not many kilometres east of here. A member of the hospital staff comments that even the trickle of government soldiers coming here today is a new phenomenon. And even now, when the sun goes down, the streets are dark except for a large pool of light at the hospital and a much smaller one at the US AID compound.

But change is in the air and it is centred on the – until now – unsurfaced airstrip. The terse announcement from US official sources in Vientiane at the end of July said merely that "military logistic support" recently sited at Ban Xon was being transferred to Vang Vieng. The airstrip there was severely damaged by a flash flood on July 20-21, which also caused extensive damage in some of the refugee villages in the vicinity. It was implied that the "logistics" move to Vang Vieng stemmed from that incident.

In fact, the flood and the resulting damage to LS-272 seems only to have speeded a move already approved at upper levels. Ban Xon had become the temporary site of the secrecy-shrouded CIA operations formerly conducted at Long Cheng, and of the highly sophisticated electronics equipment used there, when that base was threatened last December and January. In the ensuing months it became apparent that there would be no return to Long Cheng and that Ban Xon was ill adapted for the mission, for a variety of reasons.

There was the matter of the refugees. It is quite thoroughly established that intelligence collection and caring for refugees have been opposite sides of the Air America operation for as long as that line has been in existence. At Ban Xon, however, the two functions hve been in each other's way. The air traffic involved in the refugee feeding programme, for example, has taxed the LS-272 facilities under the best of conditions; when the weather is bad – as it frequently is in the mountains around Ban Xon, the added military traffic has often strained them past breaking point. (Fatal accidents are common in the Ban Xon air operation.) Medical facilities have been similarly strained. Thus, in March, according to the Green Beret-trained medic directing it, the dispensary programme operating out of Ban Xon had to service more than 150,000 people, of whom some 130,000 were refugees.

The Long Cheng siege also placed a burden on the Na Suh hospital (at Ban Xon) that it was not designed to handle. Earlier, a new 40-bed facility had been put into operation at Na Moh, at



Frances Starner

US AID's Houei Sai headquarters: Critical spot

continued

DAILY WORLD
5 OCT 1972

True picture of U.S. in Laos shows through in new book

THE END OF NOWHERE, American Policy Toward Laos since 1954, by Charles A. Stevenson. Beacon Press, Boston. 1972. $8.95.

By JOHN PITTMAN

Current reports from Laos offer no indication of any moves by the Nixon government to wind down its aggression against the people of Laos. On the contrary, the signs speak of every intention of Nixon and his military and civilian bureaucrats to press the virtual extermination of the Meo minority and continue his program of nullifying the 1962 Geneva Agreement on Laos to which a former U.S. government was signatory.

One such report published Oct. 1, 1972 from Fox Butterfield of the New York Times, speaks of the concern of "American officials" in Long Tieng, Laos, over the exhaustion of the mercenary troops under the Meo chief, Gen. Vang Pao. These 30,000 troops are no longer Meos, the dispatch says, because the Meos have either been killed or become disillusioned. Vang Pao's forces now are "other hill tribesmen" and Thai mercenaries "who are also paid and equipped by the United States."

The dispatch notes that although "foreign military aid to Laos and the presence of foreign troops or advisers is banned by the 1962 Geneva accord on Laos," there are still Americans in Long Tieng, the CIA base, and "several could be seen...some of them in jungle camouflage uniforms carrying M-16 rifles and boarding helicopters with the irregular troops."

Of course, the U.S. censors couldn't pass this dispatch without seeing that it attributed all opposition to the Vang Pao forces to "North Vietnamese." The reason for this "editing" of press dispatches from Laos is two-fold: on the one hand, it suppresses the native, Laotian resistance to U.S. plans conducted by the indigenous armed forces of the Neo Lao Hak Sat (Laotian Patriotic Front); on the other hand it sets up the false premise of North Vietnamese, that is, foreign violation of the Geneva Agreements, which is used to justify U.S. interments to save "freedom" in Laos.

But the book under review debunks these and the myriad other alibis of U.S. bureaucrats and militarists for their aggression in Laos. The author is one of the few writers with sufficient backbone to question the right of Americans to be in Laos in the first place. As is becoming increasingly popular in hindsighted reappraisals of U.S. policy during the past quarter of a century, the author attributes the decisions to move into Laos to the obsessive anti-communism of such champions of freedom and democracy for the masses as the late John Foster Dulles.

"The obsession with anti-communism and the consequent opposition to a coalition government were deeply rooted in the minds of policy makers in the 1950s and 1960s. This continued fear of any loss of territory to Communist control, or even to substantially increased Communist influence, has been the driving force of American foreign policy for a quarter of a century."

A conspicuous flaw in the book is its insufficient and sometimes erroneous information concerning the liberated areas of Laos. Nevertheless, it can be recommended as a first-rate expose of U.S. imperialist policy, and specifically of the aggressive and barbarous policy which the Nixon government is continuing today.

THE SYDNEY, AUSTRALIA MORNING HERALD
2 Oct 1972

Drugs and the CIA

incomplete as received.

From a staff correspondent in New York

publication of a chapter from his then forthcoming book in "Harper's Magazine" and similar accusations made by Mr McCoy before a Congressional hearing.

The allegations attracted little national attention at that stage.

But, in July, the CIA made a formal request to the publishers, Harper and Row, to review the manuscript, stating that Mr McCoy's claims were "totally false and without foundation."

Although affirming their belief that Mr McCoy's "scholarship is beyond reproach" and refusing to promise to make any changes in the text, Harper and Row agreed to make the manuscript available to the CIA.

That decision caused controversy in publishing circles because of the precedent of allowing the CIA to review a book before publication.

However, Mr B. Brooks Thomas, vice-president and general counsel for the publishing house, explained: "We are not submitting to censorship or anything like that. We are taking a responsible middle position."

When the CIA's critique of the book was submitted at the end of July, Mr McCoy and his publishers regarded it as an anti-climax.

Mr Thomas stated that the publishers were "underwhelmed" with the CIA's reply. Harper and Row made a point-by-point refutation of the CIA's defence and announced that they would publish the book unchanged.



General NE WIN

General VANG PAO

American reviewers have hailed the book as the first work of near-scholarship on the popular subject of heroin smuggling.

While the book adopts a New Left, anti-CIA and anti-American foreign policy stance, it is a fascinating history of the world's opium and heroin trade.

Mr Colby flatly denies the charge that the South-East Asian opium trade in any way "depends on the support (money, guns, aircraft, etc) of the CIA," as claimed by Mr McCoy.

He said that the US Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs had publicly stated that the CIA for some time had been its strongest partner in identifying foreign sources and illegal trade in narcotics.

The CIA, he said, had no evidence that General Vang Pao was involved in the Laotian drug trade.

"Because his forces are the principal Laotian deterrent to North Vietnam aggression, many US Government personnel have been in constant contact with General Vang Pao for a number of years," he said. "No evidence has come to light connecting him with narcotics traffic."

Mr Colby said that Air America had long had an effective inspection system, and recently had introduced a more rigid system to bar even the inadvertent transport of narcotics.

Mr McCoy, in his determination to indict the Nixon Administration and the CIA, fails to give credit for strenuous efforts the American Government has made in recent times to combat the narcotics trade.

James A. Markham, a writer on the drug problem for "The New York Times," says that, in certain parts of the world, "American diplomats give almost monomaniacal attention to persuading frequently indifferent or corrupt officials to do something about poppy cultivation, heroin refining and heroin trafficking."

Mr Nelson G. Gross, senior adviser on international narcotics to the US Department of State, said recently that the intensive drive mounted by the Government over the past year-and-a-half was beginning to have a noticeable impact on the trade.

"The availability of heroin on the streets is less than it was a year ago. The quality is not as good. The wholesale price is higher and the retail price is higher," he said.

The Government, he said, was moving fast to prevent a major new route of drug traffic developing from South-East Asia.

With the US Secretary of State, Mr William P. Rogers, he had met Chairman Ne Win of Burma to explore means of helping the Burmese Government combat heroin processing and transport.

The frightening extent of heroin addiction in American cities and the street crime it spawns make drug traffic an emotional subject in this country.

If Mr McCoy's book helps step up the campaign against drug trafficking it will serve a good purpose.

But the campaign will not be helped by his politically motivated and exaggerated accusations.

WASHINGTON POST
1 OCT 1972
STATINTL

[redacted]

"They weren't ten deep for the Laos assignment, but I just pinch myself daily when I think I'm being paid for doing this."

—G. McMurtrie Godley

Our Man In Vientiane

By Jonathan C. Randal
Washington Post Foreign Service

VIENTIANE, Laos — Still savoring his cigar after a three-course luncheon washed down with French wines, G. McMurtrie Godley answered the telephone, postponed his tennis game, dashed to his sedan and was driven off at top speed.

"Wheatburner 50 to Wheatburner Base," he intoned into the car's radio-telephone, "heading for airport — ten-four." The rush mission of American Ambassador Godley on an otherwise sleepy recent afternoon in the Laotian capital turned out to be a false alarm of sorts. There was just a chance that three captured American pilots North Vietnam had agreed to release might be on board the regular weekly Aeroflot flight which was arriving from Hanoi ahead of schedule. And "Mac" Godley wanted to be on hand just in case the men accepted his personal suggestion they disembark and accept U.S. government transportation home rather than continue in the company of their antiwar chaperones.

While Russians in sports shirts and North Vietnamese in pith helmets and business suits streamed off the Ilyushin 18, Godley saw that the pilots were not among the passengers, got back into the car and headed home to change for tennis. "Forty-five minutes is about all the tennis I can take in this age anyway."

At 55, Godley has been going at this pace for more than three years in Laos and, for that matter, ever since he graduated from Yale, class of '39. Part proconsul, part traditional striped-pants diplomat and part general, Godley personally directs the no longer quite so secret American war in Laos —and loves every minute of it.

He has no doubts about his job or how to carry it out even though his critics suspect he is more Defense Secretary Melvin Laird's man in Vientiane than Secretary of State William Rogers.' "Call me field marshal if it makes you feel better," he is inclined to say. "I don't care. But please note I've got no troops."

"Uncle Sugar"

INVOLVED in undercover work since World War II when he dealt with American prisoner of war problems while based in Switzerland, one of the first U.S. diplomats to work closely with the military, activist ambassador to the Congo during the "Simba" revolt in 1964, Godley believes in the American world mission in uncomplicated terms uncomfortable to more doubting Americans.

So big and burly that Congolese called him "The Bear that Walks Like a Man" when he was ambassador in Leopoldville, Godley maintains he "think I've had the very best of the U.S. Foreign Service" and "if I end up being the fall guy I couldn't care less."

Godley is given to pithy, direct language of a nature which an earlier age would not have found repeatable in mixed company. Pure product of the Cold War in warm climates, he invariably refers to the United States as "Uncle Sugar," a sobriquet reflecting the persuasiveness of American power in underdeveloped countries.

Even with a staff of 1,200 diplomatic, military and CIA men, as ambassador to this Oregon-sized country Godley has his hands full:

- Requesting and approving all American air strikes against North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao troops—who numbered over 100,000 just before the Easter invasion of South Vietnam—in northern Laos and along the Ho Chi Minh supply trails leading south to Cambodia and South Vietnam.
- Directing CIA military operations and the activities of some 230 military attaches whose tasks include supplying arms and ammunition to the Royal Lao army, Meo tribesmen and Thai volunteers in the Plain of Jars north of Vientiane and in the southern Laos panhandle.
- Keeping able neutralist Premier Souvanna Phouma in office despite repeated right-wing efforts to dislodge him, to ensure that the tatty facade on the 1962 accords remains intact for another effort to neutralize Laos in the event of an Indochina-wide peace settlement, a task even the North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao representatives here privately concede he performed brilliantly in the past month.
- Maintaining the precarious and artificial Laotian economy within the limits of a congressional aid ceiling of $350 million annually, a far from easy task since most of the money goes for military spending. Indeed, the annual threat of the fall of the CIA's base at Long Cheng on the Plain of Jars is feared less than the economic crisis reflected by the fall in value of the Laotian kip from 500 to 800 to the dollar in the past year.

Dropping the Veils

FOR MOST of Godley's first year as ambassador, and indeed since the 1962 Geneva accords were broken first by North Vietnam and then by the United States, American military involvement was kept as secret as possible. But in the past year or so, Washington has progressively dropped the principal fiction imposed by the Geneva accords which set up the tripartite right-wing, neutralist and left-wing government under big power auspices: a promise to avoid any foreign military establishment in Laos except for a small French training mission.

As early as 1964, the United States was deeply committed to the Souvanna Phouma government, providing aid, a stabilization fund for the kip and military help. In return, Souvanna Phouma allowed the United States to bomb North Vietnamese positions on the strength of a verbal understanding which even now remains the only basis for American military operations here.

In March, 1970, President Nixon started lifting the secrecy after a Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee headed by Stuart Symington held hearings on Laos as part of its investigation of U.S. commitments abroad. Whatever major mystery was left disappeared last December when U.S. officials [illegible] of Long Cheng, headquarters of Gen. Vang

continued

NEW YORK TIMES

1 OCT 1972

Tribesmen's Drive in Laos Slows and Fears for Base Rise

By FOX BUTTERFIELD
Special to The New York Times

LONGTIENG, Laos, Sept. 27 —Maj. Gen. Vang Pao's irregular army of hill tribesmen has opened its annual rainy-season offensive against the Communists around the Plaine des Jarres.

But despite some successful thrusts behind the enemy's lines, American officials here are concerned that the irregular's campaign has stalled, bedeviled by exhaustion after many years of war and unusually stiff North Vietnamese resistance.

As a result, these Americans fear that when the rains stop in another month, the North Vietnamese will still be in a good position to threaten the important base at Longtieng and the 132,000 refuges who live in valleys just to the south.

"Militarily the loss of Long Tieng wouldn't mean the end of the war," said one high-ranking American officer at this once-secret center for the irregular army, "but it would be a major catastrophe for the hill people who have been retreating for four or five years and would have to move on again."

Farther south lies only the hot, humid and already crowded Vientiane plain, which the hill people, mostly members of the Meo tribe, consider uninhabitable.

The chief hope of the Laotians and Americans is that when the roads become passable again in November, the North Vietnamese, preoccupied by their offensive in South Vietnam, will not substantially reinforce the estimated 6,000 troops they have scattered around the Plaine ne Jarre and just north of Long Tieng.

Last spring the Communists withdrew one of their two divisions — the 312th — from the fight for Long Tieng, transferring it across the border to Quangtri Province.

"If the North Vietnamese don't bring in a lot more troops we can hold Long Tieng," said another American who has watched the Communists gradually push General Vang Pao's forces south over the past five years. "It all depends on Hanoi."

Long Tieng itself, nestled in a narrow mountain valley 83 miles northeast of Vietntiane, has been largely rebuilt since the devasting three-month North Vietnamese siege last spring. General Vang Pao once again has his headquarters here and many dependants of the tribal soldiers have returned after being evacuated.

Planes belonging to Air Americ aand Continental Air Services bring "supplies for the irregulars. A squadron of tiny T-28 fighter planes manned by Royal Lao Air Force pilots also use the paved airstrip, which ends abruptly in a series of jagged limestone cliffs that look like the scenery in a Chinese landscape painting.

Because of the Communists' offensive in South Vietnam, American air support for the fighting here in northern Laos has been drastically reduced, authoritative American sources say. It is down from an average of 200 sorties a day last year to only about 20 sorties a day.

There are still a number of Americans here, agents of the Central Intelligence Agency, which finances and helps train and direct General Vang Pao's forces. Several could be seen today during a visit sponsored by the American Embassy, some of them in jungle camouflage uniforms carrying M-16 rifles and boarding helicopters with the irregular troops.

Although much of the secrecy that once surrounded Long Tieng has ended, Americans here still use only facitious names and newsmen were not allowed to photograph them. Foreign military aid to Laos and the presence of foreign troops or advisers is banned by the 1962 Geneva accord on Laos.

The irregulars' offensive began in mid-August with four separate task forces totaling about 5,000 men being lifted by helicopter onto the heights around the plain des jarres, which lies 20 miles north of Long Tieng. Their objective was to cut in behind the entrenched North Vietnamese facing Long Tieng and force them to retreat.

But General Vang Pao's troops, reportedly exhausted by last spring's fighting and afraid of the Communists' newly introduced 130-mm. long-range guns, moved slowly.

In one of the columns, American officers say, almost 500 men had to be evacuated with trench foot after they had failed to dry their feet during the monsoon rains. Another column lost its commanding officer on the first day.

Even more disastrous, the North Vietnamese did not pull back this year as they have in the past to shorten their supply lines during the torrential rains. Instead they have clung to heavily fortified positions in the mountains and blasted the irregulars with their artillery.

General Vang Pao appears as energetic and determined as in the past. Despite years of bitter fighting and defeat, the sturdily built 43-year-old Meo leader spends almost all his time these days at Long Tieng and gives his officers a tongue-lashing over lunch in his quarter, Americans who work with him report.

But the number of Meos among his 30,000 soldiers has steadily decreased as they have been killed or became disillusioned. They have been replaced by other hill tribesmen, particularly upland Loa, and by so-called volunteers from Thailand, who are also paid and equipped by the United States.

The number of Thais is a closely guarded secret, but one well-informed source estimates that ther are "wellover" the 4,800 figure used in a Senate Foreign Relations Committee report last year.

THE YALE ALUMNI MAGAZINE
Oct. 1972

[redacted]

Yale Graduate Student Causes a Stir with Book on Heroin and the C.I.A



Every now and then the University community discovers that one of its members just happens to be the author of a best-selling book, or at least a book that is causing a lot of talk. It's happening again.

"The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia" (Harper & Row), by Alfred W. McCoy, a Yale graduate student in Southeast Asian history, may not rise to the top of best-seller lists but it has caused a considerable stir in government and publishing circles because it reveals, among other things, the complicity of the Central Intelligence Agency in the world heroin trade.

The book is the product of 18 months of research—four in Southeast Asia—and 275 interviews, many of them in the "Golden Triangle" region where Laos, Thailand and Burma meet and where 70 per cent of the world's illegal opium poppies are grown.

McCoy's book documents in exhaustive detail the route and manner in which refined heroin travels from the hillsides of northern Laos to the streets of America's cities. The opium trade generates the major financial resources for the U.S.-allied Meo guerrillas of northern Laos, McCoy charges. He further insists that C.I.A. personnel in the region not only tolerate the opium trade, but abet it and profit from it.

Back home, the C.I.A., aware of McCoy's research and familiar with his testimony on the matter before a Senate subcommittee, disagreed with his charges and demanded to see a pre-publication copy of the book. Harper & Row, while insisting that it was not submitting to censorship, gave the C.I.A. a set of galleys—a move which McCoy "totally opposed." The C.I.A. returned the galleys with a list of minor factual objections but failed to refute the author's main thesis, and on Aug. 17 Harper & Row published the book without a single change from its original version.

McCoy is taking the fall semester off from the Graduate School. He doesn't have time, he says, for school *and* all the business surrounding the publication of "The Politics of Heroin." He says he enjoys celebrity and has had quite a bit of media exposure lately, though he is still $1,000 in the red as a result of research and travel costs associated with writing the book.

McCoy, who co-edited another book about Laos in 1970, still hasn't completed a portion of his doctoral comprehensive exams at Yale and hasn't had time to work on a dissertation, although he has a topic. Meanwhile, Harper & Row has three more ideas for books it would like him to write.

Why not ask Yale to credit the work he has already done toward the requirements for a doctoral thesis?

"Aw, come on," he says, "you know Yale well enough to know it doesn't work that way."



The Vientiane Connection: Trading Drugs for Peace

THE POLITICS OF HEROIN, by Alfred McCoy (Harper and Row $10.95).

"The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia," is not an easy book to read, and not much fun really. Even with the old sure-fire spy-gangster-three spook elements it's not much fun, because there is something disturbing about the subject, or subjects.

There is nothing very charming about the heroin trade anymore, because it is hurting too many people, has pitted too many lives; and there is precious little enchantment left in the work of our foreign cryptoperatives because it can lead to some very dirty, very enduring situations.

But the subjects are very much with us, and need to be treated, and that gets done here pretty well.

THE BOOK GOT started by accident, author Alfred McCoy explains. A member of the Antiwar Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars, in 1970 he coedited "Laos: War and Revolution" for Harper and Row, and included a section on the role opium traffic played in Southeast Asian politics.

Editor Elizabeth Jakab took a run up to New Haven where McCoy was (and is) working on his doctorate in Southeast Asian history and persuaded him to do a book on the junk trade and tradition. It's hard to say what she envisioned, but McCoy saw a quick-in-and-out. Perhaps 250 pages, paperback, to be finished by September 1971. He was off by one year, 150 pages and a cover.

He went to Europe, began talking around Paris with old French Indochina hands: Refugees from the Diem regime of Vietnam, exiles, former French colonial, army and intelligence officials.

One of the former French officials "sort of sat me down and ran down to me [redacted] opium trade," McCoy says. "I was flabbergasted."

He talked with Col. Roger Trinquier, who was among the leaders and losers against the Viet Minh in 1954, who told him how the French sought to cement relations with the Meo tribesmen in the Indochinese uplands "To have the Meo, one must buy their opium."

"And he said he wold expect the Americans were involved in the opium traffic the same way he was," McCoy recalls. "It was just an economic imperative for anybody who's going to treat with that tribe."

And at that point, history turned into journalism.

WHAT McCOY found in Southeast Asia was not an American duplication of the French opium traffic role. He found evidence of opium moving on CIA airlines, found opium growing, moving through territory which [redacted] under CIA dominion: "They did carry the stuff. They were shipping it. They wet [redacted] it. It's a level of very, very extreme complicity that actually becomes involvement.

"It's not like the French military intelligence actually managing and directing traffic for profit and for a source of financing. But they [redacted] from it because by providing facilities for their allies (the Meo, remnants of Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintag, Laotian government officials, others) they are enforcing the political strength of their allies, providing them with a national base."

He says conversations with a former USAID (United States Agency for International Development) official indicated a heroin refinery was operating [redacted] CIA's Long Cheng headquarters in Laos.

"It's as if you were allowing a heroin refinery to be operating in [redacted] not attached to your house. The fine line of involvement . . . I think you'd be put in for abetting."

The CIA must have thought it could get "put in" for something because early last summer, after McCoy testified in Senate narcotics hearings, the CIA asked for a look at the book before publication. This reaction from the normally invisible, unflappable agency was extraordinary.

After Harper and Row agreed, the CIA studied the doument, specified objections. he publisher decided they were without merit, and publication came a month ahead of schedule.

American allies, or former allies, implicated by McCoy in the drug trade include former South Vietnamese Vice President Ky, the late Ngo Dinh Nhu. And Americans contributing to the growing complicity include more than the CIA shadow-men. Writes McCoy:

"Rather than sending U.S. combat troops into Laos, four successive American presidents and their foreign policy advisers worked through the CIA to build the Meo into the only effective army in Laos. The fundamental reason for American complicity in the Laotian opium traffic lies in these policy decisions . . ."

DEALING historically—opium, morphine and heroin trade has a position of long standing in Southeast Asian economies—and politically—the traffic has been fostered by a succession of governments, colonial and native—McCoy's major point becomes a matter of little dispute: American heroin users are getting more and more of their drug from the "golden triangle" area of Laos, Burma and Thailand. Official estimates of U.S. heroin sources used to attrubute no more than five percent to Southeast Asia; now the figure is rising to 25 percent, McCoy says.

The book, says this historian-scholar, is primary a heroin book: "What I hoped it would do is fill an informational function, and raise a debate.

"And I hope somewhere in the smoke the substance doesn't get lost—that people begin to understand that the old image—the Turkey-Marseille-New York route is something of interest to moviegoers and historicans and that it is a part of the present, but not part of the future."

The Vientiane Connection? McCoy says he has already talked with one moviemaker about the possibilities.

JAMES HARPER, Free Press Staff Writer

HARPER'S
Oct 1972

[redacted]

COMMENTARY

Interrupting its usual silence, the CIA has provided Harper's *with a rare public document. It is an official letter of protest against our July cover story, "Flowers of Evil," an extremely compromising report by Alfred W. McCoy about the CIA's complicity in the heroin trade in Southeast Asia. "I trust," writes W. E. Colby, the Agency's executive director, "you will give this response the same prominence in your publication as was given to the McCoy article."*

The letter appears below in full, together with Mr. McCoy's reply and the testimony of a former USAID representative who witnessed the CIA's participation in the Laotian drug traffic. This exchange, we hope, throws further needed light on a little-known stretch of the sewer that runs between Washington, Saigon, Vientiane, Pnompenh, and Bangkok.

Beyond all that, we are surprised by Mr. Colby's use of the word "trust." We may well be reading too much into it, but that word, and indeed the whole tone of the letter, suggests that Mr. Colby expected an immediate mea culpa *from* Harper's. *Is the CIA that naïve? Mr. Colby, who once presided over the notorious Phoenix program in Vietnam,* is hardly an innocent. Still, his entire letter reflects a troubling simplicity, an unquestioning trust in the goodness of his own bureaucracy. He asks us to share that trust, whatever the stubborn facts may be. As conclusive evidence of the Agency's purity, for example, he even cites Director Richard Helms' public-relations argument that "as fathers, we are as concerned about the lives of our children and grandchildren as all of you."*

Such curious expectations of trust apparently motivated the Agency to ask Harper & Row to hand over the galleys of Mr. McCoy's book, The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia, *from which he drew his magazine article. The Agency declared that it simply wanted to check the book for factual inaccuracies, possible libel, or damage to national security. To deliver this unusual request, the Agency dispatched Cord Meyer, a man with the proper Establishment connections who, as the CIA's overseer of the since-transformed Congress for Cultural Freedom,** might be said to have once been in the publishing business himself. Although the galleys were duly sent to the Agency, the CIA's subsequent complaints about Mr. McCoy's research failed to impress Harper & Row, which has since confidently published the book, unchanged. Apparently there are limits to trust, even among gentlemen.*

Although Mr. McCoy won't agree with us, our own reaction to this episode is to feel a certain sympathy for the beset bureaucrats of the CIA, who seem to be impaled on the defensive notion, "The Agency, right or wrong." By definition the CIA finds itself involved with a good many questionable people in Southeast Asia. That is a condition of its mission—a mission it did not invent but simply carries out on White House orders—and we suspect that the public would trust the Agency a good deal more if it either acknowledged the facts or remained silent. Alas, the CIA now seems determined to revamp its image into something like a cross between General Motors and the League of Women Voters. But so endeth our sermon. Let the reader draw his own conclusions.

THE AGENCY'S BRIEF:

Harper's July issue contains an article by Mr. Alfred W. McCoy alleging CIA involvement in the opium traffic in Laos. This allegation is false and unfounded, and it is particularly disappointing that a journal of *Harper's* reputation would see fit to publish it without any effort to check its accuracy or even to refer to the public record to the contrary.

Normally we do not respond publicly to allegations made against CIA. Because of the serious nature of these charges, however, I am writing to you to place these accusations in proper perspective and so that the record will be clear.

The general charge made by Mr. McCoy that "to a certain extent it [the opium trade in Laos] depends on the support (money, guns, aircraft, etc.) of the CIA" has no basis in fact. To the contrary, Mr. John E. Ingersoll, Director of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, in a letter to Representative Charles S. Gubser of California on May 27, 1971

*Phoenix is a campaign of systematic counterterror designed to root out and destroy Vietcong sympathizers. As U.S. pacification chief from 1968 to mid-1971, Ambassador Colby headed CORDS (Civil Operations and Rural Development Support), which ran Phoenix in cooperation with the South Vietnamese police. Mr. Colby has testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that, in 1969 alone, Phoenix agents "neutralized" 19,534 suspected Vietcong, killing 6,187 of them in the process. Critics argue that Phoenix uses assassination methods and that Mr. Colby's figures are extremely conservative.

**The CCF, among other activities, at one time published a dozen or so serious anti-Communist magazines throughout the world. The best known is *Encounter*, which now has a different sponsor.

continued

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[redacted]

OUI
October 1978

ILLEGIB

[redacted]

ILLEGIB

The CIA's Superpilots Spy in the Beams

[redacted]

continued

THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY
Oct 1972

REPORTS & COMMENT

THAILAND

Though détente is Asia's order of the day, in Thailand there is tension and danger. Mr. Nixon's "era of peace" has not yet dawned over this enigmatic kingdom, which wants a placid life but is not permitted by geography to have one. Sabotaging tomorrow's hopes, the Vietnam War lingers on. Thailand's current troubles center upon two related issues: Can Thailand avoid paying a big price for its key role in the Indochina war? How can Thailand find a way to live with China? Beneath both issues lie U.S.-Thai relations, and some anxious questions for Americans.

In Thailand at present, one has a weird feeling of *déjà vu,* of anachronism. Is this really 1972, with prudent President Nixon trimming down open-ended American commitments in Asia, or is it still the mid-1960s, with President Johnson talking (and bombing) as if every second Asian land were mankind's linchpin?

It now seems macabre to read the worried remark of Senator Stuart Symington, Democrat of Missouri, last March, in his letter of transmittal of the staff report by the Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee he heads: "In fact, in the not too distant future, there may be about *half as many* American military personnel in Thailand as there are in Vietnam." Though Washington has not pointed it out, today there are in fact *more* U.S. forces in Thailand (some 50,000) than in Vietnam (43,500). The seven U.S. air bases which punctuate the dusty kingdom buzz with new life. The one at Tahkli had been closed but now swings again with Phantoms, bars, and brothels. An expanded base mushrooms at Nam Phong. Thailand has become the mainland headquarters for American bombing in Indochina. Faster than the weapons of war leave Vietnam, they pour into Thailand: Phantom fighter-bombers, EC-121's, C-130 transport planes, B-52's, KC-135 supertankers, U-2's, and SR-71's (the most up-to-date reconnaissance plane). According to the State Department, there are 550 to 600 fixed-wing attack aircraft in Thailand now, and Thai military sources tell me the total figure for U.S. warplanes of all sorts is 800.

Three years ago, withdrawals of troops began from Thailand as from other East Asian countries. But in 1971, when the total was down to 32,000, the process stopped. During 1972 the tide has been reversed. Today there are more U.S. troops here, and far more planes, than before the withdrawals began in 1969. Not only is Thailand the place of origin of almost all air sorties over Laos and North Vietnam, and of many over Cambodia; it also provides vital troops for the anti-Communist ground war in Laos. The innocent observer might feel that something funny has happened on the way to implementing the Nixon Doctrine in Thailand.

To be sure, the doctrine never said that reductions of forces in East Asia would go in a straight line downward; and there were pressing reasons for the 1972 buildup of air power in Thailand. As the U.S. troop level in Vietnam got down around 150,000, military planners told Nixon that if further reductions were to take place there must be a buildup in air capacity outside but near Vietnam's borders.

In this way Thailand started to become ransom to Vietnamization. The process continued as even middle-level officials made hasty decisions to move the Seventh Airborne Command, the Army's 131st Aviation Battalion, and other units from Vietnam to Thai bases. With the Communist offensive of last spring in Vietnam, the buildup in Thailand became quite frank and feverish. Planes came into Thailand from Asia and the United States, to make possible the staggering pummeling that Vietnam has been dealt these past months.

Each year Mr. Nixon seems to find it necessary to effect a sharp zag of escalation in order to provide a zig of withdrawal. In 1970 it was the operation into Cambodia. In 1971 it was the invasion of southern Laos. In 1972 it is the revamping of Thailand as a base for air attacks. The trouble is that the zags were not quite as neat and surgical as hoped. In some ways Cambodia and Laos are in a mess no less intractable than Vietnam's, as the recent reports by James Lowenstein and Richard Moose for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee suggest. As for Thailand, if there is a Vietnam settlement soon, we (and the Thais) will avoid any comparable mess there; but if there is not a settlement soon . . . ?

Tie-up

Does the buildup matter much anyway? American activity in Thailand cost the taxpayer about $250 million last year (this is total U.S. outlay, including surplus equipment, Peace Corps, agricultural aid, as well as military and economic assistance, but not including the $100 million or so which the CIA spends to send Thai troops into Laos). But there is a see-

continued

PORTLAND, ORE.
OREGONIAN

M - 245,132
S - 407,186
SEP 30 1972

Heroin airlift

To the Editor: In response to your Sept. 19 editorial denouncing the charges Sen. McGovern directed at the Nixon Administration's involvement in the Southeast Asian opium traffic, I feel it my duty to inform you that McGovern's charges are not "innuendos without verified facts," as you stated.

There is undeniable evidence that American funds and equipment have been utilized to transport raw opium from field to refinery in Southeast Asia's golden triangle region.

Gen. Ovan Rathikun, former commander-in-chief of the Laotian army, has publicly admitted his own involvement in the opium business and has discussed the cooperation he has received from the CIA. Ronald Rickenbach, a former USAID representative in Laos, has testified that he personally watched hundreds of pounds of raw opium being loaded onto a Laotian air force aircraft, which in reality is an American aircraft paid for by American taxpayers.

Alfred W. McCoy, in his forthcoming book "The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia," has interviewed scores of people directly involved in the drug traffic of Southeast Asia, and all evidence indicates that the CIA, the American embassies in Southeast Asian countries, and the Administration itself, are not as innocent and law-abiding as they would have us believe. And for our President to brag about rising heroin prices on the East Coast as an indication of increased government vigilance is pure hogwash. Is Mr. Nixon happy that the pushers are making more money now? Is he happy that addicts are suffering more and stealing more from our communities to pay for the higher priced heroin?

ANDRE ALLAERT,
4936 SE Brooklyn St.

PHILADELPHIA, PA.
INQUIRER

M - 463,503
S - 867,810
SEP 27 1972

Returning 'pawns of war' deserve to be left in peace

The people who make policy in Hanoi are not given to casual sentimental gestures. And whatever Bob Hope may say in his Christmastide monologues to the troops in the field, neither are the planners in the Pentagon.

So anyone who believes that the last three weeks of maneuvering three U. S. officers' release from North Vietnamese captivity is anything but political manipulation has abandoned reason.

In the recent public pronouncements on the subject, no one has emerged with much credit.

★ ★ ★

The only ones with a just claim for sympathy are the prisoners of war themselves: Navy Lts. Mark L. Gartley and Norris A. Charles and Air Force Major Edward Elias. The sympathy due them, in immediate terms, is because they have become, as James McCartney of our Washington Bureau points out, true "pawns of war."

But in larger measure, these men — pressured from all sides to take stands, clarify truths, make public judgments — will remain symbolic prisoners long after their return home. Few, if anyone, alive can be as acutely aware as they of the effect that anything they say or do will have on the lives and hopes of the 423 U. S. military personnel who they left behind in North Vietnamese prisons.

The three men were selectively released because Hanoi believed there would be practical political benefit in doing so. For the United States government or any of its significant officials to try to frustrate that intent could have no imaginable effect except to make the plight of the remaining prisoners more uncomfortable.

Thus the proper U. S. position, from the time that the proposal came up, was to hold its tongues, beyond a dignified and restrained: "Welcome home; we're glad to have you back."

★ ★ ★

In the face of the conditions of release made clear through the antiwar intermediaries — who have a predictable role to play — the Defense and State Departments' move to meet the prisoners at the Vientianne airport was ill conceived. Perhaps the U. S. Ambassador to Laos, G. McMurtrie Godley, really intended simply to give the men a warm handshake, as perhaps did the naval and air attaches he took with him. But for years the attaches and others in the embassy in Laos have been managing a clandestine, CIA-managed war there; their credibility is low.

So there was some reason, but no temperance, in Sen. George McGovern's stump charge that "the Administration seems to be playing politics" with the prisoners. And there was less temperance yet in Defense Secretary Melvin Laird's outburst that "Sen. McGovern apparently is willing to act as an agent for Hanoi."

The men are now expected to reach U. S. soil tomorrow. The government and the campaigners would do best to leave them in peace.

There is little enough of that to be had these days.

RECORD
SEP 25 1972
E - 33,470

STATINTL

[redacted]

Statute Versus Treaty As Narcotics Control

On paper at least, September 18 looked like a great day for the good guys in their battle against international drug traffic.

There on Capitol Hill was the U. S. Senate ratifying by a vote of 69 to 0 a strengthening revision of a 90-nation treaty designed to clamp down on the narcotics trade.

Henceforth, the revision provides, the International Narcotics Control Board will see to it that the world production of dope is limited to the quantity needed for medical and scientific use. Production above that ceiling will be reported to the signatory nations and the United Nations General Assembly.

And there at the Department of State was President Nixon saying this country will suspend all American economic and military assistance to any government "whose leaders participate in or protect the activities of those who contribute to our drug problem."

Just which initiative will be the more productive is hard to say just now.

That of the Senate is dependent on devious channels and protocols, but it does have the advantage of being taken without benefit of George McGovern jawboning.

The route the president can take is a good deal more direct, if only he will follow it now that he has made a McGovern-nudged pitch for diligence.

But the chances for clamp-down would be a great deal fatter, one suspects, if the president had been right when he said he is "required by statute" to cut off aid to governments contributing to our drug problem.

The statute is not quite so forceful.

The rule, written into last year's Foreign Assistance Act, is that aid shall be cut off only when the president himself decides that a government has "failed to take adequate steps" to suppress dangerous drugs. The president is the sole judge of which countries are being helpful and which are not. He is "required" to take no action that his personal verdict on the evidence does not support.

His evidence, clearly, is not the same as that which has disturbed Senator McGovern.

The president, says his challenger, has failed to "crack down on the narcotics trade in Laos, Thailand and South Vietnam" because the administration needs "air bases in Thailand, Laos" and "mercenaries and Vietnamese soldiers to fight its war."

There may be more partisan testimony than hard evidence in that accusation, of course. Even so, the McGovern statement is not barren of corroboration.

There have been charges that the CIA's Air America has helped transport heroin in Southeast Asia. In his book, *The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia*, Arthur W. McCoy raised the question of CIA agents knowingly engaging in such traffic to help maintain alliances. And Mr. McCoy qualified with no question his assertion that officials in Southeast Asian governments allied to the U. S. have profited from the drug traffic.

To accuse is not to prove. But if Mr. McCoy's questions and statements are rooted in nothing firmer than supposition, they suggest that the president, even if not derelict, will have a difficult time being diligent in application of that statute.

The helpfulness (or, for that matter, the helplessness) of allies like South Vietnam and Thailand in areas other than drug control cannot fail to influence Mr. Nixon's reading of the evidence.

Not, that is, so long as a keystone of this nation's foreign policy is to prop up such allies.

Presidential options running afoul of presidential commitments, it's just possible the Senate has [illegible] to narcotics control.

SAN FRANCISCO, CAL.
EXAMINER
E - 204,749
EXAMINER & CHRONICLE
S - 640,004

SEP 24 1972

BOOKS

The Politics Of Heroin Exposed

Reviewed by
Thomas Lask

THE POLITICS OF HEROIN IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. By Alfred W. McCoy, with Cathleen B. Reed and Leonard P. Adams II. Harper & Row; 464 pp.; $10.95.

ALTHOUGH "The Politics of Southeast Asia" is packed with information, some of it of considerable compexity, its charges (for that is what its conclusions are) are simple enough to be spelled out in a school primer.

Seventy per cent of the world's supply of heroin, the book asserts, has its origin in Southeast Asia in an area of northeast Burma, North Laos and North Thailand known as the "Golden Triangle."

It is transported in the planes, vehicles and other conveyances supplied by the United States. The profit from the trade has been going into the pockets of some of our best friends in Southeast Asia.

The charge concludes with the statement that the traffic is being carried on with the indifference if not the closed-eye compliance of some American officials and there is no likelihood of its being shut down in the foreseeable future.

Quick Controversy

These conclusions have been drawn by a young Ph.D. scholar from Yale who studied the subject for 18 months and who has already been embroiled with the Central Intelligence Agency over them.

'We have to continue to fight the evil of Communism and to fight . . . you must have money. In these mountains the only money is opium'

—A Taiwan general

Before publication, his book was attacked by the CIA for what it said were unjust accusations that the agency knew of but failed to stem that heroin traffic. After reading the galleys (which the publisher had made available) and sending off a critique to Harper's, the CIA took no further action.

It is difficult for anyone not close to the field to assess the accuracy of McCoy's material. But it must be said that his book is a serious, sober, headline-shunning study with 63 pages of supporting notes, referring to a large number of personal interviews, newspaper accounts, previously published books, Congressional committee hearings, government reports and United Nations documents. It is so filled with information that it will take a great deal more than mere dislike of its contents to demolish it.

Official Acknowledgement

Perhaps the greatest guarantee of its accuracy is a cabinet-level report prepared by officials of the CIA, the State Department and the Defense Department that confirms the main findings of the McCoy book. The report, dated Feb. 21, 1972, said that "there is no prospect" of stemming the smuggling of drugs by air and sea in Southeast Asia and cited as one reason the fact that "the governments in the region are unable or in some cases unwilling" to make a truly effective effort to curb the traffic.

That drug smuggling is not a problem remote from us can be seen from the fact that a shipment of the Double U-O Globe brand, a bulk heroin manufactured in the Golden Triangle, was seized in an amount estimated by the police to be worth $3.5 million in the Lexington hotel in New York City last November and another shipment worth by police estimates to be $2.25 million was taken in Miami.

The politics of heroin — and in this book the emphasis is on the politics — is an artful one. McCoy cites the case of Ngo Dinh Nhu, brother of President Ngo Dinh Diem of South Vietnam, later murdered by his colleagues.

During his brother's regime, Nhu was head of the secret police and had set up a close

continued

THE BULLETIN [redacted]

[redacted]

THE C.I.A. AND THE HEROIN TRADE

STATINTL

By ALFRED W. McCOY and KATHLEEN B. READ

"LADIES and gentlemen," announced the genteel British diplomat, raising his glass to offer a toast, "I give you Prince Sopsaisana, the uplifter of Laotian youth."

The toast brought an appreciative smile from the guest of honor, cheers and applause from the luminaries of Vientiane's diplomatic corps assembled at the farewell banquet for the Laotian ambassador-designate to France, Prince Sopsaisana. A member of the royal house of Xieng Khouang, the Plain of Jars region, the prince was vice-president of the National Assembly, chairman of the Lao Bar Association, president of the Lao Press Association, president of the *Alliance Francaise,* and a member in good standing of the Asian People's Anti-Communist League. After receiving his credentials from the king in a private audience at the Luang Prabang Royal Palace on April 8, 1971, he was treated to an unprecedented round of cocktail parties, dinners, and banquets. For Sopsai, as his friends call him, was not just any ambassador; the Americans considered him an outstanding example of a new generation of honest, dynamic leaders.

The final send-off party at Vientiane's Wattay Airport on April 23 was one of the gayest affairs of the season. Everybody was there; the champagne bubbled, the canapes were flawlessly French, and Ivan Bastouil, charge d'affaires at the French embassy, gave the nicest speech. Only after the plane had soared off into the clouds did anybody notice that Sopsai had forgotten to pay for his share of the reception.

His arrival at Paris's Orly Airport on the morning of April 25 was the occasion for another reception. The French ambassador to Laos, home for a brief visit, and the entire staff of the Laotian embassy had turned out to welcome the new ambassador. There were warm embraces, kissing on both cheeks, and more effusive speeches. Curiously, the prince insisted on waiting for his luggage like any ordinary tourist, and when his many suitcases finally appeared after an unexplained delay, he immediately noticed that a particular one was missing. Sopsai angrily insisted that his suitcase be delivered at once, and French authorities promised, most apologetically, that it would be sent to the Laotian embassy as soon as it was found. Sopsai departed reluctantly for yet another reception at the embassy, and while he drank the ceremonial champagne with his newfound retinue of admirers, French customs officials were examining one of the biggest heroin seizures in French history.

The ambassador's suitcase contained 60 kilos of high-grade Laotian heroin — worth $13.5 million on the streets of New York, its probable destination. A week later, a smiling French official presented himself at the embassy with the suitcase in hand. Although Sopsaisana had been bombarding the airport with outraged telephone calls for several days, he suddenly realised that accepting the suitcase was tantamount to an admission of guilt and so, contrary to his righteous indignation, he flatly denied that it was his. Ignoring his declaration of innocence, the French government refused to accept his diplomatic credentials, and Sopsai remained in Paris for no more than two months before he was recalled.

DESPITE its resemblance to comic opera, the Prince Sopsaisana affair offered a rare glimpse into the workings of the Laotian drug trade. That trade is the principal business of Laos, and to a certain extent it depends on the support (money, guns, aircraft etc) of the CIA. Unfortunately, the questions raised by the prince's disgrace were never asked, much less answered. The French government overlooked the embarrassment for diplomatic reasons, the international press ignored the story, and the United States embassy demonstrated a remarkable disinterest in the entire subject.

Over the past 50 years, Laos has become something of a free port for opium. The delicate opium poppy grows abundantly at high elevations in the northern mountains, and under a sequence of different regimes (French, American, Laotian), the hill tribesmen have been encouraged to cultivate the poppy as the principal cash crop. Opium dens can be found in every quarter of Vientiane, and the whereabouts of the opium refineries are a matter of common knowledge.

The Laotian indifference to Prince Sopsaisana's misfortune therefore becomes easily understandable. The reticence of the American embassy, however, requires a few words of explanation. Sopsai had allegedly received his 60 kilos of heroin through the kind offices of a particularly [redacted] Pao. Vang Pao also happens to be the commander of the CIA secret army in

continued

STATINTL

CHICAGO, ILL.
NEWS

E - 434,849

SEP 23 1972

Fiction: An ex-CIA man's disputed thriller

COMPANY MAN by Joe Maggio (Putnam, $6.95).

By George Harmon

THE late Allen Dulles, quarterback of our World War II spies and later chief of the CIA, scoffed at the notion of the American diplomat or spy being a closed-mind blunderer too cynical to play by any rules but his own. He criticized such novels as Graham Greene's "The Quiet American" and Burdick and Lederer's "The Ugly American" for promoting "mischief-creating prejudices."

Dulles wrote that he preferred "taking the raw material which we find in America — naive, home-grown, even homespun — and training such a man to be a good intelligence officer, however long the process lasts." Those homespun boys, if we are to believe recent news accounts, are traveling much farther afield than Dulles seemed willing to send them.

THE BACKBONE of CIA activity apparently remains the clandestine listening posts and purloined letters which Dulles so loved. But now the charge is often made that the CIA tries to foment change rather than merely report it; in Uganda, for example; in Chile, in Laos.

So much is being written about the CIA, in fact, that its argot is creeping into American slang: a spy is a spook, to kill is to "terminate with extreme prejudice."

Now arrives Joe Maggio, a mercenary-turned-writer, who says he worked off and on for the CIA in places like Africa and Laos.

His novel tells of Nick Martin, a sort of comic book superhero and former Green Beret. A "home-grown" boy whom Dulles would have liked, he is recruited off a Florida campus by "the Company" (in-group slang for the CIA), and works part time, training Bay of Pigs invaders and shooting up Africa and the Tonkin Gulf. There is enough bad writing to fill three pulp magazines ("steel split the air overhead").

BUT MAGGIO'S book has an aura of authenticity about it, and few readers know enough about the CIA to dispute him — even though the question already has been raised: Is Joe Maggio the Clifford Irving of the barracks set?

W. E. Colby, executive director of the CIA, disputes the publisher's contention that "Company Man" is "a novel of facts," proclaiming it a "tawdry fabrication" filled with "lurid writing and inane contradictions." He denies that the CIA ever has carried out assassinations or has trafficked in drugs, as Maggio asserts.

Colby also says Maggio was "terminated for cause" during a six-month CIA training program and never went overseas for the CIA or undertook any of the "assignments" Maggio says he performed. But Maggio has obtained a government letter quoting the CIA as saying that he worked for the agency on contract.

In any event, Maggio writes enough like a soldier to convince the reader he has been one. He has produced an unprofessional but good example of thriller fiction.

George Harmon is a Daily News editor and writer.

BROWNSVILLE, TEX.
HERALD
SEP 22 1972
E - 12,705
S - 12,809

Laotians Can Do Some Wonders With Figures

By LARRY MATTHEWS
Copley News Service

VIENTIANE, Laos -- American men killed in combat -- 99,200; wounded--2[illegible]; listed as missing or captured in the first four months of 1972--32,000. The statistics are staggering and, of course, untrue.

But in Laos where a jungle war has now raged for more than a decade, there is bitter significance in such casualty figures.

For the American casualties above are equivalent to the royal Lao government losses, according to figures compiled from the official Laotian news bulletin, Lao Presse.

Eight hundred forty-four Laotian soldiers died fighting during the first four months of this year, according to Lao Presse. In this tiny kingdom, where only 1.7 million of the total 3 million population are under government control, those deaths are equivalent to 99,200 American deaths.

In the same four-month period, 2,469 Laotians were wounded, esuivalent to 290,400 Americans.

Two hundred seventy-two Laotians are listed as missing in action or captured. That is the same as 32,000 GIs, 20 times the actual number of Americans missing or captured in Indochina since 1961.

The Laotian figures show that seven men were killed and 27 were wounded every day, and moreover, the 1972 casualties are not high. In fact, the opposite is true. Laotian casualties are running lower this year than in the last four years.

A 1971 study done for the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee started that Laotian forces lost an average of ten men killed a day from 1963 through April, 1971. The wounded went uncounted.

Many of the casualties were suffered during North Vietnamese drives against the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) base at Long Cheng in the north and along Route 23 on the Bolovens Plateau in the South in January and March of this year.

In each case, intense communist artillery barrages and human wave frontal assaults sent hundreds of Laotian soldiers to hospital wards and morgues.

Even though the Pathet Lao-North Vietnamese Dry season offensive had ended, fighting continues. Within the next month, royal Lao army forces will take advantage of monsoonal rains to counterattack and retake ground lost during the wet season. More casualties are inevitable.

The majority of government causalities, however, are recorded not in large battles like those of January and March, but rather in small guerrilla encounters throughout the country.

Clashes involving no more than 20 men kill and would several soldiers daily.

Few roads or trails in the country are safe from ambushers who always claim a victim or two before scurrying off.

Each day, mines and booby traps blow away lives and limbs. And because few Laotian units keep maps of the mine fields they lay, government as well as Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese troops repeatedly fall into their own traps and pay the human toll.

During an average day recently, the Laotian Ministry of Defense reported that eight government troops were killed, 26 wounded and two were missing in nine clashes, eleven shellings and one mine incident. The tally at the end of that week was 46 killed, 140 wounded and two missing.

As the war drags on, replacing the casualties becomes more difficult.

In Vientiane last March, army trucks waited outside a popular movie theater and hauled off young men caught without proper identification papers.

Army recruiters in southern Laos recently picked up healthy-looking bicyclists, threw them (and their bicycles) into trucks and hustled the lot off to the airport to be sent into battle.

To help the manpower-deficient Laotian government, the CIA began importing Thai troops a little over a year ago. They now number 5,000 and more are needed.

In spite of Laotian recruiting methods and the presence of Thai troops, the problem remains.

"Laos cannot go on this way much longer," says one American official. "There are just no more men to fill the places of the dead and wounded."

DES MOINES, IOWA
REGISTER

M - 250,261
S - 515,710
SEP 22 1972

Cracking Down on Drug Trade

President Nixon said he would comply fully and promptly with the statute which requires him to suspend aid to "any government whose leaders participate in or protect the activities of those who contribute to our drug problem."

Taken literally, the statute would require him to suspend aid to South Vietnam, Laos and Thailand, all of which have leaders deeply involved in the drug trade.

Formerly nearly all the heroin for Americans came from Turkish poppy fields via French processors and smugglers. In recent years the United States has been paying Turkey to cut off opium production and catching the French smugglers. So the traditional Southeast Asia opium trade has greatly expanded, begun manufacture of heroin and gone after customers among American soldiers in South Vietnam and in the world market. Burma is part of the chain, too, but Burma scorns U.S. aid.

If the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency were a foreign power (sometimes it acts like one), the President would have to cut off support for it, too. For years the C.I.A. has tolerated the opium and heroin trade of Southeast Asia in its search for "freedom fighters." The opium-growing Meos of Laos are C.I.A. proteges, and so, earlier, were the opium-growing Chinese Nationalist exiled guerrillas in Burma. The chain of smugglers who brought the opium from the interior highlands to processing and distribution points as heroin included Laotian and South Vietnamese generals and officials.

Unfortunately, all this is hard to prove in any individual case, though the general outlines are well-known.

The C.I.A. denies everything, and the Thai, Laotian and South Vietnamese governments do the same -- and occasionally co-operate in crackdowns to keep the White House satisfied.

Still, the President would be wise to keep his pledge on file and consider actually carrying out the threat. America's "honor" and "face" have been hopelessly smirched by the long, cruel Indochina war, but he could still salvage a little honor by ending the whole war (not just for Americans on the ground) out of refusal any longer to co-operate with those who are corrupting American troops with heroin.

OAKLAND, CAL.
CALIFORNIA VOICE
SEP 21 1972
WEEKLY - 12,500

Politics and History of Heroin

By Mark Henriquez

Almost universally acknowledged as something akin to the great plague itself, it is often surprising to learn that heroin was once proclaimed to be the wonder drug of the age. The time was shortly before the turn of the century and the place was imperial Germany where heroin had just been developed as a cure for a more sinister addiction, that of morphine. As use of the drug became more widespread and its disadvantages more obvious, heroin quickly lost its privileged position and the scientific institutions of the day renewed their search in other directions.

Quantities of heroin first appeared in this country around 1930. The principle importers of the drug were sailors and other global transients whose activities were confined primarily to the larger coastal cities. The ghettos for the most part remained untouched.

MORPHINE

With the coming of W W II the situation underwent a radical change and once more the use of morphine was involved. Standard procedure adopted by the U. S. armed forces for the treatment of wounds received in combat involved immediate massive injections of the drug to deaden the pain. So widespread was the use of morphine during the war that many G. I.'s were issued their own personal drug supply and hypodermic needle in the event that self treatment became necessary. Despite the fact that morphine was known to have been dangerously addictive some fifty years before the outbreak of the war, the drug had become an integral pat of America's wartime medical machine.

