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U.S. plans prolonged role in Vietnam

By Richard E. Ward

Despite press speculation a peace agreement for Vietnam may soon be concluded, there is concrete evidence indicating the U.S. is planning to prolong the conflict and will attempt to subvert any peace accords.

U.S. procrastination in Paris, intensified bombing and the huge shipments of arms to Saigon, among other developments, are all indicators that the White House has no desire for true peace and has not abandoned its neo-colonial designs in Indochina.

An even more ominous proof of U.S. intentions of maintaining its puppet regimes in Indochina, was the apparent effort by presidential envoy Henry Kissinger to press Saigon's "demands" in Paris at the end of November, which would have virtually scrapped the agreement reached in October by Kissinger and Le Duc Tho of the DRV.

There have been various hypotheses put forward in the Western press concerning Kissinger's seeming about-face on behalf of Saigon, after proclaiming in October before the world that "peace is at hand." Nearly every possible explanation has been proposed by the pundits except the most plausible one. The U.S. stalling in Paris does not represent any deference to its Saigon puppets, but rather it is for the purposes of U.S. policy and the Saigon regime is merely an instrument. U.S. expressions of "support" for Saigon's policies, now as in the past, to the extent they are not fictions for deceiving American opinion, are fundamentally expressions of the aims and designs of the U.S.

Gain time

In essence, American procrastination in Paris has been an effort to gain time for augmenting Saigon's war machine and setting up a huge clandestine network of "civilian advisors" which will attempt to prolong the struggle in Vietnam, as well as in the rest of Indochina. If peace agreements have been reached,

"Even as the U.S. military is packing up for its expected exit from Vietnam, American officials here are secretly planning a major postwar presence of U.S. civilians in Vietnam, with many of them doing jobs formerly done by the military," wrote Fox Butterfield in a report from Saigon in the Nov. 27 New York Times.

Without alluding to the delay in Paris, Butterfield noted that the U.S. is in the process of augmenting its "civilian advisory" force in Vietnam, from 5000 to 10,000, its peak level at the stage of maximum U.S. military presence in Vietnam. But it should be apparent that this "advisory" apparatus could not be assembled overnight, any more than the enormous flow of U.S. arms could be brought to Saigon in a day. Saigon's air force was increased two-fold, from approximately 1000 to 2000 aircraft during the past two months, to give only one item of U.S. supply effort.

To place recent developments in their proper perspective, it must be noted that there has been a major shift in U.S. strategy set in motion last spring in the wake of the long-sustained offensive by the Liberation Armed Forces in South Vietnam.

Despite administration efforts to play down the strength of the offensive, it is evident that once again the whole U.S. strategy for victory in Vietnam was smashed. Only the most drastic U.S. measures of the war prevented the complete collapse of the Saigon regime and its armed forces: the blockade of the DRV, the greatest aerial escalation against the DRV and liberated areas of South Vietnam (while heavy bombing of Laos and Cambodia was sustained), and unprecedented aerial tactical and logistics support for the Saigon forces.

The augmentation of the U.S. air logistics support for Saigon's forces during the offensive surged from a monthly average of about nine million pounds of cargo before the offensive to 60 million pounds in May. Augmented U.S. "support" for Saigon after the offensive began, raised total U.S. expenditures on the war by an annual rate of approximately \$10 billion or nearly double the rate prior to the offensive.

The Nixon administration concealed this augmentation by requesting additional war funding only for the period ending Sept. 30. At about the same time the administration presented Congress with a request for these funds in June, Air America and Continental Air Services, the CIA contractual "civilian" airlines, began stepping up recruiting among Air Force personnel in Indochina, according to a Dec. 1 report of Dispatch News Service, by John Burgess. He quoted from a confidential recruiting brochure which, among other points, stated:

Clandestine warfare

"The flying is non-military; in other words, civilian flying. You are flying for the U.S. government, that is government agencies

such as USOM, USAID, USIS, etc. While these agencies may be under CIA direction, you don't know and you don't care. The government agencies direct the routings and schedulings, your company provides the technical know-how and you fly the airplane."

The brochure makes it clear that "civilian flying" is merely a cover for clandestine military activity: "Although flights mainly serve U.S. official personnel movement and native officials and civilians, you sometimes engage in the movement of friendly troops, or of enemy captives; or in the transport of cargo more potent than rice and beans! There's a war going on. Use your imagination!"

In what Burgess describes as a "hastily" added postscript, the brochure states: "Foreign aid situation unclear pending outcome military situation in RVN (Republic of Vietnam), but it looks as if we'll finish the war (and peace terms favorable for our side); if so, it is expected that a boom among contract operators will result. . . ."

In other words, here we have the first concrete indication that the White House was implicitly admitting defeat of its "Vietnamization" program and reverting to a less costly program of clandestine warfare. The U.S. strategy shift was probably equally dictated by a desire to further diminish the political impact of the war on American opinion and finally by a desire to diminish the blow to U.S. prestige in the event of ultimate failure, that is the collapse of the puppet regimes.

The U.S. is clearly trying to stave off this development as long as possible, but it also

wants to avoid the impression of being engaged in direct and large-scale U.S. intervention at the time, which sooner or later Nixon and Kissinger must know is inevitable.

Even if they cannot face this reality, they are now in deadly earnest about maintaining support for the puppet regimes, regardless of any peace agreement. If the U.S. honestly adhered to a peace agreement, Saigon's political collapse would quickly follow. That is why the U.S. is stepping up clandestine support for the Saigon regime, military aid disguised as civilian "contractual" aid, provided mainly by U.S. private military contractors.

There is a relationship between the U.S. arms build-up Indochina and the program for secret contractual aid. Before the October peace agreement, the U.S. made little effort to keep the program secret. In testimony before the Senate Appropriations Committee on Sept. 13, Air Force Maj. Gen. Joseph R. DeLuca explained in detail U.S. plans for contracting for personnel to train Saigon Air Force members. In the area of maintenance alone, the U.S. was planning to make contracts for \$54 million of one to three years to train Saigon personnel, according to DeLuca.

continued

EDITORIALS**The Carpet Bags of Saigon**

No doubt some kind of simulated cease-fire will be patched up in Vietnam, and probably before the end of the year; failure to achieve anything would be too embarrassing for the Administration. It will be a military stand-still without a political foundation or, in proper bureaucratese, infrastructure. So it is quite natural that, in an adaptation of Clausewitz's famous saying, it will be war carried on by other means. A recent report from Saigon by George McArthur, headlined in the *Los Angeles Times*: "Vietnam Future: U. S. Planners Thinking Big," gives a printout of the future.

McArthur leads off his dispatch with the not very surprising news that, while the negotiations proceed by fits and starts in Paris, U. S. bureaucrats in Saigon "are confidently using the time to blue-print empires in South Vietnam." Some of them have acquired villas there; they find the climate congenial, and would like to stay on, enjoying the good life to which they have grown accustomed. It is impossible to get any accurate estimate of how many U. S. civilians are hanging out in South Vietnam with some kind of official connection with the American Embassy, or the armed forces, or intelligence, or whatever else in the way of "programs" may be under way. And if that is impossible, how can anyone estimate what number of bodies will be required to carry on a simulated peace? The only thing certain is that proliferation is under way; the bureaucrats are "thinking big." "No single person or headquarters," writes McArthur, "seems to be running the show. Things are just growing, strangely enough, in a somewhat microscopic replay of the great buildup of 1965." Of course, microscopic can turn into macroscopic. The planners, at first stunned by Kissinger's forecast that "peace" was close at hand, are regaining their vigor and redoubling their efforts. They intend to stay on.

Clothes may not make the man, but they can make him look different, and by all indications such transformations will be taking place on a large scale. It takes only a few minutes and some pieces of paper to change a colonel in uniform into a civilian bureaucrat in colorful sport shirt and slacks. Or he may be nominally a civilian already, a Central Intelligence Agency type, striving to win the hearts and minds of the people. In addition to CIA, AID, CORDS and other organizations whose full names are rarely used, the United States now has four consulates in South Vietnam. McArthur predicts that these peace-loving offices, complete with military attachés, State Department political officers, CIA operatives, et al., will be installed permanently at Can Tho, Nha Trang, Bien Hoa and Da Nang—"by coincidence" the present locations of headquarters for the four Army corps of the million-man South Vietnamese Army. Four consulates may be thought a reasonable number, since in France, with 50 million Frenchmen and hordes of U.S. tourists, we have five consulates in all.

There is also a legal side to this orgy of preparation for "peace": it centers in Washington. Having had practically nothing to say about the start of the war, Con-

gress may want to be in at the finish. Constitutionally, this is no simple matter. Since we do not recognize North Vietnam, except for the purposes of killing and bombing, an agreement with Hanoi would not be a treaty and the Senate would have nothing to say about it. But we do recognize South Vietnam, so if they sign, wouldn't that constitute a treaty? Some lawyers think so, but it is a safe bet that President Nixon will not. As Commander in Chief he can order a cease-fire at his pleasure.

Sen. J. William Fulbright thinks an agreement to end the war should be submitted to the Senate for its scrutiny. But the Senate wants a cease-fire and will doubtless be reluctant to appear to be meddling in the interminable negotiations. All the same, the time will come when the Senate must insist on a say. "I would assume," Senator Fulbright observes, "any agreement would involve obligations to spend several billions of dollars, a commitment that should be submitted to the Congress." And further, "with these secret agreements, we find so often that they have obligations on our treasury or to send troops abroad, so it seems only fair that Congress have a chance to examine them." If Congress hopes to maintain some degree of control over what happens in Vietnam after a cease-fire, it should note what is happening there now. The bureaucrats are "thinking big" and will no doubt set programs in motion without initial Congressional approval, and then, as in the past, gamble that they can induce the Senate and House to continue and even expand them. So the time for vigilance is now.

New U.S. Buildup in Vietnam

President Nixon has reduced the American military forces in Vietnam from almost 600,000 in the first months of his Presidency to 25,200. The number now is frozen pending clarification of where the Paris peace talks are going. But the remaining troops are organized for withdrawal on a 57-day schedule to conform with the 60-day limit written into the nine-point peace plan tentatively agreed on two months ago.

At the same time, the United States is quietly and slowly building up its civilian forces in South Vietnam, actively recruiting additional personnel, reportedly authorizing the transfer of some soldiers to civilian status, alerting Indochina experts now in other posts that they soon may be sent to Vietnam. Unofficial estimates indicate that a civilian force of as many as 10,000 Americans is being prepared for Vietnam.

There is no official explanation because, officially, there is only a denial of such a buildup. But it is clear from some of the categories being recruited that the new band of Americans in mufti will be doing in the future some of the things that Americans in uniform are doing now, including such tasks as operating computers for the Saigon military command, advising troops in action, repairing, servicing and perhaps flying combat and transport aircraft, and assisting with espionage and sabotage.

To put it bluntly, there is evidence that the American government has no intention of ending American involvement in Indochina, that it is only working to convert the involvement to the form that prevailed before the massive buildup and direct battlefield role of 1965 and 1966.

If this is the intention, it is time for Mr. Nixon to be very clear about it. It must be explained. It must be debated. The ultimate decision must represent the will of Congress, a national consensus.

As matters now stand, we know of no good reason to justify the buildup.

Of course, it can be argued that there are not enough skilled Vietnamese to operate the sophisti-

cated weapons and instruments of war that were given them by the United States. But the point is that peace, not war, is to be waged now.

Of course, it can be argued that President Nguyen Van Thieu will be weaker without the Americans, more vulnerable to overthrow, and it can be anticipated that there will be cheating on a cease-fire, and perhaps no absolute peace for years and years. But it is no more reasonable to propose a prolongation of the American commitment than to advocate the right of Hanoi to recruit advisers from Moscow and Peking.

Aid there must be, aid both to the north and the south, a reconstruction of Vietnam, regardless of ideology and political commitment, but not aid that is a screen to preserve American influence and prolong American commitment.

It is not in the American interest to talk, as American officials now are talking, of enlarging the number of U.S. consulates in South Vietnam and placing them just where U.S. Army corps headquarters have been operating. It is a travesty to suggest that the military attache in the U.S. Embassy requires "hundreds" on his staff. There is no logic to recruiting a 100-man team of Americans to monitor the cease-fire unless the United States would be looking for an excuse to reenter the hostilities. It is folly to leave even a suspicion that the reconstruction contractors may be operatives of the CIA.

Mr. Nixon sought office in 1968 and reelection in 1972 on a commitment to get out of Vietnam. That is what the American people understand is being arranged in Paris. That is what the American people have shown so clearly that they want.

They want to get out not just because they are weary of the war, not just because they now recognize the madness of the war. They want to get out because they now know that this is not and never was their business. It is not for the Americans, it is for the Vietnamese to decide the future of Vietnam—the Vietnamese by themselves, not through the mask of a new and clandestine army of Americans.



Newsmen risk credibility using confidential sources

By John P. Roche

Ever since the Supreme Court held that the relationship between a reporter and his sources was not privileged (that is, protected from scrutiny on the model of the lawyer-client connection), there has been a great deal of discussion about curbs on freedom of the press.

This controversy was intensified when the Supreme Court held that a Harvard assistant professor, Samuel Popkin, had to answer a grand jury's questions on the Pentagon Papers or go to jail for contempt. A handcuffed Popkin was seen en route to prison. (He was subsequently freed.)

There are two aspects of this problem, one of which has been almost entirely overlooked. Understandably, emphasis has been placed on the moral obligation of a newsman to protect a confidential source. (Or, in Popkin's case, on the duty of a scholar to safeguard his informants.) But very little has been said about the inherent dangers — to journalism as to scholarship — of using unverifiable sources.

Let us look first at the legal issue, which is historically simple. In the American majoritarian tradition there were no inherently privileged relationships. Indeed, the very foundation of a democratic order is that every citizen is a cop, that laws are enforced by the citizenry not by the police. This majoritarianism, which somewhat resembled vigilantism, would only tolerate privi-

leged relationships if they received statutory approval. Given the role of lawyers in politics, the first privilege to receive general acceptance was that between lawyer and client.

Contrary to supposition, the doctor-patient and minister-parishioner relationships have largely rested on custom, not statute. Indeed, a case can be made that to provide special privilege to the priest or minister would violate the separation of church and state. In practice it is hard to conceive of a grand jury throwing a priest in jail for protecting the secrets of the confessional. However, not more than a year or so ago in New York a psychiatrist was forced to testify, the state courts holding (correctly) that only a statute could provide immunity.

The answer to the press' (and Dr. Popkin's) problem then (as the Supreme Court pointed out) is an act of Congress stipulating immunity for the reporter or the scholar. In the meantime reporters or professors who choose to protect their sources just have to take certain risks, and in the process thank God they are not dealing with British judges, who really throw the contempt power around.

But what about the other side of this matter the growing use of unverifiable "confidential sources"? Of course, journalists have done this routinely for years.

It is a practice I try to avoid because, having been one, I am suspicious of the motives of "high White House sources,"

who are normally trying to play the press like a salmon. However, with the advent of "instant history," we now find whole volumes which at crucial evidential points rests on a "confidential source." Or worse perhaps, on no cited source whatsoever.

Imagine my interest when, in Herbert Parmet's "Eisenhower and the American Crusades," I learned that "one of Dulles' closest confidants" had revealed that Ngo Dinh Diem was "discovered" by the CIA and "rammed" into office in 1954 by John Foster Dulles. Later we are told that during President Eisenhower's 1955 heart attack, Dulles was the "quarterback," that "nothing was done without his approval." This is interesting because 1) it sounds like Dulles' view of his own role, and 2) it is in contradiction to what others have said. Good, let's find out — check footnote 9: "Confidential source." Thanks a lot.

Parmet, however, is a small-time operator when it comes to "confidential sources." David Halberstam has just turned out a 665-page book on the Kennedy-Johnson era in which a number of people are quoted in extraordinary fashion, and even more non-people (a "Johnson aide," a "Kennedy confidant," etc.) turn up saying the strangest (but singularly useful from Halberstam's viewpoint) things. There is not a single footnote in the book! I suppose if you can't beat 'em, join 'em: Did I ever tell you how Jack Kennedy told me never to believe anything Ken Galbraith said?

HARD TIMES

SPOOKING. THE SPOOKS: the victor marchetti story by james ofis

"I'm a scoutmaster" says Victor Marchetti. He is, in fact, more than a scoutmaster.


Until 1969 he was executive assistant to the deputy director of Central Intelligence, Admiral Rufus Taylor. More recently, he has been the subject of a legal case which could crack open the darkest recesses of America's clandestine government. "I am the kind of a guy who manages Little League teams," he goes on. "Well, my scouts and ball players began to grow up on me and they became draft age. They let their hair grow; they changed. Now I know these were good boys, and they started to get to me. They began saying, 'I'm not going to go and get shot in Vietnam, because it's an unjust war.'" Doubts, gnawing doubts about Vietnam and the CIA's role in foreign affairs. He says that he saw himself becoming a lifer, an intelligence bureaucrat, and he "didn't want to play the game any longer." After 14 years as a spy for America, Marchetti quit.

That was 1969. Now, in August, 1972, in Washington, D. C., he sat in a Chinese restaurant known as a place frequented by CIA agents. Far from the taciturn and glamorous killer, Marchetti looked stolidly middle class, of conservative mien and talkative manner. As he spoke, he furtively sized up the occupants of the other tables and mentally chronicled the comings and going of all patrons, presumably out of habit. Did he think the interview was being bugged? "It's not beyond them," he replied, his face a mixture of edginess and resignation.

It had not always been like this. He had left the agency on the best of terms, his boss assuring him that he "had a

if I was at the Agency. I was going to dinner parties . . . we'd sit around and talk. In fact, I saw as much of Agency people as I did when I was working."

But somewhere along the line he got the notion that he wanted to blow the whistle on the CIA: "I would go down to a shopping center and walk around. For the first time in 15 years, I began to look at a check-out clerk as a human being, instead of a check-out clerk. I got interested in people and my ideas about the Agency became firmer and sharper, and I began to



Marchetti: Blowing the whistle

focus on precisely what was bothering me."

Victor Marchetti decided to write a book. While the process of writing can be a solitary and private experience, he could scarcely expect to scribble away, merrily exposing his former employers, without it coming to their horrified attention. True, the CIA's record has been afflicted with tragicomic vicissitudes, but it can presumably keep tabs on its own.

