

24 DEC 1972

B-52s Pound N. Vietnam For 7th Day

From News Dispatches

U.S. planes continued the heaviest assault of the war on North Vietnam through a sixth day Saturday, as Hanoi accused the U.S. of waging an "extermination" bombing campaign against populated areas.

U.S. and South Vietnamese intelligence agents monitored a radio message reporting that North Vietnam's legendary Defense Minister Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap was killed Friday in an explosion while touring a bomb-damaged area of Haiphong.

But Washington Post correspondent Peter Osnos reported from Saigon that the origin of the report, a spoken and uncoded message from somewhere in North Vietnam, was not clear and intelligence sources expressed doubt that it was genuine.

The North Vietnamese delegation to the Paris peace talks denied the report of Giap's death with extraordinary rapidity, Washington Post correspondent Jonathan Randal reported. The formal denial was issued 90 minutes after the report first surfaced in Paris.

Seven foreign embassies in Hanoi—those of East Germany, Bulgaria, India, Egypt, Cambodia, Cuba and Albania—and the Hungarian trade mission have now been damaged by American bombs, according to reports from several capitals.

The Soviet news agency Tass reported Saturday that U.S. airstrikes on Hanoi had resulted in casualties among American pilots held in the main POW camp in the North Vietnamese capital.

Tass correspondent Alexander Mineyev reported from Hanoi that raids "during three straight nights" had dropped bombs in the area of a prison camp.

"There were wounded among the prisoners," he said. He did not indicate the number of casualties and reported that a POW camp official said the injured had been taken to a hospital for treatment.

U.S. raids against targets in North Vietnam continued Saturday and Sunday. Hanoi Ra-

dio claimed two more B-52s were shot down over Haiphong in Saturday's raids, bringing to 17 the number of big bombers North Vietnam claims to have downed this week.

The U.S. command in Saigon announced that two B-52s were shot down in Friday's raids. It has now reported that a total of 10 B-52s have been shot down since the renewed bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong began last Monday.

Agence France-Presse correspondent Jean Thoraval reported from Hanoi that U.S. planes made their 40th raid of the week against the North Vietnamese capital at dawn Saturday.

He reported that while some residents of Hanoi can be seen fleeing to the countryside on bicycles or carts, people remain in the city in "big numbers, calmly continuing their daily activities, despite the alerts and the destruction of buildings, sometimes right in the middle of the city, that are in no way military."

Thoraval also reported that the weekly Aeroflot flight which lands at Hanoi's Gialan airport was cancelled Saturday because the only stretch of runway left unscathed by bombs was too short to receive a four-engine jet.

But he said a turboprop Chinese civilian plane managed to land in Hanoi after waiting in Anning, Southern China, for more than 20 hours for a lull in the bombing.

The North Vietnamese message reporting Giap's death said he was killed Friday at the Tran Hung Dao armaments depot in Haiphong when a delayed-action bomb dropped by U.S. warplanes exploded.

Correspondent Osnos reported from Saigon that intelligence officials said a message of such importance would almost certainly have been in code.

"It could well have been a plant," one official told Osnos. There have been erroneous reports before of the death of North Vietnam's top military strategist, who became a legend after defeating the French at Dienbienphu in 1954.

In Paris, the North Vietnamese delegation to the peace talks termed the report of Giap's death "an out-and-out invention of the CIA." A spokesman said: "We do not stoop to deny this product of the CIA's war of aggression and warfare."

The North Vietnamese Foreign Ministry, in a statement broadcast by Hanoi Radio, accused the United States of waging an "extermination" bombing campaign against populated areas, destroying homes, schools and pagodas.

"By doing this, Nixon has committed crimes even more barbarous than those of Hitler," the Foreign Ministry statement said.

A statement issued by the Hanoi delegation in Paris said B-52s had leveled villages, hospitals and schools in "saturation bombing" raids against "the most densely populated regions in North Vietnam."

The Hungarian news agency and Tass both reported that the Hungarian commercial mission and the East German embassy in Hanoi were damaged in the U.S. bombing raids. The Bulgarian news agency reported that the Bulgarian Embassy in Hanoi was also damaged. Radio Hanoi Saturday added the Albanian and Cambodian embassies to the list of those which have been reported damaged by U.S. bombs.

In New Delhi, U.S. charge d'affaires Lee Stull was summoned to the Foreign Ministry Saturday to receive a protest over damage to the Indian embassy in Hanoi Thursday. A U.S. spokesman said Stull expressed deep regret over any damage caused by American bombers.

In Warsaw, U.S. charge d'affaires Davis E. Booster saw Poland's deputy foreign minister Friday and delivered "profound condolences" for the death of three Polish seamen killed in Haiphong when their ship was reportedly hit and sunk by U.S. bombers, Warsaw newspapers reported today.

The Bulgarian and Hungarian news agencies also reported that the Bach Mai Hospital in Hanoi—heavily damaged in Friday's raids—was hit for the second time Saturday.

The North Vietnam News Agency said Sunday that "more than 25" workers at Bach Mai Hospital and members of their families were killed in the two raids. Casualties to patients were avoided by evacuating them before the bombing.

The first bombing attack

tion of the Bach Mai hospital, wrecked the ear-nose-throat institute and "completely demolished" a research section, Hanoi said. A second B-52 raid Saturday "laid a carpet of bombs of different calibers on a long stretch going from the gate of the hospital to different sections and patient wards," the agency reported.

This strike damaged every untouched room, including underground sections of the hospital, and destroyed the departments of dermatology, internal medicine, pharmacology, administration, kitchens, repair shops and laundries, Hanoi said.

Worldwide Protests Mounted on Bombing

From News Dispatches

Denunciations of the U.S. bombing campaign against North Vietnam were reported in a number of cities around the world yesterday.

Sweden's Prime Minister Olof Palme called the bombing an "outrage on a level with the Nazi massacres of World War II."

U.N. Secretary General Kurt Waldheim said he was greatly disturbed by the continued bombing and called for a resumption of the Paris talks.

In Dacca, Bangladesh students ransacked the U.S. Information Service building and burned President Nixon in effigy Friday night.

About 200 persons demonstrated against the bombing in front of the U.S. embassy in Tokyo.

29 NOV 1972

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Laos: New facts on secret war

By Richard E. Ward
Second of a series

Clandestine sabotage, combat and espionage missions have been conducted in Laos and Cambodia by U.S. military personnel, despite White House denials and contrary to congressional prohibition.

Such missions are top-secret actions directed by the Studies and Observations Group of the U.S. Army Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, located in Saigon and generally known by its initials, MAC-V SOG. The most comprehensive picture of these activities available, based on testimony of former participants in these missions, known as Command and Control operations, is contained in a series of three articles by Gerald Meyer, published in the Nov. 5, 10 and 12 issues of the St. Louis Post Dispatch.

Unless otherwise indicated all material in this article is based on the articles by Meyer, a regular staff member of the Post Dispatch, who interviewed former Special Forces members, helicopter pilots and others who took part in the Command and Control operations during the 1960s and into 1972.

The Post Dispatch's informants, whose names were not revealed to protect them from possible prosecution, stated that the clandestine commando raids were still in progress as of August. One informant said that in August when he left Bien Hoa, one of the Command and Control bases, more than 100 Army Special Forces were stationed there and reinforcements were being sent from Okinawa.

The commando raids in recent years, utilizing Army personnel who generally command teams composed of mercenaries from Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam, were also sent into North Vietnam and liberated areas of South Vietnam. There is evidence that the Air Force has operational jurisdiction over a similar program based at Nakon Phanom, Thailand, just across the Laotian border.

Commando raids were ordered by

Washington against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in the early 1960's, as documented in the Pentagon Papers, but which provided few details. The present program, apparently undergoing a partial "Vietnamization," is an outgrowth of the original escalation of CIA-Special Forces missions in Indochina ordered by the Kennedy administration.

Although the Post Dispatch does not mention the CIA, it is clear that Studies and Observations Group is a CIA operation. The informant most knowledgeable about SOG, a Special Forces officer, was described by correspondent Meyer as fearful of being jailed or fined, saying: "If I talked to you and got caught, I could get 10 years in prison and a \$10,000 fine."

The Special Forces officer said that the connections between Command and Control and the 'MAC-V SOG' organization in Saigon were so highly classified that we would not risk commenting on them," wrote Meyer.

Despite his reluctance to talk the officer explained that the Command and Control operations were "formally" under the direction of the Fifth Special Forces Group until January 1971, when the Fifth Special Forces officially was described as having been withdrawn from Vietnam. Actually, according to Meyer, "numerous Fifth Special Forces were left behind at Command and Control bases throughout South Vietnam" and various efforts were employed to conceal their continued presence. They were forbidden to wear the green beret and Special Forces insignia while they remained in Indochina.

Symbolic of the Command and Control operations, was a gestapo-like insignia, used by one of the units, a green-bereted skull with blood dripping from its teeth. This was the emblem of Command and Control Central. There were at least two other main units, Command and Control North and Command and Control South. The North, Central and South referred to the base areas of the commando teams.

Apparently most of the operations under the Command and Control program, at least in recent years, took place in southern Laos. However, after the U.S.-Saigon invasion of Cambodia and subsequent Congressional prohibition against use of U.S. ground troops in Cambodia, it is safe to assume that the secret U.S. missions were increased in the latter country.

Airborne bandits

Typically, Command and Control missions comprised several U.S. officers or NCO's commanding a mercenary team which would land in Laos or Cambodia, and "aimed at taking prisoners, gathering information and disrupting communist activities." The commandos would be transported in four helicopters, while four helicopter gunships would provide air cover, at least initially. Two other aircraft, one serving as a command post and a second as the forward air controller, were also involved in missions.

One Special Forces veteran, who participated in Command and Control raids from Danang, said he had taken part in missions in North Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. "He said they were for the purpose of gathering intelligence, rescuing other American missions threatened by North Vietnamese forces, destroying supplies and disrupting enemy communications facilities."

Command and Control Central, operating out of Dakto and Kontum, near the tri-border area of South Vietnam and Laos and Cambodia, was used for raids deep within the two latter countries.

"A Special Forces soldier formerly assigned to Command and Control Central said that the group's missions were handled by about 150 Americans and from 300 to 400

Montagnard tribesmen. Men participating in missions first were transported to Dakto and then sent by helicopter across the borders, he said.

"The missions were rotated among the men and casualties were severe, the man said. . . . Such teams usually included two or three American leaders and about half a dozen Montagnards.

"Dakto was the starting point also for large 'hatchet forces,' with larger numbers of Americans and Montagnards. . . .

"Less frequently—apparently only about once every six months—very large groups of Americans were sent across the borders on so-called Slam (Search, locate and annihilate) missions. More than 100 men sometimes participated in such missions. . . .

"Some penetrations into Laos apparently were quite deep. Both the Special Forces (two of Meyer's informants) said the U.S. operated a radio relay station on a mountain top about 30 miles inside Laos.

"This station, called the 'Eagle's Nest,' was used to transmit messages between South Vietnam and Command and Control teams operating beyond the mountain top in the Laotian countryside."

The radio station, whose exact location was not specified, could have been located near the Bolovens plateau, in Southern Laos, where the Pathet Lao told this correspondent in 1970 there was a secret U.S. base. The Pathet Lao liberation forces captured

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STATINTL

Capitol Punishment

A Small Favor

By Art Buchwald

If Richard Nixon wins the election next week, most of the credit will go to Lu Doc Toy who heads the "Communists For Nixon" Committee in Hanoi.

Lu Doc Toy who, until this election, always voted the straight Communist party ticket, decided to support Nixon this year because he said, "I'm sick and tired of having my kids bused along the Ho Chi Minh Trail."

Having made the decision, Lu Doc Toy contacted the Committee for the Re-election of the President in Washington which sent one of their top CIA men to Hanoi to help him in the campaign.

Lu Doc Toy told the CIA man, "I need bumper stickers, buttons, posters and a secret fund to get the Communists For Nixon off the ground."

The CIA man said, "We've written off North Vietnam as far as electoral votes go, but you could help us tremendously in getting the President re-elected with a small favor."

"What can I do? Lu Doc asked.

"Arrange a peace treaty with the U.S. a week before the elections."

"It's done," Lu Doc Toy said. "My cousin is a member of the Politburo and he owes me a favor."

Lu Doc Toy went to see his cousin Ton Son Not in his bomb shelter the next day. During a 15-minute break in the bombing he said, "Ton Son Not, as you know I am head of the Communists For Nixon and I have a small favor to ask of you."

"You have dishonored your ancestors. Lu Doc Toy," Ton Son Not said. "How can you support a man whose party would bug the Watergate?"

"It was a prank," Lu Doc Toy said. "Everyone does it during an election year. Besides Nixon knew nothing about it."

"That's what all the Communists For Nixon say. But we know differently. Besides, how could you work for a man who said he would stop the war in 1968?"

"Exactly," Lu Doc Toy said. "That's what I came to speak to you about Nixon wants to stop the war again, only this time before the election."

"It's a trick," Ton Son Not said. "What does he want in exchange for it?"

"Nothing we wouldn't have given him in 1968. It's the same deal that was offered to him then."

"But why now? I thought the U.S bombing was working."

"Who knows what goes on with those cockamamie Americans? But I'm giving it to you straight. If you people say okay Nixon will send what's-his-name to Paris to sign the deal."

"Wait a minute," Ton Son Not said, "If we agree to a peace settlement, that means we'll have four more years of Nixon."

"Look, Ton Son Not." Lu Doc Toy said, "We hold the key to the American presidential election in our hands. We have to decide whether we want Nixon for President and a generation of peace, or whether we want the misguided, badly thought out, socialistic programs of George McGovern."

The bombing started again. "WHAT ABOUT THIEU? WILL HE GO ALONG WITH IT?" Ton Son Not yelled.

"DON'T WORRY ABOUT THIEU," Lu Doc Toy yelled back. "HE'LL DO ANYTHING NIXON ASKS HIM TO!"

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STATINTL

11 OCT 1972

Voice covertly broadcasts propaganda to Vietnamese

By Bernard Zubres

Written for The Christian Science Monitor

The news unit of the Voice of America has been covertly broadcasting anti-Communist propaganda to the North Vietnamese since the beginning of their spring offensive. The operation was launched on direct orders from the White House — reportedly over the protests of the newsroom editors.

The VOA's news unit is supposed to be as untainted as possible. News writers are supposed to have two separate sources of information on any story used (if it doesn't come from a field reporter). The Voice is supposed to be a paragon of objective reporting, modeled on the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC).

The 18 hours of daily programming beamed at North Vietnam are intended to weaken the morale of the North Vietnamese. The shows include reading the names of North Vietnamese prisoners of war, and any editorial material from American newspapers critical of North Vietnam.

This propaganda activity is in apparent contravention of the VOA's charter which calls for news to be presented in a balanced and factual manner. Propaganda is left for the non-news programming. On language programs other than Vietnamese the VOA news is generally scrupulous about its objectivity.

The VOA's propaganda activity first came to public attention when the Japanese Government protested the use of the American transmitter in Okinawa in broadcasting anti-North Vietnamese programs. The State De-

partment flatly, and in good conscience, said no propaganda programs were being broadcast from Okinawa. What the State Department failed to say was that the programs are simply being retransmitted from Okinawa. They are broadcast from Washington.

The voice has not staffed the operation with regular employees, because they don't believe it will become a fixture. The special programs are supposed to end simultaneously with the termination of the spring offensive. VOA newsroom editors and managers protested its existence.

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and military aircraft often drop transistor radios to the North Vietnamese so they can listen to the programs.

Critics of the programs say the broadcasts probably are self defeating. The North Vietnamese can listen to the BBC, Radio Moscow, French, Dutch, Australian, Korean, Japanese, and Chinese newscasts. There are those who say the harm to the VOA news' reputation from these U.S. propaganda programs under VOA auspices is great.

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U.S. Harassed POWs, Princeton Prof Says

Princeton professor Richard A. Falk, just back from escorting home the three American POWs released in Hanoi, claims the Defense Department may have jeopardized the safety of all POWs held in North Vietnam by inserting espionage materials in personal packages sent by their families.

In talking with seven other prisoners, Falk said "various kinds of CIA gadgetry had been sent in hollow soap bars and peanuts" and the American POWs "seemed disturbed about this."

Falk, of Millbank, one of four peace activists who retrieved the POWs from Hanoi, said the release "was an experience to see whether such a gesture could elicit a constructive response on the part of the United States Government."

But "it hasn't elicited a con-

structive response," he said. According to Falk, a favorable response would have been "either an attitude of appreciation for release of the three prisoners or in doing something construed as a reciprocal gesture" such as halting the bombing of North Vietnam.

Cites Harassment

Falk charged that the administration "persistently" harassed the three pilots on their way home and described their arrival in New York as "a recapture ceremony rather than a reunion."

"What I found most irresponsible about the government's handling of this thing is not only the harassment beginning in Moscow but also the failure of the government to ask us, the pilots, or their relatives why it might jeopardize the chances of others if they persisted in this action," said the professor of

international law at Princeton.

Falk said there was no "genuine basis for such interference."

"All three were prepared to turn themselves in to the military after a few days back with their families," he said.

Falk said the North Vietnamese didn't say anything that would suggest further releases of this type would be contemplated.

"But they did say in a negative sense that attempts by the U.S. Government to use the pilots to propagandize the war effort would jeopardize further chances for prisoner releases," Falk said.

Treated Well

The Americans were treated well by their North Vietnamese captors, according to Falk. Conditions in POW camps "were never bad and were consistently improving over the period of their confinement."

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Col. Hogan in Hanoi?

It looks as if Hanoi's Communist propagandists have gone astray, again, in charging that packages received by American prisoners of war from their relatives at home have contained hollowed out peanuts, soap and toys with messages and a giant-size tube of toothpaste with a radio receiver in it.

The accusation is that these and other devices have been sent to POWs in an effort to enlist them as spies. Spies? From prison cells?

The Politburo must be tuned in to those everlasting re-runs of the TV comedy series, Hogan's Heroes, who are pictured as World War II POWs raising all kinds of hell for the Nazi war machine from a spy base in Stalag 13.

It's really too much to believe that relatives would knowingly endanger their sons and husbands in Communist prison quarters by sending them materials for spying. Or that the CIA, the Pentagon or any official of the U. S. government would do it, considering the futility of such a project. ✓

The display was shown to the anti-war activists who went to Hanoi to help Hanoi's propagandists publicize the release of three American POWs. One of them said, "It looks to us an unmistakably professional job." Meaning, one supposes, the CIA. The CIA has done some silly things, only revealed when their agents have been caught, but we'd hate to think the agency is as naive as the Hanoi Politburo is in making such charges, and the people who swallow them.

29 SEP 1972

STATOTHR

Inside North Vietnam

Bombings Take Toll of Famed

Church

This is one of a series of articles by the chief Washington correspondent of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Richard Dudman, who has returned from two weeks in North Vietnam.

Long before it was bombed this year, the cathedral of Phatdiem was a routine showplace for foreign visitors. North Vietnamese leaders wanted to refute the idea that they suppress Catholicism.

Now the wrecked church complex has become a high-priority exhibit of the horrors of the war for such views as the three U.S. pilots released this week and the American delegation that went to bring them home.

A tour of the area on Sept. 4 showed at least four bomb craters within the cathedral compound.

The central Cathedral is in two parts, one of them an ornate stone belfry topped with swooping Chinese-style roofs and human figures as well as crosses. It was undamaged.

Behind it, the huge wooden main building, 250 feet long and 70 feet wide inside, had been battered by a bomb that had struck in a courtyard beside it. Fragments of tile lay in the pews, and the wreckage of carved wooden paneling lay on the floor. Flagstones from the courtyard lay on the roof, where they had been hurled by the explosion.

Two Churches Guttled

To the west, across the courtyard, two smaller churches, St. Joseph's and St. Peter's, both had been gutted by the blast. A choir hall had been wrecked by another bomb that shattered two walls and the roof.

On the east side of the main cathedral, St. Roco's Church had been smashed by another bomb. Behind it, a small all-stone church said to have been built in 1875 and to be the oldest in the group was undamaged. Its religious statues had been removed for safekeeping.

Some of the churches in the Roman Catholic complex had been damaged by the Johnson administration's bombing raids of the 1960s. Officials said they had been restored by the time regular bombing of North Vietnam was resumed this year. The craters and wreckage observed there this month obviously were fresh.

A local official, Pham Ngoc Ho, vice chairman of the Kimson district administrative committee, said that two of the churches were hit July 24, when six bombs were dropped on the area. He said 19 persons were killed and six injured.

Ho, who said he was not a Christian, reported that a second attack came on Aug. 15, which he said was a religious holiday—"the day St. Mary went up to the sky." Aug. 15 was the Feast of the Assumption. He said five were killed and three injured.

"The Catholics had several masses that day, but they were in an evacuation church away from here," he said. "Four planes came just before 4 o'clock in the afternoon. They circled overhead for 20 minutes. Then they dropped 10 bombs on the churches and some houses next to them."

Survivors presented

Several victims and survivors of the two attacks were presented. One of them was a 12-year-old girl named Nguyen Thi Tho, who wore a St. Mary medal on a string around her neck and the customary white cloth around her head for mourning.

"On Aug. 15, my mother was drying rice in the sun on the stone pavement near the church, on the other side from our house," she said. "When I heard the warning, I got into our shelter. The American planes came, and I heard a bomb explode close by. People said it hit in the churchyard on the other side of the church. I saw that my mother had been there. I ran to the place and found her lying

there. She was already dead."

"Little Tho," as the Vietnamese call the girl, is the eldest of four children. Their father, a farmer, now builds dikes and digs irrigation canals, she said.

The pastor of three local parishes expressed the opinion that the bombing of the churches was deliberate. The Rev. Vu Hieu Cuc, 75, was interviewed in a parish conference room decorated with a crucifix, a defunct grandfather clock, two sets of water buffalo horns and an elephant's tooth.

A sign on the wall in Vietnamese said, "Deep regrets at the death of Ho Chi Minh."

"I think the Americans have suffered heavy failures on the battlefield and now are trying to threaten us by killing many people," he said. "And now they are trying to kill many Christians and destroy many churches in order to arouse the people against the government."

If that was the intent—to turn a potentially dissident minority group against the government—he said it had failed in his parishes.

"Fight to the End"

"These Christians know very well the crimes committed by the Americans," he said. "They know that they must take up arms, and I know they are willing to fight to the end even if the war drags on for many years."

He said he was advising Catholics to dig bomb shelters at their homes and around the churches. In answer to a question, he said he would shoot down an American plane if he had the opportunity.

Father Cuc said the congregations of his three parishes totaled 1,650. The number of crosses and religious medals worn by townsfolk made that the community was about half Catholic. He said he did not know how

many Catholics there were in all of North Vietnam, but he said there were 80,000 in Ninhbinh province, which includes the Phatdiem diocese.

Officials in Hanoi said there were 800,000 practicing Roman Catholics in North Vietnam. Some well informed U.S. government specialists consider that figure reasonable.

Whatever difficulties the Hanoi government may have had in the past with its Roman Catholic minority, the Catholics now appear to be regarded as a loyal segment of the population.

Officials referred to what they called a propaganda campaign by the United States in 1954 to try to persuade all the Catholics to move south of the 17th parallel. They described the campaign as partly successful.

Reports Disputed

Reports that the Hanoi government had executed some 500,000 Roman Catholics in a ruthless land-reform campaign in 1955 and 1956 have lately been disputed. On the contrary, it is said by some students of the episode, this "bloodbath" story was a piece of black propaganda fabricated by persons subsidized by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.

In any case, many Roman Catholics remain in the North and continue to practice their religion there. Their attendance at daily mass in large numbers and their obvious knowledge of the ritual supported the official line that freedom of religion is permitted.

Whether the Catholics can be considered first-class citizens in a Communist society is another question. One bit of evidence suggested that they are not.

continued

27 SEP 1972

Reds say POW's get spy kits

Peking anti-American anti-war activists, in Peking with three prisoners of war released by North Vietnam, disclosed yesterday a charge by Hanoi that United States packages mailed to POW's have contained spying devices, rigged into such things as cans of milk.

The Pentagon called the charge ridiculous.

The charge was first made on the American delegation's second day in Hanoi September 17. Hoang Tong, editor of the official Communist party newspaper, *Nhan Dan*, said his government was "extremely upset by electronic devices hidden in packages regularly sent to prisoners."

The activist delegation—Cora Weiss, David Dellinger, the Rev. William Sloane Coffin and Richard Falk—who went to Hanoi to get the prisoners, said they asked for evidence to prove the charge. This evidence, they assert, was displayed Monday shortly before the group left for Peking and thence Moscow en route to the United States.

As described by the delegation, the nearest thing to an "electronic device" seemed to be material for a radio receiver.

A correspondent accompanying the group did not see the display. He had attended various meetings with the three released POW's and seven other POW's who were brought forward for interviews Monday, but was not advised that the alleged espionage materials were to be shown.

Later Mrs. Weiss told of the display and passed on photographs which she said the North Vietnamese had described as showing packages and contents sent to American prisoners.

"Too ridiculous"

A Pentagon spokesman, Maj. Gen. Daniel James, said when asked to comment in Washington: "The charges are too ridiculous to dignify by trying to address them in detail. I know of no instance of such actions taking place, and I think it is just another of the propaganda web that Hanoi is spinning to obscure the real facts concerning her intransigent position in refusing to negotiate meaningfully for our prisoners of war."

From the pictures could be discerned three names of alleged recipients—Charles R. Tyler, of Mesa, Ariz.; Edward A. Brudno, of Harrison, N.J., and William Robinson, of Robersonville, N.C.

Mrs. Weiss's group told of the following:

1. An extra-large tube of Colgate toothpaste which when squeezed revealed what Hanoi said was a receiving apparatus with a battery compartment and an earpiece.

2. Inside a candy bar were two pieces of cellulose paper, each 2 by 3 inches, with instructions for writing messages that would not be detectable. The special paper was to be folded so that it made a sharp edge, and the secret message was to be written with this edge, the North Vietnamese said. Then, by using a code word in a normal letter, the prisoner would tell the person receiving his letter that there was a special message to be found by special processing of the paper.

3. A peanut shell that had been hollowed out and contained a message, and also cans of milk and instant coffee which Hanoi said also had contained messages.

4. A toy hippopotamus about 1½ inches long, sealed, which when opened showed an enclosure with raised writing on one side reading "see secret hiding place" and on the other, "hold together, stand up."

5. A wrapped bar of soap that had been cut in half, each half gouged out and containing plastic bags full of capsules said by the North Vietnamese to be used for secret writing.

One small cellulose sheet was said to have asked for verification of the deaths of five American fliers, as announced by the North Vietnamese, and information about any others known to be dead.

The same sheet asked recipients to provide any information about prisoners captured anywhere in Indochina. The instructions with this were said to read:

"Identify X reference word X provide details on letter writing procedure X. Are you under constant observation by guards or interrogators while writing home queries? Are some POW's not allowed to write? Do you get to keep your letters from home? Do POW's have access to or control of communications receivers? What frequencies and times can you receive queries? If not available, what critical parts are needed to build a receiver? How effective is covert POW communications?"

September 1972

by TOM SCHUSTER

THE CIA'S WAR WITH RED CHINA AND OTHER ASIAN LANDS

THE OLD WORLD WAR TWO C-46 bounced and yawed in the violent turbulence as its twin engines strained to maintain 160 knots. Its American pilot gripped the controls with every ounce of strength he could muster, and his eyes ached from the strain of searching the darkness to avoid the towering Himalayan mountains on each side. They'd taken off from a secret base over three hours ago and were threading their way east of the Tibetan capital of Lhasa, long occupied by the forces of Red China. Their mission: drop agents and supplies to a band of Tibetan guerrillas who were still fighting the Communists. The copilot, sweating over the air chart in his lap, tried to guide them to the drop zone that a mysterious American "civilian" at their base had earlier described. "Hold your course," he yelled. "Another two minutes should put us right on." The pilot reached up, flicking on the "get-ready" light to alert the Tibetan agents who'd be jumping, and the plane crew who would kick the supplies out. "Go!" he yelled and switched on the buzzer. Just as the last chute opened, the old plane was suddenly rocked by deadly Communist 37mm antiaircraft fire and the pilot cursed to himself, "Goddam— bastards were waiting for us."