It was with the release of many of these wounded veterans from service that the specter of widespread drug addiction first appeared. No one, it seems, had yet developed a cure for morphine addiction but heroin was a good substitute. Sailors soon found that they could make a lot more money selling heroin than they could on any ship and the rush was on to secure the most lucrative markets and methods of production.

EFFECT

Nowhere was the effect of heroin felt more dramatically than in the Black community. Seemingly overnight scores of young men, whose only misfortune was to have served



their country, returned home with only their wits between them and what was most often a slow agonizing death.

Five years after the close of W W II the pusher was already established as the new king of the ghetto. The post war baby boom, the newfound affluence of the ifties, and the Korean conflict in which even more Americans were introduced to use of narcotics all played a role in the rise of smack. As a result countless millions of young men and women, most of them Black, found themselves involved with heroin before reaching the age of twenty.

Black power advocates were the first to allege that heroin addiction was actually encouraged by this country's federal government as a means to further subjugate the Black population, and thereby avoid full scale revolution in the face of increasing repression. Stokely Charmichel, Rap Brown, the now defunct SNCC, Peace and Freedom Party and even a fledgling Black Panther Party (New York chapter) have all espoused this position at one time or another. Whether or not this charge is valid in and of itself, there is a substantial body of evidence to suggest that the United States government has actively encouraged large scale heroin production to further its own political ends.

The genesis of this intrigue began shortly before the actual introduction of American troduction of American ground troops in South Vietnam. Before the American army could embark it was necessary to determine the amount of local support they could expect. Since the South Vietnamese army was barely on the edge of destruction and the civilian population almost solidly behind the Viet Cong, or just as solidly neutral, the search concentrated on certain jungle tribesmen who inhabit the remote mountain areas that border Laos and Cambodia. It just so happened that these Meo (pronounced Mao) and Montingyard tribesmen traditionally engaged in running guns and opium to the lucrative markets of Thialand and Viet Nam.

As they were already doing a booming business on their own, some incentive was needed to push them into the uncertainties of war. It seems that since these tribesmen had little or no contact with any government, political appeals were largely ineffective.

COMPROMISE

What evolved was a compromise. Montingyard and Meo tribes would fight and provide intelligence for American troops if the Americans would, in turn, help them move greater quantities of opium and heroin.

The details as to how this compromise has worked have been the subject of numerous articles appearing in publications ranging from Ramparts to THE NEW YORK TIMES. Air America aircraft, a charter owned and operated by the CIA, certain aircraft belonging to the USAF, and in one case documented by CBS, even the personal aircraft of the American ambassador to Saigon have all been involved in the trafficing of heroin.

That a new generation of American soldiers becomes addicted while serving in Viet Nam is seemingly a small price to pay for the opportunity of stopping the insidious red hoards.

WASHINGTON STAR
18 SEP 1972

Nixon Warns of Aid Cut To Drug-Dealer Nations

By GARNETT D. HORNER
Star-News Staff Writer

President Nixon today warned that he will not hesitate to cut off all American economic and military aid to any government whose leaders participate in or protect the drug traffic.

He also praised the Central Intelligence Agency for its role in fighting international drug traffic and said the agency has been "much maligned."

He said the CIA has "performed superbly" in fighting the international drug trade. "In the field of intelligence," he added, "we always find that the failures are those that are publicized. Its successes by definition must always be secret. In this area, there are many successes, and particularly ones of which this agency can be very proud."

Critics of the CIA have charged that the Agency has aided drug traffickers in Southeast Asia to help maintain alliances.

He spoke of "fine initial progress" in immobilizing and destroying sources of drugs coming into the United States.

He said, "France, Paraguay, Laos, Thailand and Turkey are just a few examples of the many countries where the work of American officials, from the ambassador down, in partnership with local officials, has produced important breakthroughs — huge heroin seizures, key arrests, or — in Turkey's case — the courageous decision to eradicate the opium poppy itself."

The President said he considers keeping dangerous drugs out of the United States "just as important as keeping armed enemy forces from landing in the United States" because the drugs can endanger the lives of youg Americans just as much as would an invading army.

Speaking at an international conference on drug control at the State Department, he asked American officials from around the world to convey to foreign officials with whom they deal "this personal message" from me:

"Any government whose leaders participate in or protect the activities of those who contribute to our drug program should know that the President of the United States is required by statute to suspend all American economic and military assistance to such a regime.

"I shall not hesitate to comply fully and promptly with that statute."

Nixon said he has been "cracking the whip" over government agencies involved in dealing with dangerous drugs to get them to "quit fighting each other and start fighting the problem."

Citing some results, he said the number of arrests of drug traffickers in the last fiscal year was double the number arrested in 1969, and the seizures of heroin and other illicit drugs are at an all-time high.

"Very sharp increases in the prices of heroin throughout the eastern United States indicate that the supply is drying up and that the pressure is on the criminal drug trade," he said.

Nixon's statements apparently were in response to a statement yesterday by Democratic presidential candidate Sen. George S. McGovern.

McGovern said the number of heroin addicts in the United States had doubled since 1968 and charged that Southeast Asia had become a major source of heroin because the administration would not crack down on the narcotics trade in Laos, Thailand and South Vietnam.

Nixon made no direct reference to McGovern's charges, but his comments appeared to be a sharp counterattack.

The President's praise of the CIA role follows claims and official denials that the agency's Air America has helped transport heroin in Southeast Asia.

In a book called "The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia," that was published recently, Arthur W. McCoy raised the question of whether CIA operatives knowingly engaged in such traffic to help maintain alliances.

More specifically, McCoy accused officials in governments of U.S. allies in Southeast Asia—particularly in Saigon—of profiting from the traffic.

STATINTL

THE WASHINGTON POST BOOK WORLD
27 Sept 1970

The Poppies And the Pushers

THE POLITICS OF HEROIN IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

By Alfred W. McCoy

With Cathleen B. Read and

Leonard P. Adams II

Harper & Row. 464 pp. $10.95

By LAURENCE STERN

"ORDINARILY THIS AGENCY does not respond to public criticism," the CIA's general counsel wrote the general counsel of Harper & Row publishing company last July 5. "However in this case we are under the strongest directive to support the U.S. government's effort against the international narcotics traffic and are bending every effort to do so. We believe we cannot stand by and see baseless criticism designed to undermine confidence in that effort without trying to set the record straight. . . ."

The subject of this extraordinary letter was *The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia* by Alfred W. McCoy, a doctoral candidate at Yale University. Harper & Row provided the CIA with advance proofs of the book and after receiving a statement of rebuttal covering several of McCoy's allegations of Agency involvement in opium traffic, the book was published.

If the intervention had any effect, it has probably been to boost the sales of McCoy's book; certainly it turned its publication into something of a *cause célèbre*. Perhaps the Agency would have better served its own interests by following the time-honored intelligence precept of maintaining silence in times of adversity. Public accountability has never been its strongest game.

By its nature as one of the world's most profitable illicit businesses, the opium and heroin trail is heavily canopied with underworld and official secrecy. In the Golden Triangle region of northeastern Burma, northern Thailand and northern Laos, the principal opium growing and processing area in Southeast Asia, the traffic is fed by highland tribes, minor warlords and paramilitary soldiers, and it is controlled by high-ranking officials of the three countries. This distribution system fed heroin into the veins of American soldiers in Vietnam and into the international heroin stream that surfaces terminally in the ghettos and suburbs of the United States.

LAURENCE STERN is the roving foreign correspondent of The Washington Post.

McCoy has done a sturdy and comprehensive reporting job. He has interviewed American and Southeast Asian sources who either played a direct role in the opium traffic or are highly competent to talk about it. It is his argument that when the United States embarked on the geopolitical objective of trying to contain Chinese and North Vietnamese power at their borders in Southeast Asia, it slipped inexorably into the narcotics traffic.

The international market had been created long before by the European colonial powers, chiefly Britain and France. Great Britain in the late 18th century took the first big step toward internationalization of the Asian drug traffic by establishing a government monopoly over India's opium harvest, helping finance the regime of the Raj by taxing the product, and beginning the massive export of Indian opium into China. When Chinese imperial authorities tried to stop it, Britain, with its gunships, blasted open the Chinese ports to European trade and Indian opium during the Opium War of 1839 to 1842.

Under the forced infusions of opium from British-ruled India the Chinese imports rose from a level of 340 tons in the first decade of the 19th century to 6,500 tons by 1860. It was in this period that the Chinese began a large-scale program of domestic opium production, much of it in the outlying provinces of Szechwan and Yunan. By the beginning of the 20th century, China had an addict population of 15 million. The wave of Chinese migrations into Southeast Asia spread the scourge of addiction southward.

The French played a similar role in expanding and monopolizing opium production under colonial authority. Centuries before the French arrived the Meo [illegible] opium, but more as a ceremonial intoxicant than to achieve the stupefaction of "living death" with which the Chinese coolies escaped their wretched life cycle of toil, poverty and disease. The French established their own monopoly and converted the Meo poppy harvests into an important cash crop which was taxed and sold to the growing addict population of Indochina. By the beginning of World War Two, according to McCoy's research, there were some 2,500 opium dens in Indochina serving about 100,000 addicts.

The Viet Minh war of independence eventually became a major challenge to French political rule and a drain on the colonial economy. In countering their guerrilla movement the French turned to the Meo tribal peoples in the Laotian highlands and to their poppy harvests. Meo opium became an important factor both in financing the war and in cementing the loyalties of the tribal guerrillas fighting on the French side. McCoy relates the case of the French Expeditionary Corps' "Operation X," a top-secret project for the collection and transport of Meo opium into the Saigon markets where it was turned over to the Binh Xuyen, an underworld secret society which the French occupation authorities permitted to take over civil authority in Saigon. By the time American influence replaced the French military presence, the poppy was the main cash crop in the Golden Triangle, the opium economy was fully developed, and there were well-rutted patterns for dealing with the tribal mountain guerrillas who had been enlisted by the French in the war against the Pathet Lao and Vietnamese Communist insurgents.

Here the argument begins. McCoy asserts that Central Intelligence operations became heavily involved in the opium-heroin traffic. He says that some of the Agency's chief Asian operatives and clients controlled it and that the CIA's contract airline, Air America, moved it toward the ultimate markets.

All this has long been a matter of conventional wisdom and surmise in the bars and embassies of Vientiane, where wags spoke of Air America as "Air Opium," but McCoy seeks to document the case with interviews (alas, some of the crucial ones anonymous) and hard evidence.

One of the most sensational allegations in the book is that Meo General Vang Pao, the most important field commander on the Royal Lao government side, arranged for the delivery of 60 kilos of high grade Laotian heroin (worth $13.5 million in New York) to Prince Sopsaisana, the Laotian ambassador-designate to France in April 1971. Sopsaisana returned to Laos after French

continued

HOUSTON POST

15 SEP 1972

Soviet Embassy employe defects

By DONALD R. MORRIS
Post News Analyst

Evgeniy Sorokine, 24, an employe of the GRU Rezidentura in the Soviet Embassy in Vientiane, Laos, has defected to the United States.

According to AP and UPI reports, Sorokine and his wife Tatiana were posted to Laos in 1971, where he was assigned duties as driver and French interpreter for Col. Vladimir P. Gretchanine.

Gretchanine was listed as a Soviet military attache. In the early 1960s, Gretchanine was posted to Washington, and was expelled in the course of a quid pro quo reprisal for several U.S. diplomats expelled from Moscow at the time.

ON SEPT. 10 Sorokine's car was found crashed into a tree halfway between the Soviet Embassy and Vientiane Airport. That evening he requested political asylum at the U.S. Embassy, and the following day he was flown out of Laos, probably on a chartered Air America flight.

Sorokine is now reported to be in the United States. Tatiana Sorokine remains in Vientiane.

These are the bare outlines of a story that will not be expanded on by official U.S. sources, at least for some time to come. Several conclusions, however, may be drawn.

Sorokine was an employe of the Soviet military intelligence service, the GRU; he was not attached to the KGB. All personnel attached to the Soviet military attache office are employes or officers of the GRU, and never of the KGB. Gretchanine is, and always was, a GRU officer.

SOROKINE WAS, most likely, not an officer, but an employe whose duties were exactly as given; driver-interpreter to Col. Gretchanine, whose rank indicates he was probably the GRU Resident — the officer in command of the GRU Rezidentura.

Although not an agent handler, Sorokine will be nonetheless valuable. He will be able to provide a complete breakdown of the GRU Rezidentura, including those officers under other covers outside of the Military Attache Office. He will undoubtedly be able to identify a goodly proportion of the KGB Rezidentua as well. His duties would also have enabled him to identify a number of GRU agents, developmental cases and spotting leads as well.

Post analysis

Several aspects of the story hint that Sorokine may be something of a handling problem. More than twenty officers of the Soviet intelligence services have defected to Western countries. It is the act of a deeply maladjusted man, a misfit in his own society who is, by cutting off his entire past life with no hope of return, in effect, taking what may be the only alternative to suicide open to him. For complex psychological reasons, defection almost never occurs before middle age, and Sorokine, at 24, is quite possibly the youngest GRU defector to reach the West.

THE CRASHED car indicates further agitation and a spur-of-the-moment decision. Under no circumstances would this be some form of window-dressing to mislead the Soviets; the CIA eschews such James Bondish dramatics.

Sorokine's desertion of his wife may be still further evidence of disturbance; had the defection been planned in advance with CIA assistance she could easily have been evacuated as well. (But several defections have been triggered by the urge to escape an impossible marital situation.)

The Soviets reported that Sorokine was missing to the Laotian Foreign Ministry the same day he was flown out of the country. They dropped their standard gambit in such cases, which was to charge that the defector had absconded with the embassy petty cash fund and should be treated as a common criminal. Either they placed little reliance in the Laotian police, or they knew he was out of the country when they reported his absence.

THE CIA is to be commended for the speed with which Sorokine was evacuated; even in Laos such operations pose administrative problems, especially with a sudden walk-in. Over the years, they have been able to count on such a defection every 18 months or so, to implement the knowledge gained from their independent penetrations of the Soviet services.

Sorokine, in fact, may be astonished to find that his hosts know more about the GRU than he does. It has happened before.

Soviet Embassy employe defects

[redacted]

STAT INTL

[redacted]

By DONALD R. MORRIS
Post News Analyst

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Although not an agent handler, Sorokine will be nonetheless valuable. He will be able to provide a complete breakdown of the GRU Rezidentura, including those officers under other covers outside of the Military Attache Office. He will undoubtedly be able to identify a goodly proportion of the KGB Rezidentua as well. His duties would also have enabled him to identify a number of GRU agents, developmental cases and spotting leads as well.

Post analysis

Several aspects of the story hint that Sorokine may be something of a handling problem. More than twenty officers of the Soviet intelligence services have defected to Western countries. It is the act of a deeply maladjusted man, a misfit in his own society who is, by cutting off his entire past life with no hope of return, in effect, taking what may be the only alternative to suicide open to him. For complex psychological reasons, defection almost never occurs before middle age, and Sorokine, at 24, is quite possibly the youngest GRU defector to reach the West.

THE CRASHED car indicates further agitation and a spur-of-the-moment decision. Under no circumstances would this be some form of window-dressing to mislead the Soviets; the CIA eschews such James Bondish dramatics.

Sorokine's desertion of his wife may be still further evidence of disturbance; had the defection been planned in advance with CIA assistance she could easily have been evacuated as well. (But several defections have been triggered by the urge to escape an impossible marital situation.)

The Soviets reported that Sorokine was missing to the Laotian Foreign Ministry the same day he was flown out of the country. They dropped their standard gambit in such cases, which was to charge that the defector had absconded with the embassy petty cash fund and should be treated as a common criminal. Either they placed little reliance in the Laotian police, or they knew he was out of the country when they reported his absence.

THE CIA is to be commended for the speed with which Sorokine was evacuated; even in Laos such operations pose administrative problems, especially with a sudden walk-in. Over the years, they have been able to count on such a defection every 18 months or so, to implement the knowledge gained from their independent penetrations of the Soviet services.

Sorokine, in fact, may be astonished to find that his hosts know more about the GRU than he does. It has

DAILY WORLD

14 SEP 1972

STATINTL [redacted]

CIA "secret army" crumbles in Laos

VIENTIANE—Units of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency's "secret army" of Meo tribesmen in northern Laos fled from the Plain of Jars Wednesday after coming under heavy attack by the Lao Patriotic Front forces. The four columns of "secret army" troops were reported about 12 miles north of the big CIA base at Long Cheng.

According to informed sources, the Meo tribesmen complained of a lack of U.S. air support and said that this justified their somewhat hasty withdrawal. But other observers said the Meos are being affected by the recent reports of CIA involvement in opium-smuggling in Southeast Asia. The entire Meo tribal economy is based on opium-smuggling, except for the CIA funds they receive.

selves with those on whom the Americans bombs are falling. But all of us could identify with the hostages of those terrorists in Munich, and feel the horror the Israeli athletes must have felt at the realization that those armed men, self-righteous in their own cause, were ready to kill them without a qualm.

Perhaps that glimpse of the ultimate evil of which humans are capable will steel us toward the harsh judgment we must, it seems, make as a nation in this election: Will we condone a continuation of the killing in the vain hopes of redeeming our blunder in Vietnam?

If the Munich tragedy does that for America and the world, there may be some measure of meaning in its madness. Otherwise, we must record it as just another mindless massacre in this darkened age.

CHICAGO COUNCIL OF LAWYERS ENDORSES CONSUMER PROTECTION AGENCY LEGISLATION

Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, I am exceedingly pleased to learn that so distinguished a group as the Board of Governors of the Chicago Council of Lawyers has endorsed legislation to create a governmental voice for the consumer, who for so long has gone unrepresented before Federal agencies and courts.

In view of the fact that both the Republican and Democratic Party platforms, just adopted, endorsed the concept of an independent consumer advocacy agency, and that the Senate Government Operations Committee recently voted 15 to 2 to report S. 3970 to the floor, I am hopeful that the leadership will act promptly to schedule this legislation for full consideration before the Senate.

The Consumer Protection Agency legislation is a precise and balanced measure which affords the authority and resources needed to assure effective advocacy for consumer interests. It is needed, because the regulatory agencies Congress has set up to protect the consumer have simply not been doing the job. The legislation also provides for a Council of Consumer Advisers which will advise the President on policy matters that critically affect the public and will guarantee that consumer interests are taken into account at the highest levels of Government.

Mr. President, the Chicago Council of Lawyers was founded in response to the need for a reform professional organization of lawyers in the Chicago area. Since its organization, council membership has grown to over 1,300 and it is now counted as a major general membership bar association in Chicago affiliated with the ABA.

I ask unanimous consent that the resolution adopted by the Chicago Council of Lawyers be printed in its entirety in the RECORD. The reference to S. 1177 in the resolution is a reference to the predecessor bill of S. 3970, which was modified somewhat in the course of 2 months consideration before the Government Operations Committee. The basic findings and conclusions of this resolution, however, continue to apply with the same force and effect as they did with respect to the original measure.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

STATEMENT OF THE CHICAGO COUNCIL OF LAWYERS

The Chicago Council of Lawyers' Board of Governors urges adoption of Senate Bill 1177 which authorizes creation of a Council of Consumer Advisers to the President and an independent Consumer Protection Agency. In recent years, it has become apparent that the interests of the American consumer of goods and services have not always been considered either by industry in product design and delivery or by government in regulatory policy-making. At present, the consumer's view is advocated only by a few dedicated citizens whose resources do not permit broad representation and who often are forced to expend those limited resources and energies merely to establish their right to be heard. Essentially, S.B. 1177 provides an integrated framework for developing over the long-term national consumer programs and priorities through a Council of Consumer Advisers (the "CCA"), and for meeting the need for a consumer spokesperson, through a Consumer Protection Agency (the "CPA"), with financing and authority to represent consumer interests full time on specific questions.

The CCA, to become a part of the executive department, is directed to report annually to the President on consumer programs, priorities and legislative goals; thus progress in meeting consumer needs will receive the national attention and concern they deserve. The CPA will have standing to be heard in federal administrative adjudicatory and rule-making proceedings. Though it will have no authority to impinge on the jurisdiction of other agencies, an active and aggressive CPA will force sometimes ineffective and industry-wedded agencies to consider the interests of the consumer. Another important feature of the CPA's role is the direction to conduct industry-wide surveys and investigations to analyze industry and business practices of concern to consumers. Included in this authorization is the important power to require business and industry to answer interrogatories. Until now, only understaffed and inadequately financed citizen groups have undertaken such studies. Other important consumer interest functions the CPA will exercise are to receive consumer complaints and direct them to the appropriate agency for action, to act as a clearinghouse for information of interest to consumers, and to publish a Federal Consumer Register of information useful to consumers.

Besides establishing a potentially strong advocate for consumer interests, S.B. 1177 contains safeguards against unnecessary and irresponsible harrassment of business by the CPA. Specifically, section 208 requires the CPA to take all reasonable measures to assure the accuracy of all public disclosures, to avoid "surprise" disclosures, and to announce product comparisons only under controlled conditions. Perhaps most important to business is the role the CPA will take as advocate for industries and businesses forced to act contrary to consumer's interest because of existing laws or agency policies. For example, only two years ago the television industry, alerted to a potential fire hazard in color TVs, sent representatives to a Chicago meeting to discuss upgrading flammability standards at the risk of Justice Department intervention on antitrust grounds. The CPA would act to urge government approval of industry cooperation in similar matters.

Recognizing, too, the critical role citizen groups have played in making government and industry increasingly responsive to consumer interests the drafters of S.B. 1177, notably Senators Charles Percy and Abraham Ribicoff, have assured further responsible citizen initiative by providing for a CPA administered system of grants to help support citizen research and action groups. To the same end, section 405 orders all federal agencies to clarify, and relax where appropriate, procedural requirements for citizen participation in public hearings.

In sum, the Chicago Council of Lawyers believes S.B. 1177 is legislation that all interests—consumer, industry and government—can and should support.

LAOS: THE FURTIVE WAR

Mr. EAGLETON. Mr. President, the concern that congressional power is being usurped by the executive branch has been voiced many times by this body. The 68-to-16 vote for passage of the War Powers Act is a clear indication that an overwhelming majority of Senators feel it is time to reassert the constitutional prerogatives of Congress.

In the forefront of this fight to bring awareness to the Congress and to the American people is my distinguished senior colleague from Missouri (Mr. SYMINGTON). As a member of the Committees on Armed Services, Foreign Relations, and Joint Atomic Energy, Senator SYMINGTON has viewed with growing concern covert operations of the U.S. Government.

Senator SYMINGTON has now contributed a most perceptive article in World magazine entitled "Laos: The Furtive War," in which he expresses in a compelling manner his deep concern that the power of Congress to declare war has been eroded.

Senator SYMINGTON's strong feeling that the authority of Congress has been bypassed in the Laotian experience is reflected in the following passage from his article:

The Constitution has been bypassed by a small group of men in various Departments of the Executive Branch who, under the direction of four Presidents, initiated and carried out policies without any real Congressional knowledge and thus any true Congressional authorization. Needless to say, these policies were also carried out without the knowledge and approval of the American people, on whose consent our government is supposed to rest.

This theme is reinforced in Senator SYMINGTON's article as he looks at the history of our involvement in Laos since the Presidency of Dwight Eisenhower. Senator SYMINGTON's analysis is both compelling and shocking. I commend it highly to the Senate.

I ask unanimous consent that the article be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From World magazine, Aug. 29, 1972]

LAOS: THE FURTIVE WAR

(By U.S. Senator STUART SYMINGTON)

(NOTE.—Stuart Symington, a Democrat, is the senior senator from Missouri, and the only sentator on the Armed Services, Foreign Relations and Joint Atomic Energy Committees. Born in Massachusetts, he has been in the Senate for twenty years.)

The United States has been involved for more than a decade in an undeclared and largely unnoticed war in northern Laos. From the beginning, and as of today, this war has been characterized by a degree of secrecy never before true of a major American involvement abroad in which many American

WASHINGTON STAR

10 SEP 1972

Heroin Road In SE Asia

By TAMMY ARBUCKLE
Special to The Star-News

VIENTIANE—"I have the fastest boat on the river," boasted the Lao colonel as he swigged another glass of throat-burning rice whisky at a party in Ban Houei Sai, a Lao garrison town.

Nobody could dispute the colonel's claim, for the previous record-holder — a big Chrysler belonging to American Treasury and Customs officers — had a burned-out engine after someone had surreptitiously drained the oil from its crank case.

The prime suspect of U.S. officials is none other than the Colonel and his henchmen, who, they believe, are in the opium and heroin trade.

"The river" is the mighty Mekong, now swollen by monsoon rains. From Yunnan in China it plunges in a brown mass of whirlpools and forming eddies, over giant rock outcroppings that could dash a boat to pieces between the sloping green hills that make excellent land for poppy-growing.

If the river doesn't kill the unwary traveller he faces the peril of an arrow fired from a crossbow of Shan or Ekaw tribesmen or bullets from a Ho musket or a Kuomintang carbine.

The whole area—Burma on one bank and Laos on the other—is the battleground for American narcotics agents and heroin smugglers and refiners. The sabotaged boat is just a skirmish in the battle that started last November, when the United States persuaded the Lao government to pass anti-narcotics laws.

Stalemate

Agents of the Treasury and Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs say that, after initial successes, they have reached a stalemate in the fight against drug traffickers along the borders.

Earlier this year agents knocked out two heroin refineries in villages just north of Ban Houei Sai. At one of them, Lao military officials, who denied running the refinery, burned buildings as a sign of good faith to show their willingness to stop the trade after considerable American pressure.

Later American narcotics agents and Laos' tough new drug squad leader, Gen. Khammu Bousarrath, took away truck loads of equipment from the burned refinery, including ether in 10-gallon drums, acetone and acedic anhydrate, all used in heroin manufacture.

But the all-important chemist was never caught.

In Vientiane Gen. Khammu raided the house of a national assembly deputy, Meo tribesman Mou Seu, and reported confiscating 27 pounds of heroin hidden under the house roof.

Mou Seu, claiming immunity as a legislator, has not yet been prosecuted. This immunity runs out when the Assembly closes Nov. 11, and many American officials take the view that if the Lao government fails to prosecute Muo Seu under the new law, cooperation in the drug fight will have failed.

Sixty-six pounds of boiled opium have been confiscated from passengers on aircraft chartered to U.S. government agencies by Air America and Continental Airlines.

Since this flurry of activity, agents and runners have been eyeing each other warily.

"Nobody is buying opium for the international market," an informed U.S. official said.

Americans say the 1972 opium crop harvested in January and February has not been sold internationally because of the crackdown. This judgment is based on a drop in opium prices indicating a glut on the market on the Burmese side of the border.

To date, opium and heroin have followed certain routes, and the Americans are concentrating first on closing off these routes. The flow of heroin follows the line of least resistance, one U.S. official said "We will stop it coming one way and it will flow around us. The traffickers will find new routes and we will close them off till it's no longer worthwhile. We can pinch the flow off across Thailand and Laos eventually, but the traffickers can always move through Burmese territory to Rangoon and the Bay of Bengal and there won't be much we can do about it. We have no political leverage in Burma."

American officials say about 450 tons of opium are produced annually in Burma's Shan and Wa states.

The opium flows out of the hills to the walled city of Kengtung. From Kengtung it follows the Burmese road system to Tachilek opposite the Thai town of Mai Sai. There are at least eight heroin refineries around Tachilek.

From Tachilek heroin moves in two directions, one across the border into Thailand and through Thailand's busy road net, the other east from Tachilek to a point just north of the area where Burma, Laos and Thailand come together.

The heroin crosses into Laos from Burma at Muong Hi village then continues down to the Yao tribes' headquarters at Nam Keun on the Mekong River.

In the Nam Keun area there are also heroin refineries which handle not only Burmese opium, but opium grown by the Lahu and Ekaw tribes in Laos.

continued

LORAIN, OHIO
JOURNAL
SEP 9 1972
E & S - 35,960

U.S. Planes Carry Dope

THE U.S. government has insisted for years that its unofficial CIA-run airline, Air America, has not been running opium in the mountain-bound Asian land of Laos.

But now, from the files of the CIA and other U.S. intelligence agencies, we have evidence that U.S. ground and air equipment —if not U.S. personnel—has formed the backbone of the Laos opium trade.

"SELECTED ROYAL Lao Army and Royal Lao Air Force units, utilizing air and ground equipment furnished by the U.S., provide the means for protecting, transporting and processing of narcotics," reports one intelligence summary on Laos.

"A broad spectrum of Lao society is involved in the narcotics business, including Generals, Princes, high-level bureaucrats and Province Governors," says the report.

Another document, complete with a secret CIA map, reports unequivocally: 'Most of the refineries in Laos operate under the protection of the Royal Laotian Armed Forces...Some reports suggest that a senior Royal Laotian Armed Forces officer may hold an ownership interest in a few of these facilities."

To end narcotics running by the highest echelons of Laotian society, the documents propose drastic action.

"An important target group will be the air force generals and other Royal Lao Air Force personnel who command and operate the transport aircraft involved in shipping narcotics."

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600120001-5

DAILY WORLD
9 SEP 1972

[redacted]

CIA Laos army disintegrates

VIENTIANE—United Press International quoted "American sources" on Friday as saying the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency's "secret army" of Meo tribesmen and Thai mercenaries in northwest Laos "has virtually disintegrated." Numbers involved were estimated at 6-8,000. The "secret army" was under attack by forces of the Lao Patriotic Front.

Approved For Release 2000/05/15 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000600120001-5

WASHINGTON POST
9 SEP 1972

STATINTL

Laotian Irregulars Abandon Offensive

From News Dispatches

VIENTIANE, Sept. 8 — A 2,400-man task force of CIA-supported Laotian irregular forces was forced to withdraw from its positions northwest of the Plain of Jars under heavy fire on Tuesday, abandoning an offensive operation against the North Vietnamese-held Plain, American sources said today.

WASHINGTON POST

[redacted]

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

U.S. Is Backbone of Laos Drug Trade

By Jack Anderson

The U.S. government has insisted for years that its unofficial CIA-run airline, Air America, has not been running opium in the mountainous Asian land of Laos.

But now, from the files of the CIA and other U.S. intelligence agencies, we have evidence that U.S. ground and air equipment — if not U.S. personnel — has formed the backbone of the Laos opium trade.

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"An important target group will be the Air Force generals and other Royal Lao Air Force personnel who command and operate the transport aircraft involved in shipping narcotics.

"Officials high and low who are found to be involved in a substantial way will have to be removed from positions of influence," urges the memo. It recommends curtailment of some aid to Laos.

"This is aimed specifically at eliminating the use of all U.S.-owned aircraft operated by the Royal Laotian Air Force or U.S.-leased aircraft, including U.S. support items, in the transport of narcotics."

In recent months, America's spokesmen claim a new Laotian anti-heroin law is having some effect. But, in fact, only lowly opium hustlers are arrested; the generals and princes go untouched.

Jonah and the Whale

The Federal Reserve Board is supposed to supervise banks, not do their dirty work. But recently the Fed aided the banks in an attempt to take over an entire industry.

The victim of this power play was supposed to be the armored car and courier industry, a collection of small companies all over the country.

The banks would like to swallow up the industry, and the Fed has been deliberating whether to grant permission.

Unwilling to play Jonah to the banks' whale, the armored car and courier companies are fighting back. As part of their counterattack, one courier firm hired Dun & Bradstreet to survey how good a job the courier companies do.

They decided to survey the Fed's own outlying banks, figuring that if the Fed's own branches liked the courier service, this would be convincing argument that the industry deserved to survive.

Dun & Bradstreet gathered 20 interviews with Fed banks before their bosses in Washington got wind of the survey.

Off went a peremptory telegram. "It appears inappropriate for officials of Federal Reserve banks and branches to express any opinions about courier services," wired Board Secretary Tynan Smith, noting that a Fed decision on the takeover was pending.

To make absolutely sure the courier survey was stymied, Smith added: "Please keep us informed if you are contacted for such information." This so intimidated the regional Fed officials that two of them, who had already given interviews, tried to withdraw them. Other officials insisted their replies be totally anonymous.

Although the survey was aborted, the courier services did get some use out of it. Based on the incomplete returns, it showed the Fed banks were generally satisfied with the private courier services.

No Spanish Allowed

A top anti-poverty official has scolded subordinates for speaking Spanish at a recent meeting that included Spanish-speaking officials.

"I was appalled," wrote operations chief James Griffith, "to hear a meeting of in-house (anti-pvoerty) people closed with a statement in Spanish and answered in Spanish. This was absolutely uncalled for and taken as a direct insult by the persons in attendance."

Griffith's rebuke was directed at migrant staff official Pete Merilez. Asked for an explanation, Griffith told us: "We poor gringos who don't speak Spanish sometimes get embarrassed when we hear others speak it. We get the feeling they're speaking behind our backs."

ground mining experience being permitted to work alone while installing temporary roof support in face areas;

4. *Management's failure* to enforce the company's approved roof control plan and other policies designed to eliminate substandard conditions and practices which result in roof-fall accidents.

5. The *failure of management* to establish a procedure by which trainees are readily identifiable and the lack of communication between the safety department, supervisory personnel, and employees relative to the type, extent, and control of training new employees before they are required to work alone, and

6. *Management's failure* to analyze and utilize the data logged in the accident record books in the prevention of injuries from roof-falls." (Italic supplied.)

If the miners of this Nation knew of this record and could vote on retaining or not retaining Consol's current managament team, I feel certain that they would vote to throw that team out of office.

By failing to properly train and retrain employees, to instill in all their employees, a sense of safety consciousness, and, most importantly, to insure that *all* Federal and State safety rules are fully observed, Consol officials are clearly negligent and should be replaced. Consol needs management people who will devote greater personnel time and effort to health and safety than production. This means *all* Consol mine officials whatever their title—not just the Safety Directors. Until this is done, I predict that Consol will continue to lead or nearly lead the Nation in mine deaths.

I urge that you personally take charge of Consol's health and safety program and initiate steps to drastically reduce injury and fatality rates at *all* Consol mines for the remainder of this year and thereafter.

I would be interested in learning what actions you take or plan to take to achieve this.

Sincerely,

KEN HECHLER.

WORLD ORDER STRATEGY COMMITTEE, MEMBERS OF CONGRESS FOR PEACE THROUGH LAW

(Mr. DRINAN asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. DRINAN. Mr. Speaker, I have the honor to chair the World Order Strategy Committee of our bipartisan, bicameral organization, Members of Congress for Peace Through Law MCPL now has 134 members—32 Senators and 102 Representatives, from both parties and every region of the country.

The World Order Strategy Committee was created by MCPL several months ago for the purpose of examining the basic assumptions on which American foreign policy is based.

Our committee is very fortunate to have 13 exceedingly able and dedicated members—public servants who believe that a careful review of the fundamental questions of how to obtain peace through law is a necessary enterprise. They are Senators ALAN CRANSTON, of California; HAROLD HUGHES, of Iowa; and BOB PACKWOOD, of Oregon; and Representatives RICHARD BOLLING, of Missouri; PAUL FINDLEY, of Illinois; DONALD FRASER, of Minnesota; PAUL MCCLOSKEY, of California; PATSY MINK, of Hawaii; HENRY REUSS, of Wisconsin; FRED SCHWENGEL, of Iowa; JOHN SEIBERLING, of Ohio; and CHARLES WHALEN, of Ohio. We have six Republicans and eight Democrats in all.

Our committee has undertaken an inquiry into the following fundamental questions:

SEVEN FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS

First. What kind of international political order do you want your grandchildren to inherit?

Second. What is U.S. national security?

Third. Is the balance of power concept consistent with international peace and national security?

Fourth. Is the policy of deterrence an adequate response to our need for security?

Fifth. Does U.S. foreign policy contribute to the ability of peoples to select governments of their own choosing?

Sixth. How do existing disparities among nations in wealth and human well-being affect U.S. national security?

Seventh. What should be the fundamental principles of U.S. foreign policy?

These are obviously questions of exquisite difficulty. The process of arriving at even tentative answers will be long and arduous. However, we believe these questions must be asked and discussed very seriously if world order is ever to be more than an idle dream.

COMMITTEE HOLDS HEARINGS

To begin our inquiry, the committee held a series of six hearings. Each of the six distinguished citizens who testified reflected on the fundamental questions. The contributions of Prof. John Kenneth Galbraith, Hans Morganthau, and Robert W. Tucker, Dr. Richard J. Barnet, Norman Cousins and C. Maxwell Stanley to our work were so outstanding that I would like to bring their statements to the attention of all of our colleagues.

The hearings of the World Order Strategy Committee are open to the public and every Member of Congress is invited to attend and join us in discussion with the witnesses.

On behalf of the committee I welcome the assistance of all Congressmen and Senators as we continue to seek new, practical answers to the fundamental questions which the United States and mankind must answer if we are to survive.

A brief biographical sketch of each of our witnesses to date, and summaries of their statements follow:

JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH

Professor John Kenneth Galbraith was born in Ontario, Canada and was educated at the University of Guelph, the University of California and Cambridge University in England. Assistant Professor of Economics at Princeton University, 1939–40, he also served as Economic Advisor to the National Defense Advisory Committee, 1940–41. Between 1941 and 1943, he was at the Office of Price Administration, first as Assistant Administrator in charge of the Price Division and then as Deputy Administrator.

He was a Member of the Board of Editors of *Fortune* magazine 1943–48 and was Director of the Office of Economic Security Policy, Department of State in 1946. He has served as Chairman of the Americans for Democratic Action and as U.S. Ambassador to India, 1961–63. A Visiting Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge University, 1970–71, he is currently Paul M. Warburg Professor of Economics at Harvard University, where he taught from 1934–39 and from 1948 to the present.

His numerous publications include *A Contemporary Guide to Economics, Peace and Laughter* (1971), *Who Needs the Democrats and What It Takes To Be Needed* (1970), *How To Control The Military* (1969), *Ambassador's Journal* (1969), *How To Get Out of Vietnam* (1967), *The New Industrial State* (1967, second edition, 1971), *The Affluent Society* (second revised edition, 1969), *Economic Development in Perspective* (1962), *American Capitalism, the concept of countervailing power* (1952, second revised edition, 1955), and *Beyond the Marshall Plan* (1949).

STATEMENT BY PROF. JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, BEFORE THE WORLD ORDER STRATEGY COMMITTEE OF MEMBERS OF CONGRESS FOR PEACE THROUGH LAW, JUNE 27, 1972

(1) There is advantage in being compelled to state the basic problem of our foreign policy in brief compass. This is a field where meaning is ordinarily disguised by words, the more words the better the disguise. It is one reason why discussion of foreign policy tends to be intellectually inferior even to the more suspect forms of sociology. Its reputation is saved principally by the circumstance that those who discuss foreign policy have a superior social position, more self assurance, a lesser awareness of what they do not know, and somewhat better tailoring.

(2) The effects of American foreign policy in the last quarter century have been regionally very diverse. Western Europe and Japan were the areas of failure and war in the first half of this century. Here, on the whole, the policy has been a success. Economics have been strong; nationalism has receded. We are now suffering competitively in relation to these parts of the world. That, however, has been the consequence of incompetent economic management here at home. In Singapore this week, former Secretary of the Treasury John Connally was generous enough to say that he thought that Britain had a sound economy. He was wise not to mention the state of the American economy from which he had just taken the precaution of detaching himself.

(3) In relation to the Communist states things have also improved in these last years. For this we must give credit to the recent initiatives of Mr. Nixon. They have moved us perceptibly away from the cold war terror which so effectively enthroned the military and so extensively destroyed civilian reason in the fifties and sixties. (It was unreason, it must be added, which Mr. Nixon had previously done much to enhance.) Our great need in relation to the Soviet Union is to avoid the risk of further confrontation. We cannot continue to depend on the insane assumption that the Russians will always back down. And the further need is to negotiate an effective arms limitation agreement. We cannot afford another arms limitation like last which (in the Administration view) is only acceptable if associated with a large increase in arms expenditure. Arms limitation of this kind could only be treated adequately by the late Lewis Carroll.

(4) The area of our misfortune in foreign policy in the last twenty-five years has been in the Third World. This—at the Bay-of-Pigs, in the Dominican Republic, in Bangladesh and above all in Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam—has been the theatre of all our disasters. Here, repeatedly, we stumbled. It is obvious that something is very wrong with our policy toward this part of the planet—unless, of course, the disasters were really a succession of righteously conceived initiatives all misconstrued as mistakes by the American people. However popular in Washington at the time and still in the memoirs of those involved this is a proposition it would be unwise to accept.

(5) The source of our disasters was the

NEW YORK DAILY NEWS

5 SEP 1972

Reveal Disaster In Plain of Jars

By JOSEPH FRIED
Staff Correspondent of THE NEWS

Saigon, Sept. 4—Communist troops smashed the spearhead of a major allied drive to retake the strategic Plain of Jars in Laos by shattering two elite Lao mobile units, reliable sources disclosed today. Authorities so far have been able to account for only about 650 allied troops out of a total of 2,400 men.

The drive was launched recently to take advantage of the departure of a North Vietnamese division, possibly for redeployment to South Vietnam's battlefields.

Spearheading the push were two crack mobile units of Laos special forces consisting of Meo tribesmen under the command of Gen. Vang Pao. The Meos are recruited and financed by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.

Sources said the Laotians were battered by a North Vietnamese regiment which had remained behind in the Plain of Jars, and suffered the severe casualties in two days of fighting late last month. Some of the missing allied troops were believed to be still attempting to slip through enemy lines, but most have been killed, wounded or captured.

The dimensions of the sharp setback had not been revealed by officials in Vientiane. The sources said it has had a crippling effect on the drive in the Plain of Jars which was reported to be proceeding half-heartedly.

Helicopter Downed

In today's fighting in South Vietnam, Communist troops drove South Vietnamese rangers from a highland base near the jungley Cambodian border after the enemy fired 200 mortar rounds into the position last night. A supporting U.S. helicopter was downed in the action at Le Minh, 10 miles from the border and 25 miles west of Pleiku city, but the aircraft's six wounded crewmen were rescued.

Typhoon Elsie cut deeply into U.S. air activity. Some Air Force jets based in Thailand and South Vietnam managed to raid the North yesterday, but their 60 strikes were the fewest since the U.S. resumed across-the-border missions in April. Elsie's 55-mile-per-hour winds also curtailed U.S. raids in South Vietnam, trimming the number to 204 during the last 24 hours. As Elsie was downgraded to a Tropical Storm, Navy and Air Force raids today

B-52s Fly High

The bad weather did not affect high-flying B-52 bombers, which struck twice in North Vietnam and three times inside the demilitarized zone overnight and today against enemy supply caches. The Stratoforts also logged 29 missions in South Vietnam, including seven in provinces around Saigon where a Communist build-up is under way.

Fighting picked up around battered An Loc, 60 miles north of Saigon, where 134 Communists were killed yesterday and early today. An Loc underwent a bitter three-month siege by the Communists last spring, and the upsurge in activity could herald a renewed Communist drive around the rubble-strewn capital of Binh Long Province. U.S. warplanes and artillery accounted for more than half of the enemy casualties. South Vietnamese losses were eight dead.

Around battle-scarred Quang Tri city, government forces killed 61 Communists while losing 10 dead. Another 19 enemy soldiers were killed in neighboring Thua Thien Province. There, Communist sappers attacked armored elements near Camp Eagle, the headquarters of the South Vietnamese 1st Army Division and barely four miles southwest of Hue. The raiders succeeded in destroying five armored personnel carriers. Two South Vietnamese soldiers were killed, while enemy losses were unknown.

THE NEW YORK TIMES BOOK REVIEW
3 September 1972

The Politics Of Heroin in Southeast Asia

By Alfred W. McCoy. With Cathleen B. Read and Leonard P. Adams II. Illustrated. 464 pp. New York: Harper & Row. $10.95.

A movie natural, with a part for the C.I.A.

By JAMES M. MARKHAM

It looks as though *Papaver somniferum*, the rather beautiful opium poppy, is going to provide us with a new genre of film, fiction, journalism and, even, scholarship. This is understandable. Heroin addiction is savaging our cities. "Any nation that moves down the road to addiction, that nation has something taken out of its character," President Nixon observed last March shortly after his return from China, once the most addicted of nations. Mr. Nixon has declared "war" on heroin at home—and galvanized his emissaries abroad. In certain parts of the world, American diplomats now give almost monomaniacal attention to persuading frequently indifferent or corrupt officials to do something about poppy cultivation, heroin refining and heroin trafficking.

Moreover, from the perspective of a journalist or film-maker, the subject is a natural, replete with ignorant hill tribesmen hacking away at their poppy fields in remote corners of Asia, ragtag paramilitary smugglers leading vast mule caravans across cloud-shrouded mountains, shadowy Chinese middlemen bribing high-ranking officials to look the other way, cosmopolitan Corsican intriguers arranging for stewardesses to strap on "body packs" of No. 4 heroin and fly to New York, intrepid undercover agents trying to foil all of the aforementioned and—last, but by no means least important—the junkies on our streets, symptoms and carriers of disquieting diseases.

This book, the first work of near-scholarship in the new genre, comes to us redolent of controversy [see The Last Word]. Before it was even in galleys—on June 1—the Central Intelligence Agency dispatched an employe to Harper & Row in New York to warn the company that the book could well be inaccurate, libelous and "damaging to the interests of this country," according to the recollection of Executive Editor M. S. Wyeth. The next day Alfred McCoy testified before a Senate subcommittee about alleged involvement of high-ranking South Vietnamese officials, Air America and others in the opium business. Alarmed, the C.I.A.'s General Counsel, Lawrence R. Houston, stepped up the pressure, and on July 5 asked to "see the text prior to publication" in order to point out its inaccuracies.

In a display of post-Irving caution—and over the author's objections—Harper & Row agreed on July 19 to let the C.I.A. consider the galleys for a week and submit its criticisms, on the understanding that the publishers would be under no obligation to make any changes. The mountain at Langley, Va., labored and produced a mouse. The 1,500-word critique the Agency returned to Harper & Row on July 28 understandably "underwhelmed" the editors (who appeared to have been concerned mainly about libel suits) and they decided to proceed with the publication of the book.

The C.I.A.'s clumsy intervention—particularly when linked to its ongoing efforts to prevent a former agent, Victor L. Marchetti, from even writing a book about the Agency for Alfred A. Knopf—is seriously disturbing. So is Harper & Row's submission of the book for prepublication criticism; it sets a worrying precedent even if the company maintains, as it does, that this was a special case. But the C.I.A. assaulted the McCoy book like a bull lunging at a matador's outstretched cape. For what the 27-year-old Yale graduate student has given us is not—as advertised—an expose of "C.I.A. involvement in the drug traffic" but rather a fascinating, often meticulous unraveling of the byzantine complexities of the Southeast Asian opium and heroin trade. To be sure, McCoy weaves a New Left anti-C.I.A. leitmotif throughout his pages and at times lapses into the error (usually made by angry non-Americans) of crediting American espionage with history-bending powers. Thus, in the early (and weakest) chapters of the book we are led to believe that if the O.S.S. had not backed the Mafia in Sicily at the end of World War II and if the C.I.A. had not sponsored Corsican mobsters as anti-Communist strikebreakers on the Marseilles waterfront, these two underworld groups would have subsided into well-deserved oblivion and never gotten into heroin trafficking.

As a former C.I.A. agent told Seymour Hersh (who unearthed the pre-publication fiasco), McCoy's assertions are "10 per cent tendentious and 90 per cent of the most valuable contribution I can think of." "He's a very liberal kid," the ex-agent continued, "and he'd like to nail the establishment. But some leading intelligence officers inside the Government's program think that his research is great." Well they might. For McCoy has done his homework, and, unlike most authors of books about spooks and mobsters, he gives us a rich set of footnotes. It is too bad they are not at the bottom of the pages, because this is a book to be read in tandem with its footnotes. Some assertions in the text are stronger than the footnotes they rest on; many are not.

The book's strength does not lie in its finger-wagging approach to history, but in its astounding-but-true tales of exotic rivalries that make up the heroin trade. Have you ever heard, for example,

James M. Markham, who was a correspondent for The Associated Press in South Asia and Africa, now reports frequently on drug problems for The Times.

continued

[redacted]

WASHINGTON STAR

3 SEP 1972

Reds Enlarge Control Along Chinese Roads

By TAMMY ARBUCKLE
Special to The Star-News

NAM YU, Laos — Communist forces are enlarging their area of control along the west flank of the Communist Chinese road network which runs from China across northwest Laos to within 25 miles of the Thai-Laos border and passes 30 miles southeast of this Lao irregular base.

Informed military sources say pro-Communist Pathet Lao forces have assaulted and captured 11 irregular hilltop positions in the past six months in a move which coincides with a rise in the number of incidents initiated by terrorists in that part of Thailand across the border from the road area.

The Pathet Lao have knocked irregulars from positions overlooking the river valley midway between here and the Chinese road and which parallels the road.

Motive Unclear

Communist motivation for the move against the irregulars may be only to keep them further from the road to stop the irregulars' teams from slipping through the road defences to survey Chinese traffic. But it may also be aimed at stopping surveillance of some new activity on the road. The Chinese started road construction in the area Sept. 1, 1968, and now have roads linking China with North Vietnam and most of northwest Laos. The road points like an arrow at Thailand's heart and Thais have been increasingly nervous about it.

Xieng Lom lies inside Laos on the south bank of the Mekong opposite the Chinese road end at Pak Beng. The Thais asked Laos to agree to the Thai army's use of Xieng Lom in exchange for the Thais giving Lao troops help in defending Long Cheng in northeast Laos against a North Vietnamese attack.

Two Uses for Road

To date the Chinese road appears to have two uses. First, it serves as boundary to North Vietnamese influence in North Laos. No North Vietnamese troops have been spotted west of the Chinese road. Secondly, it serves as an infiltration route for Thai Communists going to Peking and Hanoi for training or returning from there. It is also a route for small arms, ammunition and mines destined for terrorists in northern Thailand's Nan and Chiengrai provinces. Thai troops and Lao troops around Xieng Lom have been plagued the last few months by mines on hill paths and numerous small sharp ambushes and clashes.

Like Long Cheng

The third possibility for a Pathet Lao attack is that the Chinese have decided to eliminate this base. Nam Yu is a smaller edition of the Central Intelligence Agency base at Long Cheng. It has a good runway sited among limestone escarpments and is a home base for irregular troops.

The irregulars are led by a handful of U.S. officials and it is possible Chinese or Pathet Lao may view Nam Pu as an American listening post because of its proximity to the Chinese road system in Laos and its relative closeness to Chinese and Burmese borders.

The Lu and Ekhaw and Kun or Ho tribesmen drift over each country's borders and pass through Nam Yu or the hilltop positions it controls, reaching all the way to just northwest of the Pathet Lao and Chinese garrisoned town in Laos, Muong Sing. Nam Yu therefore has intelligence potential.

WASHINGTON, D.C.
NATIONAL OBSERVER
WEEKLY - 524,212
SEP 2 1972

STATINTL

[redacted]

When the Embarrassed Chuckling Stopped

Our Allies, Opium, and the CIA

[redacted]

STATINTL

By Michael T. Malloy

Staff Writer Malloy spent several years in Southeast Asia as a correspondent for United Press International.

We were just about to take off from one of the many secret airstrips the Central Intelligence Agency had cut into the mountains of northern Laos, when a tribal soldier hurried up, spoke briefly to an American CIA agent, and threw a big, white canvas bag aboard. I already half knew the answer, but as we buckled our seat belts I asked the agent what was in the bag.

He looked embarrassed. "Opium," he said.

Embarrassment was the strongest emotion that American officialdom showed a decade ago if anyone mentioned the wide-open dope traffic conducted by our allies in Southeast Asia. Narcotics smuggling was more often viewed with amused tolerance as just another Asian peccadillo like corruption, gold smuggling, and night clubs that advertised "Twenty Fresh Girls Just Arrived From Bangkok With Medical Certificates."

White slavery and gold smuggling still rate little more than an embarrassed chuckle at some of our Southeast Asian embassies ("we're here to fight communism, not to play missionary"), but narcotics is something else. The epidemic of opium-based heroin that struck our armies there in 1970 and the frightening inroads the drug has made among high-school students at home have turned that amusing peccadillo into a deadly menace to our own national well-being.



'The book is so thoroughly researched, so carefully annotated, and so specific in its accusations that even the Central Intelligence Agency has crawled out of its accustomed shell of secrecy to issue 11 pages of denials.'

Free Publicity

So *The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia* couldn't have been published at a worse time for the men who direct our policies in that bloody and controversial corner of the world. Newspapers, magazines, and television reporters have described allied involvement with the narcotics trade in the past, without generating more than *pro forma* evasions and denials. But this book, published Aug. 17, is so thoroughly researched, so carefully annotated, and so specific in its accusations that even the Central Intelligence Agency has crawled out of its accustomed shell of secrecy to publicly issue 11 pages of denials.

The agency should have stayed in its shell. It guaranteed the book an enormous amount of free publicity by asking Harper & Row to suppress its publication. It trapped itself in a "put up or shut up" corner by telling the publishing company it could demonstrate that author Alfred McCoy's allegations were "totally false." It failed to demonstrate any such thing when Harper & Row broke publishing tradition by giving the agency an advance look at the book and a chance to explode its charges. Instead of preventing its publication, the president of the 155-year-old publishing house said the CIA's response merely "reaffirmed" his company's confidence in the book.