Within weeks of his book outline being shown to various New York publishers, the CIA obtained a copy through a source within the industry. It immediately sought, and received, a court injunction against any further revelation of the book's contents. The

written book with his literary agent, publishers, or wife. It is an injunction of unprecedented scope—never before has the government gone to court to prevent former employees from speaking or writing. At the heart of the case lies a basic conflict between the First Amendment guarantees of free speech and the government's interest in keeping a lid on its various clandestine—and often illegal—activities. Provoked by the wave of "whistle-blowing" attendant on Daniel Ellsberg's release of the Pentagon Papers, the conflict arises because of official activity which offends the moral sensibilities of rather ordinary, and very loyal, public servants like Victor Marchetti. If the Supreme Court backs Marchetti's right to talk, it could open a floodgate for a torrent of revelations about the nefarious activities of American spy agencies. If it upholds the CIA, it could cut down on the trickle of information which currently keeps the Invisible Government on its guard.

Aside from the broader implications of the case, the CIA has good reason to fear what Marchetti himself might reveal about his erstwhile employers. He is unquestionably the highest-ranking intelligence official to threaten exposure of the Agency's more questionable endeavors. He knows where the skeletons are hidden. Indeed, Marchetti is given credit for developing the surveillance techniques which led the CIA to discover Russian missiles in Cuba and thereby provoked the 1962 Missile Crisis.

As Marchetti tells the story, "After I was with the Agency for five or six years, I was assigned to the Cuban problem. This was exciting and personally very satisfying because another fellow and I evolved a strange analytical working tool which we called crateology. With it we were able to identify the merchant ships that were arms carriers. Over a period of time, since the Soviets were very methodical, we began to learn which crate contained a SAM 2 and which crate

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On Duty, "Dirty Tricks" and Democracy

A profile of Maj. Gen. ^{Edward} Edwin Lansdale, the original "Ugly American"

By Stanley Karnow

As he walks his poodle along the shaded street near his split-level Alexandria home, Maj. Gen. Edward Geary Lansdale resembles any number of retired officers pasturing in the Washington suburbs. He is still lean and erect despite his 64 years, and, like so many military pensioners, he finds life somewhat tame after his adventurous career.

But in contrast to the superannuated colonels who reconstruct battles at the dinner table, Lansdale's experiences were of a high order. For he was in times past a dynamic, influential and often controversial figure who single-handedly managed foreign governments and whose behind-the-scenes counsel helped to shape U.S. policy and practice at critical junctures in recent history.

In the Philippines during the early 1950s, for example, Lansdale virtually directed the campaign against the Communist-led Huk in his capacity as special adviser to Ramon Magsaysay, then that country's defense secretary. In Saigon not long after, he effectively kept South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem in office by conspiring to crush his domestic foes while persuading Washington to support him. Later, as the Vietnam war escalated, Lansdale was instrumental in convincing President Eisenhower and Kennedy that the United States and its Vietnamese clients could defeat the Vietcong by relying on counterinsurgency techniques. Some of these techniques, as disclosed in the secret Pentagon Papers, have revealed him to be considerably less savory than the public image of him as an idealist.

Little of the exotic drama that characterized Lansdale's career is apparent in his present manner. He

is a gray, unassuming man whose subdued style borders on self-effacement. Some of his friends suggest that he has lost much of his verve since his wife's death last spring, and he himself concedes that her passing has left him lonely and dispirited. Except for occasional evenings with old cronies, many of them Asia veterans like himself, he leads a rather secluded existence.

Other friends point out that he is weary after years of battling bureaucrats who oppose his unconventional ideas, and Lansdale himself substantiates that view with bitter humor when he says that "the knives going in don't seem to hurt anymore." Yet, as he speaks, it is clear that he still burns with a hard flame that is nearly religious in fervor. His religion, he explains, is not formal. It is his faith that the United States could have successfully played world policeman by propagating its political philosophy.

At the core of Lansdale's doctrine is the conviction that Communist guerrillas can be defeated in brushfire wars by "winning the hearts and minds" of people. In Vietnam, according to this thesis, the United States should have exported American democratic principles along with guns, money, machinery and food. "We couldn't afford to be just against the Communists," Lansdale has written. "We had to be for something."

Lansdale's proposals often provoked the fury of Establishment strategists, some powerful enough to block his advancement. He has also been derided as a dreamer whose perception of reality was, at best, blurred. At the same time, though, he inspired a coterie of disciples who regarded him as nearly infallible. Several years ago in two celebrated novels that, whatever the

validity of their arguments, at least endowed him with a measure of literary immortality. William J. Lederer and Eugene Burdick portrayed him in *The Ugly American* as Col. Edwin Barnum Hillendale, whose sweet harmonica purportedly stimulated rural Filipinos to oppose Communism. Graham Greene, on the other hand, depicted him in *The Quiet American* as Alden Pyle, the naive

U.S. official who believed that he could mobilize Vietnamese peasants to resist the Communists by instilling them with the precepts of Town Hall democracy.

Although the old soldier has faded away, the debate lingers on. Just as Lederer and Burdick approvingly quote their hero as saying that "if you use the right key, you can maneuver any person or nation any way you want," so Lansdale's disciples still contend that the United States could have attained its objectives in Vietnam by developing psychological warfare methods more efficacious than those employed by the Communists. This view, which became popular during the Kennedy Administration, is best articulated in the articles of Lansdale's close friend, Robert Shaplen, the *New Yorker* correspondent in Saigon, who has long asserted that the United States and its South Vietnamese proteges could have beat the Communists by preempting the revolution. And just as Graham Greene indirectly reproved Lansdale by declaring that Vietnamese "don't want our white skins around telling them what they want," so his present-day critics claim that he never ac-

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Marasco: CIA Eyed Air Drop To Free Berets

STATINTL

(Former Green Beret Capt. Robert F. Marasco and seven other Special Forces members were involved in one of the major controversies of the Vietnam War in 1969 when accused of murdering a triple agent. Now a civilian in Bloomfield, he spent many hours being interviewed by Daily Journal reporter Thomas Michalski, recalling events surrounding the assassination that he says never were made public.)

By THOMAS MICHALSKI
Journal Staff Writer

The Central Intelligence Agency and U.S. Special Forces in an "unsanctioned move" were to free eight Green Berets from military custody in September 1969 by means of an incredible escape plan that involved a parachute drop of 1,300 men on Long Binh and a flight to Burma, according to former Capt. Robert F. Marasco.

Marasco, one of the eight charged with the murder of Vietnamese triple-agent Thai Khac Chuyen, said "the highly secret, unorthodox and unconventional" escape plan has never before been made public.

In telling the story to The Daily Journal, Marasco said the parachutists would have distracted base personnel enough to allow the landing of a twin-engine C-7A Caribou on a roadway at Long Binh, pick up the Berets and fly off to Burma.

Once in Burma, Marasco said, the Berets, with CIA funds, would have established guerrilla forces for counter-intelligence work in Red China and other parts of Asia.

"We were in the stockade three weeks," Marasco said. "We were in maximum security where they held rapists and murderers."

"Officers are never put in jail. They are usually held in house arrest."

Such was the case of Col. Robert B. Rheault, Green Beret commander, who also was involved in the Chuyen incident.

Marasco's cell was four by seven. It had no toilet facilities. A 200-watt bulb burned continuously, and the average temperature, he said, was 120 degrees.

"We lay in these cells in undershorts," Marasco recalled. "When you had to go to the latrine you had to scream. 'Guard, prisoner in

Cell Two has to go to the bathroom . . ."

Marasco said. "We were, in fact, prisoners of war, POWs of the American military."

"The jail's commander, a lieutenant colonel, made our lives as bearable as possible with books, cigarettes, things like that."

While in the Long Binh stockade, the Berets were "still convinced that eventually somebody would find out what was going on and that we would be let out."

In early August an American newspaperman was in an enlisted man's club when he heard two military policemen talking about the case.

"He went to MACV — Military Assistance Command, Vietnam — and started asking questions," Marasco said.

On Aug. 15 the Army, after having held the Berets for over three weeks without officially charging them with any crime, issued a news release that said "eight Green Berets are being held for murder and conspiracy to commit murder."

Murder carries a minimum of life sentence and conspiracy a maximum of life imprisonment.

"Now that it was all out in

the open we said to the CIA 'You'd better get the word back to Washington that if you continue this foolishness you have to assume the potential of us compromising every high

Fourth of 5 articles

level intelligence operation in Southeast Asia," Marasco said.

"We didn't do anything that wasn't done regularly," Marasco said. "The only difference is that it was usually given to the Vietnamese to do for us.

"But, because Project Gamma was a unilateral operation, we couldn't do that," Marasco said. "The Vietnamese weren't supposed to know Project Gamma existed."

Military attorneys for the Berets were joined by a host of well-known stateside lawyers. One of the civilian attorneys said, "I have evidence to prove that the CIA has ordered the killing and effectuated the killing of over 100 people in South Vietnam during the past year."

George W. Gregory, attorney for Major Thomas C.

Middleton Jr., cabled Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird to charge that the Berets were being held under "inhuman conditions."

Shortly afterward, the men were released from Long Binh jail and allowed to stay in regular billets.

The handling of the case also stirred reaction among some congressmen. Sen. Ernest F. Hollings of South Carolina said, "These men are soldiers who were doing a job that had to be done."

Rep. L. Mendel Rivers, chairman of the House Armed

case is going from bad to worse." STATINTL

Attorneys for some of the men, meanwhile, contended that their clients could not get a fair trial in Vietnam because Gen. Creighton Abrams, commander of U.S. Forces in Vietnam, and Maj. Gen. G.L. Mabry, commander of support troops in Vietnam, were "prejudiced because they have prejudged the defendants."

"Abrams caused this whole thing simply because of service rivalry between the regular Army and elite Green Berets," one attorney told the Associated Press.

Meanwhile, the threat by the Berets to expose other CIA secret operations got back to CIA Chief Richard Helms, who sat down with President Nixon, Marasco said.

Marasco said a few days later Abrams met with President Nixon at the Western White House to discuss troop withdrawals.

"The next day Nixon's military aide called us and said, 'Forget it, you're not coming home,' Marasco said. "Abrams, the aide said, told President Nixon that if he wanted the troop withdrawals to go smoothly, without problems, he wanted the Green Berets."

Abrams, Marasco said, pointed out to the President that as military commander in Vietnam he should be allowed to handle the case.

The exchange, Marasco said, occurred in September, 1969, when troop withdrawals were in their early stages. President Nixon, he said, agreed to allow Abrams to handle the Green Beret case.

CONFIDENTIAL

A Bad Deal that May Not Work

I. F. Stone

-Washington

I

The pending cease-fire agreement, as so far disclosed by Hanoi and Washington, is like a delicate watch, intricately fabricated to make sure it won't work. No agreement ever had so many ingenious provisions calculated to keep it from succeeding. If by chance one spring doesn't break down, there is another in reserve that almost surely will, and if by some unforeseen mishap that one also should work, there is still another which will certainly go blooey sooner or later.

The fragility of the agreement to end the second Indochinese war is put in better focus if one compares it with the cease-fire which ended the first, at Geneva in 1954. The only signed document that emerged from the Geneva conference was a cease-fire agreement between the military commands on both sides. It was accompanied by a final declaration which nobody signed and to which the United States and the separate state the French had created in the south objected; then as now the puppet was more obdurate than the master.

The first Indochinese war ended, as the second seems to be doing, with a cease-fire but no political settlement. The prime defect, the "conceptual" flaw, to borrow a favorite word of Kissinger's, lay in the effort to end a profoundly political struggle without a political settlement. A cease-fire then, as now, left the political problem unresolved and thus led inevitably to a resumption of the conflict. It will be a miracle if the new cease-fire does not breed another, a third, Indochinese war.

A political solution was left to *mañana* and "free elections." But the Geneva cease-fire agreement, disappointing as its results proved to be, was far more precise in its promise of free elections than is the new cease-fire. It set a firm date—July, 1956—for the balloting; specified that the purpose of the elections was "to bring about the unification of Vietnam"; provided for the release within thirty days not only of POWs but of "civilian internees"; and provided for the release of political prisoners by defining civilian internees as

... all persons who, having in any way contributed to the political and armed struggle between the two parties, have been arrested for that reason and have been kept in detention by either party during the period of hostilities.¹

Nobody knows how many thousands of political prisoners are in Thieu's jails. The most famous is Truong Dinh Dzu, the peace candidate who came in second in the 1967 presidential election, the first and only contested one. Thieu's most notorious instrument for these round-ups was Operation Phoenix, which the CIA ran for him. A Saigon Ministry of Information pamphlet, *Vietnam 1967-71: Toward Peace and Prosperity*, boasts that Operation Phoenix killed 40,994 militants and activists during those years.² These are the opposition's civilian troops, the cadres without which organizational effort in any free election would be crippled. Arrests have been intensified in preparation for a cease-fire.

The fate of the political prisoners figured prominently in the peace negotiations. The seven-point program put forward by the other side in July of last year called for the dismantling of Thieu's concentration camps and the release of all political prisoners. The eight-point proposal put forward by Washington and Saigon last January left their fate in doubt. It called for the simultaneous release of all POWs and "innocent civilians captured throughout Indochina." The ambiguous phrasing seemed designed to exclude political since these were neither "captured" nor, in the eyes of the Thieu regime, "innocent."

The new cease-fire terms do not bother with such ambiguity. Dr. Kissinger in his press conference of October 26 seemed to take satisfaction in the fact that the return of US POWs "is not conditional on the disposition of Vietnamese prisoners in Vietnamese jails." Their future, he explained, will be determined "through negotiations among the South Vietnamese parties," i.e., between Thieu and the PRG. So the political will stay in jail until Thieu agrees to let them out. This may easily coincide

This is only one of the many built-in vetoes by which Thieu can block free elections and a political settlement

The new cease-fire agreement gives him far more power than he would have had under the proposals he and Nixon made jointly in January. Under Point 3 of those proposals, there was to have been "a free and democratic *presidential* [my italics] election" in South Vietnam within six months. One month before the election, Thieu and his vice president were to resign. The president of the senate was to head a caretaker government which would "assume administrative responsibilities *except for those pertaining to the elections*" (my italics).

Administrative responsibility for the election, according to those Nixon-Thieu terms, was to be taken out of the hands of the Saigon regime and put in those of a specially created electoral commission "organized and run by an independent body representing all political forces in South Vietnam which will assume its responsibilities on the date of the agreement."³

Finally the joint proposals of last January indicated that the electoral commission would be free from the inhibitions of the Thieu constitution, under which communist and neutralist candidates can be declared ineligible. According to those proposals, "All political forces in South Vietnam can participate in the election and present candidates."

How much weaker is the setup under the new cease-fire agreement? There is no provision for Thieu's resignation before the election. The existing government is no longer excluded from responsibility in holding the elections; no clear line is drawn between what the Thieu government can do and what an electoral commission will do: what happens if the latter is reduced to observing the irregularities of the former? Thieu will continue to be in control of the army and the police, and there is no way to keep him from using them to harass the opposition and herd the voters.

Instead of an electoral commission, the new agreement would set up a tripartite Council of National Reconciliation and Concord for much the


continued

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HEROÏNE : LES POURVOYEURS

Michel R. Lamberti et Catherine Lamour ont fait le tour du monde pour remonter toutes les filières qui mènent aux vrais patrons de la drogue

 « Si nous ne venons pas à bout de ce fléau, c'est lui qui viendra à bout de nous », s'exclamait, le 17 juin 1971, le président Nixon devant des dizaines de millions de téléspectateurs. Les Etats-Unis ont, en effet, le triste privilège de compter le plus grand nombre d'héroïnomanes du monde : plus d'un demi-million actuellement, dont trois cent mille pour la seule ville de New York. Plus de 50 % des crimes perpétrés dans les grandes villes sont directement liés à la drogue : on tue pour se procurer l'argent nécessaire à l'achat d'une dose d'héroïne.

Le phénomène n'est pas seulement américain : tous les pays européens voient croître à une vitesse vertigineuse le nombre de leurs héroïnomanes. En France, où la pénétration de la drogue n'a été sensible qu'à partir de 1968, on en compte déjà vingt mille. Et le ministère de la Santé estime que le pays pourrait compter cent mille héroïnomanes en 1976.

Couper la source

La drogue n'est plus un simple problème de police. Partant du principe évident, exposé dernièrement à un journaliste américain de « U.S. News and World Report » par l'ancien directeur des Douanes américaines, Myles J. Ambrose, et selon lequel « on ne peut pas devenir toxicomane si l'on ne trouve pas de stupéfiants », Washington a décidé de remonter à la source, c'est-à-dire à la production même de l'opium, dont l'héroïne est un dérivé.

Couper la source d'approvisionnement des trafiquants, c'est intervenir dans les affaires des pays producteurs : de policière, la lutte contre la toxicomanie est devenue politique. Se posant une fois de plus en « gendarmes du monde » mais, cette fois, pour une cause dont personne ne songe à discuter le bien-fondé, les Etats-Unis se sont lancés dans une croisade que d'aucuns jugent d'avance vouée à l'échec.

On produit, en effet, chaque année, dans le monde, assez d'opium pour approvisionner les cinq cent mille héroïnomanes américains pendant cinquante ans : deux à trois mille tonnes, dont la moitié seulement est destinée à l'industrie pharmaceutique.

Le reste passe sur le marché entre les mains des trafiquants qui approvisionnent les fumeurs d'opium et les héroïnomanes.

Les trafiquants peuvent se fournir à deux sources différentes :

1) Les pays dans lesquels la culture du pavot est légale et contrôlée par l'Etat, mais où une partie de la récolte échappe aux autorités administratives.

2) Les pays dans lesquels la culture du pavot est en principe interdite, mais qui n'ont pas les moyens matériels et politiques — ou le désir — de faire respecter cette loi.

La Turquie, troisième producteur mondial, entrait dans la première catégorie. Jusqu'à ce que le gouvernement d'Ankara décide de proscrire la culture du pavot sur tout le territoire turc à partir de 1972, 25 % de la production d'opium était détournée vers le marché clandestin, alors qu'elle aurait dû, en principe, être entièrement achetée par l'Etat. Ce pays n'est pas le seul à connaître pareil problème, une enquête effectuée par le service stratégique des renseignements du Bureau des Narcotiques américain (B.N.D.D.) donnait, pour 1971, les chiffres suivants :

	Production (1) écoulee sur le marché licite	Production écoulee sur le marché clandestin
Turquie	150	35 à 50
Inde	1 200	250
Pakistan	6	175-200
Iran	150	?
U.R.S.S.	115	?
République populaire de Chine	100	?
Yougoslavie	0,83	1,7
Japon	5	—
Triangle d'or (Thaïlande - Birmanie - Laos)		750
Afghanistan		100-150
Mexique		5-15

(1) En tonnes.