But he managed to drop down and contour fly the valley floors, below the Red radar, and just after dawn they landed back at their base. They climbed from the plane, their gray uniforms soaked through with sweat, and the pilot

muttered for the thousandth time, "There's gotta be an easier way to make a buck." The C-46 was ancient, but its skin had been polished to shine like a mirror. Back toward the tail were small blue letters that spelled out "Air America." The only other identifying marks were the fresh 37mm holes in the left wing panels.

Throughout Asia, people have come to recognize these strange aircraft and their even stranger American pilots. Especially the pilots. You learn to spot them wherever you are. They're the guys in the gray Air Force-type uniforms, crushed caps, cowboy boots, with pistols hanging at their sides. They can be found raising hell in the Suzy Wong section of Hong Kong or racing motor bikes along Tu Do Street in Saigon or joking with the girls at the Vieng Rattay Club in Vientiane. They're the pilots of the cloak and dagger Air America, one of the world's least known airlines. Many are "old China hands" who first began flying for the "outfit" back when mainland China belonged to Chiang Kai-shok. They're the last of that breed known as soldiers of fortune, and these devil-may-care mercenaries will

continued

9 AUG 1972

Nixon's threats only reveal U.S. weakness

By Wilfred Burchett
Guardian staff correspondent

Paris

President Nixon's real attitude toward the Paris talks on Vietnam, the pilot prisoners-of-war and the Vietnamese people was sharply revealed at his July 27 press conference when he said he could "finish off North Vietnam in an afternoon" were it not for the "great restraint" he has been exerting.

On July 13, when delegates took their places around the Paris conference table for the first time in two months, it was clear Nixon still believes that because the U.S. is a superpower and Vietnam a small, economically underdeveloped country, the U.S. delegation can negotiate from a "position of strength" and the DRV-PRG delegations from a position of weakness.

U.S. "strength" has been shown in the last few weeks to result in devastating defeats on the battlefield at Quang Tri and An Loc and in a censure of its bombing of the dikes in North Vietnam by the Secretary General of the UN, Kurt Waldheim.

Saigon President Nguyen Van Thieu ordered the province of Quang Tri, including its capital city of the same name, captured by July 13. Despite paper claims to the contrary, Thieu's troops were reeling back from the area on the target date, never having entered the city and not having retaken anything of importance in the rest of the province.

Unprecedented bombings

This defeat occurred despite the use on an unprecedented scale in military history of B-52 bombers and the big guns of the 7th Fleet to escort the Saigon troops every step of the way. By the Aug. 3 peace talks, the elite paratroopers had been withdrawn, having lost one full regiment—a third of the only parachutist division lost in one action. The division had already been severely mauled in other actions during the past three months.

The citadel in the heart of Quang Tri city remains in the hands of the resistance forces and it is now Saigon's single Marine division that is being cut to pieces in the same area—all to insure a prestige victory and give U.S. ambassador to the talks William Porter a "strong hand" at the negotiations.

As for An Loc, the battle began there when Thieu ordered Highway 13, connecting An Loc with Saigon, opened early this April. Three months later it is still shut down and another division—the Third—is out of action.

The Nixon administration received another jolt in late July when the UN Secretary General, commenting on the reports of many who visited the dikes and reflecting world outrage at the bombing of the dikes, said: "Even in cases

where the dikes are not directly bombed the nearby bombing causes cracking of the earth of the dams and in this way the result is the same."

Waldheim continued: "I am deeply concerned about this development and I appeal to stop this kind of bombing, which could lead to enormous human suffering, enormous disaster."

Waldheim enraged the White House. Nixon promptly declared the Secretary General and other "well intentioned and naive people" had been "taken in" by Hanoi's statements.

The President was clearly put on the defensive. He got the State Department to hand out a report—prepared largely by the CIA—that claimed "no major dike has been breached. . . . Photographic evidence shows conclusively that there has been no intentional bombing of the dikes." But the report admitted damage had been caused at 12 points—allegedly because they were "close to identified individual targets." By the end of July DRV radio was asserting the dikes had been damaged at 60 points.

Waldheim met with U.S. representative to the UN George Bush. Bush emerged from the talk "subdued and troubled," according to one account. Bush said the talks were "frank and full" and "I think the best thing I can do on the subject is to shut up."

The Secretary General's condemnation of the dike bombings is the strongest UN censure yet of any U.S. actions. But he had made other statements against the Vietnam war. An earlier memo the Security Council said: "I feel strongly that the UN can no longer remain a mute spectator of the horror of the war and of the peril which it increasingly poses to international peace." And in a statement in May he said it was time for the "full machinery" of the UN to be used to stop the war.

Democratic presidential nominee Sen. George McGovern (S.D.) said Nixon "stooped beneath the dignity of his office yesterday in bragging that 'We could finish off North Vietnam in an afternoon.'

"The President is again deceiving and misleading the American people," McGovern said. "And at the same time, it now becomes clear he is running the war and peace talks to try to fit his own election timetable."

It was Nixon who boasted March 10 last year that those who think Vietnam is going to be a big political issue next year are making a grave miscalculation. The truth is that the Nixon-Kissinger attempt to sweep the Vietnam question under the rug has turned out to be an abysmal failure and miscalculation. The barbarous attacks against the dikes in North Vietnam are a measure of Nixon's fury over his great failures.

"Just and generous"

At the peace talks July 13, Porter called attention to the "just and generous" nature of Nixon's peace proposals. "As you know," he said, "they envisage first of all the return of all U.S. POWs and an accounting for those reported missing in combat."

There was no mention in this most "just and generous" proposal of a reciprocal release of Vietnamese POWs (North Vietnamese and NLF) who are held under the most barbarous conditions in South Vietnam. This is one more symptom of the racist nature of the war. The main point is that, as with every other question, Nixon tries to place the cart before the horse. He tries to extort the most favorable conditions for the U.S. while refusing to tackle the question of the comprehensive political and military solution to the war.

Ho Assassination Blocked By CIA

SAN FRANCISCO (UPI) — was still alive at the time he The CIA opposed a suggested was working on it. The North American plot to assassinate Vietnamese leader died on North Vietnamese leader Ho Sept. 3, 1969.

Chi Minh and the attempt Smith met newsmen on the publication date of was never made, the author of "O.S.S.: The Secret History of a history of the intelligence of America's First Central Intelligence Agency" agency said Monday.

R. Harris Smith, whose book deals with the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), predecessor of the CIA, told Smith tells in his book of the OSS backing Ho Chi Minh a news conference that he heard about the assassination during World War II.

plot from an ex-CIA officer but had no documentation. "The OSS felt an emotional rapport with Ho," Smith said. "They felt he was fighting to free his country from the Japanese and also to free it from colonialism."

"The plot was conceived by a retired high-level State Department official but was opposed by the CIA director and was never put into effect," Smith said. "An OSS medic once saved Ho's life in the jungle and then 20 years later the CIA, which followed the OSS as America's intelligence agency, apparently saved his life again by its opposition to the assassination plot."

"The suggestion was considered at the highest levels of government and was turned down by the White House at the CIA director's recommendation, the writer said.

"CIA got into the act because they were the ones who would have had to carry out the plot," he said. "They opposed it as politically foolish, stupid and insane."

Smith said the man who gave him the information did not say when the plot was conceived, but that it must have been between 1966 and 1969, because these were the years that the informant was active in the CIA. He was influential in both the Johnson and Nixon administration, the author said.

Smith, 25, a former CIA analyst, told the news conference he did not use the incident in his book because Ho



U.S. Terms Damage to Dikes Minor and Accidental

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 26 —

The Administration said today that any damage done to North Vietnam's dike system by American bombing was accidental and had only "the most incidental and minor impact" on the system.

Repeating what has become an almost daily denial that American aircraft are deliberately bombing the irrigation system, the State Department said that any damage to the dikes was a result of legitimate attacks on military installations such as anti-aircraft sites.

Charles W. Bray 3d, the department spokesman, said that the United States had evidence to bear out his contention that "there has been no new indication of anything but the most incidental and minor impact on the system of levees as the result of strikes against military installations."

"This is a fact," he said.

Administration Annoyed

In recent days, the Administration has made no secret of its annoyance and frustration over the growing world concern that the American bombing of North Vietnam might lead to catastrophic results during the current rainy season if the dike system breaks down.

North Vietnam has repeatedly charged the United States with systematic bombing of the dikes and has invited various observers to inspect the dikes. Expressions of concern have

come from such sources as the Rev. Dr. Eugene Carson Blake, secretary general of the World Council of Churches and Secretary General Waldheim of the United Nations.

President Nixon, Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird, and Secretary of State William P. Rogers have denied that American aircraft have been authorized to bomb the dike system.

But for a month, State and Defense Department officials

have acknowledged — as Mr. Bray did today — that some bombs may have fallen on or near the earthen levees along the Red River, either by inadvertence or because a military target was there.

The Administration made plans to hold a special briefing for newsmen yesterday to present photographs to buttress its arguments but at the last moment the briefing was not held. Informed sources said that the Administration recognized that Hanoi could also produce photographs.

"We could show an undamaged dike and they could show one with a crater in it. Or if they didn't have one, they could drop a mortar in it and make one," one State Department official said.

So far, despite the start of the heavy rainy season, there have been no reports of any flooding. The Hanoi press has printed several articles exhorting the population to take part in the regular summer dike building program to prevent a repetition of last year's flooding, the worst since 1944.

In another matter, Administration witnesses opposed to-

day the adoption of a Senate resolution that would outlaw the use of weather modification as a means of war.

Witnesses from the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the Defense Department refused to discuss the military uses of weather modification, asserting that such information was classified. They testified before a hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee on oceans and international environment.

Senator Claiborne Pell, Democrat of Rhode Island, the subcommittee chairman, said there was "no doubt in my mind that the United States has indeed been conducting weather modification operations in Southeast Asia."

The New York Times reported on July 3 that the United States Air Force and the Central Intelligence Agency had conducted cloud-seeding operations over Laos since 1967, and over South and North Vietnam since 1968. The Pentagon has denied that any of its aircraft were involved in seeding over North Vietnam but has refused to discuss operations elsewhere.

July 20, 1972

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

charge from the plant, by using excess heat as its energy source.

Mr. Austin also noted the efforts of Bottlers of Coca-Cola directed toward achieving a better environment. He cited such projects as recycling centers in the United States for the reclamation on one-way glass packages; the collection and recycling of aluminum cans by Bottlers of Coca-Cola in Australia; and the collection for recycling of aluminum bottle caps in South America, where almost all of the Company's products are sold in returnable packages.

Mr. Austin noted also the independent funding, by his Company, of a number of major studies into the total environmental impact of all its packaging designed to seek to determine their true cost, from the mining and extraction of raw materials to the disposal of waste products. That way, he said, "we'll be able to make even more intelligent decisions in the future."

Citing his Company's concern not only for the physical environment, but for the quality of life, Mr. Austin pointed to the Company's efforts toward the development of a protein-rich, nutritional beverage which could aid the undernourished, and to the Company's efforts in a program in its Florida citrus operations to upgrade the standard of living for the migratory-type workers who harvest the citrus.

The protein-beverage work, in progress for more than four years, is not altogether altruistic, Mr. Austin said, "We expect to profit from this venture. But so will those whose diets and lives are improved through our efforts. Those enterprises which succeed to the fullest are the very ones which enrich everyone involved."

The Company's farm labor reform project, Mr. Austin noted, did not contain the profit motive when it was inaugurated; but today, due to the continuing success of the activity, that factor is now a possibility.

With its individual components of better housing, better pay and benefits and improved health and educational facilities, the aim of the farm labor program is to stabilize the once migratory labor force and to raise the standard of living of the workers to a parity with other Company employees.

Even though Mr. Austin called the program "at the beginning of the beginning," he noted that with steady employment and normal incentives, the individual productivity rate is going up. The cost to the Company, he said, for equipment, supervisory personnel, transportation and other support requirements, have diminished surprisingly. "This translates quickly into a more profitable operation and a better return on investment."

PROHIBITION OF GEOPHYSICAL MODIFICATION ACTIVITY AS A WEAPON OF WAR

Mr. PELL. Mr. President, as chairman of the Subcommittee on Oceans and International Environment, I have been very much concerned over the unofficial and unconfirmed reports that the United States has attempted to modify weather conditions in Southeast Asia as an instrument of warfare.

During the recent Senate recess, a number of informative articles concerning this subject appeared in the press. Among these were articles written by Bruce De Silva, in the Providence Journal and Evening Bulletin; Seymour M. Hersh and John Noble Wilford, in the New York Times of July 3, 1972; and by Victor Cohn, in the Washington Post of July 2, 1972.

These articles reinforce my belief that we must approve legislation to ban the use of

all geophysical warfare. In an effort to achieve this goal, I have scheduled hearings on July 26 and 27, 1972, to receive testimony on Senate Resolution 281 which I introduced earlier this year. This resolution, which was cosponsored by Senators BAYH, CASE, COOPER, CRANSTON, HART, HUGHES, HUMPHREY, JAVITS, KENNEDY, MCGOVERN, MONDALE, NELSON, STEVENSON, TUNNEY, and WILLIAMS expresses the sense of the Senate that the United States should seek the agreement of other governments to a proposed treaty prohibiting the use of any environmental or geophysical modification activity as a weapon of war, or the carrying out of any research or experimentation with respect thereto.

I believe that the articles referred to above will be of great interest to a number of Senators. I therefore ask unanimous consent that they be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the items were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

**RAINMAKING IS USED AS WEAPON BY U.S.—
CLOUD SEEDING IN INDOCHINA CONFIRMED—
CHEMICAL ALSO EMPLOYED TO FOIL RADAR**

(By Seymour M. Hersh)

WASHINGTON, July 2.—The United States has been secretly seeding clouds over North Vietnam, Laos and South Vietnam to increase and control the rainfall for military purposes.

Government sources, both civilian and military, said during an extensive series of interviews that the Air Force cloudseeding program has been aimed most recently at hindering movement of North Vietnamese troops and equipment and suppressing enemy antiaircraft missile fire.

The disclosure confirmed growing speculation in Congressional and scientific circles about the use of weather modification in Southeast Asia. Despite years of experiments with rainmaking in the United States and elsewhere, scientists are not sure they understand its long-term effect on the ecology of a region.

SOME OPPOSED PROGRAM

The weather manipulation in Indochina, which was first tried in South Vietnam in 1963, is the first confirmed use of meteorological warfare. Although it is not prohibited by any international conventions on warfare, artificial rainmaking has been strenuously opposed by some State Department officials.

It could not be determined whether the operations were being conducted in connection with the current North Vietnamese offensive or the renewed American bombing of the North.

EFFECTIVENESS DOUBTED

Beginning in 1967, some State Department officials protested that the United States, by deliberately altering the natural rainfall in parts of Indochina, was taking environmental risks of unknown proportions. But many advocates of the operation have found little wrong with using weather modification as a military weapon.

"What's worse," one official asked, "dropping bombs or rain?"

All of the officials interviewed said that the United States did not have the capability to cause heavy flooding during the summer in the northern parts of North Vietnam, where serious flooding occurred last year.

Officially, the White House and State Department declined comment on the use of meteorological warfare. "This is one of those things where no one is going to say anything," one official said.

Most officials interviewed agreed that the operations had accomplished one of its main

objectives—muddying roads and flooding lines of communication. But there were also many military and Government officials who expressed doubt that the project had caused any dramatic results.

The sources, without providing details, also said that a method had been developed for treating clouds with a chemical that eventually produced an acidic rainfall capable of fouling the operation of North Vietnamese radar equipment used for directing surface-to-air missiles.

In addition to hampering SAM missiles and delaying North Vietnamese infiltration, the rainmaking program had the following purposes:

Providing rain and cloud cover for infiltration of South Vietnamese commando and intelligence teams into North Vietnam.

Serving as a "spoiler" for North Vietnamese attacks and raids in South Vietnam.

Altering or tailoring the rain patterns over North Vietnam and Laos to aid United States bombing missions.

Diverting North Vietnamese men and material from military operations to keep muddied roads and other lines of communication in operation.

KEYED TO MONSOON

The cloud-seeding operations necessarily were keyed to the two main monsoon seasons that affect Laos and Vietnam. "It was just trying to add on to something that you already got," one officer said.

Military sources said that one main goal was to increase the duration of the southwest monsoon, which spawns high-rising cumulus clouds—those most susceptible to cloud seeding—over the paratropic areas of Laos and North Vietnam from May to early October. The longer rainy season thus would give the Air Force more opportunity to trigger rainstorms.

"We were trying to arrange the weather pattern to suit our convenience," said one former Government official who had detailed knowledge of the operation.

According to interviews, the Central Intelligence Agency initiated the use of cloud-seeding over Hue, in the northern part of South Vietnam. "We first used that stuff in about August of 1963," one former C.I.A. agent said, "when the Diem regime was having all that trouble with the Buddhists."

"They would just stand around during demonstrations when the police threw tear gas at them, but we noticed that when the rains came they wouldn't stay on," the former agent said.

"The agency got an Air America Beechcraft and had it rigged up with silver iodide," he said, "There was another demonstration, and we seeded the area. It rained."

A similar cloud-seeding was carried out by C.I.A. aircraft in Saigon at least once during the summer of 1964, the former agent said.

EXPAND TO TRAIL

The Intelligence Agency expanded its cloud-seeding activities to the Ho Chi Minh supply trail in Laos sometime in the middle nineteen-sixties, a number of Government sources said. By 1967, the Air Force had become involved although, as one former Government official said, "the agency was calling all the shots."

"I always assumed the agency had a mandate from the White House to do it," he added.

A number of former CIA, and high-ranking Johnson Administration officials depicted the operations along the trail as experimental.

The state of the art had not yet advanced to the point where it was possible to predict the results of a seeding operation with any degree of confidence, one Government official said. "We used to go out flying around and looking for a certain cloud formation," the official said. "And we made a lot of mis-

BENNINGTON, VT.

BANNER JUL 13 1972

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Monkeying with weather

The first man-made snowstorm took place about 25 years ago in northern Berkshire County in Massachusetts, when scientific researchers of the General Electric Co. dumped some dry ice pellets into a cloud and produced a snowstorm over Mt. Greylock. (There are those familiar with the Pittsfield, Mass. snow belt who might wonder why anyone would want to produce any more snow in that area, but there's no accounting for the whims of the scientists. They probably seeded the cloud because it was there).

But snow and rain making have made some unheralded advances from the days when they were a matter depending largely on either witchcraft or prayer, depending on one's religious point of view.

Now we find rainmaking in the news again and also find that it has become a highly sophisticated and effective enterprise. Last week the New York Times reported that the United States has been secretly seeding clouds over Indochina in an effort to use rain as a weapon against the Communists. It seems to have been going on in one fashion or another since 1963, initiated by the CIA and then pursued by the Air Force and Navy, reportedly under direct White House supervision.

As with the civilian rainmaking attempts over the past quarter-century, there is dispute about the effectiveness of the Indochina operations. But the more basic dispute involves the whole concept of "geophysical warfare" — of tinkering

with the atmosphere in this manner for military purposes.

The Pentagon seems to feel that it doesn't matter whether one drops bombs or rain. But scientists have protested that using weather as a weapon is fraught with ugly potentialities. At best, cloud-seeding is an unpredictable and nonselective tactic, more damaging to civilians than to combatants. Further, although the federal government is spending an estimated \$20 million annually on weather-modification research, there are no reliable answers to questions about the long-term impact on regional or global ecology.

Particularly disturbing to scientists is the danger that the Pentagon rainmakers may cripple current efforts to expand and strengthen the World Weather Watch, an international program of global weather forecasting with huge potentialities for benefiting all mankind. Many of the nations now participating are likely to pull out if they feel that the information they are furnishing to the program may be put to military use.

Last year the National Academy of Sciences recommended that America take the lead in seeking a U.N. agreement under which the whole field of weather modification would be put under international auspices, with a specific ban on its use in war. It is a recommendation worth pursuing. And as a preliminary step the Pentagon should be firmly instructed to lock up the Pandora's box it has opened in Southeast Asia.

STATOIR

BOSTON, MASS.
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JUL 11 1972

A Fair-Weather Protest?

A minor storm has been brewing in recent weeks over reports that the U. S. has been tampering with the weather in Indochina to hamper North Vietnam's military operations.

Several congressmen, a few scientists and some members of the anti-war crowd have lodged protests alleging that the Pentagon is engaging in cruel and unusual weather warfare, causing floods and other unpleasantness.

Pentagon spokesmen deny the accusation, insisting that it is merely a propaganda ploy designed to blame Uncle Sam for monsoons that have been occurring in Indochina for centuries.

√ Apparently, however, the CIA has seeded a few clouds over the Ho Chi Minh trail. But these rain-making efforts to hinder Communist supply

and troop infiltration movements haven't been very successful.

And if they were, would that be so bad? The purpose, after all, seems to be to curtail the fighting. And we have noticed that, year after year, there is always a lull in the battle during the monsoon season (just as the turn-out at anti-war rallies is always much smaller when it's cold and damp).

Anyway, isn't it more humane to hit the enemy with raindrops, instead of bombs and napalm? If they had their wits about them, the protesters should be applauding the CIA's cloud-seeding efforts and wishing them more success in the future.

In fact, if the war hasn't ended before they can hold another anti-war rally in the Common, we expect to see at least a few signs that read: "Make Rain, Not War" next time.

JUL 9 1972

M - 239,949

S - 350,303

America's new morality: 'What's worse, bombs or rain?'

FROM THE SAME people who gave the world the Gatling gun, the A-bomb and plastic shrapnel we now have, once again, a new, improved way of making war.

The U.S. Air Force and the CIA can now make it rain on your parade, whether that parade is a military convoy on the Ho Chi Minh Trail or a political demonstration in Saigon (or Louisville?).

We understand the Nixon administration's unwillingness to brag about the cloud-seeding operations that the United States has been conducting in Indochina. Any bragging, now—or even any admission that such operations have, indeed, taken place—would make it appear that Defense Secretary Laird lied to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last month when he was asked about Air Force rainmaking activities. The Secretary said, "We have not engaged in any over North Vietnam."

Now at least a dozen present and former military and civilian officials tell *The New York Times* that our planes have seeded clouds over North Vietnam at least as late as 1971—and over Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam as well.

In addition to damaging Secretary Laird's impeccable credibility, premature admissions to rainmaking might also lose Mr. Nixon the votes of those environmentalists, if any, who still take him seriously when he puts on his Smokey the Bear hat and proclaims himself hard to beat at admiring and protecting Mother Nature.

For it appears that Mr. Nixon, who rarely hesitates to rush in where angels and Democrats fear to tread, has outrained—as well as outbombed—the previous administration. State Department protests that our tinkering with Indochina's rainfall was taking environmental risks of unknown proportions apparently persuaded former Defense Secretary McNamara to call off cloud-seeding operations in 1967.

But, in the words of one pro-rainmaking official, "What's worse, dropping bombs or rain?"

Added ingredient possible

If we overlook the fact that Mr. Nixon and his generals (or perhaps, as seems to be common, the generals without Mr. Nixon's consent) are dropping both, it's a fascinating question.

The residents of our drought-stricken Southwest probably would reply that bombs are worse than rain. However, the citizens of Rapid City, S.D., or our eastern seaboard might not agree. And the tightly closed mouths at the Pentagon these days might

tempt the people of Rapid City to ask a few more questions about that cloud-seeding experiment that was conducted in the Black Hills on the day their city was flooded and scores of their friends and relatives were killed.

The anonymous official's question also prompts a second question: Is the destruction wrought by our bombing in Indochina as indiscriminate as that wrought by the forces of nature? If it is, then we've been lied to again about the pinpoint accuracy of our attacks on war-supporting industries and supplies in North Vietnam, in which our "smart" bombs always seem to demolish our targets but leave the civilians unharmed. If it isn't, then the rain could be far worse than the bombing—especially during the two monsoon seasons when, as an official explained, the cloud-seeding amounts to "just trying to add on to something that you already got." One thing the Indochinese peoples have got during those seasons is the strong danger that they'll be wiped out by floods. And it's a safe bet that the soldiers in that American Special Forces camp that received seven inches of rain in two hours, courtesy of a CIA blunder, didn't laugh.

In addition to sizable quantities, the Americans, never content to let nature go unimproved-upon, can now deliver two kinds of rain—either the plain, old-fashioned variety or a new, improved rain with an extra secret ingredient. This new rain, according to one source, has "an acidic quality to it and it would foul up mechanical equipment—like radars, trucks and tanks."

We're left to wonder whether it damages other mechanisms, such as humans and trees. But even if it doesn't, we hope the White House reserves the fancy rain for export only. If our government begins using rain to break up political demonstrations, as the CIA did in Saigon when the Diem regime was tottering, we hope the protestors will be spared the additional indignity of having to hitch-hike home.

Richard Jordan Gatling, the inventor of that primitive machine gun that we see used with such effectiveness against the Indians in Western movies from time to time, hoped that by developing such a terrible weapon he would make men more reluctant to resort to arms. If meteorological warfare fulfills its potential, Mr. Gatling's dream might yet come true. Our future disputes may be settled by a few wizards—heads of state, maybe—at control panels, instructing Mother Nature where to send her floods, winds, earthquakes and tidal waves.

There'll be no need of arms then, and "World War" will have a new meaning.

JUL 1972

Laird Acknowledges Some Viet Dikes Hit

WASHINGTON — (UPI) — Softening previous flat U.S. denials of Hanoi's claims, Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird has acknowledged American warplanes may have damaged some flood control dikes in North Vietnam.

The CIA declined comment on the reports, which indicated the experiments were conducted in past dry seasons along with other U.S. efforts to hinder supply-truck movements from North Vietnam to Communist troops in South Vietnam and Cambodia.

Laird charged, however, that most of the claims result from a deliberate effort by Hanoi to duck responsibility for failing to repair the dike system adequately after disastrous monsoon floods a year ago.

North Vietnam's dikes themselves have never been the target of U.S. bombs or rockets, Laird said Thursday. But he said in certain cases dikes may have suffered damage during attacks against antiaircraft weapons firing from them or supply convoys traveling down roads built on them.

Laird said U.S. pilots are allowed to fight back against antiaircraft fire "wherever it comes from," including from emplacements on the dikes. He said he considers this proper, but implied it does not happen often.

Other defense officials said they saw no inconsistency between this policy and the presidential order against attacking dikes. Although the dikes are prohibited as targets, these officials said, neither are they intended to be sanctuaries for Hanoi's war effort.

STATOTHR
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U.S. at MILDWATER

War crimes

The very phrase "war crimes" is taboo in Washington because it fits the deeds of the Administration, military, CIA and other circles. It cannot be said that they can claim to be unaware of their crimes. Their maneuvers give them away.

The National Academy of Sciences last year issued a statement urging the Nixon Administration to sponsor a UN resolution "dedicating all weather modification efforts to peaceful purposes and establishing, preferably within the framework of international non-governmental scientific organizations, and advisory mechanism for consideration of weather-modification problems of potential international concern."

The request has gone unheeded.

Pell, with 13 other Senators, has filed a resolution calling on the U.S. to join in a treaty outlawing "any use of any environmental or geo-physical modification activity as a weapon of war, or the carrying out of any research or experimentation with respect thereto."

Pell has so far drawn zero attention from the Nixon Administration. But that does not mean it is indifferent to the issue. What it means is that it is opposed to it.

The proof is that at the recent Stockholm world conference on the environment, sponsored by the UN, the U.S. delegation managed to have inserted a weasel-worded limitation into a recommendation calling on all governments to "carefully evaluate the likelihood and magnitude of climatic effects" as a result of weather modification.

The U.S. delegation insisted on adding "to the maximum extent feasible." According to the New York Times (July 3): "Officials later acknowledged that possible military use of weather modification was the basis for the amendment."