McCoy is a 27-year-old graduate student at Yale. His book is a monumental piece of scholarship in a field that sometimes resists investigation to the point of killing the investigators. He has interviewed spies, gun runners, opium farmers, mercenaries, policemen, and generals along a trail that ran from dusty European libraries to mountaintops in the no man's land of northern Laos. He produced a fascinating tale of mercenary armies, lost battalions, commando raids on Communist China, and wild mountain tribesmen led by hard-drinking American adventurers who sometimes pay cash bounties for enemy ears. It is right out of *Terry and the Pirates*, and it is all more

McCoy's chief conclusion is that "American diplomats and secret agents have been involved in the

continued

THE WASHINGTON MONTHLY

Let Them Eat Bombs

by John Everingham

Author's Note: From March, 1968, to May, 1972, I made seven treks to the jungled villages of Long Pot District in north central Laos. The district is located approximately 32 miles to the northwest of Long Cheng, headquarters for General Vang Pao's American-trained army, and 30 air miles to the southwest of the now deserted Plain of Jars.

In 1968, Long Pot was made up of slightly less than 2,000 people living in 11 separate villages. Five of these were populated by the Meo clan, five by the Hill Lao, and one by the people of the Mekong River lowlands. Long Pot is the name of the district and also the name of the Meo village serving as district headquarters.

It was a three-day walk to Long Pot village from the nearest motor road. When I first arrived, I saw clusters of thatch and bamboo houses gripping the sides of a man-scraped ridge. The cries of small children scampering on the rust-colored clay mingled with the grunts and squeals of fat pigs rooting in the underbrush. It was a peaceful scene.

I was shown to the home of the district chief. He was a short, vigorous man in his late fifties, with a high forehead and the melancholy dignity of a senior statesman. Gair Su Yang wore loose black pants of traditional Meo cut and a U. S. military fatigue jacket; he wore no shoes.

According to Gair Su Yang, the first helicopter landed in Long Pot in 1960. The pilots were American, but a Meo officer climbed out to talk with him. The officer spoke of an alliance between the Americans and a Meo colonel of the Royal Lao Army named Vang Pao. He said that American officials had made a pact with Vang Pao; promising to build for the Meo their own army and independent state in the mountains. They guaranteed that the tribesman would not fall under the control of either faction of lowland Lao then girding for civil war. The officer painted a picture of future prosperity for the Meo. All they had to do was become anti-communist, helping the Americans to fight the Pathet Lao revolutionaries controlling sections of Laos' northern provinces.

One of the problems that the people of Long Pot had in accepting the deal was that they were not sure who Vang Pao was. But there was a more basic problem—though Gair Su Yang did not inform me of it until sometime later: "If we joined the alliance, the Pathet Lao would have become our enemy and would have threatened our village. . . . I told him that Long Pot would not join Vang Pao and the Americans." According to Gair Su Yang, the officer then became angry and threatened that Vang Pao and the Americans considered those not friends to be enemies, and "enemy villages would be attacked and captured by Vang Pao's men."

"We couldn't do anything," Gair Su Yang later contended, pointing out that only fear of a helicopter-load of soldiers descending upon Long Pot forced him to accept involvement in the war venture.

By the end of 1960, every man in Long Pot village had received an M-1 rifle or carbine. Many had been flown to Long Cheng for three to four months' training by U. S. soldiers. (These were probably U. S. Special Forces, whom it was common to see in small up-country towns of Laos until 1968-69. Thereafter CIA "civilians" were used to train Vang Pao's army.) Long Pot's men were then given rank in irregular battalion 209.

Long Pot had been militarized in defense of "Meoland" nearly eight years when I first visited. It had not, however, gone to war. The M-1s were used for shooting squirrels and birds. Men, women, and children slashed, burned, and planted to reap harvests of rice, corn, and, of course, the opium poppy. Opium was the main cash crop, which from 1960 onwards had been bought by Meo soldiers and transported both by pony caravan and American-piloted Air America helicopters from Long Cheng.

October, 1970

During the summer of 1969, the Bureau of Public Roads, Laos Division (an arm of USAID), opened war-abandoned Route 13 linking Vientiane administrative capital with the royal capital at Luang Prabang. The new road put Long Pot only a half-day walk from motor transport. A companion and myself traveled up Route 13 by motorcycle and walked the rest of the way to Long Pot village. As we arrived, 20 teenage boys in U. S. army uniforms, dragging M-1 carbines and rifles often too big for them, paced through mock-military maneuvers, periodically diving to the ground in a half-hearted manner that would have gotten them killed if bullets had really been flying. A few days earlier, they had returned by helicopter from Long Cheng. There, they said, U. S. soldiers had put them through three months of military training. Another helicopter would arrive that afternoon, they said, and take them off to Moung Soui district, about 30 miles to the northeast, where the Pathet Lao were in the midst of attacking and taking the town.

The boys' eyes revealed their fear and demoralization as they talked about the coming helicopter ride and their destination. And as we all waited, bombs could be heard peppering the hills in the distance, in the direction of Moung Soui. The bomb blasts, though 15 to 20 miles away, shook the hill under our feet and shattered the young soldiers' nerve. Several mothers were crying as they fussed over their soldier-boys; lucky charms were stuffed into baggy pockets. District Chief Gair Su Yang was at the center of the gathering handing out new U. S. army uniforms, pep-talking his recruits. But Gair Su Yang's voice was flecked with anger and did nothing to ease the funereal atmosphere.

No, said every boy I asked, they didn't want to go to fight the Pathet Lao. They said their village headmen had chosen them; they must go. And they went. Early next morning, I ran out from breakfast in Gair Su Yang's house as a helicopter finally whoop-whooped in to land. "Air America" was clearly printed down the side of the silver and blue craft. Boys clambered aboard. The helicopter rose and swept away toward Moung Soui. In three swift trips, 20 village boys were gone. None ever saw home again—except for one. His body was returned for burial 12 months later.

Tong Ouie is a village of Hill Lao people about an hour's walk from Long Pot village. The Hill Lao are a less prosperous, less colorful race who share the mountains with the Meo. But such distinctions are obscured in khaki. Early in 1970, Long Cheng demanded men from Tong Ouie to boost the failing Meo forces. The headman recounted the story bitterly: he had first refused to send a single man up to Long Pot village to fill out the district's quota. "The Americans are crazy. So is Vang Pao. They send more and more men against the Pathet Lao each year and they all get killed. Why should our people fight and die for the Meo or the Americans?"

Continued

John Everingham is a reporter for Dispatch News Service [illegible] reporting from Laos, where he has been for the past three years.

SCIENCE
SATURDAY REVIEW
SEPT 1972

[redacted]

Books

Bombs (Quietly, Please) Away!

BY NOAM CHOMSKY

VOICES FROM THE PLAIN OF JARS: Life Under an Air War
compiled by Fred Branfman
Harper-Colophon, 160 pp., paperback $1.95

On March 31, 1968, Lyndon Johnson ordered a partial bombing halt over North Vietnam. On the same day a cable to U.S. ambassadors stated that "air power now used north of 20th [parallel] can probably be used in Laos (where no policy change planned) and in SVN [South Vietnam]." One of the targets was the Plain of Jars, in northeastern Laos, which had been bombed intermittently since 1964 when it fell into the hands of the Pathet Lao.

In November 1968 negotiations began in Paris. The bombing of North Vietnam was temporarily halted, and again the bombers were shifted to South Vietnam and to Laos. Sixteen months later T. D. Allman, a correspondent for the *Far Eastern Economic Review*, reported that, in the judgment of observers, the "five-fold escalation of the U.S. bombing in Laos" was "the most significant development in the recent history of the Laotian war," and that it "convinced the North Vietnamese that they had to meet force with counter-force." The bombing was now primarily directed against settled areas. Villagers fled to forests and hills.

In mid-1969 infiltration fell off sharply along the trails. As air power was again released, strikes against Northern Laos were sharply accelerated. After massive bombardment the CIA mercenary army swept over the Plain of Jars, murdering and pillaging. The remnants of the population were removed to the Vientiane Plain.

"In September 1969, after a recorded history of seven hundred years, the Plain of Jars disappeared." With these words Fred Branfman opens this searing account of the destruction of a peaceful society of 50,000 by a secret air war that was "aimed at the systematic destruction of the material basis of the civilian society," in the accurate phrase of a Belgian United Nations adviser.

Why? Speaking for the administration, former Ambassador William Sullivan has conceded in Senate testimony that the war in Northern Laos "has nothing to do with operations in South Vietnam or Cambodia." In earlier Senate testimony he had hinted at the primary motivation: Laos is being used as a buffer to protect the interests of the Thai elite, long the main support for American programs in Southeast Asia. The Pentagon Papers reveal that as early as 1954 Thailand had been designated by the National Security Council as the "focal point of U.S. covert and psychological operations in Southeast Asia." George Ball, then Undersecretary of State, in a memorandum of July 1, 1965, observed that "Securing the Mekong Valley will be critical in any long-run solution, whether by the partition of Laos with Thai-U.S. forces occupying the western half" or by some other arrangement. This remark foreshadows later developments: the economic integration of U.S.-dominated areas of Laos with Thailand, and the introduction of Thai mercenaries, contrary to explicit Congressional directives. The destruction of the civilian society of Northern Laos was one element in these long-range plans.



There were, no doubt, other reasons for the air war against Northern Laos. Modern history attests, amply, the consequences of overwhelming power at the service of a fanatic ideology. American planners operated on the assumption that the U.S. position throughout the world might collapse if the forces of revolutionary nationalism in Indochina attained victory. In the Pentagon Papers there is no instance of any hesitation with regard to any military policy except in terms of the potential costs to the American planners and interests they represent, - one of these costs being popular revulsion. In Northern Laos the war was a carefully guarded secret, and the costs were minute. Correspondingly, the destruction was total. Flying over the Plain of Jars in 1971, T. D. Allman describes it as a deserted wasteland, "empty and ravaged, a striking example of what less than three years of intensive U.S. bombing can do to a rural area." The plain may be uninhabitable for decades because of the vast quantities of unexploded ordnance.

Furthermore, U.S. planners have always been concerned over the "ideological threat" of Asian communism—the threat, very simply, that it might work. The slow and patient steps of

Noam Chomsky is professor of linguistics at MIT. He has written extensively on American foreign policy and the Indochina war.

continued

RAMPARTS
SEP 1972

Seoul's Hired Guns

by James Otis

THE AMERICAN SOLDIERS who work with them in Vietnam speak respectfully of the "ROK Marines." Technically, ROK indicates their place of origin—the Republic of Korea (South Korea). But the Americans utter the term as if it were "Rock," and as though it referred to their physical conditioning and the state of their sensibilities: as soldiers they are brutal, licentious and they get results. Militarily, they are trusted by the American high command, which—in the current fighting—has assigned them the responsibility of keeping the vital An Khe Pass open and preventing South Vietnam from being split in half.

Some 37,000 of these troops are presently engaged in South Vietnam. Referred to pretentiously as "allies," their involvement is said to arise from ideological commitment to the cause of freedom, national self-interest, or some other self-serving platitude. In fact, they are latter-day Samurai, hired guns of the Orient, who have sold their services to Washington for the duration.

To be specific, the normal salary of a ROK army private is $1.60 a month. But if that private elects to serve in Vietnam, he can earn 23 times that amount, or $37.50 a month. In one day, he earns almost as much as he would have made in a whole month had he remained in his homeland—courtesy, to be sure, of the American taxpayer. The middleman of this operation is the government of South Korea, which receives a kickback of well over $300 million per year for the service.

Such "allies" are to mercenaries what a "protective reaction raid" is to an unprovoked strike and what an "incursion" is to an invasion—namely, the same thing.

For some time now, persistent reports have linked these mercenary Koreans to brutalities in Vietnam which would make Rusty Calley blush. In June, the *Alternative Feature Service* (AFS) of Berkeley, California released a heretofore secret study by the RAND Corporation entitled—ironically enough—"Mention of Korean Troop Activities in RAND Interviews," and thereby made public what the American government has known for at least six years. The 1966 document is replete with these stories of barbarity which Americans have learned how to take in and ignore:

- "When they came to the VC-controlled areas . . . they raped the women in those areas. There were times they killed the women after they had raped them. I heard just recently women were raped and killed. The people were so frightened of the Korean troops, they didn't dare to stay in their homes but moved away." (from a National Liberation Front deserter)
- ". . . only 50 villagers still lagged behind. Most of them were women, children and elderly people. The Korean soldiers rounded them up in one place. The people thought that they were to be evacuated to the GVN-controlled areas by helicopters. . . . The Koreans suddenly pointed their guns at the crowd and opened fire. Only two babies of two and three survived. They crawled on their mothers' bellies." (from a refugee)
- ". . . when the Korean troops came, they called all the old women and children down in the trenches to come up. Then these people were told to sit in circles. Afterward, the Korean troops machine-gunned them." (from an NLF prisoner)
- "Everybody agreed that the Koreans were barbarous. They went on operations without interpreters going along. They killed at random without distinguishing between the rights and wrongs. Some people said it was because the VC mixed themselves with the villagers, and thus the Koreans couldn't help making a mistake. I don't think their reasoning was right. I don't see why the Koreans should kill the children. Kids of two, three, or even five or seven years weren't VC. They also burned the paddy and the people's houses. They burned the cow pens and the animals inside too. Cows are certainly not VC!" (from a refugee)

The introduction to the document notes that "no effort has been made to ascertain the veracity of the statements made by the interviewees." And AFS quotes former RAND analyst Melvin Gurtov as saying that the report was "a draft circulated for comments . . . as opposed to a published study." It would be a mistake to surmise, however, that this report outlines the full extent of the U.S. government's information about South Korean murders in Vietnam. On the contrary, American officials have received at least three other major reports on the subject.

On January 10, 1970, A. Terry Rambo, a graduate student at the University of Hawaii, told the *New York Times* that he had reported the extensive killing of civilians by South Korean troops to U.S. Army officers in Vietnam in 1966, but the information had been suppressed. Rambo and two colleagues, Jerry M. Tinker and John D. Lenoir, were researchers for Human Sciences Research (HSR), Inc., McLean, Virginia, on a refugee interview project for the Pentagon's Advanced Research Projects Agency.

Rambo took the atrocity information to American officials in Vietnam. He briefed a "group of ranking American officers in Saigon about the report." The result: Rambo was "ordered by a general officer of the MACV [Military Assistance Command, Vietnam] staff to cease investigating the Koreans—and no mention of it was to be made in our reports."

The Rambo team prepared two reports, one without atrocity information, one with it. This was done, according to Tinker, because they "knew that if our report contained anything about murders it would be classified

continued

MAN MAGAZINE
September 1972

[redacted]

by TOM SCHUSTER

THE CIA'S WAR WITH RED CHINA AND OTHER ASIAN LANDS

THE OLD WORLD WAR TWO C-46 bounced and yawed in the violent turbulence as its twin engines strained to maintain 160 knots. Its American pilot gripped the controls with every ounce of strength he could muster, and his eyes ached from the strain of searching the darkness to avoid the towering Himalayan mountains on each side. They'd taken off from a secret base over three hours ago and were threading their way east of the Tibetan capital of Lhasa, long occupied by the forces of Red China. Their mission: drop agents and supplies to a band of Tibetan guerrillas who were still fighting the Communists.

The copilot, sweating over the air chart in his lap, tried to guide them to the drop zone that a mysterious American "civilian" at their base had earlier described. "Hold your course," he yelled. "Another two minutes should put us right on."

The pilot reached up, flicking on the "get-ready" light to alert the Tibetan agents who'd be jumping, and the plane crew who would kick the supplies out. "Go!" he yelled and switched on the buzzer.

Just as the last chute opened, the old plane was suddenly rocked by deadly Communist 37mm antiaircraft fire and the pilot cursed to himself, "Goddam—bastards were waiting for us."

But he managed to drop down and contour fly the valley floors, below the Red radar, and just after dawn they landed back at their base. They climbed from the plane, their gray uniforms soaked through with sweat, and the pilot muttered for the thousandth time, "There's gotta be an easier way to make a buck."

The C-46 was ancient, but its skin had been polished to shine like a mirror. Back toward the tail were small blue letters that spelled out "Air America." The only other identifying marks were the fresh 37mm holes in the left wing panels.

Throughout Asia, people have come to recognize these strange aircraft and their even stranger American pilots. Especially the pilots. You learn to spot them wherever you are. They're the guys in the gray Air Force-type uniforms, crushed caps, cowboy boots, with pistols hanging at their sides. They can be found raising hell in the Suzy Wong section of Hong Kong or racing motor bikes along Tu Do Street in Saigon or joking with the girls at the Vieng Rattay Club in Vientiane.

They're the pilots of the cloak and dagger Air America, one of the world's least known airlines.

Many are "old China hands" who first began flying for the "outfit" back when mainland China belonged to Chiang Kai-shek. They're the last of that breed known as soldiers of fortune, and these devil-may-care mercenaries will

continued

WORLD
29 AUG 1972

Laos: The Furtive War

by U.S. Senator Stuart Symington

The strange history of a war—undeclared, undisclosed, and largely undiscussed—a war in which U.S. involvement continues to grow.

The United States has been involved for more than a decade in an undeclared and largely unnoticed war in northern Laos. From the beginning, and as of today, this war has been characterized by a degree of secrecy never before true of a major American involvement abroad in which many American lives have been lost and billions of American tax dollars spent.

A perversion of the processes of government has been going on, a perversion inimical to our democratic system and to the nation's future.

Who is responsible? The Constitution has been bypassed by a small group of men in various departments of the Executive Branch who, under the direction of four Presidents, initiated and carried out policies without any real Congressional knowledge and thus any true Congressional authorization. Needless to say, these policies were also carried out without the knowledge and approval of the American people, on whose consent our government is supposed to rest.

The war in northern Laos, in which the United States has been a principal party, has been pursued without a declaration of war by the Congress. Moreover, in the past few years, the U.S. government has financed Thai troops fighting in northern Laos despite a clear legislative prohibition against such activity.

It has been possible for successive administrations to ignore the normal processes of government because, until recently, the Executive Branch has succeeded in concealing from the people and the Congress the true facts of our involvement in this little country. As long as Congress and the people did not know what the United States was doing, as long as there was no public debate on the issues involved, Executive Branch policy-makers were free to do as they pleased without having to explain or justify their actions. John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State under President Eisenhower and an arch proponent of the Domino Theory, considered Laos a key domino that then stood between China and North Vietnam on the Communist side and Thailand, Cambodia, and South Vietnam on the free world side.

By an exchange of diplomatic notes in July 1955, the U.S. and the Royal Government of Laos called for economic cooperation and the defense of the Kingdom of Laos. During the late Fifties, U.S. aid to Laos was running $40-million a year, and 80 per cent of that went to the support of the Royal Laotian Army.

To guide the Lao Army, the State Department organized an incognito American military mission with headquarters in Vientiane. This group was attached to the U.S. Operations Mission, or more popularly, the PEO. Its members were called technicians and wore civilian clothes. At its head was an equally disguised American general. When the general assumed command of this force his name was erased from the list of active American army officers.

Thus for many years this war was a well-kept secret. When John F. Kennedy became President in 1961, there were 700 American military personnel in Laos as well as 500 Soviet operatives whose mission was to provide logistic support to local Communist forces. These forces included at least 10,000 North Vietnamese.

Soon thereafter, the military position of Royal Lao government forces began to deteriorate whereupon President Kennedy and the Soviet and Chinese leaders entered into negotiations that led to a conference in Geneva. The Geneva Convention recessed when President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev met in Vienna and produced a joint statement on Laos in which both parties assured the neutrality and independence of Laos and "recognized the importance of an effective cease fire." In July, what became known as the Geneva agreements of 1962 were signed.

THE GENEVA Agreements prohibited Laos from joining any military alliances, including SEATO, banned the introduction of foreign military personnel and civilians performing quasi-military functions (with the exception of a small French training mission), and forbade the establishment of any foreign military installation in Laos.

After these agreements were signed, the United States and the Soviet Union withdrew their military personnel. The North Vietnamese, however, failed to withdraw most of their forces and advisers.

In the fall of 1962, because of the continuous presence of the North Vietnamese in Laos, the United States agreed to provide Souvanna Phouma, the Prime Minister and leader of the Neutralist faction in the tripartite government, with limited amounts of military equipment as permitted by the Geneva Agreements.

In 1962 the United States began, through the CIA, to support a force of Lao irregulars on the theory that it would be possible to deny officially that the Geneva Agreements were being violated. [illegible] the instrument for waging what became a full-scale war was, in my view, a clear perver-

Continued

Stuart Symington, a Democrat, is the senior senator from Missouri, and the only senator on the Armed Services, Foreign Relations [illegible] Atomic Energy Committees. Born in Massachusetts, he has been in the Senate for twenty years.

Soldiers of Fortune—A Vanishing Breed

The trade of a mercenary—a hired soldier—isn't what it used to be, according to Joe Maggio.

Mr. Maggio, who's been out of the business more than seven years (ever since the war in the Congo between Joseph Mobuto and Moise Tshombe), says pessimistically that there doesn't seem to be much call nowadays for soldiers of fortune.

"Back in the Congo days you could walk into the Memling Hotel or the Purple Cow Bar in Leopoldville and wind up with a well-paying fighting job," says Joe with a trace of nostalgia. "Today it's gotten much tougher."

Maggio says he has done most of his own free-lance fighting on behalf of the CIA which, he claims, has freely employed mercenaries in the past. Working on contract as a CIA "adviser," he has seen service in the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba, in Laos, Thailand and elsewhere. He has just written a novel based on his experiences called *Company Man*, published by Putnam. The title alludes to the CIA which, Maggio says, is known among mercenaries as "The Company."

Maggio got his credentials for mercenary work by serving a three-year hitch in the Marines after dropping out of military college.

"People become mercenaries for two reasons," he explains. "Either they're attracted by the romance of the idea, or they're trying to get away from something. With me it was the romance. I thought the most adventurous life possible was that of a soldier of fortune."

Photo of a soldier of fortune: Maggio ready for jump into Vietnam in 1963.

Maggio claims that he doesn't share the feeling of many mercenaries that it doesn't matter whom you're fighting for as long as the pay is good. "Some mercenaries have a mentality that says 'For $500 I'll kill this guy.' I never felt like that. My idea was to be on the right side. Like in the Bay of Pigs, we thought we were right. We also never doubted that we'd win, with the whole weight of the U.S. supposedly behind us."

Maggio, a 34-year-old native of Atlantic City, N.J., who now makes his home on a schooner in Nassau, says that the best mercenary force in the world still is the fabled French Foreign Legion, which numbers around 8000 men and is stationed mostly in Southern France. Belgians and Scotsmen, he claims, make particularly good mercenaries.

Pay is good

For most mercenaries, he admits, the big attraction still is the money. "A free-lance infantryman makes up to $1200 a month," he says, "and a pilot as much as $2600. That's tax-free, of course—you don't get W-2 forms when you're a mercenary. And you also keep all you can steal."

Maggio says that the quality of mercenaries isn't as high as it used to be.

"There were about 3000 soldiers and 500 officers in the Congo," he recalls. "The officers were pretty good material but there were plenty of alcoholics, deviates and bums among the troops. I saw some guys there that were in the Bay of Pigs operation, too."

Maggio ascribes the current lack of mercenary opportunities to a UN crackdown on hired armies following events in the Congo. But despite the present lack of openings, Maggio says there still are plenty of would-be mercenaries ready for action. However, he can't recommend it as a likely career, especially for youngsters ready to run away from home in search of adventure.

Experience necessary

"You really have to have a good background as a soldier and the papers to prove it," he says. "There's an office in Paris that keeps a kind of register of available mercenaries. I don't know just where it's located right now, but if I went over there to the neighborhood of the Boulevard St.-Michel and the Rue St.-Jacques I could find it in no time. You can go there and apply, but they want credentials on your military record—they're interested only in true professionals. If they do get you a job, they keep 30 percent of your pay for six months.

"But there just doesn't seem to be any market for mercenaries any more. The profession is dying out. I can see why, but it's too bad for a lot of guys who were men left behind by time and could only find themselves in this kind of life. I know that there are lots of people who'll say 'good riddance,' but for me there's a kind of sadness in it, too."

[redacted] H.K.

CINCINNATI, OHIO
HERALD
AUG 26 1972
WEEKLY - 17,500

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OUR MAN IN WASHINGTON

A joint report recently released by the CIA, the State Department, and the Defense Department has admitted that "there is no prospect" of halting the smuggling of narcotics by air and sea from Southeast Asia into the United States "under any conditions that can realistically be projected."

This shocking admission contradicts the Nixon Administration's optimism with respect to its war against the illicit entry of opiates into the United States. In appalling frankness, this high-level report revealed the futility of stemming the influx of narcotics until the "allied" nations of Southeast Asia restrict the growth transportation, and refining of the opium plant. While the governments of South Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand are openly stating their willingness to continue to cooperate with American officials in stamping out the opium traffic, the fact is that opium traffic has become ingrained in the economic fabric of these countries to such an extent that the Asian authorities approach the enforcement of their anit-smuggling laws with a grin and a wink.

Yet the U.S. taxpayer, in his commitment to subsidize the governments of these impoverished nations, is indirectly supporting authorities in countries where the ssmuggling is widespread. Eighty to ninety percent of the opium traffic from the Orient is estimated to travel through Thailand, yet known refineries, says the report, dot the shore of this nation around the Gulf of Siam providing easy access to the trawlers which transport the refined opiates to Hong Kong and then point east, or to European ports.

While much is said about Turkey as a farmland for opium, the Asian nations of Thailand, Laos, and South Vietnam provide a sustantial share of the plant which infects the lives

Mr. Anderson

of so many Americans. Furthermore, American money has much more to say about what happens in these Asian nations which are so economically dependent upon American support. Nevertheless, although the CIA knows about the location of the opium fields, and although the CIA knows about the paramilitary Nationalist Chinese units which transport the opium through Thailand, and although the CIA constantly monitors the shipment of heroin out of the Thai ports, these governments ironically seem totally unable to stem the flow.

Needless to say, there must be many an American on the payroll of these smuggling organizations. Needless to say, there are dazzling profits to be reaped in this illegal business where the demand is incessant and where there are no taxes to pay. Needless to say, this admission by such a high level of American federal agencies is an alarming revelation of the weakness of a free nation which prides itself on the glories of entreprenvership. Certainly, this is not the type of un[illegible] urging these Aisan nations to maintain.

WASHINGTON POST
25 AUG 1972

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Lao Unit Bids To Take, Hold Plain of Jars

By D. E. Ronk
Special to The Washington Post

VIENTIANE, Aug. 24—American-supported commando forces have parachuted deep behind enemy lines in Northern Laos in an effort to recapture and hold the Plain of Jars, field reports said today.

About 100 commandos were dropped into an area 40 miles northeast of Long Cheng Monday night in an attempt to cut the supply route from North Vietnam to the Communist forces in Northern Laos.

This was the first use of parachutists in Laos in recent memory and appears to underscore the determination of Gen. Vang Pao, commander of the Lao irregular forces, and his CIA advisers to recapture and this year hold the Plain of Jars, about 100 miles North of Vientiane.

Almost exactly one year ago, Gen. Vang Pao's forces advanced from Long Cheng onto the Plain of Jars, but they failed to capture and occupy its northeast corner and the mountains to the east before the end of the rainy season.

As a result, North Vietnamese forces were able to mass virtually unopposed within easy range of the plain. And when communist forces hit at the beginning of the dry season last December, they swept Gen. Vang Pao's forces off the plain in less than three days.

By the time the communist offensive had run its course, the North Vietnamese were in Long Cheng Valley, 40 miles to the southwest off the opposite side of the Plain of Jars, and for the next three months, communist artillery laid siege to Long Cheng with devastating effect.

This year, however, Gen. Vang Pao has augmented his rainy season offensive with airborne troops.

Communist successes during the last dry season, however, changed the strategic picture radically in Northern Laos. No longer are North Vietnamese troops forced to wade through a powerful defensive ring around Long Cheng to get at the heart of Northern Laos' defenses. They are still within easy striking distance of Long Cheng.

It is that presence that alters the strategic picture.

With his best troops now 20 to 40 miles outside Long Cheng, Gen. Vang Pao has a lot riding on this bid to relieve Communist pressure on Long Cheng and the entire northern front.

If the gamble pays off and his forces can recapture and hold the Plain of Jars through the coming dry season and hold Long Cheng, it could hearten the entire Lao army and have an effect on peace talks now in their preliminary stages.

If the gamble fails, the entire defenses of Northern Laos will have to be reestablished elsewhere.

CIA Awakens Sleepy Laotian Village

VANG VIENG, Laos — (AP) — Until late July, Vang Vieng was a sleepy mountain village in North-Central Laos. But now the Americans have arrived and have established it as a major logistics center for the Central Intelligence Agency.

The military organization here will be supporting Laotian irregulars including Gen. Vang Pao's Meo army, officials here said.

Vang Vieng is on Highway 13, 67 miles north of Vientiane, and has about 2,000 residents.

The move to Vang Vieng culminates a series of responses to intense and continued North Vietnamese pressure on the former logistics and operations base at Long Cheng, the CIA base 70 miles northeast of Vientiane.

Long Cheng had come under a heavy North Vietnamese attack in January. For the first time, the North Vietnamese breached ridgeline defenses that protected the Long Cheng Valley and a vital air strip.

Because of the situation around Long Cheng, a base at Ban Xon was maintained until early July, when heavy flooding destroyed most of the logistics center.

Vang Vieng airport, next to the village's main street, is now undergoing radical changes with the arrival of the Americans. The dirt air strip is receiving an all-weather surface, and office buildings and warehouses are being built besides the airstrip. The entire area is being enclosed with a chain-link fence.

ROANOKE, VA.
TIMES
AUG 21 1972
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Misdirections in War on Drugs

There have been only a few brave individuals in Congress willing to take on the whole of the Nixon Administration's war on international drug trafficking.

The reasons are obvious. No one in his right mind wants to be placed in the category of being pro-heroin, and on the surface, the opposition of Rep. Robert Steele, R-Conn., and a few others would appear to be a misjudgment. In addition, the complexities of the traffic are so great that one has to know his facts before venturing any opinion; those who couldn't even follow the plot line of "The French Connection" would be totally lost after one pass at the real world of drug trade.

But the opposition has some good points, and it turns out that Rep. Steele and the others are not, after all, suggesting that addiction can be fun. What they are suggesting is that the administration's 18-month-old drug trade abatement program may be both self-defeating and aimed in the wrong direction, toward European labs and Turkish sources.

It is self-defeating, some of the critics say, because if the flow of heroin into this country is appreciably slowed, it will only guarantee that the price for the commodity will rise and that a price rise, in turn, will cause more drug-related crimes.

There is no answer to this objection except the British system of drug-maintenance for addicts. A law professor at Stanford, Herbert Packer, mainttains that decriminalization of heroin and related activities would dry up the tremendous profits in drugs overnight. That may be an exaggeration; but the British solution would make such trade and sales less profitable. However, the strain of Puritanism in America, which would equate such a drug maintenance program as trafficking with the Devil, runs strong enough to make prospects for such a program dim for the foreseeable future.

The second charge—that the U.S. program is misdirected, is based on the contention that the Nixon efforts are largely overlooking the tremendous role of Southeast Asia in the international heroin picture. Alfred McCoy, a student of Southeast Asian history at Yale, makes the case (in a book excerpted in Harper's magazine) that the greatest potential source of heroin is the "Golden Triangle" of Burma, Thailand and Laos. He claims, also, that the CIA, in its long struggle to organize the tribesmen of Laos in a counter-insurgency war, has provided the logistics for vastly increased heroin traffic and has refused to admit the terrible implications of that traffic because some of its most important "clients" are making profit from that traffic.

The Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs has admitted, belatedly, that there is some truth in the McCoy argument. In a recent secret report that leaked out, the agency says that the Southeast Asian heroin sources are larger than previously thought and that there is evidence that the potential of the "Golden Triangle" is not being lost on organized crime. That area has produced as much as 70 per cent of the annual production of opium, the source of heroin; and if the CIA continues to build airfields and prop up corrupt local generals, production might even increase.

The administration should be listening to the voices of dissent. Drug trafficking, like prostitution, is not so much rooted out as temporarily inconvenienced. If the demand continues, the administration had better face up to some of the real problems of pinched supply.

NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS

A Correspondence wi

Alfred W. McCoy

I

On June 1 of this year an official of the US Central Intelligence Agency paid a visit to the New York offices of my publisher, Harper and Row, Inc. This CIA official was Mr. Cord Meyer, Jr. (now the CIA's Assistant Deputy Director of Plans; formerly the CIA official in charge of providing covert financial subsidies for organizations such as the National Student Association, *Encounter* Magazine, and the Congress for Cultural Freedom).[1] Mr. Meyer urged several of his old friends among Harper and Row's senior management to provide him with a copy of the galley proofs of my history of the international narcotics traffic, *The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia*. In this book I show the complicity of various US agencies–particularly the CIA and the State Department–in organizing the Southeast Asian drug traffic since the early 1950s.

Mr. Meyer presented one of Harper and Row's senior editors with some documents giving the CIA's view on the Southeast Asian drug traffic. His manner was grave. He said, "You wouldn't want to publish a book that would be full of inaccuracies, embarrass the United States government, or get you involved in libel suits, would you?"

Harper and Row's management promised to consider Mr. Meyer's request and summoned me from Washington, DC, where I was then testifying before the Senate Appropriations Committee on my findings after eighteen months of research into the Southeast Asian drug traffic. This research included more than 250 interviews with heroin dealers, police officials, and intelligence agents in Europe and Asia.

At a meeting in New York on the afternoon of June 8, Harper and Row's president, Mr. Winthrop Knowlton, and its senior vice president, Mr. B. Brooks Thomas, told me that they had decided to provide the CIA with a copy of the galley proofs prior to publication for the following reasons:

First, the CIA would be less likely to seek a temporary court injunction barring publication of the book if the Agency were given a chance to persuade itself that national security was in no way endangered by portions of my book; and secondly, Harper and Row felt that a responsible publisher should have enough confidence in the veracity of any of its particularly controversial books to show them to any reputable critic for comment prior to publication.

At first I disagreed strongly with Harper and Row's decision, arguing that submitting the galley proofs to the CIA could set a dangerous precedent and ultimately weaken First Amendment guarantees concerning freedom of the press. Moreover, in view of what I had learned of the CIA's operating methods in Southeast Asia I was convinced that the Agency was capable of using unethical means–such as coercing my sources into retracting statements they had made to me about US complicity in the international narcotics traffic–in order to induce Harper and Row to withdraw the book from publication.

After a week of negotiations, however, Harper and Row told me that they would not be willing to publish the book unless I agreed to submit the manuscript to the CIA. Faced with what I believed would be lengthy delays if I took the book to another publisher and the prospect of losing my Harper and Row editor, Elisabeth Jakab, with whom I had worked closely, I capitulated. Thus began more than two months of lengthy negotiations between the CIA, Harper and Row, and myself. Most of what happened during these elaborate negotiations is in the correspondence reprinted below. I have added introductory notes to explain some of the attending circumstances.

Considered collectively, this exchange of letters provides us with another important reminder–perhaps the first since the National Student Association scandals of 1967–of the contempt this most clandestine of our governmental agencies has for the integrity of the press and publishing industry. As the CIA's letter of July 28, 1972, shows, it was unable to rebut effectively my analysis of its role in the international heroin traffic during the last quarter century. Since the CIA simply had no plausible defense against this charge, it tried to impose prior censorship in order to avoid public scrutiny of its record. If it was not already clear, it now should be obvious to publishers that the Agency cannot be regarded as a responsible critic when its public image is seriously threatened by what is written about it.

II

1 In this letter, written after Cord Meyer, Jr.'s visit, Harper and Row asked the CIA for official confirmation of their interest in seeing the book. Since the CIA had never before been quite so willing to defend itself publicly, neither Harper and Row nor [illegible] Agency.

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and Row by stating categorically that it could rebut all my charges about its complicity in the international narcotics traffic. We were surprised, however, that the CIA made no reference to "national security" as one of its concerns in requesting to review the manuscript. Rather, the Agency made its request purely on grounds of government privilege.

Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

5. July 1972

Mr. B. Brooks Thomas
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc.

Dear Mr. Thomas:

Mr. Cord Meyer has asked me to respond to your letter to him of June 30th in connection with the book, *The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia*, by Alfred W. McCoy.

As you are no doubt aware, Mr. McCoy testified on 2 June 1972 before the Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee. His testimony included allegations concerning support of the international opium traffic by U. S. agencies, including the Central Intelligence Agency, and numerous other allegations concerning participation in the opium traffic by both Americans and local personnel in Southeast Asia.

In the light of the pernicious nature of the drug traffic, allegations concerning involvement of the U. S. Government therein or the participation of American citizens should be made only if based on hard evidence. It is our belief that no reputable

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NEWSWEEK
21 AUG 1972

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Sparks or Sputters?

A Washington drawing room was the scene last year of an unlikely encounter between poet Allen Ginsberg and Richard Helms, director of the Central Intelligence Agency. The subject of the post-poetry-reading confrontation was opium—and Ginsberg insisted that the CIA was deeply involved in shipping it around Southeast Asia. So totally false did Helms consider the accusation that he agreed to a fascinating bet with the poet: Helms promised that he would sit down for an hour of meditation each day for the rest of his life if the charges were proved correct.

The same accusations—true or not—boiled again last week. This time, the CIA, which almost never takes a public stand on any issue, clashed with the respected publishing firm of Harper & Row. At issue is a book—"The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia"—in which author Alfred W. McCoy presents a heavily documented argument that the CIA has assisted in the flow of opium and its by-product, heroin. The CIA challenged the book before publication, and Harper & Row reluctantly allowed the agency to peruse the galleys. Then, despite a list of objections specified by the CIA, Harper & Row announced that it was satisfied that the book was sound and would publish it this week—a month ahead of schedule.

McCoy, a 26-year-old Yale graduate student, first made his accusations during Congressional testimony in June. McCoy charged that because drug traffic is such a local custom in Asia—and U.S. allies, from guerrillas to government officials, are so deeply involved—the CIA not only overlooks their dealings, but sometimes even helps them transport opium and heroin. Soon afterward, the CIA's general counsel, Lawrence Houston, wrote to Harper & Row: "We believe we cannot stand by and see baseless criticism ... without trying to set the record straight."

After considerable deliberation, Harper & Row sent the agency a set of galleys. Seven days later, the CIA weighed in with a lengthy critique—which Harper & Row editors judged rather light. B. Brooks Thomas, vice president and general counsel of the publishing house, then replied to Houston: "We believe the best service we can render the author, the CIA and the general public is to publish the book as expeditiously as possible, and that is what we intend to do." Privately, the Harper & Row lawyer commented, "We were underwhelmed by their criticism."

Why did the CIA—usually the most silent of government agencies—take on Harper & Row so publicly? One agency insider observed that McCoy's charges had been made before—mostly in underground or fringe publications. "But what I think has got the backs up around here," he suggested, "is that the charges are now showing up in Harper's magazine and in a Harper & Row book. That is hitting where these people live," he said, gesturing around him at CIA headquarters. "These are people with vast contacts in the academic community and government. They can't let this ridiculous falsehood be accepted as fact."

McCoy is content to let readers make up their own minds. "I had hoped that my work would be interesting enough to spark a public debate," he says. "Now the CIA, by attempting to suppress the book, has itself sparked the debate." Still, there is no indication that CIA director Helms has been convinced by the book's charges; he has not disclosed any plans to begin daily meditations.

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John Everingham—DNSI



Robert R. McElroy—Newsweek

McCoy interviewing Laotians, and his provocative book

THE HOUSTON POST
20 AUG 1972

Smuggling? Yes; collusion? No

Despite its full commitment to the fight against the narcotics trade, the CIA runs into continual accusations of engaging in the traffic itself.

The accusations center around Air America, an airline operating in Vietnam and Laos and into the "Golden Triange" where 70 per cent of the world's illicit opium is produced.

It is an open secret that Air America was covertly established by the U.S. government to provide safe and adequate air services in a part of the world where commercial carriers provided neither.

The capital to start it was funneled through the CIA, which still serves as a funding mechanism for operating costs, but it is a semi-autonomous organization whose employes are all civilians under contract to the airline and not to the CIA or the U.S. government.

AIR AMERICA RUNS scheduled flights throughout Vietnam and Laos, and it is used by all manner of passengers with official travel orders.

In Laos, it is also used on a charter basis to support the irregular war effort against the North Vietnamese, transporting supplies, equipment and food as well as advisers and the Meo tribesmen and their families from hilltop airstrip to hilltop airstrip.

Throughout the "Golden Triangle" — which is beyond all formal administration, no matter what the lines on the map say — no currency has much value, and raw opium serves as the basis of what passes for an economy.

The CIA does not and never has paid its assets in it and does not and never has dealt in it. The tribesmen with whom the CIA works, however, do deal in it, and raw opium in small amounts has undoubtedly moved on Air America flights in the bundles of Meo personal possessions.

AIR AMERICA WILL stop this when it can, but it isn't easy. No U.S. airline, for example, has yet discovered how to prevent even shotguns from being smuggled aboard their flights. The problem is in any event inconsequential, since the amounts are small and destined for use only as currency in Meo village barter.

Far more serious is the problem of ranking Laotian diplomats and military notables who smuggle large quantities of opium and heroin out of Laos and into the world market.

The diplomats are immune to search when they travel, and an Air America employe — a resident alien in Laos — would be on a sticky wicket if he tried to search the luggage of a senior Laotian official in Laos itself.

The responsibility, moreover, is not that of the airline but of the customs service in the country of arrival. Here again, diplomatic luggage is immune to search, as are certain official aircraft used by the military, and a country that insists on an illegal search had better find what it is looking for.

THE JULY HARPER'S magazine features an extract from the forthcoming book "The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia," by Yale Ph.D. student Alfred McCoy. The extract starts with a detailed description of the arrival at Orly Airport in Paris on 25 April 1971 of Prince Sopsaisana, the new Laotian ambassador to France.

Despite the presence of a large reception party, the prince insisted on waiting for his numerous official suitcases like an ordinary tourist, and when they arrived he at once noticed one was missing. He angrily demanded that it be produced, but was forced to depart with the promise that it would be delivered to the Laotian embassy as soon as it was found.

The suitcase contained 132 pounds of pure heroin. France refused to accept Sopsaisana's credentials, and he had to return to Laos.

The gist of McCoy's article is that the drug trade in the "Golden Triangle" flourishes with CIA support. His argument runs:

- All the leading figures in Laos are deeply involved in the drug trade.
- The CIA works closely with many of these figures.
- Ergo, the CIA is supporting the drug trade.

While the first two statements are correct, the conclusion is not valid and is not borne out by any evidence.

McCoy might, for example, have asked who tipped the French government off to this particular shipment. Customs officials do not take it upon themselves to search an ambassador's luggage. Authority for that can only come from the highest levels, and takes days to arrange.

The Orly officials, moreover, knew precisely which suitcase to sequester. They removed the right piece of luggage and let the rest go in a matter of minutes, obviously before there had been any chance to search all of them. In short they had heard from Vietiane exactly what to look for, and this tip did not come from the Laotian government.

The U.S. government, through the State Department and the CIA, is doing all it can to scotch the trade. The government of South Vietnam has had impressed on it that collusion between its customs officials and arriving smugglers is a serious matter, and it has arrested both its own citizens and halted and searched ranking foreigners.

In short, neither the CIA nor any other U.S. agency has ever deliberately engaged in, fostered or cast a deliberately blind eye on narcotics smuggling, although it has worked in other fields with officials who have been privately active in that one.

Raw opium has undoubtedly been transported on Air America flights in the past, but only as a private venture of a foreign passenger, and never with the connivance of an Air America employe. And the CIA has done what it can to prevent the use of Air America for such purposes.

The stories will no doubt continue, as long as there is a need for air services in Indochina, and as long as opium holds the peculiar place it does in the economy of that part of the world. But the stories must be seen in perspective, and in no way will they support the contention that the U.S. government, through the activities of the CIA, has deliberately furthered the international narcotics trade.

THE MIAMI HERALD
8 AUG 1972

Miamian's Novel Is Blood, Guts In Pulp Manner

COMPANY MAN, by Joe Maggio; G.P. Putnam; $5.95.

Reviewed by LAWRENCE MAHONEY

About the most accurate appraisal of this first novel is to call it an expanded version of the men's blood and guts fiction that appears in stag pulp magazines. That essentially is what Miamian Joe Maggio has done.

The publisher touts it as a powerful novel of modern warfare, a rival to Robin Moore's "The Green Berets" of a few years back. Heady adventure stuff, but it doesn't measure up.

MUCH of the book is set in Miami, Coconut Grove to be exact. Maggio has long played the soldier-of-fortune there and the book's Nick Martin doubtlessly is based on himself.

The paragraphs of this book are stuffed to overflowing with military abbreviations. This doesn't help Maggio's chopped style either and he has a lot to learn about dialogue.

It is quite easy to write such fiction about the Central Intelligence Agency because the truth about that superspy "company" is so hard to come by.

MAGGIO'S story line centers on Nick Martin, a Hemingway-type hero, a maverick who finds himself in the contract employment of the CIA in Miami and Guatemala during the buildup for the Bay of Pigs episode.

Specifically, he is employed by something called SOD (Special Operating Division), a paramilitary group used to do the CIA's dirtiest work. After the abortive Cuba invasion, Martin finds himself in a variety of other difficult spots.

It is in the cockpit of Indochina that Martin finds himself disillusioned with the "Company" because of a series of gory missions, including one which devastated the fishing villages of North Vietnam and triggered the Tonkin Gulf incident and ultimately the Tonkin Resolution which plunged the U.S. headlong into the Vietnamese Civil War.

IT IS IN Laos near the North Viet border that Martin crosses up his superiors and finds himself arrested for crossing the border to rescue tribesmen he had trained and sent over.

The book ends with a totally disillusioned hero leaving "the Company" for a local mercenary force in the Congo, where he becomes a true mercenary, risking his life in combat only for money, with no concern for cause.

If Maggio's book is based on fact, which the publisher claims it is, then the CIA training and operations are even more weird and unchecked than Americans have had reason to believe before.

Lawrence Mahoney is a Herald staff writer.

QUINCY, MASS.
PATRIOT LEDGER
AUG 19 1972
E - 65,785

GLOBAL CONNECTION

Two U.S. government reports released this week show the size and complexity of the drug problem and point to some gloomy conclusions about the effectiveness of attempts to control it.

A "World Opium Survey, 1972," put together by the State Department, Central Intelligence Agency, Bureau of Narcotics, Customs Bureau and Treasury, found that the international heroin market, controlled by international criminal "cartels," continued to have enough heroin to supply the world's users despite increasing crackdowns and seizures. A minimum of 200 tons of opium (from which heroin is refined) were estimated on the world market in 1971; in the same year, about one-tenth of that amount was seized by law-enforcement agencies world wide. This year, seizures are running somewhat higher than last year.

The report estimated that 100 kilograms of heroin, representing an investment of less than $300,000 to the French Corsicans who control the European trade, would ultimately sell for $22 million on the streets of New York.

Although efforts are under way to control the growing of the opium poppy, notably in Turkey, the report said those efforts are unlikely to be successful in various areas unless accompanied by "serious changes in a number of long-standing social and economic traditions."

An illustration of the complexities involved in the opium trade is the case of the Meo hill tribesmen of Laos. The Meo tribesmen have been an important force in the U.S. effort to support the Laotian government in its war with the Communists. On the other hand, the principal cash crop of the Meo is the opium poppy.

The other report this week was on an investigation by the Government Accounting Office of drug abuse control programs in the U.S. military services. The report found that although the Defense Department has actively cooperated in the enforcement of laws against drug trafficking, there is no way of telling whether its drug education programs are effective.

The study suggested that enforcement crackdowns may have contributed to the replacement in the drug trade of marijuana, which is bulky and easily detected by smell, by more dangerous drugs such as heroin.

And, said the report, military programs offering exemptions from prosecution for drug users who voluntarily turned themselves in for treatment had resulted largely in confusion, distrust and resentment among both troops and their immediate superiors. Further, said the accounting office, rehabilitation programs for drug users have met with very limited success.

The conclusions to be drawn are as familiar as they are cheerless: the drug problem is a reflection of deep and complex problems in the modern world, and most of our attempts to deal with it to date have been hasty, shallow and insufficient.

DAILY WORLD
18 AUG 1972

[redacted]

Free (drug) enterprise

Perusal of news dispatches about the Federal "World Opium Survey 1972" discloses several deficiencies in the report.

It does not deal with the role of the Central Intelligence Agency in conspiring in the opium traffic in the "golden triangle" in Burma, Thailand, and Laos. That CIA role is dealt with in detail in Alfred W. McCoy's "The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia," published yesterday by Harper & Row.

The Survey is, thus, a coverup for the CIA's drug operations.

The Survey does not deal with the drug traffic in Saigon where several of President Thieu's generals are major operators. That traffic has been protected by the U.S. command. One consequence has been the massive drug addiction among GIs, addiction which has returned to the U.S. with them.

The Survey reveals one useful consequence of President Nixon's visit to Peking. For years the U.S. Narcotics Bureau, and Harry Anslinger, its chief, carried on a slanderous war against the Peoples Republic of China as the main source of the world's opium traffic. The present report admits, in effect, that that was a lie. There is "no reliable evidence that China has either engaged in or sanctioned the illicit export of opium or its derivatives," it says.

The Survey concedes that, world-wide, government "seizures... represent only a small fraction of the illicit flow."

The obvious conclusion is that the flow of opium through the capitalist world is made possible by massive corruption of government officials, police agents, etc.

The inspiration for the massive business in opium is the same one that inspires other business — profit. In this respect, it is a shining example of "free enterprise."

[redacted]

Life in the shadow of the american embassy in Saigon

Editor's note. — *The Nixon administration has been striving to foster the Nguyen Van Thieu regime as a tool for the "Vietnamization" of the war. But no glossy veneer can hide the latter's nature as a traitorous clique, a gang of robbers trading in prostitutes, drugs and war means, a band of political speculators, black-marketeers and embezzlers who have been plundering "aid" funds and the salaries and wages of their own civil servants and soldiers — all this under American protection. The following inquiry by Thanh Nam exposes part of this corrupt and rotten US-puppet regime.*

SAIGON, in early 1972.

Tens of thousands of Honda and Suzuki motorbikes and Mercedes and Datsun sedans of every colour and hue rush along, belching clouds of exhaust fumes which ruin the foliage and flowers of the trees lining the streets.

The 3.6 million people of Saigon live crowded in eleven districts. High-rise US-style buildings of nine, ten, eleven storeys tower insolently in Dong Khanh and Nguyen Hue avenues while along muddy and refuse-strewn alleys in workers' quarters at Chuong Duong, Binh Dong and Cholon whole families are crammed into shanties of thatch, tin and card-board.

The number of Americans in military uniform has decreased a great deal. More and more snack-bars, Turkish-bath establishments and massage parlors catering to the American soldiery are closing down. American military police continue to stalk about, but in dwindling numbers.

And yet, while the war is being "Vietnamized," the American presence remains intact, overwhelming, in this city. It seems to have grown even heavier, more stifling. The scream of American jets keeps coming from the Tan Son Nhut airfield. Crowds of American civilians and air force officers continue to throng Tu Do boulevard. The American hand, the tricks of old Banker, the desperate moves of President Nixon to avoid checkmate, as well as the histrionics of Thieu, Huong, Khiêm and Co. are still daily topics of discussion for the Saigonese. People talk about the fiasco staring Nixon in the face, the inevitable departure of Nguyen Van Thieu, the collapse of "Vietnamization." For the last seven or eight years, the Saigonese people have had their ears full of the "lofty mission of the Americans" in this country and the "stability" of the "Second Republic." More and more clearly, the truth is appearing to them.

The fortress in the city

Everyone in Saigon knows about the new American fortress embassy, Bunker's residence. The old embassy at the corner of Ham Nghi and Vo Di Nguy streets now serves only for the reception of ordinary visitors and the delivery of passports and visas. The new embassy is white-painted and six storeys high, with a helicopter landing strip on its terrace roof; where a chopper and its pilot are standing by at all hours of the day and night. The box-shaped building is set back some distance from the street, surrounded by a solid ferro-concrete wall, equipped with air-conditioners, electronic computers and a hot telephone line linking it to the White House in Washington, and defended by machinegun nests. It is served by a power-house in the backyard. Military police stand guard day and night. The Americans boast that all building materials came from the United States and that plans were drawn and construction supervised by a renowned American military engineer, at the cost of 2.25 million dollars. In early 1971, in an interview with a French journalist, Bunker bragged about the solidity of this "White House" on the eastern shore of the Pacific. The unimpressed Frenchman replied with a wry smile: "Mr Ambassador, in my opinion, the fortress style of the embassy building suits your name rather than ambassadorial functions." Bunker's face showed that he was not amused by the play on word. In fact, Bunker was no ordinary ambassador and the unusual style of his residence indeed fits his unusual assignment.

Bunker has been in Saigon for six consecutive years. His is the most difficult and dangerous job ever held by an American diplomat in any period of American history. Political circles in Saigon are rife with stories and rumours about the man and the policies he has been pursuing. In spite of his 75 years, Bunker is very fastidious about his clothes, and the expensive *eaux de Cologne* he uses vary according to the season and the occasion. He has been, before his appointment to Saigon, ambassador to Argentina, Italy, India and Nepal.

The American press considers him as a skilful trouble-shooter who shows cold toughness not only to his adversaries but also to his allies. Saigon politicians nickname him The Old Fridge, while the Saigon press has dubbed him the Proconsul. His business is to pull the strings on which Nguyen Van Thieu dances, and he seems to perform it well. Even when the going is hard, he knows how to smooth away the obstacles. For instance he would lower his voice and call Thieu by his name (instead of Mr President) and tell him: "The United States is a great country, but one of her foibles is to lack patience. So you should realize that there are limits to American forbearance." Or he would say bluntly: "This has been decided in Washington. Once our President has taken a decision, there is no turning back." Then the only thing Thieu can do is to shut his mouth and stay quiet. If he doesn't, Bunker will have this clincher: "You know, Mr Thieu, Congress has become rather restive. They might reduce or even cancel some of the aid appropriations..." And that settles it.