Contrairement à ce que l'on pourrait penser, les « fuites » ne sont pas proportionnelles à l'importance de la production licite ni à celle des superficies cultivées

en pavot. Elles dépendent du plus ou moins grand sous-développement administratif du pays concerné et de la capacité des autorités locales à exercer un contrôle effectif sur les paysans, au moment des récoltes.

Pourtant, même des contrôles rigoureux ne suffisent pas à éviter les détournements, compte tenu de la différence de prix pratiqués sur le marché officiel et sur le marché clandestin. L'exemple de l'Inde le prouve, où, en dépit d'un système de contrôle gouvernemental cité en exemple par toutes les instances internationales, les fuites s'élèvent à 18 % de la production totale. La Yougoslavie laisserait échapper près de 70 % de sa production. Le Pakistan, enfin, qui produit légalement six tonnes d'opium, contribuerait pour près de deux cents tonnes à l'approvisionnement des trafiquants.

Le pavot partout

Dans une deuxième catégorie de pays la production de l'opium est illégale. Il n'existe évidemment aucun organisme d'Etat chargé de contrôler une production qui, en principe, n'existe pas. Clandestinement la récolte d'opium est entièrement écoulée sur le marché parallèle. Selon le B.N.D.D. ces pays contribueraient pour huit cent cinquante à mille tonnes à l'approvisionnement du trafic.

D'autres régions, sur lesquelles on ne possède absolument aucune information produisent de l'opium en quantité appréciable : le Népal et, probablement, la Syrie et le Kurdistan irakien. On signale aussi l'apparition de champs de pavots en Amérique du Sud. Contrairement à ce que l'on a souvent affirmé, la culture du pavot ne requiert pas de conditions géographiques ou climatiques exceptionnelles. Elle réclame seulement une main-d'œuvre abondante et un bon marché car la récolte demande beaucoup de soins et de minutie.

Nombre de pays qui ne sont pas des producteurs traditionnels d'opium pourraient, s'ils le voulaient, se mettre à cultiver le pavot. C'est le cas tout récent du Japon. La production d'opium a, de ce fait, tendance à croître en fonction de la demande et pourrait encore augmenter considérablement. Des indices nombreux mesurent

Vietnam Future: U.S. Planners Thinking Big

Civilian Advisers Rising;
Bureaucrats See Country
Taking on American Tone

BY GEORGE McARTHUR
Times Staff Writer

SAIGON—While cease-fire negotiations proceed with questionable progress in Paris and elsewhere, the U.S. bureaucrats of Saigon are confidently using the time to blueprint future empires in South Vietnam.

As of now, their vision is unsettling.

Although past American experiences in Laos and Cambodia can hardly be called successful, the planners are casually using those countries as partial models for the Vietnam blueprints.

President Nixon's senior wordsmith, Herbert G. Klein, has denied plans to station "either civilian or military advisers" with South Vietnam's army after a cease-fire. He was treading a semantic tightrope, according to all the evidence in Vietnam, itself.

The American military population has at least temporarily levelled off at about 27,000 men. But the overall U.S. presence in South Vietnam once gain has started to slowly grow. Civilian technicians have arrived in significant numbers and civilian contractors are stepping up operations in dozens of areas like training, maintenance and supply.

Impossible to Get Estimate

At this moment it is impossible to get an accurate estimate of the number of U.S. civilians in South Vietnam with some kind of official connection with the U.S. Embassy, military, intelligence or others.

No single person or headquarters seems to be running the show. Things are just growing, strangely enough, in a somewhat microscopic replay of the great buildup of 1965. No one seems to expect this civilian

minibuildup to get out of hand. But nobody has yet said "stop."

Part of the problem is that Washington has not stepped in to provide answers to some specific bureaucratic questions.

With Saigon's military warehouses bulging with liquor, PX goods and other supplies for some 30,000 men, the supply officials naturally want to know "how long?" and, more supplies are en route by ship already.

Planners Regain Vigor

Meanwhile, the planners, who were stunned by the mid-October revelation that a cease-fire was near, have regained their vigor. Having been frozen out of earlier planning by the secrecy of the talks, they are redoubling their efforts.

"Plans are proliferating prodigiously," admitted one staff colonel, who retained a sense of humor and perspective despite a tiring and unending round of committee meetings.

The plans, partial plans, contingency plans and perhaps some wishful dreaming on paper now provide for a South Vietnam with a pronounced American governmental cast. While many of the new experts or technicians (or advisers) will be wearing civilian sportshirts, the suspicion is strong that underneath they will have dogtags, or at least retirement papers. And, the civilians already here, including many

Central Intelligence Agency types, will simply change titles and continue what they are doing, and possibly do more.

One staff officer, already sporting civilian clothes much of the time, admits that the biggest change in his office will be the removal of some awards and military knickknacks, including a mounted enemy AK-47 rifle, which would not fit his "new" identity.

He also admits that he could get different orders tomorrow, and he halfway expects them.

"To tell you the truth," one colonel admitted, "nobody can make flat statements around here."

The new plans seem in some measure to be an outgrowth of this military insecurity.

"When in doubt plan for everything," joked an enlisted clerk soon to depart Vietnam.

In the initial days following Washington's announcement that it had agreed to a 60-day evacuation period following a cease-fire, the U.S. command was mainly concerned with the crash program to bring in aircraft, guns and priority military equipment.

Planning Activities

As the negotiations became more and more extended, so did the planning activities at the U.S. Embassy and MACV — Military Assistance Command Vietnam. Recommendations began to load the coded radio circuits back to Washington.

In more or less finished form, a dozen or more major plans now exist.

The first is a troop withdrawal schedule, with evacuation starting the day after a cease-fire is signed and extending until about D-plus-57, when the last evacuation flight will depart Tan Son Nhut Airport (probably to be followed on the runway by a jet landing with mail for the U.S. military attache's office).

Other plans cover setting up various military attache offices and specifying the troop numbers needed, the setting up of finance teams (as required by U.S. law) to check on Vietnamese use of military equipment, provisions to provide military information to international supervisory teams and a new cloak for an agency known as CORDS—Civil Operations and Rural Development Support.

The CORDS agency is a scheduled casualty since it is now largely manned by military officers and is directly under the U.S. military command. As the chief "civilian" agency for pacification, CORDS always has included many young State Department officers, although it has been directed by either a CIA man or a retired military officer.

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Feared He Was Next

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Sergeant Revealed

Killing

(Former Green Beret Capt. Robert F. Marasco and seven other Special Forces members were involved in one of the major controversies of the Vietnam War in 1969 when accused of murdering a triple agent. Now a civilian in Bloomfield, he spent many hours being interviewed by Daily Journal reporter Thomas Michalski, recalling events surrounding the assassination that he says never were made public).

By THOMAS MICHALSKI
Journal Staff Writer

The murder of a South Vietnamese triple-agent in June 1969 came to light when one of the eight Green Berets involved "blew the whistle" because he thought "he was next on the list."

Former Capt. Robert F. Marasco said a sergeant, Alvin L. Smith Jr., started a chain of events that caused the commander of the U.S. Forces in Vietnam "to lose his cool."

Marasco earlier disclosed the order to murder Thai Khac Chuyen came directly from a high Central Intelligence Agency official.

Chuyen was "eliminated" -- thrown into the South China Sea -- after being shot twice in the head, on or about June 15, 1969.

"I had about two more weeks to serve in Vietnam," Marasco recalled. "Smith, who was in on the negotiations and decisions all the time, was very friendly with Chuyen.

"They were buddies, which was his first mistake. You never become a buddy with your principal agent. It's just bad intelligence practice."

Marasco said Smith also was friendly with Chuyen's wife, Pham Kim Lien, and her sister.

"He was always going to Saigon with Chuyen for one thing or another," Marasco said. "But it didn't seem wrong until afterwards."

All through the negotiations concerning Chuyen's fate, Marasco said, Smith "was not agreeing that he (Chuyen) should be eliminated. He was not disagreeing, either. He had no alternative, but he had a special feeling for Chuyen."

Marasco said Smith "became very nervous for a number of reasons. He had recently buried his mother in Florida and had become quite neurotic in Vietnam.

"He had decided that because he was the only enlisted man, a non-commissioned officer, involved in the Chuyen thing, that we did not trust him and that we would kill him.

"That was absolutely ridiculous," Marasco said. "The thought never entered our minds."

In August 1969, Marasco said, Smith went to the CIA station chief at Nha Trang.

"But he went to a different agent, not the one who was involved in the thing from the outset," Marasco said. "This agent did not know anything about the Chuyen thing."

Marasco pointed out that "everything is celled and compartmentalized in the intelligence community. Sometimes the right hand doesn't know what the left is doing."

The Nha Trang CIA man directed Smith to Marasco. Smith, based on his belief that the Berets wanted to assassinate him, refused and, instead, was sent to Army officials in Saigon, Marasco said.

"He told his story to the

must understand that the Army had no real knowledge of Project Gamma. Although we were military, we, in fact, worked for SOG -- Special Operations Group."

The Chuyen incident, however, went up Marasco's chain of command to Col. Robert B. Rheault, Green Beret commander at the time.

"He made the final decision on the assassination, based on our information and that provided by the CIA," Marasco said. "We assumed that Rheault went up his chain of command as we went up ours. He did not."

Smith, Marasco said, told his story to an unidentified Army officer in Saigon who relayed it, through channels, to Gen. Creighton Abrams, commander of the U.S. forces at the time and now Army chief of staff.

"Abrams called in an aide, a brigadier general, who was supposed to know all about intelligence operations in Vietnam," Marasco said. "He was asked about the Chuyen matter.

"The aide, having been in Vietnam only a month, said 'we don't have any cross-border operations.' He said there were no CIA agents controlling military people and that the Special Forces are only involved in advisory training.

Abrams, Marasco said, then called Rheault to Saigon "to square things away.

"We had come up with a

Third of 5 articles

cover story, before, about what had happened to Chuyen," Marasco said. "Just in case it was needed, it was

standard procedure.

The story was that "we had found out that Chuyen might have been a bad guy, but that we didn't know for sure and that he was sent to Cambodia on a mission. We had a helicopter log and it showed that a guy went from Nha Trang at the specified time to the Cambodian border where he was dropped off.

"Chuyen was chubby and we happened to have a heavy-set Oriental in Project Gamma who looked like him.

"In the cover report," Marasco explained, "we said Chuyen went to Cambodia, had one-way radio transmission, and that he was supposed to contact us and never did."

Marasco, who could not identify Chuyen's double, said "he wasn't really that involved in the operation."

"We said in the cover story that Chuyen was a bad guy and that he just never came back from Cambodia," Marasco said.

One of the military's unwritten rules, Marasco said, is "to always cover your commander, no matter what."

"This is why Rheault gave the general the cover story but, according to a CIA 'after action' report, Abrams "became very upset because one of his senior commanders apparently had lied to him," Marasco said.

Abrams, Marasco said, was further angered by the fact that civilians, in this case the CIA, were in charge of the Berets.

Letters

Bloodbaths, or allegations?

To the Editor:

In his zeal to reassure himself and his readers of the soundness of past literature on North Vietnam, John S. Carroll ("After we get out, will there be a bloodbath in South Vietnam?", Oct. 15) violated the first rule of honest argumentation, which is to represent with reasonable accuracy the text which you wish to refute. Having chosen my "revisionist" critique of past and present allegations of a "bloodbath" in North Vietnam as his target, Carroll manages nevertheless to avoid reference — with a single exception—to any of the specific evidence which I have offered in the two publications which he cites.

I object, of course, to his taking out of context my remark that I no longer wish to rest my case against Nixon's bloodbath allegations on the International Control Commission reports alone, and using it to conclude that "at least one of the principal assumptions on which the revisionist history rests is not even believed by its own author." I made the remark in the context of a long, fully documented study of the North Vietnamese land reform which I was then completing. As I explained to him at that time, in comparison with the evidence I had found of a general distortion of the North Vietnamese land-reform campaign in both primary and secondary sources available to Americans, the I.C.C. reports simply receded in importance.

As a matter of fact, I did not and do not "acknowledge that the original I.C.C. approach is weak." Carroll has completely misrepresented the nature of the evidence to be found in the International Control Commission reports—evidence to which he never specifically refers. It is nec-

essary, therefore, to repeat it here: From April, 1955, to February, 1961, during which time the Diem Government was actively pressing charges of Vietminh violations of the Geneva Agreement with the I.C.C., the French Government and Diem submitted only 43 complaints of political reprisals in the North alleging a total of 56 incidents of re-

prisal. However, of the first 12 complaints, three were investigated and it was found that there was in fact no damage to life or property to the alleged victims. And of the 18 cases of reprisal by D.R.V.N. alleged to have occurred in the December, 1955-July, 1956, period—the height of the land reform campaign—only one involved alleged loss of life.

Even more important, during this same period of time, the population of the North, which submitted many thousands of personal petitions to fixed and mobile teams of the I.C.C. complaining of violations of their freedom of movement, submitted only 41 petitions complaining of political reprisals. This evidence thus has nothing to do with the D.R.V.N. land-reform law or the I.C.C.'s inability to investigate airfields. As much as Mr. Carroll and others would like to believe that mass reprisals were carried out against former French and puppet Government personnel, the evidence indicates that the worst thing to befall the former civil servants, soldiers and policemen of the French regime in Vietnam was that they were shamed into accepting the same low salary that Vietminh cadres received. (See Duong Chau, "The Seventeenth Parallel," Saigon, 1958, p. 147.) The former resistance fighters in South Vietnam did not fare so well during the same period.

I am even more disappointed that Mr. Carroll did not see fit to deal seriously with my study of the land reform. He cites all the usual sources alleging a "bloodbath" in the North (Buttinger, Van Chi) without even acknowledging that the meth-

odology and conclusions of these works do not stand up under careful analysis. An entire chapter of my 60-page study is devoted, for example, to an analysis of how Bernard Fall systematically misunderstood the socioeconomic background of the land reform in arguing that it was economically unjustified. But Carroll repeats Fall's argument that there were no "real" landlords as though it were unchallenged.

I have also documented how Hoang Van Chi's supposedly "authoritative" account has been the primary source for virtually every secondary source on the land reform (including Fall), but there is no mention in Carroll's article of this dependence.

But most important, Carroll ignores the evidence that Hoang Van Chi's account was written for the explicit purpose of advancing a propaganda campaign against the D.R.V.N. behind which were the U.S. and the South Vietnamese Governments: the repeated instances in which Chi fabricated evidence where none existed for a policy of massive executions of innocent people; Chi's close relationship with the U.S. and Saigon propaganda organs and the C.I.A., all of whom funded and promoted his writings; the significant change between 1958 and 1964 versions of his charge of "landlord quotas"; and his lack of qualifications to write from personal experience about the party's policy on land reform.

Carroll attempts to defend Hoang Van Chi's "loose" translation of Vo Nguyen Giap's statement by citing the opinions of unnamed experts that the Communists normally used the terms in question as euphemisms for terror and execution. But regardless of the opinions of such unnamed experts, the fact is that the Communists did not use the word in question to mean "execution." And if Carroll had bothered to ask me, I could have cited numerous usages of the word

in Communist documents in contexts which make this clear beyond any doubt.

Finally, his flippant dismissal of the documentary evidence used in my study indicates that Mr. Carroll is simply unfamiliar with scholarship on Communist affairs. Most of the documents which I cite, primarily the party newspaper Nhan Dan, were intended to communicate with an audience of party members and general public in North Vietnam what the general political line and specific policies of the party were during the land-reform period. These are precisely the documents with which any serious scholar would begin in a study of the land reform campaign. Moreover, the D.R.V.N. history of the land reform, which is based on official policy directives and statistical surveys of the land-reform period, is in no way inconsistent with these earlier documents.

As for the estimate of 800 to 2,500 executions during the land reform, which I have suggested on the basis of the available data, it is entirely consistent, as I point out in the study, with statistics on death sentences in several provinces in the North during the land reform—statistics published by the South Vietnamese Government.

Readers of The Times Magazine who wish to pursue the subject further may order copies of my study, "The Myth of the Bloodbath: North Vietnam's Land Reform Reconsidered," from the International Relations of East Asia Project, Cornell University.

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What role for Saigon police?

By Michael T. Klare

Under the terms of the peace settlement announced by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and Presidential advisor Henry Kissinger on Oct. 26, all U.S. military personnel are to be withdrawn from South Vietnam within 60 days of the signing of the agreement.

Although many provisions of the treaty require clarification, the impression one gets from reading the published text is that the entire U.S. warmaking machinery will be removed from Indochina. It is for this reason that documents recently acquired by the Guardian on the U.S. "Public Safety" program are cause for special concern.

These documents, the Agency for International Development's (AID's) "Program and Project Presentation to the Congress" for fiscal 1972 and 1973, indicate that Washington would like to maintain an elaborate police-support apparatus in Vietnam for some time to come.

This apparatus, supervised by AID's Office of Public Safety in the State Department, is administered as part of the foreign aid program and thus is not identified as a military program. Nevertheless, the Public Safety program is directly tied to the war effort, and is considered a major part of Operation Phoenix—the CIA's effort to destroy the political structure of the National Liberation Front (in Pentagon parlance, the "Viet Cong Infrastructure," or VCI).

According to the AID documents, which the Vietnamese are no doubt aware of, the purpose of the program is to assist "the Vietnamese National Police (NP) to maintain law and order and local security in pacified areas, combat smaller VC elements and deny resources to the enemy." An added function is to help Saigon dictator Nguyen Van Thieu consolidate his control of urban areas by suppressing dissent and crushing all opposition to the Saigon regime.

"The development of an effective National Police and the institutionalization of law enforcement," AID reports, "are important elements in pacification and long-term national development."

Launched in 1955

The Public Safety program in South Vietnam was launched in 1955, when 33 American police instructors arrived in Saigon under the cover of the Michigan State University Group (MSUG) to train Ngo Dinh Diem's palace guard and secret police in modern counterinsurgency techniques.

In 1962, the program was expanded under President Kennedy's orders, and administrative responsibility shifted to the U.S. Operations Mission. In 1967, as the pace of the U.S. war effort was accelerated, Public Safety operations were placed under Pentagon jurisdiction through the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support program (CORDS).

The resident U.S. police staff was enlarged with each of these administrative changes; beginning with a staff of six men in 1959, the Public Safety mission in Vietnam increased to 47 in 1965 and to 196 in 1972.