It was not "possible military use" that was the consideration, but actual use. Used in 1963, rain-making was taken up by the CIA.

"We first used that stuff in about August of 1963, when the Diem regime was having all that trouble with the Buddhists," a former CIA agent is quoted by Hersh as saying. Notice, Buddhists.

Rain-making activities were expanded in the following years and by 1967 the Air Force was involved. The Joint Chiefs of Staff in February 1967 proposed wider use of rain-making to the White House. Operations were kept super-secret because even calloused war-makers felt it "might violate what we consider the general rule of thumb for an illegal weapon of war — something that would cause unusual suffering or disproportionate damage," according to a former State Department official. He said also there was "concern because of possible ecological risk."

Not only were efforts made to produce deluges of rain, but special types of rain, such as an acidic rain to foul radars, trucks and tanks.

In 1971, the program was under the direct control of the White House, but the operation was kept secret from all but a few because it was so dreadful and foul a deed. The Department of Defense refused to give information.

"This kind of thing was a bomb, and Henry (Kissinger) restricted information about it to those who had to know," a Government official told Hersh.

The horror of this inhuman warfare is intensified by the danger that it may be combined with the destruction of dikes, flooding all of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam — and its people, down to the babies. The last time there was a flood, two million people died of starvation.

While warfare unrestricted by law or human or moral considerations is conducted in Indochina, the Commerce Department's National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration is establishing rigorous regulations for weather modification in the U.S. with fines up to \$10,000 for violations. This contrast indicates in its own way the genocidal character of the U.S. aggression in Indochina.

Lying, of course, accompanied the secrecy in which this hideous "scientific advance" was clothed. In April, Sen. J. William Fulbright asked Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird why the secrecy. Laird replied: "We have never engaged in that type of activity over North Vietnam" — but the U.S. had.

5 JUL 1972

Our readers say--

EDITOR
THE DAILY WORLD
1205 WEST 19th ST.
NEW YORK 10011

FAKE ALTERNATIVE

The working of the war-maker's mind is a wonder to behold. The calloused indifference to human values is stunning.

When it became known that the U.S. military and CIA had been using rain-making devices in Indochina since 1963 in their drive to win the war, one Administration official (unnamed by the reporter) asked: "What's worse, dropping bombs or rain?"

These are not alternatives; both are destructive. That a real alternative exists — neither bombing nor spreading genocidal destruction by precipitating deadly rains — apparently never entered his mind.

—LOUISE MARTIN, Bronx, N.Y.

M - 66,673

S - 209,501

Chafee Declines To Comment on Seeding Clouds

By BRUCE DE SILVA

Former Navy Secretary John H. Chafee and the White House both refused comment yesterday on Providence Journal-Bulletin and New York Times reports that the Pentagon has seeded clouds in Southeast Asia for military reasons.

Dave Sweet, a member of Mr. Chafee's Senate campaign staff, said Mr. Chafee will entertain questions on the matter at his press conference tomorrow morning "and not before then."

The New York Times yesterday gave the first indication of Navy participation in the seeding project, which is believed to be predominantly a Central Intelligence Agency and Air Force operation.

The Times quoted a "well informed source" as saying that Navy scientists developed a chemical which when deposited on clouds produces an acidic rain that fouls radar equipment, trucks, tanks and other mechanical equipment. The Times story implied, but did not state, that this chemical has been used in Southeast Asia.

Sen. Claiborne Pell, Mr. Chafee's November opponent, has said he believes the United States has seeded clouds in Southeast Asia for military reasons.

Press aides with the President at the Western White House in San Clemente, Calif., yesterday took two hours to scrutinize a list of seven questions submitted earlier in the day by the Journal-Bulletin.

The White House then referred the questions to Jerry

W. Friedheim in the Pentagon's public affairs office.

When asked if this meant that the President would not comment at all on the matter, a press aide, who asked not to be quoted by name, said: "Yes, it does."

The New York Times yesterday quoted an unnamed former high-ranking official as saying that the weather modification activities over Southeast Asia have been under the direct control of the White House since 1971.

Mr. Friedheim, reached in his Pentagon office yesterday, said the United States has never engaged in rainmaking activities over North Vietnam. They were the same words used by Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird during a confrontation with Senator Pell and Sen. J. William Fulbright, D-Ark, in a Senate foreign relations committee hearing several months ago.

However, Mr. Friedheim said, "It can't enlarge on that" when asked if rainmaking activities have been carried out in South Vietnam, Cambodia or Laos.

When asked about the U.S. capability to produce acidic rainfall, Mr. Friedheim replied: I have no knowledge of that."

© N.Y. Times News Service

Washington -- Two former high-ranking officials of the Johnson administration said yesterday that Robert S. McNamara, while Secretary of Defense, specifically ordered the Air Force to stop all rainmaking late in 1967, well before its first use in North Vietnam.

But other officials, who served in both the Johnson and Nixon administrations, said they recalled no such clearcut order.

It was not clear whether McNamara's order was disobeyed, ignored or -- as one official suggested "there was a kind of slippage" in putting it into effect.

According to a number of government sources the rainmaking program apparently has grown in importance in the last few years. The two officials of the Johnson administration both recalled the rainmaking efforts to be little more than experiments con-

Repeated State Department protests about the project led to a re-evaluation by the Pentagon, a former Defense Department official said, "and McNamara killed it."

"He had reservations about it," the former official added. "There was a distinct feeling that we were dealing with something shady -- something

that could cause trouble in case people were killed because of it."

A former high-ranking intelligence official similarly recalled in an interview that "the technical possibilities were briefly explored and it was decided that it not be used."

These official recollections -- that the program had been stopped by the end of the Johnson administration -- were disputed by a number of Nixon administration officials.

One well-informed government source said that he had received regular, perhaps monthly, top-secret reports on operations from 1967 until he left the government in 1971. He said specifically that he had received the documents without interruption.

A former high-ranking Air Force official who also served in both administrations said that it was his "recollection that there was no clearcut line of demarcation regarding

the effective cutoff of the program."

"Within the various enclaves of the government," the official added, "there are interpretations and interpretations -- even of White House orders."

"Don't forget that the people who are espousing the program feel that it is great," he said. "And it's clear that you can affect weather."

Discussing the continuation of the program in the face of strenuous government objections, the former official also said:

"The fact is that the thing did go by fits and starts. There were holds and delays and interruptions and reinterpretations. These things are very complicated when they're so sensitive.

M - 66,673

S - 209,501

Seeding Clouds Over Vietnams By U.S. Charged

By BRUCE DeSILVA

Quoting unnamed Central Intelligence Agency and State Department sources, The New York Times News Service yesterday reported new evidence that the Pentagon is changing the weather over Southeast Asia for military reasons.

In a story by Seymour M. Hersh, the reporter who first broke the story of the My Lai massacre, the Times said the United States first began seeding clouds to increase rainfall over Hue in the northern part of South Vietnam in 1963.

According to a former CIA official, the action was taken to prevent Buddhist demonstrations in that city against the South Vietnamese government, the Times reported.

"They would just stand around during demonstrations when the police threw tear gas at them, but we noticed that when the rains came they wouldn't stay on," the former agent is quoted as saying.

The story repeats, as first reported in the June 25 Providence Sunday Journal, that seeding operations were begun in the mid 1960's to create heavy rains which washed out portions of the Ho Chi Minh Trail and impeded infiltration of supplies and men to the South.

Sen. Claiborne Pell said late last month he strongly believes the United States is seeding clouds in Southeast Asia for military reasons.

Reached at his home last night and informed of the Times story, the Senator said: "This provides additional foundation for my own belief, a belief that I have advanced for several months, that these activities have been conducted by the United States."

The Senator is planning Senate hearings for later this summer on his proposed treaty to ban the use of weather modification as a weapon of war.

In addition to impeding infiltration, the Times reported that the Pentagon rain-making program has the following purposes:

- To provide rain and cloud cover for infiltration of South Vietnamese commandos and intelligence teams into North Vietnam.
- To serve as a "spoiler" for North Vietnamese attacks and raids in South Vietnam.
- To divert North Vietnamese men and material from military operations to keep muddied roads and other lines of communication open.

The Times quotes a "former high-ranking official" as saying that by the end of 1971, the program was under the direct control of the White House.

Henry Kissinger, the President's special adviser for national security, felt the program was politically sensitive and ordered it kept a secret from all but a handful of administration officials, the official is quoted as saying.

The Times quoted a "well informed source" as saying Navy scientists developed a new chemical agent effective in warm stratus clouds that produces an acidic rain capable of fouling "mechanical equipment — like radars, trucks, and tanks."

The story implies, but does not say, that the chemical was actually used over the North.

The Times reports that officials interviewed said the United States did not have the capability to cause heavy flooding during the summer in the Northern parts of North Vietnam last year. The flooding destroyed crops and reportedly killed thousands.

However, Sen. Pell and David Keane, a member of the Senate foreign relations committee's professional staff, told the Journal they believe the United States does have that capability and was responsible for the floods.

In a letter to Senator Pell last year, Rudy Johnson, the assistant secretary of defense for legislative affairs, said the Pentagon has the power to increase rainfall by up to 50 per cent.

A 50 per cent increase in the torrential monsoon rains of the region could obviously have a considerable effect.

Rainmaking Is Used As Weapon by U.S.

Cloud Seeding in Indochina Confirmed— Chemical Also Employed to Foil Radar

By SEYMOUR M. HERSH

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 2—The United States has been secretly seeding clouds over North Vietnam, Laos and South Vietnam to increase and control the rainfall for military purposes.

Government sources, both civilian and military, said during an extensive series of interviews that the Air Force cloud-seeding program has been aimed most recently at hindering movement of North Vietnamese troops and equipment and suppressing enemy anti-aircraft missile fire.

The disclosure confirmed growing speculation in Congressional and scientific circles about the use of weather modification in Southeast Asia. Despite years of experiments with rainmaking in the United States and elsewhere, scientists are not sure they understand its long-term effect on the ecology of a region.

Some Opposed Program

The weather manipulation in Indochina, which was first tried in South Vietnam in 1963, is the first confirmed use of meteorological warfare. Although it is not prohibited by any international conventions on warfare, artificial rainmaking has been strenuously opposed by some State Department officials.

It could not be determined whether the operations were being conducted in connection with the current North Vietnamese offensive or the renewed American bombing of the North.

Effectiveness Doubted

Beginning in 1967, some State Department officials protested that the United States, by deliberately altering the natural rainfall in parts of Indochina, was taking environmental risks of unknown proportions. But many advocates of the operation have found little wrong with using weather modification as a military weapon.

"What's worse," one official asked, "dropping bombs or rain?"

All of the officials interviewed said that the United States did not have the capability to cause heavy flooding during the summer in the northern parts of North Vietnam, where serious flooding occurred last year.

Officially, the White House and State Department declined comment on the use of meteorological warfare. "This is one of those things where no one is going to say anything," one official said.

Most officials interviewed agreed that the seeding had accomplished one of its main objectives — muddying roads and flooding lines of communication. But there were also many military and Government officials who expressed doubt that the project had caused any dramatic results.

The sources, without providing details, also said that a method had been developed for treating clouds with a chemical that eventually produced an acidic rainfall capable of fouling the operation of North Vietnamese radar equipment used for directing surface-to-air missiles.

In addition to hampering SAM missiles and delaying North Vietnamese infiltration, the rainmaking program had the following purposes:

• Providing rain and cloud cover for infiltration of South Vietnamese commando and intelligence teams into North Vietnam.

• Serving as a "spoiler" for North Vietnamese attacks and raids in South Vietnam.

• Altering or tailoring the rain patterns over North Vietnam and Laos to aid United States bombing missions.

• Diverting North Vietnamese men and material from military operations to keep muddied roads and other lines of communication in operation.

Keyed To Monsoon

The cloud-seeding operations necessarily were keyed to the

two main monsoon seasons that affect Laos and Vietnam. "It was just trying to add on to something that you already got," one officer said.

Military sources said that one main goal was to increase the duration of the southwest monsoon, which spawns high-rising cumulus clouds — those most susceptible to cloud seeding—over the panhandle areas of Laos and North Vietnam from May to early October. The longer rainy season thus would give the Air Force more opportunity to trigger rainstorms.

"We were trying to arrange the weather pattern to suit our convenience," said one former Government official who had detailed knowledge of the operation.

According to interviews, the Central Intelligence Agency initiated the use of cloud seeding over Hue, in the northern part of South Vietnam. "We first used that stuff in about August of 1963," one former C.I.A. agent said, "when the Diem regime was having all that trouble with the Buddhists."

"They would just stand around during demonstrations when the police threw tear gas at them, but we noticed that when the rains came they wouldn't stay on," the former agent said.

"The agency got an Air America Beechcraft and had it rigged up with silver iodide," he said. "There was another demonstration and we seeded the area. It rained."

A similar cloud-seeding was carried out by C.I.A. aircraft in Saigon at least once during the summer of 1964, the former agent said.

Expanded to Trail

The Intelligence Agency expanded its cloud-seeding activities to the Ho Chi Minh supply trail in Laos sometime in the middle nineteen-sixties, a number of Government sources said. By 1967, the Air Force had become involved although, as one former Government official said, "the agency was calling all the shots."

"I always assumed the agency had a mandate from the White House to do it," he added.

A number of former CIA, and high-ranking Johnson Administration officials depicted the operations along the trail as experimental.

The state of the art had not yet advanced to the point where it was possible to predict the results of a seeding operation with any degree of confidence, one Government official said. "We used to go out flying around and looking for a certain cloud formation," the official said. "And we made a lot of mistakes. Once we dumped

seven inches of rain in two hours on one of our Special Forces camps."

Despite the professed skepticism on the part of some members of the Johnson Administration, military men apparently took the weather modification program much more seriously.

According to a document contained in the Pentagon papers, the Defense Department's secret history of the war, weather modification was one of seven basic options for stepping up the war that were presented on request by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the White House in late February, 1967.

The document described the weather program over Laos—officially known as Operation Pop-Eye—as an attempt "to reduce trafficability along infiltration routes."

Authorization Needed

It said that Presidential authorization was "required to implement operational phase of weather modification process previously successfully tested and evaluated in same area." The brief summary concluded by stating that "risk of compromise is minimal."

A similar option was cited in another 1967 working document published in the Pentagon papers. Neither attracted any immediate public attention.

The Laos cloud-seeding operations did provoke, however, a lengthy and bitter, albeit secret, dispute inside the Johnson Administration in 1967. A team of State Department attorneys and officials protested that the use of cloud-seeding was a dangerous precedent for the United States.

"I felt that the military and agency hadn't analyzed it to determine if it was in our interest," one official who was involved in the dispute said. He also was concerned over the rigid secrecy of the project, he said, "although it might have been all right to keep it secret if you did it once and didn't want the precedent to become known."

The general feeling was summarized by one former State Department official who said he was concerned that the rainmaking "might violate what we considered the general rule of the thumb for an illegal weapon of war—something that would cause unusual suffering or disproportionate damage." There also was concern, he

added, because of the unknown ecological risks.

A Nixon Administration official said that he believed the first use of weather modification over North Vietnam was in 1969 when rain was increased

continued

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CIA-Backed Commando Raids into N. Viet Told

BY WAYNE THOMIS

(Aviation Editor)

(Chicago Tribune Press Service)

SAIGON, Viet Nam, June 14

Hanoi broadcasts infrequently mention "works of saboteurs" in North Viet Nam's panhandle, and Saigon's vernacular press occasionally report odd little aircraft accidents with nonmilitary planes in mountainous regions of Laos, Northwestern South Viet Nam, and sometimes in Northeastern Thailand.

These are mere pecks by the general public at a tremendous submerged "iceberg" of clandestine operations continuously and now increasingly carried out against the Communist North.

These actions probably never will be disclosed in full detail but it can be said responsibly that today they constitute an important phase of this Southeast Asia battle.

It is a silent war. It is carried out by special forces and by mercenaries. It is a hit-and-run war in which units are airlifted or sea borne deep into North Viet Nam for demolition missions, for seizure of prisoners, for probing forays, and—it now is understood—for accumulation of information on American prisoner of war camp locations.

This type of action has been taking place in the North Vietnamese panhandle from the Demilitarized Zone to well north of Vinh during the last 60 days.

An increasing series of such raids have come from the sea-coasts and from helicopter air-bridge links in Laos and Thailand to points where damage can be done or information obtained from the North Vietnamese, it was learned from reliable sources.

Communist broadcasts from Hanoi in the past have used "saboteur" in an ideological sense. Now they are referring to actual dynamitings by these raiders. They specialize in targets which are too difficult for bombers to identify from the air, or are too well hidden to be spotted by aerial photography. They also carry out a traffic in agents not otherwise possible under present conditions.

Size, Duration Vary

Reports filtering from Central Intelligence Agency and associates military establishments indicate such raids may vary from 20 to several hundred men. They may stay in North Viet Nam from a few minutes to 24 hours.

Mercenaries enlisted for such secret actions include Europeans, Chinese, Malays, Japanese and Americans. The operations are carefully planned and surrounded by the tight security.

The CIA now believes the large-scale American attempt to free prisoners from a camp near Hanoi a year ago failed because of a security leak

which resulted in a prisoner shift.

The raiders are heavily armed. Not one operation has failed, and none of the raiders have been trapped, according to informed sources.

Casualties among these special forces have been low. Pay scales are said to be "quite high" and morale among these specialists in demolition, electronics sabotage, and interrogation is very high. The men regard themselves as an elite corps.

Financed by CIA

The mysterious, CIA-financed Air America civil flying fleet seems to operate on a super-national basis across Cambodian, Thai, Laotian, and South Vietnamese borders. It has had a part in some of this work. However, much of the work is being done by military detachments, temporarily posted to the special forces.

The military establishment here generally attempts to suppress mention of this side of the war for a number of reasons, with security against enemy knowledge being the least important. The North Vietnamese are fully aware of the nature of the CIA-directed and financed special operations.

It is known that after each such raid all civilians and military personnel in the North who have had contact with the raiders are subjected to rigorous and lengthy questioning by Communist secret police and political commissars.

The U. S. forces seek to hide the clandestine side of the war to prevent embarrassment to Thai, Cambodian, and Laotian governmental departments.

It is recognized by American leaders that such concealment is merely "token" but is required in certain diplomatic countries fringing South Viet Nam maintain.

STATOTHR

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Silent War Stepped Up In Vietnam

Saboteurs Harass North's Panhandle


By WAYNE THOMAS
Miami Herald-Chicago Tribune Wire

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BACKGROUND REPORT

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STATOTHR

U.S. Air-Drops Asian Guerrillas

Saboteurs Raid N. Vietnam

By D. E. Ronk

Special to The Washington Post

VIENTIANE, Laos, June 14—Use of Laotian territory and specially recruited Asian mercenaries for CIA-sponsored espionage and sabotage missions in North Vietnam has been confirmed here by American sources close to the operation.

The missions are originating from a number of small mountaintop sites in northern Laos within 30 miles of the North Vietnamese border. The guerrilla troops are transported by unmarked Air America planes.

The existence of the guerrilla missions inside North Vietnam was first reported in Saigon earlier this week. Such missions were known to have been initiated in early 1960s, but were not regarded at the time as very effective and were apparently suspended after the 1968 bombing halt.

Highly trained mountain tribesmen from northern Laos and some Thai mercenaries with long experience in special operations are said here to make up the teams. Most of the guerrillas are said to speak Vietnamese, some fluently.

Officially, the Air America management in Vientiane is unaware that the company's pilots or planes are flying such missions. Air America is a quasi-private airline under contract with U.S. government agencies.

Pilots used on the espionage-sabotage mission flights are carefully selected and receive special pay for hazardous duty by a "white envelope system." This means that the money received is not accountable or traceable, even for tax purposes, sources say.

Official U.S. spokesmen in Vientiane decline to comment on the operation, but information pieced together from American sources here indicates that virtually

inaccessible CIA-maintained bases in Laos are used to train, house, and transport the guerrillas.

Nam Yu, the CIA's most secret base in Laos, situated in northwestern Laos near the town of Ban Houei Sai, is reported to be the primary training center.

Nam Yu was formerly a base for intelligence teams being sent into South China to report on telephone and road traffic, a program discontinued last year when President Nixon accepted an invitation to visit China.

From Nam Yu, the guerrillas are moved to the Long Cheng area 80 miles north of Vientiane where they continue to train, making forays into the surrounding mountains inside Laos on lower-level reconnaissance missions for seasoning and practical experience in avoiding capture and inflicting harm on Communist forces.

Many of the potential North Vietnamese infiltrators are "weeded out" during this training period, sources say.

Resident newsmen here have been unable to visit Long Cheng in recent months.

Jump-off points for the guerrillas are considerably east and northeast of Long Cheng, according to the sources, most being tiny hilltop positions hardly known to exist. A major point of departure is said to be at Bouam Long, sometimes called "the fortress in the sky," about 40 miles northeast of Long Cheng, a base the Communists have never been able to wrest from its Meo defenders.

Practical training exercises are also conducted at Bouam Long. Communist radio broadcasts frequently note the presence, capture or killing of commandos from Bouam Long in the Sam Neua area of northeast Laos. Caves in nearby mountains contain the headquarters of the Communist-supported Laotian rebels.

The highest priority, however, is given to missions that move into North Vietnam

where they conduct sabotage, espionage and propaganda missions in that country's least inhabited and defended areas. Precise information on targets and types of guerrilla action is not available here.

It is known, however, that the CIA is distrustful of many claims made by the guerrilla infiltrators and frequently equips the units with cameras so they can photograph themselves at targets. The photographs prove the missions were carried out, and provides intelligence data for CIA analysts.

Each mission uses at least one specially equipped twin-engine Otter plane, said to carry half a million dollars worth of radio and electronic gear for pinpoint navigation and locating of ground forces. Because of the twin Otter's virtual silent operation as it passes close over the ground, its short take-off and landing capability, and the load it can carry, its basic function has been the clandestine insertion, pickup and resupply of guerrilla missions.

There are also reports of guerrillas being snatched from enemy-occupied territory by a hook dangling from rescue aircraft. The guerrilla on the ground inflates a large balloon with lighter-than-air gas, attaches it to a thin line which is then attached to a harness he fastens to himself. The rescue craft passes over the balloon, hooks on and hauls him up.

Qualified sources here say, meantime, that they believe that such espionage missions will be increased in northern Laos, and may be resumed inside China itself, to sabotage war material that—because of the mining of Haiphong—is expected to flow increasingly through China's Yunnan Province and the Laotian Province of Phong Saly on its way into North Vietnam.

STATOTHR

Commando raids on North Vietnam

'Mercenaries' (CIA recruits?) hit supply and transport lines

By Daniel Southerland
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Saigon

United States-hired commandos are making unannounced raids into North Vietnam, according to U.S. sources in Saigon.

The sources said the raids are being made against North Vietnam's supply and transport system, mainly in the country's southern panhandle, by "Asian mercenaries." Most of the commandos are believed to be recruits of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency in Laos.

Many of the commandos are being inserted into North Vietnam by unmarked aircraft, the sources said. But according to one report, some have been slipped into North Vietnam on boats.

The sources said the raids are being staged from a "neighboring country," undoubtedly meaning Laos. But it was thought that bases in Thailand might also be involved.

Targets spotlighted

Truck parks and supply depots are among the targets, the sources said.

The CIA had organized sabotage and intelligence raids into North Vietnam in the early 1960's, but these were believed to have met with little success.

In early 1964, the raids were stepped up and came under the control of the U.S. Military Assistance Command in Saigon. Some of the details of those raids were disclosed in the "Pentagon papers" published last year.

The raids were apparently suspended after the bombing halt in 1968.

The renewed raids are no secret to the North Vietnamese. Hanoi publications such as Quan Doi Nhan Dan (People's Army) have made at least half-a-dozen references over the past few weeks to "puppet ranger groups" making raids in the north.

Publication warns

The armed forces publication recently warned that the United States is "attempting to conduct surprise attacks by infantry or commandos in vital areas to sever our transportation to the front line."

In another issue, Quan Doi Nhan Dan said that North Vietnam's local forces are "determined to destroy all U.S. puppet ranger groups."

"At present, along with using aircraft and warships to . . . attack us, the Nixon clique is maneuvering to continue to use rangers to carry out sabotage activities in the north," the paper said. "These activities are aimed at sabotaging our communications lines and military and economic installations.

"They use aircraft, boats, and rubber rafts to land these rangers or send them across the borders. Their basic plot is to land secretly, quickly carry out sabotage activities, and then withdraw quickly."

But it added that "sometimes they leave behind a small number of rangers to carry out activities for a long time."

Although the North Vietnamese publication called the raids "desperate," activities which "cannot escape being appropriately punished," there is no evidence so far that the Communists have had much success in stopping them.

Along with the bombing, mining, and commando raids, the United States has also resumed the dropping of propaganda leaflets over North Vietnam.

The Voice of America has increased its broadcasts to North Vietnam from a pre-offensive level of 6 hours a day to a current level of 13 hours a day.

How We Sank into Vietnam

Joseph Buttinger

One of the most puzzling questions future historians will have to deal with is why the United States ever got involved in the contemporary struggle for Indochina that has been going on since 1945. Did the considerations that determined the course of American foreign policy after World War II make this involvement inevitable or could it have been avoided in spite of the tensions that arose after 1945 between the West and the so-called Communist bloc? On this point, opinions will probably always remain divided, but those who believe that no other course could have been chosen without damage to the West or the United States would do well to consider the following:

(1) no Indochina war would have taken place if France had not insisted on reestablishing its control over Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos after these countries had gained independence following the Japanese surrender in 1945;

(2) it is questionable that the United States would ever have reached the point of even considering intervention in Vietnamese affairs if it had refused from the beginning to support the reestablishment of French rule in Indochina.

It is indeed one of the important conclusions of the Pentagon Papers "that the Truman Administration's decision to give military aid to France in her colonial war against the Communist-led Vietminh 'directly involved' the United States in Vietnam and 'set' the course of American policy."¹

Yet this decision was made only in 1950, after the victory of Communism in China and the recognition of Ho Chi Minh's regime by the Soviet Union and Communist China. It would never have come about had it not been preceded by the decision made by the victorious Allies at the Potsdam Conference of July 17 to August 2, 1945, which gave the French not only a free hand but also Allied support for the reconquest of Indochina. This Potsdam decision, supported only by the British under both Churchill and Attlee, might not have been taken if President

Roosevelt had still been alive. It was opposed by Nationalist China under Chiang Kai-shek and certainly not favored by Stalin. Vigorous American opposition to it would probably have led to the acceptance of Roosevelt's concept of a United Nations Trusteeship for French Indochina as a first step toward full independence.

Surprisingly on this crucial point the conclusion of the Pentagon Papers is that Roosevelt "never made up his mind whether to support the French desire to reclaim their Indochinese colonies from the Japanese at the end of the war."² In view of the forceful statements Roosevelt made against the return of the French to Indochina to his Secretary of State Cordell Hull and to his son Elliot, as reported in their memoirs,³ this conclusion must be regarded as erroneous.

There has been much speculation about the question whether American massive military intervention in Vietnam might not have been avoided if President Kennedy had been alive. It is unlikely that this question will ever be answered with any degree of certainty. But it is probable that Vietnam after 1945 would have experienced a period of peaceful evolution toward independence, under a regime not unlike that of Tito's Yugoslavia, if Roosevelt had lived and succeeded in imposing his anticolonial solution for Indochina. Nor is it far-fetched to assume that Roosevelt would not have disregarded the appeals of Ho Chi Minh, in at least eight letters to Washington in 1945-46 for United States and United Nations intervention against French colonialism.⁴ "There is no record . . . that any of these appeals were answered."⁵ Not until publication of the Pentagon Papers did the American public hear of the existence of these letters.