The above are part of what the world press calls the tactics of pressure and blackmail, the mainspring of American diplomacy.

In fact, "Fridge" Bunker still has one more trick reserved for when Thieu is really intractable. He would smile and give the latter a gentle tap on the shoulder and say softly: "Mr Thieu, we happen to know that you and Mrs Thieu have some personal financial affairs to settle. We should be glad to

continued

LOS ANGELES TIMES
13 August 1972

[redacted]

STATINTL

'Cease-Fire' Lines Taking Form in Laos

BY JACK FOISIE
Times Staff Writer

VIENTIANE, Laos — The "yo-yo" no longer seems a part of the Laotian war.

For the first time in the decade since it became part of the Indochina insurgency conflict, combat in this landlocked Asian buffer state has ceased to be a series of seasonal advances and retreats by both sides. The lines are virtually stationary.

The North Vietnamese-Pathet Lao forces, which formerly utilized the dry season for attack and then retreated when the rains came, are not doing so this summer. Despite having to commit some of its Laos-based troops to the NVA three-front offensive in South Vietnam, those troops remaining have dug in at their forward-most positions.

This is generally true all along the loosely contested 800-mile front. There is speculation that Hanoi's stay-put order is predicated on possible negotiations to end the Indochina war. The present front would presumably then become the cease-fire line.

Little Pressure

Although the political gain for the NVA by standing fast is apparent, Gen. Nguyen Giap's army in Laos has been under little pressure from the American-backed Royal Lao Army so far. With the wet season almost half over, the Lao generals have made no effort yet to stage their annual thrusts at critical points along the long front.

Gen. Vang Pao, regarded as the Laotians' most aggressive commander, has made no move to recapture the lost Plain of Jars in the north, or even sortie out to [illegible] the fortified headquarters at Long Cheng 20 miles north of here. In the south, the strategic Bolovens plateau, totally lost for the first time to the enemy this year, is still firmly under NVA control and the town of Pakse is threatened.

With the furthest ever advance of the Communist forces in Laos being retained, only a third of the nation remains under pro-government control. But as the royal army still holds all the Mekong river towns, about two-thirds of Laos' estimated three million people give at least nominal allegiance to the Lao king in the royal capital of Luang Prabang and to Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma and his cabinet here.

Various reasons are advanced for the inability, or reluctance, of the Lao generals to do what normally comes naturally at this time of year in Laos—advance on the heels of the NVA and Pathet Lao units falling back to rainy season quarters.

Rebuilding Operation

Putting the best face on the no-go status, American advisers say the Lao generals are reluctant to attack without customary U.S. close air support—and that all American air power is preoccupied with bombing North Vietnam. Air officers deny that its Thailand-based 400-plane bomber armada is stretched thin and say "we are ready to support ground operations in Laos anytime."

A more plausible explanation is that the Royal Lao Army is using this wet season to rebuild and "will be stronger than ever before" when it takes the field again.

Thanks to the political wizardry of U.S. Ambassador G. McMurtrie Godley, the warlord-controlled Lao forces are being forged into American army divisional format. One-third of the 45,000-man Lao regular army will be prepared under the plan, at least in theory, to [illegible] wherever the [illegible]

[illegible] practice has been for each regional warlord family to hold onto its troops and wait for the enemy to invade the fiefdom before giving battle.

Gen. Vang Pao's Meo mountain tribal army, now being supported logistically by the American Army as well as the Central Intelligence Agency, also is undergoing recruiting and training.

Perhaps all this is necessary, for the Royal Lao Army—regular and irregular—is said to be outnumbered by the combined NVA and Pathet Lao (Communist) force. According to American estimates, in mid-July the enemy totalled 97,600 men. They included 63,200 NVA, with the others being NVA-led Pathet Lao units, PL irregulars and a handful of Communist-leaning ("neutralists") Laotians.

Thai Volunteers

The equalizer for the Royal Lao Army has been the Royal Thai Army "volunteers," who for better-than-Thai army pay provided by the Americans, cross the Mekong river to fight in critical areas.

During the past November-May dry season, about 10,000 Thai infantry and artillerymen were fighting in Laos under American sponsorship, authoritative sources revealed. But Thai units trying to stem the NVA offensive on the Plain of Jars last December were decimated. So the urge to reenlist for short-time high-paid duty in Laos has lost some of its appeal.

Gen. Vang Pao's inactivity may be explained by his only recent return from a five-week sojourn in the United States. The colorful tribal leader and ex-French army sergeant is the top soldier of the war in CIA opinion. With two wives he visited Washington, chatted with fellow soldier Gen. William C. Westmoreland and saw Disneyland. He spent [illegible] with a bevy of his children who live with ex-Lao veterans in Missoula, Mont. As a man from the tropics, Gen. Vang Pao was able to touch snow for the first time when he hunted in the Montana mountains—and he frolicked in the cold white stuff barefooted.

CIA Relocates

What promises of new support he obtained, in Washington is not apparent, but "it's not his nature to stand still," an American friend explained. If he intends to push back the foe from around Long Cheng, the NVA is not backing off. They periodically shell his base and his CIA support team has recently relocated in Vang Vieng, closer to Vientiane.

Even while "wintering," the NVA command has ventured, for the first time in the war, into the Mekong Valley. An enemy force captured Khong Sedone, a town in south Laos on the main north-south highway adjacent to the Mekong River. In its one forceful retaliation of the present wet season, Lao troops claim to have recaptured the town, killing 225 enemy. By Lao war standards that's a big battle.

Throughout Laos since Jan. 1, the Royal Lao army admits to having lost 400 men in battle.

WASHINGTON STAR

Laos Claims U.S. Gunships Are Being Used by Assassins

By TAMMY ARBUCKLE
Special to The Star-News

VIENTIANE — Is the United States using its giant C130 Spectre gunships for nighttime assassinations of Communist officials, Communist sympathizers and Communist suspects in their homes?

This charge is being leveled at the U.S. by Lao officials, authoritative diplomatic sources say, after an incident at Khong Island on the Lao-Cambodian border Friday night July 21.

Diplomats quote Lao sources as saying a Spectre gunship circled the house of Khong islands's chief information officer then opened fire blasting it five times and reducing it to a shambles. The officer and his family escaped unharmed after the first firing pass.

The sources say weather was clear and point out that Khong Island which is 8,000 yards long by 5,000 yards wide and located in the middle of the broad Mekong, is clearly distinguishable. Therefore, they say, the Spectre cannot have mistaken its target.

Afraid to Go Home

Diplomats quoted Khong's province chief as saying the Central Intelligence Agency was out to get him and he is afraid to go home each night.

Well informed sources, however, gave another version of the incident. They say the Spectre was about 12,000 yards off target. The Spectre zeroed in using a starscope, an instrument which turns nighttime into daylight but colored green and shows the target almost as clearly as in daylight.

These sources said the target was a house near Khompong Srilao, a Cambodian town on the Mekong bank west of Khong.

These sources said the information officer will be compensated with new furniture by the U.S. embassy.

Why should a high ranking official of the friendly Lao government and a Lao information officer also a Lao government employee make such accusations against the United States?

Deals in Contraband?

The answer may be a guilty conscience.

Informed U.S. sources have consistently asserted Lao officials in Pakse working with Lao officials in Khong have been dealing in contraband with North Vietnamese forces and Pathet Lao whose forces surround the island. This traffic in fuel, other petroleum products, batteries, rice and cloth has been going on with the connivance of high-ranking Lao army officers, Americans charge.

On June 5 a Royal Thai Air Force OHF 10 Bronco fired on and sank a boat traveling from the Mekong town of Pakse to Khong island reportedly filled with contraband cloth for Communist uniforms. The boat's owner was believed to be Col. Samran Rajphakdy, brother of the Laos army chief of staff, Gen. Phasouk Rajphakdy. In another earlier incident U.S. aircraft strafed what was claimed to be a boat full of students at a known Communist crossing point near Moulahamok between Khong and Pakse. How effective is the gunship if it is used in such a way?

Pinpointed House

There is no doubt it successfully pinpointed a single house and shot it apart but its inhabitants escaped because the first firing pass was used to zero in on the target, informed sources said.

One drawback to use of the Spectre for assassination of Khong officials is that it would be rather obvious to the Lao public who did the killing as North Vietnam hasn't got around to flying Spectres yet. The incident has left a bad taste in the mouth of Lao officials even in Vientiane and defense minister Sisouk Na Champassac has given stern orders not to discuss the incident with the press, the Lao say.

If the U.S. Air Force is carrying out assassinations with Spectre gunships in Communist-held areas off Southeast Asia, a bit more care on targeting seems necessary. Diplomats say a high-ranking group of U.S. officers is presently in Vientiane to investigate the incident but the embassy has not confirmed the report.

[redacted]

ST. LOUIS, MO.
POST-DISPATCH

E - 326,376
S - 541,868
AUG 1 2 1972

Dope And The CIA

The publishing firm of Harper & Row is to be commended for its rejection of Central Intelligence Agency criticism of a book on the heroin traffic in Southeast Asia which it plans to release this month. The author, Alfred W. McCoy, alleges that some American officials and CIA agents have allied themselves with groups engaged in the drug traffic, have abetted the traffic by covering up for drug runners and have been involved "in the transport of opium and heroin."

The CIA, which has undertaken an unusual publicity campaign to throw down the charges (some of which have been published previously), asked Harper's for permission to examine the advance text. The firm complied, and received a long CIA criticism of the book. Harper & Row editors went over the comments with Mr. McCoy, examined his substantiating documents, and then informed the agency it saw no reason to make any changes in the book.

B. Brook Thomas, Harper & Row vice president and general counsel, said the publishers were "underwhelmed" by the CIA critique. He added that the CIA had been very courteous and correct—"We haven't got any pressure."

We would consider the very request by the CIA to be a form of pressure, however, and Harper & Row was well-advised to resist it.

Mr. McCoy makes a strong case for the charge that CIA policies have in fact aided the heroin traffic in Southeast Asia. This has come about through the agency's free-wheeling clandestine efforts to control events in remote areas of Indochina. If the CIA would stick to intelligence gathering it would not be subject to such charges as Mr. McCoy has leveled, and would not have to defend itself.

DAILY WORLD
10 AUG 1972

STATINTL [redacted]

By: Dan Siegel

By the way, Young also happens to be chairman of the Asia Society!

His Introduction rambles on about "professional advisors" a while longer and then finally mentions "specific subjects" SEADAG will study: Development Administration, Education and Manpower, Mekong Development, Political Development, Regional Development, Rural Develoment, Urban Development and — nota bene — the Problems of Development Under Conditions of Insurgency, which means how to foist a capitalistic game plan on people who hate capitalism.

"Clearly," the Penn students wrote, "one of the imperatives behind the formation of SEADAG was that money would be available from the Federal Government," thus enabling Penn scholars to go ahead with their research without having to worry about the rent. "It is noteworthy," the students point out, that Young chairs both SEADAG and the Council on Foreign Relations which helps Nixon formulate foreign policy. Obviously, the Penn scientists' thoughts are fathered by the wishes of Washington, not the needs of future Vietnamese.

One more anagram is relevant here, although the ubiquitous Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) ties to USAID are almost common knowledge by now. In an interview with Dan Blackburn of Metromedia News, Dr. John Hannah, director of USAID, was asked: "Doctor, how do you respond to complaints that the AID Program is being used as a cover for CIA operations in Laos?"

"Well," said Dr. Hannah, "I just have to admit that that is true. This was a decision that was made back in 1962 and by administration from now until then (sic), and it is the only place in the world that we are."

Hannah was lying through his teeth about Laos being the only country in the world where USAID fronts for the CIA, but his admission suffices to prove that Penn counts the CIA as one of its patrons of higher learning.

Moreover, Young's Introduction states flatly that USAID has "the final veto power on every SEADAG grant," exercising the following criteria:

- "Projects should be related to areas of AID geographic concern. Priority will be given to projects involving or relevant to the Philippines, Thailand, Laos, Indonesia, Vietnam and Korea...
- "Priority will be given to projects which are relevant to AID programs, activities and planning.
- "Projects will be considered as to their sensitivity to local political situations." (My emphasis — D.S.)

STATINTL [redacted]

WASHINGTON POST
8 AUG 1972

[redacted]

Publisher Bars Changes in Book On SE Asia Drugs Hit by CIA

By Tim O'Brien
Washington Post Staff Writer

The Central Intelligence Agency has sent Harper and Row, Inc., a detailed critique of a book the firm is about to release, saying the work will do a "disservice" to the fight against narcotics traffic in Southeast Asia.

The New York publishing house, however, has decided to go ahead with publication of "The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia" by Alfred W. McCoy. The firm informed the CIA that "it is our sincere opinion that Mr. McCoy's scholarship remains unshaken and we do not see any reason for making changes in the text."

The book is highly critical of the CIA's efforts to suppress opium production and smuggling in Southeast Asia.

On July 5, CIA General Counsel Lawrence R. Houston wrote to Harper and Row, asking "to see the text" of the book. "In the light of the pernicious nature of the drug traffic, allegations concerning involvement of the U.S. government therein or the participation of American citizens should be made only if based on hard evidence," Houston wrote. "It is our belief that no reputable publishing house would wish to publish such allegations without being assured that the support evidence was valid."

"This, of course, in no way affects the right of a publisher to decide what to publish. I find it difficult to believe, however, that a responsible publisher would wish to be associated with an attack on our government involving the vicious international drug traffic without at least trying to ascertain the facts," he wrote.

Author McCoy, when told that Harper and Row planned to release galley proofs to the CIA, protested. He argued in a letter to B. Brook Thomas, the firm's vice president and general counsel, that "submitting the manuscript to the CIA for prior review is to agree to take the first step toward abandoning the First Amendment protection against prior censorship."

McCoy cited "extralegal actions" taken by the CIA to obstruct the book's publications. He said, "Visits by the CIA to Harper and Row, the telephone calls, and the letters are extralegal attempts by the CIA to harass and intimidate me and my publisher."

Thomas replied in a July 18 letter, however: "We want very much to publish (the book). But we want even more to live up to the traditions and responsibilities of a great publishing house as we see them. If we are forced to make a choice between the two, there can be no doubt what that choice must be."

McCoy, under "strong protest," agreed to give the CIA an advance copy of his book. He did so, he said yesterday, "for pragmatic reasons," partly because of the firm's decision not to publish the work if it were not first reviewed by the CIA.

Acknowledging receipt of the manuscript, CIA counsel Houston wrote Harper and Row on July 21: "It is not our intention to ask you to make changes in Mr. McCoy's book even if we believe some of the statements might be harmful to the government. It is possible that we might find some statement which is currently and properly classified in the interest of national security. If so, we will consult with you, but we believe this is highly unlikely. Our primary interest is in the validity of the evidence with which Mr. McCoy supports his allegations."

A CIA agent hand-delivered the agency's formal critique of the book in a letter dated July 28.

"Mr. McCoy supports his theme by citing a large number of allegations, assertions and interpretations," the 11-page criticism said. "From an examination of these, it is plain that Mr. McCoy has limited his citations to those supporting [illegible] appears to have ignored available information which might contradict it."

"Mr. McCoy's charges against the CIA, both directly and by innuendo, have been repeated by editorial writers throughout the nation and could create an accepted myth that the CIA has been involved in the drug traffic. The truth is that CIA has never been involved in the drug traffic and is actively engaged in fighting against it. We believe that the effect of Mr. McCoy's book is to do a disservice to this fight and to dishearten the many sincere people in CIA who are at least as concerned about this menace as Mr. McCoy."

In his book, McCoy argues that "American diplomats and secret agents have been involved in the narcotics traffic at three levels"—coincidental complicity by allying with groups engaged in drug trafficking; abetting trafficking by covering up for Southeast Asian traffickers; and active engagement "in the transport of opium and heroin."

The CIA critique covered several, although not all, of the illustrations used by McCoy to substantiate his three charges. For example, McCoy said that Air America —"which is really a CIA charter airline"—has been actively involved in the transport of opium products out of Laos. His sources, he said, include former Laotian chief of staff Ouane Rattikone (himself a suspected drug smuggler), Laotian air force commander Gen. Thao Ma, a USAID officer in Laos, and McCoy's own interviews with officials in Laotian villages.

The CIA critique said: "We believe the statement Mr. Paul Velte, Managing Director of Air America, made on 2 June 1972 in response to these allegations, labeling them as 'utterly and absolutely false,' clearly expresses the company and CIA views on this matter."

"General Ouane categorically denied that Air America was in any way involved in such traffic."

McCoy said yesterday that "there are over 200 pages of material on American operations in the Golden Triangle area. Out of all that, this is all they (the CIA) could come up with. They're only criticizing about 2 per cent of my total information."

"The most remarkable thing about the CIA's critique is that the agency actually admitted that one of its own mercenary army commanders, Laotian Gen. Chao La, was running a heroin lab in northwestern Thailand. Although the CIA said it destroyed his laboratory in mid-1971, it had been operating since 1965 [illegible] the agency's full knowledge," he said.

Elisabeth Jakab, the editor handling the manuscript, said yesterday that "the industry has been very cautious on things like this ever since the Clifford Irving story broke."

A source at Harper and Row said the CIA wrote the publishing firm that it could "prove beyond doubt" that McCoy's facts were wrong. "They just didn't do it," the source said.

On Friday, the firm wrote the CIA, responding to each of the agency's criticisms. The "best service we can render the author, the CIA and the general public is to publish the book as expeditiously as possible, and that is what we intend to do." The book is scheduled for release on Aug.

[redacted]

LOS ANGELES TIMES
6 AUG 1972

[redacted]

American Involvement Still Growing in Laos

U.S. Military Takes More Far-Ranging Role, Including Remolding Royal Army

BY JACK FOISIE
Times Staff Writer

VIENTIANE, Laos — American involvement in South Vietnam may be winding down, but in Laos it continues to grow.

The significance is not yet in increased numbers, but in more far-ranging roles. The newest one is remolding of the Royal Lao Army in the U.S. format. An Indochina peace settlement would end all such ambitious undertakings, but with the American-backed Laotian government in poor shape militarily, the shoring-up process is proceeding as if the war remains unending.

As noted, the numbers of official Americans reported in Laos is up only slightly — from 1,041 in 1970 to 1,190 last year. Now it totals 1,250. But that does not count daily commuters from Udorn, Thailand, a 30-minute flight away. There the Central Intelligence Agency, the U.S. Army and Air Force, and the chartered U.S. airlines Air America and Continental have their Laos-operation headquarters, their logistical base, and many of their aircraft.

French Supplanted

Americans have supplanted the French as trainers of the Royal Lao Army. With the usual "take-charge" desire, American military officers are settling into their role as revampers of the motley Lao units into American-style division.

The American organizers of these radical changes insist the Laotians will conduct all their own training operations, with "two or three" Americans to oversee the process at each of four training camps. But if this endeavor follows the American experience in revamping the South Vietnam and Cambodian armies, the U.S. presence in the camps will become plentiful.

The enlargement of the American role expands in other directions. The U.S. Embassy, having recently added a second large building, is now constructing a third. Such diplomats as narcotics agents are housed inside.

The AID mission, besides its own legitimate civilian air program, continues to harbor CIA field agents, despite a Washington announcement a year ago that this practice would end.

The AID mission's role here as "paymaster" for other agencies including the CIA is considered defensible. As one AID official explained: "When you've got irregular soldiers on the embattled hill, that's CIA. When you've got civilians on the same hill, that's AID. But it's better to make one rice drop than two—and AID is in the rice-dropping business.

The candor with which officials discuss American activities here is due to a "fess-all" decision by Ambassador G. McMurtrie Godley early this year. He decided, it was explained, "that just about all the secret activity in Laos has leaked out."

Patton-Like Phrases

Thus, Laos is now relatively open coverage for reporters. Thailand is the only [illegible] where the American coverup still exists.

With Godley's see-for-yourself policy, one might assume his image would have improved in the press. But he is still regarded in most profiles as a diplomat-turned-warrior. He uses such Patton-like expressions as "giving them the steel" in referring to a larger import of artillery to be used against the North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao forces in Laos.

And while there is still some denial, many previous restrictions on American military activities in Laos have been relaxed during Godley's regime. As a foreign diplomat observed: "The 1962 Geneva big-power agreement (to keep Laos non-involved in the Indochina war) is the most violated document in recent history — by both sides."

[redacted]

NEW HAVEN, CONN.
REGISTER
AUG 4 1972
E - 104,849
S - 122,459

Book Coming Out Despite CIA

A Yale student's book linking the Central Intelligence Agency to Southeast Asian heroin traffic will be published this month despite the CIA's objections to it.

Harper & Row will publish "The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia" by Alfred W. McCoy, a Yale graduate student, on Aug. 17, according to the author.

The book charges that the CIA was aware of, and at times a participant in, heroin business conducted by government officials in Laos, South Vietnam and Thailand.

The CIA asked to review the book prior to publication, saying that it could disprove a number of McCoy's claims. The publishing company told McCoy it would not print the book if he refused this review.

The CIA sent Harper & Row a letter listing its objections Thursday, but McCoy said most of them were simply "flat denials."

McCoy said this morning he felt the agency was trying to squash the book but that extensive coverage of the CIA review in the news media caused it to pull back.

McCoy said many of his charges — substantiated in the book — were supported by news stories as well following the CIA request to review the book.

REFERRAL OF MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD subsequently said: Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a message from the President of the United States on Tropical Storm Agnes received today be referred jointly to the same committees to which a previous message on the same subject was referred; namely, the Committee on Public Works; the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs; and the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. HUGHES). Without objection, it is so ordered.

EXECUTIVE MESSAGES REFERRED

As in executive session, the Presiding Officer (Mr. GRAVEL) laid before the Senate messages from the President of the United States submitting sundry nominations, which were referred to the appropriate committees.

(The nominations received today are printed at the end of Senate proceedings.)

MILITARY PROCUREMENT AUTHORIZATIONS, 1973

The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill (H.R. 15495) to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1973 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, tracked combat vehicles, torpedoes, and other weapons, and research, development, test, and evaluation for the Armed Forces, and to authorize construction at certain installations in connection with the Safeguard antiballistic missile system, and to prescribe the authorized personnel strength for each active duty component and of the Selected Reserve of each Reserve component of the Armed Forces, and for other purposes.

Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, I yield such time as may be needed to the distinguished Senator from Iowa (Mr. HUGHES), whom I will replace in the chair.

(Mr. CRANSTON assumed the chair as Presiding Officer.)

Mr. HUGHES. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum and ask unanimous consent that the time be equally divided between both sides.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. CRANSTON). Without objection, it is so ordered. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. HUGHES. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. HUGHES. Mr. President, I rise today in support of the amendment of the Senator from California. I rise again, as I have so many times before in the last 3½ years that I have been a Member of this body, in support of a move constitutionally based on the Senate's power and right to declare war, and to supply the funds to support armies at war or during peacetime, almost unbelieving that so much time has passed since this debate began.

Some of us have been deeply torn by the fact that within our own party many years ago we had to part courses from a President that we dearly loved, a President with legislative prowess and with expressed concerns for peace for this country, who espoused great programs which were jointly brought into being through Congress, who has all but been forgotten because of one failure—a failure to bring an end to a conflict that not only has torn Southeast Asia apart, but also has torn apart this country.

I find myself today in a position of having agreed to time limitations on an amendment, when everything from the very center of my being cries out that we should have filibustered against the passage of this bill until a determination was made once and for all to end this war.

I find myself again listening to the rafters ring as men whom I honor and respect cry out for the blood of our enemies, and say that the only way for justice to prevail is through death, destruction, bombing, and destroying. They seem to believe that little children and civilians, peaceful people, the dying and the aged, are of no concern and of no conscience to the people of this country. I cannot believe that nor can I much longer tolerate it.

The expressed will of these people time and time again has cried out in agony from the very center of their being, saying, "Bring it to an end; do not let it go on."

Yet we fail and we say the same things over and over again: Give the President a little more time; let him negotiate; let him bomb; let him destroy; let him bring them to their knees.

Ten years have passed. Our President has long since gone of his own volition, and we have a new President who 4 years ago said to the American people:

> I have a plan to bring this war to an end. The people of America deserve a new President to make new decisions.

Since that time 22,000 American men have died in combat and other thousands have died for other reasons. There have been hundreds of thousands of civilian casualties, deaths on both sides of the borders, an invasion of Cambodia, an invasion of Laos, incessant bombing of the north, armies fighting without our knowledge or authorization, paid by the CIA.

How much longer can our consciences cry out, not for truth from our enemies, but for truth from our leadership in our country? How much longer must we consent to time agreements of 4 hours to debate an issue that has brought death to hundreds of thousands of people on the face of this earth?

How much longer must we be asked, in the interest of ending a session of Congress, to sacrifice our right, as Senators, to continue to try to bring this war to an end, if we feel it right to do so, or at least to exhaust every means we have?

We have coaxed, we have tried, and we have appealed. I do not speak in anger toward any Member of this body because of his personal feelings. I speak in anguish from the bottom of my heart and from the bottom of my soul at what this country has done in the name of justice and continues to perpetrate in the name of peace. How long can it go on and how long will the people tolerate it? It seems almost forever.

Since President Nixon came into office more days have passed than from the bombing of Pearl Harbor, the beginning of the buildup of our forces, the conquest of the Continent of Europe, the devastation of Hitler and to the day when peace was signed with those countries involved. Yet we are still at war with a little nation in Southeast Asia. And we were promised a settlement and justice.

Now, they say, "Give us time." They say, "You are aiding and abetting the enemy. You dare to cry out for the right to exercise your constitutional right as a Member of the Senate representing the people of your State."

I say that unless I dare to cry out in that regard, then I have ceased to represent the people of my State and the people of this country. I have not only the right but also the will to use whatever means and devices the forefathers of this country gave in the separation of powers in the constitutional structure of this country to see that civilian control of our military force to exercise justice in the world is derived from the feelings of the hearts and the consciences of the people and not from the heart of the military superpowers who know nothing but to be trained to fight wars.

I do not fault them. They have their purpose in being able to fight, to win, to conquer. But they are the servants of the will of the people of this country, not the rulers of it. Too long has it been the other way around.

The fact is, however, that a real bloodbath has been going on while we have been debating a hypothetical one. By the President's own admission, there have been 600,000 civilian casualties in South Vietnam since 1965. Official statistics now show more than 1 million combat deaths on all sides. In the past 3 months alone, there have been 45,000 additional civilian casualties, according to the President.

With this evidence and with the evidence of our environmental warfare, there can be no doubt now that we have been destroying Vietnam allegedly in order to save it.

How much longer can this continue? We cannot end this war by ourselves, of course; but we can end our contribution to the slaughter. We can halt our massive bombing, and we can bring all of our troops and prisoners home safely.

We have been preaching to the American people about changing the face of this war, and we have been moving forces into Thailand and into the South China Sea and wreaking destruction in the process. Is that bringing the war to an end? It is not bringing the war to an end.

The debate over what kind of government there is in South Vietnam as opposed to what kind of government there is in North Vietnam is interesting. It is interesting to see that Members of this body have no reluctance at all to vote

WASHINGTON POST
2 AUG 1972

STATINT

[redacted]

Report Pessimistic On Screening Out Indochina Drugs

By Tim O'Brien
Washington Post Staff Writer

A White House report circulated among congressmen early last month gives a gloomy forecast for U.S. efforts to stem illicit narcotics trafficking in Southeast Asia, particularly Burma and South Vietnam.

The little noticed report shows that a total of only 29 tons of illegal opium or its derivatives were seized in Southeast Asia between August 1971 and June 1972. This represents about four per cent of the annual illicit production in the region, which according to the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs is approximately 700 tons.

The report—a chronology of "narcotics action" in Thailand, Laos, Burma and South Vietnam—shows that 26 of 29 tons were destroyed at Chiang Mai, Thailand, last March.

The action has frequently been cited as an indication of a crackdown in Thailand.

But columnist Jack Anderson says that "the CIA and other federal agencies have quietly informed Washington that something besides opium went up in that bonfire." He said that all but five of the 26 tons was nothing but fodder, plant material and chemicals.

The Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs refuted those charges, claiming that on-the-spot U.S. inspectors examined the material under microscopes and found it to be "genuine opium."

Andrew C. Tartaglino, Deputy Director for Operations in the BNDD, said "our chemist tested it before it was burned. There is no question—it was opium."

Anderson's colleague, reporter Les Whitten, was present at a BNDD press conference, challenging Tartaglino to make available a weekly intelligence summary compiled by the bureau from CIA and State Department reports. The summary, Whitten said, contained [illegible] the effect that extraneous matter was mixed with only five tons of opium."

Tartaglino said the summary was based on "raw intelligence" and had been "discounted as unreliable." He said the summary is classified and cannot be released without going through "established procedures."

The United States paid $1 million for the 26 tons of material that was voluntarily turned over by bands of Nationalist Chinese living in northern Thailand according to Tartaglino.

The White House study, signed by Richard Harkness, information director for the President's Narcotics Control Program, said there would be difficulties in any long-term effort to stem the flow of illegal drugs in South Vietnam.

"Smuggling is endemic in the country and real control is unlikely," the report said.

According to the study, South Vietnam President Thieu was handed a memorandum on May 3, 1971, "which notes relationship between narcotics problems and future U.S. role in Vietnam." The memo urged him to greatly improve "intelligence and enforcement activities to identify and arrest narcotics ringleaders and pushers."

The following day, the head of the Vietnamese national police's narcotics bureau was replaced, and its personnel expanded from 26 to 52.

But the unpublicized White House report summarized: "Encouraging as Vietnam's recognition of the problem and (its) dynamic response may be, real progress of a long-term nature is questionable."

This conclusion stands in contrast to the administration's public optimism, reiterated only a week ago by presidential assistant, Egil Krogh Jr.

The study was compiled for the White House by those State Department desks responsible for the four countries covered in the narcotics action chronology.

The report listed no specific seizures or arrests in Burma the largest opium producing country in Southeast Asia.

The Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs estimates that Burma's illicit opium production is about 400 tons a year.

According to the report, "the Burmese government's policy of non-alignment and sensitivity to foreign influence is a limiting factor in its involvement with the U.S. or the United Nations in the narcotics field."

"There are no BNDD (Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs) or U.S. Customs programs in Burma such as exist in neighboring countries with which the U.S. is allied or has common security interests and programs," the study said.

The White House said "very little opium is now grown in Laos; less than 30 tons a year." However, the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs estimated last Tuesday that Laos produces more than three times that amount — about 100 tons a year.

"Nearly all of (the Laotian opium) still being grown is consumed by the growers," the report said. "There is no evidence that significant amounts of Lao-grown opium are entering the international traffic. Laos is a conduit for Burmese opium and opium derivatives, including heroin, however."

Of the 30 or 100 tons of opium products grown each year in Laos, less than one ton was confiscated between August 1971 and June 1972, according to the report's chronology of narcotics actions.

Although the report said that Laos is a "conduit" for Burmese opium and although only one ton was confiscated there in the 10-month period, the report concludes that "the flow of opium and heroin through Laos has been seriously disrupted."

Alfred W. McCoy, author of a soon to be published book "The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia," testified before a Senate subcommittee early last month that "all U.S. officials in Indochina know that the vast majority of the high grade heroin sold to GIs fighting in South Vietnam is manufactured in Laotian laboratories."

"In northern Laos," he said, "Air America aircraft and helicopters chartered by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency and USAID have been transporting opium harvested by the agency's tribal mercenaries on a regular basis."

Publication of the book by Harper and Row, Inc., has been held up by a CIA request to review it. McCoy, under "strong protest," agreed to give the CIA an advance copy.

Last Friday, a CIA agent delivered "written comments and criticisms" to the New York publisher, but the company has not yet announced whether the CIA asked for revisions or a halt to publication. It is believed the firm will not agree to alter the manuscript, a source close to McCoy said.

WASHINGTON STAR
2 AUG 1972

BOOKS

James Bonds of Yesteryear

By ROGER JELLINEK
New York Times News Service

In 1941 a British naval intelligence officer named Ian Fleming recommended to Gen. William (Wild Bill) Donovan that he recruit as American intelligence officers men of "absolute discretion, sobriety, devotion to duty, languages, and wide experience." Donovan, a World War I hero and successful Wall Street lawyer, understood the fantasies of writers and presidents, and in a memo to President Roosevelt promised an international secret service staffed by young officers who were "calculatingly reckless," with "disciplined daring" and trained for "aggressive action."

The Office of Strategic Services came to include such James Bonds as John Birch, Norman O. Brown, David K. E. Bruce, Dr. Ralph J. Bunche, William Bundy, Michael Burke, Julia Child, Clark Clifford, John Kenneth Galbraith, John W. Gardner and Arthur J. Goldberg. There were others — Sterling Hayden, August Heckscher, Roger O. Hilsman, Philip Horton, H. Stuart Hughes, Clark M. MacGregor, Herbert Marcuse, Henry Ringling North. And still others: John Oakes, Walt W. Rostow, Elmo Roper, Arthur M. Schlesigner Jr., Ralph de Toledano — to name just a few of the hundreds in this book by R. Harris Smith.

SMITH, WHO WAS in the trade himself, resigning in 1968 after a "very brief, uneventful, and undistinguished association with the most misunderstood bureaucracy of the American government," the Central Intelligence Agency, now lectures in political science at the University of California's Extension Division. "This history of America's first central intelligence agency" is "secret" because Smith was denied access to OSS archives, and so had to rely on the existing literature supplemented by some 200 written and verbal recollections of OSS alumni.

The book is densely packed with the bewildering variety of OSS exploits in World War II: Spying, sabotage, propaganda, military training missions, politicking and coordinating resistance groups against the Germans.

OSS agents had to compete as much with their allies as with their enemies.

OSS: The Secret History of America's First Central Intelligence Agency. By R. Harris Smith. Univ. of California Press. 458 pages. Illustrated. $10.95.

In France and Switzerland, where Allen Dulles operated, the British SOE (Special Operations Executive) was especially grudging. In Germany itself, the OSS lost out to more orthodox American military intelligence, though paradoxically they were strongly represented at Nuremberg, where Gen. Donovan was himself a deputy prosecutor — at the same time that the head of the Nazi secret service, Gen. Reinhard Gehlen, was under OSS protection in exchange for his intelligence network in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

From present perspective the most (literally) intriguing story is that of the OSS in China and Indochina. There were both pro-Communists and anti-Communists in the OSS, and most agents sympathized with Asian nationalists, so that the OSS aided Thai partisans against the British and, of course, more famously, the Vietminh against the French in Laos and Vietnam (an OSS medic saved Ho Chi Minh's life). Smith's retelling of the tragicomedy of Indochina after the Japanese surrender in 1945, with Vichy and Gaullist French, British, Chinese and the Vietminh jockeying for control, makes a fascinating setpiece.



The book ends with an account of the transformation of the OSS into its "mirror image," the CIA. Smith's admiration for the OSS's wartime pragmatism, its "tradition of dissent" and its anticolonialism suggests his thesis: That the OSS/CIA has been made the straw man of the radical and liberal left. In fact, he asserts, the CIA has been the principal guardian of liberal values in the "intelligence community."

HE REMINDS US that the CIA fought Sen. Joseph R. McCarthy, and he argues that the CIA's campaign to fund anti-Communist liberals successfully undermined international Communist organizations and disarmed the paranoid anti-Communism of the FBI and others at home. He notes that CIA liberals worked against Batista for Castro, who betrayed them, allowing the CIA conservatives to plan the Bay of Pigs action. Finally, he points to the evidence in the Pentagon Papers that the CIA has been a critic of the Vietnam War from the beginning.

But the question remains whether the OSS "tradition of dissent" is meaningful, whether it doesn't compromise liberals as much as aid them. Smith's book is full of cryptic references to former OSS agents now prominent in international business and finance. CIA liberalism has not prevented a number of CIA-fomented coups d'etat in favor of military regimes. Even CIA liberal criticism of the war in Vietnam seems to have had little effect on policy. All might be fair in time of war, but Smith ought to have scouted the need for a permanent bureaucracy part of whose function is officially devoted to clandestine political manipulations abroad in time of "peace."

ST. LOUIS POST DISPATCH

[redacted]

A Protest By The CIA [redacted]

STATINTL

Intelligence Agency Denies Links With Drug Trade In Laos

(The following letter to the editor of the Post-Dispatch *takes issue with statements made in an editorial printed on this page. The statements, although reflecting charges publicized over a period of several years, were based in this instance mainly on an article in the July 1972 issue of* Harper's Magazine, *titled "Flowers Of Evil, The CIA and the Heroin Trade," by Alfred W. McCoy. The article was adapted from a chapter in* The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia, *a book by Mr. McCoy, a PhD student in Southeast Asian history at Yale University, to be published in September by Harper & Row, Inc.)*

In your editorial of June 27, you state: "The connection of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency with the dope traffic in Laos has long been notorious." I write you to state that this allegation is false and unfounded. It is disappointing to see a journal of the Post-Dispatch's reputation repeating such an unfounded assertion without a check of its accuracy, any reference to the public record to the contrary, or any apparent effort to specify its sources.

Normally CIA does not respond publicly to allegations made against it. Because of the serious nature of the drug problem in this country, I am writing to you to make the record clear, although the sweeping phraseology of your comment is difficult to counter in detail.

CIA's real "connection" with the "dope traffic in Laos" has been to work against it. John E. Ingersoll, director of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, in a letter to Representative Charles S. Gubser of California on May 27, 1971 (reproduced in the Congressional Record of June 2, 1971), stated:

"Actually, CIA has for sometime been this bureau's strongest partner in identifying foreign sources and routes of illegal trade in narcotics. Their help has included both direct support in intelligence collection, as well as in intelligence analysis and production. Liaison between our two agencies is close and constant in matters of mutual interest. Much of the progress we are now making in identifying overseas narcotics traffic can, in fact, be attributed to CIA co-operation."

Roland Paul, investigator for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, reported in the April 1971 issue of Foreign Affairs "that due to the long association with the CIA, the Meo tribesmen in Laos were shifting from opium to rice and other crops."

You also allege that "The big shot of the Laotian trade is Gen. Vang Pao, an unsavory character who for the last decade has been commander of the CIA's secret army in northeastern Laos. American diplomatic officials in Laos seem to look the other way; they have confined their recent efforts to promoting Laotian laws against opium addicts."

In truth, Gen. Vang Pao is not engaged in the drug trade in Laos. On the contrary, he has, as a leader of the Meo, conducted an energetic program over the years to bring this tribal group to abandon their traditional growth of the opium poppy and develop substitute crops and new forms of livestock to provide daily sustenance and income. He has done this in the course of fighting off a North Vietnamese invasion of the Meo territories in Laos. He has received American asssistance in both of these efforts.

While vague assertions such as your editorial have been made about him in the past, the U.S. Government personnel in constant contact with him for many years have never found evidence connecting him with trafficking in narcotics.

More than one year ago, in an address before the American Society of Newspaper Editors, Richard Helms, director of Central Intelligence, stated the following:

"There is the arrant nonsense, for example, that the Central Intelligence Agency is somehow involved in the world drug traffic. We are not. As fathers, we are as concerned about the lives of our children and grandchildren as are all of you. As an agency, in fact, we are heavily engaged in tracing the foreign roots of the drug traffic for the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs. We hope we are helping with a solution; we know we are not contributing to the problem."

This statement remains valid today.

W. E. Colby
Executive Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C.



—Post-Dispatch, July 25, 1971

". . . And I Thought It Was An Escape!"

STATINTL

[redacted]

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[redacted]

CLASSIFIED FILES: The Yellowing Pages

A Report on Scholars' Access to Government Documen

By Carol M. Barker and Matthew H. Fox



The Twentieth Century Fund/New York/1972

Continued

RAMPARTS
AUG 1972

STATINTL

[redacted]

U.S. Electronic Espionage: A Memoir

[redacted]

STATINTL

ABOUT THIRTY MILES NORTHEAST of CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia, right off the Baltimore-Washington expressway overlooking the flat Maryland countryside, stands a large three story building known informally as the "cookie factory." It's officially known as Ft. George G. Meade, headquarters of the National Security Agency.

Three fences surround the headquarters. The inner and outer barriers are topped with barbed wire, the middle one is a five-strand electrified wire. Four gatehouses spanning the complex at regular intervals house specially-trained marine guards. Those allowed access all wear irridescent I.D. badges – green for "top secret crypto," red for "secret crypto." Even the janitors are cleared for secret codeword material. Once inside, you enter the world's longest "corridor"–980 feet long by 560 feet wide. And all along the corridor are more marine guards, protecting the doors of key NSA offices. At 1,400,000 square feet, it is larger than CIA headquarters, 1,135,000 square feet. Only the State Department and the Pentagon and the new headquarters planned for the FBI are more spacious. But the DIRNSA building (Director, National Security Agency) can be further distinguished from the headquarters buildings of these other giant bureaucracies –it has no windows. Another palace of paranoia? No. For DIRNSA is the command center for the largest, most sensitive and far-flung intelligence gathering apparatus in the world's history. Here, and in the nine-story Operations Building Annex, upwards of 15,000 employees work to break the military, diplomatic and commercial codes of every nation in the world, analyze the de-crypted messages, and send on the results to the rest of the U.S. intelligence community.

Far less widely known than the CIA, whose Director

[redacted]

STATINTL

continued

WASHINGTON POST
JUL 1972

STATINTL [redacted]

CIA Moving Base In Northern Laos

Special to The Washington Post

VIENTIANE, July 30—The headquarters for CIA-backed Laotian irregular forces in northern Laos is moving from the Long Cheng area to a new location 17 miles west, according to highly reliable U.S. sources here.

Vang Vieng, a town on Route 13 85 miles north of Vientiane and 34 miles southwest of Long Cheng Valley, has been chosen as the new operations and logistics center for Gen. Vang Pao's guerrilla force.

The move to Vang Vieng became necessary as a result of setbacks suffered by Gen. Vang Pao's forces, according to the U.S. sources.

Arms, ammunition, petroleum and all other war material supplied by the United States to Gen. Vang Pao's irregular army of Meo tribesmen are expected to be stockpiled at Vang Vieng for greater safety, sources said.

Both CIA and Meo planners, coordinators and advisors also will be based at the new center, where they will be in less danger than they currently are in at Long Cheng and Ban Song.

U.S. sources in Long Cheng recently reported Vang Pao's forces are having considerable difficulty recapturing positions strategically important to the defense of Long Cheng Valley.

U.S. advisers to Vang Pao are said to be increasingly worried about the vulnerability of the Ban Song base.

Ban Song replaced Long Cheng as headquarters for Vang Pao's irregular army early this year when North Vietnamese forces launched heavy attacks on Long Cheng after capturing the Plain of Jars.

COURIER JOURNAL
STATINTL
JUL 31 1972
M - 239,949
S - 350,303

Opinion

U.S. aid for the drug traffickers?

AS PART OF the effort to combat drug abuse—which, according to President Nixon last summer, has "assumed the dimensions of a national emergency"—the administration is committed to an all-out attack on the international narcotics trade. This involves not just the breaking up of the syndicates that process and import the heroin to the United States, but persuading other governments, particularly in Southeast Asia where most of the world's heroin now originates, to come down hard on the growers and marketeers. But is the Nixon administration trying as hard as it could to cut off this profitable trade at its source?

Disturbing evidence is accumulating that it may not be. There is *The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia,* to be published this fall but excerpted in the July issue of *Harper's* by a young Yale graduate student specializing in Southeast Asian history and politics. This documents the involvement of high government and military officials in Laos and Thailand in the narcotics trade; it even charges complicity by the Central Intelligence Agency. The CIA has challenged all the author's allegations, asserting that most of them are without foundation.

'Lever' is hard to use

But there is also the study made last winter by top-level officials of the CIA, the State Department and the Pentagon, and just now disclosed. This report concludes that there is no prospect of cutting off the smuggling of narcotics from Southeast Asia because of "the corruption, collusion and indifference at some places in some governments, particularly Thailand and South Vietnam." This conclusion, too, is being discounted by administration officials, who argue that it is out of date and that "substantial progress" has been made in the past four months.

Yet it would be naive to assume that a situation that was so bad could have improved as significantly and as swiftly as all that. Certainly the administration should not be speaking the success it scored last year when it was able to persuade the Turkish government to



Dowling in The Kansas City Star

"The place to start is the other end."

of the opium poppy. In Turkey's case the United States is to help in compensating the thousands of peasant farmers for whom poppy-growing has been an innocent livelihood for centuries and who now must switch to other cash crops. Whether the Turkish government or anyone else is compensating the many middlemen who have grown fat off the opium trade is not discussed publicly.

But the United States has another way of persuading reluctant governments to join the anti-drug campaign. Congress tacked on a provision to last year's foreign aid bill permitting the President to suspend aid to any country that doesn't take action against the drug traffic. The only problem is that suspending aid to the governments of Southeast Asia would virtually end the Vietnam war overnight.

It's a dilemma, to be sure. But it's worth recalling that last winter, when President Nixon was vehemently reiterating this country's commitment to keeping President Thieu in power in Saigon, even though this was the main obstacle to serious negotiations in Paris, the same regime was one of the major factors being blamed by U.S. officials for the continuation of our own "national emergency" in drugs. And that's why we ask: Is the administration trying as hard as it can in the war on drugs, or must that effort still rank way below a certain view of a solution for

STATE JOURNAL
JUL 30 1972
E - 15,301
S - 15,679

Wanted: Answers on Laos

Last week Americans learned through the press that the Central Intelligence Agency is experimenting with rainmaking techniques in Laos to retard the flow of enemy supplies down the Ho Chi Minh trail into South Vietnam. The report came from "military sources," not from the Nixon administration. Sec. of Defense Melvin Laird refused to comment on the subject.

THAT IS HOW the American people have learned over the years the extent of their country's involvement in Laos, an involvement that does not seem likely to diminish as a result of "Vietnamization" of the war or any other scheme that focuses primarily on Vietnam.

Reports started appearing several years ago that U.S. bombers were ranging far beyond the Ho Chi Minh trail to drop their deadly cargo on the Plain of Jars in central Laos. There have been persistent rumors that the CIA has been training mercenaries to fight against the Communist Pathet-Lao, which is engaged in a civil war with the Lao government (admittedly with the help of the North Vietnamese). There is also considerable evidence that Americans in the Army's elite Special Forces have been fighting on the ground in Laos.

Only recently has the Nixon administration acknowledged that U.S. bombers have operated over Laos, generally giving the impression that American air strikes there have been directed only against North Vietnamese supply routes. The other reports have either been denied or, as in this instance, dismissed with a highhanded "no comment."

YET REPORTS from U.S. military and civilian personnel returning home from Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam indicate that the number of bombs dropped in Laos since 1965 probably amounts to hundreds of times the destruction rained on Pearl Harbor by the Japanese. That attack was rightfully considered an act of war by the American people. But when the tables are turned, when the U.S. unleashes literally thousands of air attacks on a small Asian country, both Democratic and Republican administrations have refused to so much as comment on what is going on, let alone ask Congress for a declaration of war or for its token approval with another Tonkin Resolution.

Although the U.S. Constitution stipulates Congress is the only power that can legitimately commit American fighting men to combat, reports coming out of Laos show the extent to which Congress has lost control over the U.S. war machine.

This newspaper recently ran a two-part condensation of a report to Congress by Rep. Paul McCloskey, R-California, which presented evidence that U.S. ambassadors in Laos have been able to order Air Force strikes against virtually any village in the country with little interference from Congress or the White House. McCloskey's report, based on interviews with dozens of U.S. servicemen and Laotian refugees, suggests that lower echelon policy makers have used bombs to "herd" the Laotian civilian population out of Communist territory and into government controlled areas, the loss of a few thousand lives notwithstanding. There was even some evidence that biological warfare materials have been used in Laos on a selective basis.

THIS INFORMATION is hard to believe, if only because it seems unlikely that the U.S. military and diplomatic corps would dare to so flaunt the powers the Congress seems to have lost by default. But the reports continue to come in, despite government silence on the war in Laos. If true, they provide a sad commentary on the extent to which American diplomacy has been brutalized during a decade of military free rein in Indochina.

It has been said that thanks to the clever posturing of Richard Nixon during his trips to Red China and Moscow and with the withdrawal of troops from Vietnam, the war in Indochina will not be an issue in this election year. Americans may be able to write off the tragedy of Vietnam, once our troops are back home and the prisoners of war have been released. But there will remain the tragedy of Laos, of which most Americans are hardly aware, thanks to the deliberate efforts of the executive branch.

According to the present Vietnamization schedule, a substantial number of U.S. bombers will remain in Thailand, the source of most of the air strikes into Laos. The Vietnamization idea does not represent a significant change from the kind of thinking that got his country involved in the quagmire of Southeast Asia in the first place. The U.S. Air Force will remain to literally fly to the rescue of political regimes in Laos or who-knows-where else.

THIS IS A good year for Americans to ask the politicians where they stand on continuing this presence in Southeast Asia, and, for those who favor it, whether they would make it accountable to Congressional authority.

Yes, the reports coming out of Laos are hard to believe. But impossible? As, yourself. And then ask the candidates. — G.L.

30 July 1972

Denounces AID Link With CIA

By WILLIAM K. WYANT JR.
A Washington Correspondent of the Post-Dispatch

WASHINGTON, July 29—Senator Stuart Symington (Dem.), Missouri, denounced Saturday the Agency for International Development's involvement in Laos with the Central Intelligence Agency.

"The activities and funds of these two agencies in Laos are now so mixed," he said, "that it must be impossible for Lao officials to know whether they are dealing with AID or with the CIA."

Symington, chairman of the Senate foreign relations subcommittee on security agreements and commitments abroad, made the statement in a preface he wrote for a declassified version of hearings over which he presided last April 13.

He criticized the Executive Branch of the government for making extensive deletions in the hearing record, made public Saturday. He said the deletions were made "on alleged grounds of security."

The hearing transcript was scissored so severely, Symington said, that his panel was at first reluctant to make public what remained. However, it was decided that the report would add to information available about Laos.

Roderic L. O'Connor, co-ordinator of AID's bureau for supporting assistance, appeared before the subcommittee in response to a letter Symington wrote March 21 to John A. Hannah, administrator of the Agency for International Development.

Symington's letter had asked Hannah a series of questions about the relationship in Laos between AID, which administers foreign assistance, and the CIA, which finances irregular troops fighting Communists.

In a separate statement issued Saturday with the censored but now declassified hearing record, the Missouri Senator said the facts now coming out "raise serious questions about the legality of some United States expenditures in Laos . . ."

The facts also disclose, Symington said, "a pattern of deviousness, if not actual deception, which has characterized the conduct of our policy in Laos for the last decade."

O'Connor told the subcommittee that AID was not now financing, and never had financed, military or intelligence operations in Laos, as such. He conceded that AID's assistance had helped the royal Lao government carry its defense burden.

In fiscal 1972, the witness said, the CIA is reimbursing AID in the amount of $2,500,000 for medical services and supplies for paramilitary forces or their dependents in Laos.

O'Connor said AID supplied certain services in the health and humanitarian fields for "anybody in Laos who is ill, sick, or wounded."

EXAMINER
E - 204,749
EXAMINER & CHRONICLE
S - 640,004
JUL 30 1972

STATINTL

[redacted]

southeast asia

'The Politics of Heroin'

IT WAS the harvest land for raw opium, the infamous "golden triangle." In the corner embracing northeastern Burma, northern Thailand and northern Laos about 1000 tons of raw opium was produced, about 70 per cent of the world's supply.

From there it eventually found its way to the American market, but that source of heroin, according to Administration officials, had been turned off.

"We think all the countries are cooperating with us and we are quite satisfied with that cooperation," said Secretary of State William P. Rogers to a Senate subcommittee last May.

On the Defensive

How much cooperation, however, was subject to dispute, with the Central Intelligence Agency and eventually the Administration on the defensive last week.

Part of the official worry originated with the soon-to-be-published book by Alfred W. McCoy, a 26-year-old Yale graduate student who spent 18 months investigating narcotics operations in Indochina.

In "The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia," McCoy charged that the CIA knew of the narcotics trade but failed to take action and that both CIA and State Department officials had provided political and military support for America's Indochinese allies actively engaged in drug traffic, had covered up evidence of such involvement and had been actively involved themselves in the trade.

The CIA launched a big effort to refute the charges, calling them unwarranted, unproven and fallacious, and managed to persuade the publishers of the expose, Harper & Row, to permit the CIA to review the manuscript prior to publication.

The book has been based on more than 250 interviewers, some of them, McCoy said, with past and present officials of the CIA.

He said that top-level South Vietnamese officials,

The CIA was accused of drug trafficking

including President Nguyen Van Thieu and Premier Tran Van Khiem, were involved.

The CIA began an unusual public defense by sending two letters for publication to the Washington Post, which had printed some of McCoy's allegations.

The Approach

The CIA began its approach to Harper & Row in learning of McCoy's appearance before a Senate subcommittee.

Harper & Row decided that although "we don't have any doubts about the book at all . . . as one of the oldest publishing houses in America, Harper & Row has an obligation to itself and what it stands for."

A Harper & Row spokesman added that if McCoy did not agree to the CIA review, it would not publish the book.

Cabinet Report

Then came a Cabinet level report, released last Sunday. Contrary to administration assurances of success in halting drug traffic, it said, there was "no prospect" of slowing the traffic "under any conditions that can realistically be projected."

The report was prepared by officials of the CIA, State Department and Defense Department and noted that "the most basic problem and that one that unfortunately appears least likely of any early solution, is the corruption, collusion and indifference at some places in some governments, particularly Thailand and South Vietnam . . ."

The report also stated that "it should surely be possible to convey to the right Thai or Vietnamese officials the mood of the Congress and the Administration on the subject of drugs."

To which, Lester L. Wolff, a New York Democratic critic of government's handling of Southeast Asia drug traffic, said, "We think the trade has got so much protection in high places in Thailand that the Administration is afraid they'll tell us to take our air bases out if we put too much pressure on them."