These "Public Safety Advisors," recruited primarily from the FBI, the CIA and military police units, work closely with the National Police Directorate and Internal Security Bureau in Saigon, the National Police "Special Branch" (political police), and with Operation Phoenix personnel assigned to the hundreds of provincial and district "interrogation centers" where political suspects are routinely beaten and tortured before being shipped to Con Son prison island.

These advisory activities are accompanied by lavish subsidies and grants of police materiel, which have turned the South Vietnamese police apparatus into one of the largest and most heavily-armed paramilitary forces in the world. Under Diem, the National Police force numbered only 19,000 men—a number which at that time was considered sufficient to justify pinning the label of a "police state" on the Saigon government.

Since 1962, however, the U.S. has financed a sixfold increase in NP strength—to 114,000 men on Jan. 1, 1972. U.S. support of the NP under the AID program amounted to \$85 million between 1961 and 1971 and additional millions of dollars were provided by the Department of Defense under Vietnam war appropriations. The cost of the Phoenix program, estimated at \$732 million, is totally borne by the CIA.

It is clear, from the documents made available to the Guardian, that U.S. aid to the Saigon police apparatus may well increase in future years, if the battle shifts to a political struggle between Thieu and his many opponents. In the preface to the Fiscal Year (FY) 1972 AID presentation, it was stated that:

"As one aspect of Vietnamization, the Vietnamese National Police are called upon to carry a progressively greater burden. They must share with the Vietnamese armed forces the burden of countering insurgency and provide for daily peace and order—not only in the cities, but throughout the countryside. It is planned to increase police strength from about 100,000 at present to 124,000 during Fiscal 1972 to allow assumption of a greater burden in the future. The U.S. plans to make commensurate assistance available."

Specifically, AID listed these "activity targets" for the Public Safety program in FY 1972:


"Provision of commodity and advisory support for a police force of 122,000 men by the end of FY 1972, increasing the capability of the police to neutralize the Viet Cong infrastructure in coordination with other Government of Vietnam security agencies (under Operation Phoenix); assisting the National Identity Registration Program (NIRP) to register more than 12,000,000 persons 15 years of age and over by the end of 1971; continuing to provide basic and specialized training for approximately 20,000 police annually; providing technical assistance to the police detention system, including the planning and supervision of the construction of 34 jail facilities during 1971; and helping to achieve a major increase in the number of police presently working at the village level."

The Fiscal 1973 program sets the same overall objectives, but calls for a vast increase in the number of NP officers assigned to the village police posts—from 11,000 in 1972 to 31,000 by the end of 1973.

To finance this massive effort during the FY 1971-1973 period, AID asked Congress for an appropriation of \$17.9 million, of which \$13.6 million would pay the salaries of the nearly 200 Public Safety Advisors, \$3.3 million would go for commodities (ID systems, radios, patrol cars, tear gas, etc.), and \$613,000 would be used for training several hundred Saigon police officers in the U.S. and other "third countries."

continued

6 NOV 1972

**BOB CONSIDINE**

STATINTL

A Day That Will Never Come

Question: Do you think there'll be a day when the U.S. is not bugged by somebody named Nguyen, or Duong?

Answer: Ngo.

Retired Maj. Gen. Duong Van Minh, the CIA puppet who overthrew the South Vietnamese government of President Ngo Dinh Diem nine years ago, has come out against the Kissinger "peace is at hand" plan. He says a ceasefire at this time, when the fighting is spread all over the country in small pockets, would be impossible to police by neutral forces and the U.N. Better to have the estimated 150,000 North Vietnam invaders retire to large regrouping areas, where they can be more easily watched. President Nguyen Van Thieu won't budge until his land is completely clear of his enemies from the North.

The rule of Big Minh, as he is called, lasted only from Nov. 1, 1963, to Jan. 30, 1964. He was pushed out by Maj. Gen. Nguyen Khanh. He retired to Thailand to raise orchids, but surfaced again in Saigon several years ago and briefly opposed Thieu's election last year! He dropped out before Election Day with an announcement that the election was rigged. Since then, Big Minh has been a quiet rallying point for anti-Thieu former generals, colonels and officials. It is a mark of his potential power that he has not been forced into oblivion, as has one-time premier Nguyen Cao Ky.

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Core of Vietcong Surviving War

By FOX BUTTERFIELD
Special to The New York Times

SAIGON, South Vietnam, Nov. 4—Despite years of fighting that have largely shattered the Vietcong guerrillas, the Communists in South Vietnam have managed to preserve the core of their political apparatus with what many well-informed Vietnamese and American officials believe to be a dedicated cadre of 40,000 to 60,000.

Those knowledgeable sources feel that the Vietcong political organization will pose a formidable threat to the Saigon Government under a cease-fire. The organization is spread throughout the country and includes local village operatives, secret agents in Government-controlled areas and political officers among the guerrillas, who form the Vietcong's military arm.

The continued existence of the Vietcong's political apparatus appears to be a major reason why President Nguyen Van Thieu and many other Vietnamese are nervous about the peace settlement worked out by Hanoi and Washington.

"The Vietcong have lost many of their best cadre and they aren't 10 feet tall any more," said an American with a decade of experience in Vietnam. "But their organization," the American went on, "is built on the hard bedrock of discipline and shared sacrifices. The survivors are tough."

A '72 Tactic: Restraint

One of the clearest indications of the continued strength of the Communist political apparatus is that despite the intensive fighting this year, the number of defections from the Communist ranks is half that of last year. There have been 8,237 defectors so far this year, against nearly 16,000 at this time in 1971.

To intelligence analysts, this suggests a high level of discipline among the Vietcong and confidence that they are winning. Some American analysts now say, in fact, that Hanoi's strategy this year was designed to take advantage of the Communist political strength. With its vast offensive, employing North Vietnamese troops, Hanoi hoped

settlement and turn the military struggle into a political struggle.

The analysts say that Hanoi this year carefully preserved its cadre of secret agents in Government-controlled areas by not trying to stir popular uprisings to accompany the offensive. During the Communist Tet offensive of 1968, thousands of cadres were killed when they came out in the open to lead what they thought would be mass revolts.

As one intelligence officer explained Hanoi's 1972 policy: "The war was a stalemate that neither side could win. They figured that if they could get the United States out, they stood a better chance of winning the peace."

Some high-ranking American military and intelligence officers, however, do not agree that the Vietcong have maintained political strength. This view, which is known to have been transmitted authoritatively to Washington, is that the Communists are badly weakened militarily and politically and are practically suing for peace.

Whatever the case, there is no doubt that the Vietcong, or National Liberation Front—the Communists never refer to themselves as Vietcong—are weaker in some ways than they were in 1965, when they came close to taking over the country without large-scale North Vietnamese help. The North Vietnamese invasion this spring indicates that.

Militarily, intelligence sources report, the Vietcong now have to rely on North Vietnamese troops to keep the traditional Vietcong guerrilla units up to strength. In some famous battalions with Vietcong names, only the guides and a few of the officers are native southerners, the intelligence sources say.

Moreover, American analysts say, whatever independence the southern Vietcong once had has been lost over the years as Hanoi has taken control.

Political Links Strong

The Vietcong cadres are almost all members of the People's Revolutionary party, the southern branch of Lao Dong, the North Vietnamese Communist party, and reportedly get their orders through the agency known as COSVN. This, usually spelled out as the Central

would be better translated as the Central Committee's Office for South Vietnam, American intelligence sources say.

The office is believed to be located in Kratie Province in northeastern Cambodia, a sparsely populated and heavily forested region long under Communist control. The top officials, most of whom are thought to be North Vietnamese, are the leaders of the People's Revolutionary party and also members of Hanoi's elite Politburo or of the larger Central Committee, according to American analysts.

For example, Phan Hung, who is believed to be the head of the office, is also the ruling secretary of the party and a member of the Hanoi Politburo. He is a North Vietnamese. His second-in-command, who uses the pseudonym of Muoi Cuc, is also a northerner and a member of the Central Committee.

American officials say that the Vietcong's titular leaders such as Nguyen Huu Tho, chairman of the front, or Huynh Tan Phat, the Secretary General of the front, have become progressively less powerful.

Most experts agree that one reason for the Vietcong's military decline is the enormous shift of South Vietnam's population away from the countryside and into safe urban areas to escape the war. At least a third of South Vietnam's villagers are estimated to have left their homes, often depriving Vietcong units of bases for recruitment, supplies or taxation.

Some allied officials are concerned that this trend may be reversed under a cease-fire and that thousands of villagers may come home — providing the Vietcong with a renewed source of power.

But no matter how badly the Vietcong have been hurt militarily, several recent American studies have shown that their political organization remains intact.

The organization withstood the vaunted Phoenix program, established by the Central Intelligence Agency in 1967 specifically to eliminate the Vietcong cadre. Though more than 20,000 were killed under the Phoenix program and another 40,000 jailed or persuaded to defect, officials connected with it admit frankly that it has been a failure.

A recent study for the Rand Corporation found that in Dinh Tuong Province, in the

part of the populous Mekong delta, the Vietcong have preserved a core of about five cadres per village. "Despite the decline in military capabilities," the study said, in part, "the N.L.F. in Dinh Tuong has managed to keep the nucleus of its movement intact."

The study also found a large measure of "latent support" for the Vietcong among villagers. This continuing sympathy for the Communists, the study reported, was not in evidence where the Saigon Government forces were strong, but it could easily reappear, should Saigon weaken.

For example, the study noted that before the 1968 Tet offensive, many Vietnamese and American officials thought that the Vietcong in Dinh Tuong were on their way to defeat. But, once the Communists gave their sudden order to attack, "almost the entire rural population in the province was mobilized and coordinated in support of the attack," the study concluded.

The highest cadre concentration, according to Vietnamese and United States intelligence estimates, is 25,000 in the Mekong delta, Military Region IV.

These sources report that the second largest number of Vietcong, about 15,000, are in the Central Highlands and central coast, known as Military Region II, and most of them are concentrated in Dinh Dinh Province.

The situation in the northernmost region of South Vietnam, Military Region I, has been complicated this year by the invasion across the demilitarized zone and by the North Vietnamese reportedly taking large numbers of people north for indoctrination.

The area around Saigon, Military Region III, has always had the lowest number of Vietcong cadre, analysts say, because of the numbers and alertness of the Government police in the capital. But while there are fewer than 10,000 Communist party members and cadres in the Saigon area, they are said to be the best in the country.

Over the last few years, the Vietcong organization in the city of Saigon has appeared to be steadily losing power. Despite orders in captured Communist documents calling for terrorist acts in Saigon this fall, in the past month there were only three very minor incidents. The Saigon city apparatus is also reported to have been criticized for failing to produce its quota of taxes and supplies.

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QUINCY, MASS.
PATRIOT LEDGER
NOV 4 1972
E - 65,785

NO SECRET WAR

An Associated Press report yesterday from Saigon that the United States is planning to keep a military advisory group of American civilians in South Vietnam after regular military forces are withdrawn is disturbing.

The report quoted military sources as saying that the advisers would be employed by civilian firms under contract either to the Defense or State Departments.

Whether such activities would be covered by a Vietnam peace agreement or excluded from them remains conjectural. There is as yet no signed peace agreement. The U.S. is insisting upon reaching certain mutual understandings concerning the basic accord that is being worked out.

The implication of this report is quite clear — the continuation of American clandestine operations in Vietnam after the uniformed regulars are withdrawn, the kind of operations being conducted in

the "secret wars" in Laos and Cambodia.

Nobody in the U.S. government, of course, is going to confirm that CIA or other agents will remain behind to do what they can secretly to prevent Communist takeovers in Indochina. Obviously a number of American civilian officials will stay in Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam in various capacities.

The New York Times reported this week, for example, "In conversations in recent days with Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma of Laos and others, Nixon has stressed that he would seek to continue American economic and other assistance to Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam because he believed it was important to maintain non-Communist governments in Southeast Asia."

It would be all too tempting to use "civilian" aid officials, for example, for covert operations. It would be naive to suggest that the United States have no intelligence agents in Indochina after a peace agreement. But the U.S. should not shift its involvement in Vietnam from an open war to an underground war waged by agents under cover.

LIFE & LETTERS

HEROIN AND THE CIA

by Flora Lewis

THE POLITICS OF HEROIN IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA

by Alfred W. McCoy
Harper & Row, \$10.95

One fact is beyond dispute: heroin is flooding into the United States in sufficient quantities to support an ever growing number of addicts. Estimates about the drug traffic are unreliable, but trends are painfully clear in mounting deaths, young zombies stumbling through city streets, crime to the point of civic terror. There are said to be some 560,000 addicts in America now, twice the number estimated two years ago and ten times the level of 1960.

Another fact goes unchallenged: suddenly, in 1970, high-grade pure white heroin, which Americans prefer to the less refined drug more normally consumed by Asians, appeared in plentiful and cheap supply wherever there were GI's in Vietnam. The epidemic was a vast eruption. It took the withdrawal of the troops to douse it, for the fearful flow could not be staunched.

Beyond those facts, the sordid story of drug trafficking has been a shadowy, elusive mixture of controversial elements. It was obvious that there must be corruption involved. It was obvious that there must be politics involved, if only because the traffic continues to flourish on such a scale despite the energetic pronouncements of powerful governments. It takes a map of the whole world to trace the drug net.

Since the United States suddenly

became aware of the sinister dimensions of the plague and President Nixon bravely declared war on drugs (unlike the persistently undeclared war in Indochina), it has been customary for U.S. officials to pinpoint the poppy fields of Turkey and the clandestine laboratories of Marseille as the source of most of the American curse. Nobody denied that the bulk of the world's illicit opium (some say 70 percent, some say 50 to 60 percent) is grown in Southeast Asia and particularly in the "golden triangle" of mountains where Burma, Thailand, and Laos meet. But the U.S. government insisted, and continues to insist in the 111-page report on the world opium trade published in August, that this supplies natives and seldom enters American veins.

Not so, says Alfred W. McCoy, who spent some two years studying the trade. And further, it is certain to become less and less so as measures which the United States demanded in Turkey and France take effect in blocking the old production and smuggling patterns. This is of crucial importance for two reasons. One is that firm establishment of an Asian pattern to America means that the crackdown in Turkey and France will be next to futile so far as availability of heroin in the United States is concerned. The second is that focusing attention on Southeast Asia would bring Americans to understand that the "war on drugs" is inextricably involved with the Indochina war, and has to be fought on the same battleground from which President Nixon

assured us he was disengaging "with honor."

McCoy, a twenty-seven-year-old Yale graduate student, worked with immense diligence and considerable courage—for the opium trade is dangerous business and the combination of opium, politics, and war can be murderous—to document the facts of the Asian pattern.

A good deal of it has been common gossip in tawdry bars of Saigon, Vientiane, and Bangkok for years. But the gossip mills of Indochina are a long way from the streets of Harlem and the high schools of Westchester County. The general knowledge that the rumors reflected is a long way from precise, confirmed detail. So the Asian pattern had never come through clearly in the United States.

Now, in his book *The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia*, McCoy has set it down. To show how it developed, he had to backtrack. The use of opiates in the United States has a long history. It wasn't until after World War I that widespread opprobrium, added to growing understanding of the dangers, turned the trade into an underworld monopoly. But World War II disrupted the supply routes. Unable to get drugs, American addicts were forced to quit the hard way. The market diminished, and, with a modicum of enforcement effort and international cooperation, might have been wiped out.

A single U.S. official act, McCoy believes, turned that chance around and enabled the creation of a worldwide octopus of evil almost beyond

NOV 1970

PEACE ACTIVISTS SPUR SIGN-THE- TREATY DRIVE

STATINTL

By GENE TOURNOUR and TIM WHEELER

NEW YORK, Oct. 31 — Pressure on the Nixon Administration to sign a Vietnam peace agreement mounted visibly today even as the original Oct. 31 deadline passed in Paris without the initialing of a treaty.

In New York and Washington, peace activists warned of Nixon pre-election trickery and the possible abandonment of the agreement after Election Day.

"The next week is the most important of the war," Cora Weiss told several hundred anti-war activists who crowded into Hunter College Assembly Hall last night. The meeting was held on strategy to thwart President Nixon's maneuvers to sabotage accords reached on Oct. 8 with the representatives of the Vietnamese people.

"If Nixon is not forced to sign the nine-point peace accord in the week before the election, then he has four more years to sabotage peace and keep up the killing, Mrs. Weiss warned.

Seven-day drive

Reporting on her meeting in Paris Friday with representatives from North and South Vietnam, Mrs. Weiss said, "It is up to the U.S. peace movement whether or not Nixon manages to turn this chance for peace into just another election maneuver which can be abandoned after Nov. 7.

"Our job in the next seven days is to put the U.S. on record in support of the peace agreement

reached in principle on Oct. 8."

Mrs. Weiss and David Dellinger, a leader of the Peoples Coalition for Peace and Justice, called on the audience, many of whom were veteran peace workers, to help mobilize the city for what they termed "the supreme test of the peace movement."

Telegram forms circulated

During the meeting, telegram forms were circulated that carried the message: "If this is not an election maneuver, sign the agreement now." For 25 cents the message will be sent to Nixon immediately, the audience was told.

At the meeting's conclusion at 10 p.m., 400 participants, despite near-freezing temperatures, marched to Nixon campaign headquarters at Madison Ave. and 53 St., and began a vigil in support of the immediate signing of the peace agreement.

"Trick or treaty?"

"Is it a trick or is it a treaty?" shouted the marchers to passers-by as they made their way to the vigil site.

The vigil was scheduled to continue until 6 p.m. tonight which is midnight Paris time, the end of the day on which the U.S. had committed itself to signing the nine-point peace accord.

In other parts of the country similar demands are being expressed that the American people prevent Nixon from sabotaging the chance for peace.

Congressman Parren Mitchell (D-Md.) in a statement to the Baltimore Afro-American, now on the newsstands, declared, "If reports from North Vietnam are correct, then every person in this country ought to be applying pressure on the White House to achieve at long last an end to a futile, wasteful war which we could not win.

"Thieu must go"

"If indeed President Thieu stands as the only opposition to peace in Vietnam then he must go. His administration has been cor-

Hanoi: Peace as a Pause

By Nguyen Tien Hung

The writer was born in Thanhhoa, North Vietnam, later lived in South Vietnam, and is currently an associate professor of economics at Howard University.