Yet the Truman administration's policy toward Vietnam remained ambivalent for at least the first three years of the Indochina war. On the one hand, the U.S. "fully recognized France's sovereign position," as Secretary of State George Marshall said in a still secret State Department cablegram sent to the U.S. Embassy in Paris; on the other hand,

STATOTHR

June 1972

The Pentagon Papers—
A Discussion

The publication of "confidential" materials has inevitably given rise to a debate concerning a number of different but related problems: To what extent do the revelations contained in the documents throw light on events or policy decisions with which they deal? To what extent, if at all, does the publication of the information contained in the documents jeopardize the processes of executive decisionmaking? How can the conflict between the public's right to know and the executive's need for confidentiality be reconciled? The editors of the *Political Science Quarterly* have in the past published a number of articles dealing with the issue of access to governmental information and the terms on which that access is made available, notably, Adolf A. Berle's and Malcolm Moos's reviews of Emmet John Hughes, *The Ordeal of Power* (*PSQ*, LXXIX, June 1964) and Theodore Draper's review of Jerome Slater, *Intervention and Negotiation: The United States and the Dominican Revolution* (*PSQ*, LXXXVI, March 1971). The recent publication of the *Pentagon Papers* has given the controversy new urgency. U.S. Senator George McGovern of South Dakota, candidate for the Democratic party nomination for president, and Professor John P. Roche, from 1966-68 special consultant to President Lyndon Johnson, were asked by the editors of the *Political Science Quarterly* to review the *Pentagon Papers* and to debate in print the political and legal issues to which their publication has given rise.

I

Publication of the *Pentagon Papers* has raised a storm concerning the right of the press to publish classified government documents. But the contents of the papers are so sweeping in their disclosures of official suppression of the realities in Vietnam, so revealing of the disastrous, secretly conceived policies and practices which led us into this tragic war, that it is impossible—in fact it misses their true significance—to discuss them in such abstract terms.

The integrity of our democracy is profoundly involved, not only in the constitutional sense with respect to the war-making power, but in the basic sense of the reality of government by popular rule. It is axiomatic with us that a free people can remain free only if it is enlightened and informed. It is axiomatic with us, as well, that a free press is essential to the creation and maintenance of an enlightened and informed people. A press which obtains access to a record revealing so immense a gap between what our executive leadership knew and what it led the nation

Duplicity on Vietnam

The comments on "Nixon's Peace Spectacular" in the March *Progressive* were excellent. It is a bit misleading, though, to emphasize that "virtually every item in his plan had previously been proposed by the United States, and all had previously been rejected by the other side." The important point is not that the proposals have all been rejected in recent years; the important point is that nearly every item was *accepted*—by Ho Chi Minh, in 1954. It is our steadfast refusal to observe that agreement that makes it difficult for the Vietnamese to believe us now.

We now offer to repeat some of the promises which we have been ignoring, but repeat them in greatly weakened form, under circumstances which make them worthless.

The Vietnamese are acutely aware—even though we like to forget—that international agreements involving the United States are made meaningless by the activities of the CIA, which operates in complete disregard of international law, specific treaties, declarations of principle, or tradition. In 1954, it violated the Geneva accords as soon as they were signed, by smuggling in tons of prohibited military supplies, sabotaging North Vietnamese railways and bus lines, and hunting down those who had been prominent in the struggle for Vietnamese independence.

At present, the CIA is placing major emphasis on "Operation Phoenix"—a program for subsidizing the assassination of individuals suspected of being part of "the Vietcong infrastructure." On July 19, 1971, William E. Colby, who had directed the program for the CIA, testified that it had killed 20,587 suspects since 1968, and that the program was being stepped up. Presumably, therefore, we have managed to murder at least 30,000 Vietnamese by now.

Since Vietnam is less than one-tenth the size of the United States, this is equivalent to slaughtering more than 300,000 Americans, as far as political impact is concerned. Would Nixon really insist that the 1972 election was a fair one if the Democrats were allowed to assassinate the 300,000 most prominent Republicans before November?

William Palmer Taylor
Hamilton, Ohio

sult of startup problems at Litton's new facility. In terms of concept and design, Litton has taken a revolutionary approach to shipbuilding that if successful, would greatly improve both efficiency and costs in our shipbuilding industry. However thus far the experience of Litton has resulted in neither increased efficiency or lower costs.

In October 1968 Litton won a contract for 7 merchant marine ships including four container ships for the Farrel Line. Three weeks after launching, the superstructure of the first Farrel container ship sank by 1/2 inch. There is no doubt the Farrel Line is very dissatisfied with the shoddy construction on the ship and delays in its delivery.

There have also been significant labor problems at the Pascagoula facility. Difficulty has been accounted in recruiting both skilled labor and managerial personnel. The turnover rate at the new west bank facility has been twice that at the old east bank facility reaching levels as high as 50 percent per year. Litton has also undertaken a major recruitment program of skilled managerial personnel which I understand has been quite successful.

In addition to labor problems, there have been production problems at the yard forcing the movement of some ships from the new west bank yard to the east bank facility. Several of the merchant marine ships which initially were scheduled to be built in the west bank yard are now being constructed on the other side of the river. In addition, some of the LHA ships have been moved to the old yard and some DD-963's may be constructed in the older and traditional facility.

In sum, Mr. Speaker, we have a huge mess on our hands. The Navy chose during a 13-month period to pour more than \$3 billion for 39 ships into a brand new and untested shipyard. The result thus far has been nothing less than disastrous. Cost overruns, delays, and now a series of complex negotiations between the Navy and Litton have been the result. It is no secret that now Litton expects a major increase in the cost of the LHA program.

It is my hope that the Navy will answer all these serious questions that I have raised during the next several weeks. It is also my hope that the Navy will hold Litton to its original contract, and not grant huge price increases to Litton. The Navy and the Congress must resist the temptation to bail Litton out.

The letter to Mr. Staats follows:

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Washington, D.C., April 17, 1972.

MR. ELMER STAATS,
Comptroller General of the United States,
General Accounting Office, General Accounting Office Building, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. STAATS: I am writing to you to request the General Accounting Office undertake a study of escalation charges in the 30 ship DD-963 program. In its latest Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) for the DD-963, the Navy estimates that the cost of escalation will be \$309.6 million. In the same report the Navy also indicates that it has revised its method of computing escalation

and the result has been an increase of \$136.5 million in estimated cost growth. Later in the same report an increase of \$455 million as recorded "due to including contractors estimate of escalation". Apparently there is a discrepancy in the estimate of escalation cost by the Navy and Litton of approximately \$145 million.

Specifically, I hope that the General Accounting Office will evaluate:

1. Has Litton Industries realistically evaluated the escalation charges for the DD-963 program? Are all the costs reflected in the \$455 million the result of escalation and cost growth?

2. Why is there a discrepancy of \$145 million between the Navy's estimate of escalation and Litton's estimate of escalation? Is the Navy including escalation charges under other items in the Selected Acquisition Report (SAR)?

I also hope that the General Accounting Office will be able to determine if all of the escalation estimates by both the Navy and Litton Industries seem to be reasonable and within guidelines established by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.

A member of my staff, William Broydrick, is ready to discuss details of the studies with any member of your staff.

Thank you very much for your cooperation.

Sincerely,

LES ASPIN,
Member of Congress.

THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from New York (Mr. ABZUG) is recognized for 60 minutes.

Mrs. ABZUG. Mr. Speaker, the American people have made it clear time and time again that they want this Nation to get out of Vietnam and to get out now.

They want this withdrawal to include not only our men, but our planes, and our bombs, too.

They want it to be contingent solely upon the release of our prisoners of war.

They do not want it to be contingent upon the continued existence of the corrupt Thieu dictatorship or upon the destruction of the North Vietnamese people and nation.

It has been so long since the will of the American people became apparent that it is truly incredible to see this administration reescalating the death and destruction and returning us to the dark days of 1967 and 1968.

The Pentagon's own studies have stated that massive bombing of the North has no noticeable effect upon the flow of supplies to the South. Why then are we bombing? The fact of the matter is that Vietnamization has been an abject failure, as it was doomed to be from the beginning. The South Vietnamese military is no better able to defend itself from the people of Vietnam than it was 2, or 3, or 10 years ago. Mr. Nixon, recognizing the political impossibility of recommitting American ground forces to this futile conflict, thinks that if he devastates North Vietnam from the air, he will somehow secure the position of the Thieu government. There is no other conceivable reason for his action. The Defense Department's own studies show that the bombing will not stop the flow of supplies, and will, therefore, be of no use in "protecting" the American troops who remain in Indochina.

Mr. Speaker, this morning's New York Times carried an editorial which notes that:

Every new air raid means more pilots shot down and captured.

Since it is clear at this point that our prisoners will not be returned while we bomb North Vietnam and maintain a substantial military presence in the South, it is plain that Mr. Nixon's primary interest in the POW's is their use as pawns, for his actions only serve to prolong their detention and to increase their numbers. The Times editorial is an excellent one, and I wish to read it in full at this time:

[From the New York Times, Apr. 17, 1971]

OF BLOOD AND SLOGANS

Slogans can have a fateful significance.

Taking office in 1969 on a pledge "to end the war and win the peace," President Nixon made a fateful decision concerning the true content of that vague but beguiling campaign slogan. "Winning the peace," he decided, meant that an anti-Communist Government had to be consolidated in power in South Vietnam. Otherwise the "peace" would be lost because additional military effort by the Communists would soon bring them the victory they have long sought.

Since the United States and its South Vietnamese allies had not conclusively defeated the Communists on the field of battle, there was no immediate visible way to "win the peace" in Mr. Nixon's special sense of that term. As a result, "ending the war" had to be indefinitely postponed and the subtly but significantly different objective of "winding down the war" had to be substituted. Even this phrase had to be defined in a special sense. The war itself was not wound down; on the contrary, it was extended to Cambodia and Laos and American bombing greatly increased. What was "wound down" was the scale of American involvement in the ground fighting.

When these special Nixonian interpretations have been decoded, that 1968 promise "to end the war and win the peace" translates into ordinary English as a promise "to continue the war until the enemy concedes defeat and accepts American peace terms."

Would the American people have accepted Mr. Nixon's leadership four years ago if they had understood the true import of his slogan? The question is unanswerable. What can be said is that the Communist forces in Vietnam are not prepared to accept Mr. Nixon's special definitions. The bloody fighting of the last ten days demonstrates that the war was not ended.

South Vietnam's Army has been able to achieve at least a temporary stalemate but on terms that have ominous implications for long-term American involvement. Only massive American bombing, including heavy raids in North Vietnam itself, enabled the South Vietnam forces to halt the Communist advance. And it is the precarious position of South Vietnam's embattled forces that has led to the weekend's American escalation of the air war near Haiphong and Hanoi.

If American air support on a large scale is the essential prerequisite for staving off a South Vietnam defeat, the United States may be fighting an air war in Southeast Asia for several more years—on and on into the indefinite future in an elusive effort to "win" an ever-receding "peace."

America's involvement in the Vietnam war cannot be satisfactorily ended until this country obtains the release of its prisoners of war. Every new air raid means more pilots shot down and captured. The number of American prisoners steadily grows. Thus, every raid not only brings death and devastation to Vietnam but postpones the end of the war.

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

By Jack Anderson

POW Secrets

Government red tape and secrecy rules have kept hundreds of documents on prisoners of war in Saigon for up to two years while the POW families waited and wondered about their loved ones.

One classified data includes reports of Vietcong prisoner interrogations, CIA memos, Army intelligence papers and other fragments of military information gleaned from the field in Vietnam.

Interwoven with genuine secrets are such innocuous facts as the location of POWs, their condition, orders given for their protection and even an intriguing plan to buy freedom for some prisoners through double agents.

Although the White House has paid lip service to the POWs and their families, it did not unlock the files until the case of Sgt. John Sexton came to light. His family feared he was dead, although U. S. intelligence authorities had held a letter from him for two years which said he was alive.

To head off more "Sexton cases," Defense Secretary Mel Laird ordered a housecleaning of old POW data. This brought bales of documents to Washington from U. S. intelligence files in Saigon.

The suppressed documents included nothing so dramatic as the Sexton letter. Nevertheless, some of the details, if released sooner, would have spared the news-starved families months of anguish.

To the credit of the Army casualties section handling the data in Washington, once a new fact was discovered it was tephoned to the family, or in some cases an officer flew to the POW family's home to brief them.

STATOTHR

April 1972

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SR: BOOKS

Book Review Editor: ROCHELLE GIRON

STATOTHR

**IN THE MIDST OF WARS:
An American's Mission
to Southeast Asia**

by Edward Geary Lansdale
Harper & Row, 386 pp., \$12.50

Reviewed by Jonathan Mirsky

With the exception of the Pentagon Papers, Edward Geary Lansdale's memoir could have been the most valuable eyewitness account of the internationalizing of the Indochinese war. Lansdale, a "legendary figure" even in his own book, furnished the model for the Ugly American who, from 1950 through 1953, "helped" Magsaysay put down the Huk revolution in the Philippines. He then proceeded to Vietnam where, between 1954 and 1956, he stuck close to Ngo Dinh Diem during Diem's first shaky years when Washington couldn't make up its mind whom to tap as the American alternative to Ho Chi Minh. Lansdale's support insured Diem as the final choice for Our Man in Saigon. While the book's time span is, therefore, relatively brief, the period it covers in the Philippines and Vietnam is genuinely important.

There is only one difficulty with *In the Midst of Wars*: from the cover to the final page it is permeated with lies. That Harper & Row finds it possible to foist such a package of untruths on the public—and for \$12.50!—several months after the emergence of the Pentagon Papers, and years after the publication of other authoritative studies, exhibits contempt for a public trying to understand the realities of our engagement in Vietnam.

The lie on the jacket describes Lansdale merely as an OSS veteran who spent the years after World War II as a "career officer in the U.S. Air Force." In the text Lansdale never offers any explicit evidence to the contrary. Indeed, on page 378—the last of the text—he states that at the very time Diem was being murdered in Saigon, "I had been retired from the Air Force."

For all I know Lansdale drew his pay from the Air Force and, as the photographs in his book attest, he certainly wore its uniform. This is irrelevant. Lansdale was for years a senior operative of the Central Intelligence Agency; on page 244 of the Department of Defense edition of the Pentagon Papers, Lansdale, two other men, and Allen Dulles are identified as "proposing

the CIA at a meeting of the President's Special Committee on Indochina held on January 29, 1954.

Why is this important? Because if there is one word Lansdale uses repeatedly it is "help"—and he uses it personally, simulating a Lone Ranger-like urge to offer *spontaneous* assistance. Thus, the first day he ever saw Diem, ". . . the thought occurred to me that perhaps he needed help. . . I voiced this to Ambassador Heath. . . Heath told me to go ahead." The informal atmosphere continues when Lansdale, upon actually meeting Diem, immortalizes him as "the alert and eldest of the seven dwarfs deciding what to do about Snow White."

Further desires to serve inform Lansdale's concern for the "masses of people living in North Vietnam who would want to . . . move out before the communists took over." These unfortunates, too, required "help." Splitting his "small team" of Americans in two, Lansdale saw to it that "One half, under Major Conein, engaged in refugee work in the North."

"Major" Lucien Conein, who was to play the major role the CIA had in the murder of Diem in 1963, is identified in the secret CIA report included by the *Times* and *Beacon* editions of the Pentagon Papers (see SR, Jan. 1, 1972) as an agent "assigned to MAAG [Military Assistance Advisory Group] for cover purposes." The secret report refers to Conein's refugee "help" as one of his "cover duties." His real job: "responsibility for developing a paramilitary organization in the North, to be in position when the Vietminh took over . . . the group was to be trained and supported by the U.S. as patriotic Vietnamese." Conein's "helpful" teams also attempted to sabotage Hanoi's largest printing establishment and wreck the local bus company. At the beginning of 1955, still in Hanoi, the CIA's Conein infiltrated more agents into the North. They "became normal citizens, carrying out everyday civil pursuits, on the surface." Aggression from the North, anyone?

Lansdale expresses particular pleasure with the refugee movement to the South. These people "ought to be provided with a way of making a fresh start in the free South. . . [Vietnam] was going to need the vigorous participation of every citizen to make a success of the noncommunist part of the new nation before the proposed plebiscite was held in 1956." Lansdale modestly claims that he "passed along" ideas on how to wage psychological warfare to "some nationalists." The Pentagon Papers, however, reveal that the CIA "engineered a black psywar strike in Hanoi: leaflets signed by the Vietminh, signed by the CIA, and signed by the Vietminh, telling how to behave for the Vietminh take-

over of the Hanoi region in early October [1954] including items about property, money reform, and a three-day holiday of workers upon takeover. The day following the distribution of these leaflets, refugee registration tripled."

The refugees—Catholics, many of whom had collaborated with the French—were settled in the South, in communities that, according to Lansdale, were designed to "sandwich" Northerners and Southerners "in a cultural melting pot that hopefully would give each equal opportunity."

Robert Scigliano, who at this time was advising the CIA-infiltrated Michigan State University team on how to "help" Diem, saw more than a melting pot:

Northerners, practically all of whom are refugees, [have] preempted many of the choice posts in the Diem government. . . [The] Diem regime has assumed the aspect of a carpet bag government in its disproportion of Northerners and Centralists . . . and in its Catholicism. . . The Southern people do not seem to share the anticommunist vehemence of their Northern and Central compatriots, by whom they are sometimes referred to as unreliable in the communist struggle. . . [While] priests in the refugee villages hold no formal government posts they are generally the real rulers of their villages and serve as contacts with district and provincial officials.

Graham Greene, a devout Catholic, observed in 1955 after a visit to Vietnam, "It is Catholicism which has helped to ruin the government of Mr. Diem, for his genuine piety has been exploited by his American advisers until the Church is in danger of sharing the unpopularity of the United States."

Wherever one turns in Lansdale the accounts are likely to be lies. He reports how Filipinos, old comrades from the anti-Huk wars, decided to "help" the struggling Free South. The spontaneity of this pan-Asian gesture warms the heart—until one learns from Lansdale's own secret report to President Kennedy that here, too, the CIA had stage-managed the whole business. The Eastern Construction Company turns out to be a CIA-controlled "mechanism to permit the deployment of Filipino personnel in other Asian countries for unconventional operations. . . Philippine Armed Forces and other governmental personnel were 'sheep-dipped' and sent abroad."


Elsewhere Lansdale makes much of Diem's success against the various sects, Cao Dai, Hoa Hao, and Binh Xuyen. (At every step Diem was advised by Lansdale who, at one pathetic moment, even holds the weeping Chief of State in his arms, telling him how to behave for the Vietminh take-

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continued

EARTH
March 1972

THE SELLING OF



Text by Morton Kondracke
Photography by Dennis Brack & Fred Ward

What the Pentagon Censored

Publication of the Pentagon Papers by several prominent daily newspapers last June confirmed the general suspicion that the Government's security classification system serves as much to protect political leaders from embarrassing public scrutiny as to preserve genuine military secrets.

Now the publication of the Pentagon's own censored version of the Pentagon Papers demonstrates that the system is not only abusive of the democratic process but self-deluding as well.

The Pentagon rushed into print with its "sanitized" version of the Papers when it became known that Beacon Press was about to publish the original, classified version of the papers—as made available by Senator Mike Gravel, Alaska Democrat.

The Pentagon's motives were unclear, but the effect was to reveal what it considers to be the most sensitive portions of the original document, a development of interest not only to the American public but also to any potentially hostile foreign power.

Much of what the Pentagon censored had already appeared in *The New York Times*, *The Washington Post*, the *Chicago Sun-Times*, and other newspapers. The rest of what was deleted was immediately apparent to those reporters who possessed the original papers and should now be evident to any foreign intelligence service which takes the time to put the Pentagon version and the Beacon Press version side by side.

An analysis of what the Pentagon deleted shows that the Government is still anxious to conceal the role of the United States in several crucial aspects of the Vietnam involvement: how the first U.S. combat troops were sent to Vietnam, how plans were drawn up to use nuclear weapons against China, how the secret war in Laos has been waged, how the CIA conducted exten-

sive covert operations in North Vietnam, and how U.S. officials plotted the overthrow of South Vietnam President Ngo Dinh Diem in 1963.

Other deletions were more predictable, largely the record of diplomatic dealings with the Soviet Union, the Western European powers, and several "Third World" countries.

The most inexplicable deletions deal with the Diem coup. The Pentagon censors obviously failed to get the word from their Commander-in-Chief, President Nixon, who admitted openly at a White House press conference September 16 that "the way we got into Vietnam was through overthrowing Diem and the complicity in the murder of Diem."

Yet the Pentagon censors snipped out page after page of narrative detailing the intimate involvement of U.S. Embassy officials in the sordid maneuvering that led to Diem's fall. A possible explanation, in current political terms, is that the deletions contain several citations of U.S. hostility toward General Duong Van (Big) Minh. Minh sought briefly this year to mount a campaign against President Nguyen Van Thieu but backed out, charging that Thieu had rigged the elections with tacit U.S. approval.

The deletions covering the dispatch of the first combat troops to Vietnam in 1965 amount to more than six pages. Apparently they were made to obscure indications that the troops were conceived from the beginning as the vanguard of a major offensive buildup, not the small, defensive, and support force they were depicted as being at the time. In the original version, the Pentagon historians concluded that the evidence pointed "in support of the phased build-up proposition."

The deletions about nuclear weapons include a devastatingly matter-of-fact comment by Secretary of State Dean Rusk in 1964 that nuclear weapons would be used if Communist China entered the Vietnam war.

"If escalation brought about major Chinese attack," Rusk is paraphrased by the Pentagon Papers historian as declaring, "it would involve use of nuclear arms. Many free world leaders would oppose this. Chiang Kai-shek had told him [Rusk] fervently he did, and so did U Thant. Many Asians seemed to see an element of racial discrimination in use of nuclear weapons; something we would do to Asians but not to Westerners. . . . One must use the force one had; if Chinese used masses of humanity, we would use superior firepower."

On the eve of President Nixon's trip to Peking the Pentagon censors obviously thought it best to leave such blatant "Yellow Perilism" on the cutting room floor. But unless China's security officials are as obtuse as ours, it is likely that Rusk's remarks are already part of their briefing book for the Presidential visit to Peking.

—THOMAS ROSS and
MORTON KONDRACKÉ

(Mr. Ross and Mr. Kondracke are Washington correspondents for the Chicago Sun-Times.)

STATOTHR

Kennedy's role in Indochina

By Richard E. Ward

Fourth of a series on the Pentagon papers

If only John F. Kennedy had lived, certain writers have asserted, the U.S. never would have become bogged down in a major war in Southeast Asia.

The Pentagon papers are unkind to that myth, for the documents clearly show that the Kennedy administration set the stage for the escalation in Vietnam by its successor. In effect, Lyndon Johnson carried out a program germinated by the Kennedy administration, some of whose chief figures contemplated as early as 1961 the massive use of U.S. ground forces and the bombing of North Vietnam.

The Kennedy administration took office just a month after the formation of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam in December 1960. The NLF quickly gained wide support throughout the South and the U.S.-sponsored regime of Ngo Dinh Diem was soon on the defensive militarily and politically. From 1961, there was a steady escalation in U.S. interventionary activities. Espionage missions against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam were stepped up and the first regular American ground troops were sent to the South as "advisors" to the Saigon armed forces which were being expanded by the U.S. By mid-1963, the White House concluded that its aim of victory in Vietnam would not be possible under the Diem regime and the U.S. gave the green light for a coup in Saigon.

As the number of U.S. personnel in Indochina approached 20,000—an almost 20-fold increase in less than three years—the Kennedy administration came under increasing domestic criticism. In response, it stated the U.S. military presence in Vietnam had reached its peak and would be concluded by 1965. While that was what the public heard, the Pentagon papers reveal that most top administration officials were aware that the commitment of the first complement of U.S. troops implied a larger American combat role in the future.

The President's personal military advisor, Gen. Maxwell Taylor, recommended the use of U.S. forces on a limited scale in early November 1961, following a visit to South Vietnam. Taylor himself discounted the possibility that a major war would result from the use of American troops, which he suggested could be sent to

"flood relief." In a report to Kennedy, Taylor wrote: "The risks of backing into a major Asian war by way of SVN are present but are not impressive. NVN is extremely vulnerable to conventional bombing, a weakness which should be exploited diplomatically in convincing Hanoi to lay off SVN."

In a report of Nov. 8, 1961, endorsing the Taylor recommendations, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara spelled out the implications of a military victory with the use of U.S. troops: "The other side can be convinced we mean business only if we accompany the initial force introduction... by a warning... to Hanoi that continued support of the Viet Cong will lead to punitive retaliation against North Vietnam."

"If we act in this way, the ultimate possible extent of our military commitment must be faced. The struggle may be prolonged and Hanoi and Peiping (sic) may intervene directly. In view of the logistic difficulties faced by the other side, I believe that we can assume that the maximum U.S. forces required on the ground in Southeast Asia will not exceed 6 divisions, or about 205,000 men."

Although the Kennedy administration never actually made the decision to send the forces for fighting a full-scale war, its strategy (continued by the Johnson administration) foresaw their use and its actions laid the necessary groundwork for the subsequent escalation. One of these preparatory steps deemed necessary by Washington was the elimination of the Diem regime.

U.S. responsibility for the elimination of Diem was no less than for his installation in Saigon. Both roles have always been officially disclaimed by Washington, although there has been sufficient evidence of the facts for anyone who wanted to draw the correct conclusions. Of course details were missing. Some of them have been supplied in the Pentagon report.

The published communications between Washington and the U.S. embassy in Saigon show that the U.S. gave the plotters full assurances that the U.S. desired a coup. The U.S. furnished the generals with plans of Saigon military installations and at the time of the coup a CIA liaison man was in the generals' command post. White House officials and Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge were aware that Diem was likely to be assassinated and made no serious effort to save him, despite all his past services to the U.S.

The published documents and narratives concentrate primarily on the U.S. role in Diem's downfall, but provide less details on what is perhaps a more important question—the reason why the U.S. prompted the coup. Yet there seems to be enough evidence to say that the primary reason was not the regime's unpopularity at home and abroad, but rather because with the increase in U.S. troops in Vietnam Washington wanted a greater degree of control over the Saigon administration than Diem and his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu were willing to grant.

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12 AUG 1971

Expert Calls Taiwan U.S.-China Spy Base

By JEROME CARILL

Washington, Aug. 11 (NEWS Bureau)—The United States and the Chinese Nationalists for 20 years launched espionage, sabotage and guerrilla forays against Communist China from Chiang Kai-shek's island bastion of Taiwan, a former State Department official told Congress today.

Allen S. Whiting, professor of political science at the University of Michigan, who served in the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and in the U.S. Consulate in Hong Kong from 1961 to 1968, said the covert operations included support of the ill-fated uprising in Tibet in 1959.

Increased After Korean War

Whiting said America's "shadowy involvement" in the clandestine operations grew steadily after the Korean war and the 1954 Geneva Conference. He said they triggered the Formosa Strait crises of 1954 and 1958 and helped set the stage for the Sino-India war in 1962 along the Tibetan frontier.

Testifying before a subcommittee of the Senate-House Joint Economic Committee, Whiting said the publication of the Pentagon papers provided partial documentation of the operations, particularly U. S. and Nationalist Chinese overflights of mainland China.

Quoting from a top-secret memorandum from Brig. Gen. Edward

Lansdale to Gen. Maxwell Taylor, Whiting said a Nationalist Chinese airline called Civil Air Transport carried out "more than 200 overflights of mainland China and Tibet." In addition, the line provided aircraft for an abortive CIA effort to overthrow the Sukarno regime in Indonesia in 1958, and helped transport sabotage teams into North Vietnam as early as 1954, the witness said.

Airline Linked to CIA

In 1960, Whiting told the subcommittee, a new Taiwan-based airline, China Air Lines, came into being, and engaged in "clandestine intelligence operations" as well as commercial flights to Laos and Vietnam. He linked the airline to the CIA-backed Air America, which raided Northern Laos in the course of the CIA's "secret war in Laos."

At times, he said, the bombers strayed over the border, hitting mainland Chinese territory. This may explain "much of Peking's expanding military presence in road construction and antiaircraft activities in Northern Laos," he went on.