TORRINGTON, CONN.
REGISTER
JUL 29 1972
E - 11,792

Editorials

Uncle Sam – drug pusher

Acting FBI Director Patrick Gray declared the other day that a shortage of heroin on the street market has developed as a result of the government's crackdown on the drug traffic, "the most intensive drive this nation has ever directed against narcotics racketeers." This might be encouraging news were it not for the fact that while the FBI is trying to crack down on the drug merchants another federal agency has been aiding and abetting them.

A detailed report linking the CIA to the enormously profitable traffic in heroin is presented in the July issue of Harper's magazine. It was written by Alfred W. McCoy, a PhD student in Southeast Asian history at Yale, not as a journalistic expose but as a chapter in a Harper & Row book scheduled for September publication under the title "The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia."

It is a shocking indictment that McCoy presents in reciting how, as a result of direct and indirect American involvement, opium production in Southeast Asia is increasing and the export of high-grade heroin is flourishing. Most of the heroin used by American GIs in Vietnam has come from Laotian areas where the CIA is active, McCoy writes, and increasing amounts are being sent to the United States and Europe.

As part of the U. S. effort to bolster Southeast Asia against Communist inroads, the CIA has been working since 1959 with the Meo tribesmen of hilly northern Laos. In forging an effective guerrilla army, the CIA built up the power of tribal commanders both militarily and economically. But by Laos tradition, economics is opium, starting with poppy farmers like the Meos and extending into the royal Laotian government.

One of the commanders of the CIA secret army, McCoy reports, is General Vang Pao, a major entrepreneur in the opium business since 1961. CIA operatives guided the building of airstrips to link his villages via Air America planes — which, naturally, soon were flying Meo opium to market. CIA and the U. S. Agency for International Development later helped finance a private airline for Vang Pao, who went on to open a heroin processing plant near CIA headquarters.

A year ago, President Nixon declared war on the international heroin traffic, and — under U. S. pressure — opium dens in Laos were shut by the hundreds. But, according to McCoy's report, neither U. S. nor Laotian officials are going after the drug traffickers. He notes that, according to a United Nations report, 70 per cent of the world's illicit opium has been coming from the Golden Triangle of Southeast Asia — northeast Burma, northern Thailand and northern Laos — "capable of supplying the U. S. with unlimited quantities of heroin for generations."

McCoy's conclusion: "Unless something is done to change America's policies and priorities in Southeast Asia, the drug crisis will deepen and the heroin plague will continue to spread."

WASHINGTON POST

29 JUL 1972

STATINTL

Book World

Looking at Laos

THE END OF NOWHERE: American Policy Toward Laos Since 1954. By Charles A. Stevenson.

(Beacon. 367 pp. $8.95)

VOICES FROM THE PLAIN OF JARS: Life Under an Air War. Compiled with an Introduction and Preface by Fred Branfman.

(Harper Colophon. 160 pp. $1.95)

Reviewed by Walt Haney

The reviewer taught in Laos for three years and is the author of "A Survey of Civilian Casualties Among Refugees from the Plain of Jars," published by the Kennedy Subcommittee on Refugees.

Millions upon millions of words have been written about America's involvement in Vietnam but remarkably little about United States actions in Laos—despite the fact that we have spent some $5-$8 billion on that small country in the last four years. These two books, though strikingly different in many respects, represent valuable contributions to a long-needed public discussion of the American role there (or as one U.S. official interviewed by Charles A. Stevenson calls that kingdom, and whence the title of his book, "The End of Nowhere").

Stevenson and Fred Branfman differ as much as their books. Stevenson is the pedant; footnotes and bibliography span almost 50 of his book's 300 pages. An earlier version of "The End of Nowhere" served as his doctoral dissertation at Harvard. In writing it, Stevenson interviewed 86 past and present government officials —from AID bureaucrats to CIA operatives, from ambassadors to congressional staff members. At first one thinks: How remarkably thorough, this man must have traced down nearly every American official who ever had anything to do with Laos. But he did not interview a *single* Laotian.

Whether this omission represents the arrogance of American academia or whether it reflects a de facto acknowledgement that Laotians have never had much say about what the U.S. did in their country is not made clear. I suspect it represents a mixture of both. For as Stevenson writes:

"The basic fact is that Americans control most of what happens in areas allegiant to the Vientiane government. The United States provides essential advice, coordination and supplies for the war. Outside of a few cities, Americans or their agents perform most of the functions of the central government. U.S. funds support the economy and the government."

He also notes: "At $350 million per year, direct American aid is about 10 times the size of the Laotian budget and about 75 per cent larger than the gross national product of $202 million."

Though Stevenson traces the numerous blunders, deceptions and missed opportunities of American involvement in Laos, it is "Voices from the Plain of Jars" that brings home the tragedy. The book's editor, Fred Branfman, is an activist, deeply opposed to United States policy in Indochina, who lived and worked in Laos for four years—first as a volunteer with International Voluntary Services and then as a free-lance journalist.

Like Stevenson, he interviewed dozens of people about U.S. policy in Laos. But unlike Stevenson he talked with people on the receiving end, with hundreds of Laotian refugees, which led him to the remarkable idea (and like many innovative ideas, quite obvious once it was put forward) that is the basis for this book. He simply asked the refugees to write of their lives and the war they experienced—as they called it, the war of the airplanes. The result, among all the hundreds of books on Indochina, is truly unique.

Its greatest weakness is Branfman's introduction. A history of Laos as abbreviated as his must inevitably contain some partial truths and consequent distortions. Yet the introduction to "Voices from the Plain of Jars" contains too many. For example, Branfman speaks of the present condition of the refugees from the Plain of Jars in almost unrelievedly bleak terms. He quotes one observer to the effect that the refugees are dying in refugee camps on the Vientiane Plain. He reports that they have been given "some of the poorest land in (Vientiane) province . . . most (of it) uncleared."

In fact the refugees have by now been completely resettled on land cleared for them by the Royal Lao government and the U.S. aid mission. Indeed, judged by conditions in neighboring Vietnam or Cambodia or even by conditions in previous years in Laos, the refugees from the Plain of Jars have been treated extremely well since soon after their evacuation from the Plain. Yet to be given shelter and medical aid and to be resettled was surely the least they were owed. And besides, their treatment after becoming refugees is not the main issue raised by this volume of essays.

The real issue, simply put, is why was the Plain of Jars destroyed, completely leveled by bombs? Again and again the essays and drawings by the refugees call out this plaint: Why did the planes bomb?

Stevenson almost completely ignores the issue of U.S. bombing in Laos and his book does more to explain why the once verdant land than does Branfman's. (Branfman speaks of a secret decision to wage an air war against the Plain, as if there was some sort of huge conspiracy in the U.S. government when even the Pentagon Papers afford little evidence to support such a theory.) First, Stevenson shows the cavalier indifference of U.S. officials. For example, Dean Rusk told Stevenson, "After 1963, Laos was only the wart on the hog of Vietnam." And Chester Cooper, a member of the National Security Council from 1961 to 1967 commented, "Laos was not all that goddamned important."

Second, by the example of his own analysis, Stevenson helps to explain why the Plain was destroyed. For like the policymakers he studies, Stevenson carefully avoids moral judgments of who escalated the conflict in Laos, of why the U.S. did what it did in Laos and whether our actions can possibly be justified by the ends we seek. Matter-of-factly he writes:

"What could have been done differently in the past? What can and should be done in the future? These questions have not been addressed directly because the main purpose of this book is to explain and understand the policymaking process rather than to evaluate or criticize the results of that process."

Stevenson does not ask the vital question of why the bombs were dropped on so many innocent Laotians. For all his research, he never comes to grips with the question of why. Why is the United States spending $1 billion annually to bomb a country whose gross national product is only $200 million? Why are we spending 28 times more to bomb Laos than we are on economic assistance to that country? Why have the Laotian provincial capitals of Xieng Khouang and Sam Neua been completely destroyed by bombing? Why? Perhaps because not enough people in responsible positions ever stopped to ask why.

Branfman, though his answers are not always completely credible, at least has the insight and the courage to ask the important ques-

NEW YORK TIMES
JUL 27 1972

U.S. Terms Damage to Dikes Minor and Accidental

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 26 — The Administration said today that any damage done to North Vietnams dike system by American bombing was accidental and had only "the most incidental and minor impact" on the system.

Repeating what has become an almost daily denial that American aircraft are deliberately bombing the irrigation system, the State Department said that any damage to the dikes was a result of legitimate attacks on military installations such as antiaircraft sites.

Charles W. Bray 3d, the department spokesman, said that the United States had evidence to bear out his contention that "there has been no new indication of anything but the most incidental and minor impact on the system of levees as the result of strikes against military installations."

"This is a fact," he said.

Administration Annoyed

In recent days, the Administration has made no secret of its annoyance and frustration over the growing world concern that the American bombing of North Vietnam might lead to catastrophic results during the current rainy season if the dike system breaks down.

North Vietnam has repeatedly charged the United States with systematic bombing of the dikes and has invited various observers to inspect the dikes.

Expressions of concern have come from such sources as the Rev. Dr. Eugene Carson Blake, secretary general of the World Council of Churches and Secretary General Waldheim of the United Nations.

President Nixon, Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird, and Secretary of State William P. Rogers have denied that American aircraft have been authorized to bomb the dike system.

But for a month, State and Defense Department officials have acknowledged — as Mr. Bray did today—that some bombs may have fallen on or near the earthen levees along the Red River, either by inadvertance or because a military target was there.

The Administration made plans to hold a special briefing for newsmen yesterday to present photographs to buttress its arguments but at the last moment the briefing was not held. Informed sources said that the Administration recognized that Hanoi could also produce photographs.

"We could show an undamaged dike and they could show one with a crater in it. Or if they didn't have one, they could drop a mortar in it and make one," one State Department official said.

So far, despite the start of the heavy rainy season, there have been no reports of any flooding. The Hanoi press has printed several articles exhorting the population to take part in the regular summer dike building program to prevent a repetition of last year's flooding, the worst since 1944.

In another matter, Administration witnesses opposed today the adoption of a Senate resolution that would outlaw the use of weather modification as a means of war.

Witnesses from the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the Defense Department refused to discuss the military uses of weather modification, asserting that such information was classified. They testified before a hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee on oceans and international environment.

Senator Claiborne Pell, Democrat of Rhode Island, the subcommittee chairman, said there was "no doubt in my mind that the United States has indeed beenconducting weather modification operations in Southeast Asia."

The New York Times reported on July 3 that the United States Air Force and the Central Intelligence Agency had conducted cloud-seeding operations over Laos since 1967, and over South and North Vietnam since. 1968. The Pentagon has denied that anoy of its aircraft were involved in seeding over North Vietnam but has refused to discuss operations elsewhere.

in line with the changes already voted by the Senate in this bill?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Will the Senator repeat his parliamentary inquiry?

Mr. HUGHES. Is the section 15 mentioned in this amendment now a properly numbered section, in view of the changes already made in the proposed legislation before the Senate today?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Will the Senator ask unanimous consent that the amendment be properly numbered?

The Parliamentarian informs the Presiding Officer that that will take care of the problem of the Senator from Iowa.

Mr. HUGHES. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the amendment be properly numbered to conform with the changes already made in the bill.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

FOOD FOR PEACE VERSUS FOOD FOR WAR

Mr. HUGHES. Mr. President, I was startled to read an article in this morning's paper citing the latest report on the food-for-peace program and noting that in some instances about 80 percent of the payment received for agricultural commodities is funneled back to the local governments for military equipment and facilities.

On further investigation, I discovered that this activity is perfectly legal under section 104(c) of Public Law 480, which permits agreements to use these repayments "To procure equipment, materials, facilities, and services for the common defense including internal security."

Perhaps, Mr. President, I am singularly naive in supposing that this fine program—which I have long supported and which has done so much to help share America's abundance with the hungry and undernourished people of the world—would be used only for peaceful activities.

After all, the declaration of policy at the start of this law declares a major purpose:

To use the abundant agricultural productivity of the United States to combat hunger and malnutrition and to encourage economic development in the developing countries, with particular emphasis on assistance to those countries that are determined to improve their own agricultural production.

But there is another declared purpose, one which has apparently become a blank check for many activities abroad:

To promote in other ways the foreign policy of the United States.

This catch-all clause has permitted the U.S. Government to return nearly three-quarters of a billion dollars to the government of South Vietnam in the form of military aid, nearly $600 million to the government of South Korea, and now we are doing the same in Cambodia. Over the years since 1954 we have returned over $1.7 billion in defense-related aid,

Although this amounts to only 13 percent of total Public Law 480 assistance, the figure is about 80 percent for Vietnam and Korea.

Perhaps Congress would approve such provisions if given the opportunity. But I believe that we should be given that opportunity.

Otherwise, we may again be drawn into military arrangements without our full knowledge and consent.

Personally, I consider the use of food for peace as food for war to be a perversion of the basic intent of Congress. I also believe that it does our credibility no good at home or abroad to have these funds rechanneled for war under the label of food for peace.

For too long we have learned, after the fact, of unauthorized funds going for foreign aid—the under-valued excess defense articles, the CIA money for Laos which has been channeled through the AID budget, and the quiet reprograming which leads to mushrooming commitments without the prior consent of Congress.

This is merely another example of such concealed aid.

In order that Congress can advise and consent to such agreements, I am today offering an amendment to the pending bill which would provide simply that no agreement for common defense purposes under Public Law 480 shall be entered into unless authorized by further affirmative legislation by Congress.

Since the hour is late and the time on this bill is short, I believe that this provision would give Congress the opportunity to step back and look at these disguised military aid programs—and then accept or reject them as we choose.

Mr. President, as I have stated, this amendment, very simply, would give Congress and the proper committees the right from this point on, after the passage and signing into law of this bill, to review these matters if our Government wants to rechannel the food for peace funds into military channels.

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HUGHES. I yield to the distinguished Senator from Minnesota.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield me 3 minutes?

Mr. HUGHES. I yield.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I am very pleased to join the Senator from Iowa (Mr. HUGHES) in offering this amendment.

I was very much disturbed this morning to read reports indicating that the United States had funneled $78 million into South Vietnam's war budget from the surplus agriculture commodities under the terms of Public Law 480. The report was brought to our attention this morning in the press. I ask unanimous consent that the AP story on the White House report, entitled "'Food for Peace' Funds Arm Saigon" on food-for-peace operations in Indochina last year, be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

"FOOD FOR PEACE" FUNDS ARM SAIGON

A White House report shows the United States funneled $78 million last year into South Vietnam's war budget under the Food for Peace foreign-aid program.

The disclosure came in a report to Congress on Food for Peace operations last year. It was signed by President Nixon on June 29.

According to the report, South Vietnam through 1971 received $919.8 million worth of U.S. farm commodities under Food for Peace. Of that, $742.7 million was kicked back to the Saigon government to use for "common defense" purposes.

Authority for the expenditures is provided in Section 104-C of the Food for Peace law.

Further, the report shows, Korea last year received $20 million Food for Peace aid to help pay military bills, and Cambodia got $7.4 million.

Through 1971, Korea had received $593.1 million in "common defense" funds under Food for Peace out of a total aid under the program of $752.2 million. Cambodia began receiving the aid last year.

Under a typical arrangement, the United States agrees to provide South Vietnam with farm commodities, to be paid for with local currencies. About 80 per cent is then kicked back for "common defense" purposes.

The report says: "The major uses . . . are for personnel equipment, mostly clothing, construction and construction materials, and local services provided for the United States Military Assistance Command—Vietnam."

Over-all supervision of the "common defense" money is handled by the U.S. Department of Defense and the Agency for International Development, the report says.

In the case of Korea, the study says the money is used "to help offset the increasing defense costs" which are being transferred from U.S. military aid mission to the Korean defense budget.

The money in Cambodia is used "for military pay and allowances," the report says.

"Although 1971 was the last year local currency arrangements will be signed, it is anticipated that 104-C grants will continue to be made to Vietnam and Cambodia out of funds generated under credit agreements," the report says.

Since Food for Peace was enacted in 1954, more than $1.7 billion has been spent on "common defense" arrangements. The report shows that about $12.9 billion in total aid, the military kickbacks have amounted to 13 per cent.

Although Vietnam, Korea and Cambodia are the only current recipients, many countries over the years have shared in the "common defense" benefits.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, last year, you may recall, the Presiding Officer now in the chair (Mr. PROXMIRE) I am sure will, introduced an amendment sponsored by the Senator from Wisconsin (Mr. PROXMIRE), the Senator from Montana (Mr. MANSFIELD), the Senator from South Dakota (Mr. MCGOVERN), and myself to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1971, designed to repeal the wording in Public Law 480 which in practice had become a means for the U.S. Government to provide additional military assistance beyond the amounts authorized or appropriated by Congress. The amendment was designed to restore the original purpose of Public Law 480 of which I was one of the earlier sponsors.

Public Law 480 is the Food for Peace Act. Its purpose is to promote international trade in agricultural commodities, to combat hunger and malnutrition, and to further economic development.

Putting $78 million into South Vietnam's defense budget hardly fulfills the spirit of the Food for Peace Act. It is hardly in keeping with the amendment introduced last year, the Proxmire-Humphrey-Mansfield-McGovern amendment, written into law as Public Law 92-226. This amendment attempted to close a loophole and to prohibit any use of Public Law 480 funds for military purposes. That was its intent, and that was the

NEW HAVEN, CONN.
JOURNAL-COURIER
JUL 24 1972
M - 32,217

CIA Said Eyeing Student's Book

A Yale University graduate student's forthcoming book on heroin traffic in Southeast Asia is reportedly being reviewed by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

Alfred W. McCoy, 26, of 29 Lake Place, a Ph.D. student in Southeast Asian studies, spent 18 months in Asia investigating narcotics operations and recently testified before the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Aid.

He testified at the time that aircraft chartered by the CIA and the Agency for International Development "have been transporting opium harvested by the agency's tribal mercenaries on a regular basis."

The CIA, with the permission of Harper & Row, the book's publishers, is reviewing the manuscript of McCoy's book with the intention of demonstrating that some of the book's claims are "totally false and without foundation," according to a recent article in The New York Times.

McCoy testified in two Congressional appearances in June that the material in the forthcoming book, "The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia", was based on more than 250 interviews, some with CIA officials.

In a chapter of the book printed in the current issue of Harper's Magazine, McCoy charged that "American involvement has gone beyond coincidental complicity; embassies have consciously covered up involvement by client governments, CIA contract airlines have reportedly carried opium and individual CIA men have abetted the opium traffic."

At the time of his Congressional testimony, McCoy was described as a "very thorough scholar and not the antiwar type" by a senate staff member.

In the magazine article, McCoy wrote that during the last several months of 1970, more American soldiers were evacuated "mas casualites rom South Vietnam for durg-elated reasons than for reasons aving to do with war wounds."

He also wrote that farmers in the Golden Triangle—northeastern Burma, northern Thailand and northern Laos—produce 70 per cent of the world's supply of raw opium and that much of it is being funneled to addicts on New York streets.

"After pouring billions of dollars into Southeast Asia for over 20 years, the United States has acquired enormous power in the region. And it has used this power to create new nations were non-existed, to hand pick prime ministers, to topple governments and to crush revolutions.

"Unless something is done to change America's policies and priorities in Southeast Asia, the drug crisis will deepen and the heroin plague will continue to spread," McCoy wrote.

McCoy could not be reached Sunday night for comment.

KATHRYN KOLKHORST

NEW YORK TIMES

24 JUL 1972

Report to U.S. Sees No Hope of Halting Asian Drug Traffic

By SEYMOUR M. HERSH

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 23—A Cabinet-level report has concluded that, contrary to the Nixon Administration's public optimism, "there is no prospect" of stemming the smuggling of narcotics by air and sea in Southeast Asia "under any conditions that can realistically be projected."

"This is so," the report, dated Feb. 21, 1972, said, "because the governments in the region are unable and, in some cases, unwilling to do those things that would have to be done by them if a truly effective effort were to be made."

The report, prepared by officials of the Central Intelligence Agency, the State Department and the Defense Department, noted that "the most basic problem, and the one that unfortunately appears least likely of any early solution, is the corruption, collusion and indifference at some places in some governments, particularly Thailand and South Vietnam, that precludes more effective supression of traffic by the governments on whose territory it takes place."

The report sharply contradicts the official Administration position and Government intelligence sources say its conclusions are still valid today. In May, Secretary of State William P. Rogers told a Senate subcommittee that "we think all the countries are cooperating with us and we are quite satsified with that cooperation."

Similarly, Nelson G. Gross, Senior Adviser to the Secretary of State and Coordinator for International Narcotics Matters, testified before Congress in June on the subject of narcotics smuggling that "the governments of Thailand, Laos and Vietnam have already joined us in the fight and, while we have a long way to go, we feel that during the past year some real progress has been achieved."

All officials concerned with the drug problem acknowledge that the United States agencies, under personal prodding from President Nixon, have begun an intensive effort against international narcotics traffic. But critics contend that the effort is far less effective today than Administration officials say it is.

Critics' Charges Backed

Two leading critics of what they allege to be the Government's laxness in stopping the flow of narcotics are Representative Robert H. Steele, Republican of Connecticut, and Alfred W. McCoy, a 26-year-old Yale graduate student who has written a book on narcotics in Southeast Asia. The New York Times reported Saturday that Mr. McCoy's allegations concerning the C.I.A. and the drug traffic had been the subject of an intense and unusually public rebuttal by the agency.

The Cabinet-level report, made available to The Times, buttressed many of the charges made by the two critics, particularly about the pivotal importance of Thailand to the international drug smugglers. Thailand is also a major Air Force staging area for the United States.

In a report on the world heroin problem last year, Mr. Steele wrote that "from the American viewpoint, Thailand is as important to the control of the illegal international traffic in narcotics as Turkey. While all of the opium produced in Southeast Asia is not grown in Thailand, most of it is smuggled through that country."

Mr. Steele's report, filed with the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, noted that many American citizens had established residence in Bangkok, and had moved into the narcotics trade. The report added that the inability of the United States to have a few notorious smugglers deported had led some intelligence officials to conclude that the men were paying Thai officials for protection.

Mr. McCoy said in testimony before Congressional committees last month that hundreds of tons of Burmese opium passed through Thailand every year to international markets in Europe and the United States and that 80 to 90 per cent of the opium was carried by Chinese Nationalist paramilitary teams that were at one time paid by the C.I.A.

There are a number of opium refineries along the northern Thai border, he said, and much of the processed high-quality heroin is shipped by trawler to Hong Kong.

"Even though they are heavily involved in the narcotics traffic," Mr. McCoy testified, "these Nationalist Chinese irregulars units are closely allied with the Thai Government." He said that Thai Government police units patrol the northern border area and collect an "import duty" of about $2.50 a [illegible] Thailand. All this activity, he said, is monitored by United States intelligence agencies.

Thai-U.S. Agreements Cited

Mr. Gross, the State Department's adviser on international narcotics, said in his Congressional testimony that "during the past year the Thais have increased their efforts in the drug field with United States and United Nations assistance." He cited two agreements, signed in late 1971, calling for more cooperation and more long-range planning between Thai and United States officials to stamp out the trade.

"Based on all intelligence information available," Mr. Gross testified, "the leaders of the Thai Government are not engaged in the opium or heroin traffic, nor are they extending protection to traffickers." He added that the top police official in Thailand had publicly stated that he would punish any corrupt official.

The cabinet-level report, submitted to the Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control, asked "highest priority" for suppression of the traffic by Thai trawlers, noting that each trawler "would represent something like 6 per cent of annual United States consumption of heroin."

The report said that the trawler traffic should have priority because "it is possible to attack the Thai trawler traffic without seeking the cooperation of Thai authorities and running the attendant risks of leaks, tip-offs and betrayals."

After such a seizure, the report said, the United States Embassy in Bangkok could "repeat with still greater force and insistence the representations it has already often made to the Government of Thailand" for more effective efforts "to interdict traffic from the north of Thailand to Bangkok and also the loading of narcotics on ships in Thai harbors."

At another point in the report, a general complaint was voiced. "It should surely be possible to convey to the right Thai or Vietnamese officials the mood of the Congress and the Administration on the subject of drugs," the report said. "No real progress can be made on the problem of illicit traffic until and unless the local governments concerned make it a matter of highest priority."

Representatives Steele, Lester L. Wolff, Democrat of Nassau County, and Morgan F. Murphy, Democrat of Illinois, have sponsored legislation that would cut off more than $100-million in foreign aid to Thailand unless she took more action [illegible] traffic of heroin. Their measure cleared the House Foreign Affairs Committee on June 21 and is included in the Foreign Assistance Act, now pending.

During a Congressional hearing into drug traffic last month, Representative Wolff disputed the Administration's contention that it was making "real progress" in stemming the narcotics flow and said, "we think the trade has got so much protection in high places in Thailand that the Administration is afraid they'll tell us to take our air bases out if we put too much pressure on them."



The New York Times

Nelson G. Gross asserted that there has been progress against smuggling.



United Press International

Robert H. Steele charged the Government is lax in halting flow of drugs.

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NEW YORK TIMES

22 JUL 1972

C.I.A. AIDES ASSAIL ASIA DRUG CHARGE

Agency Fights Reports That It Ignored Heroin Traffic Among Allies of U.S.

By SEYMOUR M. HERSH
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 21 — The Central Intelligence Agency has begun a public battle against accusations that it knew of but failed to stem the heroin traffic of United States allies in Southeast Asia.

In recent weeks, high-ranking officials of the C.I.A. have signed letters for publication to a newspaper and magazine, granted a rare on-the-record interview at the agency's headquarters in McLean, Va., and — most significantly — persuaded the publishers of a forthcoming expose on the C.I.A. and the drug traffic to permit it to review the manuscript prior to publication.

The target of all these measures has been the recent writings and Congressional testimony of Alfred W. McCoy, a 26-year-old Yale graduate student who spent 18 months investigating the narcotics operations in Southeast Asia. His book, "The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia," is scheduled to be published by Harper & Row in mid-September—barring delays caused by the intelligence agency's review.

In his book, Mr. McCoy alleged that both C.I.A. and State Department officials have provided political and military support for America's Indochinese allies actively engaged in the drug traffic, have consciously covered up evidence of such involvement, and have been actively involved themselves in narcotic trade.

C.I.A. officials said they had reason to believe that Mr. McCoy's book contained many unwarranted, unproven and fallacious accusations. They acknowledged that the public stance in opposition to such allegations was a departure from the usual "low profile" of the agency, but they insisted that there was no evidence linking the C.I.A. to the drug traffic in Southeast Asia. One well-informed Government official directly responsible for monitoring the illegal flow of narcotics complained in an interview that many of Mr. McCoy's charges "are out of date."

"Go back three or four years," he said, "and no one was concerned about this. It wasn't until our own troops started to get addicted, until 1968 or '69, that anyone was aware" of the narcotics problems in Southeast Asia.

This official said that in the eyes of the C.I.A., the charges were "unfair." He said of the C.I.A., "they think they're taking the heat for being unaware and not doing anything about something that was going on two or three years ago."

Based on 250 Interviews

During two Congressional appearances last month, Mr. McCoy testified that his accusations were based on more than 250 interviews, some of them with past and present officials of the C.I.A. He said that top-level South Vietnamese officials, including President Nguyen Van Thieu and Premier Iran Van Khiem, were specifically involved.

In July, 1971, Representative Robert H. Steele, Republican of Connecticut, said during a House Foreign Affairs subcommittee hearing that the United States Government possessed "hard intelligence" linking a number of high-ranking Southeast Asian officials, including Maj. Gen. Ngo Dzu, then commander of the South Vietnamese II Corps, with involvement in the narcotics trade. Mr. Steele's accusations were denied and mostly ignored.

Mr. McCoy also alleged that Corsican and American syndicate gangsters had become involved in the narcotics trade. He said that such information was known to the C.I.A. In a chapter of his book published in this month's Harper's Magazine, Mr. McCoy further charged that in 1967 the infamous "Golden Triangle" — an opium-producing area embracing parts of northeastern Burma, northern Thailand and northern Laos—was producing about 1,000 tons of raw opium annually, then about 70 per cent of the world's supply.

The bulk of Mr. McCoy's accusations—both in the magazine and during the Congressional hearings—failed to gain much national attention. Nonetheless, the C.I.A. began its unusual public defense after a Washington Star reporter cited some of Mr. McCoy's allegations in a column.

Letter Sent to Paper

Two letters were sent to the newspaper for publication [illegible] Colby, the executive director of the C.I.A., and the other by Paul C. Velte Jr. a Washington-based official with Air America, a charter airline that flies missions for the C.I.A. in Southeast Asia. Both categorically denied the allegations linking C.I.A. personnel to any knowledge of or activity in the drug traffic.

A similar letter of disavowal, signed by Mr. Colby, was sent for publication to the publisher of Harper's Magazine within the last week. Robert Schnayerson, the magazine's editor, said that the letter would be published as soon as possible.

The C.I.A. began its approach to Harper & Row in early June, apparently after learning of Mr. McCoy's appearance before the Senate subcommittee. Cord Meyer Jr., described as a senior agency official, met with officials of the publishing concern and informally asked for a copy of the manuscript for review prior to publication.

On July 5, a formal letter making the request, signed by Lawrence R. Houston, general counsel of the C.I.A. was sent to Harper & Row.

Mr. Houston's request was not based on national security, but on the thesis that "allegations concerning involvement of the U.S. Government [in drug traffic] or the participation of American citizens should be made only if based on hard evidence."

The letter continued: "It is our belief that no reputable publishing house would wish to publish such allegations without being assured that the supporting evidence was valid." If the manuscript were handed over, the letter said, "we believe we could demonstrate to you that a considerable number of Mr. McCoy's claims about this agency's alleged involvement are totally false and without foundation, a number are distorted beyond recognition, and none is based on convincing evidence." A copy of the letter was made available to The New York Times.

Mr. McCoy, in an interview, said that the book had been commissioned by Harper & Row and carefully and totally reviewed by its attorneys with no complaint until the C.I.A. request was made.

B. Brooks Thomas, vice president and general counsel of the publishing house, said in an interview in New York, "We don't have nay doubts about the book at all. We've had it reviewed by others and we're persuaded that the work is amply documented and scholarly."

"We're not submitting to censorship or anything like that," Mr. Thomas said. "We're taking a responsible middle position. [illegible] C.I.A. should have the chance to review it." If Mr. McCoy did not agree, he added, Harper & Row would not publish the book.

In a subsequent interview, Robert L. Bernstein, president of Random House and president of the Association of American Publishers, Inc., said that his concern had twice refused official C.I.A. requests for permission to revise manuscripts.

"In general," Mr. Bernstein said, "our opinion would be that we would not publish a book endangering the life of anybody working for the C.I.A. or an other Government agency. Short of that, we would publish any valid criticism."

In a series of interviews with The New York Times, a number of present and former officials of the C.I.A. acknowledged that smuggling and "looking the other way" was common throughout Southeast Asia during the nineteen-sixties. But many noted that the agency had since taken strong steps to curb such practices.

One official, who spent many years in Southeast Asia, said, "I don't believe that agency staff personnel were dealing in opium. But if you're talking about Air America hauling the stuff around, then I'll bet my bottom dollar that they were in it."

Another former C.I.A. agent described Mr. McCoy's published writings as "1 per cent tendentious and 90 per cent of the most valuable contribution I can think of."

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WASHINGTON STAR
22 JUL 1972

MILTON VIORST

The Switch to Automated Warfare

Just in case you've forgotten how all that fuss down in Miami Beach (and since) got started, may I remind you that it was a war in Indochina—which, in the absence of large American casualties, has dropped off the front pages again.

For myself, I'm grateful for a little book by Fred Branfman, who spent four years in Laos, called "Voices From the Plain of Jars." It's an account, largely in the words of the victims, of what living beneath an American air campaign is like. It's worth $1.95 for this grim reminder of Orwellian struggle.

The Plain of Jars, Branfman tells us, is a small and beautiful plateau, whose 150,000 inhabitants lived in virtual isolation from the outside world in tiny farming villages. For centuries, the Plain was fought over by different tribal groups, none of which seemed to hold it for very long.

In 1964, the Plain was taken rather effortlessly from the right-wing Laotian heirs of the French colonial regime by a local Communist group called the Pathet Lao. To rescue it from this fate, the United States decided to bomb the Plain of Jars, as we say, back into the Stone Age.

The entire operation was conceived by the CIA—and, of course, the American people were told nothing about it. Over the ensuing years, U.S. bombers literally destroyed the ancient society there, killing tens of thousands of people and driving the others into the forests and the cities.

It was a stirring American victory or, as Tacitus put it, "where they make a desert, they call it peace." It is hard to know what strategic purpose was served—but the Plain of Jars victory has been amply confirmed by outside sources.

At first, I was disposed to think that Branfman exaggerated when he wrote: "Although few people realize it as yet, the disappearance of the Plain of Jars is one of the signal events of our time, as significant in its own way . . . as the atomic bombing of Hiroshima."

He went on to explain that the Plain of Jars marked the historical advent of "automated" warfare.

The armies of our allies, he pointed out, were so much weaker than their adversaries that conventional air support was inadequate. "So," he wrote, "the traditional roles of air and ground forces were reversed." Air power became the principal arm of conquest, with ground forces supplementing the bombs.

To a superpower, he said, the advantages of automated war are that it is "relatively inexpensive and . . . its own citizens are barely or not at all aware of it, and their leaders are free to wage war at their pleasure."

But, even more frighteningly, he adds: "The basic psychology of war is altered as well. Heretofore, hatred of the enemy and love of country or faith — real or manufactured — has been a necessary prerequisite for sending men off to war.

"However, when tens of thousands of technicians are called upon to wage war against a country and a people they will never see, then the need for such motivation disappears. When even the relatively few who do enter enemy territory remain 5,000 feet in the air and wage battle by pushing buttons and pulling levers to release ordnance on unseen persons below, even the tenuous human bonds which once existed between enemies are dissolved.

"War becomes a technical exercise, bereft of malice or rancor, freeing combatants from pangs of conscience and the moral constraints."

Branfman finished his book before the full implications of President Nixon's Indochina strategy became apparent—but it is clear that the lessons we learned over the Plain of Jars have been incorporated into the fighting in South Vietnam.

We no longer fight on the ground. We send our bombers in from our sanctuaries in Thailand, Guam and the carriers in the Tonkin Gulf. After releasing their destruction, the technicians who fly them return home to martinis and a hot supper.

Not even the Pentagon claims that the South Vietnamese army is more than a minor auxiliary of American air power.

As Secretary Laird said recently, we will "be continuing air and sea power in Asia for a good time. The idea that somehow or other the Nixon Doctrine means that we will not have air or sea power in Asia is a great mistake."

So the next time someone tells you how swell it is that President Nixon has wound down the war in Vietnam, you can answer that he hasn't wound down anything. He's just shifted from the obsolete kind of war to the new, invigorating automated war.

WASHINGTON STAR
STATINTL
21 JUL 1972

Laos War Being Run on a Personal Basis

By TAMMY ARBUCKLE
Special to The Star-News

VIENTIANE — Considerable rivalry exists between the U.S. State and Defense departments on who should run the Laos war and how the Laos war should be run, well-informed U.S. official sources say.

This rivalry is so great that sometimes one group of U.S. officials is not totally aware of what other another department is doing, sources said. Right now the Laos war is run by the State Department through its man on the scene, U.S. Ambassador G. McMurtrie Godley.

Personal Direction

Godley orchestrates the war very personally, deciding for example whether and where B52 strikes should be made. To help and advise him from the field the ambassador has the Central Intelligence Agency. The agency acts as the State Department's executive assistant in Laos with its employes coordinating and directing the activities of the Laos irregular army, which takes the brunt of the Laos fighting.

Representing the defense Department is the 127-man army of the attaches' office. It, too, advises the ambassador, but its men in the field are found only with units of the Royal Lao Army, which does not do very much fighting in Laos.

Senior army attaches are present at most policy meetings, but a senior U.S. official said this does not mean they are always up to date on a fast-moving military situation because the CIA doesn't always tell them. A source said one Army attache was "just about in tears when he left Laos because he couldn't keep up with it (the situation)."

During the military crisis in north Laos the first three months of this year, Godley was conferring with Central Intelligence Agency officials as soon, as they returned from the field. The sessions were in private, U.S. owned buildings at the Vientiane airport, not at full dress embassy team meetings with army attaches present.

Reports Conflicted

During the battle for the provincial capital of Khong Sedone the U.S. Army was saying the mountain overlooking the town was in friendly hands when in fact it wasn't, according to irregular commanders on the scene. This preeminence of the State Department in a war has not caused the top-ranking U.S. military to love Godley.

A high-ranking visitor here from Cincpac (Commander in Chief Pacific) headquarters in Hawaii snapped "Get rid of that man (Godley) and we would be all right."

The Defense Department has assigned an officer to oversee what Godley does in a roundabout way.

The officer is Brig. Gen. John W. Vessey, deputy chief of the U.S. military mission to Thailand. Vessey is based at Udorn in northeast Thailand, and is in charge of logistics for the Laos war, which is paid through Defense Department funds. "Vessey's very sharp, a kind of watchdog on Mac," is how one U.S. source described him. Most of the Defense Department's animus seems directed at the State Department rather than the Central Intelligence Agency. "That's because they know the CIA wants to get out of this business," an informed American source said. "The Army would like to be doing what the CIA is doing — outrunning the irregulars," one source said. And, in fact, the Defense Department is getting more and more into the act in Laos through control of funds for the war.

Except for $7.1 million from the Defense Department, the CIA has been funding the Lao irregulars to the tune of close to $100 million. All costs of Lao irregulars, however, will come out of Defense Department funds in fiscal 1973, according to a report this year for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

The Defense Department is also taking over the $44 million cost of air supply contracts with Air America, Continental Air Services and Laos Air Development, contractors who handle the delivery of war supplies and other chores for the U.S. government in Laos.

Hidden by State

These costs were previously hidden in U.S. aid funds under State Department control. Unfortunately, one shudders at the thought the U.S. Army and Defense Department are running the Laos war. For under their aegis, most U.S. officials believe, U.S. involvement would become greater and more costly.

As ambassador, Godley is abreast of political developments and therefore better able to orchestrate the war.

The CIA has set up a separate Laos army relatively free from the corruption and intrigue which plagues the Royal army. Irregular officers are promoted or demoted on merit, the soldiers are paid on time, they are fighting on a voluntary basis and they fight pretty well.

Guerrilla Instruction

The agency has introduced some guerrilla warfare concepts (though not enough) such as mobility, keeping away from static defense and using small teams to find the enemy. Each individual weapon is accountable and frequent on-the-scene inspection by Americans insures against material wastage.

The State Department, CIA and Army have all sent their best officials to Laos, and it is easy to sympathize with U.S. Army frustrations here with a war nobody will let them get into. But given the Army's record in South Vietnam, U.S. officials here prefer to see the war remain in the competent hands of the State Department's Godley and the CIA.

Generals, Staffs, Cooks

They say there has only been a rise of 219 in the number of Americans involved in the Laos war with 1,259 Americans involved in early 1972 compared to 1,040 in March 1970.

"The Army would have generals, an appropriate staff, then cooks for the staff and so on. We'd never get out of here if they were running it," an American official said.

Sources said the Army had shown itself not to be geared for guerrilla warfare in Vietnam just from the point of view of infantry tactics alone. "They'd probably get the Lao going on these big fancy operations with no results," sources scoffed. All U.S. officials here, however, admit to one major problem looming which concerns State, Defense and CIA.

Downgrade or Upgrade?

The problem is that at some point Lao irregulars and the Royal army will have to be integrated. How does one do it? U.S. officials ask.

Obviously the latter is more desirable and if it is going to be done, who is going to do it? The CIA tends to shy away from further involvement here and that leaves the job to the Defense Department, informed U.S. sources say. This plus increased participation in funding by the Defense Department indicates the Pentagon is likely to play an increased role in Laos. Some Americans believe that is the situation if Laos and Laos conglomerate military forces survive long enough against the continuing North Vietnamese pressure — currently a very questionable factor indeed.

WASHINGTON POST
20 JUL 1972

A Visit to a Secret American Base in Thailand

By Peter Smith
Pacific News Service

PHITSANULOK, Thailand—In a U-shaped bend of a small river about 15 miles east of this northern district capital lies a secret U.S. military training base known as Camp Saritsana.

Near the point where I had been told to turn off the road to find the camp, a Thai waitress in a small restaurant said that there were usually about 1,000 Thai soldiers at the site, but that most had just left. She also told me that 10 or 15 Americans were stationed there, and that planes landed on an average of five times a day.

As I walked along the river away from the highway, the whine of diesel generators guided me until I saw several concrete and wooden buildings, a 100 foot-high water tower, and a generator shed. Further up, a steel suspension bridge carried truck traffic across the river. The scene reminded me of places where I had served in Vietnam and Thailand.

At Saritsana, U.S. Army Special Forces train Thai soldiers for combat in neighboring Laos. Since the early '60s, CIA-financed Meo mercenary armies, led by their most powerful chieftain Vang Pao, have been fighting in Laos, and estimates of the number of Meo men killed run as high as 50 per cent. To replace these losses, the United States has been training Thais for the last three years. But the training and the fact that Thailand has been sending troops to Laos have not been acknowledged by U.S. or Thai officials.

Senate Report

But a U.S. Senate subcommittee on security agreements and commitments abroad reported last year:

"The Thai irregular program . . . was designed by the CIA specifically along the lines of the irregular program in Laos. The CIA supervises and pays for the training of these irregulars in Thailand and provides their salary, allowances (including death benefits), and operational costs in Laos."

These Northern Thai speak a dialect similar to Meo dialect, and they are easily integrated into Vang Pao's forces.

At the camp, I was stopped at the main gate by three Thai guards, who called their commanding officer, a Thai special forces sergeant major, on the phone. When I told him I had once served with the U.S. Special Forces in Thailand and just wanted to talk with some Americans on the base, he said, "Sure, come on." One of the guards got on the back of my motorcycle and we drove to headquarters.

The 50-acre site is divided roughly in the middle by an airstrip. Heavy woods surround the base. Ten barracks for Thai soldiers were on the left side of the entrance road. Elsewhere on the grounds were a Thai special forces headquarters, a jump tower and cable rig for parachute training, a drying loft for the parachutes, and several maintenance buildings.

'Air America' Sign

After checking with the Thai sergeant major, the guard took me across the runway to a building marked "Air America," the name of the charter line which flies secret missions for the CIA throughout Asia. My Thai escort ushered me into a U.S. Special Forces team room, where five men were having their morning beer. All wore civilian clothes or jungle fatigues without insignia or name tag, a frequent tip-off that people are engaged in activity which might not square with formal pronouncements of U.S. policy.

Scattered among the usual pin-ups and memorabilia of home were other signs. One said: "No war was ever won with moderation and civility. KILL!" Another said: "Make war, not peace. War is the final answer."

The men were polite, almost painfully so. They did not mention their mission, and when I expressed interest they changed the subject.

Finally one of the men offered to escort me to the gate, and I followed his truck out and waved to the Thai guards as I left.

WASHINGTON STAR
20 JUL 1972

[redacted]

STATINTL

Letters to the Editor

SIR: I refer to the letter of W. E. Colby, executive director of the Central Intelligence Agency, who rebutted the charges made by some American newspapermen that the CIA was involved in opium trafficking. I do not question Colby's good faith, neither do I say that the CIA, as an entity, traffics in opium; but, I am sorry to say that there is more to these charges than mere "gossip, conjecture and old history."

I also know what I am talking about because I was involved in security matters for the South Vietnamese government under President Ngo Dinh Diem. In effect, one day, the President told me to investigate into the activities of our chief of secret police, chief of our own "CIA" and chief of military security, and to report directly to him, because, as he put it: "I cannot ask my own chiefs of police, 'CIA,' and military security to investigate into themselves."

I found out the corruption of two chiefs, and the President took very drastic measures against them. I have kept the contact with my security agents ever since. They firmly confirm that a few CIA agents in Indochina are involved in opium trafficking. But above all, a line must be drawn between Indochina and the rest of the world, because, due to the fact of the counter-insurgency warfare, the operations of the American CIA in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia are extremely important when they are compared to operations of the same agency in other countries. In Indochina, the CIA is a real army with his own aerial fleet. A number of CIA operatives deal directly with Vietnamese, Lao, or Meo warlords or officials at the highest level, with whom they share the proceeds of the opium traffic. For good American citizens in the United States, it is very difficult to imagine the influence and power of these operatives in Indochina. Their power, in fact, is unlimited—they are the true rulers of Indochina; their desires are orders—no Vietnamese, Laotian or Cambodian official would dare resist their orders. Corruption growing from a de facto power affects some of these CIA operatives.

The traffic of opium involves a relatively large number of persons. Outside a few Americans, there are Vietnamese, Laotians and Meo who are involved. Since these persons have their clans, families and friends who live from this traffic, the total number of persons concerned become so great that it is impossible to keep secret the operations.

I also do not question the good faith of CIA Director Richard Helms when he said that "os an agency, in fact, we are heavily engaged in tracing the foreign roots of the drug traffic for the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs. We hope we are helping with a solution; we know we are not contributing to the problem . . ." However, as I said previously, a line must be drawn and a distinction must be made; for circumstances are not the same—there is not the vaguest resemblance between CIA operatives in Indochina and their colleagues operating in other countries.

In conclusion, CIA Director Helms and Colby, Miss Randal, and McCoy said the truth and did not contradict one another; they perhaps did not talk about the same country.

Tran Van Khiem,
Attorney, Former Deputy,
Vietnamese National Assembly.

Chevy Chase, Md.

WASHINGTON STAR
20 July 1972

STATINTL

[redacted]

Letters to the Editor

Reply on CIA Drug Charges

SIR: On July 5, W. E. Colby, executive director of the Central Intelligence Agency, responded to a June 29 column by Judith Randal in a letter. He stated that charges of CIA involvement in the narcotics traffic from Southeast Asia were "unsubstantiated." Since I am one of the persons who have made such charges, I would like to give the basis for my findings.

The specific charge is that Air America aircraft chartered by the CIA have been transporting opium harvested by the CIA-supported Meo tribesmen in Laos. I have three sources for this information:

(1) This was told to me by Gen. Ouane Rattikone, former chief of staff of the Royal Laotian Army, who also admitted to me that he had controlled the opium traffic in northwestern Laos since 1962.

(2) Air America's involvement was confirmed by Gen. Thao Ma, former commander of the Laotian Air Force, who refused to carry opium for Gen. Ouane.

(3) I spent six days in August 1971 in the opium-growing Meo village of Long Pot, Laos. *(The writer assures us that that is, in fact its name--Ed.)* Ger. Su Yang, the district officer, told me:

"Meo officers with three or four stripes (captain or more) came from Long Tieng to buy our opium. They came in American helicopters, perhaps two or three men at one time. The helicopter leaves them here for a few days and they walk to villages over there, then come back here and radioed Long Tieng to send another helicopter for them. They take the opium back to Long Tieng."

Verified by Others

This account was verified by other officials, farmers and soldiers in Long Pot. Ger Su Yang also reported that the helicopter pilots were always Americans. Long Pot harvests weighed approximately 700 kilos (1,543 pounds) and could not have been carried without the pilot's knowledge.

In my June 2 testimony before the Senate Foreign Operations Subcommittee, I charged that "by ignoring, covering up and failing to counteract the massive drug traffic from Southeast Asia, our government is aiding and abetting the influx of heroin into our nation." I stand by this charge. The U.S. has put top priority on its military and political goals in fighting the war in Indochina. As long as our Asian allies have fought the war, U.S. officials have tolerated governmental corruption. Narcotics trafficking has not been treated differently from stealing U.S. aid, currency manipulation or black marketeering, all of which are rampant.

The CIA has organized a mercenary army of mostly Meo tribesmen in Laos under Gen. Vang Pao. The Meos' cash crop has been opium, and the CIA merely followed their French colonial predecessors' dictum: "In order to have the Meo, one must buy their opium." The CIA may not have bought their opium, but did ship it to market.

Ignored Involvement

More importantly, the CIA, the U.S. Embassy and the whole U.S. apparatus in Laos ignored Gen. Ouane Rattikone's involvement in the narcotics traffic, even while American troops in Vietnam were being decimated by Laotian heroin. His involvement, as well as the location of the heroin laboratories, was common knowledge among even the most junior U.S. officials. As late as June 9, 1972, Nelson Gross, the State Department's drug coordinator, called my charges of Gen. Ouane's involvement "unsubstantiated allegations." However, John Warner of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs in a June 19 interview in The Star admitted for the first time that Gen. Ouane controlled and protected the Laotian narcotics traffic for years. Colby quoted Warner in his letter to try to discredit my charges, but conveniently omitted mention that the former chief of staff of the Royal Laotian Army was also the chief narcotics trafficker.

Southeast Asia is fast becoming the major source of heroin for the U.S. market, and high government officials in Laos and South Vietnam are involved in the narcotics traffic. The U.S. government knows this but ignores and covers it up.

The time has come when we have to decide which is more important to our country--propping up corrupt governments in Southeast Asia or getting heroin out of our high schools.

Alfred W. McCoy.

New Haven, Conn.

Editor's Note: McCoy is the author of the Harper's Magazine article, "Flowers of Evil," appearing in its July, 1972, issue, quoted by Miss Randal.

[redacted]

STATINTL

LOUISVILLE, KY.
COURIER JOURNAL
JUL 9 1972

M - 239,949
S - 350,303

America's new morality: 'What's worse, bombs or rain?'

FROM THE SAME people who gave the world the Gatling gun, the A-bomb and plastic shrapnel we now have, once again, a new, improved way of making war.

The U.S. Air Force and the CIA can now make it rain on your parade, whether that parade is a military convoy on the Ho Chi Minh Trail or a political demonstration in Saigon (or Louisville?).

We understand the Nixon administration's unwillingness to brag about the cloud-seeding operations that the United States has been conducting in Indochina. Any bragging now—or even any admission that such operations have, indeed, taken place—would make it appear that Defense Secretary Laird lied to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last month when he was asked about Air Force rainmaking activities. The Secretary said, "We have not engaged in any over North Vietnam."

Now at least a dozen present and former military and civilian officials tell *The New York Times* that our planes have seeded clouds over North Vietnam at least as late as 1971—and over Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam as well.

In addition to damaging Secretary Laird's impeccable credibility, premature admissions to rainmaking might also lose Mr. Nixon the votes of those environmentalists, if any, who still take him seriously when he puts on his Smokey the Bear hat and proclaims himself hard to beat at admiring and protecting Mother Nature.

For it appears that Mr. Nixon, who rarely hesitates to rush in where angels and Democrats fear to tread, has outrained—as well as outbombed—the previous administration. State Department protests that our tinkering with Indochina's rainfall was taking environmental risks of unknown proportions apparently persuaded former Defense Secretary McNamara to call off cloud-seeding operations in 1967.

But, in the words of one pro-rainmaking official, "What's worse, dropping bombs or rain?"

Added ingredient possible

If we overlook the fact that Mr. Nixon and the generals (or perhaps, as seems to be common, the generals without Mr. Nixon's consent) are dropping both, it's a fascinating question.

The residents of our drought-stricken Southwest probably would reply that bombs are worse than rain. However, the citizens of Rapid City, S.D., or our eastern seaboard might not agree. And the tightly closed mouths at the Pentagon these days might tempt the people of Rapid City to ask a few more questions about that cloud-seeding experiment that was conducted in the Black Hills on the day their city was flooded and scores of their friends and relatives were killed.

The anonymous official's question also prompts a second question: Is the destruction wrought by our bombing in Indochina as indiscriminate as that wrought by the forces of nature? If it is, then we've been lied to again about the pinpoint accuracy of our attacks on war-supporting industries and supplies in North Vietnam, in which our "smart" bombs always seem to demolish our targets but leave the civilians unharmed. If it isn't, then the rain could be far worse than the bombing—especially during the two monsoon seasons when, as an official explained, the cloud-seeding amounts to "just trying to add on to something that you already got." One thing the Indochinese peoples have got during those seasons is the strong danger that they'll be wiped out by floods. And it's a safe bet that the soldiers in that American Special Forces camp that received seven inches of rain in two hours, courtesy of a CIA blunder, didn't laugh.

In addition to sizable quantities, the Americans, never content to let nature go unimproved-upon, can now deliver two kinds of rain—either the plain, old-fashioned variety or a new, improved rain with an extra secret ingredient. This new rain, according to one source, has "an acidic quality to it and it would foul up mechanical equipment—like radars, trucks and tanks."

We're left to wonder whether it damages other mechanisms, such as humans and trees. But even if it doesn't, we hope the White House reserves the fancy rain for export only. If our government begins using rain to break up political demonstrations, as the CIA did in Saigon when the Diem regime was tottering, we hope the protestors will be spared the additional indignity of having to hitch-hike home.

Richard Jordan Gatling, the inventor of that primitive machine gun that we see used with such effectiveness against the Indians in Western movies from time to time, hoped that by developing such a terrible weapon he would make men more reluctant to resort to arms. If meteorological warfare fulfills its potential, Mr. Gatling's dream might yet come true. Our future disputes may be settled by a few wizards—heads of state, maybe—at control panels, instructing Mother Nature where to send her floods, winds, earthquakes and tidal waves.

There'll be no need of arms then, and "World War" will have a new meaning.

9 JUL 1972

STATIN

[redacted]

Pentagon:

Weather As a Weapon Of War

WASHINGTON—Dr. Gordon J. F. MacDonald, a prominent geophysicist who had just completed a tour as vice president of the Defense Department's Institute of Defense Analysis, published in 1968 a little-noted but chilling study on the military potential of meterological warfare. He listed a number of options available to those who would choose to tamper with nature. Among them:

● Altering the world's temperature by rocketing materials into the earth's upper atmosphere to either absorb light (thereby cooling the surface below) or absorb outgoing heat (thereby heating the surface below). This technique could be targeted at a specific area.