OFFICIALLY, it is clear, a settlement of the Vietnam war is about to be reached. But in the minds of Hanoi's leaders, the cease-fire and political accord that now appear imminent will not mean the end of the struggle. Rather, to them such developments will mean only that yet another phase in the war between North and South has been opened.

It must be understood that in the Hanoi politburo there are no "doves" on the question of unifying Vietnam under communism; all are "hawks." What they differ substantially on is the method of accomplishing this aim. Thus the main key to Hanoi's increasingly accommodating stance at present and to what may happen after a settlement is signed can be found largely in the power struggle within the Hanoi politburo.

The struggle is between one faction headed by Le Duan, a Southerner and secretary-general of the Communist Party, and another led by Truong Chinh, a Northerner and chairman of the standing committee of the National Assembly. Their rivalry dates back to the 1940s, when they competed for the mind and confidence of the late President Ho Chi Minh. The rift was greatly intensified in 1956 when President Ho effectively replaced Truong Chinh with Le Duan as secretary-general of the party, a post Chinh had held for 13 years.

Truong Chinh Emerges

RECENTLY THEIR CONFLICT has extended to three broad issues: the economic performance in the North; the ideological direction regarding economic policy, and, above all, the conduct of the war in the South.

Le Duan's faction called for immediate conquest of the South at all cost, and he strongly supported Vo Nguyen Giap's big-battle and total-uprising strategy. Giap, spoiled by the Dienbienphu victory and obsessed with the thought of becoming a Vietnamese Napoleon, provides Le Duan with protection against the powerful police force of Tran Quoc Hoan, an ally of Truong Chinh.

Truong Chinh, on the other hand, wants to pursue a guerrilla strategy, accompanied by political and diplomatic efforts to help the National Liberation Front seize power in the South. For should the South fall under the thumb of the NLF, unification of the country under communism would be inevitable. Chinh's strategy is supported by Giap's lieutenant, Gen. Van Tien Dung.

Recent events in North Vietnam suggest that the politburo battle had been greatly intensified and that Truong Chinh has begun to emerge as the clear leader, capable of filling the power vacuum left by Ho Chi Minh's death in 1969. The effect of Chinh's emergence and the resulting change in Hanoi's power structure has been a reversal of Hanoi's policy on the war: from intransigence at the negotiating table to a more concessionary attitude; from conventional warfare to guerrilla and terror tactics; from an emphasis on decisive military victories to political and diplomatic offensives.

It is consistent with Truong Chinh's policies for Hanoi to agree to a cease-fire in order to recover from the war, and to prepare for new efforts to achieve final victory.

The Power Alignment

IN ANALYZING the Hanoi rivalry, it is essential to know the strength of each faction under the existing power structure. According to an unpublished study by Saigon educator Nguyen Ngoc Bich on the North Vietnamese assembly election in April, 1971, Truong Chinh skillfully used the occasion to weaken Le Duan's faction by eliminating the 87 Southern deputies in the National Assembly. These deputies had been staunch supporters of Le Duan in the legislative branch.

The power center in Hanoi, though, is not the assembly but the politburo. It consists of nine full members and two alternates. Recently (about August or September of this year), the two alternates, Tran Quoc Hoan and Van Tien Dung, were promoted to full membership on the pretext that they were to fill the seats vacated by Ho Chi Minh's death in 1969 and by Nguyen Chi Thanh's death in 1967. Hoan is minister of public security, which is the equivalent here to the director of the FBI, chief of all local police forces and director of the CIA combined; Dung is army chief of staff and a Dienbienphu hero. Apparently their

As in all Communist countries, no leader would dare express himself openly on so sensitive a question as party factions. Nevertheless, based on each politburo member's past record, position, performance, and on the Vietnamese pattern of behavior, one can speculate on the current power alignment in North Vietnam as follows:

LE DUAN FACTION

- Vo Nguyen Giap, strongman of the army. Giap is a long-time, bitter enemy of Truong Chinh. His hatred for Chinh stems from two sources—Chinh's favorable attitude toward Chinese intervention in Vietnamese affairs, and Chinh's undermining of Giap's authority by appointing political commissars to share responsibility side by side with military commanders.

- Pham Hung, director of the war in the South. Like Le Duan, Hung is a Southerner. Although he remains director of COSVN, the armed forces in the South, he was removed as first deputy on June 10, 1972, after the National Assembly election.

TRUONG CHINH FACTION

- Le Duc Tho, currently adviser to Hanoi's delegation to the Paris peace talks. Tho's hatred of Le Duan dates back to 1950 when he was sent by Ho Chi Minh as an inspector to the South. He became engaged in a bitter dispute with Le Duan on the conduct of the war. Duan was summoned to North Vietnam in 1951, while Tho remained in the South for some time thereafter.

- Nguyen Duy Trinh, foreign affairs minister, supports Truong Chinh because of their common agreement with Chinese policies.

- Hoang Van Hoan, Chinh's right-hand man in the standing committee of the National Assembly.

- Le Thanh Nghi, an economist, favors industrialization and is close to Chinh's position on rebuilding North Vietnam. His point of view is supported by important technocrats, such as Vice Premier Do Muoi.

- Tran Quoc Hoan, responsible for security and internal order. He controls all police forces and possesses all secret information on leading figures in North Vietnam. His lining up with Truong Chinh is explained by his suspicion of Vo Nguyen Giap's ambition to dominate the internal security domain. His recent appointment to full membership of the politburo causes alarm to Giap.

- Van Tien Dung, chairman of the army's chiefs of staff, appears to be a hero of Dienbienphu, Dung is said to be displeased with

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OCT 26 1972

Bob Considine

Some Subsidies For U.S. Proteges

If the truth were known — and that's a pretty preposterous thought in these times — we may have offered President Nguyen Van Thieu a considerable fortune to get lost.

There is precedent. To clear the path for President Diem we must have underwritten some or all of Bao Dai's departure from Vietnam and his subsequent posh life on the French Riviera. Before President Kennedy reluctantly okayed the CIA's scheme to unseat Diem, we offered to send Madam Nhu and her husband, Diem's brother, on a long visit to Paris, all expenses paid, to get them offstage.

(Diem was incensed. In what must have been the last interview he gave before his murder, he said to Bill Hearst, Frank Conniff and this reporter, "How would President Kennedy feel if I suggested that he send his brother Robert and Robert's wife away?")

The U.S. taxpayer was tapped, without his knowledge, for our buildup of Diem's successor, Big Minh, and money paid to him and the nine other military officers who took over the Saigon government, among them one Col. Nguyen Van Thieu. When Big Minh fled or was pushed to Bangkok, where he lived the life of a country gentleman and orchid fancier, we unquestionably supported him. If Thieu gets out alive, good old Sam The Man will be picking up his tabs. Maybe for life.

The bills for the Vietnam war will still be coming in for a long time. As President, LBJ pledged that when the war ended the U.S. would spend a billion dollars rehabilitating both the North and the South. We'll spend a lot more than that, putting back what we bombed away, and for the relief of victims on both sides of the DMZ. As for the pensions of the men who served there, and the payments to the families of those Americans who died, they will last well into the 21st Century.

You have to be terribly rich to make war, or engineer coups d'etat.

★ ★ ★

REMEMBER ALL THOSE nice things the British did for the gang of American tourists who were stranded at Gatwick Airport, London, when their U.S. charter plane company went bust? Happened a couple months ago. The Americans, 122 of them, were a pathetic group. Most of them were broke at this sorry ending of a nice cheap vacation. For three days and nights they lived in a corner of the terminal. Their beds were hard seats or the floor.

They were fed by an office of Social Security at nearby Crawley at a cost of about \$750. British travelers, touched by their plight, gave them money to make phone calls to their relatives in America, brought drinks, diapers and whatnot. A delegation of the strandeers called on the U.S. Embassy and asked for help but were told that there are no funds earmarked to cope with a situation of this type.

Wimpy International, the firm that introduced the hamburger to Britain, put up the money to fly them home. Their fourth and final night in England was a comfortable one, thanks to Grand Metropolitan Hotels, which put them up and picked up all their bills.

Many of the Americans were tear-streaked with gratitude as they boarded their British Caledonian Airways jet for the trip to New York. They swore that they would return the money that had been spent on them by the Social Security Department.

That was two months ago. So far, the office at Crawley has received a total repayment of \$27.50.

24 OCT 1972

In the Absence of Facts, Saigonese Intoxicate Selves on Rumor

By Jacques Leslie
Los Angeles Times

SAIGON, Oct. 23—"Every-one is intoxicated by rumors," a Vietnamese observer said a few hours before Presidential adviser Henry Kissinger left Saigon for Washington Monday.

Indeed, even if Kissinger's six-day visit to Saigon produced no known outcome, it has generated a remarkable quantity of rumors, covering every conceivable turn of the talks.

Even in quieter times, Saigon is a city which thrives on rumors. More often enjoyed than believed, they provide a balance to the bland and sometimes too obviously facile announcements of the government.

But, during the last few days the rumors became obsessional, a psychological release. Here was a time, the rumor-makers seemed to think, when the fate of a country which has been at war for decades was being determined, yet no one knew for sure the substance of the talks. They decided to make up for that.

Rumors Spread

A few weeks ago, a rumor spread that the wife of South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu had left Saigon for Paris with 27 pieces of luggage. Now, with the talks under way and Thieu's hold on the presidency in doubt, another rumor circulated: All his personal mementoes, such as photographs and plaques, had been removed from his living quarters.

Rumors had both Kissinger and Thieu "winning" the talks, while just what either had won was another continual topic of discussion. Kissinger also was frequently suspected of having taken off for a brief, secret trip to Hanoi. As a result, American embassy officials were often questioned on the exact time they had last seen the elusive negotiator.

Rumors ranged from plausible to barely imaginable.

According to one, the recent fighting around Saigon has not, as commonly thought, involved Vietcong. Rather, commandos of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency were said to be spearheading the attacks, hoping to force Thieu into submission at the negotiating table by showing him that his military situation is untenable.

Complexity Breeds Rumors

The complexity of the negotiating points has helped to produce so many rumors. Observers, who include government officials, intelligence experts, politicians, journalists and cab drivers, had a chance to contemplate the vagaries of cease-fire,

tripartite government, constitutional amendments, the makeup of neutralist factions and predictions by various astrologers.

Near the end of the six-day period, journalists seemed to have given up asking for the latest rumors. Meanwhile, they found themselves constantly being asked to explain what was going on.

When one journalist sat down in a Saigon restaurant for a late dinner, he was apologetically approached by the manager, a Frenchman, who said, "Excuse me. We are told nothing. Can you tell us what is happening?" The journalist passed on what he had heard and

was rewarded with a free glass of cognac.

The only certain facts seemed to be who had met with whom, and for how long. This information was given out by the U.S. embassy. Just to make sure, a few reporters stood with binoculars on the route from the embassy to the presidential palace to check official cars as they passed by.

All this has had an odd impact on Saigon residents. They do not have much access to news, particularly with local newspapers some- press code. Government radio and television and ban-

ners around the city de-ounce the concept of coalition government, yet according to the rumors this may come about. At the same time, warnings of a possible Vietcong attack on Saigon are still being made.

Some people have reacted by buying provisions in case of attack. Others take seriously the idea of a cease-fire, and depending on their point of view are either cheered by the prospect of an end to the fighting or depressed by the possibility that Communists will be in the next government. Most go about their business as usual.

For people intimately involved in Kissinger's visit to Saigon, the six days were a tense, exhausting time. Halfway through his visit, one journalist who was being tempted by juicy rumors but had no hard evidence of any kind and found himself waiting for any official word said, "This is very agonizing."

On Monday a small electrical fire broke out in the Saigon bureau of a French news agency. A reporter saw it and yelled, "Stop the fire! Stop the fire!" Those words also mean "cease-fire" in French. The people around him got very excited, for not having seen the blaze, they thought he had a scoop.

Phoenix program under House inquiry

By Richard E. Ward

A congressional subcommittee has charged the Pentagon with failure to investigate charges of war crimes carried out under the U.S.-sponsored Phoenix program in South Vietnam.

The criticism of the Pentagon was made in a report by the House of Representatives Foreign Operations and Government Information subcommittee, which noted that many of the so-called "Vietcong" killed under the Phoenix "pacification" program were innocent civilians. The report also expressed reservations about U.S. support for a program that "allegedly included torture, murder and inhumane treatment of South Vietnamese civilians."

The report, not approved for public release by the parent Government Operations Committee, was summarized in an Oct. 3 UPI dispatch. According to the news agency, the Department of Defense refused to investigate the charges when they were brought to the attention of high officials.

Public release of the cautiously worded subcommittee report has apparently been delayed because members of the full committee are less than enthusiastic about confronting the issue of U.S. war crimes. In July 1971 at the time of hearings that constituted the basis for the report, two subcommittee members, Rep. Ogden R. Reid (D-N.Y.) and Rep. Paul McCloskey (R-Calif.) charged outright that the Phoenix program had been responsible for "indiscriminate killings" and the illegal imprisonment of thousands in South Vietnam.

In September of this year, during a hearing before the Senate Refugee

subcommittee, a top Defense Department official described the Phoenix program as an intelligence operation. He was challenged by Sen. Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.) in a surprisingly sharp interchange. Kennedy asked how the more than 20,000 "Vietcong" were killed and the witness insisted that the deaths occurred during "military" operations.

'Intelligence operation'?

During the 1971 hearings the House subcommittee heard testimony from William E. Colby who headed the "pacification" effort from mid-1968 to mid-1971. Colby stated that under the Phoenix program 20,587 members of the "Vietcong" infrastructure were killed from 1968 through May 1971.

Colby, who had been a top CIA official before serving in Saigon on assignment from the White House, insisted that the Phoenix program was "entirely a South Vietnamese operation," although he conceded it had been originated by the CIA.

Colby tried to portray the U.S. role as primarily an "advisory" one, but he also admitted that U.S. personnel participated in the naming of suspects and the capture of prisoners. Admitting "occasional" abuses—the assassination of civilians—had occurred, Colby stated that "we put a stop to this nonsense" in collaboration with the Saigon authorities.

With a facade of candor, Colby's testimony actually was riddled with lies about the Phoenix program, which was initiated under President Johnson and expanded by the Nixon administration. Essentially, the Phoenix program attempted to identify and then assassinate cadres of the National Liberation Front, the political leaders on a local level of the

anti-U.S. resistance in South Vietnam.

The program had access to secret CIA funds as well as large appropriations from the U.S. military and economic assistance programs. Assassination teams of mercenaries and U.S. agents who compiled lists of persons to be assassinated were secretly funded.

These aspects of the Phoenix program were revealed in testimony before the same House subcommittee in August 1971 by K. Barton Osborn, who served as an intelligence agent assigned to provide information to the Marines and who also worked for the CIA Phoenix program. Based in Danang, Osborn supervised agent networks for 15 months beginning in 1967.

Osborn contradicted Colby's disclaimers of direct U.S. responsibility for the Phoenix program and made it clear that U.S. personnel participated in murders and tortures. He said U.S. "advisors" were really directing the program.

Osborn also described atrocities he witnessed, including seeing Vietnamese pushed from helicopters, a practice known as "airborne interrogations." He also described how Marine intelligence officers held a Vietnamese woman prisoner in a small cage at their headquarters and starved her to death, refusing to give her either food or water.

These and other examples given by Osborn provide only a small glimpse of the war crimes committed by the U.S. in South Vietnam. The atrocities were an intrinsic part of the Phoenix program directed by the highest U.S. authorities on White House orders. Obviously the Defense Department is not going to investigate these war crimes.

Why No Peace?

The men most responsible for the continuing carnage in Indochina are Nixon, Kissinger and Nguyen Van Thieu, whose role is explored in a just issued 108-page pamphlet, "Aid to Thieu," by Lê Anh Tú and Marilyn McNabb of the American Friends Service Committee, 112 South 16 Street, Philadelphia 19102. Backed by 273 references and notes, the pamphlet is a calm account of tyranny, oppression and mass murder, carried on with vast amounts of American money, military aid and the participation of the CIA. The last paragraph of the text reads:

The demand that the U.S. cease its aid to Thieu is reasonable from the point of view of Vietnamese who want peace and national independence. It is imperative from the point of view of Americans who want to bring this country's expensive and bloody adventure in Indochina to an end.

The Nixon Administration locked itself into an alliance with Thieu at a time when that seemed the only alternative to military defeat. With his four "no's," Thieu is now the principal obstacle to a negotiated peace. Getting rid of him is the problem of Nixon and Kissinger. If they persist in keeping Thieu in power no other conclusion can be drawn than that they are determined to win the war militarily, regardless of the moral and material consequences to the American and Indochinese people.

14 OCT 1972

*International***Terrorism, genocide and strategic bombing**

By JOHN PITTMAN

If the outlawing of strategic bombing is not on the agenda of forthcoming conferences on disarmament, it should be. The experience of the United States aerial warfare in Indochina confirms the experience of the Korean War and the Second World War that strategic bombing is essentially a means of terror and genocide, and that its effect on the military outcome of a conflict is minor.

During seven and a half years of bombing Indochina, the U.S. Air Force dropped three and a half times more tons of bombs than were dropped by all the Allied Powers in all the theaters of the Second World War.

Yet, a military victory for the United States and its Saigon puppet regime is not in sight, while Saigon is now threatened with encirclement.

In both Korea and Indochina the U.S. Air Force has had full command of the air. Neither the North Koreans nor the Indochinese have been able successfully to challenge the U.S. control of their air space, although North Vietnam's defenses have become formidable.

In both cases, the U.S. Air Force slaughtered thousands of civilians, mainly children, women and the elderly. In Indochina the extensive use of napalm, poisonous chemical defoliants, and anti-personnel bombs produced biocidal results, that is, the extermination of all living things.

Military analysts draw a distinction between strategic bombing and the use of air power as an auxiliary arm of the army and navy. The distinction is pointed up by the contrast between the U.S. and British use of air power and that of the Soviet armed forces in World War II.

Military historians note that the Red Army never employed strategic bombing, but used its

air power for purposes of aerial reconnaissance and as a form of artillery supporting the troops. On the other hand, the English and Americans cold-bloodedly dropped tons of bombs on heavily populated cities, as in the case of Dresden, to terrify the people, drive the workers out of their homes, and hopefully bring about a reduction in the Nazi arms production.

Yet, except for the distorters of the war's history who falsely claim that the U.S.-British alliance won the war in Europe, it is generally known that the Nazi war machine was smashed on the Eastern Front. And although the Nazis also employed strategic bombing with genocidal effects against the Soviet Union, they went down to defeat before the onrushing might of the Red Army.