U.S. sabotaged Geneva accords

By Richard E. Ward

Third of a series of articles

Official U.S. policy statements on Indochina issued to the public characteristically have charged the Vietnamese with the crimes actually being committed by the U.S. From 1954 to the present day, among the U.S. ideological keystones have been the spurious claims of North Vietnamese aggression and violations of the 1954 Geneva settlement.

Although U.S. responsibility for sabotaging the Geneva agreements has been recognized widely for well over a decade, the first time it was seriously suggested in the New York Times was last month in its final installment of documents and reports from the Pentagon's history of U.S. intervention in Vietnam.

Following the disastrous French defeat at Dien-bienphu in May 1954 as well as serious military reverses elsewhere in Indochina, France finally faced the necessity of negotiations to avoid complete destruction of its forces. The ensuing settlement at Geneva contained provisions for a durable peace in Indochina. But as quickly as French troops left Indochina the U.S. began its direct intervention, preventing essential provisions of the Geneva agreement from being carried out.

Armed resistance begins

As is well known, the U.S. caused its puppet Ngo Dinh Diem to be installed in Saigon, even before the settlement had been reached in Geneva. Under programs financed and largely conceived by his CIA tutors, Diem instituted a neo-fascist regime. Thousands of patriots who had served in the anti-French resistance were assassinated or jailed and tortured. Armed struggle became the only road to survival; this developed spontaneously in some regions or under the direction of local cadres in others. Full-scale, coordinated resistance began with the formation of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam in December 1960, which was headed by a representative cross-section of the leadership of democratic and progressive organizations in the South.

In the U.S. version, which the American press rarely challenged (except to give a partially true picture as Diem neared his end in 1963), the Saigon puppets were treated as the legitimate rulers, threatened by subversive agents acting on behalf of Hanoi. In essence, according to Washington, in the late 1950s the U.S. was not intervening in Vietnam while "foreign aggression" was carried out by Vietnamese.

Unfortunately the press has only published a small amount of material from the Pentagon study on the period following the Geneva settlement. However, there is sufficient information from the Pentagon report to demonstrate that Washington consciously and deliberately was trying to crush the revolution in Vietnam and that virtually every public statement was nothing but a tissue of lies designed to conceal U.S. activities from the American people.

At various stages the U.S. and its apologists have blown hot and cold about the Geneva agreements. At the conference itself the chief U.S. delegate, Walter Bedell Smith, pledged that the U.S. would not upset them by force. Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000900020001-3

instructions from President Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles opposed any international recognition of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, which had existed for nearly nine years and led the resistance against the French.

Blind policies

Prior to the Geneva conference itself, Washington policy papers of 1954 underscored U.S. aims in Indochina as "a military victory" for the French, whose armies were on their last legs—indicating the lack of realism in Washington. Thus it is not surprising that the U.S. worked to destroy the new peace. This was evident at the time to anyone who wanted to see what was happening in Vietnam.

Clearer than before, the newly available documents show that the U.S. never intended to respect the Geneva settlement. On August 3, 1954, just two weeks after the Geneva conference concluded, the National Security Council discussed Vietnam. About the meeting, Fox Butterfield in the Times wrote: "The objectives set by the [National Security] Council were 'to maintain a friendly non-Communist South Vietnam' and 'to prevent a Communist victory through all-Vietnam elections.'"

Although the Pentagon analyst denied that the U.S. "connived" with Diem to prevent national elections, Butterfield noted that Washington had made its desires known to Diem and when Diem later blocked the elections, the U.S. indicated its full "support." The Pentagon papers could hardly conceal the fact that Diem remained in power by virtue of U.S. backing, although the dependence on the U.S. is sometimes obscured, particularly in ascribing to Diem the repression for which U.S. was ultimately responsible.

Washington's cynical attitude toward the Geneva settlement was stated by John Foster Dulles in a cable to the U.S. embassy in Saigon on Dec. 11, 1955: "While we should certainly take no step to speed up the present process of decay of the Geneva accords, neither should we make the slightest effort to infuse life into them."

Perhaps the most revealing new document from the post-Geneva period is a lengthy report on the activities of the so-called Saigon Military Mission, headed by Col. Lansdale of the CIA. Ostensibly written by anonymous members of the group, there is no doubt that the report which eulogizes Lansdale was largely his doing. Lansdale's activities were described in fiction by Graham Greene, in "The Quiet American." Lansdale's chauvinism and callousness might also be compared to the comic strip character, Steve Canyon, like Lansdale an Air Force colonel.

continued

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22 JUL 1971

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A SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT:

Kennedy's Private War

Ralph L. Stavins

The article that follows is part of *The Planning of the Vietnam War*, a study by members of the Institute of Policy Studies in Washington, including Richard J. Barnet, Marcus Raskin, and Ralph Stavins.* In their introduction to the study, the authors write:

"In early 1970, Marcus Raskin conceived the idea of a study that would explain how the Vietnam disaster happened by analyzing the planning of the war. A group of investigators directed by Ralph Stavins concentrated on finding out who did the actual planning that led to the decisions to bomb North Vietnam, to introduce over a half-million troops into South Vietnam, to defoliate and destroy vast areas of Indochina, and to create millions of refugees in the area.

"Ralph Stavins, assisted by Canta Pian, John Berkowitz, George Pipkin, and Brian Eden, conducted more than 300 interviews in the course of this study. Among those interviewed were many Presidential advisers to Kennedy and Johnson, generals and admirals, middle level bureaucrats who occupied strategic positions in the national security bureaucracy, and officials, military and civilian, who carried out the policy in the field in Vietnam.

"A number of informants backed up their oral statements with documents in their possession, including informal minutes of meetings, as well as portions of the official documentary record now known as the 'Pentagon Papers.' Our information is drawn not only from the Department of Defense, but also from the White House, the Department of State, and the Central Intelligence Agency."

The study is being published in two volumes. The first, which includes the article below, will be published early in August. The second will appear in May, 1972.

*The study is the responsibility of its authors and does not necessarily reflect the views of the Institute, its trustees, or fellows.

I

At the end of March, 1961, the CIA circulated a National Intelligence Estimate on the situation in South Vietnam. This paper advised Kennedy that Diem was a tyrant who was confronted with two sources of discontent, the non-Communist loyal opposition and the Viet Cong. The two problems were closely connected. Of the spreading Viet Cong network the CIA noted:

Local recruits and sympathetic or intimidated villagers have enhanced Viet Cong control and influence over increasing areas of the countryside. For example, more than one-half of the entire rural region south and southwest of Saigon, as well as some areas to the north, are under considerable Communist control. Some of these areas are in effect denied to all government authority not immediately backed by substantial armed force. The Viet Cong's strength encircles Saigon and has recently begun to move closer in the city.

The people were not opposing these recent advances by the Viet Cong; if anything, they seemed to be supporting them. The failure to rally the people against the Viet Cong was laid to Diem's dictatorial rule:

There has been an increasing disposition within official circles and the army to question Diem's ability to lead in this period. Many feel that he is unable to rally the people in the fight against the Communists because of his reliance on virtual one-man rule, his tolerance of corruption extending even to his immediate entourage, and his refusal to relax a rigid system of public controls.

The CIA referred to the attempted coup against Diem that had been led by

General Thi in November, 1960, and concluded that another coup was likely. In spite of the gains by the Viet Cong, they predicted that the next attempt to overthrow Diem would originate with the army and the non-Communist opposition.

The Communists would like to initiate and control a coup against Diem, and their armed and subversive operations including united front efforts are directed toward this purpose. It is more likely, however, that any coup attempt which occurs over the next year or so will originate among non-Communist elements, perhaps a combination of disgruntled civilian officials and oppositionists and army elements, broader than those involved in the November attempt.

In view of the broadly based opposition to Diem's regime and his virtual reliance on one-man rule, it was unlikely that he would initiate any reform measures that would sap the strength of the revolutionaries. Whether reform was conceived as widening the political base of the regime, which Diem would not agree to, or whether it was to consist of an intensified counter-insurgency program, something the people would not support, it had become painfully clear to Washington that reform was not the path to victory. But victory was the goal, and Kennedy called upon Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric to draw up the victory plans. On April 20, 1961, Kennedy asked Gilpatric to:

- a) Appraise the current status and future prospects of the Communist drive to dominate South Vietnam.
- b) Recommend a series of actions (military, political, and/or economic, overt and/or covert) which will prevent Communist domination of that country.

CIA 104 Lansdale Edward
 Soc. 4.01.2 The Planning of
 the Vietnam War

Lansdale's Secret War

They were America's first Vietnam warriors—a small team of Central Intelligence Agency operatives called the Saigon Military Mission, headed by the legendary Col. Edward Lansdale, and sent into Vietnam in the chaotic, eleventh-hour summer of 1954 to try to stave off a Communist take-over. How they did it was revealed last week in a diary kept by some of the SMM agents and excerpted by The New York Times among its final selections from the Pentagon's secret study of the war. Undated, unsigned, the diary chronicles one year of CIA operations in North and South, Vietnam—operations plainly in violation of the spirit if not the letter of the Geneva agreements, which the U.S. had pledged not to disturb—and provides a revealing glimpse of the earliest covert moves that led ultimately to massive, open U.S. involvement in the war.

It was fearfully late to be establishing a U.S. mission. Ho Chi Minh was rushing to consolidate control in the north, and so wobbly was Premier Ngo Dinh Diem's original government in the south, the diary relates, that high-level officials in Washington already considered Vietnam probably lost. "We admitted that prospects were gloomy," the diary states, "but were positive that there was still a fighting chance."

Lansdale was certainly the man to take it. A tough Air Force career officer turned CIA agent, Lansdale had become the foremost American counter-insurgency expert helping the Philippines' Ramon Magsaysay crush the Communist Hukbalahap rebellion two years before—and reportedly was the model for Colonel Hillandale in "The Ugly American." He threw SMM—and his own prestige—behind Diem, and sent a crack American paramilitary team to Hanoi to try to slow the Communist take-over.

The northern team was led, ironically, by U.S. Army Major Lucien Conein—the same CIA agent who, nine years later, was to sit in on the planning and execution of the South Vietnamese Army generals' overthrow of President Ngo Dinh Diem. This time, using the refugee evacuation program as a cover, Conein and his men worked furiously to recruit a team of North Vietnamese insurgents

(code-named Binh), "exfiltrate" them for training at a secret U.S. base, and smuggle them, with supplies and ammunition, back into the north before the Vietminh seized Hanoi.

They were also engaged in psychological warfare—and sabotage. According to the diary, one leaflet circulated in Hanoi, ostensibly announcing Vietminh plans for such programs as monetary reform, so demoralized the populace that the value of Vietminh currency fell by half and refugee applications to move south tripled in a single day. But when Hanoi finally fell in October, Conein and his men very nearly fell with it. On their last raid, the team attempted to wreck Hanoi's bus system by pouring a contaminant into its oil supply. "The team," the diary relates, "had a bad moment . . . in an enclosed storage room. Fumes from the contaminant came close to knocking them out. Dizzy and weak-kneed, they masked their faces with handkerchiefs and completed the job."

Tricks: SMM was up to the same kind of paramilitary, psy-war tricks in the south—including recruiting another team of Tonkin-bound insurgents code-named Hao, and publishing an almanac filled with calamitous astrological forecasts for the north. But Lansdale's biggest headache seems to have been keeping the man he had backed in power. Army Chief of Staff Gen. Nguyen Van Hinh made no secret of his eagerness to overthrow Diem, and it apparently took all of Lansdale's considerable wiles to keep him from doing it. He managed to stave off one coup by dispatching Hinh's two key aides on a junket to the Philippines, and he developed his own spy-lines to the general. "Our chief," the diary relates, ". . . was a friend of both Hinh's wife and his favorite mistress (the mistress was a pupil in a small English class conducted for mistresses of important personages at their request . . .)." Within a month, Hinh had departed for France, spurred on his way in no small measure by Lansdale's operations.

The diary's conclusions ring with pride in a job well done. "We had smuggled into Vietnam about eight and a half tons of supplies," it relates. "Our Binh and our northern Hao teams were in place, completely equipped. It had taken a tremendous amount of hard work . . ." Later, Lansdale had an opportunity to see where it all had led. When he returned to Vietnam in 1965, the man he had backed was dead, the South Vietnamese Army was all but inoperable—and the U.S. had begun the infusion of half a million fighting men.

STATOTHR

How the Pentagon papers battle shielded Nixon plan for China trip

STATOTHR

"Pentagon papers 'delay also saved CIA agents' lives, helped allied regimes, safeguarded key emissaries."

By J. F. TER HORST

Chief of Our Washington Bureau

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WASHINGTON — One prime reason why the government went into court to try to stop publication of the Pentagon papers was a fear that certain disclosures might wreck the secret planning then under way for President Nixon's anticipated trip to Communist China.

In going to court, the government's top lawyers believe they also saved the lives of several Americans, headed off some grave security leaks and preserved the machinery of some of today's most delicate and secret peace moves involving many countries of the East and West.

The Washington-Peking thaw is one of them. Mr. Nixon, it can be said on high authority, shares this view.

So even though the Supreme Court ruled, 6-3, that the New York Times and Washington Post could resume printing material from the top-secret Pentagon study of U.S. involvement in Indochina, the government feels it won more than it lost.

Two factors are vital in the government's reasoning.

One was the two-week period, June 15 to July 1, during which the administration's court tactics kept the Times, Post and some other newspapers from publishing the documents.

The second factor, now in the Supreme Court's vault, is a single-spaced typewritten list of "10 items" from the Pentagon study. The government contends these items would cause "grave international harm" if disclosed at any time.

These two elements—the two-week time span and the 10-item list—are interlocking.

Together they constitute the heart of the government's contention that it went into court, not to prevent embarrassment to previous administrations or to thwart the First Amendment, but to head off "irreparable injury" to the global security of the United States.

(Daniel Ellsberg, the former Pentagon staffer and Rand Corp. employe, has said repeatedly that he was the conduit to the New York Times, the Post and other newspapers.)

As proof of the government's success in this respect, the official cited the nature of stories in the Times and Post after the Supreme Court gave them permission to resume publication of the Pentagon papers.

"They haven't surfaced any of the ultra sensitive stuff on the 10-item list," he said.

What the government feels it gained from its lawsuits, in spite of the Supreme Court verdict:

• The two-week injunction period gave the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) sufficient time to "extract" key agents from dangerous assignments abroad.

These agents "almost certainly would have been killed," one source said, had several Pentagon documents been printed or described in detail.

"By going into court we gained enough time to get them the hell out," he said.

Removal of these agents—six in particular—appears to have been accomplished "without blowing anybody's cover," to use the phrase of one intelligence official. In other words, the agents may be able to resume their assignments later, without tipping off unfriendly governments.

• The lawsuits gave the government an opportunity, beneath the formal umbrella of the federal courts, to use in-chambers sessions to acquaint the judges and Times and Post editors with the highly sensitive nature of some portions of the 47-volume Pentagon study.

"It might have appeared to be only ancient history to some people," one knowledgeable official said, "but at the time it was a grave matter of highest priority. Disclosure certainly would have affected, if it was an acute and current matter of highest priority. Disclosure certainly would have affected present relations with many countries, especially behind the Iron and Bamboo curtains."

In other words, since the newspapers involved had not availed themselves of the government's declassifying process for the Pentagon papers, the government used the courts as a mechanism to "get the message across."

U.S. Attorney Whitney North Seymour first submitted a 22-page "special appendix" before the federal Appellate Court in New York in the New York Times case, citing items in the Pentagon study which the government believed would cause grave national danger if disclosed. When the case moved to the Supreme Court, Solicitor General Irwin H. Griswold summarized these matters in his 10-item list given to the justices in a sealed envelope for in-chambers perusal.

What the government believes it has been successful in preventing is the publication of details of certain Pentagon papers on that list, obtained by this reporter. The contents are summarized here only in general terms so as not to violate security.

The News has been assured that the following points, without further amplification, do not offer any security breach or threat to the people involved.

• The Pentagon study included precise documentation of American reconnaissance and intelligence activities involving certain Asian countries supporting Hanoi's side in the Vietnam war.

These activities were known to be taking place by the spied-upon countries but they were technically unable to stop it and so had said nothing publicly.

But publication of official U.S. documents from the Pentagon papers, detailing specifics of the reconnaissance activity, undoubtedly would have required these countries to respond publicly against the United States "in a most bellicose fashion" to quote American officials.

The ensuing diplomatic crisis, they believe, would have undercut current U.S. efforts to improve relations with these countries.

One can assume that among initiatives that would have been jeopardized, if not destroyed, is Mr. Nixon's scheduled trip to mainland China before next May and his administration's efforts to normalize relations with that diplomatically-unrecognized country of 800 million persons.

At the height of the Pentagon papers controversy, some key foreign diplomats were secretly arranging with Peking the 12-day visit by Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, White House foreign policy adviser.

U.S. POLICY FILES REVEALED SLOWLY

Winnowing Vast Archives Is
a Painstaking Task

By HENRY TANNER

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 10—The Government is keeping 49,000 cubic feet of documents on World War II stored in the National Archives Building, a colonnaded neoclassical structure on Pennsylvania Avenue a few blocks from the White House.

The material, according to an estimate, amounts to 160 million pages. The estimate for the Korean war is 60 million pages.

Those figures, unofficial and highly approximate, illustrate the magnitude of the Government's task in recording and revealing—or withholding—the history of the nation's foreign policy.

The Government tackles the task on four levels.

Its great pride is that since 1861 it has been publishing without interruption a monumental chronological history called "The Foreign Relations of the United States."

Though generally praised by scholars for its fairness, completeness and professional quality, it is universally criticized because it is running 25 years behind events.

Two Eagerly Awaited

The 11 volumes to be issued this year deal with the events of 1946. Two of them, eagerly awaited by China scholars, will discuss relations with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and with the Chinese Communists during that crucial year.

On occasion the State Department has also issued separate volumes of documents. Among them was the famous and highly controversial China White Paper, published in 1949 and dealing with developments during the preceding four years. It has been roundly condemned by historians as highly selective, self-serving and misleading.

In addition, thousands of documents are released routinely by various departments, without claim to being a historical record.

Finally, there is the mass of documents in the archives, the vast majority of which have not found their way into either the chronological series or special publications. They are open to scholars and researchers after 30 years.

Notes Must Be Cleared

American scholars can also apply for access to archives containing documents 25 to 30 years old. Permission is almost always granted, according to officials, but the visitors must later submit their notes for clearance.

More recent documents may be shown to scholars who ask for them, but it is up to the scholar to name the document or the series of documents he wants to see, having learned of their existence elsewhere. He cannot get access to the files themselves.

There is no Government regulation saying that the foreign relations series can be published only after 25 years. William F. Franklin, the State Department's chief historian, said in an interview that the delay was due partly to the forbidding, steadily growing volume of the material that has to be sifted and partly to a shortage of manpower. He has 15 historians on the series.

Political considerations also play a role. The documents relating to the most sensitive years of American-Chinese relations, 1946 to 1949, were collected and edited separately and were ready for publication some 10 years ago, but Government historians say, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles decided in 1956 against beginning to publish them in a separate series then. During the Kennedy Administration it was decided to issue them as part of the master series—that is, 25 years after the event.

Mr. Franklin said that the master series included all the documents that the editors judged important for any given period. If all documents in the files, were included, he said, it would take about a hundred volumes a year instead of the present average of 10 to 12, at about 1,500 pages each.

The price of one of the 220 volume varies, depending on such considerations as length and the number of maps. A volume on the 1945 Yalta Conference cost \$5.50; another on the conferences of American, British, French and Soviet Foreign Ministers in London, Paris and New York during 1946 is \$7.50.

The series, produced by the Government Printing Office, is usually sold out in a matter of months. Reprintings of the entire set have been bought by libraries and other institutions at over \$2,000, an official said.

The series was originally largely limited to communications with other governments.

In recent years an effort has been made to turn it increasingly into a record the internal decision-making process.

Government historians say that many of the recently published Pentagon papers will eventually be found in the series—but not, it may be safely assumed, such documents as Edward G. Lansdale's report on sabotage in Hanoi in 1954. ✓


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JUL 7 1971



All those years since the beginning of '63 the anti-war movement tried to convince the American public of the folly undertaken in Vietnam in its collective name. All those years, through the underground press, through demonstrations and teach-ins, through every means at hand the movement sought to apprise the people of the manner in which they were being deceived as to the extent of the American involvement in Indochina, as to the methods employed there, as to the motivation for being there in the first place.

The sum and substance of the information leaked from the Pentagon papers supports virtually every position the peace movement has adopted since its inception. Small wonder that they are behind its distribution. Small wonder this administration, as the previous one might well have, tried to suppress further dissemination of that information.

Looking at the so-far published segments of the Pentagon papers we see a lot of movement rhetoric—standing strong in the light of considerable evidence. Early

statements of efforts such as "Stop the Draft Week," and the Viet Nam Day Committee expose clandestine U.S. sorties across Asian borders. The Pentagon papers confirm the prosecution of covert military activities in Laos and North Vietnam. Position papers presented at early teach-ins argued that 80 per cent of the South Vietnamese population did not desire our presence in their country. It now develops that even President Ngo Din Diem, a pro-western politician elected with considerable American assistance, initially discouraged our intervention.

The teach-in arguments, as well as those forwarded by virtually every anti-war group to date, held that the Vietnam conflict is a civil war, not a war of North Vietnamese aggression. In the stolen report a Central Intelligence Agency evaluation of 1963 states that Viet Cong strength is centered not in Hanoi but in the south. In a later communique that CIA analysts curtly dismiss the domino theory, a pet fallacy of the Johnson drew that sought to justify our actions in Vietnam on the grounds that a military defeat there would

bring all of Southeast Asia under communism.

After the election of 1964 and the onset of massive U.S. air raids against North Vietnam and the deployment of U.S. ground troops in large numbers in South Vietnam, the still-small peace movement alleged that President Johnson had betrayed his campaign promises and engaged us in a land war in Asia by a plan formed prior to the election. The papers reveal the drafting of such a plan during the summer of 1964. Some time ago in congressional anti-war circles the suggestion was made that the Gulf of Tonkin incident, an ostensible attack upon American destroyers carried out by North Vietnamese gunboats in international waters, was distorted for purposes of persuasion. The papers betray that the attacks, far from being unprovoked, were part of a defense arrayed against a raid on coastal islands of the democratic republic of North Vietnam, carried out by our allies under CIA supervision.

Perhaps the most damning truths to emerge from the report, the solidest support it throws behind anti-war forces, lies in the overall confirmation of the accusation that our military commitment to South Vietnam is no accident, never was, was a calculated political move about which we were all deceived from the outset. States former Assistant Defense Secretary John

McNaughton in the papers discussing our motives in the Indochina war, we entered "70 per cent to avoid a humiliating defeat; 20 per cent to keep South Vietnam from Chinese hands; 10 per cent to allow the people of South Vietnam to enjoy a better, freer life." Certainly, that revelation lends credence to the words of Dr. Daniel Ellsberg that "the men to whom the (American people) gave so much respect and trust as well as power regarded them as contemptuously as they regarded our allies."

It has already been stated elsewhere that the paper reveals little that was entirely heretofore unknown. What the papers amount to, and this is important, is a signed confession to most of the worst accusations of the war critics.

Over the past 10 years anti-war scholars like Noam Chomsky, John Galbraith, Townsend Hoopes, and anti-war journalists like Harrison Salisbury, had seen the pernicious nature of our expanding role in Indochina and exposed its dangers to the public. I can recall reports of U.S. atrocities dating to 1967, in the Stockholm trials conducted by Bertrand Russell and Jean Paul Sartre. The accuracy of much of what has been said has only grudgingly been accepted by a nation anxious to believe its leaders.

MIAMI, FLA.
NEWS

JUL 5 1971

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Sylvan Meyer

Plots for a thousand novels rife in Pentagon papers

You could wear out your tri-focals pouring through the Pentagon documents, not to mention the 400 page official summary of Vietnam history read aloud the other night by Sen. Gravel of Alaska.

And you can hardly blame the senator for waxing emotional. What the senator did not reveal, though he probably knows, is what the U.S. is up to today in clandestine operations and in policy debates.

There are several novels hidden in the understated drama of the papers that have been released since the Supreme Court decision earlier this week. Perhaps the stories are too real today to be fictionalized.

One novel might be structured around the foreboding U.S. leaders felt in the early 1960s about a national commitment to keep communism out of South Vietnam.

Maxwell Taylor, in November 1961, informed President Kennedy that a commitment to protect South Vietnam from communism might pull us into an endless morass, but he recommended the commitment be made, anyway. Gen. Taylor's own struggle to decide the moral and military issues, if we knew the man's inner mind, would provide a dramatist all the material he could wish for a play or a book.

Our 1961 concern over Diem's

leadership, our final desperation with him as his own forces rebelled against him and our concluding offer to help preserve his personal safety, all revealed in detail by the papers, would have provided Shakespeare a plot equal to that of Richard III. Not many modern writers, with their contemporary fixation on individual introspection and revelation, would tackle a story of one leader's confrontation with almost cosmic forces.

And the spy writers have a bottomless well of source material in the stranger than fiction disclosures of the most recently published documents. A memo on unconventional warfare directed to Gen. Taylor, for example, shows intrigue and duplicity enough to baffle James Bond. Indeed, the fictional spies barely could earn a merit badge in espionage compared to the real thing.

This memo tells of clandestine training bases in Okinawa and Saipan, working under the cover of routine Navy and Army setups, teaching counter-intelligence, CIA support activities and psychological warfare. It tells of a small ship, ostensibly owned by a Baltimore company, with an American captain and a Philippine crew ready for "paramilitary activities" in the Far East area.

It tells of "Frisco" Johnny San

Juan, an old Huk guerrilla fighter of the Philippines, who working as head of a corporation known as Eastern Construction, directed "unconventional operations" in Indochina, helped write the Constitution of the Republic of Vietnam and for a while received clandestine U.S. support for his activities.

The old pulp magazines, whose authors in this day and age obviously have turned to TV script writing, could have a time with "CAT," an airline headquartered in Taiwan and referred to in the documents as "a CIA proprietary." CAT provided logistical support to CIA operatives and U.S. agencies in Asia, overflew mainland China frequently and "demonstrated its capacity to meet all types of contingencies of longterm cover air support requirements in support of U.S. objectives." Here is a ready made plot for daring pilots air dropping supplies to the French at Dien Bien Phu, which CAT actually did, we learn a decade and a half after the fact.

In detail, after detail the documents provide true stories of operations in advising foreign governments, organizing military units in Thailand and Laos, supplying them with arms for border raids and counter guerrilla fighting. But maybe fiction readers wouldn't believe such far out material.

KEY TEXTS FROM PENTAGON'S VIETNAM

Following are the texts of key documents accompanying the Pentagon's study of the Vietnam war, covering events in the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations. Except where excerpting is specified, the documents appear verbatim, with only unmistakable typographical errors corrected.

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Report of Ho's Appeals to U.S. In '46 to Support Independence

Cablegram from an American diplomat in Hanoi, identified as Landon, to State Department, Feb. 27, 1946, as provided in the body of the Pentagon study.