● Triggering tidal waves by setting off a series of underground explosions along the edge of the Continental Shelf, or by producing a natural earthquake. A guided tidal wave could be achieved by correctly shaping the energy-release sources.

● Changing the physical makeup of the atmosphere by creating, with a rocket or similar weapon, a "hole" in the important ozone layer between 10 and 30 miles up that is responsible for absorbing much of the ultra-violet light cast from the sun. Without the protective layer of ozone, a molecular form of oxygen, the radiation would be fatal to all human, plant and animal life that could not take shelter in the affected area below.

Dr. MacDonald (who is now a member of the White House Council on Environmental Quality) made it clear that his essay was based only on speculation. Last week, however, it became known that at least part of his macabre weather arsenal had been secretly in use by the United States since the 1960's.

Air Force planes, supported by the Central Intelligence Agency, have been waging a systematic war of rain on the infiltration trails of Laos, Cambodia, North Vietnam and South Vietnam. The intent: suppress enemy antimissile fire, provide cover for South Vietnamese commando teams penetrating the North and hinder the movement of men and materiél from North Vietnam into the South.

The first experimental rain-making mission was flown by the C.I.A. in South Vietnam in 1963, but it was not until 1965 that a group of Air Force scientists officially was ordered to start thinking of ways to turn nature into a military tool.

"We all sat down in a big brainstorming session," said one of the scientists who participated at the Air Force Cambridge Research Laboratories at Hanscomb Field near Bedford, Mass. "The idea was to increase the rain and reduce the trafficability in all of Southeast Asia."

Within a year, the Air Force and C.I.A. began a highly secret rain-making project over the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos, known as "Operation Pop-Eye." There were heated protests from the State Department, and eventually a directive from the Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara ordering a halt to the project. Instead, well-qualified sources said last week, "it went underground—into the dark."

From 1969 through at least early this year, weather warfare was a covert operation being directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff with White House acquiescence.

The fact that the program existed at all came to light only last week in The New York Times. But, despite an extensive investigation, it could not be learned how successful the program had been, how many missions were conducted or whether it was still being used in connection with the heavy bombing of North Vietnam that followed the enemy offensive last April.

Making rain has long been technically feasible. Scientists have learned that rain fall can be increased by as much as 40 per cent after seeding clouds by aircraft with silver-iodide particles. Other chemicals, including dry ice, also have been used with success, both in the United States and in Southeast Asia.

Military and Government specialists acknowledge that there is little precise scientific knowledge of the short-range impact of cloud seeding and practically none of the long-range ecological effect of changing the amount of natural rainfall. Some scientists have published data suggesting that weather modification, in combination with other ecological stresses such as air pollution and pesticides, may have a synergistic effect—that is, result in collective changes far greater than either abuse would have caused by itself.

In Indochina, where heavy bombing already has robbed much of the landscape of its natural water-holding capability by destroying foliage and trees, artifically induced rains may result in far greater flooding than expected, along with heavier soil erosion.

Technically, there are no international agreements outlawing such warfare. But Government officials made clear last week that the weather-making activity of the Air Force was shielded from public view because of White House sensitivity to what could be regarded as the impropriety of the action. The issue, one well-informed official said, was one in which Henry A. Kissinger, the President's national-security adviser, took a personal hand. "This kind of thing was a bomb," the official said, "and Henry restricted information about it to those who had to know."

—SEYMOUR M. HERSH

NEW YORK TIMES
7 JUL 1972

War in Air Decentralized by Nixon, But the Controls Are Termed Strict

By NEIL SHEEHAN
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 6 — President Nixon is waging the air war against North Vietnam with a decentralized system of command and control that differs significantly from the highly centralized system employed by his predecessor, Lyndon B. Johnson, during the 1965-68 air campaign. In the view of a number of civilian and military officials with experience in Indochina, the decentralization does not imply the unraveling of civilian control over the military or the loosening of the chain of military command.

News Analysis

In effect they reject suggestions of such a deterioration made in the wake of the acknowledgment by Gen. John D. Lavelle that forces under his command made at least 28 unauthorized air raids on the North between last Nov. 8 and March 8. He was dismissed as commander of the Seventh Air Force in Saigon after a secret inquiry that was completed there March 23.

In the 1965-68 air war, lists of proposed targets were forwarded from the war zone through subordinate commands to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington, who modified or approved them and sent them to the White House.

At Tuesday luncheon meetings, President Johnson and his senior Vietnam policy aides decided that certain targets could be attacked by a given date. If the attacks were not carried out by then, the authorization lapsed.

Robert S. McNamara, who favored this highly centralized system when he was Secretary of Defense because he felt that it resulted in calculated doses of force carefully applied, informed the Joint Chiefs, who in turn informed the subordinate commands what targets could be attacked by what dates.

List of Authorized Targets

Under the Nixon Administration's system, according to the officials, who were interviewed by The New York Times, a list of authorized targets in the North was transmitted to the subordinate commands by the White House and the Joint Chiefs in the latter part of April.

Targets are then selected by the field commands from those on the authorized list. The field commands tell the Joint Chiefs in advance what they intend to strike and by what date, thus giving the White House prior notice.

Mr. Nixon resumed full-scale air attacks on the southern panhandle of North Vietnam in the first part of April after the North Vietnamese had launched their offensive across the demilitarized zone. The new air war moved into high gear in the latter half of the month, with raids throughout the North.

The civilian and military officials, explaining their view that decentralization has not weakened command and control, say, first, that the President still decides how military force will be applied and to what extent he will delegate authority to apply it.

Second, they asserted, the decentralized system, in the light of the failure of the Johnson Administration's policy to bring the war to a halt, is a better method of applying air power in a coordinated campaign aimed at depriving North Vietnam of imports, both economic and military, through mining and bombing. If air power is to be effective, the officials added, the commander on the scene must be free to select his targets and to time his attacks.

In the end, regardless of what guidance is issued by the civilian leadership and the Joint Chiefs, the sources asserted, Washington and the various intermediate headquarters have to rely on what they are told by the field commands.

'Slave of Reporting System'

"On the way back you are the slave of the reporting system," an official said. "It would be very difficult to tell whether the report was falsified if it met the required format, especially when you are handling dozens of messages a day. It is highly improbable that you would smell a rat unless somebody tipped you off."

The deciding factor in the system, the officials maintained, is the honesty and discipline of the commanders close enough to the scene to know what is actually happening. They noted that there were no checks — sometimes referred to as fail-safe devices — that would automatically prevent the kind of insubordination and falsification that General Lavelle acknowledged in testimony before the House June 12.

The officials interviewed contended that there was no way to build checks into the structure to automatically forestall insubordination and falsification without so thoroughly eroding the responsibility and initiative of subordinate commanders as to make the cure worse than even the possibility of the disease.

In the view of the officials interviewed, a case similar to the Lavelle affair could have occurred — although there is no evidence that it did — under the highly centralized system used by the Johnson Administration. They also believe that it could occur under the present system.

Conforming to the Format

It was pointed out that General Lavelle met the format of the reporting system by describing the unauthorized strikes as "protective reaction."

Similarly, when Air Force jets accidentally strafed a Soviet freighter in the North Vietnamese port of Campha in 1967 while Mr. McNamara's highly centralized system was in force, the pilots and the acting wing commander, in an unsuccessful attempt to cover up the mistake, filed a false report and burned the gun-camera film that had recorded the incident.

In the case of the Mylai massacre in 1968, again while the Johnson Administration was in power, the original report forwarded to headquarters in Saigon said that 128 Vietcong had been killed and three weapons captured. Because the guerrillas are often able to recover most of the weapons from their dead and because dozens of similar reports were received all the time, the senior officer who saw this one ordered the routine message of congratulations from Gen. William C. Westmoreland, then American military commander, sent to the unit that had committed the massacre. General Westmoreland may not even have read the report.

The circumstances of the famous Green Beret murder case the following year indicate that Col. Robert B. Rheault, Special Forces commander in Vietnam at the time, may have inadvertently misled Gen. Creighton W. Abrams, General Westmoreland's successor, about the killing of a Vietnamese agent suspected of spying for the other side because the colonel had in turn been misled by his subordinates.

Subterfuge Proposed

Before President Nixon's decision to launch ground attacks on Communist bases in Cambodia in the spring of 1970, Generals Westmoreland and Abrams were repeatedly frustrated in their pleas for permission to assault those sanctuaries.

Staff officers, it is now known, proposed using the so-called rules of engagment — in the way General Lavelle used the rules of "protective reaction" — as a subterfuge to get around the prohibition. The rules of engagement permitted American troops to return fire across the border or to conduct hot pursuit into Cambodia in the midst of battle.

"People suggested getting lost, or saying we were getting shot at and shooting back, but Westmoreland and Abrams refused to chisel," an officer related.

Some officials say that, specific cases aside, actions by recent Administrations in the conduct of foreign policy and war-making have encouraged an atmosphere of deception. They assert, for example, that when the civilian leadership subverts the Congressional prohibition against employing a third country's troops in Laos by having the Central Intelligence Agency secretly hire Thai mercenaries, this has an impact on the willingness of subordinate officials to abide by restrictive orders that they dislike.

The Possibility of Error

It is also noted that even the most carefully devised system of civilian control can prove ineffective because of human error.

Mr. McNamara's rigidly centralized target selection did not prevent the bombing of schools, churches, hospitals and homes in North Vietnam because individual pilots mistook them for designated military targets or dropped their bombs prematurely.

continued

DAILY WORLD
5 JUL 1972

[redacted]

Vets return from Paris to spread peace message

By LENORE WEISS

NEW YORK, July 4 — Returning from a three-day meeting last week in Paris with veterans of the Southeast Asia liberation forces, 15 delegates of the Vietnam Veterans Against the War (VVAW), announced plans here to report their findings to their local areas.

This includes, said William del Rosario, a national coordinator of the VVAW, "speaking tours, articles, testimony to Congressmen and appearances on radio and TV."

The interview took place at VVAW headquarters on West 26 street.

They had to do their own publicity, the veterans said, because their trip had been ignored by the commercial press.

The veterans brought back photos documenting the effects of U.S. bombing raids on North Vietnam.

In their three-day talks in Paris last week, they had met with veterans of the South Vietnamese National Liberation Front, the Army of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the Pathet Lao and the Cambodian United Front to find "a common basis for ending the war."

The talks had been organized by French peace groups and representatives of the War Crimes Commission, a citizens' group established several years ago by Bertrand Russell, the late British philosopher.

"We achieved more in three days than our government has achieved in three years, said John Boychuck, an active-duty GI who was due to return to Mt. Home Air Force Base in Idaho. "We didn't have to decide if we wanted round ashtrays, square ashtrays or who was going to sit where."

Precious minutes

Toby Hollander, of East St. Louis, Ill., an Annapolis graduate, said the PRG spokesman in Paris, Ly Van Sau, expressed the purpose of the meeting when he said, "If our efforts cause the war to end one minute earlier, this equals four tons of bombs."

Veterans learned in Paris of specifications by the U.S. military for 40,000 new "tiger cages," which are cells 8 by 10 feet on Con Son Island, for the prisoners of the Saigon regime.

Laotian and Cambodian representatives in Paris told the veterans, said Paul Richard, Seattle, that the war, contrary to U.S. State Department reports, is not limited to Vietnam. They cited the presence of U.S. advisers and helicopters along Routes 4 and 5, as well as a training camp in Cambodia conducted by the CIA.

The Paris meeting, said Richards, demonstrated the solidarity of liberation forces in Southeast

WASHINGTON STAR
8 JUL 1972

[redacted]

STATINTL

Letters to the Editor

The CIA Responds

SIR: As you are aware, the Central Intelligence Agency seldom responds to criticism of any sort. It cannot remain silent, however, when a newspaper with The Star's reputation prints an article alleging that this agency supports the heroin traffic in Southeast Asia. I refer to the column by Judith Randal in The Star of 29 June.

So serious a charge should be made only on the basis of the most convincing evidence. Miss Randal states only that "reporters have been hearing for more than a year" and then refers to an article in Harper's magazine by a graduate student, Alfred W. McCoy.

Charges of this nature have been made previously and each time have been most carefully investigated and found to be unsubstantiated. The public record on this subject is clear. There is, for instance, a report by Roland Paul, investigator for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in the April 1971 issue of Foreign Affairs, which states: ". . . due to the long association with the CIA, the Meo tribesmen in Laos were shifting from opium to rice and other crops."

The Congressional Record of June 2, 1971, printed a letter from John E. Ingersoll, director of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, to Representative Charles S. Gubser of California, which states: "Actually, CIA has for some time been this bureau's strongest partner in identifying foreign sources and routes of illegal trade in narcotics. Their help has included both direct support in intelligence collection, as well as in intelligence analysis and production. Liaison between our two agencies is close and constant in matters of mutual interest. Much of the progress we are now making in identifying overseas narcotics traffic can, in fact, be attributed to CIA cooperation."

Miss Randal's article is also in contrast to the two articles by your staff writer, Miriam Ottenberg, on June 18 and 19, 1972, in which she pointed out: "U.S. narcotics agents are making a sizable dent in the Southeast Asian dope traffic and—despite reports to the contrary -- America's Asian allies and the CIA are helping them do it." And she quoted John Warner of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs as saying, "he had seen nothing of an evidentiary nature from Mr. McCoy 'other than gossip, conjecture and old history'."

Narcotics addiction is one of this country's most serious social problems. The Central Intelligence Agency is dedicated to eradicating this menace and, specifically, to interdicting the flow of narcotics entering this country.

It is difficult to understand why a writer would publish material tending to undermine confidence in this effort without the most convincing proof. More than one year ago, in an address before the American Society of Newspaper Editors, Richard Helms, director of Central Intelligence, stated: "There is the arrant nonsense, for example, that the Central Intelligence Agency is somehow involved in the world drug traffic. We are not. As fathers, we are as concerned about the lives of our children and grandchildren as are all of you. As an agency, in fact, we are heavily engaged in tracing the foreign roots of the drug traffic for the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs. We hope we are helping with a solution; we know we are not contributing to the problem."

This statement remains valid today.

W. E. Colby,
Executive Director,
Central Intelligence Agency.

3 JUL 1972

Rainmaking Is Used As Weapon by U.S.

Cloud Seeding in Indochina Confirmed—Chemical Also Employed to Foil Radar

By SEYMOUR M. HERSH
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 2—The United States has been secretly seeding clouds over North Vietnam, Laos and South Vietnam to increase and control the rainfall for military purposes.

Government sources, both civilian and military, said during an extensive series of interviews that the Air Force cloud-seeding program has been aimed most recently at hindering movement of North Vietnamese troops and equipment and suppressing enemy antiaircraft missile fire.

The disclosure confirmed growing speculation in Congressional and scientific circles about the use of weather modification in Southeast Asia. Despite years of experiments with rainmaking in the United States and elsewhere, scientists are not sure they understand its long-term effect on the ecology of a region.

Some Opposed Program

The weather manipulation in Indochina, which was first tried in South Vietnam in 1963, is the first confirmed use of meteorological warfare. Although it is not prohibited by any international conventions on warfare, artifical rainmaking has been strenuously opposed by some State Department officials.

It could not be determined whether the operations were being conducted in connection with the current North Vietnamese offensive or the renewed American bombing of the North.

Effectiveness Doubted

Beginning in 1967, some State Department officials protested that the United States, by deliberately altering the natural rainfall in parts of Indochina, was taking environmental risks of unknown proportions. But many advocates of the operation have found little wrong with using weather modification as a military weapon.

"What's worse," one official asked, "dropping bombs or rain?"

All of the officials interviewed said that the United States did not have the capability to cause heavy flooding during the summer in the northern parts of North Vietnam, where serious flooding occurred last year.

Officially, the White House and State Department declined comment on the use of meteorological warfare. "This is one of those things where no one is going to say anything," one official said.

Most officials interviewed agreed that the seeding had accomplished one of its main objectives — muddying roads and flooding lines of communication. But there were also many military and Government officials who expressed doubt that the project had caused any dramatic results.

The sources, without providing details, also said that a method had been developed for treating clouds with a chemical that eventually produced an acidic rainfall capable of fouling the operation of North Vietnamese radar equipment used for directing surface-to-air missiles.

In addition to hampering SAM missiles and delaying North Vietnamese infiltration, the rainmaking program had the following purposes:

¶Providing rain and cloud cover for infiltration of South Vietnamese commando and intelligence teams into North Vietnam.

¶Serving as a "spoiler" for North Vietnamese attacks and raids in South Vietnam.

¶Altering or tailoring the rain patterns over Noth Vietnam and Laos to aid United States bombing missions.

¶Diverting North Vietnamese men and material from military operations to keep muddied roads and other lines of communication in operation.

Keyed To Monsoon

[illegible] seeding operations necessarily were keyed to the two main monsoon seasons that affect Laos and Vietnam. "It was just trying to add on to something that you already got," one officer said.

Military sources said that one main goal was to increase the duration of the southwest monsoon, which spawns high-rising cumulus clouds — those most susceptible to cloud seeding—over the panhandle areas of Laos and North Vietnam from May to early October. The longer rainy season thus would give the Air Force more opportunity to trigger rainstorms.

"We were trying to arrange the weather pattern to suit our convenience," said one former Government official who had detailed knowledge of the operation.

According to interviews, the Central Intelligence Agency initiated the use of cloud-seeding over Hue, in the northern part of South Vietnam. "We first used that stuff in about August of 1963," one former C.I.A. agent said, "when the Diem regime was having all that trouble with the Buddhists."

"They would just stand around during demonstrations when the police threw tear gas at them, but we noticed that when the rains came they wouldn't stay on," the former agent said.

"The agency got an Air America Beechcraft and had it rigged up with silver Iodide," he said. "There was another demonstration and we seeded the area. It rained."

A similar cloud-seeding was carried out by C.I.A. aircraft in Saigon at least once during the summer of 1964, the former agent said.

Expanded to Trail

The Intelligence Agency expanded its cloud-seeding activities to the Ho Chi Minh supply trail in Laos sometime in the middle nineteen-sixties, a number of Government sources said. By 1967, the Air Force had become involved although, as one former Government official said, "the agency was calling all the shots."

"I always assumed the agency had a mandate from the White House to do it," he added.

A number of former CIA, and high-ranking Johnson Administration officials depicted the operations along the trail as experimental.

The state of the art had not yet advanced to the point where it was possible to predict the results of a seeding operation with any degree of confidence, one Government official said. "We used to go out flying around and looking for a certain cloud formation," the official said. "And we made a lot of [illegible] dumped seven inches of rain in two hours on one of our Special Forces camps."

Despite the professed skepticism on the part of some members of the Johnson Administration, military men apparently took the weather modification program much more seriously.

According to a document contained in the Pentagon papers, the Defense Department's secret history of the war, weather modification was one of seven basic options for stepping up the war that were presented on request by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the White House in late February, 1967.

The document described the weather program over Laos—officially known as Operation Pop-Eye—as an attempt "to reduce trafficability along infiltration routes."

Authorization Needed

It said that Presidential authorization was "required to implement operational phase of weather modification process previously successfully tested and evaluated in same area." The brief summary concluded by stating that "risk of compromise is minimal."

A similar option was cited in another 1967 working document published in the Pentagon papers. Neither attracted any immediate public attention.

The Laos cloud-seeding operations did provoke, however, a lengthy and bitter, albeit secret, dispute inside the Johnson Administration in 1967. A team of State Department attorneys and officials protested that the use of cloud-seeding was a dangerous precedent for the United States.

"I felt that the military and agency hadn't analyzed it to determine if it was in our interest," one official who was involved in the dispute said. He also was concerned over the rigid secrecy of the project, he said, "although it might have been all right to keep it secret if you did it once and didn't want the precedent to become known."

The general feeling was summarized by one former State Department official who said he was concerned that the rainmaking "might violate what we considered the general rule of the thumb for an illegal weapon of war—something that would cause unusual suffering or dispropriate damage." There also was concern, he added, because of the unknown ecological risks.

A Nixon Administration official said that he believed the first use of weather modification over North Vietnam [illegible] early 1969 when rain was increased

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

THE ANNALS OF THE AM. ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE
July 1972

The Use of Force in Foreign Policy by the People's Republic of China

By Allen S. Whiting

Abstract: President Nixon's "journey for peace" to Peking has implicitly modified the image of a Chinese Communist aggressive threat delineated by all previous administrations. However, it has not explicitly redefined the administration's assumptions on the Chinese use of force. This has left considerable confusion and unease among Asian and American audiences who accept the concept of massive Chinese military force being deterred from aggression primarily by American security commitments, bases, and force postures extending from Korea and Japan to India. The nine instances wherein the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has crossed customary borders in hostile array during the past twenty-two years provide prima facie evidence for the conventional image of a potentially expansionist regime contained by American commitments and force. However, closer examination of the use of military force by the People's Republic reveals an entirely different situation whereby the government in Peking, in most cases, deployed the PLA in defensive reaction against a perceived threat. The Chinese use of force primarily for defensive deterrence has remained remarkably consistent over twenty-one years, and considerable continuity may be anticipated for at least the next five years.

Allan S. Whiting, Ph.D., Ann Arbor, Michigan, has been Professor of Political Science at the University of Michigan since 1968. He previously taught at Michigan State, 1955–57, and Northwestern, 1951–53. He was a staff member of the Rand Corporation in the Social Science Division, 1957–61; Director, Office of Research and Analysis for the Far East, U.S. Department of State, 1961–66; and Deputy Principal Officer, American Consulate General, Hong Kong, 1966–68. Educated at Cornell and Columbia universities and the recipient of several fellowships, he is the author of Soviet Policies in China 1917–24 *and coauthor of* Dynamics of International Relations; Sinkiang: Pawn or Pivot?; *and* China Crosses the Yalu.

ACCORDING to a Gallup poll, in September 1971 more than half the American public saw China as the greatest threat to world peace in the next few years.[1] Nothing has eventuated from President Nixon's self-styled "journey for peace" to Peking to change this perception, nor has the administration given any systematic assurances to the contrary. Instead the Pentagon continues to demand new, complex, and costly weapons systems for the West Pacific, ostensibly to deter potential Chinese aggression. Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, warns we must prepare to fight two nuclear wars at once, with the Soviet Union and with China.[2] Our Asian allies from Korea to Thailand worry aloud about the credibility of America's deterrence in the aftermath of stalemate and withdrawal from Vietnam, against a rising weariness of military burdens in Asia, manifested by congressional pressures for cuts in military assistance.

American and Asian anxiety over the future use of force by the People's Republic is rooted in recent history. On nine occasions in the past twenty-two years, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has projected China's military power across its borders.[3] In Korea (1950) and India (1962) major war resulted. In Laos (1964) and Vietnam (1965) PLA deployments risked Sino-American conflict. Two crises in the Taiwan Strait (1954–55 and 1958) ostensibly fell within the category of civil war, but nonetheless confronted the United States as protector of the Chiang Kai-shek regime. In March 1969 bel-

Continued

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July 1972

A NOVEL ABOUT THE CIA'S MERCENARIES

COMPANY MAN

BY JOE MAGGIO

A NOVEL ABOUT THE CIA'S MERCENARIES
COMPANY MAN
BY JOE MAGGIO

Not since Robin Moore's *The Green Beret* has such a powerful novel about modern warfare appeared—a book so shocking that it promises to generate excitement, alarm and controversy. Startling in its authenticity COMPANY MAN is the painfully vivid story of a CIA mercenary—an insider's account of intrigues that are all too often borne out by sensational news breaks.

In this brutal novel, Joe Maggio expose the shadow world of the CIA ("the Company") and the mercenaries paid to die for their country. The story centers on Nick Martin, contract employee of the CIA's Special Operating Division (SOD), who finds himself stranded in the Congolese jungle. Used and abandoned by the Company, he now believes that he has been set up for ambush.

An arm of the Company that runs virtually unreigned, the SOD employs outcasts, criminals, and ex-military men in the "world defense against Communism." Once a Green Beret and later a graduate of the Farm—the SOD's "secret" training base in Langley, Virginia—Martin had already been dispatched by

(Continued on back flap)

HARPER'S
JULY 1972

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STATIN

Alfred W. McCoy

FLOWERS OF EVIL

The CIA and the heroin trade

Ladies and gentlemen," announced the genteel British diplomat, raising his glass to offer a toast, "I give you Prince Sopsaisana, the uplifter of Laotian youth."

The toast brought an appreciative smile from the guest of honor, cheers and applause from the luminaries of Vientiane's diplomatic corps, assembled at the farewell banquet for the Laotian ambassador-designate to France, Prince Sopsaisana. A member of the royal house of Xieng Khouang, the Plain of Jars region, the Prince was vice-president of the National Assembly, chairman of the Lao Bar Association, president of the Lao Press Association, president of the *Alliance Française*, and a member in good standing of the Asian People's Anti-Communist League. After receiving his credentials from the King in a private audience at the Luang Prabang Royal Palace on April 8, 1971, he was treated to an unprecedented round of cocktail parties, dinners, and banquets. For Sopsai, as his friends call him, was not just any ambassador; the Americans considered him an outstanding example of a new generation of honest, dynamic national leaders, and it was widely rumored in Vientiane that Sopsai was destined for high office some day.

The final send-off party at Vientiane's Wattay Airport on April 23 was one of the gayest affairs of the season. Everybody was there; the champagne bubbled, the canapés were flawlessly French, and Mr. Ivan Bastouil, chargé d'affaires at the French Embassy, gave the nicest speech. Only after the plane had soared off into the clouds did anybody notice that Sopsai had forgotten to pay for his share of the reception.

His arrival at Paris's Orly Airport on the morning of April 25 was the occasion for another reception. The French ambassador to Laos, home for a brief visit, and the entire staff of the Laotian Embassy had turned out to welcome the new ambassador. There were warm embraces, kissing on both cheeks, and more effusive speeches. Curiously, the Prince insisted on waiting for his luggage like any ordinary tourist, and when his many suitcases finally appeared after an unexplained delay, he immediately noticed that a particular one was missing. Sopsai angrily insisted that his suitcase be delivered at once, and French authorities promised, most apologetically, that it would be sent to the Laotian Embassy as soon as it was found. Sopsai departed reluctantly for yet another reception at the Embassy, and while he drank the ceremonial champagne with his newfound retinue of admirers, French customs officials were examining one of the biggest heroin seizures in French history.

The Ambassador's suitcase contained sixty kilos of high-grade Laotian heroin — worth $13.5 million on the streets of New York, its probable destination. A week later, a smiling French official presented himself at the Embassy with the suitcase in hand. Although Sopsaisana had been bombarding the airport with outraged telephone calls for several days, he suddenly realized that accepting the suitcase was tantamount to an admission of guilt and so, contrary to his righteous indignation, he flatly denied that it was his. Ignoring his declaration of innocence, the French government refused to accept his diplomatic credentials, and Sopsai remained in Paris for no more than two months before he was recalled to Vientiane.

Fragile flower, cash crop

Despite its resemblance to comic opera, the Prince Sopsaisana affair offered a rare glimpse into the workings of the Laotian drug trade. That trade is the principal business of Laos, and to a certain extent it depends on the support (money, guns, aircraft, etc.) of the CIA. Unfortunately, the questions raised by the Prince's disgrace were never asked, much less answered. The French government overlooked the em-

Alfred W. McCoy, a Ph.D. student in Southeast Asian history at Yale University, has written numerous articles on Southeast Asia and has edited a political history of Laos.

continued

RAMPARTS
July 1972



The Story of My Overthrow and Resistance

[MOSCOW - PEKING]

YOU MUST NOT GO, SAMDECH SIHANOUK. It's Friday, the thirteenth." These words were spoken to me, half in jest, by one of my aides on the way to Orly Airport for the plane which was to take me from Paris to Moscow. It was the morning of March 13, 1970. Unlike many of my countrymen, I am not superstitious, so I laughed, and flew off to meet the Russian leaders. Five days later, while still in Moscow, I was deposed as Cambodia's Head of State so it was an unlucky day after all.

President Podgorny met my flight, but there were no elaborate welcoming ceremonies, because mine was a political and not a state visit. After greeting me he said there was a plane waiting to take me straight home to Phnom Penh.

"Take an overnight rest in Moscow, if you like," he said, "but fly on to Phnom Penh in the morning. We have confidence in you, Sihanouk. You are really the indispensable leader of your people. But you must go back and take charge of Cambodia's affairs. See that they don't fall into the hands of Lon Nol and Sirik Matak. You must ensure that Cambodia doesn't drift into an American takeover, prevent Lon Nol and Sirik Matak from creating difficulties for the South Vietnamese people who are waging a heroic struggle for the liberation of their country." I replied that I'd have to think things over very carefully.

There was much to think about. On March 8, there had been anti-Vietnamese demonstrations in Svay Rieng Province—the reports reaching me showed that Lon Nol was behind them. On March 11, a mob—ostensibly of students and school children—attacked the embassy of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam (the NLF) and, a few hours later, that of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (Hanoi). My reports showed it to be the work of the Army—specifically Lon Nol. The nucleus of the attackers was, in both cases, some fifty military men in civilian clothes, commanded by Lon Nol's younger brother, Colonel Lon Non. This was a far cry from the "spontaneous demonstrations" naively reported in the European press and on American television. Signs had been prepared in English, a language rarely used in public display in my country. Photographers and TV crews had been alerted. Everything pointed to a scenario drawn up well in advance.

As soon as I heard of the attacks on the embassies, I sent a cablegram to my mother, the Queen, condemning the violence as "acts of personalities attaching greater importance to their personal and clan interests than to the country's future and to the fate of the people." I warned of the possibility of a rightist coup and said that I would return for a confrontation with those responsible, but added that, if the people chose to follow them "along a path that will turn Cambodia into a second Laos, they will compel me to resign."

The answer to my message to the Queen came in the [illegible] attacks

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WASHINGTON STAR
8 JUN 1972

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[redacted]

WASHINGTON CLOSE-UP

Homage to CIA Drug Fight Ironic

By JUDITH RANDAL

The American Medical Association, which predictably offers few surprises at its annual meeting, achieved the unexpected this year.

As one entered the convention's exhibition hall in San Francisco's Civic Center, one's nostrils were assailed by an odor more appropriate to that city's Haight-Ashbury district — an aroma strongly suggestive of the burning leaves and blossoms of the female Cannabis sativa plant.

The scent fired the curiosity of all in the hall who had ever sampled marijuana and drew from the wife of one physician attending the meeting the remark that she had smelled that odor many times in the back of the school bus she drives.

That was only the beginning of the surprise. Following one's nose, one soon came upon a booth housing an exhibit on drug abuse which featured a display about many drugs, including pot, and a device that generated a synthetic smoke that was close to, if not identical with the real thing.

★

There was still more surpise to come in this display, which — it turned out—had won the gold medal in the AMA's coveted Billings Prize competition as one of the outstanding scientific exhibits of the meeting. The exhibitor was no mere doctor or pharmaceutical firm, or even your average, run-of-the-mill science-oriented government bureau. It was that most unlikely of contenders for an AMA award: The Central Intelligence Agency.

Dr. Donald Borcherding of the CIA was on hand to explain the exhibit's origins. Like most agencies, he said, the CIA has an occupational health division whose job it is to promote the well-being of its personnel. When CIA officials at the agency's Langley, Va., headquarters became worried about pot, LSD, speed, heroin and the like, Borcherding and his colleagues assembled the display.

According to the CIA medic, it was an immediate hit, not only at the Langley "Spook Farm" but also among groups in the community, such as Knights of Columbus lodges and parent-teacher associations. The CIA is thinking about putting together "how-to-do-it" instructions so that other groups can build their own replicas.

★

Granted, the crusade against drug abuse needs all the help it can get. But the trouble with the CIA exhibit is that it does not tell things strictly as they are. For example, it implies that the use of marijuana sets the stage for later use of heroin. This issue is by no means settled and, as a matter of fact, there is a good deal of evidence to suggest that alcohol, rather than marijuana, is the first drug to be abused by most people who subsequently become heroin addicts.

In any case, many experts believe that if there is any connection whatever between pot and heroin, it is their illegal status and that if the former were "decriminalized," its link with the latter would tend to disappear.

More important to this discussion than an argument about the casual relationship of the two drugs is the point that the CIA does not come into the campaign with completely clean hands. Reporters have been hearing for more than a year that the agency has been supporting the heroin traffic in the Golden Triangle region of Laos, Thailand and Burma, and that this opium byproduct has been one of the more important cargoes carried by Air America, an airline operating in Southeast Asia whose charter business is almost exclusively with the CIA. The Golden Triangle region, incidentally, is said to grow 70 percent of the world's illicit opium from which morphine base, morphine and eventually heroin are derived.

For more details on the CIA's complicity in the heroin mess, one might consult an article entitled "Flowers of Evil" by historian Alfred W. McCoy, in the July issue of Harper's magazine. Part of a forthcoming book called "The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia," the article spells out in detail how Vag Pao, long the leader of a CIA secret army in Laos, has become even more deeply involved in the drug traffic and what role this traffic has played in the importation of heorin into the United States and its use by our troops in South Vietnam.

★

Writes McCoy of the situation: "As a result of direct and indirect American involvement, opium production has steadily increased, high-grade heroin production is flourishing and the Golden Triangle's poppy fields have become linked to markets in Europe and the U.S."

The CIA went away from the San Francisco meeting with a gold medal and, no doubt, a good many doctors who saw the exhibit went away impressed. Some of them probably learned for the first time what pot smells like.

But for others there was a bitter incongruity in the government's super-secret spy arm winning a medal for an exhibit on the horrors of drug abuse. To some it was a little like the Mafia getting a top award for a display of the evils of extortion, prostitution and gambling — and a few of the more socially aware physicians present did not hesitate to say so.

A mass of legislation has been enacted by the Democratic Congress, but most of it does not carry the political sex appeal of these principle issues. The President is not likely to overlook the opportunity to expose these shortcomings.

Democrats have a particular talent for killing each other off. Party infighting does not help the Nation or the Democratic Party. The writing of a platform may expose more weaknesses than the party can overcome regardless of candidate, and George Wallace and others are attempting to produce a party platform which is more acceptable to the American public than the one now proposed. Yet, efforts to start pulling responsible party factions together may have come too late to be effective. One thing is certain, the Democratic Party has serious problems ahead for November. America wants responsible programs and responsible candidates which it can confidently support for a better tomorrow. Let us hope it is not too late to repair the damage within the Democratic Party. America needs a strong Democratic Party under sound leadership.

AN OLD-FASHIONED PATRIOT SPEAKS OUT

(Mr. HALL asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. HALL. Mr. Speaker, the Missouri National Guard Association, the nonmilitary forum of over 1,700 active officers, retired officers, active and retired enlisted men of the Missouri National Guard recently held its silver anniversary conference in St. Louis, Mo. At that ceremony Col. Oliver M. Husmann, president of the association for 1971–72, and a prominent St. Louis businessman, gave his report to the members.

The conference warmly received this old-fashioned patriot who spoke out for his organization, to always defend the country. From one who has served his Nation, speaking before those who also shouldered the task of defense, Colonel Husmann eloquently and concisely stated his dedication to the United States, and its traditional spirit of patriotic maintenance of freedom, plus efforts for peace.

I recommend these words of Colonel Husmann to this Congress as an example of the strong devotion to our country that still persists today:

REMARKS BY COL. OLIVER M. HUSMANN

Webster defines a Patriot as "one who loves his country and zealously guards its welfare; especially a defender of popular liberty." This is the kind of patriot I was taught to admire and emulate. The kind who has fought for his country throughout its history. The kind who admits the imperfections of government, but loves his country even more in spite of them.

Today we have a new kind of patriot. The draft dodgers who skulks into Canada, Sweden, or any other country that will grant them asylum. Those who trample and spit upon the Flag. Those who bomb and burn our public buildings and academic institutions. Those who condemn our involvement in Viet Nam and publicly esteem our enemies. Those who question every word uttered by our leaders, but willingly accept as the whole truth any and all charges levied against us by our enemies.

There are many in this country who find favor with this new type of patriot. We find these 'sob sisters' amongst our clergy, among our so-called intellectuals and even amongst our leaders in the Congress and the Senate. They say we should not have become involved in Viet Nam and now because we are so involved, the new type of patriot must be permitted to vent his frustrations as he desires.

The National Guard is made up of men. Men from many walks of life. Men in different stages of maturity. Men of different social antecedents. Men of various religious beliefs. Men with different political convictions. These qualities and characteristics which each individual possesses, must be nurtured, moulded and fused with those of the next man until, as an entity, we can move forward in a concentrated effort toward a common goal. We must resolve to do everything in our power to again convince the people of our country that Webster's definition of a patriot is and always will be correct.

There are too many in this country who have forgotten that the two ideologies—Democracy and Communism—cannot live side by side except by artful truces and so-called cold wars, neither of which can nurture a real, lasting peace. The tentacles of Communism creep insiduously wherever they gain a foothold. Our land, our way of life, our freedom and our liberty, as we know them, are the prizes Communism strives to take from us. Guardsmen must be constantly prepared to fight this threat. We must not permit ourselves to become the weak link in the defense of this great nation.

There is a greater need for the existence of the Guard today than ever before. We must let our fellow citizens know that the enemy wants us to be careless, lazy and uninspired in the desire to defend our country. That he looks upon us with utter contempt when we say we are tired of war. We must make the public realize that America needs its men—soldiers and citizens alike—to work continously to improve our defensive posture while there is still time. If we wish to maintain for our children the liberty, freedom and safety which we enjoy, we must be prepared to defend these truths to the death. Consider for a moment what life would be like without these privileges we accept so matter-of-factly.

One thing is certain; we have the organization to build such a defense. We have the know-how and the money in this country to develop such a defense. Most important of all, we have US, the National Guard. We can discourage aggression now. All we have to do is feel the urgency, to realize the practicability of being prepared, and to work—work as men dedicated to the principle that the freedom we enjoy shall not perish.

Our silver anniversary is an opportune time to rededicate ourselves to the task at hand, to filling our ranks with true patriots, to teaching, to absorbing lessons learned, to building a defense capable of filling the needs of our people, our community and our country.

Guardsmen have taken such dedicated stands many times in history; always in the cause of freedom and liberty. Our citizen-soldiers, our National Guard, is older than the Nation itself. Dedicated men of the early colonies organized units and trained to defend their settlements long before the Declaration of Independence. Many of our present-day Guard units trace their history directly to these early groups of citizen-soldiers.

We need to review the heritage willed us by those who early stood in the defense of our country. We need to relive the struggles of the past, to see in our minds eye and feel in our hearts the valiant stand they took so this nation might be free. We need to think of those who stood with Washington at Brandywine and Germantown. We need to be reminded of the Guardsmen, militiamen, minutemen, call them what you will, who bled at Bunker Hill. We need to trace their footprints that marked with blood the snows of Valley Forge. We must bend our backs and grasp with freezing fingers the frosted oars with Washington as he crosses the icy Delaware. We must lay seige with him to the heights of Yorktown. We must strive with those who followed Lee, Sherman and Grant. We must feel the fury of the charge at San Juan. We must share with them the blood and sweat of the Philippines and the Mexican Border. Let us follow "Black-Jack" Pershing through the holocaust of WWI. Eisenhower, MacArthur and Patton through the war to end all wars. Let us relive with them Argonne, Chateau Thierry, Corregidor, Normandy and MIG Alley. Finally Korea and Viet Nam. For the first time in history American fighting men find themselves in the unusual position of fighting a battle they cannot win, a war they are not supposed to win. A classic study in frustration.

Is Freedom, Democracy and the American way of life, which was bought at such a tremendous price to be lost to the most deadly enemy that has ever theatened free men? Has the sacrifice they made, been made in vain? Can we not continue the fight, can we not as citizen-soldiers bolster the defenses, man them effectively and surely, against any and all attacks of an enemy? Can we not show a love for our country? A love that surmounts all fears, all weaknesses and dedicates men to preserve with their lives the land they love?

I am not asking that we dedicate ourselves to becoming a nation of warmongers. No, I ask that we dedicate ourselves to work for peace. I firmly believe a strong aggressive, defensive posture is the best offense available to a country whose democratic ideals prevents it from initiating an attack against any enemy unless provoked beyond endurance.

Until we have made our country so impregnable, so invulnerable that an attack would be suicidal, will our enemies keep their distance. Until we have done this, the possibility of America becoming a major battlefield in a new world conflict becomes more apparent with each passing day.

Gentlemen. Now is the time for us to look to our defenses, time to follow the heritage which is ours. The time to demonstrate, once again, to all the world, that democracy is a living thing, transcending all other ways of life, and worth protecting at any cost.

(Mr. PRICE of Illinois asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks in the body of the RECORD and to include an address by Mr. HOLIFIELD.)

(Mr. PRICE of Illinois remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.]

(Mr. BUCHANAN asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

[Mr. BUCHANAN'S remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.]

NARCOTICS AND SOUTHEAST ASIA

(Mr. WOLFF asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. WOLFF. Mr. Speaker, at this point in the RECORD, I would like to insert the texts of several formal statements made before an informal hearing which the dis-

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

27 JUN 1972

[redacted]

Politics vs. economic needs

What should determine U.S. foreign aid?

By Lucia Mouat
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

Should politics rather than economic need govern the distribution of U.S. foreign aid?

Even politicians say "no" but only in theory. In practice, political motives can often be found.

Liberals become furious when aid is continued, sometimes over the objection of legislation they have helped to pass, to such authoritarian regimes as Greece, Pakistan, and Brazil. They like it no better when the administration steps in on its own to seal the flow as it did last December when the President ordered a cut in aid to India for its entry into what is now Bangladesh.

Conservatives are often more concerned with the political aftermath of aid. They deplore the fact that the United States cannot seem to accomplish more in the way of democratic reforms in other governments or at the very least to extract some degree of allegiance or appreciation.

Sensitive case in point was the United Nations vote on Taiwan's ouster in which 40 recipients of U.S. aid were among the 76 who voted against the U.S. position.

As just desserts for what it sees as such arbitrary actions, Congress has imposed more than 70 restrictions on who is eligible to receive U.S. aid. Factors which can land a country in the taboo category vary from failing to cooperate in narcotics control to seizure of U.S. fishing vessels in what the United States recognizes as international waters.

Warning from State

State Department experts warn that economic aid is simply not suited for short-term political goals. They say history offers no evidence that development dollars play much if any role at all in keeping down revolution and deterring communism or in encouraging democracy.

Communist Cuba and socialist Chile which together have taken in well over $1 billion in U.S. aid, largely in loans, in the past years are cases in point.

Expecting recipients to follow U.S. leadership in making their foreign-policy decisions is part of the same mold.

"Political criteria aren't reasonable at all," says Maurice J. Williams, deputy administrator of AID, pointing out that many aided countries are newly independent, and bowing to U.S. pressures is not one of the attributes they need to succeed.

"In personal relations, friendship can't be bought and if it can, it's often not worth it. Though a mutuality of interests may develop, our purpose is not to have satellites, not to create a new colonialism."

Long-range result

The only possible case for a political rub-off from an economic investment, experts say, is indirect and long range. Some suggest, for instance, that there may well be a correlation between the extensive U.S. aid given Korea's economy and educational system over the years, and the role of Korean intellectuals, thus exposed to the U.S. example, in forcing the resignation in 1960 of President Syngman Rhee whose government was considered by many to be both authoritarian and corrupt.

However, even when politics is laid aside in favor of strictly economic goals, problems persist.

One of the newer discoveries of development economists, which foreign aid critics have been quick to pick up, is the fact that the income gap between rich and poor in developing countries is widening rather than closing.

The result, as World Bank president Robert S. McNamara put it in a strong speech before the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development in Santiago this spring, is that while the national growth rates may be impressive, somehow the bottom half of the population is being left behind.

He said that the 10 percent in the lowest income category in India, for instance, is actually worse off, despite aid, than it was 20 years ago.

It is now generally agreed here that foreign aid in the past put too much emphasis on industrialization and economic growth and too little on the problems of income distribution and full employment in the labor-intensive developing countries.

Manufacturing has been growing at the rate of about 7 percent a year in these countries and industrial jobs at about half that rate. The international labor organization predicts that the combination unemployment and underemployment may reach an average of of 30 percent in the developing countries by 1980.

The problem often is not so much a lack or shortage of food, for instance, as the lack of ability to buy it.

"People think because someone is hungry, all you need to do is get production up," says one AID staffer. "Hunger isn't a production problem — it's a poverty problem. Sometimes it's more important that production [illegible] than increasing yields."

In general AID officials are well awa of the problem and are shifting their thru accordingly. Terms such as income redi tribution and full employment crop up ofte in speeches given by Dr. John Hannah, AI administrator and one of the most enthu astic aid proponents which the agency h ever had.

While the United States can exercise som direction in this area, often by its own e ample, the country in question must car fully choose the economic and social policie accompanying its growth for full effectiv ness.

"There's always been disparity of i come," says AID's Mr. Williams. "Ever man can't step into the modern secto simultaneously. Every man didn't get a fac tory job at once in the days of the indus trial revolution. It's what you do abou it — your policies — that are important."

While virtually everyone agrees that th rich-poor gap must be narrowed, the divi sion between critics is still sharp on an other economic point: the degree to whic the U.S. aid program helps or hurts the U.S. economy.

Paul Hoffman, long the head of the UN Development Program, is fond of saying that foreign aid is a misnomer. He argues that in view of the possibilities in creation of new jobs, adding to export earning and national security, the term is more aptly mutual assistance.

Church raps aid program

In his lengthy, much quoted speech on the Senate floor last October, Sen. Frank Church (D) of Idaho called the U.S. foreign-aid program "patently self serving" and charged it was a "spreading money tree under which the biggest American businesses find shelter."

He argues that U.S. interest in economic stability overseas is motivated primarily by Washington's wish to create a favorable climate for private investment and notes that with government insurance for such ventures, it is the American taxpayer who shoulders the burden.

AID officials find themselves somewhat torn on this point. To sell foreign aid to skeptical conservatives, they want to emphasize its potential in terms of new markets and trading partners. Yet the further they go, the more they draw fire on the same points from the Left. In compromise, they usually focus on such relatively innocuous [illegible] payback rate and the 20 percent share of U.S. exports which already go to [illegible]

In our own country, we stand in greater need of what we call conscience. Order is Heaven's first law; the Universe, with the infinity of celestial bodies, is regulated by law and maintained in order. The human creature on our own planet—as well as those which may inhabit any like orbs—is endowed with the faculty of reason; with faith, that is to say, reasoned hope; with the belief of the pure in heart that the soul shall have immortal being.

"Hats off to the past, and coats off to the future," must yet be the homely slogan.

I believe that mirth and music are material gifts from Heaven to Man, in compensation for the tragedies of life. Good thought and conduct constitute good morals. Evil is the exact opposite. If we transgress, we are punished, in one way or another.

All the qualities of humanity that are possessed of hope, faith, courage, diligence, reason, love of home and country, vision and noble ideals, must be exercised as indispensable labors in humanity's forward march. Apropos, the spirit of reverence and the Church must perform their necessary roles.

These observations are indeed trite. The multiplication table is trite, but reliance on the mathematics of Newton took the Astronauts to the moon, and thru the voids of space.

Our Baronial Order—whose members are decendants of sureties of A.D. 1215, has great opportunity for noble and patriotic service. It has also great responsibility, and, I believe, is meeting its obligations with fine dispatch.

The Magna Charta is a lengthy instrument of 61 articles. On June 12, 1215, it was adopted to hold in restraint, a cruel, despotic King John of England. Twenty-five sureties were named from the roster of Barons, to require the arbitrary King to pay allegiance to the Great Charter, which relates to benefits and property and other rights to the Barons, as well as the people in general.

Under the benefits conferred by Magna Charta, England, and the course of civil and religious liberty made lasting progress.

The next great document of liberty was the Mayflower Compact, adopted in November 1620 by the Pilgrims in Cape Cod Harbor. It was brief, but of essential character. It provided, in simple words, a comprehensive, organic and formal instrument enabling the establishment of Plimoth Plantation—on the Plymouth Rock site, binding equally on all; and assuring total equality, and to make all needed laws. Under it, the Pilgrims lived and prospered, with complete civil and religious liberty.

This modest compact proved to be the acorn which rooted and grew to the great oak of our Constitutional government, which we must uphold and sustain.

In conclusion, let me say, as did Tiny Tim in the immortal Christmas Story of Dickens, "Lord bless us all, each and everyone!"

CIA SMUGGLES OPIUM

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. ASPIN) is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. ASPIN. Mr. Speaker, I am releasing today substantial new evidence that indicates U.S. pilots flying CIA operated helicopters have been smuggling opium inside Laos.

What this new evidence indicates is that U.S. pilots using U.S.-owned planes are illegally smuggling opium in Laos, some of which has almost certainly been sold to U.S. GI's in Southeast Asia and some of which has almost certainly been smuggled into illicit U.S. drug markets.

I am releasing today a letter which I have received from Alfred McCoy, author of a forthcoming book on heroin traffic in Southeast Asia, which details the allegation of United States and CIA complicity in drug traffic. If these allegations are true, then the CIA is implicated in fostering the drug traffic that ruins the lives of tens of thousands of Americans.

According to the information Mr. McCoy has given me, a Laotian district chief and other officials have told him that American helicopters flew Meo officers into Laotian villages where they purchased opium. The opium was also transported out by American pilots and planes to Long Tieng, the CIA headquarters in Northern Laos where it was allegedly refined into morphine and eventually heroin.

The Meo tribesmen, as many of my colleagues know, had been recruited by the CIA and form a mercenary army which fights the Pathet Lao Communist guerrillas. For the Meo, opium is considered an important cash crop.

Mr. Speaker, I have asked CIA Director Richard Helms to thoroughly investigate Mr. McCoy's allegations. Since Mr. McCoy obtained his information late last summer it is imperative to determine whether this kind of drug trafficking is still going on. A principal, unanswered question which the CIA must resolve is "At what level in the CIA were officials aware of this illicit drug traffic?"

It is also becoming increasingly clear, Mr. Speaker, that the Nixon administration is covering up and contradicting itself about the importance of heroin traffic in Southeast Asia. After Mr. McCoy testified before a Senate committee last month the State Department termed his charges about the involvement of Government officials in Southeast Asia as "unsubstantiated." However, the U.S. Army Provost Marshal reported in 1971 that high ranking members of the South Vietnamese Government were in the top "zone" of the four-tiered heroin traffic pyramid.

Mr. McCoy, quite rightly, also disputes the State Department's claim that "Southeast Asia is not a major source of heroin on our market." This statement by the State Department directly contradicts a General Accounting Office report which states that:

> The Far East is the second principal source of heroin entering the U.S.

Mr. Speaker, it is imperative to determine whether the CIA is still involved in opium traffic and who was responsible for the alleged involvement of the CIA with the opium growers of Laos.

My letter to Mr. Helms follows:

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Washington, D.C., June 27, 1972.

Mr. RICHARD HELMS,
Director, Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. HELMS: I am publicly releasing today substantial new evidence that indicates that U.S. pilots flying CIA-operated helicopters have been smuggling opium inside Laos. These allegations are contained in a letter and additional information that I have received from Mr. Alfred McCoy, author of a forthcoming book on heroin traffic in Southeast Asia. If these allegations are true, then the CIA is implicated in fostering the drug traffic that ruins the lives of tens of thousands of Americans.

I am writing to you today to request that you thoroughly investigate Mr. McCoy's allegations. Since Mr. McCoy obtained his information last summer, it is imperative to determine whether this kind of drug trafficking is still going on. A principal unanswered question which the CIA must resolve is: "At what level in the CIA were officials aware of this illicit drug traffic?".

I hope that you will report to me in full the results of your investigation.

Thank you for your cooperation.

Sincerely,

LES ASPIN,
Member of Congress.

ROONEY REQUESTS HALF BILLION FOR RELIEF OF FLOOD RAVAGED STATES

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. ROONEY) is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. ROONEY of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, in the wake of probably the most destructive flood in America's history I have today announced that I will request an additional half billion dollars in Federal funds for relief in the five States which have been declared disaster areas by President Nixon.

The $92.5 million now available to the States in the President's disaster relief fund will not begin to compensate the losses suffered by the five States. If Pennsylvania were to receive the entire $92.5 million it would cover only about 10 percent of the cost of putting the State back together.

I have introduced legislation to provide relief funds in the amount of one-half billion dollars to the States which have been declared disaster areas by the President. This money would be disbursed by the Office of Emergency Preparedness whose primary function is the administration of the President's disaster relief fund. In past crises involving disaster areas in several States OEP has apportioned financial aid to the States according to the amount of damage sustained in the respective States. This is the only fair and realistic method of tackling the massive cleanup job ahead.

Pennsylvania, hardest hit by the flooding by a wide margin, would receive the lion's share of the supplemental appropriation, and Florida, having the least amount of damage of the five States, would receive the smallest portion. The remaining money would be distributed by OEP to Virginia, Maryland, and New York.

Other Members and I of the Pennsylvania delegation will meet with Governor Shapp today to discuss the crippling effects of the flood.

I hope to explore all avenues of Federal assistance with the Governor and arrive at some concrete goals with regard to the needs of the stricken Pennsylvania communities.

BEEF PRODUCERS GET SHORT END OF STICK

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Kansas (Mr. SKUBITZ) is recognized for 10 minutes.

Mr. SKUBITZ. Mr. Speaker, in my opinion the action the President took on

ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH
21 JUNE 1972

[redacted]

editorials:

From Bangkok To The West

One of the persistent scandals of the demoralizing war in Indochina is the growth of the illicit Asian narcotics traffic of which Americans are the principal victims and for which the United States Government must assume all too much of the blame. The situation is so tragic, and so blatant, that the House Foreign Affairs Committee has voted to cut off all aid to Thailand until its government moves to curb the export of opium.

The measure on which the committee voted was offered by Representatives Wolff of New York and Steele of Connecticut who have visited Thailand and who think that, to put it mildly, the Thais are not doing enough to stop the trade in opium. The substance reaches the United States in the form of heroin; Mr. Wolff says that as much as five tons of heroin, enough to supply the entire addict population of the U.S., leaves Thailand annually.