Strategic bombing fails to discriminate between civilian and military personnel and installations. Hospitals, churches, schools and the homes of workers and peasants are wantonly destroyed. Civilians who survive are driven in flight to refugee centers. Some eight million or more Indochinese have now been herded into such centers or pacification zones, where they are subjected to CIA supervision and control by Thieu's police.

What is more, strategic bombing has been used mainly by highly industrialized imperialist powers against underdeveloped small peoples seeking independence from colonialism and neo-colonialism. Nowadays the Portuguese colonialists are using strategic bombing, along with napalm, phosphorous bombs, defoliants and anti-personnel bombs perfected in Indochina and passed on via NATO. Their victims are the peoples of Mozambique, Angola and Guinea-Bissau who are seeking to throw off the yoke of colonialism.

Who knows what small "Third World" country, striving to

strike off chains of imperialism, will be the next victim of an imperialist bombing attack? Will it be South Yemen, Chile, Somalia, Burma, Syria, Peru?

Clearly, it is in the interest of the national liberation movements of "Third World" countries that the bombing of strategic bombing should become part of the struggle for disarmament.

To claim, as the Maoists do, that "Third World" peoples have no interest in disarmament, is to speak nonsense. In view of the growing poverty gap between the developing countries and the developed industrial countries, what "Third World" country will be able to construct effective air defenses against bombing raids of which the United States, Britain, France and even South Africa are capable?

There should be no illusions concerning the scruples—now or as long as imperialism dominates U.S. society—of the generals and politicians responsible for the destruction of life in Indochina. Typical of Nixon was his hypocritical call for an international treaty against terrorism at the very moment of his escalation of the B-52 strategic bombing raids against Vietnam.

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ceutary," presumably including napalm-type weapons which the U.S. has defined as being outside the 1925 Geneva Protocol. Then there is \$7.3-million for "Miscellaneous Defensive Equipment," a category that received only \$900,000 in 1970. Obviously, these vague categories can conceal a multitude of materials.

(Anyone who doubts the military capacity for blatant evasion of Presidential directives might refer to an official government history, *Science and the Air Force*, published in 1966. At one time, the book points out, the Bureau of the Budget decreed that the Air Force could no longer spend money on basic research. Research spending was continued nonetheless—by charging the costs off to development of a new bomber. "For all the Budget Bureau knew," the book gloats, "the \$4.7-million it approved was for research connected with the development of this aircraft, clearly within the realm of applied research. But in reality, this money was handed over to OSR [Office of Scientific Research] to use, as originally planned, for basic research.")

While Mr. Nixon may well be credited with cautious good intentions concerning CBW, the military apparently is having trouble kicking the habit. It is puzzling that the administration itself chooses to interpret the 1925 Geneva Protocol as exempting tear gases and herbicides; in this regard McGeorge Bundy, in the course of his continuing descent from the hawkish role that he occupied as President Johnson's national security adviser, told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in March 1971:

"Useful as herbicides and tear gas have been in particular situations in Southeast Asia, I know of no senior military commander who would claim that in the wide perspective of the course of the war as a whole their value has been at all critical. In General Westmoreland's authoritative book-length report on his military operations between January 1964 and June 1968, there is only the briefest reference to herbicides and riot control agents. Seen in perspective, they are clearly marginal instruments."

As far as herbicides are concerned, Bundy's point is supported by a still-unreleased study of herbicide usage in Vietnam, conducted by the Army Corps of Engineers. The three-volume work, one volume of which is classified secret while the others are in the "official use only" category, indicates that commanders in Vietnam place little military value on the use of herbicides. Although the battlefield use of tear gas may figure in War College scenarios, experience in Vietnam has demonstrated that the enemy can easily equip his troops with, or train them to improvise, breathing apparatus that renders the gas ineffective. Why, then, does the military persist in retaining the option for herbicides and tear gas, continue to reinforce its capability for chemical warfare, and though the matter is uncertain, to dabble further with biological agents?

The answer is twofold: As Soviet-American arms agreements tend toward effective restrictions on the development of ultimate weapons, the military value of other weapons systems rises commensurately, just as the banning of firearms would elevate the military value of bows and arrows. And, as is clear from public indifference to the savage air offensive that has replaced American ground operations in Vietnam, the problem is not to avoid war; rather, it is to avoid shedding any great amount of American blood. Hence, in the age of the nuclear standoff, the Pentagon is looking hard for highly lethal, non-nuclear, low-manpower systems that satisfy both military necessity and public opinion. And CBW, Presidential protestations notwithstanding, fits in nicely with that quest.

Negotiations for arms-control agreements with the Soviets have frequently foundered on the issue of inspection, with the U.S. in-

sisting that its own inspectors, or perhaps an international group, have the right to conduct on-the-spot checks of compliance. Yet back home, the U.S. government seems unconcerned about verifying whether its army is in fact abiding by Presidential directives to engage only in "defensive" research. The Executive's disregard for Congress in military and foreign affairs has been so thoroughly demonstrated as to eliminate any realistic prospect for defective Congressional scrutiny. When Congress has questioned the military use of weather, modification in Southeast Asia, for example, Defense's long-standing reply has been, in effect, that it is none of your business.

If there is ever an inspection agreement with the Soviets on CBW, it will have an ironic benefit: The American public will have reason to believe government accounts of what is going on in U.S. military laboratories.

AID TO THIEU

Mr. GRAVEL, Mr. President, there has been a great deal of controversy over whether or not the United States should continue its programs of military and economic aid to the South Vietnamese Government of President Nguyen Van Thieu. It is a question of central importance to the peace negotiations in Paris, and the answer finally given will be crucial to the direction U.S. foreign policy following in the future.

In spite of the great importance the resolution of this issue one way or the other will have, very few Americans are actually aware of the extent of this aid or the purposes it serves. Recognizing this lack of information, Le Anh Tu and Marilyn McNabb of National Action/Research on the Military-Industrial Complex have prepared a special report entitled "Aid to Thieu", which traces the history of U.S. aid to South Vietnam as well as the ongoing day-to-day programs in that country which U.S. dollars finance. I think members of the Senate and their constituents will find this report of interest, and I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the report was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

AID TO THIEU
DEADLOCK ON AID

The Paris peace talks often ridiculed as "propaganda forums," have actually revealed many areas of agreement. The United States, the Saigon government, the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam¹ (called the "Vietcong" in the American press) and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam ("Hanoi") all agree in principle to the withdrawal of U.S. forces, the release of war prisoners, internationally supervised free elections, and even to a coalition government.

Yet the talks are deadlocked. One question remains unresolved: should the U.S. continue its aid to Thieu? The PRG insists that this aid must be stopped. The U.S. is equally stubborn. Both parties feel that their vital interests are involved on what might appear to be a minor issue.

To clarify the dispute over aid to Thieu, this paper will review U.S. assistance programs in South Vietnam. Special attention will be paid to projects that are considered to be of high priority by the U.S. We will attempt to describe the effects of these pro-

grams on the Vietnamese people for whom they are designed, and to determine how much the U.S. has spent on these projects. The U.S.-sponsored programs are well known to Vietnamese but not so familiar to American citizens who pay for them.

Our main source of information is the hearings held each year in Congress to examine how American taxpayers' dollars are spent in Vietnam. Supplementary sources include U.S. government publications and news reports from Saigon and Western newspapers.

2. THE SPRING ROUND-UPS

Most news reports on the spring 1972 offensive told of dramatic military clashes. Less mention was made of certain actions taken by the Thieu government which were made possible only by U.S. aid.

While U.S. bombers were pounding the contested and "enemy"-controlled areas of Vietnam, Thieu's police, accompanied by American advisers,² were rounding up thousands of suspected "Communist sympathizers" in the so-called "secure" areas.³ The spring offensive increased the regime's fear of trouble from internal dissenters. On May 26, 1972 the Buddhist Student Association in Saigon announced the arrest and imprisonment of the entire leadership of many student organizations and civil rights groups in South Vietnam.⁴ Relatives of known political activists have also been taken into custody, and held as hostages.⁵

A former New York Times Saigon correspondent and veteran observer of the war, Tom Fox, describes the far-reaching effects of this crackdown:

"Nearly everyone known to have been an outspoken critic of the Thieu government—and not protected by international recognition—has suffered at the hands of the powerful National Police in recent weeks.

"In Hue alone, more than 1500 have been arrested and most have been taken to Con Son prison island, an island which for decades has confined critics of French and American supported governments. Women and children have been rounded up among the 'political suspicious'—and taken by police to Con Son.

"We've arrested the entire student body of Hue," Hoang Duc Nha, President Thieu's press secretary recently stated flatly. . .

"In many cases people have been arrested solely because they have relatives in the NLF or in North Vietnam. . .

"A lower house Deputy from a Delta province said the police have come into villages and picked up men in their eighties who have not left their home for years, forcing them into small prison cells. 'Even village and hamlet chiefs and officers in the Saigon army are being arrested and interrogated,' he added."⁶

The ground for these arrests, having "Communist sympathies," are broadly interpreted. They extend to all political opponents of the Thieu regime, especially those having credibility and influence with the general populace. Those arrested include student organizers, religious leaders, and newspaper editors.

"In Longxuyen Province, an area dominated by the Hoa Hao religious sect, several hundred university students held a rally to protest a decree under which most of them would be drafted. Although anti-American banners were displayed—"The students and people will not die for the interests of the imperialists"—the police did not intervene. Later, however, leaders of the rally were reportedly arrested.

"Other arrests of student leaders appear to have had little to do with public demonstrations.

"A Roman Catholic priest in Saigon said he conservatively estimated that nine local leaders of the Catholic Labor Youth Movement had been arrested and that half a

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Lon Nol's dilemma


By Edith Lenart

Paris: President Richard Nixon wrote a personal letter to his Cambodian counterpart, Lon Nol, shortly after last month's National Assembly elections, asking the Marshal to nominate a vice-president and to include Opposition members in the new government. What had already disturbed the White House was the fact that Lon Nol had not bothered to take a running mate: the Cambodian Constitution invests much power in the president, and Lon Nol is a very sick man. The Americans were disturbed further when Sirik Matak and In Tam — leaders of the Republican and Democratic parties respectively — decided to boycott the poll because they considered the electoral law unconstitutional.

If President Nixon's demand for a multi-party government upset the Lon Nol-Lon Non duo's plan to consolidate their position, his request for a vice-president doubtless gave them splitting headaches. Apart from Nixon's need to see a more efficient and representative government in Phnom Penh, his demand for a vice-presidential nominee may indicate a desire to prepare Cambodia for the possibility of a negotiated settlement to the Indochina War.

The choice of a vice-president and important Cabinet figures involves personal, clan and party interests: who can be useful, who can be trusted and who can be manipulated. There would appear to be four candidates for the vice-presidency: Son Ngoc Thanh, Sirik Matak, In Tam and Au Chhloe.

If the political scene in fundamental-ly apolitical Cambodia is highly complicated, Son Ngoc Thanh's position seems




Sirik Matak; In Tam; ailing Lon Nol:
Letter from Washington.

even more so. Born in what is now South Vietnam, he is remembered for his anti-French and pro-Japanese position; his anti-monarchy stand; his co-operation with the Vietminh; his long exile in Saigon; and his connections with the CIA. Although he is currently Prime Minister, it is not clear whether he is working for the Lon Nol-Lon Non combination or simply using it for his own ends. Apparently he has the backing of a group of Phnom Penh republicans and intellectuals who would rather have an accommodation with the Khmer Rouge than see Norodom Sihanouk back in Cambodia; this group has been encouraged by Soviet promises that, in the event of a settlement, Moscow will see to it that North Vietnamese and NLF forces withdraw and that Sihanouk does not return to the country.

Sirik Matak's position is much clearer. Considered an agile politician and a capable administrator in Cambodian terms, he has the backing of business interests and some sectors of the military as well as that of the Americans, the Japanese and the French. Because he is a member of the Sisowath branch of the royal family, the republicans suspect him of royalist leanings — if not for Sihanouk, then for himself.

This leaves In Tam and Au Chhloe. In Tam, a former general, has considerable popular support — especially in the countryside — because he is a simple and honest man who fought side-by-side with the people instead of directing the



war from an armchair in Phnom Penh. But since he has no political or clan backing, he would have to fall in with one of the other contenders for political power. Au Chhloe has little to recommend him; an adviser to Lon Nol, he served Sihanouk in several cabinets. Should he be chosen as vice-president, the post would be deprived of every vestige of power.

SOUTH VIETNAM

Strangling the ICC

By Benjamin Cherry

Saigon: "We are ready for a ceasefire [but] to secure against the communists taking advantage of such a ceasefire, there must be conditions and the most important is the setting up of an international control committee." On the day President Nguyen Van Thieu made this remark in a speech to government officials, professors and students at Saigon University's Faculty of Medicine last week, the last members of the Indian delegation to the existing International Control Commission were leaving Saigon for their new headquarters — Hanoi.

Friction between the Indian delegation and the South Vietnamese Government came to a head in January when New Delhi raised its diplomatic mission in Hanoi to embassy level, while declin-

continued

KING AND COMRADE

Prince Norodom Sihanouk, the ruler of Cambodia deposed in 1970, has not followed other ex-kings into idle and luxurious exile in the south of France. Instead he is leading an active political life in Peking, a Prince among the People, rallying his country behind the guerrillas who are fighting to overthrow the Right-wing regime at present controlling Cambodia. *Mo Teitelbaum* reports on the changed life and times of this descendant of God-kings who is now a fêted comrade of Chairman Mao

Early in the morning of May 19, 1970, a more than usually sombre Alexei Kosygin and Cambodia's jovial Head of State, Prince Norodom Sihanouk, were in a car heading for Moscow airport. Sihanouk, who had been on a brief visit to the Soviet Union, was about to leave on a similar trip to China. For Kosygin it must have been an intensely uneasy ride. News had already reached him of the coup d'état that had shaken Cambodia the day before - a coup designed specifically to depose Sihanouk and reverse his politics of neutrality. It was not until they actually reached the airport and the Russian leader was certain that the Prince would definitely board the plane for Peking that he shared his secret with Sihanouk. The Soviet Chairman must have been well aware that the Right-wing, military instigators of the coup, led by General Lon Nol, had let out the bath-water and he was determined not to be left holding the baby. Let's see how the Chinese comrades cope with this one, he must have thought.

The Chinese have shown a remarkable ability to embrace the glaring contradictions raised by the presence in their midst of the descendant of Cambodia's God-kings - the incomparable, irrepressible, unpredictable, laughing and volcanic prince who for nearly three decades ruled his country as an anxious but determinedly individualistic mother figure and a spring. The exile of Sihanouk is not

that of a Farouk, not the last desperate pleasure-seeking whirl of night-club life in Western capitals with no hope of return to the mother-country. Time and circumstances are on Sihanouk's side. He is still young. In spite of the long and sensational role he has played in political life, October 22 will be only his 50th birthday. Besides which, guided by his stubbornly optimistic nature, he has chosen not to resign himself, but to fight.

It looks as if the time is fast approaching when Sihanouk will be able to return to his country. He is convinced of it, and the Chinese tend to regard his stay with them as akin to that of de Gaulle in London during the war. The comparison fits in more ways than one. Sihanouk's relationship to Cambodia has always had much of the nationalistic, paternalistic passion which de Gaulle fostered for France - both of them finding it extremely difficult to separate their identity from that of the State.

Hardly a month goes by in Peking without some public tribute to the prince. Portraits of the veteran Marxist-Leninist hero, Mao Tse-tung, hang beside those of the descendant of the Lord of the Universe, Sihanouk. At official banquets, the rather austere Prime Minister of the People, Chou En-lai, is often to be found seated next to the cheerful, Cambodian comrade. The former is the world used to jet around the world now

confines himself to journeys between Peking, Hanoi and Pyongyang. He does so, as always, with a smile. His sense of humour has not deserted him, nor has he abandoned his habitual frankness. The thoughts of Sihanouk, intensely personal and often outrageous, make a striking contrast with the thoughts of Chairman Mao. He is no Communist and the Chinese know this. He admits to a profound confusion over Marxist ideology, a tendency to lose himself in what he sees as the complex maze of differences between contending schools of thought. His own Socialism is compounded of a mixture of Buddhism, anti-Imperialism and a totally subjective, fierce love of Cambodia.

He has, nevertheless, chosen to act as the unifying symbol of the revolutionary guerrilla forces which are, at the moment, literally rocketing ahead in their bid to break the present regime in Phnom Penh. So Sihanouk's closest friends and allies now come not from international court circles but from the Marxist International.

The combination of royal determination and peasant resistance is wreaking havoc with the already enfeebled government in

continued

Cornell Author Disputes N. Vietnamese Bloodbath

By George C. Wilson
Washington Post Staff Writer

A charge by President Nixon and others that the North Vietnamese murdered up to 500,000 of their own people when they took over the country in the 1950s is a "myth," according to a study circulated yesterday by Cornell University.

The charges are dispatched in a 59-page essay by D. Gareth Porter, a 30-year-old research associate at Cornell's international-relations of East Asia project. Cornell's project office, in sending out the report, said it deserves "immediate, widespread public attention" because of Mr. Nixon's frequent references to the alleged bloodbath in North Vietnam.

"This bloodbath myth is the result of a deliberate propaganda campaign by the South Vietnamese and U.S. governments to discredit" North Vietnam, Porter says in summarizing the paper he researched in South Vietnam and at Cornell. Porter has been a critic of the Vietnam war.

The prime source for President Nixon, author Bernard Fall and others in describing the alleged massacre during the North Vietnamese land reform from 1953 to 1956 is a book guilty of "gross misquotation" and "fraudulent documentation," Porter alleges.

The book Porter cites is entitled, "From Colonialism to Communism," by Hoang Van Chi. Chi's book—published in 1964—was financed and promoted by such U.S. agencies as the Central Intelligence Agency, according to Porter.

Chi, now a course chairman in Southeast Asia orientation at the State Department's Washington Training Center, was at Ft. Bragg, N.C., lecturing and could not be reached for comment yesterday.

The National Security Council cited Chi's book as one of President Nixon's sources for declaring on April 16, 1971, "I think of a half a million, by conservative estimates, in North Vietnam who were murdered or otherwise exterminated by the North Vietnam-

ese after they took over from the South . . ."

The President added at that same news conference that "if the United States were to fail in Vietnam, if the Communists were to take over, the bloodbath that would follow would be a blot on this nation's history from which we would find it very difficult to return . . ."