Ho Chi Minh handed me 2 letters addressed to President of USA, China, Russia, and Britain identical copies of which were stated to have been forwarded to other governments named. In 2 letters to Ho Chi Minh request ~~USA~~ as one of United Nations to support idea of Annamese independence according to Philippines example, to examine the case of the Annamese, and to take steps necessary to maintenance of world peace which is being endangered by French efforts to reconquer Indochina. He asserts that Annamese will fight until United Nations interfered in support of Annamese independence. The petition addressed to major United Nations contains:
A. Review of French relations with Japanese where French Indochina allegedly aided Japs:
B. Statement of establishment on 2

September 1945 of PENW Democratic Republic of Viet Minh:
C. Summary of French conquest of Cochinchina began 23 Sept 1945 and still incomplete:
D. Outline of accomplishments of Annamese Government in Tonkin including popular elections, abolition of undesirable taxes, expansion of education and resumption as far as possible of normal economic activities:
E. Request to 4 powers: (1) to intervene and stop the war in Indochina in order to mediate fair settlement and (2) to bring the Indochinese issue before the United Nations organization. The petition ends with the statement that Annamese ask for full independence in fact and that in interim while awaiting UNO decision the Annamese will continue to fight the reestablishment of French imperialism. Letters and petition will be transmitted to Department soonest.

d. Th
specially of Malaya and Indonesia, could result in such economic and political pressures in Japan as to make it extremely difficult to prevent Japan's eventual accommodation to communism.
3. It is therefore imperative that an overt attack on Southeast Asia by the Chinese Communists be vigorously opposed. In order to pursue the military courses of action envisaged in this paper to a favorable conclusion within a reasonable period, it will be necessary to divert military strength from other areas thus reducing our military capability in those areas, with the recognized increased risks involved therein, or to increase our military forces in being, or both.
4. The danger of an overt military attack against Southeast Asia is inherent in the existence of a hostile and aggressive Communist China, but such an attack is less probable than continued communist efforts to achieve domination through subversion. The primary threat to Southeast Asia accordingly arises from the possibility that the situation in Indochina may deteriorate as a result of the weakening of the resolve of, or as a result of the inability of the governments of France and of the Associated States to continue to oppose the Viet Minh rebellion, the military strength of which is being steadily increased by virtue of aid furnished by the Chinese Communist regime and its allies.
5. The successful defense of Tonkin is critical to the retention in non-Communist hands of mainland Southeast Asia. However, should Burma come under communist domination, a communist might make Indochina, including Tonkin, militarily indefensible. The execution of

1952 Policy Statement by U.S. On Goals in Southeast Asia

Statement of Policy by the National Security Council, early 1952, on "United States Objectives and Courses of Action With Respect to Southeast Asia." According to a footnote, the document defined Southeast Asia as "the area embracing Burma, Thailand, Indochina, Malaya and Indonesia."

Objective

1. To prevent the countries of Southeast Asia from passing into the communist orbit, and to assist them to develop will and ability to resist communism from within and without and to contribute to the strengthening of the free world.

General Considerations

2. Communist domination, by whatever means, of all Southeast Asia would

seriously endanger in the short term, and critically endanger in the longer term, United States security interests.
a. The loss of any of the countries of Southeast Asia to communist aggression would have critical psychological, political and economic consequences. In the absence of effective and timely counteraction, the loss of any single country would probably lead to relatively swift submission to or an alignment with communism of the rest of

LANSDALE HEADED U.S. TEAM

'54 Sabotage in Hanoi Told

New York Times News Service

NEW YORK—The secret Pentagon study of the Vietnam war discloses that a few days after the Geneva Accords of 1954, the Eisenhower administration's National Security Council decided that the accords were a "disaster" and approved actions prevent further Communist expansion in Vietnam.

According to the Pentagon account, the National Security Council, at a meeting on Aug. 3, 1954, just after the Geneva conference, ordered an urgent program of economic and military aid—substituting American advisers for the withdrawing French advisers—to the new South Vietnamese government of Ngo Dinh Diem.

The objectives set by the council were "to maintain a friendly non-Communist South Vietnam" and "to prevent a Communist victory through all-Vietnam elections."

Under the Geneva settlement, Vietnam was to be temporarily divided into two zones pending reunification through elections scheduled for 1956. The introduction of foreign troops or bases and the use of Vietnamese territory for military purposes were forbidden. The United States, which did not join with the nations that endorsed the accords, issued a declaration taking note of the provisions and promising not to disturb them.

But a lengthy report, accompanying the Pentagon study, describes in detail how the Eisenhower administration sent a team of agents to carry out clandestine warfare against North Vietnam from the minute the Geneva conference closed.

The team, headed by the legendary intelligence operative, Col. Edward G. Lansdale, gave a graphic account of the actions just before evacuating Hanoi in October 1954.

The report says the team "spent the last days of Hanoi in contaminating the oil supply of the bus company for a gradual wreckage of engines in the buses, in taking actions for delayed sabotage of the railroad (which required teamwork with a CIA special technical team) and in

performed their part brilliantly), and in writing detailed notes of potential targets for future para-military operations.

The report is attributed to a hastily assembled group, identified as the Saigon Military Mission.

Col. Lansdale had established a reputation as America's leading expert in counter-guerrilla warfare in the Philippines, where he had helped President Ramon Magsaysay suppress the Communist-led Hukbalahap insurgents.

So extensive were his subsequent exploits in Vietnam in the 1950s that Lansdale was widely known as the model for the leading characters in two novels of Asian intrigue—"The Quiet American," by Graham Greene, and "The Ugly American," by William J. Lederer and Eugene Burdick.

A carefully detailed 21,000-word report by members of Lansdale's team, the Saigon Military Mission, is appended to the Pentagon history.

According to that report, in the form of a diary from June 1954, to August 1955, the team was originally instructed "to undertake paramilitary operations against the enemy and to wage political-psychological warfare."

"Later," it adds, "after Geneva, the mission was modified to prepare the means for undertaking paramilitary operations in Communist areas rather than to wage unconventional warfare."

Raced Deadline

One of Lansdale's first worries was to get his team members into Vietnam before the Aug. 11 deadline set by the Geneva agreements for a freeze on the number of foreign military personnel.

As the deadline approached, the report says, it appeared that the Saigon Military Mission "might have only two members present unless action was taken."

It adds that Lt. Gen. John W. O'Daniel, chief of the U.S.

Group, "agreed to the addition of 10 SMM members under MAAG cover, plus any others in the defense pipeline who arrived before the deadline. A call for help went out. Ten officers in Korea, Japan and Okinawa were selected and rushed to Vietnam."

While the report says that the team members were given cover by being listed as members of MAAG, the report also points out that they communicated with Washington through the CIA station in Saigon.

Lansdale himself is identified as a member of the CIA in a memorandum on the actions of the President's special committee on Indochina, written Jan. 30, 1954, by Maj. Gen. Charles H. Bonesteel III.

In the fall of 1954, after all the members had arrived in Vietnam, the report says, the team's activities increased.

"A small English-language class conducted for mistresses of important personages was formed under Lansdale at their request."

This class provided valuable contacts for Lansdale, enabling him to set to know such people as the "favorite mistress" of the army chief of staff, Gen. Nguyen Van Hinh, the report recounts.

When the Oct. 9 deadline for the French evacuation of Hanoi approaches, the team sought to Sabotage some of Hanoi's key facilities.

"It was learned that the largest printing establishment in the north intended to remain in Hanoi and do business with the Vietminh," the report relates. "An attempt was made by SMM to destroy the modern presses, but Vietminh security agents already had moved into the plant and frustrated the attempt."

It was the mission's team in Hanoi that spent several nights pouring contaminant in the engines of the Hanoi bus company so the buses would gradually be wrecked after the Vietminh took over the city.

At the same time, the mission's team carried out what the report calls "black psywar

strikes"—that is, psychological warfare with materials falsely attributed to the other side. The team printed what appeared to be "leaflets signed by the Vietminh instructing Tonkinese on how to behave for the Vietminh take-over of the Hanoi region in early October, including items about property, money reform and a three-day holiday of workers upon take-over." The attempt to scare the people worked.

"The day following the distribution of these leaflets," the report adds, "refugee registration (of those wishing to flee North Vietnam) tripled. Two days later Vietminh currency was worth half the value prior to the leaflets."

"The Viet Minh took to the radio to denounce the leaflets; the leaflets were so authentic in appearance that even most of the rank-and-file Vietminh were sure that the radio denunciations were a French trick."

Astrologers Hired

In the south, the team hired Vietnamese astrologers — in whose art many Asians place great trust—to compile almanacs bearing dire predictions for the Viet and good omens for the new government of Premier Diem.

To carry out clandestine operations inside North Vietnam after the team evacuated Hanoi, the report adds, Maj. Lucien Conein, an officer of SMM, recruited a group of Vietnamese agents under the code name of Binh.

"The group was to be trained and supported by the U.S. as patriotic Vietnamese," the report says, "to come eventually under government control when the government was ready for such activities."

Until Haiphong was finally evacuated in May 1955, Civil Air Transport, the Twiwan-based airline run by Gen. Claire Chennault, smuggled arms for the Binh team from Saigon to Haiphong.

Truman's First 'Crucial' Step in Vietnam

By Chalmers M. Roberts
Washington Post Staff Writer

On May 1, 1950, President Truman approved the allocation of \$10 million for the Defense Department to cover the early shipment of urgently needed military assistance items for the French in Indochina.

It was the first "crucial decision regarding U.S. military involvement in Indochina," according to the analysis of the Roosevelt-Truman years in the Pentagon papers available to The Washington Post.

The facts of the Roosevelt-Truman years are generally well known and have been widely printed. But the Pentagon papers include documentation not before available disclosing the U.S. reaction to the dominant political fact of that day—the fall of mainland China to Mao Tse-tung's Communist Party.

National Security Council paper No. 64 of February, 1950, a couple of months after Mao's troops reached the Indochinese border, set the tone for what was to come.

NSC 64 concluded that "the Departments of State and Defense should prepare, as a matter of priority a program of all practicable measures designed to protect U.S. security interests in Indochina." The same day, the United States announced recognition of the Indochinese regime of Emperor Bao Dai—on Jan. 18 Peking had recognized Ho Chi Minh's regime in Hanoi and the Soviet Union had done the same on Jan. 30.

(A memorandum for President Truman dated Feb. 3, 1950, from Secretary of State Dean Acheson urged approval of the recognition of the three regimes, Bao Dai's in Vietnam, and those in Laos and Cambodia.)

(Ho Chi Minh was described as one "who under various aliases, has been a Communist agent in various parts of the world since 1925 and was able to take over the anti-French nationalist movement in 1945." Recognition was urged to encourage "national aspirations under non-Communist leadership

for peoples of colonial areas in Southeast Asia; the establishment of "stable non-Communist governments in areas adjacent to Communist China; support to a friendly country which is also a signatory to the North Atlantic Treaty; and as a demonstration of displeasure with Communist tactics which are obviously aimed at eventual domination of Asia, working under the guise of indigenous nationalism.")

Just before NSC 64 was discussed at the White House, Dean Rusk, then Deputy Undersecretary of State, provided Maj. Gen. James H. Burns at the Pentagon a statement of his department's policy:

"The Department of State believes that within the limitations imposed by existing commitments and strategic priorities, the resources of the United States should be deployed to reserve Indochina and Southeast Asia from further Communist encroachment. The Department of State has accordingly already engaged all its political resources to the end that this object be secured. The Department is now engaged in the process of urgently examining what additional economic resources can effectively be engaged in the same operation.

"It is now, in the opinion of the Department, a matter of the greatest urgency that the Department of Defense assess the strategic aspects of the situation and consider, from the military point of view, how the United States can best contribute to the prevention of further Communist encroachment in that area."

NSC 64 found that "the presence of Chinese Communist troops along the border of Indochina makes it possible for arms, material and troops to move freely from Communist China to the northern Tonkin area now controlled by Ho Chi Minh. There is already evidence of movement of arms."

Underpinning such views was the belief that the So-

viet power both in Eastern Europe and in Asia. A 1949 NSC paper, for example, declared that "it is now clear that Southeast Asia is the target of a coordinated offensive directed by the Kremlin."

From this viewpoint, there are extrapolated what later became known as the domino theory. The NSC paper continued:

"In seeking to gain control of Southeast Asia, the Kremlin is motivated in part by a desire to acquire Southeast Asia's resources and communication lines, and to deny them to us. But the political gains which would accrue to the USSR from Communist capture of Southeast Asia are equally significant. The extension of Communist authority in China represents a grievous political defeat for us: if Southeast Asia also is swept by Communism we shall have suffered a major political rout the repercussions of which will be felt throughout the rest of the world; especially in the Middle East and in a then critically exposed Australia."

(NSC 64, as far as the "domino theory" was concerned, was expanded in June, 1952, in NSC 124/2 during the Korean War. A key paragraph said:

"The loss of any of the countries of Southeast Asia to Communist control as a consequence of overt or covert Chinese Communist aggression would have critical psychological, political and economic consequences. In the absence of effective and timely counteraction, the loss of any single country would probably lead to relatively swift submission to or an alignment with communism by the remaining countries of this group. Furthermore, an alignment with communism of the rest of Southeast Asia and India, and in the longer term, of the Middle East [with the probable exceptions of at least Pakistan and Turkey] would in all probability progressively follow. Such widespread alignment would endanger the stability and security of the world. It followed logically, from

such views, that after President Truman approved the first military assistance to the French in Indochina, his Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, in making this public, declared:

"The United States government, convinced that neither national independence nor democratic evolution exist in any area dominated by Soviet imperialism, considers the situation to be such as to warrant its according economic aid and military equipment to the Associated States of Indochina and to France in order to assist them in restoring stability and permitting these states to pursue their peaceful and democratic development."

The Associated States were the three that have come to be known as Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. They were far from independent, despite a prophetic plea by Bao Dai, approved by Paris as the Vietnamese emperor in opposition to Ho. On Aug. 20, 1945, Bao Dai said in a message to Mr. Truman, France's Charles de Gaulle, Britain's King George VI and China's Chiang Kai-shek, that "the only way to safeguard French interests and the spiritual influence of France in Indochina is to recognize frankly the independence of Vietnam and to renounce all thoughts of reestablishing French sovereignty or administration under any form whatsoever."

But de Gaulle, then head of the French Provisional Government, felt otherwise. Mr. Truman was to help the French, although the United States constantly prodded Paris to move toward granting independence in the larger aim of halting what his Secretary of State called "Soviet imperialism."

In April, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in recommendations to the Secretary of Defense, came up with a figure of \$100 million for military aid for the next fiscal year, recommended that it be "carefully controlled" and that this would

STATOTHR

KEY VIETNAM TEXTS

THE KENNEDY YEARS

Following are texts of key documents accompanying the Pentagon's study of the Vietnam war, dealing with the Administration of President John F. Kennedy up to the events that brought the overthrow of President Ngo Dinh Diem in 1963. Except where excerpting is specified, the documents are printed verbatim, with only unmistakable typographical errors corrected.

U.S. Ambassador's '60 Analysis Of Threats to Saigon Regime

Cablegram from Elbridge Durbrow, United States Ambassador in Saigon, to Secretary of State Christian A. Herter, Sept. 16, 1960.

As indicated our 495 and 538 Diem regime confronted by two separate but related dangers. Danger from demonstrations or coup attempt in Saigon could occur earlier; likely to be predominantly non-Communist in origin but Communists can be expected to endeavor infiltrate and exploit any such attempt. Even more serious danger is gradual Viet Cong extension of control over countryside which, if current Communist progress continues, would mean loss free Viet-nam to Communists. These two dangers are related because Communist successes in rural areas embolden them to extend their activities to Saigon and because non-Communist temptation to engage in demonstrations or coup is partly motivated by sincere desire prevent Communist take-over in Viet-nam.

Essentially [word illegible] sets of measures required to meet these two dangers. For Saigon danger essentially political and psychological measures required. For countryside danger security measures as well as political, psychological and economic measures needed. However both sets measures should be carried out simultaneously and to some extent individual steps will be aimed at both dangers.

Security recommendations have been made in our 539 and other messages, including formation internal security council, centralized intelligence, etc. This message therefore deals with our political and economic recommendations. I realize some measures I am recommending are drastic and would be most [word illegible] for an ambassador to make under normal circumstances. But conditions here are by no means normal.

normal. Diem government is in quite serious danger. Therefore, in my opinion prompt and even drastic action is called for. I am well aware that Diem has in past demonstrated astute judgment and has survived other serious crises. Possibly his judgment will prove superior to ours this time, but I believe nevertheless we have no alternative but to give him our best judgment of what we believe is required to preserve his government. While Diem obviously resented my frank talks earlier this year and will probably resent even more suggestions outlined below, he has apparently acted on some of our earlier suggestions and might act on at least some of the following:

1. I would propose have frank and friendly talk with Diem and explain our serious concern about present situation and his political position. I would tell him that, while matters I am raising deal primarily with internal affairs, I would like to talk to him frankly and try to be as helpful as I can be giving him the considered judgment of myself and some of his friends in Washington on appropriate measures to assist him in present serious situation. (Believe it best not indicate talking under instructions.) I would particularly stress desirability of actions to broaden and increase his [word illegible] support prior to 1961 presidential elections required by constitution before end April. I would propose following actions to President:

2. Psychological shock effect is required to take initiative from Communist propagandists as well as non-Communist oppositionists and convince population government taking effective measures to deal with present situation. To achieve that effect following suggested:

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4. Permit National Assembly wider legislative initiative and area of genuine debate and bestow on it authority to conduct, with appropriate publicity, public investigations of any department of government with right to question officials. This step would have three-fold purpose: (A) find some mechanism for dis-

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Pentagon Papers: Study Reports Kennedy Made 'Gamble' Into a 'Broad Commitment'

By HEDRICK SMITH

The Pentagon's study of the Vietnam war concludes that President John F. Kennedy transformed the "limited-risk gamble" of the Eisenhower Administration into a "broad commitment" to prevent Communist domination of South Vietnam.

Although Mr. Kennedy resisted pressures for putting American ground-combat units into South Vietnam, the Pentagon analysts say, he took a series of actions that significantly expanded the American military and political involvement in Vietnam but nonetheless left President Lyndon B. Johnson with as bad a situation as Mr. Kennedy inherited.

"The dilemma of the U.S. involvement dating from the Kennedy era," the Pentagon study observes, was to use "only limited means to achieve excessive ends."

Moreover, according to the study, prepared in 1967-68 by Government analysts, the Kennedy tactics deepened the American involvement in Vietnam piecemeal, with each step minimizing public recognition that the American role was growing.

The expansion of that role, over three decades, is traced in the 3,000 pages of the Pentagon's study, which is accompanied by 4,000 pages of documents on the Vietnam era. Previous articles in The Times's presentation of this material have recounted President Johnson's movement to war in 1964 and 1965.

President Kennedy made his first fresh commitments to Vietnam secretly. The Pentagon study discloses that in the spring of 1961 the President ordered 400 Special Forces troops and 100 other American military advisers sent to South Vietnam. No publicity was given to either move.

Small as the numbers seem in retrospect, the Pentagon study comments that even the first such expansion "signaled a willingness to go beyond the 685-man limit on the size of the U.S. [military] mission in Saigon, which, if it were done openly, would be the first formal breach of the Geneva agreement." Under the interpretation of that agreement in effect since 1956, the United States was limited to 685 military advisers in Vietnam. Washington, while it did not sign the accord, pledged not to undermine it.

On May 1, 1961, President Kennedy decided to send the Special Forces, he also ordered the start

The Times today resumes its series of articles on the Pentagon's secret study of the Vietnam war. The study was obtained through the investigative reporting of Neil Sheehan, and the articles were researched and written over three months by Mr. Sheehan and other staff members. The fourth and fifth articles, both by Hedrick Smith, are published today and form an account of decisions in the Kennedy Administration.

Three pages of documentary material covering the Kennedy policy begin on Page 3, and documents on the 1963 coup begin on Page 9. A summary of the three earlier articles, covering the Johnson Administration, appears on Page 15.

of a campaign of clandestine warfare against North Vietnam, to be conducted by South Vietnamese agents directed and trained by the Central Intelligence Agency and some American Special Forces troops. [See text, action memorandum, May 11, 1961, Page 3.]

The President's instructions, as quoted in the documents, were, "In North Vietnam . . . [to] form networks of resistance, covert bases and teams for sabotage and light harassment." The American military mission in Saigon was also instructed to prepare South Vietnamese Army units "to conduct ranger raids and similar military actions in North Vietnam as might prove necessary or appropriate."

The Pentagon study reports that the primary target of the clandestine campaign against North Vietnam, and Laos as well, was to be "lines of communication"—railroads, highways, bridges, train depots and trucks.

The study does not report how many agents were actually sent north, though documents accompanying it describe some of the build-up and training of the First Observation Group, the main South Vietnamese unit conducting the covert campaign.

Within weeks of President Kennedy's May 11 decision, moreover, the North Vietnamese Government made repeated protests to the International Control Commission that its airspace and territory were being violated by foreign aircraft and South Vietnamese ground raids thrusting into the demilitarized zone along the border between the two Vietnams.

In July, 1961, Hanoi announced publicly that it had captured and was holding in custody three South Vietnamese participants in undercover operations who had survived the crash of a plane

that was shot down, Hanoi said, while preparing to drop them into North Vietnam. The North Vietnamese, protesting formally to Britain and the Soviet Union—the co-chairmen of the 1954 Geneva conference on Vietnam—described in detail what they said the survivors had disclosed about their American training and equipment.

Mr. Kennedy's May 11 orders, the study discloses, also called for infiltration of South Vietnamese forces into southeastern Laos to find and attack Communist bases and supply lines.

On Oct. 13, moreover, the President reportedly gave additional secret orders for allied forces to "initiate ground action, including the use of U.S. advisers if necessary," against Communist aerial resupply missions in the vicinity of Tchepone, in the southern Laotian panhandle.

The Pentagon study does not analyze these covert operations in detail, but it shows Mr. Kennedy's decisions as part of an unbroken sequence that built up to much more ambitious covert warfare against North Vietnam under President Johnson in 1964.

Combat-Support Efforts Begun

The analysts handling the Kennedy period put more stress, however, on the evolution of President Kennedy's decision in November, 1961, to expand greatly the American military advisory mission in Vietnam and, for the first time, to put American servicemen in combat-support roles that involved them increasingly in actual fighting.

In a cablegram to Washington on Nov. 18, cited in the study, Frederick E. Nolting Jr., the United States Ambassador in Saigon, described the significance attached to those moves.

He said he had explained to President Ngo Dinh Diem of South Vietnam that the new roles of American servicemen "could expose them to enemy action."

"In response to Diem's question," Mr. Nolting continued, [I] said that in my personal opinion these personnel would be authorized to defend themselves if attacked. I pointed out that this was one reason why the decisions were very grave from U.S. standpoint."

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ADVISERS ON MILITARY

JFK Panel Screened 'Dirty Tricks'

The Kennedy Administration's control over the covert "dirty tricks" of the military and the Central Intelligence Agency was centered in a secret top-level group known as the 303 Committee.

The committee, named for the room in the Executive Office Building where it met, was set up by President Kennedy after the Bay of Pigs fiasco in the spring of 1961 — a situation in which he felt he did not have enough control over the government's intelligence operations.

Original members of the committee were McGeorge Bundy, national security adviser to the President; Deputy Defense Secretary Roswell Gilpatric; Undersecretary of State U. Alexis Johnson, and Richard Helms, then deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Although the name and composition of the group has not previously been made public, the existence of such a high-level group to advise Kennedy on covert operations — what Dean Rusk called "back alley fighting" — has been no secret. In fact, leaders of the Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon administrations have all insisted that covert activities are controlled at the very highest levels of the government.

The 303 Committee operated in the shadow of a larger and more public group—the Special Group (Counter Insurgency), which was headed by Kennedy's military adviser, Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor and had as its co-chairman the president's brother, Robert F. Kennedy.

According to some reports, the attorney general created a courtroom atmosphere in the weekly meetings of the SGCI and badgered government officials called as "witnesses." But Taylor said such reports were "nonsense," although he described the younger Kennedy as a very active participant in the meetings.

The 303 Committee was largely responsible for the unofficial policy of the government and managed covert operations — most often carried out by the CIA or the Army's Special Forces — throughout the world. The SGCI, on the other hand, was responsible for the open official activities of the government

in responding to the Communist strategy of "wars of national liberation." They were both, in different ways, deeply involved in the growing struggle in Southeast Asia.

Both the 303 Committee and the better known SGCI were created as part of President Kennedy's effort to find a better decision-making apparatus than the rather rigid National Security Council of the Eisenhower days and to assert firmer control over covert activities so as to avoid the embarrassment of another Bay of Pigs.

They were part of a great proliferation of committees in the White House in the administrations of both Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson.

"They Came and Went . . ."

In a study of the national security process written for the Institute for Defense Analyses in 1968, Chester L. Cooper, a former White House official, described the situation this way: "There were a bewildering variety of . . . ad hoc groups during the Kennedy and Johnson years, with uncertain charters and fluid missions. They came and went with the ebb and flow of crises. Some have likened them to floating crap games, in which the locale, the stakes, and the players all churned about in perpetual motion."

The biggest game in town during all this period, of course, was the Vietnam situation and both the number of committees and the amount of attention devoted to that part of the world was considerable.

The 303 Committee reportedly gave its approval to four major covert operations involving the U.S. in a secret war in Southeast Asia and begun by Kennedy within six weeks after he assumed office.

They were listed as the training of the Montagnard tribesmen, Operation Farmhand, the DeSoto patrols and the 34a operations.

Sabotage in the North

Operation Farmhand was the first covert program approved by the committee for Vietnam and involved airlifting South Vietnamese into North Vietnam to "commit sabotage, spy and harass the enemy."

Frequently, according to one report, the men would show up drunk or fail to show up at all and were invariably arrested as soon as they landed in the North.

Although started covertly, the training of the Montagnards has long since become well known and they are organized as Civilian Irregular Defense Groups.

The other two covert operations — the DeSoto patrols and the 34a operations — have since become controversial because they were both directly involved in the Tonkin Gulf incident of August 1964 in which two destroyers were attacked by gunboats. The North Vietnamese apparently assumed they were involved in a shelling attack.

Under the DeSoto plan, destroyers were sent close to the shores of North Vietnam and China to gather electronic intelligence. The DeSoto patrols were reportedly approved by the President in 1962 and placed under the Joint Center for Intelligence at the Pentagon.

The 34a operation reportedly did not begin until February, 1964, three months after Johnson had succeeded Kennedy.

Personal OK Required

After the Tonkin incident, the 303 Committee reportedly exerted greater control over activities

by adopting a policy where by every member was required personally to approve each order of a 34a operation.

Later in the Johnson White House, many of the most important decisions concerning the war were made at the weekly Tuesday Lunches, which brought together the President and his closest top-level advisers.

The SGCI remained in use until 1966, by which time it was almost a general-purpose standing committee. It was replaced then by the new Senior Interdepartmental Group — designed to give the secretary of state clearer authority in directing and coordinating overseas activities.

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KEY TEXTS FROM PENTAGON'S VIETNAM

Following are texts of key documents accompanying the Pentagon's study of the Vietnam war, covering the opening of the sustained bombing campaign against North Vietnam in the first half of 1965. Except where excerpting is indicated, the documents are printed verbatim, with only unmistakable typographical errors corrected.

Letter From Rostow Favoring Commitment of Troops by U.S.

Personal letter from Walt W. Rostow, chairman of the State Department's Policy Planning Council, to Secretary McNamara, Nov. 16, 1964, "Military Dispositions and Political Signals."

Following on our conversation of last night I am concerned that too much thought is being given to the actual damage we do in the North, not enough thought to the signal we wish to send.

The signal consists of three parts:

- a) damage to the North is now to be inflicted because they are violating the 1954 and 1962 accords;
- b) we are ready and able to go much further than our initial act of damage;
- c) we are ready and able to meet any level of escalation they might mount in response, if they are so minded.

Four points follow.

1. I am convinced that we should not go forward into the next stage without a US ground force commitment of some kind:

a. The withdrawal of those ground forces could be a critically important part of our diplomatic bargaining position. Ground forces can sit during a conference more easily than we can maintain a series of mounting air and naval pressures.

b. We must make clear that counter escalation by the Communists will run directly into US strength on the ground; and, therefore the possibility of radically extending their position on the ground at the cost of air and naval damage alone, is ruled out.

c. There is a marginal possibility that in attacking the airfield they were thinking two moves ahead; namely, they might be planning a pre-emptive ground force response to an expected US retaliation for the Bien Hoa attack.