Of course Thailand is supposed to be a United States "ally" and is increasingly the seat of United States air power as American forces are withdrawn from Vietnam, and that is part of the trouble. Mr. Wolff has said that high-ranking Thai officials are involved in the drug traffic, and he has noted that while opium also comes from Cambodia and Laos these two countries do not have the ability to control it as Thailand does.

The connection of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency with the dope traffic in Laos has long been notorious. The big shot of the Laotian trade is Gen. Vang Pao, an unsavory character who for the last decade has been commander of the CIA's secret army in northeastern Laos. American diplomatic officials in Laos seem to look the other way; they have confined their recent efforts to promoting Laotian laws against opium addicts.

The United States has seven big air bases in Thailand. They have been absorbing units from Vietnam as efforts are made to comply with President Nixon's troop withdrawal schedules. One base, Nam Phong, is closer to Hanoi than the Da Nang airbase in South Vietnam which recently lost all its remaining fighter squadrons to bases in Thailand. The present announced total of U.S. military strength in South Vietnam, 54,000, does not include 42,000 men on naval ships in the Gulf of Tonkin and 50,000 airmen in Thailand and Guam.

So the U. S. presence in Thailand actually is growing and so is the opportunity for corrupt Thai officials to exploit the situation and develop the drug traffic. Bangkok has long been a center of activity in such international commodities as gold and jewels, and Mr. Wolff says that 11 trawlers now openly transport heroin and opium from Bangkok to Hong Kong. Presumably this comes from northeastern Burma, northern Thailand and northern Laos, the so-called Golden Triangle, and it could not be moved without official connivance.

We feel sure the Thais, who have an authoritarian government, could crack down on this dirty business if they had a mind to, and the United States ought to exert maximum pressure. The idea of cutting off military assistance can at least be clearly understood by the pragmatic Thais.

DAILY WORLD
27 JUN 1972

STATINTL [redacted]

STATINTL [redacted]

White House linked to raid on Dem center

By CONRAD KOMOROWSKI

WASHINGTON, June 26—Participants in the June 17 raid on national Democratic party headquarters here had direct links with the White House, Republican National Committee, Central Intelligence Agency and fascistic organizations of Cubans living in the U.S.

Disclosures have linked an organization of veterans of the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba with the White House and the raid on the Democratic headquarters.

The tentacles can be glimpsed of a long-term conspiracy to use terrorist gangs and individuals against "left-wing causes" in the U.S.

The raid on Democratic party headquarters—not at all a "left-wing" organization—shows how far this fascistic activity has gone.

Ties with the fascistic elements in the military reserve through the White House can be discerned.

Trail of CIA

The trail of the CIA is visible at all stages of the operations of these gangs. Members of the Ex-Combatientes Cubanos de Fort Jackson are reported to have met with "American friends" on "direct action to combat what they viewed as left-wing causes in the U.S.," according to Tad Szulc in the New York Times June 22.

The blundered attempt to bug Democratic party headquarters and to photograph files has revealed a festering cancer in the White House.

When Nixon moved into the White House he brought with him the baggage of the days when he introduced the first concentration camp bill in the history of Congress and helped create the period of McCarthyism.

McCord's links

James W. McCord, who was held on $30,000 bond after his arrest last Saturday, was at that time under contract as security coordinator to the Committee for Reelection of President Nixon headed by former Attorney General John N. Mitchell and of the Republican National Committee.

McCord was also a member of a 15-man unit of the Office of Emergency Plans and Preparedness, which is a part of the Executive Office of the President. Its job is witchhunting, the hunting out of dissenters and so-called "subversives" and planning of measures to deal with them.

The Cubans, who were recruited for subversive activities against Cuba, including the CIA-organized invasion, have been working with the United States Military Reserve unit, which operates under the Office of Emergency Plans and Preparedness in the White House.

Other direct links

These are not the only direct links. The name of E. Howard Hunt, Jr., was found in the address books of two of the participants in Saturday's raid. Hunt is a former CIA agent, who worked for it from 1949 to 1970. He was an associate of "Frank Bender" in the organization of the Bay of Pigs invasion, and has maintaind his connections with former Cubans. Hunt was a consultant at the White House in 1971 and in 1972 until at least March.

Two of the participants in the raid are connected with Ameritas, which is a wholly-owned subsidiary of the All-State Investment Fund, S.A., incorporated in Panama. Persons familiar with the revelations of CIA "fronts," through which funds are channeled and activity conducted, believe this setup has the same foul smell.

At his Thursday press conference, Nixon did not denounce the raid but confined his statement to: "This kind of activity . . . has no place whatever in our electoral process or in our government process."

The fact is that the connections of the participants in the raid with the White House, etc., show that "this kind of activity" does [illegible] although it should not. The history of surreptitious activity by governmental circles, both Democratic and Republican, as in the Bay of Pigs fiasco, the CIA activities in Laos and Cambodia, and the role of secret conspiracy in the Indochina war show that Nixon's statement is untrue.

WASHINGTON POST

21 JUN 1972

Senate Increases Israel Arms Aid; Other Cuts Stand

By Spencer Rich
Washington Post Staff Writer

The Senate voted $35 million in extra military aid for Israel yesterday but refused—on a 37 to 35 vote—to restore $245 million slashed from the administration's request for worldwide military aid.

The White House won a partial victory, however, when Sen. Clifford P. Case (R-N.J.) withdrew his provision barring the United States from financing CIA-directed Thai "volunteers" fighting Communists in Northern Laos.

The actions came in debate on the $1.7 billion foreign military aid authorization bill. Both sides in the dispute openly sought to lure support by promises of larger aid to Israel.

Sen. Church Fights Move

Minority Leader Hugh Scott (R-Pa.), acting for the administration, opened the fight by proposing to restore $245 million of the $550 million that was cut by the Foreign Relations Committee.

Scott said the funds were needed to help provide modernization of the Korean army, equipment for other Asian nations, and assistance to countries like Jordan.

But Sen. Frank Church (D-Idaho), who led the successful fight to beat the Scott amendment, said much of the military aid money simply goes "to supply authoritarian, dictatorial regimes with weapons which they want only for the purpose of holding their own people in check."

Included in the Scott package was $20 million for Israel, which was to be in addition to the $50 million in security supporting assistance and $300 million arms credits already earmarked for Israel in the committee bill.

Several senators said inclusion of the extra funds for Israel was an open attempt by the administration to push the rest of the $245 million through the Senate on the back of a popular increase in Israel aid.

An aide to Sen. Abraham A. Ribicoff (D-Conn.), who is Jewish and a supporter of aid for Israel, said the State Department had approached the senator's office a week ago with a promise to add $20 million for Israel if Ribicoff would help restore funds for the other countries—a deal which Ribicoff turned down.

Turns Tables on Scott

Church, also an ardent Israel supporter but a critic of aid to some other nations, turned the tables on Scott by outbidding him on the Israel issue. He offered a motion killing Scott's proposed $245 million overall boost but providing $35 million more for Israel than in the committee bill. In this way, pro-Israel senators could support more aid for Israel without taking the remainder of the $245 million package.

In the first of two votes on the issue, Scott's $245 million proposal was killed, 37 to 35, with both Virginia senators voting against Scott and both Maryland senators for him. Church's $35 million extra for Israel was then approved, 54 to 21, with J. Glenn Beall (R-Md.) the only Maryland or Virginia senator opposing it.

On the Laos issue, Case was persuaded that he didn't have the votes, despite strong support from Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.), who said the CIA is spending $100 million this year and $100 million next for its Northern Laos operations. So Case agreed to an amendment by Sen. Peter Dominick (R-Colo.) deleting Case's strong ban on U.S. financing of Thai volunteers in Laos.

However, another part of the same provision, prohibiting U.S. financing of troops from other countries fighting in Thailand at some future time, was retained.

Existing law already bars financing of third country mercenaries fighting in Laos, but the administration has said this doesn't apply to the Thais fighting in Northern Laos because they are volunteers. Symington called this an utter fake yesterday, saying staff members he'd sent to Laos were told by the alleged volunteers, "I was ordered to come here."

be done by the military attachés in the Embassy.

Mr. JAVITS. I thank the Senator.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. JAVITS. I yield.

Mr. SPARKMAN. I am glad the Senator brought that up. As a matter of fact, I was going to bring it up.

Of course, the Senator knows that the managers on the part of the Senate do not file a report or a statement. The managers on the part of the House do.

I am certain that the Senator will agree with me that their statement does not necessarily constitute law. That just happens to be a unilateral interpretation that they have given to this, and we certainly had nothing of this in mind. In fact, I believe it was clearly stated in our discussions in the committee that this work would be handled by aides out of the Embassy.

Mr. JAVITS. That is the important point.

Mr. SPARKMAN. They have it, for one thing, in the latter part, where it refers to training Cambodians in South Vietnam. There is nothing in the measure that would point this up or that would dispute it. It is my understanding that we are doing that now. This measure, as I interpret it, does not affect that.

Mr. JAVITS. I should like to say to the Senator that I support the conference report, that I think they have rendered the country a great service in settling this matter.

I understand Senator AIKEN's worries, and I agree with him. But I believe that, as we talked originally in an effort to settle this matter, when things lean on each other, they probably will work out. We have many other recourses if they do not.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Speaking of these reports, I think it is understandable that reports of different kinds and rumors get out. During the last several days, under the management of our coach and general manager, we have had many conferences—sometimes several conferences in the same day—and it is very easy for rumors or reports to get out which do not necessarily state the true conditions.

Mr. JAVITS. I think it is important for the Senate that Senator SPARKMAN and Senator MANSFIELD express it authoritatively, that this language does not indicate the existence of any understanding that there will be a MAG; but, on the contrary, that an understanding does exist that if any military personnel are required, it will be personnel operating out of the military section of the embassy.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Of course, the effect of a statement such as this, or a statement by one of us, if we made it, would affect the legislation only in the event that it is ambiguous. I do not think the proposed legislation is ambiguous. Certainly, we threshed it out thoroughly on the floor of the Senate when we were debating the measure. I think it is clear and can be understood easily.

Mr. JAVITS. I think the Senator has made a fine record on it, and I thank him very much.

Mr. President, the situation seems to have turned out quite differently from what we intended. In this regard, let me quote briefly from a recent report of the Foreign Relations Committee:

On January 31, 1971, a Military Equipment Delivery Team Cambodia (MEDTC) was formed to administer the program. The Chief of the MEDTC and his staff were located in Saigon, but 16 and later an additional 7 MEDTC officers were stationed in Phnom Penh. In July 1971, the MERTC Chief, a Brigadier General, moved to Phnom Penh, and the MERTC element in Cambodia was raised to its present strength. In Phnom Penh, there are now 43 MEDTC personnel (50 are authorized and up to 12 more have been approved by the Executive Branch). There are 63 other MEDTC personnel at MACV in Saigon. Of the 12 new personnel, 4 will be used to monitor third-country national contracts (50 additional third-country nationals will be hired to train Cambodians in logistics), 4 to monitor training, 3 to be assigned to help advise on port operations at Kompong Som and 1 will be a fiscal specialist who will monitor the military uses portion of the Public Law 480 agreements (these agreements are discussed below).

Although American military personnel in the MEDTC seem to be acutely aware of the prohibition against their acting as advisors or participants in the planning and execution of tactical operations, they are nevertheless deeply involved as advisors or organizers in activities such as force planning, military budgeting, logistics and training. As noted above, 11 of the 12 new MEDTC personnel will be involved in logistics and training activities.

I have heard that the spirit of the law has been stretched even further in that U.S. military personnel who are training Cambodian troops in South Vietnam sometimes accompany those Cambodian forces back to Cambodia, and at the border these U.S. trainers become members of MEDTC. If this is so, I question whether it is not tantamount to a violation of the law.

I know we are at war, and I am in favor of supporting the South Vietnamese financially, assuming they can remain viable. I know that could include ARVN military actions in Cambodia. I have no objection per se to that, Mr. President; and I believe that is probably the generality of opinion in the Senate.

But that is a very different thing from backing into a war by getting involved ourselves in Cambodia, whether directly or indirectly through advisers or in some other way, so that we inevitably somehow acquire a "national commitment," and it is said the national "honor" is at stake, as the President has expressed it, or his honor as President is at stake, and the powers of his office. We get all involved in our own dialectic, and next thing you know you have had it, you are in another Vietnam fighting to honor another "commitment."

Mr. President, I make these remarks only by way of expressing the hope that provisions such as the ones addressed by Senator DOMINICK's amendment may be obviated by a much closer relation, between the appropriate committees of Congress, in this case, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. I do not relish the idea of locking this into law, which does have a tendency to put U.S. policy in something of a bind—Senator DOMINICK and his associates are strongly calling our attention to that, and I understand it perfectly—but it is brought about by a long-standing and long proceeding series of events which erode a sense of feeling on the part of those who have responsibility to the Senate for foreign policy, insofar as we ourselves participate in it, that they really know what is going on.

As regards the Cambodia situation, I am considering whether there is an appropriate amendment to introduce to clear up the anomolies and ambiguities I have discussed.

Mr. President, I hope very much it is in this area that we can make the most progress, and can be instructed by what has here occurred, in showing how urgently necessary it is that we be informed.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, will someone yield me 3 or 4 minutes?

Mr. DOMINICK. I am happy to yield to the Senator from Kentucky.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, first I wish to ask a question of the distinguished Senator from Colorado. Does the Senator's amendment strike subsection (b) on page 8 also?

Mr. DOMINICK. Yes, it does.

Mr. COOPER. I am glad it does, because even if we had to vote on the total section, I intended to ask that (a) and (b) be severed for a separate vote. I do not believe we have a constitutional right to require the President of the United States to provide the Congress to report, at least in advance, on detailed military operations.

But to go to the subject which the Senator from New York (Mr. JAVITS) has just been ably discussing.

I should like to point out that we learned—I am sure that some Members of the Senate knew before—sometime in 1967 and 1968 about our operations in Laos. These operations began in 1962 or 1963 under the administration of President Kennedy, and have continued since that time.

I recall that on August 12, 1968, I offered an amendment to prohibit the use of any U.S. forces in support of Thailand or Laos, to prevent the expansion of the Vietnam war, excluding Cambodia, because at that time Cambodia was considered a neutral country. The amendment was adopted unanimously by the Senate, although we were told at that time by Senator STENNIS that Secretary Laird had reported that it was not of any effect. Later I discovered why it was not—because my use of the term "U.S. Forces" evidently did not include the use of CIA forces.

I support the modification of the Senator from Colorado, but I do want to point out a contradictory position. Evidently, we are supporting this amendment because we are at war and operations are going on in Laos which we are not willing to interrupt because we are at war, and evidently because we consider it would endanger our forces, whether CIA in Laos or regular U.S. forces in South Vietnam, are not willing to strike all funds for Laos and to stop this operation.

I simply point out that it is contradictory to adopt this kind of measure with respect to Laos, and to vote then for an amendment to take our troops out of Vietnam by August 31, 1972, where they are certainly at war and could be greatly endangered by a sudden evacuation. I have supported most of such proposals, with the exception of the Hatfield-McGovern amendments and then because of my opposition to a fixed date I have always believed that the flat and clear way is to adopt an amendment which says, "Take all our forces out. Stop the war and prohibit funds except for withdrawal." I have believed there would be a greater possibility of getting prisoners of war back and of having a peaceful settlement. The situation since the massive attack by North Vietnam has

CHICAGO, ILL.
SUN-TIMES
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M - 536,108
S - 709,123

Secret U.S. air base in Thailand prepares for bombers

By Peter Smith
Special from Pacific News Service

NAM PHONG, Thailand — The new U.S. Air Force installation here at Nam Phong, in northeast Thailand, was secretly constructed during the last three years, but has been dormant for about 14 months.

That has changed now as a mass of Air Force and Navy seabee personnel arrived at the base to prepare it for the influx of fighter-bombers pulling out of South Vietnam.

(On Tuesday, the Marine Corps commandant said Marine A-6 Intruder planes began operating Tuesday from Nam Phong, where the corps is moving its air operations from Da Nang, South Vietnam. Gen. Robert E. Cushman Jr. said the shift was "part of the move to get out of Vietnam, to get a base that's more secure." Cushman's was the first official acknowledgment of how Nam Phong would be used.)

Unlike all other American air bases in Thailand, which are near population centers and in plain view, the base at Nam Phong is in a sparsely populated, heavily wooded area. A secondary road leading off the Kon Kaen-Udorn Mitrapob (Friendship) Highway goes past the entrance road to the base, which is out of sight, about three miles to the south on the other side of a small hill.

View of base, facilities

Although newsmen are barred from the base, I was able to gain access to it and observe the activities. At present, aside from its massive 10,000-foot main runway, the air base includes only taxi strips, a small loading and unloading area, and perhaps a dozen or so barracks and office buildings. Already, however, all the communications and radar equipment necessary for putting the base on at least a temporary operational footing have been shipped in and set up in the woods around the main strip. Giant C-141 Air Force cargo jets bringing in this and other equipment have been seen landing as often as once an hour. Reminiscent of many air strips in Vietnam, temporary pumping stations, rows of earth embankments holding rubber bladders, have been constructed to fuel the many planes expected to arrive in the next few weeks.

Hundreds of marines and Navy seabees lounge in the barracks areas of the tent cities set up to house them or work in the new storage yards where the massive amount of incoming Air Force equipment in crates and seabee construction material was being sorted out and deposited, awaiting later use. Several Thai civilian contractors have already come up from Bangkok with earth-moving equipment. They intend to start clearing almost immediately to make way for the aircraft maintenence and parking areas and for the many administrative buildings that the base will require to become fully operational.

The base is divided into two parts. The first comprises the main air strip and related buildings and is entirely American-operated. Later, when the construction is completed, this part of the base will be turned over to the Royal Thai Air Force, according to Thai press sources. But this is only a convenient formality that will allow Americans to give guard duty and responsibilities to the Thais, and let them fly the Thai flag, while leaving effective control in their own hands.

Big personnel increase

The second part of the base, separated from the first, is a secret camp used to support the classified ground war being conducted by the CIA-financed and controlled army of Gen. Vang Pao in northern Laos. At this camp, Thai "volunteers" who fight in Laos are trained and garrisoned.

The opening of the Nam Phong base, which brings to seven the number of U.S. Air Force installations in operation in Thailand, was necessitated by the Nixon administration's need to relocate Air Force and Marine fighter-bomber squadrons being pulled out of Vietnam. While troop strength in Vietnam has been reduced from 61,000 to 43,000 over the last three months in line with troop withdrawal policy, the number of Air Force personnel in Thailand has been increased from 32,000 to 46,000. Recently the air base at Takli was reopened and is now in full operation, with four wings of Phantom jets and 3,000 airmen. The giant air base at Utapao, south of Bangkok, has received 50 or more additional B-52s since the beginning of the current air-war build-up.

Out by the gate, while one of their buddies was over buying soda from the Thai shopkeepers who have already opened small stores across from the main entrance, several U.S. marines were standing around. They stood just inside the gate, evidently observing a restriction that no Americans are allowed off post. I walked up and asked them if this was the new air base the Americans were building, and was greeted with the paranoia typical of soldiers well coached on saying nothing to anybody about anything. "Which base?" one asked back. I volunteered that I had been sitting across the street for a half-hour watching aircraft landing at the strip just down the road.

"Yes, this is the new base," offered another. "But who are you? Do you have any identification? The base is highly classified and we can't talk to anybody about it." Soon their buddy arrived in the truck with his load of soda, and all the marines piled on and drove off. Apparently they were part of an advance party that preceded the main group coming in from bases in Vietnam.

Peter Smith served with the U.S. Special Forces as a sergeant in Vietnam. He trained for a year in Thailand.

Asian Allies Help Cut Heroin Traffic

By MIRIAM OTTENBERG
Star Staff Writer

U.S. narcotics agents are making a sizable dent in the Southeast Asian dope traffic and—despite reports to the contrary — America's Asian allies and the CIA are helping them do it.

"We have seriously damaged the program of the narcotics traffickers," reported John Warner, chief of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs' strategic intelligence office. "It's becoming increasingly more difficult for them to operate, even though their profits are tremendous."

Warner countered testimony given recently by Alfred W. McCoy, a Ph.D student, before a Senate Appropriations subcommittee to the effect that the governments of South Vietnam, Laos and Thailand are actively engaged in the heroin traffic and that the U.S. government has not moved to stop it.

"Corruption," Warner acknowledged, "is a way of life in Southeast Asia. It reaches to all levels. But the United States government has made it perfectly clear to all governments in the area that we will not compromise on the narcotics issue."

He cited as an example of increasing cooperation on instance earlier this year when 26 tons of opium were turned over to the government of Thailand by one of the insurgent forces along its border—presumably for reasons of its own.

Until recently, the opium would have found its way back into the traffic. But this

Second of 2 Articles

time, it was burned in the presence of American narcotics agents and samples were taken and analyzed by American chemists.

Even more significant are recent successes of Laos and Thai narcotics investigative units set up with U.S. aid.

Warner explained how they came into being and, in doing so, replied to the charges made by McCoy in his Congressional appearance.

McCoy had charged that the U.S. ambassador to Laos, G. McMurtrie Godley, "did his best to prevent the assignment" of U.S. narcotics agents to Laos.

Actually, Warner said, Godley has been one of the staunchest supporters of the anti-narcotics program in Laos, and requested U.S. narcotics agents as advisers long before they could be sent there. He was instrumental in persuading Laos to outlaw the opium traffic, Warner said.

Godley also persuaded the Laotian government to appoint an honest and competent general to head the new narcotics investigative unit which the U.S. Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs established and trained, Warner added.

In the short time the unit has been operational, Warner reported, it has made tremendous progress in arresting traffickers and seizing laboratory equipment and the chemicals used to make heroin.

The unit's latest score came on June 7 when it arrested a Meo deputy of the Laotian parliament and seized 10 kilos of No. 4 heroin (the injectable kind), 26 kilos of opium and a number of U.S. Army carbines.

Another special investigative force, trained and equipped by BNDD agents, has just gotten under way at Chingmai in northern Thailand. Chingmai is a road junction in the network of roads leading south to Bangkok.

It's particularly important to U.S. narcotics agents because they hope there to halt the movement of heroin out of the "Golden Triangle," the opium growing area bordering Laos, Burma and Thailand.

The new Thai unit has just scored its first success. On June 10, a joint BNDD and Thai task force raided a compound and seized 1,600 kilos of raw opium and processing equipment, he said.

Warner also reported that the Royal Hong Kong police also have stepped up their anti-narcotics program, making large seizures of narcotics, arresting traffickers and seizing two laboratories this year. At the time, both labs had quantities of heroin, opium and morphine base.

Burma, the other government touched by the opium traffic, has expressed its willingness to cooperate, Warner reported, but Burmese officials frankly admit their control over the border areas are very tenuous. It would require an army to make any impact on the border areas where insurgent forces protect the opium traffickers, Warner said.

In Laos an acknowledged impartant trafficker has been knocked out of business not by an army but by American diplomacy, Warner said.

Gen. Ouane Rattikone, former chief of staff of the Royal Laotian Army, had consolidated several opium refineries into one, and with his army, controlled and protected the Laotian narcotics traffic for years, Warner said.

"He was forced to retire in July, 1971. We have political clout in the area and Ambassador Godley exerted it."

Warner said similar action would be taken against Vietnamese figures if charges of narcotics trafficking were proven.

"Politics means nothing to us in BNDD," he said. If we had the evidence . . . the President would be informed and I know something would be done about it.

McCoy had said in is congressional testimony that the political apparatus of Gen. Nguyen Cao Ky (the former president of South Vietnam) "demonstrates the importance of official corruption in Southeast Asia's drug traffic." McCoy also said Ky's sister is tied in with heroin smuggling.

Warner, however, said there is no evidence that Ky is involved.

McCoy, in his Senate testimony, said he had briefed BNDD on his findings and they corrobated much of his evidence. Asked about that, Warner said he had seen nothing of an evidentiary nature from McCoy "other than gossip, rumors, conjecture and old history."

McCoy had accused the CIA of providing substantial military support to mercenaries, rebels and warlords actively engaged in the narcotics traffic and of letting aircraft it chartered be used to transport opium harvested by the mercenaries.

Of those charges, Warner said the American-chartered aircraft now have security forces guarding against the against the transport of any narcotics.

Since President Nixon asked the CIA to assist in dealing with the Southeast Asian narcotics problem, Warner said, the CIA has been one of the most cooperative government agencies working with BNDD to develop the information on which BNDD and its foreign counterparts can act to interdict the traffic and make cases.

The weeding out of Asian officials heavily involved in the dope traffic, as well as the strikes against the traffickers themselves, are all fairly recent. And so is the BNDD involvement in the Pacific.

It's only in the last two years that American narcotics agents have come into the Orient in force. Since BNDD Director John E. Ingersoll pushed for more agents to fight the Pacific traffic in drugs, regional offices have been set up in Bangkok, Siagon and Tokyo, and district offices in Chingmai, Vientiane, Kuala Lumpur, Singapore, Hong Kong, Okinawa and Manila.

PORTLAND, ME.
PRESS-HERALD
M - 56,603
TELEGRAM
S - 108,947

JUN 18 1972

Hathaway Asks CIA Watchdog

Congressman William D. Hathaway said Saturday he will introduce a bill Monday to give Congress the means to oversee operations of the Central Intelligence Agency.

In making the announcement from his Portland headquarters, the second district representative said, "It is essential that the elected representatives of the American people have the right and perform the duty of overseeing the activities and expenditures of the CIA ... as they do with all government agencies."

"In addition to running an extensive spy network worldwide, the agency gives money and technical assistance to secret military and political operations which often run counter to U.S. foreign policy."

Hathaway cited the war in Laos as an example which, he said, "the CIA was financing to the tune of several hundred million dollars a year long before it was public knowledge."

The Congressman, who is seeking the Democratic nomination for the Senate seat now held by Sen. Margaret Chase Smith, said his proposal would establish a joint committee on foreign information and intelligence for the House and Senate.

CHICAGO TRIBUNE

[redacted]

CIA-Backed Commando Raids into N. Viet Told

BY WAYNE THOMIS
[Aviation Editor]
[Chicago Tribune Press Service]

SAIGON, Viet Nam, June 14—Hanoi broadcasts infrequently mention "works of saboteurs" in North Viet Nam's panhandle, and Saigon's vernacular press occasionally report odd little aircraft accidents with nonmilitary planes in mountainous regions of Laos, Northwestern South Viet Nam, and sometimes in Northeastern Thailand.

These are mere peeks by the general public at a tremendous submerged "iceberg" of clandestine operations continuously and now increasingly carried out against the Communist North.

These actions probably never will be disclosed in full detail but it can be said responsibly that today they constitute an important phase of this Southeast Asia battle.

It is a silent war. It is carried out by special forces and by mercenaries. It is a hit-and-run war in which units are airlifted or sea borne deep into North Viet Nam for demolition missions, for seizure of prisoners, for probing forays, and—it now is understood—for accumulation of information on American prisoner of war camp locations.

This type of action has been taking place in the North Vietnamese panhandle from the Demilitarized Zone to well north of Vinh during the last 60 days.

An increasing series of such raids have come from the seacoasts and from helicopter airbridge links in Laos and Thailand to points where damage can be done or information obtained from the North Vietnamese, it was learned from reliable sources.

Communist broadcasts from Hanoi in the past have used "saboteur" in an ideoligical sense. Now they are referring to actual dynamitings by these raiders. They specialize in targets which are too difficult for bombers to identify from the air, or are too well hidden to be spotted by aerial photography. They also carry out a traffic in agents not otherwise possible under present conditions.

Size, Duration Vary

Reports filtering from Central Intelligence Agency and associates military establishments indicate such raids may vary from 20 to several hundred men. They may stay in North Viet Nam from a few minutes to 24 hours.

Mercenaries enlisted for such secret actions include Europeans, Chinese, Malays, Japanese and Americans. The operations are carefully planned and surrounded by the tight security.

The CIA now believes the large-scale American attempt to free prisoners from a camp near Hanoi a year ago failed because of a security leak which resulted in a prisoner shift.

The raiders are heavily armed. Not one operation has failed, and none of the raiders have been trapped, according to informed sources.

Casualties among these special forces have been low. Pay scales are said to be "quite high" and morale among these specialists in demolition, electronics sabotage, and interrogation is very high. The men regard themselves as an elite corps.

Financed by CIA

The mysterious, CIA-financed Air America civil flying fleet seems to operate on a supernational basis across Cambodian, Thai, Laotian, and South Vietnamese borders. It has had a part in some of this work. However, much of the work is being done by military detachments, temporarily posted to the special forces.

The military establishment here generally attempts to suppress mention of this side of the war for a number of reasons, with security against enemy knowledge being the least important. The North Vietnamese are fully aware of the nature of the CIA-directed and financed special operations.

It is known that after each such raid all civilians and military personnel in the North who have had contact with the raiders are subjected to rigorous and lengthy questioning by Communist secret police and political commisars.

The U. S. forces seek to hide the clandestine side of the war to prevent embarassment to Thai, Cambodian, and Laotian governmental departments.

It is recognized by American leaders that such concealment is merely "token" but is required in certain diplomatic [illegible] countries fringing South Viet Nam maintain.

THE MIAMI HERALD
16 June 1972

[redacted]

STATINTL

Silent War Stepped Up In Vietnam

Saboteurs Harass North's Panhandle

By WAYNE THOMIS
Miami Herald-Chicago Tribune Wire

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WASHINGTON POST

1972

[redacted]

U.S. Air-Drops Asian Guerrillas

Saboteurs Raid N. Vietnam

By D. E. Ronk
Special to The Washington Post

VIENTIANE, Laos, June 14—Use of Laotian territory and specially recruited Asian mercenaries for CIA-sponsored espionage and sabotage missions in North Vietnam has been confirmed here by American sources close to the operation.

The missions are originating from a number of small mountaintop sites in northern Laos within 30 miles of the North Vietnamese border. The guerrilla troops are transported by unmarked Air America planes.

The existence of the guerrilla missions inside North Vietnam was first reported in Saigon earlier this week. Such missions were known to have been initiated in early 1960s, but were not regarded at the time as very effective and were apparently suspended after the 1968 bombing halt.

Highly trained mountain tribesmen from northern Laos and some Thai mercenaries with long experience in special operations are said here to make up the teams. Most of the guerrillas are said to speak Vietnamese, some fluently.

Officially, the Air America management in Vientiane is unaware that the company's pilots or planes are flying such missions. Air America is a quasi-private airline under contract with U.S. government agencies.

Pilots used on the espionage-sabotage mission flights are carefully selected and receive special pay for hazardous duty by a "white envelope system." This means that the money received is not accountable or traceable, even for tax purposes, sources say.

Official U.S. spokesmen in Vientiane decline to comment on the operation, but information pieced together from American and [illegible] here indicates that virtually inaccessible CIA-maintained bases in Laos are used to train, house, and transport the guerrillas.

Nam Yu, the CIA's most secret base in Laos, situated in northwestern Laos near the town of Ban Houei Sai, is reported to be the primary training center.

Nam Yu was formerly a base for intelligence teams being sent into South China to report on telephone and road traffic, a program discontinued last year when President Nixon accepted an invitation to visit China.

From Nam Yu, the guerrillas are moved to the Long Cheng area 80 miles north of Vientiane where they continue to train, making forays into the surrounding mountains inside Laos on lower-level reconnaissance missions for seasoning and practical experience in avoiding capture and inflicting harm on Communist forces.

Many of the potential North Vietnamese infiltrators are "weeded out" during this training period, sources say.

Resident newsmen here have been unable to visit Long Cheng in recent months.

Jump-off points for the guerrillas are considerably east and northeast of Long Cheng, according to the sources, most being tiny hilltop positions hardly known to exist. A major point of departure is said to be at Bouam Long, sometimes called "the fortress in the sky," about 40 miles northeast of Long Cheng, a base the Communists have never been able to wrest from its Meo defenders.

Practical training exercises are also conducted at Bouam Long. Communist radio broadcasts frequently note the presence, capture or killing of commandos from Bouam Long in the Sam Neua area of northeast Laos. Caves in nearby mountains contain the headquarters of the Communist-supported Laotian rebels.

The highest priority, however, is given to missions that move into North Vietnam where they conduct sabotage, espionage and propaganda missions in that country's least inhabited and defended areas. Precise information on targets and types of guerrilla action is not available here.

It is known, however, that the CIA is distrustful of many claims made by the guerrilla infiltrators and frequently equips the units with cameras so they can photograph themselves at targets. The photographs prove the missions were carried out, and provides intelligence data for CIA analysts.

Each mission uses at least one specially equipped twin-engine Otter plane, said to carry half a million dollars worth of radio and electronic gear for pinpoint navigation and locating of ground forces. Because of the twin Otter's virtual silent operation as it passes close over the ground, its short take-off and landing capability, and the load it can carry, its basic function has been the clandestine insertion, pickup and resupply of guerrilla missions.

There are also reports of guerrillas being snatched from enemy-occupied territory by a hook dangling from rescue aircraft. The guerrilla on the ground inflates a large balloon with lighter-than-air gas, attaches it to a thin line which is then attached to a harness he fastens to himself. The rescue craft passes over the balloon, hooks on and hauls him up.

Qualified sources here say, meantime, that they believe that such espionage missions will be increased in northern Laos, and may be resumed inside China itself, to sabotage war material that—because of the mining of Haiphong—is expected to flow increasingly through China's Yunan Province and the Laotian Province of Phong Saly on its way into North Vietnam.

WASHINGTON STAR
15 JUN 1972 STATINTL

Laos Finally Starts to Train Regular Army

By TAMMY ARBUCKLE
Special to The Star

PHOU KHOA KWAI, Laos — In this rough mountain valley, 40 miles northeast of Vientiane, Laos has finally begun training its regular army after 14 years of almost continuous warfare against North Vietnam and the pro-Communist Pathet Lao.

"If Laos is ever going to have an army it's going to have to train soldiers," an informed military man said as he explained the setting up of this Lao training school, the first of its kind in the nation.

Laos has never trained its royal army, the right-wing fighting force, before for two very sound reasons.

These are, first, nowhere in Laos is safe from Communist attack apart from the capital, Vientiane, which is politically protected by the presence of a Communist garrison. Vientiane, in the flat, heavily-populated plain, is unsuitable for training, however.

Dramatic Example

This Communist attack ability was dramatically demonstrated at the school May 19 when over 100 Neo-Communist troop overran Phou Khao Kwai. Fourteen Lao trainees were killed, 13 seriously wounded and 15 are missing. Communists threw satchel charges into buildings, blew up generators and ran through instructors' huts shooting them up.

No instructors were killed. Along with two American military advisors who handle the school's logistics, they lay in fields and ditches and fought back and the Communists pulled out.

The second point is that most of the fighting in Laos is done by Lao and Thai irregular forces trained in Thailand or in CIA-run camps in southern Laos. These irregulars, often recruited from the royal army, are paid directly by Americans and come under a different command system.

According to a report by Richard M. Moose and James G. Lowenstein, investigators for U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, published in May, royal Lao army regulars kill fewer enemy troops in combat than the irregulars: 1,160 enemy in 1971 compared to 4,544 killed by irregulars in the same year. The royal Lao army had only 557 men killed in 1971 compared to the Lao irregular death toll of 2,259 in the same year, the report says. With low-level participation in war by regulars and a high level of corruption in the army, Americans tended to try to build a separate army rather than improve the existing one.

Now with the U.S. cutting back its role in Southeast Asia, American officials here feel regulars should be trained to irregular standards and the two forces merged eventually into one competent army.

Volunteers Dwindle

Also, the supply of Thai volunteers is dwindling as more of them are killed in Laos. Thais are political liability because of U.S. congressional distaste over their being funded by the United States while Thais are fighting for mostly mercenary motives.

The seriously deteriorating military situation in Thailand and a change in world political alignments are causing Thais to take a close look at their role as allies of United States.

The Lao military is happy with the school here. They say they were treated as second-class citizens while being trained in Thailand and they could not understand why they had Thai instructors anyway as Thais have done little fighting compared to Laotians. Military sources, however, point out the training here has "a long way to go" before regulars can reach irregular standards.

The school is set in a long, narrow valley overlooked by rocky bluffs.

There is a dirt airstrip capable of taking American medium-sized transports. Lao army engineers have constructed six barrack blocks, two stories each, from teak trees in the valley. The damage wrought by the Communist satchel charges has already been repaired. U.S. funds have constructed a new concrete headquarters to replace one burnt by the Communists.

The school can train 600 men at one time, but presently has only 440, all recruits. The school is divided into three sections: infantry training, a 10-week course; artillery training, some courses long as six months; and commando training, a course which has not yet started.

Realistic Training

Instructors are young first lieutenants and captains, all of whom have had combat experience in Laos and trained in Thailand and the U.S. Two officers also have been to Australian jungle warfare school.

Infantry school training is realistic as recruits from the first have to patrol to protect their camp from real life Red Guerrillas. They are taught how to shoot at stationary and pop-up targets before assignment to a combat unit. They also learn small unit tactics.

More important, perhaps, recruits are given a literacy test at school. Those who can't write, usually 60 to 80 percent of the intake, are given six hours a week of classes to learn reading and writing which followed up by a "good citizenship" course to provide some sort of motivation and explain why the nation is at war with North Vietnam.

Artillery Exam

Tolay at Phou Khao Kwai is examination day for the artillerymen, before they are assigned to combat units. The exam takes place in a grass and bamboo classroom.

Young peasant boys aged 13 to 20 jostle each other shyly as the examining officer calls each candidate in turn to enter the classroom. Once in the doorway the recruit snaps to attention, gives his name, the number of the course and such while his hand quiver in a salute.

"Do you know how to use this?" the examining officer says, showing a rangefinder.

"No sir," says the recruit. The officer sighs while sergeants taking down scores giggle. The officer works his way through three mechanical aids in fire control for artillery until the recruit shows he can use one and gives a demonstration of his ability.

Unusual Feature

Today at Phou Khao Kwai is feature. Its afternoon schedule starts at 1:30 p.m. while the royal army does not function until 3 p.m. in the rest of Laos.

The location of the school in this picturesque, cool valley has caused some hardship to local Meo tribesmen. Many of them have been shifted to the hot Vientiane Plain to cultivate paddy rice. Lao military men say that with firing ranges in the valley, particularly the artillery ranges, there would have been some danger to the local population. Also, training camp security had to be taken into account as some Meo support Communists operating as part time guerrillas. Laos admit there were Meo objections to the camp's installation, but their removal is called an "obligation" for country's needs. Meo tribesmen in Phou Khao Kawai long had a reputation for hostility to the Meo comander, Gen. Vang Pao and Laotians, who they accuse of trying to take over their valley.

NEW YORK TIMES BOOK REVIEW

[redacted]

Foreign policy—peace through war, truth through lies

Roots of War

By Richard J. Barnet.
350 pp. New York. Atheneum. $10.

By RONALD STEEL

For the past three decades one President after another has been telling us that we must make the world safe for America. F.D.R. preached the Four Freedoms, Harry Truman dropped the atomic bomb, Ike and Dulles set up a global system of bases, J.F.K. told us we were the "watchmen on the walls" of freedom, L.B.J. warned us that others wanted what we have, and Nixon seeks respect for his office by B-52 raids on small Asian states. Security through terror, peace through war, truth through lies: this has been the model for United States foreign policy for nearly two generations.

Richard Barnet argues in this provocative and disturbing study of the Thirty Years' War waged in the name of peace that instead of trying to make the world safe for America we should be looking for a way to make America safe for the world. It is not our enemies, he maintains, but we ourselves who are the greatest threat to world peace, pursuing what we insist is our national interest by "spreading death, terror, and destruction," and behaving in a way that America is "surpassed by none in the fear and hatred it has inspired around the world."

Since 1940, Barnet argues, the external business of the United States has been war and preparation for war. We have the world's most powerful military force, maintain some 400 major overseas installations, have waged two land wars in Korea and Vietnam, and have intervened either through the C.I.A. or with our own troops from Guatemala and Cuba to Lebanon and Laos. Until Vietnam we assumed that the feeding of a permanent war machine was the price we had to pay for living in a threatening world.

"We are the Number One nation," Lyndon Johnson said as he was devastating Vietnam, "and we are going to stay the Number One nation." But the price of being the world's Number One military interventionist is getting to be more than the country can support. Inflation is rampant, unemployment is persistent, the balance of payments is disastrous, the vaults at Fort Knox are emptying, and the public mood is turning from disenchantment to confusion and even to an ugly search for authoritarian order. The world is not going the way we want it to, and—judging from President Nixon's kiss-and-make-up visits to Peking and Moscow—maybe the menace is not so terrible as we were told it was all these years. If not, what is the purpose of murder in Indochina and the most gargantuan war machine the world has ever seen?

This is the question that many are beginning to ask, but few have approached it with the incisiveness and originality shown by Richard Barnet. Drawing on his experience in government and his work at the Institute for Policy Studies, which he founded in Washington 10 years ago with Marcus Raskin and has helped transform into a brains trust of the radical left, he has looked at foreign policy from the inside. Instead of asking how we responded to external threats, he tries to find out what it is about our society that led us to create situations that would justify the wars of intervention, why for three decades we have been organized for war.

Barnet is not the first to view foreign policy as an outgrowth of domestic policy. But the special value of his book lies in his examination of the domestic political, economic, and social forces that determine that amorphous thing we call the national interest. For the élite who have evolved our foreign policy, that national interest demands war, the threat of war and the preparation for war. "War is primarily the product of domestic social and economic institutions," Barnet insists, and those who control these institutions decide which threats are important enough to justify war.

In Barnet's schema the roots of war are three-fold: the concentration of power in a national security bureaucracy that plays by rules of its own making and is largely self-perpetuating; the capitalist economy and the business creed that sustains it; and the vulnerability of the public to manipulation on national security issues. To get the roots of war means more than just a change of leaders or of policy. It means sweeping institutional changes within the society: shrinking and controlling the bureaucracy, eschewing the growth mystique that feeds economic expansion and military interventions, and making the public aware of how it is directly affected by the decisions of the élite. Only in this way, he believes, can the United States "renounce militarism and war as primary instruments of policy and accommodate its fears and appetites to the postimperial world."

The centerpiece of Barnet's argument is his dissection of the national security bureaucracy, an organization that permits individuals to "get medals, promotions and honors by committing the same acts for the state for which they would be hanged or imprisoned in any other circumstance." These men are able to commit what he calls "bureaucratic homicide, "because their official roles insulate them from personal responsibility for their actions. They direct the "Green Machine," as the G.I.s call the war juggernaut in Vietnam, and decide from their desks and push buttons which governments shall be overthrown and which nations destroyed. They do so in the name of the national interest, which they are solemnly pledged to uphold and defend.

These men are not monsters, nor do they see themselves operating as oppressors and aggressors. They are, Barnet holds, deeply moral men who are convinced that what they are doing is best for the nation and, by extension, best for the world. They are always saying so, and there is no reason to believe that they do not mean it, however much those they are subverting and bombing may disagree. These men are talented and intelligent, the "brightest and the best" by every standard American society holds dear. They have been to the right schools, hold the right jobs in finance, law and business, belong to the proper clubs and organizations, and succeed one another in all the important governmental posts—regardless of which political party is in power.

Barnet shows how between 1940 and 1967 all the first- and second-level posts in the national security bureaucracy were held by fewer than 400 individuals. Of the 91 people who held the very top jobs—the Secretaries of Defense and State, and of the three services, the chairman of

continued

Ronald Steel's most recent book is "Imperialists and Other Heroes." He is at work on a biography of Walter Lippmann.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

[redacted]

Commando raids on North Vietnam

'Mercenaries' (CIA recruits?) hit supply and transport lines

By Daniel Southerland
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Saigon

United States-hired commandos are making unannounced raids into North Vietnam, according to U.S. sources in Saigon.

The sources said the raids are being made against North Vietnam's supply and transport system, mainly in the country's southern panhandle, by "Asian mercenaries." Most of the commandos are believed to be recruits of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency in Laos.

Many of the commandos are being inserted into North Vietnam by unmarked aircraft, the sources said. But according to one report, some have been slipped into North Vietnam on boats.

The sources said the raids are being staged from a "neighboring country," undoubtedly meaning Laos. But it was thought that bases in Thailand might also be involved.

Targets spotlighted

Truck parks and supply depots are among the targets, the sources said.

The CIA had organized sabotage and intelligence raids into North Vietnam in the early 1960's, but these were believed to have met with little success.

In early 1964, the raids were stepped up and came under the control of the U.S. Military Assistance Command in Saigon. Some of the details of those raids were disclosed in the "Pentagon papers" published last year.

The raids were apparently suspended after the bombing halt in 1968.

The renewed raids are no secret to the North Vietnamese. Hanoi publications such as Quan Doi Nhan Dan (People's Army) have made at least half-a-dozen references over the past few weeks to "puppet ranger groups" making raids in the north.

Publication warns

The armed forces publication recently warned that the United States is "attempting to conduct surprise attacks by infantry or commandos in vital areas to sever our transportation to the front line."

In another issue, Quan Doi Nhan Dan said that North Vietnam's local forces are "determined to annihilate U.S. puppet ranger groups."

"At present, along with using aircraft and warships to . . . attack us, the Nixon clique is maneuvering to continue to use rangers to carry out sabotage activities in the north," the paper said. "These activities are aimed at sabotaging our communications lines and military and economic installations.

"They use aircraft, boats, and rubber rafts to land these rangers or send them across the borders. Their basic plot is to land secretly, quickly carry out sabotage activities, and then withdraw quickly."

But it added that "sometimes they leave behind a small number of rangers to carry out activities for a long time."

Although the North Vietnamese publication called the raids "desperate," activities which "cannot escape being appropriately punished," there is no evidence so far that the Communists have had much success in stopping them.

Along with the bombing, mining, and commando raids, the United States has also resumed the dropping of propaganda leaflets over North Vietnam.

The Voice of America has increased its broadcasts to North Vietnam from a pre-offensive level of 6 hours a day to a current level of 13 hours a day.

THE MIAMI DAILY PLANET
10 June 1972

GINSBERG-McGOVERN QUESTION [redacted]

CIA SMACK SMUGGLING

By FLORA LEWIS

NEW YORK — A weird series of incidents is bringing into focus the question of the CIA's relation to the booming Indochina traffic in heroin and the opium from which it is made.

Ramparts magazine has published a study of the drug trade in Indochina, pulling together many details of the widely but only vaguely known story and making a series of specific charges against top South Vietnamese, Laotian and Thai officials. Further, Ramparts charged that it is CIA operations and subsidies in the area which have made possible the big increase in the supply of heroin from Indochina.

Sen. George McGovern (D.-N.D.) wrote a letter to CIA Director Richard Helms asking six questions about it. One inquired whether the opium production in Laos was conducted with the knowledge of CIA officials, particularly around the CIA's secret army base at Long Cheng in Laos, and if the effect of CIA operations is to "protect the supplies (of opium) and facilitate their movement."

CIA legislative counsel Jack Maury called on McGovern to give oral answers to the questions. He referred to a sheaf of legal-size papers for his information, indicating that the CIA has made a new investigation, but he didn't give McGovern the papers. He denied some of the charges, but said the CIA has been trying to convince the local people not to be in the drug traffic, which obviously inplies that the CIA knows about it.

McGovern's query wasn't the first challenge to Helms on the subject. On March 4 Helms went with his wife to an evening event at the Corcoran Gallery in Washington. The star happened to be Allen Ginsberg, the tousle-haired mystic poet. They met at a reception before the poetry reading, and Ginsberg took after Helms for what he says is CIA support of the dope trade.

The poet has been investigating drug traffic for seven years, and he has on the tip of his tongue a lot of precise names and places and figures. For one thing, he said, Long Cheng is a central collecting market for the opium flowing from Zieng Quang Province of Laos down into Vietnam and Bangkok and out around the world back to the United States.

Helms said it wasn't true, so Ginsberg said, "I'll make you a wager." If he lost, Ginsberg promised to send Helms a "vajra" (sic) which he describes as "a Buddhist-Hindu ritual implement of brass symbolizing the lightning-bolt doctrine of sudden illumination." Helms was to meditate one hour a day for the rest of his life if he lost.

Some time later, Ginsberg sent Helms a clipping from the Far East Economic Review saying that a number of correspondents who sneaked into Long Cheng over the years saw raw opium piled up for sale in the market there, in full view of CIA armed agents. He also sent a note offering Helms suggestions about how to keep a straight back while meditating, the best sitting position and proper breathing.

He has had no acknowledgement from the CIA chief, but says, "I have been tender toward him. It is terribly important to get him into an improved mind-consciousness. Anything that might help save the world situation would be sheer Hari Krishna magic, the hard-headed people have brought us to such an apocalyptic mess."

Helms says that he has received no note from Ginsberg, and only vaguely remembers the bet. He called the charges "vicious," "silly," "ridiculous." He told me, "There is no evidence over the years that any of these people were involved in any significant way. Almost all the opium grown there is in Communist-controlled areas, Pathet Lao areas."

I asked about Thailand, and he said, "I don't control northern Thailand. I don't control the Royal Laotian government; it's an independent country" (whose national budget and army are subsidized by the United States). "I don't know why you want to lay all this on the poor old CIA."

"We are not involved in the drug traffic in Laos or anywhere else. There is no evidence at all. To have evidence you'd have to get somebody in my office and have him say yes, I ran drugs with your approval."

At another point, he said, "Opium's been in that part of the world for centuries," and "most drugs in the United States come from Turkey." He said he didn't know anything about a U.N. report that 70%-80% of the world's supply comes from Southeast Asia.

And at another point he said "that part of the country (Laos) is loaded with opium. It's all over the area."

Maury, he said, had told McGovern that "it's all rot. It's not true." Later, Maury told me that he couldn't say anything about his talk with McGovern and that a written report which he has promised to give the senator won't be available to you or anybody else for publication."

Meanwhile, the rate of heroin addiction among GIs in Vietnam is soaring dramatically, and drugs continue to pour into the United States.

Certainly, Helms is right when he says that drug control is not the CIA's responsibility. But two facts are inescapable.

1.—Drugs are flowing into Vietnam and out of Indochina into the world underground network in dramatically increasing quantity. Not only is there a fearful growth in the amount of opium, from which heroin is refined, produced and exported from southeast Asia. Alongside the traditional opium trade, heroin is being produced there. This is new. The proof that it is true is the ready availability of heroin to GIs in Vietnam. Their powder doesn't come all the way from Turkey or France.

2.—The CIA provides virtually all the transportation, the arms, and much of the money on which the people engaged in growing and moving drugs depend on in order to keep going. The CIA isn't there because of the drug traffic. As Helms says, it does not officially condone the traffic. But official CIA operations have made it much easier for the trade to prosper in security.

While the standard American government position is that Turkey is the main source of the heroin reaching the U.S., there is every reason to question whether this remains true. The United Nations Commission on Narcotic Durgs has said that 80% of the world's opium supply comes from southeast Asia. Dr. Alexander Messing, a UN narcotics expert, says that "if (the supply of opium from) Turkey were shut down overnight, there is still so much of the stuff around that it would hardly make a difference."

Partly, this is because the main producers of opium are the hill tribes in Laos and northeast Thailand. Many are the Meo people, on whom the CIA relies for its "clandestine army" in Laos. Opium is their one cash crop. The CIA needs the goodwill of the Meos. It does not go out of its way to offend them.

Partly, this is because the very nature of CIA operations in southeast Asia requires the cooperation of high local officials, daredevils, adventurers. Often those who are corrupt cooperate all the more willingly, since it facilitates their illicit enterprises. The CIA doesn't support what they do on the side, but it

NEW YORK, N.Y.
POST

EVENING - 623,245
WEEKEND - 354,797

JUN 9 1972

MEANWHILE IN THAILAND . . .

A 7th Airbase for New U.S. Stronghold

NAM PHONG, Thailand, (Dispatch News Service International)—The U. S. has begun work on a seventh airbase in Thailand to be used for air-strikes in the Indochina war. The move feeds speculation that the U. S. plans to turn Thailand into a stronghold for anti-communist military activity in Southeast Asia.

At present, the site—in the Nam Phong district of Khon Kaen province in the northeast—is an isolated Royal Thai army post where Americans train Laotians and Thais for the clandestine war in Laos.

Its development as an airbase will place American strength in Thailand—now at an official 36,000-37,000—back up toward the 1969 high of 49,000. Military sources in Bangkok say the base will be the home of F4 Phantom fighter-bombers.

(A Defense Dept. spokesman in Washington says there are presently no U.S. troops at Nam Phong, though there is a possibility the base may be used as an airstrip in the future.)

May Prove Embarrassing

The U. S. Embassy here admits that construction has already begun, and it will no doubt prove embarrassing to the Thai government, which only six months ago signed in Kuala Lumpur a plea for a "Declaration of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality" for Southeast Asia. (Under the agreement, the major powers would consent to non-interference and be denied military facilities in the area.)

The base will thus throw into question again alleged U. S. intentions to wind down the air war and its presence in Southeast Asia.

In the wake of the North Vietnamese offensive in South Vietnam, American air power in Thailand was increased until five bases were operating at top capacity.

One month ago it was announced that Takli Airbase, closed since late 1970, would be reactivated by the U. S. Air Force. The Pentagon stressed that this was a temporary move to counter the offensive.

But, according to GIs and civilians working at Takli, the base had been so thoroughly stripped that it was little more than runway and empty buildings. Reconstruction will take months.

The task at Nam Phong will be even larger. At present there is a 10,000-ft. runway and little else. Everything—including quarters for several thousand American troops, maintenance facilities, protective structures for the aircraft—will have to be built from scratch.