Asked by Porter to document the President's "half a million" figure, the National Security Council quoted Chi as writing the following: "The guilt complex which haunted the peasants' minds after the massacre of about 5 per cent of the total population . . ." The National Security Council added on its own that "5 per cent of the total population of North Vietnam at that time would be about 700,000."

"Mr. Chi offers no justification for this allegation" that 5 per cent of the North Vietnamese population was murdered, asserts Porter, "but he suggests at one point that most of the deaths were those of children who starved 'owing to the isolation policy.'"

Charges Porter: "This is yet another of the many wholly unsubstantiated charges put forth by Mr. Chi, for there was no such policy of isolating families, even of those landlords sentenced for serious crimes during the land reform . . ."

"Yet it is mainly on the basis of Mr. Chi's totally unreliable account, the intention of which was plainly not historical accuracy but propaganda against" North Vietnam, says Porter, "that the President of the United States himself has told the American people that 'a half a million' people were exterminated."

In contrast to CIA's description of Chi as a "former Vietminh cadre" who could thus be expected to have firsthand knowledge of the land reform program, Porter asserts that Chi was never a party member before leaving the North for South Vietnam in 1955.

"Mr. Chi was himself a rela-

tively wealthy landowner," Porter claims on the basis of an interview with Chi. Thus, he argues, Chi could not be expected to give an unbiased account of the land reform program.

Western authors like Fall, says Porter, suffered a "critical" shortcoming because they could not read Vietnamese and thus could not research the original documents the North Vietnamese used to communicate with their own cadre. Fall and others, therefore, had to rely on Saigon and U.S. government summaries of the North Vietnamese material or on authors like Chi. (Porter reads Vietnamese and said in an interview that this enabled him to study documents that went to North Vietnamese cadre from party leaders.)

In an attempt to show the danger relying on summaries and other secondary sources, Porter charges Chi distorted a North Vietnamese party (Lao-dong Party) slogan by saying it included the phrase, "liquidate the landlords." There was no such phrase, Porter asserts. Instead, he alleges, the slogan said: "Abolish the feudal regime of land ownership in a manner that is discriminating, methodical and under sound leadership."

He charges Chi also mistranslated Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap's speech of Oct. 29, 1956, on land reform. Giap, according to the Chi's translation, said the party "executed too many honest people" and came to regard torture as normal practice.

Comparing the Vietnamese original text of Giap's speech with the Chi and Porter translations (which Porter said other scholars and Vietnamese corroborated), Porter alleges that "Mr. Chi's translation is one of his most flagrant abuses of documentary evidence."

Donald Brewster is the National Security Council staffer (on loan there from AID) who discussed the source of Mr. Nixon's bloodbath figures with Porter. Brewster told The

Washington Post yesterday that real and literal meanings of Communist statements are sometimes two different things.

Brewster added that the sources he cited for Porter "are not the totality" of the material the White House relied upon. Also, said Brewster, it is the trend that is most important, not specific figures. In that sense, he said, the trend of Communist actions, such as North Vietnamese assassinations in Hue, shows fears of a bloodbath in South Vietnam are indeed well founded, just as President Nixon has stated.

Porter himself said in an interview that he has filed for conscientious objector status and would decline to serve in the military in the Vietnam war. He is on a year-long fellowship, \$5,000 for the academic year, in pursuit of his doctorate at Cornell's East Asia research center.

STATINTL

'THE GREEDY WAR'

STATINTL

FRED J. COOK

Mr. Cook, a long-time contributor to The Nation, is the author of many books, including the recently published The Nightmare Decade: The Life and Times of Senator Joe McCarthy (Random House).

The most damning document to come out of the war in Vietnam has now struggled into the light in this election year. It was indeed a struggle: the disclosures were squelched for years by the highest arms of the American bureaucracy; the pith of the message was ignored by the Senate subcommittee, headed by Abraham Ribicoff, which exposed the PX scandals; the revelations were verified by one of *Life's* top journalists—and pushed aside in favor of the incident on the bridge at Chappaquiddick; the truth set forth was too much for major American publishing houses, and in the end was published in Great Britain, coming to the American market on the rebound through the David McKay Company.

This bombshell is *The Greedy War*, a 278-page book written by the British journalist James Hamilton-Paterson

and detailing the Vietnamese experiences of Cornelius Hawkrige, a dedicated anti-Communist who spent seven and a half horrible years in Russian and Hungarian prison camps before escaping to the United States. Hawkrige and Hamilton-Paterson call the war greedy and the contents of this book fully justify the epithet. Hawkrige was born in Transylvania, the son of a Hungarian mother and a British father, a colonel in the Hungarian police force. His passionate hatred of communism and the Russians led him into protests and guerrilla actions—and into those long years in prison. He came to America believing all the dogmas of the cold war and eager to aid as a security officer in what he considered a holy crusade.

The Dominican upheaval in 1965, in which Hawkrige could not find the Communists President Lyndon B. Johnson assured us we were opposing, was the first disillusionment. Then came Vietnam. Hawkrige's first day in the field there in 1966 was a shocker. He had his nose rubbed immediately in the stinking squalor of the refugee camps of Qui Nhon. More than 2,000 refugees were living in paper shacks built largely of discarded American packing cases. Three contaminated wells provided the only drinking water. There were no sanitary facilities. "The inmates defecated between the rows of paper homes and the slow seep of ordure crept up the pulp walls." Hawkrige asked a priest what had happened to all the USAID. "Stolen," the priest said simply. "It's taken by the Vietnamese Government."

Hawkrige soon discovered that virtually everything was being stolen. Only the smallest trickle of supplies and war matériel being shipped to Vietnam in such prodigious, multibillion-dollar amounts ever reached their intended destinations. The Qui Nhon marketplace, an area of a good-sized block next to the refugee camp, was stocked with "C-rations, K-rations, drink, clothing, guns, cannons, shells, cases of grenades, television sets, washing machines . . . the mounds seemed limitless." So Hamilton-

Paterson writes describing Hawkrige's discoveries. "Wondering what limits there were he asked a Vietnamese stallholder whether he could buy a tank. Tanks are a bit difficult right now, this man admitted, but how about some armored personnel carriers? Or helicopters, of course. Or how about a heavy-duty truck?"

What the hell goes on?, Hawkrige thought. And he rushed to tell American authorities what he had found. They were bland, uninterested. Washington, in its holy-crusade delusion, had concluded agreements with the South Vietnamese that tied the hands of any security agent who tried to put an end to the national pastime—wholesale looting. Two provisions were critical: trucks could be driven only by South Vietnamese drivers; and only South Vietnamese police could make arrests. Even if an American security agent like Hawkrige trapped hijackers in the act, he was forbidden to lay a finger on them; he had to call in the South Vietnamese police. And when they arrived, they simply collaborated in the looting.

Here, in capsule form, are some of the things Hawkrige learned and some of his experiences:

¶South Vietnam all but sank into the sea under the weight of the tons of black-and-white television sets, radios, spin driers, untaxed diamonds and other commodities produced by a society of conspicuous consumption and shipped off to Vietnam to win what must be one of the most curious wars in history.

¶The port of Qui Nhon was clogged with shipping, a fleet that spread out to the horizon. Some of the ships waited for months to unload; meanwhile small boats plied out to them in the night and sometimes in the day; and so, when they finally reached a pier, some 60 per cent of their cargoes had vanished.

¶The United States shipped enough cement into South Vietnam to pave the entire nation, but there was a chronic shortage of cement to extend airfield runways and erect facilities. And the Vietcong always had a superabundance with which to build their individual bomb shelters.

¶On one occasion a truck containing several hundred TV sets was hijacked, tracked down in Tu Duc and turned over to the South Vietnamese police. Hawkrige went to reclaim this U.S. property, but was told he would have to get a Vietnamese driver to take the truck away. By the time he had found a driver, the truck had been stripped of its contents right in the police compound.

¶One night Hawkrige was following a hijacked truck, mystified because the Vietnamese were ripping open packages in disgust and tossing them into ditches at the roadside. Hawkrige kept stopping and picking up the packages. They were a consignment of aircraft parts for fighter squadrons at Bien Hoa. When Hawkrige arrived at the air base, he was hailed almost as a savior because several jets had been grounded for lack of spare parts.

¶Another time, Hawkrige chased a hijacked truck right into a compound belonging to the South Vietnamese Security Police. The panicked driver sped across the compound, forgetting there was a river on the other side, and braked to a halt at the last second with the front wheels

continued

Seoul's Hired Guns

by James Otis

THE AMERICAN SOLDIERS who work with them in Vietnam speak respectfully of the "ROK Marines." Technically, ROK indicates their place of origin—the Republic of Korea (South Korea). But the Americans utter the term as if it were "Rock," and as though it referred to their physical conditioning and the state of their sensibilities: as soldiers they are brutal, licentious and they get results. Militarily, they are trusted by the American high command, which—in the current fighting—has assigned them the responsibility of keeping the vital An Khe Pass open and preventing South Vietnam from being split in half. Some 37,000 of these troops are presently engaged in South Vietnam. Referred to pretentiously as "allies," their involvement is said to arise from ideological commitment to the cause of freedom, national self-interest, or some other self-serving platitude. In fact, they are latter-day Samurai, hired guns of the Orient, who have sold their services to Washington for the duration.

To be specific, the normal salary of a ROK army private is \$1.60 a month. But if that private elects to serve in Vietnam, he can earn 23 times that amount, or \$37.50 a month. In one day, he earns almost as much as he would have made in a whole month had he remained in his homeland—courtesy, to be sure, of the American taxpayer. The middleman of this operation is the government of South Korea, which receives a kickback of well over \$300 million per year for the service.

Such "allies" are to mercenaries what a "protective reaction raid" is to an unprovoked strike and what an "incursion" is to an invasion—namely, the same thing.

For some time now, persistent reports have linked these mercenary Koreans to brutalities in Vietnam which would make Rusty Calley blush. In June, the *Alternative Feature Service* (AFS) of Berkeley, California released a heretofore secret study by the RAND Corporation. "Mention of Korean Troop

Activities in RAND Interviews," and thereby made public what the American government has known for at least six years. The 1966 document is replete with these stories of barbarity which Americans have learned how to take in and ignore:

• "When they came to the VC-controlled areas . . . they raped the women in those areas. There were times they killed the women after they had raped them. I heard just recently women were raped and killed. The people were so frightened of the Korean troops, they didn't dare to stay in their homes but moved away." (from a National Liberation Front deserter)

• ". . . only 50 villagers still lagged behind. Most of them were women, children and elderly people. The Korean soldiers rounded them up in one place. The people thought that they were to be evacuated to the GVN-controlled areas by helicopters. . . . The Koreans suddenly pointed their guns at the crowd and opened fire. Only two babies of two and three survived. They crawled on their mothers' bellies." (from a refugee)

• ". . . when the Korean troops came, they called all the old women and children down in the trenches to come up. Then these people were told to sit in circles. Afterward, the Korean troops machine-gunned them." (from an NLF prisoner)

• "Everybody agreed that the Koreans were barbarous. They went on operations without interpreters going along. They killed at random without distinguishing between the rights and wrongs. Some people said it was because the VC mixed themselves with the villagers, and thus the Koreans couldn't help making a mistake. I don't think their reasoning was right. I don't

see why the Koreans should kill the children. Kids of two, three, or even five or seven years weren't VC. They also burned the paddy and the people's houses. They burned the cow pens and the animals inside too. Cows are certainly not VC!" (from a refugee)

The introduction to the document notes that "no effort has been made to ascertain the veracity of the statements made by the interviewees." And AFS quotes former RAND analyst Melvin Gurtov as saying that the report was "a draft circulated for comments . . . as opposed to a published study." It would be a mistake to surmise, however, that this report outlines the full extent of the U.S. government's information about South Korean murders in Vietnam. On the contrary, American officials have received at least three other major reports on the subject.

On January 10, 1970, A. Terry Rambo, a graduate student at the University of Hawaii, told the *New York Times* that he had reported the extensive killing of civilians by South Korean troops to U.S. Army officers in Vietnam in 1966, but the information had been suppressed. Rambo and two colleagues, Jerry M. Tinker and John D. Lenoir, were researchers for Human Sciences Research (HSR), Inc., McLean, Virginia, on a refugee interview project for the Pentagon's Advanced Research Projects Agency.

Rambo took the atrocity information to American officials in Vietnam. He briefed a "group of ranking American officers in Saigon about the report." The result: Rambo was "ordered by a general officer of the MACV [Military Assistance Command, Vietnam] staff to cease investigating the Koreans—and no mention of it was to be made in our reports."

The Rambo team prepared two reports, one without atrocity information, one with it. This was done, according to Tinker, because they "knew that if our report contained anything about murders it would be classified

September 1972

by TOM SCHUSTER

THE CIA'S WAR WITH RED CHINA AND OTHER ASIAN LANDS

THE OLD WORLD WAR TWO C-46 bounced and yawed in the violent turbulence as its twin engines strained to maintain 160 knots. Its American pilot gripped the controls with every ounce of strength he could muster, and his eyes ached from the strain of searching the darkness to avoid the towering Himalayan mountains on each side.

They'd taken off from a secret base over three hours ago and were threading their way east of the Tibetan capital of Lhasa, long occupied by the forces of Red China. Their mission: drop agents and supplies to a band of Tibetan guerrillas who were still fighting the Communists.

The copilot, sweating over the air chart in his lap, tried to guide them to the drop zone that a mysterious American "civilian" at their base had earlier described. "Hold your course," he yelled. "Another two minutes should put us right on."

The pilot reached up, flicking on the "get-ready" light to alert the Tibetan agents who'd be jumping, and the plane crew who would kick the supplies out. "Go!" he yelled and switched on the buzzer.

Just as the last chute opened, the old plane was suddenly rocked by deadly Communist 37mm antiaircraft fire and the pilot cursed to himself, "Goddam—

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bastards were waiting for us."

But he managed to drop down and contour fly the valley floors, below the Red radar, and just after dawn they landed back at their base. They climbed from the plane, their gray uniforms soaked through with sweat, and the pilot

muttered for the thousandth time, "There's gotta be an easier way to make a buck." The C-46 was ancient, but its skin had been polished to shine like a mirror. Back toward the tail were small blue letters that spelled out "Air America." The only other identifying marks were the fresh 37mm holes in the left wing panels.

Throughout Asia, people have come to recognize these strange aircraft and their even stranger American pilots. Especially the pilots. You learn to spot them wherever you are. They're the guys in the gray Air Force-type uniforms, crushed caps, cowboy boots, with pistols hanging at their sides. They can be found raising hell in the Suzy Wong section of Hong Kong or racing motor bikes along Tu Do Street in Saigon or joking with the girls at the Vieng Rattay Club in Vientiane. They're the pilots of the cloak and dagger Air America, one of the world's least known airlines. Many are "old China hands" who first began flying for the "outfit" back when mainland China belonged to Chiang Kai-shek. They're the last of that breed known as soldiers of fortune, and these devil-may-care mercenaries will

continued

14 Aug 1972

in the shadow of the american embassy in Saigon

STATINTL

Editor's note. — The Nixon administration has been striving to foster the Nguyen Van Thieu regime as a tool for the "Vietnamization" of the war. But no glossy veneer can hide the latter's nature as a traitorous clique, a gang of robbers trading in prostitutes, drugs and war means, a band of political speculators, black-marketeers and embezzlers who have been plundering "aid" funds and the salaries and wages of their own civil servants and soldiers — all this under American protection. The following inquiry by Thanh Nam exposes part of this corrupt and rotten US-puppet regime.

SAIGON, in early 1972.

Tens of thousands of Honda and Suzuki motorbikes and Mercedes and Datsun sedans of every colour and hue rush along, belching clouds of exhaust fumes which ruin the foliage and flowers of the trees lining the streets.

The 3.6 million people of Saigon live crowded in eleven districts. High-rise US-style buildings of nine, ten, eleven storeys tower insolently in Dong Khanh and Nguyen Hue avenues while along muddy and refuse-strewn alleys in workers' quarters at Chuong Duong, Binh Dong and Cholon whole families are crammed into shanties of thatch, tin and card-board.

The number of Americans in military uniform has decreased a great deal. More and more snack-bars, Turkish-bath establishments and massage parlors catering to the American soldiery are closing down. American military police continue to stalk about, but in dwindling numbers.

And yet, while the war is being "Vietnamized," the American presence remains intact, overwhelming, in this city. It seems to have grown even heavier, more stifling. The scream of American jets keeps coming from the Tan Son Nhut airfield. Crowds of American civilians and air force officers continue to throng Tu Do boulevard. The American hand, the tricks of old Bunker, the desperate moves of President Nixon to avoid checkmate, as well as the histrionics of Thieu, Huong, Kieu and Co. are still daily topics of discussion for the Saigoneses. People talk about the fiasco staring Nixon in the face, the inevitable departure of Nguyen Van Thieu, the collapse of "Vietnamization." For the last seven or eight years, the Saigoneses people have had their ears full of the "lofty mission of the Americans" in this country and the "stability" of the "Second Republic." More and more clearly, the truth is appearing to them.

The fortress in the city

Everyone in Saigon knows about the new American fortress embassy, Bunker's residence. The old embassy at the corner of Ham Nghi and Vo Di Nguy streets now serves only for the reception of ordinary visitors and the delivery of passports and visas. The new embassy is white-painted and six storeys high, with a helicopter landing strip on its terrace roof; where a chopper and its pilot are standing by at all hours of the day and night. The box-shaped building is set back some distance from the street, surrounded by a solid ferro-concrete wall, equipped with air-conditioners, electronic computers and a hot telephone line linking it to the White House in Washington,

and defended by machinegun nests. It is served by a power-house in the backyard. Military police stand guard day and night. The Americans boast that all building materials came from the United States and that plans were drawn and construction supervised by a renowned American military engineer, at the cost of 2.25 million dollars. In early 1971, in an interview with a French journalist, Bunker bragged about the solidity of this "White House" on the eastern shore of the Pacific. The unimpressed Frenchman replied with a wry smile: "Mr Ambassador, in my opinion, the fortress style of the embassy building suits your name rather than ambassadorial functions." Bunker's face showed that he was not amused by the play on word. In fact, Bunker was no ordinary ambassador and the unusual style of his residence indeed fits his unusual assignment.

Bunker has been in Saigon for six consecutive years. His is the most difficult and dangerous job ever held by an American diplomat in any period of American history. Political circles in Saigon are rife with stories and rumours about the man and the policies he has been pursuing. In spite of his 78 years, Bunker is very fastidious about his clothes, and the expensive *eau de Cologne* he uses vary according to the season and the occasion. He has been, before his appointment to Saigon, ambassador to Argentina, Italy, India and Nepal.