2. The first critical military action against North Vietnam should be designed merely to install the principle that they will, from the present forward, be vulnerable to retaliatory attack in the north for continued violations of the 1954 and 1962 Accords. In other words, we would signal a shift from the principle embodied in the Tonkin Gulf

response. This means that the initial use of force in the north should be as limited and as unsanguinary as possible. It is the installation of the principle that we are initially interested in, not tit for tat.

3. But our force dispositions to accompany an initial retaliatory move against the north should send three further signals lucidly:

a. that we are putting in place a capacity subsequently to step up direct and naval pressure on the north, if that should be required;

b. that we are prepared to face down any form of escalation North Vietnam might mount on the ground; and

c. that we are putting forces into place to exact retaliation directly against Communist China, if Peiping should join in an escalatory response from Hanoi. The latter could take the form of increased aircraft on Formosa plus, perhaps, a carrier force sitting-off China distinguished from the force in the South China Sea.

4. The launching of this track, almost certainly, will require the President to explain to our own people and to the world our intentions and objectives. This will also be perhaps the most persuasive form of communication with Ho and Mao. In addition, I am inclined to think the most direct communication we can mount (perhaps via Vientiane and Warsaw) is desirable, as opposed to the use of cut-outs. They should feel they now confront an LBJ who has made up his mind. Contrary to an anxiety expressed at an earlier stage, I believe it quite possible to communicate the limits as well as the seriousness of our intentions without raising seriously the fear in Hanoi that we intend at our initiative to land our troops in the Red River Delta, in China, or seek any other objective than the re-installation of the 1954 and 1962 Accords.

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minds as simply as we can about our appreciation of the view in Hanoi and Peiping of the Southeast Asia problem. I agree almost completely with SNIE 10-3-64 of October 9. Here are the critical passages:

"While they will seek to exploit and encourage the deteriorating situation in Saigon, they probably will avoid actions that would in their view unduly increase the chances of a major US response against North Vietnam (DRV) or Communist China. We are almost certain that both Hanoi and Peiping are anxious not to become involved in the kind of war in which the great weight of superior US weaponry could be brought against them. Even if Hanoi and Peiping estimated that the US would not use nuclear weapons against them, they could not be sure of this. . . .

"In the face of new US pressures against the DRV, further actions by Hanoi and Peiping would be based to a considerable extent on their estimate of US intentions, i.e., whether the US was actually determined to increase its pressures as necessary. Their estimates on this point are probably uncertain, but we believe that fear of provoking severe measures by the US would lead them to temper their responses with a good deal of caution. . . .

"If despite Communist efforts, the US attacks continued, Hanoi's leaders would have to ask themselves whether it was not better to suspend their support of Viet Cong military action rather than suffer the destruction of their major military facilities and the industrial sector of their economy. In the belief that the US would not use nuclear weapons in their favor in South Vietnam, they might

1 JUN 1971

KEY TEXTS FROM PENTAGON'S VIETNAM

Following are texts of key documents from the Pentagon's history of the Vietnam war, covering events of August, 1964, to February, 1965, the period in which the bombing of North Vietnam was planned. Except where excerpting is specified, the documents are printed verbatim, with only unmistakable typographical errors corrected.

Rusk Cable to Embassy in Laos On Search and Rescue Flights

Cablegram from Secretary of State Dean Rusk to the United States Embassy in Vientiane, Laos, Aug. 26, 1964. A copy of this message was sent to the Commander in Chief, Pacific.

We agree with your assessment of importance SAR operations that Air America pilots can play critically important role, and SAR efforts should not discriminate between rescuing Americans, Thais and Lao. You are also hereby granted as requested discretionary authority to use AA pilots in T-28's for SAR operations when you consider this indispensable rpt indispensable to success of operation and with understanding that you will seek advance Washington authorization wherever situation permits.

At same time, we believe time has come to review scope and control arrangements for T-28 operations extending into future. Such a review is especially indicated view fact that these operations more or less automatically impose demands for use of US personnel in SAR operations. Moreover, increased AA capability clearly means possibilities of loss somewhat increased, and each loss with accompanying SAR operations involves chance of escalation from one action to another in ways that may not

be desirable in wider picture. On other side, we naturally recognize T-28 operations are vital both for their military and psychological effects in Laos and as negotiating card in support of Souvanna's position. Request your view whether balance of above factors would call for some reduction in scale of operations and-or dropping of some of better-defended targets. (Possible extension T-28 operations to Panhandle would be separate issue and will be covered by septel.)

On central problem our understanding is that Thai pilots fly missions strictly controlled by your Air Command Center with [word illegible] in effective control, but that this not true of Lao pilots. We have impression latter not really under any kind of firm control.

Request your evaluation and recommendations as to future scope T-28 operations and your comments as to whether our impressions present control structure correct and whether steps could be taken to tighten this.

Rusk Query to Vientiane Embassy On Desirability of Laos Cease-Fire

Cablegram from Secretary of State Rusk to the United States Embassy in Laos, Aug. 7, 1964. Copies were also sent, with a request for comment, to the American missions in London, Paris, Saigon, Bangkok, Ottawa, New Delhi, Moscow, Phnompenh and Hong Kong, and to the Pacific command and the mission at the United Nations.

1. As pointed out in your 219, our objective in Laos is to stabilize the situation again, if possible within framework of the 1962 Geneva settlement. Essential to stabilization would be establishment of military equilibrium. Moreover, we have some concern

that recent RIG successes and reported low PL morale may lead to some escalation from Communist side, which we do not now wish to have to deal with.

2. Until now, Souvanna's and our position would require Pathet Lao withdrawal from areas seized in PDJ since May 15

and that such preconditionference. Queritorial gains vided they c practice bro equilibrium no longer n Lao withdraw tion to 14-n fact though curred to So is also touc to Butler (Souvanna a PDJ withdr evitably ins gains, and arrangemen present fa division. I were to be best be don

it might be used by Souvanna as bargaining counter in obtaining satisfaction on his other condition that he attend conference as head of Laotian Government. Remaining condition would be cease-fire. While under present conditions cease-fire might not be of net advantage

to Souvanna—we are thinking primarily of T-28 operations—Pathet Lao would no doubt insist on it. If so, Souvanna could press for effective ICC policing of cease-fire. Latter could be of importance in upcoming period.

3. Above is written with thought in mind that Polish proposals [one word illegible] effectively collapsed and that pressures continue for Geneva [word illegible] conference and will no doubt be intensified by current crisis brought on by DRV naval attacks. Conference on Laos might be useful safety valve for these generalized pressures while at same time providing some deterrent to escalation of hostilities on that part of the "front." We would insist that conference be limited to Laos and believe that it could in fact be so limited, if necessary by our withdrawing from the conference room if any other subject brought up, as we did in 1961-62. Side discussions on other topics could not be avoided but we see no great difficulty with this; venue for informal corridor discussion with PL, DRV, and Chicom could be valuable at this juncture.

4. In considering this course of action, key initial question is of course whether Souvanna himself is prepared to drop his withdrawal precondition and whether, if he did, he could maintain himself in power in Vientiane. We gather that answer to first question is probably yes but we are much more dubious about

Continued

Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601

KEY TEXTS FROM PENTAGON'S VIET STUDY

Following are the texts of key of the Pentagon's study of the Vietnam December, 1963, through the Tonkin 1964, and its aftermath. Except where the documents are printed verbatim, typographical errors corrected.

McNamara Report to Johnson On the Situation in Saigon in '63

Memorandum, "Vietnam Situation," from Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara to President Lyndon B. Johnson, Dec. 21, 1963.

In accordance with your request this morning, this is a summary of my conclusions after my visit to Vietnam on December 19-20.

(and also by John McCone), and I do not think he is consciously rejecting our advice; he has just operated as a loner all his life and cannot readily change now.

Lodge's newly-designated deputy, David Nes, was with us and seems a highly competent team player. I have stated the situation frankly to him and he has said he would do all he could to constitute what would in effect be an executive committee operating below the level of the Ambassador.

As to the grave reporting weakness, both Defense and CIA must take major steps to improve this. John McCone and I have discussed it and are acting vigorously in our respective spheres.

4. Viet Cong progress has been great during the period since the coup, with my best guess being that the situation has in fact been deteriorating in the countryside since July to a far greater extent than we realized because of our undue dependence on distorted Vietnamese reporting. The Viet Cong now control very high proportions of the people in certain key provinces, particularly those directly south and west of Saigon. The Strategic Hamlet Program was seriously over-extended in those provinces, and the Viet Cong has been able to destroy many hamlets, while others have been abandoned or in some cases betrayed or pillaged by the government's own Self Defense Corps. In these key provinces, the Viet Cong have destroyed almost all major roads, and are collecting taxes at will.

As remedial measures, we must get the government to re-allocate its military forces so that its effective strength in these provinces is essentially doubled. We also need to have major increases in both military and USOM staffs, to sizes that will give us a reliable, independent U.S. appraisal of the status of operations. Thirdly, realistic pacification plans must be prepared, allocating adequate resources to secure the remaining government-controlled areas and work out from there.

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General Harkins
still hopes these
areas may be made
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of next year.

In the gloomy southern picture, an exception to the trend of Viet Cong success may be provided by the possible adherence to the government of the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao sects, which total three million people and control key areas along the Cambodian border. The Hoa Hao have already made some sort of agreement, and the Cao Dai are expected to do so at the end of this month. However, it is not clear that their influence will be more than neutralized by these agreements, or that they will in fact really pitch in on the government's side.

5. Infiltration of men and equipment from North Vietnam continues using (a) land corridors through Laos and Cambodia; (b) the Mekong River waterways from Cambodia; (c) some possible entry from the sea and the tip of the Delta. The best guess is that 1000-1500 Viet Cong cadres entered South Vietnam from Laos in the first nine months of 1963. The Mekong route (and also the possible sea entry) is apparently used for heavier weapons and ammunition and raw materials which have been turning up in increasing numbers in the south and of which we have captured a few shipments.

To counter this infiltration, we reviewed in Saigon various plans providing for cross-border operations into Laos. On the scale proposed, I am quite clear that these would not be politically acceptable or even militarily effective. We need to have an immediate U-2 mapping of the whole Laos and Cambodian border, and this we are preparing on an urgent basis.

1. Summary. The situation is very disturbing. Current trends, unless reversed in the next 2-3 months, will lead to neutralization at best and more likely to a Communist-controlled state.

2. The new government is the greatest source of concern. It is indecisive and drifting. Although Minh states that he, rather than the Committee of Generals, is making decisions, it is not clear that this is actually so. In any event, neither he nor the Committee are experienced in political administration and so far they show little talent for it. There is no clear concept on how to re-shape or conduct the strategic hamlet program; the Province Chiefs, most of whom are new and inexperienced, are receiving little or no direction because the generals are so preoccupied with essentially political affairs. A specific example of the present situation is that General [name illegible] is spending little or no time commanding III Corps, which is in the vital zone around Saigon and needs full-time direction. I made these points as strongly as possible to Minh, Don, Kim, and Tho.

3. The Country Team is the second major weakness. It lacks leadership, has been poorly informed, and is not working to a common plan. A recent example of confusion has been conflicting USOM and military recommendations both to the Government of Vietnam and to Washington on the size of the military budget. Above all, Lodge has virtually no official contact with Harkins. Lodge sends in reports with major military implications without showing them to Harkins, and does not show Harkins important incoming traffic. My impression is that Lodge simply does not know how to conduct a coordinated administration. This has of course been pointed out to him both by Dean Rusk and myself

19 JUN 1971

Americans Are Barred From Spy Raids in Laos

By WILLIAM BEECHER
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 11 — The Nixon Administration has decided that Americans will no longer be permitted to enter southern Laos as leaders of teams keeping watch on enemy movements along the Ho Chi Minh Trail network.

Before the South Vietnamese drive into Laos in February and March, Americans had been assigned to such missions. But they were then barred for fear an embarrassing incident might arise that would appear to contradict President Nixon's pledge that no American military men would be involved in ground combat in that Laotian campaign.

Well-placed Nixon Administration sources said that plans to resume the use of Americans on trail-watching teams after the South Vietnamese drive ended had been vetoed by officials at the White House and the Pentagon. The informants said that the decision had been made partly because of growing Congressional criticism of American military activity in Laos and partly because all military missions are being turned over to the South Vietnamese as the United States disengages from the war.

Officials conceded that the enemy's infiltration activities has gone down recently as small teams made up of South Vietnamese and of Montagnard tribesmen have taken over the trail-watching missions. But they said there were other means of collecting information, among them aerial reconnaissance and special sensors planted along the trail.

American participation in the missions had come under a secret military unit known officially as the Studies and Observation Group. Established in 1964 as a joint venture of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Army, it has been

involved not only in watching trails but also in attempts at rescuing prisoners and other highly sensitive missions in Laos, Cambodia and North Vietnam.

After a closed-door briefing of the Senate earlier this week, Senator Stuart Symington, Democrat of Missouri, declared, "Our activities in Laos have been carried out largely in secret, without Congressional sanction and outside the normal appropriations process."

Air Strikes a Factor

The main focus of Congressional concern has been American support of Thais and Laotian tribesmen who, led by Americans working for the Central Intelligence Agency, have been conducting both combat and surveillance missions against North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao forces in Laos. Extensive American air strikes throughout Laos have also been cited as a source of concern.

When the Studies and Observation Group was established, it was intended primarily for missions in and around North Vietnam.

Some of its teams are known to have slipped into North Vietnamese waters in fast boats to kidnap fishermen, who were brought to South Vietnam for interrogation on conditions in the North and then released. Other teams made up of refugees from North Vietnam were occasionally sent back by helicopter on spy or sabotage missions.

All such operations required advanced approval in Washington, the informants said.

In 1966, the unit was also authorized to watch trails and to spot targets for American bombers. The informants said that these tasks were undertaken by the Army alone, without C.I.A. participation. In late 1966 or early 1967, similar activity reportedly was extended to include Cambodia, again

without the participation of C.I.A.

Although the size of the trail-watching teams varied, a typical unit consisted of nine men—three Americans and six Vietnamese or Montagnard tribesmen. At the height of this activity, there were as many as 30 teams assigned to the Laos mission, but usually no more than two or three would be operating at any one time. The missions were said to have lasted from several hours to several days.

Information was sent by radio to a special aircraft flying along the border for relay to Air Force units and intelligence centers in South Vietnam.

According to the informants, the teams operated no more than about 20 to 30 miles inside Laos. Any watching of trails beyond that point, it was said, was assigned to special guerrilla units organized in Laos by the C.I.A.

Pentagon and other sources said that with the start of the South Vietnamese thrust into Laos, the leaders of the Studies and Observation Group were told that the Administration did not want to risk the embarrassment that would result from the capture of soldiers on an intelligence mission in Laos, even though, strictly speaking, they would not have been involved in combat.

'Still Has Some Missions'

After the South Vietnamese pulled out of Laos, the group, which has headquarters in Saigon, circulated a memorandum saying that it planned to resume its trail-watching activities. When the memorandum reached Washington, the group was told that the watching of trails would be carried out exclusively by the South Vietnamese.

"While the group's teams are under specific orders not to get involved in fighting," one officer said, "their job is to move in and out undetected. There are times when they have been discovered and have had to exchange fire with the enemy as helicopters came in to take them out."

The Studies and observation Group, it was reported, is not being disbanded at this point. "It still has some missions," an official said.

He added that the group could still be called upon to stage rescue attempts while American prisoners remain in Southeast Asia. He refused to discuss any other missions.

STATOTHR

Mercenaries crucial to U.S. policy

STATOTHR

By Michael Klare
College Press Service (NACLA)

"Vietnamization," the invasion and occupation of large sections of Cambodia and Laos by U.S.-directed Saigon forces, is but the most blatant example of a government tactic which employs foreign mercenaries and the armies of client regimes as a major foreign policy instrument.

In Vietnam, for instance, American funds have been used to pay the expenses of South Korean, Thai and Philippine troops as well as Saigon's million-man army. Washington has paid the regimes of South Korea and Thailand \$1 billion each to use their soldiers in Vietnam. Furthermore, various minority peoples inhabiting the highlands of central Indochina have been mobilized into CIA-commanded "irregular" armies to bear the brunt of the fighting in Laos and northwestern Vietnam. Similar tactics have been employed by the U.S. in Bolivia, the Congo and Cuba (the Bay of Pigs).

Substitution of mercenaries for American troops in counterinsurgency warfare has many advantages for the White House: domestic opposition to foreign operations is reduced, because U.S. involvement is less visible and costly; opposition abroad is reduced because people are not confronted with the overt presence of American expeditionary forces; and foreign troops cost the U.S. much less to maintain.

These benefits were summed up by former Defense Secretary Clark Clifford in an unusually candid statement to the Congress Jan. 15, 1969: "Clearly, the overriding goal of our collective defense efforts in Asia must be to assist our allies in building a capability to defend themselves. Besides costing substantially less (an Asian soldier costs about 1/15 as much as his American counterpart) there are compelling political and psychological advantages on both sides of the Pacific for such a policy."

The cost of mercenarization has been staggering: Pentagon figures indicate that between 1950 and 1968 the U.S. provided \$19 billion in weapons, supplies, training and cash to rightist third world armies under the Military Assistance Program (MAP) -- and this amount excludes Vietnam-related military aid.

Commodities delivered through MAP have included...

201 patrol boats, 20,639 tanks, 3460 Honest John rockets and 2,088,000 rifles. Through the Foreign Military Sales program (FMS), the Pentagon has also extended credit to selected third world countries for the purchase of additional military hardware. As part of the MAP and FMS, the Defense Department has provided special training for some 297,000 foreign military personnel in the U.S. and abroad.

For the past few years, a budget-conscious Congress has limited the military assistance appropriations to \$350 million annually (this amount excludes payments to "free world" troops in South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, which are budgeted under the Department of Defense appropriation). Of this amount, 72% has been allocated to the four "forward-defense countries"--South Korea, Taiwan, Turkey and Greece--which constitute the mainstays against "Communist aggression." Another 10% goes to Spain, Ethiopia and the Philippines. The remaining 18% is divided, in the fiscal 1971 program, between 41 additional countries.

Arguing that police constitute the "first line of defense" against insurgency and subversion, the U.S. has also established a massive program of foreign police assistance. Between 1961 and 1969, the U.S. spent over \$236 million on this program to provide third world police forces with modern communications equipment, intelligence systems and antiriot gear. As in the case of MAP aid, this assistance has been supplemented by training programs in the U.S. and abroad.

Between 1961 and 1969, 5547 third world personnel were trained in U.S. facilities at the International Police Academy in Washington, D.C.; the FDI National Academy, Quantico, Va.; the U.S. Post Office Dept. Scientific Investigation Lab, Washington; the International Police Services School, Washington; the U.S. Coast Guard Training Center, Yorktown, Va. and the Coast Guard Academy, New London, Conn.; the Criminal Investigation Lab, Washington; and at Southern Illinois University.

The Military Assistance Program is administered by a resident military assistance advisory group or military mission in each recipient country. These groups are responsible for the selection of troops who will use the equipment furnished by MAP and generally oversee the

process of mercenarization. The same functions are performed in the police assistance programs by the Office of Public Safety of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and by resident Public Safety Advisors in recipient countries.

In order to further reduce direct U.S. military presence, the Nixon administration is trying to modernize and strengthen its mercenary armies abroad. This policy, the so-called "Nixon Doctrine," requires a vast increase in the MAP funding. "Vietnamization" alone will cost another \$6 billion in the next few years, while "Koreanization" will cost an estimated \$1-2 billion.

Accordingly, the administration is expected to ask Congress to approve a supplemental military assistance appropriation which may exceed the original \$350 million MAP outlay.

In describing the administration's defense strategy to Congress, Defense Secretary Melvin Laird stated March 10, 1970 that: "The basic policy of decreasing direct U.S. military involvement cannot be successful unless we provide our friends and allies, whether through grant aid or credit sales, with the material assistance necessary to assure the most effective possible contribution by the manpower they are willing and able to commit to their own and the common defense. Many of them simply do not command the resources or technical capabilities to assume greater responsibility for their own defense without such assistance."

"The challenging aspects of our new policy can, therefore, best be achieved when each partner does its share and contributes what it best can to the common effort. In the majority of cases, this means indigenous manpower organized into properly equipped and well-trained armed forces with the help of material, training, technology and specialized skills furnished by the United States through the Military Assistance Program or as Foreign Military Sales." According to Laird, the MAP is "the essential ingredient" of the Nixon policy "if we are to honor our obligations, support our allies and yet reduce the likelihood of having to commit American ground combat units."

BOSTON STONE
14 Dec 1970

STATOTHR

CIA tells it like it is

Popular mythology, especially in liberal quarters, invariably casts the Central Intelligence Agency in a villainous role in Vietnam. But in fact, the CIA has consistently been the most objective organization functioning out there — particularly in assessing the political realities of the war.

In other words, the CIA has been generally telling it like it is rather than dishing up optimistic reports calculated to please and appease the Establishment in Saigon and Washington.

For that reason, the Agency has incurred the envy of State Department officials, the wrath of senior American military officers and something less than full White House support. And, as a consequence, its presence in Vietnam has been gradually reduced.

There are virtually no CIA men now working at the district and village levels. Instead, the estimated 50 Agency operatives currently stationed outside Saigon are assigned mainly to provincial headquarters, where their jobs are largely ritualistic.

The program designed to identify and uproot the Viet Cong political network in the countryside, known as Operation Phocnix, has been taken out of CIA hands and put under US military auspices. So has the training of the Saigon government's so-called "revolutionary development" cadres.

As run by the American military, pacification appears to be making little real headway. This view was even confirmed recently by Sir Robert Thompson, the Briton considered to be the President's favorite Vietnam expert.

One of the CIA techniques that has never quite satisfied the Establishment has been a tendency to produce qualitative intelligence — anecdotal, descriptive information often too fuzzy to be fed into computers. The Pentagon, in contrast, prefers statistics that can adorn graphs and flip-charts.

In the opinion of many Vietnam specialists, it was the military's quantitative approach that repeatedly created the illusory impression that the war was being won.

The military has also tended to paint a rosy picture of the Vietnam situation in order to help its chief to have a more

tered significant battlefield gains. With less need to justify itself, the CIA has tried to be more level in its appraisals.

A good example of the kind of frustrations the CIA has encountered was described by Neil Sheehan in a recent New York Times dispatch disclosing that the Agency had been rebuffed in its attempts to warn the President that more than 30,000 Communist agents have infiltrated various South Vietnamese government departments.

Though White House sources confirmed the existence of the CIA document, they dismissed it as exaggerated and "overly pessimistic" — apparently because it differed from the more optimistic accounts assuring the President that his policies are resulting in progress.

Similarly, studies undertaken with CIA field participation in two key South Vietnam provinces not long ago have reportedly been shelved because their findings failed to substantiate military assertions that the Viet Cong in those places has been put out of action.

According to these classified studies, Viet Cong political activists are still very much alive in those provinces, even though they have been compelled by increased Saigon government activity to operate more covertly at the present time.

The studies estimate, therefore, that the Communists would show substantial gains in the two provinces even in a free election if they had eight or nine months during a cease-fire in which to reassemble their apparatus and resume their efforts to influence the local population.

Implicit in this investigation is the suggestion that President Nguyen Van Thieu's Saigon regime is at its strongest point at the moment, and would probably perform relatively well were a political settlement initiated quickly.

Moreover, the studies recommend that preparations be made for such a settlement by strengthening the regime's village political structures.

Judging from the fate of these studies, both Washington and Saigon are evidently still persuaded that guns rather than negotiations are the answer in Vietnam. So instead of being hailed as a hero, as in the fable, the little boy who honestly declared the emperor to be naked is being adminis-

POW 'Rescue' Issue Remains

Once again, as so often before in the long, sad war, events have raised troubling questions about American activities in Indochina. This time they concern the American prisoners in North Vietnam and our attempt to rescue them and such attempts as we may make in the future to help them.

Let it be said at the beginning that had the rescuers who so bravely landed at the Son Tay camp found prisoners there and brought them out, no one could have faulted the operation.

One might have wondered privately about the effect of the rescue on the well-being of the remaining prisoners, but one could have said, with thankfulness, that at least some prisoners were free from those sufferings that we can scarcely imagine, try as we may to summon up our dread and pity.

But the prisoners were not there. Thus, the operation failed. It was, as Vermont Royster of the Wall Street Journal has eloquently pointed out, an honorable failure, the kind of honorable failure the people of this country can understand and, with pride, accept.

Only it wasn't presented by the Administration as an honorable failure; it was presented as some kind of success. At which point we ourselves began to feel a little uneasy, if only because the distinction between success and failure has been blurred rather too often already in this terrible war. Our uneasiness was not diminished by the revelation that the prisoners had been gone for some time, perhaps as long as three months.

Now comes the authoritative report in The Times Thursday that the go-ahead order for the operation was given without

consultation with the Central Intelligence Agency. ✓

A little background is in order. The CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency divide the responsibility for securing information about North Vietnam. It appears that the defense agency is responsible for intelligence, evidently mostly secured from aerial photographs, about military operations in North Vietnam; the CIA, for intelligence about the country itself, its government, the people's attitudes and so forth. The CIA, obviously, has agents in North Vietnam. ✓

Maybe the CIA could have contributed no useful information about the presence of prisoners at Son Tay. But one would think it would have been prudent to ask. One would think the CIA would have at least been asked its assessment of the effect of the raid, whether a success or failure, on the welfare of the remaining prisoners and on the attitudes of the North Vietnamese at the conference table and on the battlefield. ✓

As Times Washington Bureau Chief David Kraslow reported, knowledgeable men in Washington thought the lapse "incredible." Odd, at least.

One wonders why the CIA was not consulted. In so important an operation it could not have been carelessness. The lapse inevitably raises the difficult but natural question: How important was it to the planners that the prisoners actually be in Son Tay?

That question, taken with the repeated warnings, or threats, by American officials that some kind of further military action may be taken in regard to the prisoners, puts the U.S. public, it seems to us, in the position of suspecting—but not knowing—that a change of tactics or strategy may be in the wind, and that it may be a fairly dramatic change.

Nixon, Laird Ordered POW Raid Without Consulting CIA

Senator Calls Action 'Incredible'; Possible Intelligence Flaw Probed

BY DAVID KRASLOW
Times Washington Bureau Chief

WASHINGTON—President Nixon and Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird gave the go-ahead order for the raid on the Son Tay POW camp in North Vietnam without consulting the Central Intelligence Agency, The Times has learned.

Key senators who have been concerned about the possibility of an intelligence failure and who have been quietly probing into the background of the mission were incredulous when they learned that the CIA was not involved.

"It's absolutely incredible," said one influential senator familiar with defense and intelligence matters and who has not been critical of the Administration's policy in Vietnam. "What the hell do we have a CIA and a director of central intelligence for?"

'Unconceivable' Without CIA

A former senior official who had been intimately aware of the operations of all government intelligence agencies for years said he would find it "inconceivable" to launch something like the Son Tay raid without bringing in the CIA.

Senate sources indicated that CIA Director Richard Helms may have been advised of the Son Tay operation in its early planning stage—perhaps in August or September—but that neither he nor the CIA was further consulted before the Nov. 20 raid at the camp, just 23 miles west of Hanoi.

What is particularly troubling to competent observers in Congress and elsewhere in the government is that they have believed for some

years that the CIA has had agents in North Vietnam.

What information the CIA had or might have been able to obtain from agents or by other means on whether U.S. prisoners were at Son Tay before the raid was ordered could not be determined.

The CIA declined to comment on that or on the question of whether it had been consulted in the Son Tay operation.

A Defense Department spokesman said "we absolutely won't talk about the nature or source of the most recent official intelligence available to Laird and upon which he relied in recommending execution of the Son Tay mission.

White House 'Can't Talk'

A White House official said, "I won't say one way or another whether the CIA was involved. I just can't talk about it."

Other sources said they were certain that other than interviews with the nine U.S. prisoners released by North Vietnam Laird relied on information supplied by the Defense Intelligence Agency, the intelligence arm of the Pentagon.

"I can assure you," the White House official said, "that the intelligence available to the President on this matter was as good as it could have been."