The base is located about 60 kilometers from the provincial capital of Khon Kaen. Little distinguishes its main gate as the entrance of a military installation. No barbed wire or buildings can be seen. Three guards lazily check vehicles as they enter and wave them on to disappear over a rise on the dirt road leading in.

Across the road from the guarded entrance is a row of shacks housing about 15 small commercial shops. The closest town is a dusty district capital, five kilometers up the road.

Before construction for the air facilities began, the base was a springboard for Thailand's role in the war in Laos. Part of the 12,000-man force of Thai troops that the CIA finances and directs in Laos is trained here.

According to qualified observers these Thai troops are playing an increasing role in Laos, as the role of Meo tribesmen in combat diminishes. Soldiers who sport custom-made "commando" uniforms at the camp, openly admit they have been in combat in Laos.

80 U. S. Advisers

Outside the base one can hear the occasional boom of field guns. (An undisclosed number of the Thais in Laos are with artillery units.)

Approximately 80 Americans are stationed permanently at the post in an advisory and training capacity.

Until recently, most planes taking off from the Nam Phong airstrip were T28s carrying Laotian student pilots and their instructors. Though American transports are now landing in force, the T28s can still be seen flying circles around the camp, and practicing bombing runs.

The camp also has a 160-bed hospital caring for Thais wounded in Laos. Thai casualties in Laotian combat are a closely guarded secret, but this hospital is almost full. Most of the patients have relatively minor wounds. Those seriously injured are sent to a hospital at Udon Airbase, 100 kilometers to the North, where many of the CIA operations originate.

Many of the soldiers said they were wounded at Long Cheng, formerly a secret CIA base in central Laos, which has been under seige from Communist forces for the past several months. According to these men, Thais and Meo irregulars were the mainstay of the force defending Long Cheng and Royal Lao army units were hardly to be seen.

According to a heavily censored U. S. Senate report, the U. S. now spends over $100 million yearly to finance the Thai forces in Laos. A private receives a monthly wage of $76—at least three times his regular salary. The sum is transferred to Thai officers by CIA personnel at Udon base.

The Thai soldiers first appeared in 1970 and are officially called volunteers, as a result of the Fulbright Resolution which forbids direct U. S. financing of third national soldiers to fight in either Laos or Cambodia. It is maintained in official circles that the volunteers were all recruited in Northeast Thailand and were ethnically of Laotian stock.

But according to the soldiers themselves, neither of these claims are true. Many of the men are from provinces in the Central Plains, and cannot speak Laotian. Though most do volunteer—for financial reasons—enlisted men and officers with special skills are often ordered to Laos as part of their duties in the Royal Thai Army.

•continued

According to Laos Premier Souvanna himself acknowledged their uncertain status interview, 25 to 26 Thai battalions, each with about 400 men, were planned for deployment in Laos by June. Souvanna himself acknowledged their uncertain status by saying, "They can't be called Thai battalions. We must call them volunteer battalions."

As the Nam Phong Airbase takes shape, the nearby town of Khon Kaen undoubtably will begin to show signs of the presence of American troops.

Unless the town is closed to the GIs and they are ordered to Udon instead, local business entrepreneurs probably will begin some commercial construction of their own. Kon Kaen is one of the few provincial Thai towns in the northeast to escape the shabby commercial effects of an American presence. As an untouched town its days appear numbered.

8 JUN 1972

[redacted]

STATINTL

U.S. REPORT SAYS PAKISTAN SPENT AID FOR DEFENSES

Congress Panel Is Told of Diversion of Relief Funds to Border Fortification

By TAD SZULC
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 7—The General Accounting Office has reported to Congress that most of a grant of about $10-million made to Pakistan last fall for humanitarian relief was diverted for the construction of military defenses on what was then the East Pakistani border with India.

This grant was part of the total American emergency aid commitment of $109.1-million made last year during the civil war in Pakistan's eastern wing, which subsequently became the independent republic of Bangladesh.

42-Page Report Compiled

But the General Accounting Office, which is the investigative agency of Congress, said in a report prepared for the Senate Subcommittee on Refugees, headed by Senator Edward M. Kennedy, that "most of this assistance, even though authorized," had not been "provided or scheduled for shipment."

A copy of the 42-page report, signed by the Controller General of the United States, Elmer B. Staats, was obtained today by The New York Times.

The General Accounting Office also asserted that the Pakistani Army seized for military use last year about 50 United States Army assault boats that had been provided in 1970 for relief to victims of a cyclone and tidal wave that struck East Pakistan. The report added that trucks and jeeps belonging to United Nations aid agencies had also been taken by the Pakistanis for the same purpose.

Fund Transfer Reported

The Nixon Administration has said on several occasions in the last few months that the bulk of the over-all $[illegible] commitment for 1971 had been fulfilled. But the General Accounting Office, in response to Congressional inquiries, said that, besides the $10-million, only about $20-million in food and coastal and river vessels had been provided.

Administration sources here said today that the funds authorized last year for East Pakistani relief but not yet expended had been transferred to the 1972 assistance programs for Bangladesh. The total commitment to Bangladesh for 1972 is $217-million.

The $10-million that the General Accounting Office said was diverted for military fortifications had been intended to create employment through public works last year in what was then East Pakistan. The employment, it was said, was to provide people there with money to buy food that the United States had sold to the Pakistani Government on credit.

The General Accounting Office said that the money had been used instead for fortifications on the border between East Pakistan and India in anticipation of the Indian-Pakistani war that broke out in November.

The report said that the Agency for International Development, which was in charge of the public works assistance, had said the project, financed by rupees owend by the United States in Pakistan, was designed to create employment through "repairing roads and embankments and cutting water plants that clogged rivers."

But the General Accounting Office said it had learned that "in one sector of East Pakistan approximately 5,000 to 6,000 laborers were engaged in military defense works—constructing and digging entrenchments, constructing embankments and carving bamboo punja stakes and other military-oriented work projects."

Under United States law, humanitarian aid may not be diverted for other uses. After the Pakistani Army began its crakdown on March 25, 1971, against the autonomy movemen then under way in East Pakistan, the United States banned all new sales of military equipment to Pakistan.

No Further Funds Given

The public works grant was made on Oct. 8, 1971, but the Government Accounting Office report said that "because most of the projects carried out under this grant included building defense works along the India-East Pakistan border, AID [the Agency for International Development] decided against considering further assistance of this type."

Sources in the Accounting Office said today that the $10-million [illegible] the question of further such assistance became, in effect, academic less than two months after the original grant because of the outbreak of the Indian-Pakistani war.

They said that it had been possible to examine at the United States Embassy in Islamaba the Pakistani capital, document pertaining to the diversion of relief funds for military construction.

In the report, the Government Accounting Office complained that "our review efforts were impeded by Department of State and Agency for International Development officials."

Data Withheld, Report Says

The report said that these officials "withheld and summarized records prior to our access and thereby limited information needed for a complete and thorough report."

Senator Kennedy, recalling reports by the Government Accounting Office earlier this year on the Central Intelligence Agency's use for military activities of relief funds in Laos, said in a statement that the new findings "underscore the Administration's complicity in the repression of East Bengal, and its cosmetic concern for the millions who were unwilling pawns in our Government's policy of failure and shame."

SAGINAW, MICH.
NEWS

E - 61,356
S - 62,391

JUN 8 1972

Saigon's Role in Drug Trade Demands Probe

If the testimony of a Yale University graduate student before a Senate panel is even less than 100 per cent factual, the American people have further proof that Vietnam has exported more than unhappiness and divisiveness to this country.

In any case, the story told by Alfred W. McCoy to the Senate Appropriations Committee's subcommittee on foreign operations is too big to be swept under the rug. It calls for full disclosure and the American people are entitled to have it.

What McCoy revealed for the committee is a picture so grim as to be almost beyond belief. It represents a glossary of total corruption tying highest ranking South Vietnamese, American and assorted other Southeast Asian officials to a mammoth international trade in heroin and opium. That isn't all. The Yale student links U.S. and Corsican organized crime syndicates with the whole operation.

There can be no dismissing McCoy as a publicity-seeking crackpot. The public has heard the same story before. The difference is that this time it is sweeping in context. No names have been spared. McCoy's statements are based on an 18-month study and interviews with officials in the U.S., Indochina and Europe.

What emerges is a damning finger pointed squarely at South Vietnam's President Nguyen Van Thieu, former Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky, Prime Minister Tran Van Khiem and blood relatives in illict drug trade up to their necks. The word from the Yale man, working on a Ph.D. in Southeast Asian history, is that South Vietnam is the organizational nerve center for international trade in these drugs—and splitting the action with Laos, Cambodia, Thailand and the international crime syndicates.

Dragged into the sordid story, actually a web of intrigue spun around smugglig across borders and buying in the open market, are generals of several nations as well as ranking civilian officials in the Saigon government.

All of this is incredible enough. But credulity is strained almost to the breaking point when McCoy says his investigation revealed (1)—that heroin has been marketed to American GIs and (2)—that equally high-ranking American officials including diplomats it and the CIA know about and have blinked at it for the sake of expediency.

The only thing we find more incredible is the response of one Senate panel member following McCoy's testimony: "He has told us nothing new that we haven't heard before." That response is no longer adequate. In the light of what McCoy has said, it is an insult to McCoy and to the intelligence of the public.

Nothing less than a full scale investigation is demanded. With new and penetrating information which casts a shadow of corruption over the South Vietnamese government, we wonder again what it is that we have sent our soldiers off to fight for—and if what they are fighting for is really worth protecting. We have exported men to die and to kill fighting for a cause. The suggestion that the recipients of our largesse have and are exporting back drugs and drug addicts and are getting rich in the bargain is too much.

McCoy has laid it out for a Senate subcommittee. The question now is what does the Senate do about it? To do nothing would be to bury one more horror tale of this gruesome conflict.

BALTIMORE, MD.
SUN
M - 164,621
E - 189,871
S - 323,624
JUN 3 1972

STAT

[redacted]

Indochina called key to drug traffic

BY WALTER R. GORDON
Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington—The author of a forthcoming book on heroin smuggling told a Senate committee yesterday that the focus of opium traffic has shifted to Southeast Asia, where it is controlled by high government officials and abetted, directly and indirectly, by the United States.

Alfred W. McCoy, a 26-year-old doctoral candidate who said he spent 18 months on research, travel and interviews, said heroin traffic in South Vietnam is "divided among the nation's three dominant military factions"—those controlled by the president, Nguyen Van Thieu, the former president, Nguyen Cao Ky, and the prime minister, Tran Thien Khiem.

He did not present any evidence personally linking the three leaders to the heroin trade, however. After the hearing, he commented that Vietnamese leaders traditionally insulate themselves from the dealings of underlings and there was no way of knowing whether the three leaders were involved.

Evidence from research

He added, however, that he had evidence from research and interviews that their organizations played a key role in the smuggling.

"Most of the opium traffic in northeastern Laos," he told the committee, "is controlled by Vang Pao, the Laotian general who commands the CIA's mercenary army."

He said the American government had directly abetted the heroin traffic by allowing smugglers to use the CIA's Air America to transport opium and by employing Burmese heroin smugglers as intelligence agents operating across the Chinese border.

Border crossings halted

He said in an interview that the China border crossings had been halted under presidential directive but that the Air America operations are continuing.

Mr. McCoy was testifying before the Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee.

In response to a question from Senator William Proxmire (D., Wis), the chairman, Mr. McCoy said he believed the only way heroin smuggling could be halted would be for the U.S. to put pressure on Asian governments by cutting off aid.

Senator Gale W. McGee (D., Wyo.), the only other senator present, accused Mr. McCoy of using "the vernacular of Joe McCarthy" when he charged the U.S. was "abetting" the drug traffic merely because it supported and financed those who actually engaged in the smuggling.

Shifted from Turkey

Mr. McCoy insisted that that word was correct but said he had not meant to suggest that American officials were personally corrupt or that the U.S. government intended to encourage drug traffic.

Mr. McCoy said that since the late 1960's the principal area of opium growing had shifted from Turkey to the golden triangle of Southeast Asia, which he estimated now produces 70 per cent of the opium smuggled into the U.S.

The witness said he had spent four months in Southeast Asia last year and had had "hundreds" of interviews in the process of researching the book. He said no official whom he talked to disputed the main points of his Senate testimony.

Example given

The author gave this example of international heroin traffic: Gen. Ouane Rattikone, former Laotian chief of staff who was said to have admitted to controlling opium in northwestern Laos, allegedly sold the drug to a Chinese racketeer who was "the silent partner in Pepsi Cola's Vientiane bottling plant."

Then, according to the witness, Mrs. Nguyen Thi Ly, the sister of General Ky, bought the heroin and arranged for Vietnamese Col. Phan Phung Tien to fly the drug to Saigon aboard planes of his 5th Air Division.

Mr. McCoy also identified Gen. Ngo Dzu, recently fired as head of the 2d Military Region after suffering defeats at the hands of the North Vietnamese, and Gen. Dang Van Quang, whom he called "Thieu's Kissinger," as major supporters of President Thieu who are involved in the drug traffic.

The principal international agents on the drug traffic, he said, are a group of Corsicans who first settled in Indochina in the Nineenth Century and who maintain liason with heroin laboratories in France.

Mr. McCoy, a Ph.D. candidate in Southeast Asian history at Yale University, is the author of "The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia," which will be published by Harper and Row in July or August.

DAILY WORLD
8 JUN 1971

[redacted]

Charge CIA and Thieu push heroin to U.S. GIs

Daily World Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON, June 2—Alfred W. McCoy, a Yale student working on his doctorate, told a Senate Appropriations subcommittee today that the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency and Saigon Dictator Nguyen Van Thieu are directly involved in the shipment of vast quantities of opium and heroin to the U.S.

McCoy, who has authored a book, "The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia," debunked President Nixon's campaign against heroin imported from Turkey."

He told the Foreign Operations subcommittee, headed by Sen. William Proxmire (D-Wisc), that the U.S. underworld has totally recouped the loss of the Turkish supply by turning to Southeast Asia sources.

In South Vietnam, McCoy said, the opium and heroin traffic is divided among the nation's three dominant military factions: Pres. Thieu's political apparatus, Prime Minister Kim's political organization, and Gen. Ky's political apparatus.

"Throughout the mountainous Golden Triangle region, the CIA has provided substantial military support for mercenaries, right-wing rebels, and tribal war lords who are actively engaged in the narcotics traffic and in Thailand the CIA has worked closely with nationalist Chinese paramilitary units which control 80 to 90 percent of northern Burma's vast opium export and manufacture high-grade heroin for export to the American market," McCoy testified.

"Some of President Thieu's closest supporters inside the South Vietnamese army control the distribution and sale of heroin to Americans GI's fighting in Indochina."

"Finally U.S. agencies have been actually involved in certain aspects of the region's drug traffic. In Northern Laos, Air America aircraft and helicopters chartered by the CIA have been transporting opium."

Thieu Is Running Dope, Senate Told

Washington

South Vietnam's president, former vice president and prime minister run organizations that split control of their nation's opium and heroin trade, a narcotics researcher charged in Senate testimony yesterday.

The witness, Alfred W. McCoy, said the South Vietnam narcotics ring has links with Corsican gangsters, with an organized crime family in Florida, and with scores of high-ranking military officers in South Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Thailand.

McCoy, a PhD candidate in Southeast Asian history at Yale University, testified before the Senate Appropriations Committee's subcommittee on foreign operations. He said he had spent 18 months interviewing officials in the United States, Indochina and Europe.

POLITICS

McCoy accused American officials of condoning and even cooperating with corrupt elements in Southeast Asia's illegal drug trade out of political and military consideration.

At the State Department, a spokesman said: "We are aware of these charges, but we have been unable to find any evidence to substantiate them, much less proof."

These are McCoy's major charges:

- Heroin and opium traffic in South Vietnam is divided among the political organizations of President Nguyen Van Thieu, former Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky and Prime Minister Tran Van Khiem.
- General Ky's sister, Nguyen Thi Ly, travels about once a month to Vientiane, the capital of Laos, to arrange for shipment of packaged heroin to Pakse or Phnom Penh in Cambodia.
- The heroin is then picked up by transport aircraft belonging to the South Vietnamese Fifth Air Division and flown to Saigon.
- Until recently Mrs. Ky's prime supplier was an "overseas Chinese racketeer" named Huu Tim Heng, who used his position as the silent partner in the Vientiane Pepsi Cola bottling plant as a cover to import a chemical necessary for the manufacture of heroin, McCoy testified.
- Heng bought raw opium and morphine from General Ouane Rattikone, former chief of staff of the Royal Laotian Army.
- General Rattikone admitted, McCoy said, that he controlled opium traffic in northwestern Laos since 1962 and controlled that countrys' largest heroin laboratory producing a high-grade drug for the GI market in South Vietnam.
- Most of the opium traffic in northeastern Laos is controlled by General Van Pao, commander of the CIA mercenary army, he said.
- The government of Thailand allows Burmese rebels, Nationalist Chinese irregulars and mercenary armies to move "enormous hundreds of tons of Burmese mule caravans loaded with opium across Thailand's northern border."
- "Some of President Thieu's closest supporters inside the Vietnamese Army control the distribution and sale of heroin to American GIs fighting in Indochina."

Santo Trafficante Jr., whom he called the heir to a Florida based international crime syndicate, traveled to Saigon in 1968, contacted prominent members of Saigon's Corsican criminal syndicates and arranged increased imports of Asian heroin to the United States.

McCoy accused American embassies in London of trying repeatedly to cover up the involvement of local officials in the drug traffic.

CIA

"In northern Laos," McCoy said, "Air America aircraft and helciopters chartered by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency have been transporting opium harvested by the agency's tribal mercenaries on a regular basis."

He was asked by Senator William Proxmire (Dem.-Wis.), the subcommittee chairman, to produce documentation for several of his allegations and he promised to do so.

Senator Gale W. McGee (Dem.-Wyo.) pressed McCoy on his lack of professional qualifications, implied his material was one dimentional and slanted and likened some of his charges to "McCarthyism."

"I resent your implication, Senator," McCoy replied, insisting his allegations are based on fact.

McCoy told newsmen he was financed in his investigations by the Fund for Investigative Journalism, the publishing firm of Harper and Row and from his own savings.

Associated Press

WASHINGTON POST
JUN 1975

STATINTL

[redacted]

Viet Heroin Book Author Is Criticized

Sen. Gale W. McGee (D-Wyo.) accused author Alfred McCoy of "McCarthyism" for his testimony yesterday linking U.S. and Saigon government officials to heroin trafficking.

"It seems to me you do strain the truth a little bit," said McGee, who has a doctorate in history. "Just because the CIA or an embassy dealt with some of these people, it doesn't mean somehow they're aiding and abetting."

"I resent your implication, senator," McCoy responded during a hearing of the Senate Foreign Operations Subcommittee. He said his testimony and material in a forthcoming book were based on 18 months of research in Southeast Asia and on interviews with U.S. officials in this country.

Besides producing photostats of a U.S. Vietnam Military Assistance Command paper alleging that South Vietnam's Lt. Gen. Ngo Dzu and his father were linked with heroin trafficking, McCoy charged in his testimony that U.S. diplomats have tried to cover up illegal drug activities.

G. McMurtrie Godley, U.S. ambassador to Laos, "did his best to prevent the assignment of U.S. Bureau of Narcotics officials to Laos," McCoy testified.

WASHINGTON STAR
3 JUL 1972

Thieu, Ky Run Drug Trade, Yale Student Tells Senators

Associated Press

A narcotics researcher has testified top South Vietnamese leaders control their nation's illegal drug trade and are profiting handsomely from heroin sales to American GIs.

Alfred W. McCoy, 26, said control of heroin and opium traffic in South Vietnam is split among the political organizations of President Nguyen Van Thieu, former Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky, and Prime Minister Tran Van Khieum.

McCoy, a doctoral student in Southeast Asian history at Yale University, testified yesterday before the Senate Appropriations Committee's subcommittee on foreign operations.

McCoy, son of a career Army officer, also said American officials have condoned and even cooperated with corrupt elements of Southeast Asia's illegal drug trade for political and military reasons.

State's Reply

In reply, a State Department spokesman said, "We are aware of these charges, but we have been unable to find any evidence to substantiate them, much less proof."

McCoy said the South Vietnamese narcotics ring has links with Corsican gangsters, with a Mafia family in Florida, and with scores of high-ranking military officers in South Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Thailand.

He said he interviewed officials for four months in Southeast Asia, for two months in Europe and for a year in the United States.

High-ranking military and civilian officials in South Vietnam and other Indochinese countries have been directly involved in distributing heroin to GIs fighting in Vietnam and to addicts in the United States, McCoy said.

He said he confirmed independently an allegation by the National Broadcasting Co. that Gen. Dang Van Quang, a military adviser to President Thieu, is the "biggest pusher" or narcotics in South Vietnam.

Have Denied Charges

In Saigon, Thieu and Ky were not immediately available for comment on the charges involving them. Both have denieed similar charges in the past.

McCoy said that Santo Trafficante Jr., whom he identified as the heir to a Florida-based international crime syndicate, traveled to Saigon in 1968, contacted prominent members of Saigon's Corsican criminal syndicates and arranged increased imports of Asian heroin to the United States.

In Tampa, Fla., a friend of Trafficante confirmed that Trafficante visited the Far East in 1968, but added, "it was strictly for pleasure."

McCoy accused American embassies in Indochina of covering up involvement of local officials in drug traffic, a charge denied by the State Department.

"In northern Laos," McCoy said, "Air America aircraft chartered by the CIA have been transporting opium harvested by tribal mercenaries on a regular basis."

Paul Velte, the line's managing director and chief executive officer, said it is doing all it can in "a security program which effectively prevents the carriage of drugs on any of the airline's equipment."

STATINTL [redacted]

NEWARK, N.J.
NEWS

E - 267,289
S - 423,331

JUN 2 1972

Other Congress Developments

DRUG TRAFFIC: A Yale graduate student who has spent the last 18 months researching international drug traffic contended today that the CIA is involved in Southeast Asian heroin traffic.

In testimony prepared for the Senate Appropriations subcommittee on foreign aid, Alfred W. McCoy said that aircraft chartered in Laos by the Central Intelligence Agency and Agency for International Development "have been transporting opium harvested by the agency's tribal mercenaries on a regular basis."

BEIRUT BOYCOTT: Rep. Bell Abzug D-N.Y., wants Congress to call upon the international airlines to boycott Beirut until the Lebanese government takes "strong and effective" measures to end the activities of Arab-sponsored terrorist groups on its territories.

VA HOSPITAL: Senator Harrison A. Williams, Jr., D-N.J., announced today that the Senate Appropriations Committee has approved an increased appropriation to begin work on a new Veterans Administration hospital in southern New Jersey.

FAMILY WEEKLY
(DATE UNKNOWN)
June 1972

[redacted]

Ask Them Yourself

Want to ask a famous person a question? Send the question on a postcard to "Ask," Family Weekly, 641 Lexington Ave., New York, N. Y. 10022. We'll pay $5 for published questions. Sorry, we can't answer others.

FOR REP. CHARLES B. RANGEL, N.Y.

You've accused the CIA of aiding and abetting heroin sellers in Asia. What grounds do you have for such a serious charge?—R. D., New York, N.Y.

● Despite public disclaimers by the CIA, many of us in Congress have serious reason to believe that the agency is indeed complicit in the trafficking of deadly heroin to our servicemen in Southeast Asia. Newsmen clandestinely entering the secret CIA base at Long Cheng in Laos have reported raw opium openly piled up for sale in the market there. In addition, we know that the CIA regularly supplies arms, transportation and funds to drug-producing hill tribes in Laos and Thailand in exchange for their allegiance, knowing full well that these tribesmen are cornerstones of the drug trade. Most Congressmen have little idea how the CIA operates and how much money it spends. The CIA budget is carefully disguised and hidden. In fact, a recent Senate Foreign Relations Committee report, "Laos, April, 1971," reads like a jigsaw puzzle, with pieces "deleted at the request of the Department of State, Department of Defense and Central Intelligence Agency." Congress cannot prevent CIA involvement as long as we are deliberately kept in the dark about that agency's operations.

THE PROGRESSIVE
June 1972

[redacted]

AMERICA'S SECRET WAR

FRED BRANFMAN

Since the mid-1950s, when the French were defeated in Laos, there has been a tug of war within that country between the Royal Lao Government (RLG), supported by a group of right-wing factions backed by the United States, and the Pathet Lao, a moderate and left-wing nationalist guerrilla movement backed by the Soviet Union and North Vietnam.

By 1964, after a series of military and political struggles, the RLG, with aid from the CIA, held the capital and the south of Laos, while the Pathet Lao held the Plain of Jars, a rich plateau of great beauty in the north. The United States was determined to defeat the Pathet Lao and bring all of Laos under the RLG. This is an account of how the U.S. military set out to achieve that end, and some first person stories of what happened to the Laotions who lived on the Plain.—THE EDITORS

In September, 1969, after a recorded history of seven hundred years, the Plain of Jars disappeared.

As the central part of this account, the reader will learn of this event from essays by the Laotian peasants who lived through it.

These peasant reports show how before 1964 the Plain, located in northeastern Laos, was a picturesque and prosperous rural society of some fifty thousand people; how the Pathet Lao guerrilla movement occupied it in May, 1964, and how airplanes then came from a distant, unseen land to bomb it; how the aircraft destroyed homes, storehouses, schools, temples, and bamboo huts built in the forest; how the people retreated, first into the forest and then underground, huddling together in dugout tunnels and holes; how ricefields, vegetable gardens, and fruit orchards were rendered barren by the bombs; how water buffalo, cows, chickens, ducks, and pigs were lost to the bombs; how children, parents, grandparents, aunts and uncles and cousins alike were killed or wounded by the bombs.

These reports show, finally, how in September, 1969, the Plain of Jars was emptied of the survivors of the "war of the airplanes," as many had come to call it; how they were settled in the refugee camps where they wrote these essays, far from their ancestral homes; and how they remain there until today.

These chronicles of the disappearance of a homeland, however, represent far more than just another tale of death and destruction in this twenty-sixth year of the Indochina war.

For this "war of the airplanes" marks a new era in the history of military conflict: war which is not fought by men but machines, war which can erase distant and unseen societies clandestinely, unknown to and even unsuspected by the world outside.

More than 25,000 attack sorties were flown against the Plain of Jars from May, 1964, through September, 1969; more than 75,000 tons of bombs were dropped on it; more than 50,000 airmen at distant bases were involved; below, on the ground, thousands were killed and wounded, tens of thousands driven underground, and the entire above-ground society leveled.

And yet, for five and a half years, this massive war was unknown to the world beyond.

The ground battles raging elsewhere in Laos were reported on fairly regularly during these years. But one searches in vain through the newspapers and mag-

Fred Branfman worked in Laos from 1967 to 1971, first as an education adviser for International Volunteer Services and then as an independent researcher and writer. He interviewed thousands of Laotian refugees and dozens of American pilots. He is now working with Project Air War in Washington, D.C., an independent source of information on the continuing air war in Indochina. For a note on the book, please turn to the Office Memo, inside front cover.

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RAMPARTS
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[redacted]

[Perspective]

Electoral Politics: The Candidates Reply

IN THE EDITORIAL ESSAY "Vietnam and the Elections" which opened the April issue of RAMPARTS we observed that the call for U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam, once dismissed as extremist or naive, had at last become politically respectable. Withdrawal had in fact become the dominant theme of Vietnam policy among this year's Presidential candidates. At the same time, we noted, the clear principle of this demand was being clouded and distorted in the turgid mainstream of American electoral debate. And we called upon the anti-war movement in the coming months "to sharpen the demand for withdrawal and establish the clearest possible mandate for it."

In an attempt to follow our own advice, RAMPARTS wrote to each of the Presidential candidates, presenting to them a list of seven questions on their plans for peace in Vietnam. We received replies from Rep. Chisholm, Sen. Humphrey, Sen. Jackson, Sen. McGovern and Sen. Muskie. The letters from Chisholm, Humphrey, McGovern and Muskie essentially consisted of the candidates' point-by-point responses to our questions over their signatures. In the following commentary we have taken these questions one or two at a time, and grouped together the answers of these four candidates for comparison and analysis. Sen. Jackson's letter did not direct itself to the specific questions in a parallel way, so we are printing it in its entirety in a box on page 10. Of the Democratic candidates who remained in the aftermath of the Wisconsin primary only Wallace and McCarthy did not respond to our questions. Since Rep. McClosky had dropped out of the race in March, and Richard Nixon did not answer, we draw a blank on the Republican hopefuls.

We posed seven questions; while the original numbering is maintained, the results are discussed here in a different order. This allows us to set out first the common thrust of the four candidates' policies and in a sense proceed from the easy questions to the hard, from the shared assumptions to the problematic implications.

1. Shall the United States permanently withdraw all its armed forces (soldiers, sailors and airmen) from Vietnam on the sole condition of an agreement for the repatriation of prisoners of war, timed to coincide with our withdrawal?

2. Shall the U.S. similarly withdraw its armed forces from all of Indochina on the same single condition? What about U.S. bases in Thailand?

CHISHOLM:

1. I firmly believe and stand for an immediate total withdrawal of *all* U.S. forces from Vietnam; with the sole condition being an agreement for the repatriation of prisoners of war.

2. I also believe that it is imperative that we withdraw our armed forces from all of Indochina. I must further support a withdrawal of U.S. influence on the lives of those who seek a preservation of their culture.

HUMPHREY:

1. Yes.

2. Yes, although in regard to Thailand the critical point is that these bases not be used for strikes in Indochina. The question of leaving these bases altogether is a longer term proposition, involving issues that go beyond the Vietnam war; this calls for further study at the Presidential level.

McGOVERN:

1. Yes. It is important to note, however, that leaving U.S. forces in South Vietnam to defend the Thieu regime is a circuitous method of achieving release of our prisoners. I am convinced that they will be returned within the framework of Article 118 of the Geneva Convention on prisoners of war, which provides that prisoners will be released without delay "after the cessation of hostilities." This requires a complete American disengagement from hostilities against all parties in Indochina. I want to point out, too, that I do not regard this U.S. withdrawal as a negotiating position—it is instead a course of action which I fully intend to implement. The McGovern-Hatfield Amendment did not urge the President to negotiate our withdrawal; rather it *required* withdrawal by cutting off funds for the war.

2. Yes. The bases in Thailand have no justification other than to attempt to exert U.S. influence over the internal politics of Southeast Asian countries. The withdrawal must, of course, mean an end to all military operations, including bombing, anywhere in Indochina.

MUSKIE:

1. Yes. I have consistently supported this position in the last few years. On February 2, I urged that "We must set a date when we will withdraw every soldier, sailor, and air-man, and stop all bombing and other American military activity, dependent only on an agreement for the return of our prisoners and the safety of our troops as they leave." I do not believe that an agreement for the safety of our troops as they leave would be in any way a problem; the basic exchange would be a complete end to American military participation in the Indochina war for the return of our prisoners.

2. My proposal includes our military activity and personnel in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. I would therefore not make use of our bases in Thailand and elsewhere in Southeast Asia for activities related to the Indochina war. I would otherwise approach the issue of bases in Thailand and elsewhere in Southeast Asia in the context of efforts not only to promote detente between the U.S. and China but also with regard to the effect that either maintaining or removing our various bases would have on the possibilities for accommodation among Asian nations themselves. Clearly, we do not need to maintain anything like the number and size of bases we have now in Southeast Asia.

6. Shall the U.S. set a date by which it will carry out its withdrawal (as specified in the preceding answers) on the same single condition of an agreement on repatriation of POWs?

7. What date?

CHISHOLM:

6. Yes, it is most essential to any effective withdrawal that a time certain be set and announced.

7. As a date for total withdrawal of U.S. forces, I propose July 1, 1972.

HUMPHREY:

6. Yes.

7. I was co-sponsor last year of the Vietnam Disengagement Act which called for withdrawal of all our troops by December 31. I still support any subsequent deadline within six months. I endorsed this principle when I supported all the Mansfield amendments calling for a withdrawal date six months after the particular legislation was enacted.

McGOVERN:

6. Yes.

7. The single limitation should be a calculation of time required to accomplish the physical withdrawal. Last September an American general who has been responsible for transport of supplies in Vietnam told me that all equipment worth salvaging, along with all U.S. manpower, could be moved out within 90 days. That is the date I have been proposing but it is, of course, quite possible that withdrawals since then have considerably shortened the time needed.

MUSKIE:

6. Yes.

7. The earliest possible date.

The basic impression one gets from these responses is that all the candidates gave the right answers, namely: yes, yes, yes, and soon. The most striking difference is on the Thailand bases: McGovern's readiness to part with them and to define their objective without euphemism has a forthright ring in contrast to the geopolitical waffling of Muskie and Humphrey on that issue. Of course, how far McGovern would pursue the implications of this attitude for the American role in S.E. Asia, or for U.S. fleets and bases which "exert influence" elsewhere, remains an open and interesting question.

But, Thailand aside, in these four questions we have the basic elements which have come to be widely accepted as the Peace Alternative to Nixon's policy of war. It is a program that took shape in the divisions and debates within the U.S. Senate. The periodic gathering of the Senate doves to fight for various amendments from the Hatfield-McGovern to the Cooper, Church and Mansfield, in the absence of an aroused and visible popular movement became the most dramatic center of political opposition to Nixon's war. Now these Senatorial initiatives, whether they won or lost, or were diluted in the House, or arrogantly flouted by Nixon himself, seem to have defined the content of Presidential peace politics. And one of the problems we find is that a Vietnam peace settlement, negotiated with a House/Senate conference committee, is treated as if it had already been negotiated with the Vietnamese.

McGovern distinguishes his plan for withdrawal from a negotiating position: it is not an offer coupled with a condition, but an intention coupled with an expectation. At first glance this seems an amiable but moot distinction; as if, instead of signing a peace treaty, we would say, "we all trust each other, let's skip the formalities." But it has other implications that will appear below. While Muskie's formulation sounds more businesslike, most people would accept his summary of the Peace Alternative, "the basic exchange would be a complete end to American military participation in the Indochina war for the return of our prisoners." A consideration of the remaining questions and answers make clear, however, that this "basic exchange" is not in fact a formula for peace or genuine American withdrawal, but a perilous negation of these aims.

BECAUSE THE SENATORIAL definition of the peace issue has been accepted, it is easy to think that, when we turn to questions 3 and 4 which deal with cutting off U.S. military and economic aid to the Saigon government, we are no longer dealing with the meat of anti-war demands, but with the gravy. There are a number of misconceptions involved in this. One is that, if the candidate at least answers Yes on those four questions, then even if he falls down on the others he is nonetheless committed to getting the troops out and ending the U.S. bombing. But a closer analysis of questions 3 and 4 will show the opposite; such a candidate would be committed to maintaining the troops and bombing indefinitely.

3. Shall the U.S. end all military aid to the Saigon regime (whether or not President Thieu should resign) on the same basis?

4. Shall the United States end all economic aid to the Saigon regime on the same basis (with any humanitarian exceptions such as an imported rice dole to be distributed through an agency agreed to by the PRG)?

Question 4 as posed in this way might seem to ask the candidate in effect to recognize the PRG as the government of South Vietnam, and to endorse it at the cost of humanitarian aid. Therefore we sent a follow-up letter reformulating the question to make clearer the intended point, to distinguish granting aid to the country and people of South Vietnam, in a politically neutral way, from underwriting the government we have created in Saigon as the chosen instrument of American power.

The revised question 4 was in three parts:

A. Pending an overall settlement of the war, should U.S. economic aid to Vietnam be of a form agreed to by all the major political forces there, including the Provisional Revolutionary Government (or NLF)?

B. Pending such a limited agreement on aid, should all other aid (that is aid worked out only with the Saigon side of the conflict) be suspended beginning from a "date certain"?

C. What date?

McGovern and Chisholm answered first the original and then the revised question, both answers are included here. Humphrey and Muskie responded after the second letter and were able to take the revised question into account.

CHISHOLM:

3. There is no question in my mind that the U.S. government *must* initiate an immediate halt of all military assistance to Saigon.

4. (Original question) I believe that we can in good conscience leave the *people* a land which we have both politically and economically raped, with-

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out some degree of economic assistance. However, this is an item which must be left to negotiation after total military withdrawal.

4. (Revised question) I believe that multilateral aid should be dispensed, but with the approval of all sides involved. An agreement on the specific mechanics of distribution should be worked out in consort with neutral nations.

I further propose that all military assistance to South Vietnam be ended by July 1, 1972. What sum of U.S. economic assistance is granted to the Vietnamese by the United States should be taken directly from Pentagon funds, and so allocated in the military or Defense budget.

HUMPHREY:

3. Yes, I voted for a 250 million dollar ceiling for military assistance to Laos and 250 million to Cambodia. I am against any further military assistance to Vietnam.

4. With respect to your question on economic aid to Vietnam, I prefer to reiterate what I have already said on this subject in the past. I view economic and humanitarian assistance as a matter which transcends governmental relationships since its primary purpose is to assist people in need and not prop up any particular government. Whereas I am clearly against any continuation of military assistance to South Vietnam, I do favor economic assistance for all of Indochina. I think that the same criteria for aid to South Vietnam should be applied as is applied to other countries. In other words, the need for American assistance and the programs where our money would be channeled would have to be rigorously justified before any approval would be given. Any massive reconstruction program in Indochina would only be undertaken after a settlement had been reached, but I do think that we should focus our attention on this possibility now.

It is likely that future aid programs to South Vietnam, assuming that the United States withdraws and the war continues, would be most acceptable if they had the approval of all major political forces in the country. This approach has been taken by the United Nations in Laos and Cambodia. The United States would do well to study this example and work closely with international organizations in any future aid program to South Vietnam.

Finally, I would say that I do not think aid should become a lever to force our will on other countries. This kind of quid pro quo arrangement defeats the central purpose of economic and humanitarian assistance and rarely achieves the goal it sets out to achieve. The Senate during the recent aid debate expressed a desire to move out of bilateral aid programs and into multilateral assistance where there would be fewer strings attached. I support this orientation.

McGOVERN:

3. Yes. Unless we do we will have no basis for claiming that hostilities between the United States and other parties in Southeast Asia have ended.

4. (Original question) No. The U.S. withdrawal could easily push Vietnam over the brink of economic disaster, and I have no wish to accelerate that process. It is a certainty that the removal of our forces and the end to

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UNITED STATES SENATE
Committee on Armed Services
Washington, D.C. 20510

February 29, 1972

Dear Mr. Kolodney:

Thank you very much for your recent letter and for the advance copies of the pieces by you and by Professor Chomsky. I must say that both articles seem to have accepted, in a totally uncritical manner, the North Vietnamese position in regard to the Southeast Asian conflict. I doubt that such onesidedness can contribute very much to a just and equitable solution to the war, one that is fair to all the parties involved.

Nonetheless, I am happy to respond to the issues raised by the several questions you put forward in your letter. On September 1, 1970, in a letter to President Nixon initiated by Senator Scott and me and signed by 28 other Senators (a copy of which is enclosed), I proposed a multi-step program which would have required *all* parties to the conflict to take affirmative actions toward peace. I continue to believe that this sort of mutuality and reciprocity is an acceptable framework for ending the war.

The President's recent eight-point peace proposal embodies many of the same features of our earlier suggestions. I believe that the President's initiative is a basis for genuine negotiations, and that it is now incumbent upon the North Vietnamese to cease demanding the complete capitulation of the Republic of Vietnam as a condition for halting the killing. I do not believe that the cause of peace is furthered by irresponsible, politically-inspired, criticisms. Indeed, endorsement of the North Vietnamese position by well-known Americans only reinforces North Vietnamese intransigence, thereby prolonging the war.

The diplomatic deadlock should not, however, prevent us from reducing our military presence in South Vietnam. I have said that all of our ground combat troops could have been out of Vietnam by the end of 1971. In any event, it is clear that substantial reductions in American force levels have already been made. These can be, and should be, continued.

On the question of future outside aid to the parties involved in the Indochina conflict, I proposed on February 10, 1972, a mutual big-power freeze on military aid to North and South Vietnam (statement enclosed). It seems to me that this is one useful way of ending—or at least reducing—the role of outside powers in the Indochina situation.

The war in Indochina has proved difficult and painful for all concerned. On April 6, 1968, I said that "contrary to the notions of some critics, our basic problem in Vietnam has not been an arrogance of power. Rather, our basic problem has been to achieve a reasonable compromise with an adversary who has not wished to compromise." That, I am sorry to say, is still our basic problem almost four years later.

Sincerely yours,

/s/

Henry M. Jackson, U.S.S.

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military assistance would result in President Thieu's resignation, and in the emergence of a government which would be capable of negotiating a political settlement. Under those conditions I think we have a responsibility to begin repairing the incredible damage we have done to the people and the terrain of Indochina.

4. (Revised question)

A. Yes. Economic aid should be supplied in forms which cannot be used by the South Vietnamese government as a method of solidifying its political position. An effort to achieve agreement of all parties on the form and distribution of such aid would be the best way to achieve that result; and I would strongly pursue such an effort.

B. Since his entire claim to power in Vietnam is based on our military guarantee, there is not the slightest reason to believe that President Thieu could continue to hold power in the context of our complete military disengagement. Both he and the North Vietnamese and National Liberation Front representatives in Paris have told me this directly. I have to say frankly, therefore, that I think the question is based on an impossible premise. In that light, and considering the potential problems involved in reaching agreement on the kinds of economic aid allowable, I would not favor a total economic aid cutoff in the absence of a multiparty agreement. Interruption of humanitarian aid programs going on now would intensify the suffering of a great many innocent people in South Vietnam, and many of those people are suffering at our hands.

C. As noted above, I would not set such a date, although I think an adjustment in our aid program designed to focus on humanitarian relief should coincide with our military withdrawal timetable.

MUSKIE:

3. With regard to the maintenance of military aid to the Saigon government after American withdrawal, I have said that "we must urge the government in Saigon to move toward a political accommodation with all the elements of their society. Without such an accommodation, the war cannot be ended. And it is clear that the American people will not support an indefinite war either by our presence or *by proxy*." Thus, I would not use our aid to perpetuate a war that benefits only the dictatorial Thieu regime. I would condition our military aid on progress toward a political accommodation (and thus an end to all the fighting) in Vietnam.

4. I would treat the economic aid which serves to support the Saigon government in the same way that I would treat military aid. I would definitely make an exception for humanitarian aid which goes directly to serve the needs of people. (I believe this and the previous answer also cover your more recent questions on how I would handle aid to Saigon.)

It would be difficult not to note first of all what—given the vague Liberal-Moderate-Conservative spectrum that usually places Muskie to the left of Humphrey—would appear to be a surprising result: Humphrey is prepared to go further than Muskie on the aid issue, i.e., to oppose at least military aid.

Both Muskie and Humphrey discuss the question of aid as if the withdrawal of direct U.S. military participation by a certain date could proceed even if the aid issue were not satisfactorily settled. But their plans to withdraw "within six months" or "at the earliest possible time" are proposed as *offers* made on the condition of a POW agreement. They treat Vietnamese acceptance of this condition as a foregone conclusion. However, the North Vietnamese Nine Point Peace Plan has already made clear that they are unwilling to meet this condition of release of POWs unless withdrawal of U.S. forces (Point 1) is accompanied by an end to U.S. support to the Saigon regime (Point 3). (The Nine Points end with: "The above points form an integrated whole.")

This was underscored last January after Nixon made public his "generous offer" and denounced the enemy's intransigent rejection of it. The press spokesman of the North Vietnamese delegation in Paris countered: "In the private meetings we had the very clear impression that the Nixon Administration is clinging to its positions and has not budged an inch on our demands for total troop withdrawal and cessation of support for the Saigon regime." This casts a different light on the Peace Alternative as formulated, for instance, in Muskie's response to question 1. "The basic exchange would be a complete end to American military participation in the Indochina war for the return of our prisoners." Muskie campaigns as if this "complete end" awaited only his election, but in fact it is merely an offer of a deal he already knows to be unacceptable. What would the new President Muskie do when he could not deliver the withdrawal and the POWs? Would he pretend surprise? Would he, like Nixon, denounce the enemy for rejecting his generous offer, and keep on pounding them with bombs to force them to submit.

Any candidate who raises hopes of such a POW-Withdrawal exchange, while balking at a critical ingredient on the question of aid, is playing a dangerous game at best. And McGovern, who proposes to go ahead with our part of a nonexistent deal, is setting the stage for vengeful public outrage if they "stab us in the back" by keeping our boys imprisoned. The effect of McGovern's plan—whether intended or not—would be that for the Vietnamese to act as they had clearly said they would, would be made to seem a terrible breach of faith (not to mention a violation of the Geneva Convention on prisoners as interpreted by McGovern in answer 1).

The question of aid to Saigon then is central, not peripheral, to the prospect of peace, and failure to confront it could end in an explosive resurgence of hawkish sentiment. What exactly is at issue?

For Muskie, with his backing of military as well as economic aid, a commitment to continued dominance for the Saigon regime (*sans* Thieu) is fairly explicit in his answers to 3 and 4. He proposes to use military aid to force Saigon "to move toward a political accommodation with all the elements of their society." He would "condition our military aid on progress toward a political accommodation (and thus an end to all the fighting)." Giving military aid to one side in a war to force it to accommodate its enemies is a novel idea; normally we give such aid to help force its enemies to submit. He does not want "an indefinite war" even "by proxy," but the political accommodation he wants to bring about seems to amount

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to conciliatory terms for a Saigon victory.

Of the four candidates only Muskie proposes military assistance, and only he acknowledges support for a broadened Saigon regime as an *aim* of aid. The others restrict themselves to economic aid, and the aim projected is humanitarian, any benefits to the Saigon regime as the recipient and agent being purely incidental. Now this is really a pretty thin argument. A less likely model for humanitarian effort is difficult to conceive than the U.S. financing of the government in Saigon —a government legendary for corruption, preoccupied with maintaining an army of a million with which to prosecute an abhorrent war, which still manages to channel most of the foreign exchange we provide right back out of the country for the purchase of luxury goods by its pampered elite; an economic assistance program watched over by USAID which functions explicitly as a military adjunct and notoriously as a CIA conduit and cover in Indochina. Can there be any question that, pending a political settlement and a new government, humanitarian interests would be better served if all U.S. financial assistance to South Vietnam were funneled through the Swedish government or the United Nations and programmed and administered independent of Saigon's control or ours?

Rep. Chisholm seems to accept such a plan in her answer to revised question 4 (assuming her second paragraph merely refers to how the aid described in the first should be accounted in the U.S. Federal Budget). Humphrey's second paragraph is tentative and noncomittal. McGovern's argument is curious: The denial of military aid by itself will unseat Thieu, leading to a political settlement. Since the military cutoff will suffice to bring on a settlement, the suffering that would be caused by withholding in the interim economic aid as well would be unnecessary, gratuitous. All the better, one would think, to bypass the Saigon government in the first place through Sweden or the UN. And that will hasten Saigon's downfall, cutting short the unnecessary suffering of continued war while we wait for the military cutoff alone to bring it down.

ALL THIS HAS LITTLE TO DO with the real issues at stake. Access to American money is the principle of cohesion that holds together the structure of the Saigon government's power, its military machine, administrative apparatus, all the greased palms and beholden elites that support it. It is not really even a question of economically starving this entity. Should it become known that the access to U.S. money was *going to be* cut off, this center of power which is the prime instrument of American influence in Vietnam would begin immediately to disintegrate. Humphrey and McGovern apparently accept the possibility of a coalition government in Vietnam, perhaps formed during the early days in office of the new U.S. President. But what a coalition government means depends on how the Saigon structure enters into it, to what extent it remains intact, how much control of its military and administrative resources it retains, what territory it effectively controls, what social elements gravitate to it. If it remains intact, if it can make good use of continued access to U.S. money and backing of American power, then, even though it were the weaker element of a coalition, all is not lost for U.S. strategy in Vietnam. Such a coalition, as we proved in Laos, leaves myriad openings for the U.S. to expand its influence. Compromises can be torpedoed, coups engineered, discord programmed —everything, secret armies, Air America, the CIA, a whole new beginning is possible. But, if a new government is formed in Vietnam on the basis of a disintegrating Saigon regime, the elements of its power dissolved and dispersed, that is a different story.

The weight and unity that our Saigon subsidiary would carry into a new government depends in great measure on the resolution of political and military forces at the moment the settlement is made. And that turns in large part on two things: whether the assurance of access to U.S. money holds it together and whether the bargaining power of the U.S. military threat stands behind it. The North Vietnamese Nine Points call for formation of a new government at a point when both these elements would be absent. The peace plans of Humphrey and McGovern would in effect get around this.

It is worth considering what the offer of withdrawal tendered to the Vietnamese actually amounts to. Nixon is most likely going to offer some kind of dove-pleasing spectacular before election day. (Last January's did leave the opposition speechless, but it was too early to be his last word.) Whatever else it includes, the number of U.S. ground troops in South Vietnam by next January 20 is likely to be relatively small. At the same time Nixon will by then surely have given the Saigon government enough military supplies and reserves to make further *military* aid not critical for some time to come. Now the basic withdrawal plan proposed calls for withdrawing as fast as they can go, those GI s whom Nixon has left around, cutting off the military aid that Saigon hardly needs, and stopping the bombing (or promising to do so as soon as the date certain arrives and the GIs are out). The North Vietnamese are supposed to be rushing the U.S. POWs home at the same rate the GI s leave the South. The exchange: the North Vietnamese give up the most critical political leverage they hold on U.S. policy in Vietnam, the one thing that has kept the war a serious political liability at home, presses us toward a peace settlement, and limits our options of aggression.

In return, they get a few thousand non-combat GIs out of Vietnam and two American promises. The first they can add to their collection of U.S. bombing halts; the second, that military aid will not be resumed, they can file with the similar provision of the 1954 and 1962 Geneva Accords. Presumably if we break these promises we have to return the POWs to them.

If there is to be a coalition government, the question is whether it will be formed with the Saigon dollar line intact, the POWs safe at home, and U.S. airpower, at best withdrawn anywhere from 6 to 48 hours away, standing behind it.

What it comes down to is that each side has one fairly irretrievable concession at stake. For them, release of the POWs. For us, allowing a coalition government to form in a context where the Saigon regime is not backed

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by access to money and the U.S. bombing threat. Approved through concession first, by releasing the POWs before a coalition forms, our concession will never be made. But, once a coalition is formed, they would have to make their concession good because the POWs would then be a liability, a political basis for new U.S. attacks. The Nine Points call for this timetable: we stop supporting the Saigon regime, allowing it to collapse, at that point the process of coalition will begin along with a cease-fire, U.S. withdrawal and return of POWs.

That is the significance of their including a cessation of support for Saigon, as well as withdrawal of troops, as conditions for the POW release. So when the doves gloss over the question of economic aid as a purely humanitarian, politically incidental problem, they are placing a serious obstacle in the way of peace, and they are evading the demands of true withdrawal from Vietnam.

The one question of the seven not yet covered, question 5, though rather inconclusive is nevertheless illuminating on this point.

5. Shall withdrawal of U.S. forces include withdrawal of any or all of the military equipment bases, supplies, and reserves now being transferred to the Saigon regime, or are these to be looked on as Vietnamese and therefore immune to withdrawal? If any of this material is to be withdrawn, what? How much?

CHISHOLM:

5. I believe that total immediate withdrawal of all U.S. manpower to be the imperative priority. The usage of residual equipment bases, supplies, etc., should be left open to negotiation only after that first priority has been achieved.

HUMPHREY:

5. I have sponsored Senate Bill S2985 which would halt such giveaways of military materiel in Indochina not authorized by Congress.

McGOVERN:

5. We should withdraw that portion of military equipment which costs less to transport than to replace.

MUSKIE:

5. Although the United States would naturally withdraw much of the equipment its forces have been using in Vietnam, dismantling all bases built by the United States and withdrawing all American weapons would not in fact

ticable. Nor would a commitment to do so serve any real purpose. It presumes that we and the North Vietnamese can settle all of the issues of the war between us. This issue would become academic in the context of a political settlement worked out by the Vietnamese themselves. As I have said, we should urge such a settlement.

All the answers missed the intended point. The candidates deal with the residue of equipment still in U.S. hands next January 20. The question meant to point to the fact that arms, which even now are still American, are being given and transferred to the Saigon army and will be magically transformed into indigenous Vietnamese resources by the time the candidates' promise of withdrawal comes due. Of course it was a question that could not really be confronted because how could they answer? How far back does one draw the line? It was *all* American once, and that reveals the key point about a true withdrawal: It still is, that government which we called into being to serve us. We gave it its constitution and its political police, its bureaucracy and its corruption. Its leaders are our viceroys, its armies our mercenaries. Even though the last GI may ship out and President Thieu may be discarded, it stands as the cornerstone of our intervention, the creature of our aggression, the fruit of genocide.

That is why we have a responsibility to cut off its support and undo its power. That is also why the most dovish candidates may balk at cutting off economic aid, because to do that is to deny its legitimacy, to renounce our control, to admit defeat.

At this writing the results of the offensive launched in early April are still undetermined. For radicals there is always a tendency, especially because they understand its illegitimacy, to dismiss the client government as weak, corrupt and doomed. Thus one may speculate that the issue of cutting off economic aid will be swept aside by the liberation armies. But speculation is not politics, and the political point at least must be made. Moreover, to take the passive attitude of a football fan exhilarated by a winning team would be callous and destructive. These are costly victories and the price of every victory is increased by the torpor of the anti-war movement at home. And, finally, the measures of victory may be far from clear. Eventually a new government may well be forced into being, but it will represent a complex resolution of victories and defeats, military and political, in Vietnam and in the United States.

For the Presidential Peace Candidates the fundamental question in Vietnam is the same as it has been since the U.S. first subverted the Geneva Accords of 1954 (after paying 80 percent of the cost of the French war). Does the peace candidate propose now to make our intervention cheaper, cleaner, less direct, to salvage the instruments of our control, to leave an opening for a resurgence of our power? Or will he really turn his back on the savage 20-year attempt at American dominion? ■