That is precisely the question that has caused deep concern in Congress, the State Department and elsewhere since the Son Tay raiders returned empty-handed and since Laird's vague testimony on the intelligence issue before the Senate

Foreign Relations Committee Nov. 24.

STATOTHR

The critical question in this regard came up in the following exchange between Sen. John Sherman Cooper (R-Ky.) and Laird: Cooper: "Are you able to state the period of time in days between the date when prisoners of war were identified as being at this camp and the date of your mission?"

Laird: "Well, that would be very difficult. Of course, we know that, for a fact, prisoners were there because of the information from the very few prisoners who have come out of North Vietnam. But to give the dates and the movements of POWs, we do not have that kind of intelligence on the ground.

"That capability would be a tremendous asset, just as the capability of having a camera that would see through the roofs and into the cells would be a terrific asset. But we do not have that in the intelligence community at the present time."

50-50 Chance

Cooper: "Then it was largely the photographs of the camp itself which led you to attempt the rescue mission?"

Laird: "That was, the overwhelming evidence was, of course, attributed to the very fine aerial reconnaissance which we had of the area . . ."

8 DEC 1970

Case 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-0

STATOTHR

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Key senators who have been concerned about the possibility of an intelligence failure and who have been quietly probing into the background of the mission were incredulous when they learned that the CIA was not involved.

"It's absolutely incredible," said one influential senator familiar with defense and intelligence matters and who has not been critical of the Administration's policy in Vietnam. "What the hell do we have a CIA and a director of central intelligence for?"

'Inconceivable' Without CIA

A former senior official who had been intimately aware of the operations of all government intelligence agencies for years said he would find it "inconceivable" to launch something like the Son Tay raid without bringing in the CIA.

Senate sources indicated that CIA Director Richard Helms may have been advised of the Son Tay operation in its early planning stage—perhaps in August or September—but that neither he nor the CIA was further consulted before the Nov. 20 raid at the camp, just 23 miles west of Hanoi.

What is particularly troubling to competent observers in Congress and elsewhere in the government is that they have believed for some

years that the CIA has had agents in North Vietnam.

What information the CIA had or might have been able to obtain from agents or by other means on whether U.S. prisoners were at Son Tay before the raid was ordered could not be determined.

The CIA declined to comment on that or on the question of whether it had been consulted in the Son Tay operation.

A Defense Department spokesman said "we absolutely won't talk about the nature or source of the most recent official intelligence available to Laird and upon which he relied in recommending execution of the Son Tay mission.

White House 'Can't Talk'

A White House official said, "I won't say one way or another whether the CIA was involved. I just can't talk about it."

Other sources said they were certain that other than interviews with the nine U.S. prisoners released by North Vietnam Laird relied on information supplied by the Defense Intelligence Agency, the intelligence arm of the Pentagon.

"I can assure you," the White House official said, "that the intelligence available to the President on this matter was as good as it could have been."

That is precisely the question that has caused deep concern in Congress, the State Department and elsewhere since the Son Tay raiders returned empty-handed and since Laird's vague testimony on the intelligence issue before the Senate

Foreign Relations Committee Nov. 24.

The critical question in this regard came up in the following exchange between Sen. John Sherman Cooper (R-Ky.) and Laird: Cooper: "Are you able to state the period of time in days between the date when prisoners of war were identified as being at this camp and the date of your mission?"

Laird: "Well, that would be very difficult. Of course, we know that, for a fact, prisoners were there because of the information from the very few prisoners who have come out of North Vietnam. But to give the dates and the movements of POWs, we do not have that kind of intelligence on the ground.

"That capability would be a tremendous asset, just as the capability of having a camera that would see through the roofs and into the cells would be a terrific asset. But we do not have that in the intelligence community at the present time."

50-50 Chance

Cooper: "Then it was largely the photographs of the camp itself which led you to attempt the rescue mission?"

Laird: "That was, the overwhelming evidence was, of course, attributed to the very fine aerial reconnaissance which we had of the area . . ."

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PAUL SCOTT

CIA Plan Was Rejected

Before President Nixon approved the unsuccessful command raid to try to free American prisoners of war in North Vietnam, he turned down an even more daring one.

The rejected proposal, which can now be revealed without endangering other rescue plans, called for the seizure of several North Vietnamese officials to be held as hostages for captured Americans.

The daring commando-type raid was proposed by the CIA this summer when the President asked top officials of several government agencies to come up with "new measures" designed to free Americans being held by the North Vietnamese.

Under the CIA plan, several high-ranking North Vietnamese civilians and military officials

would be seized by American commandos from different locations in North Vietnam.

The VIP prisoners would then be flown to South Vietnam where their capture would be announced and an offer made to swap them for U.S. prisoners. A list of North Vietnamese officials to be seized was drafted by the CIA.

STATOTHR

CLAYTON FRITCHEY

That Dubious Raid to Free the Hanoi Prisoners

The North Vietnam helicopter raid to rescue U.S. prisoners of war is described as a "failure" because the prisoners had previously been removed, but it may have been a failure the administration can thank its lucky stars for.

If, as the Pentagon believed, the prisoners had still been there, they would have been in the custody of heavily armed North Vietnamese guards. At the first sign of a U.S. raid, it must be assumed the guards would probably have executed the prisoners, and then turned their guns on the rescue party.

What the final outcome would have been, nobody can say. But even if the raiders had succeeded in evacuating some of the U.S. prisoners after killing some or all of the guards, it is not pleasant to contemplate what the retaliation would have been.

Hanoi might well have executed American prisoners held in other camps, or have subjected them to such treatment that they wished they were dead. There are at least 378

U.S. military prisoners in North Vietnam. Was it prudent to endanger their lives in a long-shot attempt to rescue a small number of prisoners at the abandoned camp, especially when they, too, might have been killed?

There is a smell of desperation about this adventure. It is not the considered action of a great power, for no matter how the raid turned out it could not advance the kind of agreement that must be reached in order to resolve satisfactorily the over-all prisoner-of-war situation. Only patient negotiation can do that.

There is also the dubious smell to the various official explanations offered for the simultaneous mass bombing attacks on North Vietnam below the 19th parallel. First, it is suggested that they were intended to spur the enemy toward peace negotiations in Paris. Then we are told they were to interdict Hanoi's supply line to Cambodia and South Vietnam.

These stories won't hold wa-

ter. Since President Lyndon B. Johnson bombed North Vietnam daily for years in a vain effort to get Hanoi to the peace table, why would President Nixon's 48-hour "limited duration" bombing do the trick? It is the same with supplies. Since Johnson's continuous bombing never succeeded in shutting off Hanoi's system of supplies and reinforcements, how could a mere two-day renewal of the bombing do the job?

Administration spokesmen say key leaders on Capitol Hill were informed in advance of the raids. It turns out, however, that none of the appropriate senators or congressmen were consulted. This includes Sen. J. William Fulbright, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee; Sen. George Aiken, the ranking Republican member of the committee; Sen. John Stennis, chairman of the Armed Services Committee, and Rep. Thomas Morgan, chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. It is also widely believed that neither the CIA nor the State De-

partment was in on the raid.

By putting Vietnam on the front burner again, the President has revived congressional demands for withdrawing U.S. troops by a definite date. Previous resolutions to that effect were defeated by a President who said he, too, was dedicated to withdrawal, but needed "flexibility" in getting out.

It is becoming clearer what flexibility really means. It actually allows the administration to escalate the war whenever it sees fit and, in the discretion of the President, to abandon or slow down further disengagement from Vietnam.

Escalation has happened twice already, first in the invasion of Cambodia (unauthorized by Congress) and now in the new aerial attacks on North Vietnam, also ordered without congressional consultation. There is nothing, in fact, to stop the President from full scale renewal of the war, if he so desires, and this may not be as remote a possibility as many Americans think.

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Questions Remain

The United States this past week took two offensive military actions against North Vietnam which raises fresh dangers for President Nixon's Indochina policy.

The most dramatic was the raid against the North Vietnamese prisoner-of-war camp in Son Tay.

While the operation itself seems to have gone off with storybook precision, the intelligence evidently was bad. The Americans believed to be imprisoned in the relatively small camp were not there.

President Nixon and Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird decided to take the gamble that their predecessors in the Pueblo case passed up for fear North Korea would kill the American crewmen imprisoned outside Pyongyang.

Now that the Nixon administration rescue mission has failed, as far as bringing back any American prisoners, what will Hanoi do next?

At a minimum, the North Vietnamese will make it harder for such a surprise raid to be carried out against them again. And they might do much worse—like take their anger out on the Americans still locked up in their prison compounds.

Hanoi, it seems safe to say, lost face before the world as an American rescue force went through all the air defenses and spent an hour on the ground outside the North Vietnamese capital. However, this hardly will make Hanoi's representatives more pliable at the peace table in Paris, if the administration still had any hopes for that.

Just as the United States justifies its retaliatory actions by citing bombing halt violations, Hanoi is now in the position to claim the rescue raid violated the same understanding.

Closer to home than Hanoi's reactions is the old question of why American intelligence went awry. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) already is pleading innocent—declaring it was a Pentagon show all the way.

The heavy bombing raids below the 19th parallel—which Secretary Laird insists had no connection with the daring raid against the prison camp 20 miles west of Hanoi—were little different this time in their execution but seemingly so in their justification.

In the past, administration spokesmen have said that in exchange for the United States calling off the bombing of North Vietnam Hanoi was obliged to do three things: let America unarmed reconnaissance planes photograph their territory unimpeded; stop shelling major South Vietnamese cities, and keep large forces out of the demilitarized zone separating North and South Vietnam.

This time, in justifying the protection reaction bombing raids, Pentagon spokesmen added a new dimension to the understanding—or understandings—by linking them to Hanoi's behavior at the Paris peace talks and actions against American bombers flying over Laos.

That left the impression that the Nixon administration is reserving the right to bomb the north whenever it believes Hanoi is stalling at Paris—an open ended policy which would make it easier to cover American troops withdrawals with heavy bombing. Some of the biggest questions—such as the consequences of the rescue attempt and just how broad are the military understandings covering the Indochina war—remain to be answered.

WASHINGTON POST
24 NOV 1970

Incursions By U.S. Raise New Peril for Nixon Policy

The United States this past weekend took two offensive military actions against North Vietnam that raise fresh dangers for President Nixon's Indochina policy.

The most dramatic action was the raid against the North Vietnamese prisoner-of-war camp in Sontay—a place closer to Hanoi than Baltimore is to Washington.

News Analysis

While the operation itself seems to have gone off with storybook precision, the intelligence evidently was bad. The Americans believed to be imprisoned in this relatively small camp were not there at all.

President Nixon and Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird decided to take the gamble that their predecessors in the Pueblo case passed up for fear North Korea would kill the American crewmen imprisoned outside Pyongyang.

Now that the Nixon administration's rescue mission has failed, as far as bringing back any American prisoners is concerned, what will Hanoi do next?

At a minimum, the North Vietnamese will make it harder for such a surprise raid to be carried out against them again. And they might do much worse—like take their anger out on the Americans still locked up in their prison compounds.

Laird knew there was this risk, but said he could not bear to do nothing while Americans died in Hanoi's stockades. Military leaders, judging by their initial reaction yesterday, are glad the United States at last showed it had the determination to do something—successful or not.

Hanoi, it seems safe to say, indeed lost face before the world as an American rescue force went through all the air defenses and spent an hour on the ground outside the North Vietnam

hardly will make Hanoi's representatives more pliable at the peace table in Paris, if the administration still had any hopes for that.

Also, just as the United States justifies its retaliatory actions by citing the North's bombing halt violations, Hanoi is now in the position to claim the rescue raid violated the same "understanding." Renewed shelling of South Vietnam's cities is thus another possible consequence of the commando-type raid on Sontay.

Closer to home than Hanoi's reactions is the old question of why American intelligence went awry. The Central Intelligence Agency already is pleading innocent—declaring the rescue attempt was a Pentagon show all the way.

The heavy bombing raids below the 19th Parallel—which Laird insists had no connection with the daring raid against the prison camp 20 miles west of Hanoi—were little different this time in their execution but seemingly so in their justification.

In the past, administration spokesmen have said that in exchange for the United States calling off the bombing of North Vietnam, Hanoi was obliged to do three things: let American unarmed reconnaissance planes photograph their territory unimpeded; stop shelling major South Vietnamese cities, and keep large forces out of the demilitarized zone separating North and South Vietnam.

This time in justifying the "protection reaction" bombing raids, Pentagon spokesmen added a new dimension to the understanding—or understandings—by linking them to Hanoi's behavior at the Paris peace talks and actions against American bombers flying over Laos.

After noting concern about North Vietnam's shelling of Saigon and Hue this month, the same paragraph said:

"In addition, we are concerned that the other side has not chosen to negotiate in any substantive or productive way at Paris."

That statement left the impression that the Nixon administration is reserving the right to bomb the North whenever it believes Hanoi is stalling at Paris—an open-ended policy which would make it easier to cover American troop withdrawals with heavy bombing.

The Pentagon in two separate briefings answered some of the questions yesterday on the rescue attempt and on the weekend bombing raids. But some of the biggest questions—such as the consequences of the rescue attempt and just how broad are the military understandings covering the Indochina war—remain to be answered.

George C. Wilson

Life as a POW in North Viet Nam

A Navy lieutenant who spent two years in enemy hands describes his experience: the fear and isolation, the 'Hanoi Hilton,' his eventual release

By MIN S. YEE

He was, according to Hanoi's reckoning, the terror of the Tonkin skies, the villain incarnate of bombed buildings, bridges, wrecked rail yards and Red River rubble. He was, they said, the "Mad Bomber of Hanoi"—and they had captured him. That was three years ago.

Today, after more than 100 missions and almost two years in a North Vietnamese prison camp, Navy Lt. Robert Frishman is living quietly in La Jolla, Calif., a pleasant hilly suburb just north of San Diego.

The Navy lieutenant takes it easy these days because he must. He has yet to gain back some 50 pounds he lost as a prisoner.

And even though his 6-foot-2-inch frame shows some filling out since his release photos were taken a year ago, he still seems very thin. His cheek bones still protrude, almost skeletal-like. His right arm dangles loosely from a sling, and when he drops it down to his side, it is about six inches shorter than the left. But that's because North Vietnamese surgeons removed his elbow to save his arm and his life. He credits them with doing both.

He's had two plastic elbows inserted. He hopes the second will work better than the first. For the past 14 months, Bob Frishman has been on the Navy's hospitalized status. He was on it last week, and will be the next, and the next

... He's not counting time; nor is he "short," as they say in the Navy lingo of those men who have little time left in the service.

Nor is the 29-year-old Californian wasting his time. Night after night, almost daily, the gangly brown-eyed pilot stands before a local civic group, an American Legion audience or a church congregation, his arm slung across his chest by a thin wire. His eyes, brown eyes burning bright and raps about

what he calls "the forgotten Americans"—some 450-plus American soldiers being held in six North Vietnamese prison camps.

Since the U.S. intervened in South Viet Nam, the North Vietnamese have released nine. Bob Frishman was one.

Whether swooping down a flat hand to illustrate a Phantom roll-in or flaying his left arm to show a beating or twisting his mouth in reaction to prison food, the former pilot is the Armed Services' best articulation of life in a North Vietnamese prison. He tells an incredible story:

"It wasn't like fighting a war at all," he said, reflecting on what it was like in the front seat of an F-4 Phantom. "It's an air-conditioned cockpit. You don't think of people, really. In fact, when you roll in on a target, you can't see any people from the altitude in which you release. And then, when the missiles come up, it looks like golf balls on fire, coming at you."

The Navy lieutenant had always wanted to be a pilot. Born a week before Christmas in Long Beach, Frishman grew up in that faceless, oil-derrick-filled city and left it only to attend dental school in San Francisco. He had always wanted to join the Navy too but, after two years of dental school, he realized that if he finished he'd have to join as a dentist. He wanted to fly too much not to try.

To his asserted surprise, he passed and went off to Pensacola for pre-flight training. By May 1966 he was on the U.S.S. *Constellation*, flying attack missions on trucks and PT boats.

Later, on his second cruise aboard the U.S.S. *Coral Sea*, Frishman recalls that "every strike was a major strike."

For some time in October 1967, attacking United States planes had been having "trouble" with North Vietnamese MIGs that roared in on attacking waves from the Phuc Yen airfield north-
that October 24 was targeted for the run-

ways and grounded planes at Phuc Yen.

"It was a different kind of strike than any I've ever been on," said Lt. Frishman, watching the smoke from his cigarettes swirl toward a restaurant ceiling. "Usually, it was one wave from a carrier. But this time it was four waves with 30 minutes between time on target, four waves from two bases in Thailand and two from carriers in the Tonkin Gulf.

"We hadn't been up in the Hanoi area for some time. We had been working the Haiphong area. But there I was running in on the second wave. The first wave had cleared out 30 minutes ago. So I ran in there and they shot three surface-to-air missiles up at me.

"It's a funny-looking thing. If it's a clear day, it looks just like Cape Kennedy, there's a great big puff of smoke and this telephone pole up out of that smoke.

"Well, if you can see these things, you can take precautions to dodge them. But they fired three at me and one hit and knocked out the right engine. I continued my evasive maneuvers and they fired two more up at me. They went past me."

"Then they fired another three at me and when I turned to avoid two of them, the third one ripped into the plane and the thing just shuddered real bad and started spinning.

"I thought for a moment I was still flying the darn thing, but all of a sudden I looked up and there was blood all over the canopy and my arm was dangling up in the centrifugal force brought on by the spinning. I looked down and I could see the bone sticking out of my arm. Evidently, I caught a piece of the shrapnel from the missile.

"I looked in the back seat, toward the radar officer and it looked to me like he was dead. I tried to get his attention but I couldn't so I ejected, everything flying away which was, but the ejection went real smooth."

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

Army Spy-Proofs Office of Top Medic

By Jack Anderson

In the struggle for status on the Potomac, it's the little things that count.

The clues to a general's importance, for instance, can be found in his office. Is it large enough, say, for a battalion to pass in review? Does it contain a kingsize desk? A flag stand? A sofa suitable for taking naps? How deep do you sink in the rug? Is there a trim of woodwork around the walls? Enter a Pentagon office with this executive paneling, and you are dealing with a man of consequence.

But the most prized status symbol is a spy-proof conference room. Any general worth his stars likes to feel his conversations are so momentous that the Kremlin would stop at nothing to eavesdrop.

The latest to demand a "security room" of his own is Lt. Gen. Hal Jennings, the Army Surgeon General. Of course, he deals with medical, not security matters. Still, he feels he is as entitled as the next three-star general to protect his conferences from Soviet snooping.

The Army obligingly is preparing to spend \$12,000 to spy-proof his medical conference room. General Jennings will now be able to discuss the menace of the tsetse fly with new assurance that the Kremlin won't be able to overhear him.

The requirements of national

security would seem to be satisfied, however, by soundproofing the walls and perhaps installing an alarm system. But this, apparently, would be too simple for a man of Jennings' standing.

He not only had ordered major electrical work, but he wants new film equipment and display boards brought in. Adequate air conditioning, of course, will have to be re-installed. After the \$12,000 has been spent, Jennings should have just as plush a "security room" as any general on his floor.

Footnote: After this column began checking on the project, a spokesman called to say that the bidding was being reviewed and the plans might be altered to cut below the \$12,000 figure.

Black Panthers

The Black Panthers have offered to send "troops" to Vietnam to help the Viet Cong gun down American boys.

The Central Intelligence Agency has picked up a letter that Huey Newton, founder of the Black Panthers, sent to the Viet Cong. This column has seen a copy.

"In the spirit of international revolutionary solidarity," wrote Newton, "the Black Panther Party hereby offers . . . an undetermined number of troops to assist you in your fight against American imperialism.

"It is appropriate for the

Black Panther Party to take this action at this time in recognition of the fact that your struggle is also our struggle, for we recognize that our common enemy is U.S. imperialism which is the leader of international bourgeois domination.

"There is no fascist or reactionary government in the world today that could stand without the support of U.S. imperialism. Therefore, our problem is international, and we offer these troops in recognition of the necessity for international alliance to deal with the problem.

"Such alliance will advance the struggle toward the final act of dealing with American imperialism."

POW Abuses

The International Red cross has confirmed our reports about brutality, torture and inhuman conditions in South Vietnam's prisoner of war camps. The Saigon authorities, it should be added, are trying to halt the abuses.

Secret reports from Red Cross inspectors in South Vietnam cite details similar to those we published last August. We told how prisoners were tortured at interrogation centers and abused in prison camps.

At Tam Ky prison, for example, we reported that 50 to 100 prisoners were herded into crowded rooms with nothing but concrete platforms to

sleep on. Since there were too many people to lie down, most prisoners had to sit or stand all night.

"All the torturing," we alleged, "was done in the interrogation center across the street. There was the usual electrical shock, beatings, sticking with pins, burning with cigarettes and, at times, water torture."

We also quoted Dr. Marjorie Nelson, who treated tortured prisoners at Quank Ngai prison. She swore: "Prisoners told me of being tortured by electricity . . . of being forced to drink concoctions containing powdered lime . . . of being tied up and suspended by ropes often upside down from the rafters for hours . . . In August of 1969, I examined a woman seven months pregnant, who had been beaten badly the previous week."

American public safety advisers, who worked with Vietnamese officials in these prisons, generally have sought to prevent abuses. But at least one former adviser, Jack L. Sanders, was himself "met with rejection and anger and told to either return to Vietnam or resign" when he tried to report prison conditions to the Office of Public Safety Administration in Washington.

The presence of American advisers in these camps gives the North Vietnamese an excuse to mistreat American prisoners in their custody.

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NOV 1970

The Dominoization of Thailand

IN 1861, KING MONGKUT of Siam offered Abraham Lincoln elephants to aid the Union cause in the Civil War. The President politely refused the help, but that was not the end of military relations between the two countries. Thailand is no longer whimsically isolated from world realities; nor does it have a choice in the way it lines up on international issues. Over the past two decades, Thais have watched their country become a giant airstrip, where American B-52s, fighter-bombers and helicopter gunships roar off on missions of death for other Southeast Asian countries. They have seen their own troops become U.S. mercenaries, and their borders used as staging points for Special Forces and CIA personnel on missions of subversion into Laos and North Vietnam.

Thais have watched helplessly as their nation has become an American military base and neo-colony. U.S. Senator Gale McGee stated in a recent speech that "Southeast Asia is the last major resource area outside the control of any one of the major powers on the globe." And the mammoth Chase Manhattan Bank has been even more specific: "Thailand promises to be an excellent investment and sales area for Americans," its Economic Research Division writes, "if rebel insurgency can be contained."

The various minorities that make up Thailand have tried to resist the destruction of their culture and their forcible integration into a U.S.-controlled political economy. But the U.S. military advisors who train Thai troops to fight in South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos have also trained them to fight rebels at home. Meanwhile hordes of AID and American university personnel comb the countryside, studying every aspect of Thai life and recommending and implementing programs of counter-insurgency.

Thailand has changed greatly in the century since its king naively offered a U.S. President military aid. Since then America has decided to fight its wars abroad, not at home—wars that make sure countries like Thailand stay in the Free World bank account.

[I]

THE THAI ELITE, whose body and soul is now completely owned, once prided itself on an ability to resist colonial domination. In the 19th century, the Thais closed their country to the probes of imperialism, and tried to modernize by selective contact with the West. This relative independence was validated by a British-French agreement to let Thailand remain a buffer state between their respective colonial empires in Malaya-Burma and Indochina.

Thailand's privileged status was ended by an event which has shaped the course of its history for the last quarter century: the United States' victory over Japan in World War II and its emergence as the dominant power in the Pacific Basin. The U.S. quickly decided that Thailand's position was critical for consolidating an American foothold on the Southeast Asian mainland; by 1950, U.S. military and economic aid began to flow to the Thai government, then headed by General Phibun, a former Japanese puppet whose mili-

tary regime rode to power on a 1948 coup.

Urged on by U.S. money and by the long shadow of the Chinese Revolution, the Thai army and police began an anti-communist crusade in the early '50s. Their campaign was focused on Thailand's Chinese Community, and it began officially in 1952 with the passage of the Un-Thai Activities Act (sic), supposedly aimed at combating "communist subversion," even though the Thai Chinese Community was notoriously apolitical. But if General Phibun's attack could not rid his country of a communist menace that did not exist, it could establish his control over the Chinese Community which had traditionally been the backbone for Thailand's indigenous economy. The Chinese entrepreneurs and businessmen responded to the anti-communist hysteria by paying a kind of "protection" money to the Thai elite—offering them positions on the boards of directors of Chinese corporations and other financial incentives.

Even though it was borne of intimidation, this alliance might have been able to slowly industrialize Thailand by relying on domestic rather than Western capital and thus avoid the disastrous controls that were always attached to investment. But this last hope for economic autonomy in Thailand was quickly foreclosed by the U.S.

THAILAND'S SMALL MEASURE OF economic independence had rested upon the government's ability to finance the infrastructure for development from export surplus. But after the Korean War, the U.S. dumped large quantities of tin, Thailand's third largest export, on the world market; meanwhile, the price of rubber, Thailand's second largest export, was forced down by the falling off of war-time demand and by American corporations' marketing of new synthetics; the price of rice, Thailand's largest single export, was also plummeting.

As this surplus dried up, the U.S. and its international financial arm, the World Bank, prepared to appear at the moment of Thai financial crisis with offers of financial and technical assistance. All that was asked in return for this subsidy was that the Thai military regime abandon any attempts to create an autonomous economy and allow Thailand to become an object of U.S. corporate expansion.

Since Thailand's status as a bona fide U.S. colony has been guaranteed, American financial commitments—now totaling nearly \$600 million in economic assistance and some \$900 million in military aid—have been accelerated. But the U.S. was not content with being the Thais' guardian. It wanted to be their mentor as well. And thus, while systematically destroying what chance the Thais might have had for economic independence, the U.S. has also set about the task of re-ordering Thai society—from rebuilding its military and government administration, to introducing new agricultural techniques and a Western-oriented educational system. To coordinate and implement this massive cultural onslaught, it has called in the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID), which has its own kind of Catch 22: While AID is supposed to help Third World nations help themselves, it in fact helps American businessmen help themselves to the Third World. This is AID's mandate.

ALGONA, IOWA
UPPER DES MOINES
MAY 28 1970
SEMI-WEEKLY 5,542

* * *
A SHOCKING INTERVIEW

From Herb Caen interview column in San Francisco Chronicle — The Sergeant, soon to be Corporal, doesn't look delighted. He digs the Vietnam scene. He has been there four and a half years. He has done "infiles" (infiltrations) into North Vietnam, missions with the CIA. He has seen all the action there is to see and he may never be allowed to return to it. This saddens him. Now he is on his way to visit his mother, who lives in Auburn. For him, the fighting, the excitement, the wheeling and dealing, are over.

He speaks of strange things, in a rambling, laconic way . . .

"We were running this great gambling setup. Roulette wheel, two dice tables, blackjack setup. All the equipment was made in San Francisco. Then it was flown in a sealed plane — probably CIA — to Okinawa. From there by secret helicopter to Vietnam. We were doin' great. Honest, but the percentages were with us. Generals, Colonels — man, we had everybody playing for us. Then things got out of hand. GIs were running in crooked dice on us. Maybe a General lost too much one night." A faint smile flickers across the handsome face. "It was fun while it lasted."

The conversation ebbs and flows. "Black market money all over the place. The big Vietnese" — his term — "are getting rich." "About the helicopter," "Yeah, this chopper, it lands every morning behind the Presidential Palace. Maybe \$50,000 a day goes in there. I don't know who gets it. I guess it's divided up. No trick to get it out of the country to Hong Kong."

Somebody asks him about the dope scene. "Sure, marijuana all over the place. Junk. Weeds. But only the younger kids are using it. You can't blame 'em. There isn't much to do over there now. The kids get bored. Now they're making synthetic H — heroin. Lots of opium. The Vietnese girls are pretty, but awful short. The Thai girls are beautiful. Taller. Great skin."