The American press considers him as a skillful trouble-shooter who shows cold toughness not only to his adversaries but also to his allies. Saigon politicians nickname him The Old Fridge, while the Saigon press has dubbed him the Procnsul. His business is to pull the strings on which Nguyen Van Thieu dances, and he seems to perform it well. Even when the going is hard, he knows how to smooth away the obstacles. For instance he would lower his voice and call Thieu by his name (instead of Mr President) and tell him: "The United States is a great country, but one of her foibles is to lack patience. So you should realize that there are limits to American forbearance." Or he would say bluntly: "This has been decided in Washington. Once our President has taken a decision, there is no turning back." Then the only thing Thieu can do is to shut his mouth and stay quiet. If he doesn't, Bunker will have this clincher: "You know, Mr Thieu, Congress has become rather restive. They might reduce or even cancel some of the aid appropriations..." And that settles it.

The above are part of what the world press calls the tactics of pressure and blackmail, the main-spring of American diplomacy.

In fact, "Fridge" Bunker still has one more trick reserved for when Thieu is really intractable. He would smile and give the latter a gentle tap on the shoulder and say softly: "Mr Thieu, we happen to know that you and Mrs Thieu have some personal financial affairs to settle. We should be glad to

help." These comforting words are only said in rare circumstances, and Thieu never fails to report them to Sau, his wife, with joy in his voice. Concrete details are then worked out between a Bunker aide and General Dang Van Quang, security assistant to "President" Thieu and his financial manager. Paltry sums of a few thousand or even a few score thousand dollars can't be haggled about by a "president" personally, can they? When agreement has been reached, a money transfer would be done in favour of one of Thieu's close relatives by some American under the pretence of settling some debt, to one of the bank accounts of the Thieu family in Berne or Rome. In the budget of the American State Department, nearly three hundred million dollars are earmarked each year for such unholy deals. The dollar is a fundamental tool in American foreign policy.

This does not mean that Bunker's generosity can be easily drawn upon. The richer one is, the more niggardly one is likely to be: such is a feature of his society. Besides, Thieu himself can drive a hard bargain. And so, one sometimes sees Bunker's black Cadillac shuttle back and forth between the American embassy and "Independence Palace", some 700 yards distant. The winner in the end is, of course, Bunker, but Thieu never considers himself a loser when, after the old man's departure, he thrusts a hand into his pocket and feels his billfold.

(To be continued)

21 Aug 1972

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2. — THE PENTAGON BY THE CAU BONG CANAL

WHEREAS the new US Embassy on Thong Nhut boulevard employs only a few hundred personnel, the buildings of the American military command in the southeastern part of Tan Son Nhut airfield hum day and night with the activity of over three thousand Americans and Vietnamese of all arms and services. They are the US Pacific Pentagon and serve as headquarters to Westmoreland, then to Abrams and Weyand. The din kicked up by jets and choppers taking off and landing day and night makes the chronic pandemonium reigning at MACV even worse.

Whenever tipsy Americans lurching along Tu Do boulevard clamber aboard blue-painted taxis late at night and bark out: "Macvee!" the driver knows that he is to drive down Cong Ly road, cross the Cau Bong canal and take his passengers to the US Pacific Pentagon.

In spite of its name, United States Military Advisory Command in Viet Nam (USMACV), everyone knows that it is the supreme headquarters of all military forces under American command in all battlefields in Viet Nam and Indochina. Once a colonel of the Operations Department of the MACV petitioned Defense Secretary Melvin Laird that officers in the Pentagon by the Potomac river should be sent here by turns, for "here we are waging war and living in a war atmosphere and are likely to reap useful experience for the US armed forces."

At their clubs here, American officers talk a great deal about their commander, a burly general of the US armoured corps, with a square face and a black cigar sticking out of a corner of his mouth, much less talkative and boastful than Westmoreland but certainly not less ambitious. After Westy's "search and destroy" strategy was shelved, Abrams put forward his own: to launch guerilla style small-unit attacks on the adversary's rear areas. Say MACV American officers: "He uses his forces very sparingly and counts every pound of rice seized from the enemy." Some staff officers make light of his talents and doubt his ability for strategic command, especially since the ill-fated Lam Son 719 operation in Laos. Once an American official told a Vietnamese friend: "Abrams can command a tank squadron, or a division, but not this big war."

This big war is besides not limited to South Viet Nam.

On the the ground floor of this Asian Pentagon, next to the General Situation room, where the war in South Viet Nam is being followed, are the Cambodian and Lao war rooms, and also the North Viet Nam war room under the supervision of an air force colonel of the 7th Air Force. So there are four big wars, which correspond to what the American press has been calling the "four big quagmires of Washington in Southeast Asia."

When one gets to the first floor and walks down the corridor from Room 1b to Room 18b, one will realize that there aren't just four wars for the Americans. In these rooms painted in light ochre and equipped with air-conditioners, rows of duralumin-framed chairs, and all kinds of maps with scales ranging from 1/2,000 to 1/1,000,000, a multitude of wars are being followed: the war by B-52 strategic bombers, the electronic war, the chemical war, the war on the "pacification" front, the intelligence war and the psychological war...

The left wing houses the No. 1 officers' club, reserved for senior officers, from lieutenant-colonels up to generals. The bulk of members are colonels belonging to all arms and services: air force, infantry, navy, marine corps, armoured corps, engineers' corps, signal corps etc.

The place is off limits to all Vietnamese, including President Thieu, Defense Minister Nguyen Van Vy and Chief-of-Staff Cao Van Vien. The only ones admitted here on special occasions are either girlfriends of American generals or Saigon strip-tease artists.

The conversations overhead in the club amidst the clouds of cigarette smoke and the fumes of whisky supply facts that are at odds with those mentioned in MACV communiqués. For instance the following bits could be recorded on a Saturday evening of February 1972: "Those s.o.b.'s (meaning the Saigon troops) at firebases Hotel and Bravo refused to go on patrol outside the camps." — "That general Lam of the First Army Corps doesn't give a damn about military plans. He only seeks to feather his nest in Da Nang." — "Modern weapons entrusted to those loafers who prefer gambling to going to war are wrecked in no time." — "The CIA is purblind and the war is going down the drain in face of an adversary who shows miraculous stamina and resilience before the terrifying firepower of the American air forces..."

In spite of all the nasty words uttered by the Americans concerning the Saigon army, the American troops can't be said to have outshone it. Whenever Abrams gets to the fourth floor and peers into dossiers kept by the Personnel Department, he would feel greatly disheartened. Heroin-addiction among American GIs has increased to a horrifying rate. Fragging is rampant, i.e. the killing by GIs, black and white, of officers they don't like by means of fragmentation grenades. Hundreds of GIs have been disciplined for refusing to go on patrol. Thousands have been jailed for hold-up, theft, rape... There are also the dossiers of 248 American deserters whom the military police have failed so far to track down in spite of the cooperation of the Saigon city police. But some Saigonese know quite a few things about them. They have gone into hiding in slum quarters along the Ben Nghe canal, in teeming Cholon, and even on the northwest fringe of Tan Son Nhut airfield

along what the GIs have been calling "Drunkards Alley." They live there under Vietnamese names, take Vietnamese wives (up to three apiece) who bear them several children, and make a living through smuggling and hold-up, with attendant rape and murder. They are equipped with sub-machineguns and pistols and ally themselves with local toughies in setting up gangs bearing such names as "Skull" and "Zebra," specializing in assassination and abduction and threatening the lives and security of people in all eleven districts of the city. That is the only success so far of "Vietnamization" in Saigon.

While the Asian Pentagon hums with frantic activity, the Saigon Defence Department building on Gia Long boulevard looks deserted. Once, none other than Nguyen Van Vy, the Minister, admitted: "We have no hold on either troops, weapons or money. They (meaning the Americans) take charge of everything!"

According to a Cao Van Vien aide, each week, the Saigon "chief-of-staff" is invited to come over to MACV three times, for "exchange of views on the situation." It takes a five-minute drive on Vien's grey-painted jeep. Abrams would talk to him about the situation at the fronts and what should be done to "win victory." Relationships between the two are quite good. Vien gladly receives all criticisms, even rebukes, from his "ally" and is ready to act on all the latter's "suggestions." These he considers orders, to be transmitted without delay to the various corps and tactical regions. An Abrams aide once told a friend in the Saigon army: "Your chief-of-staff is the very kind of man we Americans have always wanted. A true soldier, with a high sense of discipline and certainly

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continued

not prone to arguing." In the French colonial days, Vien was a sergeant in the "native" troops and was laid out for a long time. He was trained to obey right from his youth. Indeed, he has had no difficulty at all switching from the familiar "Oui, Monsieur" of French days to the present "Yes, sir" or "Okay." Once in a meeting with Abrams, he showed himself to be absolutely in the dark concerning the whereabouts of two regiments of the Saigon First Infantry Division in the Tri-Thien area. But Abrams displays great leniency on such occasions. He knows that the Saigon four-star general is primarily concerned with the promotion of Saigon officers, which he and his wife look upon as a lucrative business. Abrams doesn't certainly mind. An obedient blockhead at the top of the Saigon army, that's what he wants above everything else.

(To be continued)

28 Aug 1972

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(Continued)

3 — THE GOVERNMENT: U.S.A.I.D.

NEWCOMERS to Saigon could hardly imagine that even more feverish activity is reigning elsewhere than at the fortress-embassy and the MACV headquarters. The seat of this tremendous bustle is a tall building located at No. 32 Ngo Thoi Nhiem street, next door to the Na Loi pagoda. It is the headquarters of USAID (US Agency for International Development). Outside stand rows of parked cars — Mercedeses, Triumphs, Datsuns — from which alight ranking American experts, Saigon ministers, vice-ministers and provincial chiefs, American "advisers" for Saigon ministries and provinces, top officials in "pacification" financial aid, commodity aid "rural construction," civilian affairs, agricultural development, geological survey, oil survey and exploitation, irrigation, etc. To give an idea of the size of the undertaking, let us mention in passing that there are nearly 600 Vietnamese drivers and thousands of clerks, typists, statisticians, accountants, interpreters... Other personnel number over 20,000. A ranking official in the Saigon Economics Ministry once said: "USAID is the true government of South Viet Nam, if there is one. What does our Economics Ministry do? The only job of the Minister, Mr Pham Kim Ngoc, is to go each year to Washington to beg for aid amounting to 500-700 million dollars. After that, USAID will take care of everything concerning the distribution, utilization, regulation, transfer and control of these funds."

The USAID headquarters is divided into innumerable "boards," the 15 essential ones being staffed with 1,500 ranking American experts. The American heads of those boards assume in fact the functions of Cabinet ministers in charge of economics, finance, trade, industry, agriculture, communications and transport, security, administration, labour organization, planning, culture and education, health, information and propaganda, etc. Each board is again divided into sections staffed with "experts" of numerous branches. There are two large documentation departments and a huge library equipped with electronic computers and crammed with maps, diagrams, models and blueprints, as well as statistics of the most diverse kinds. USAID has its own printing-office, the biggest in Saigon, which turns out documents and communiqués in English and Vietnamese.

A Saigon official said: "It will hardly make any difference whether Vietnamization will be completed or not. This is the American government-general for South Viet Nam, many times bigger than the former French colonial government-general. Vietnamization? One can see that plenty of Americans are around, and more are coming!"

The Saigonese know that the sharp increase in commodity prices, the cost of living and the rates of unemployment, inflation, and taxation springs from plans worked out by USAID.

This super-government, which tops "Prime Minister" Khiem's in that way, is thus very active. But how effective is it? This is a rather big question mark. Saigon politicians have relished a recent disclosure of their American "friends." In September 1971, Colby, deputy ambassador in

charge of the USAID for four years returned to the US and revealed that of the two billion dollars distributed by USAID in South Viet Nam in various programs only about 300 million had reached their destination. The rest, 1,500 million dollars, had vanished like the morning mist under the tropical sun into the pockets of Americans and Vietnamese at various levels in various places. Finally, to gloss over this tragic and ugly story, and to "avoid putting weapons in the hands of Americans who are against the war in Viet Nam", the blame was put on the war and the attendant lack of security, a situation for which no one held himself responsible.

There is still another government in Saigon, one which is invisible yet ubiquitous. It is the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) whose name the Saigonese pronounce in a way which makes it sound like the Vietnamese word meaning "excrement." How many are the CIA men, taking into account both professionals and collaborators? 50,000? 100,000? No one knows for sure. According to some people in the know who become talkative under the influence of alcohol, the American CIA men are quite numerous. They may include ambassadors, deputy ambassadors, journalists, tourists, senators on inspection tours, infantry generals, air force colonels, Green Beret sergeants, businessmen or college professors. None would admit to being CIA men, but any American could be one. They work for CIA, either full or part time, without ceasing to be members of other military, administrative, diplomatic, or political services. What about the native CIA men? They may comprise Cabinet ministers, department heads, parliamentarians, churchmen, business executives, trade union leaders, members of local maffias... Who are the CIA top men? They are very few, and very discreet. They don't live in ostentatious high-rise buildings but in cosy villas along Cong Ly, Hai Ba Trung and Truong Ming Giang boulevards—one-storey structures with private gardens, tennis courts and swimming-pools. These are the resorts of such men as Golley American ambassador and the adviser to Vang Pao, both of them top CIA men in Laos. Saigon is rife with rumours about CIA deals on drugs and weapons all over Southeast Asia. There are CIA-run channels linking Saigon to Bangkok, Singapore, Vientiane, Long Cheng, Manila, Hong Kong, Tokyo, etc., through which foreign exchange, gold, diamonds, intelligence, prostitutes and what not are travelling. CIA spending are enormous, and so are its revenues. The CIA men in Saigon spend a great deal of money. Life behind the closed doors of their discreet villas is a voluptuous one. After each series of bloody feats—building "tiger cages" for political prisoners, penning up the civilian population in concentration camps, making away with Thieu's political opponent... — they withdraw to these cosy retreats and relax with special-quality opium in golden tins engraved with twin dragons, pure heroin, strip-tease shows performed by belly-dancers brought in from Hong Kong, the Philippines and Japan, or hectic games of mahjong and poker... Lesser CIA men live in

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bigger and more crowded villas where they enjoy
entertainment which but still surpass anything Saigon playboys could
dream of.

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CIA professionals are proud of their organization, which encompasses the whole "free world" and has deep roots in almost all capitals, among people of all skin colours. They say: "Our country is CIA. CIA is a world-wide government." A member of the opposition in Saigon scoffs: "Their country is rather money, drugs, and costly prostitutes."

The most noteworthy CIA exploit was the overthrow of Ngo Dinh Diem. Of course they later denied any role in it, until the publication of the Pentagon's secret papers made everything plain enough. It was a Colonel, a CIA man, who as early as August 1963 had been personally entrusted by Kennedy with working out plans for the toppling of Ngo Dinh Diem. Even now, men like Nixon and Goldwater still deeply regret the loss of Ngo Dinh Diem and have harsh words for CIA on this score. Rumour has it that ever since he knew the detailed truth about Diem's liquidation, "President" Thieu often has had to resort to heavy doses of tranquilizers to get some sleep at night.

The NFL's great offensive of Spring 1968 gave the CIA a slap in the face. It showed that the latter had been completely in the dark about the preparations and manpower movements for that tremendous undertaking. Another hard blow came in March this year when Saigon troops suffered terrible setbacks along Highway 9 and in Quang Tri. These are two big stains on CIA records. Many Americans said at the time that CIA men had been too busy with sex and drugs. Others ascribed the fiasco to antagonisms between the CIA, MACV and the American embassy on problems of policy in Viet Nam. They recalled that CIA men hated Westmoreland's search for military victories over the Viet Cong main force, a dream which never came true. For the CIA would rather stake all on the program for "winning hearts and minds" and "pacification," which they considered the only fighting front.

In the 1964-65, the CIA fully approved of the bombing of North Viet Nam. But in 1967 it completely dissociated itself from the policy of war escalation. A top CIA man once said to Admiral Grant Sharp, the commander of US forces in the Pacific, who was passing through Saigon: "When you start hitting, pull no punch. Don't you know that, you a militaryman? Gradual escalation can only be frustrating."

THANH NAM

(To be continued)

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RECENTLY, two special experts of the American Congress came to Saigon and set out on an inspection tour of the provinces. After that they withdrew to USAID headquarters and spent two months assessing the data collected. Finally they came out with a quite candid admission: "The President's Vietnamization policy is impracticable, and pacification has reaped but scanty and nominal results. In one single night the Vietcong could upset everything!" The two experts' report caused deep repercussions on Capitol Hill in Washington. Later, the two men were identified as CIA collaborators.

4 — THE LAM SON THEATRICAL COMPANY

THE topmost task of the proconsul Bunker and of MACV, USAID and the CIA in Saigon is to promote a "model democracy" there.

The "Second Republic," made in the USA, should have its typical representatives. So let us go to Lam Son square which faces Le Loi boulevard, and attend a session of the Saigon "Lower House of Parliament." The building is still called by its old name of Municipal Theatre and the Lower House has received the popular nickname of "159-member Theatrical Company."

Indeed many sessions of the House can stand comparison with the most hectic scenes ever acted on the stage, with plenty of "suspense" worthy of the most breath-holding gangster films or crazy whodunits. The worst abuse keeps streaming from one parliamentarian to another. Here are a few specimens recorded by shorthand during a session held in April 1970:

"Shut up or I'll break your jaw!"

"Embezzlement and incompetence are limited to no one individual. Those who denounce others as dung-eaters are swallowing things that are even dirtier."

"Go home, Mr Speaker, and wash your wife's panties rather than stay here and rave!"

However there are things that shorthand records can never adequately describe. On one occasion, one woman parliamentarian rolled up the legs of her silk trousers and, picking up one of her stiletto-heeled shoes, brought it down smack on the head of a male colleague some twenty years older. On another, a representative whipped out a pistol and a grenade, which he unpinned and threatened to hurl at his opponent: all his colleagues were seized with understandable panic and quickly made themselves scared.

The Saigonese people have all heard about their "representative" Tran Kim Thoa, who championed "equality between the sexes." When called to account by her colleague Ho Huu Tuong about the pocketing of 5 out of the 25 million piastres entrusted to her for the printing of documents for a conference of the Asian Parliamentary Union in Saigon, she choked with anger and spat out between clenched teeth: "I'll tear you scoundrel to pieces and check up your bits with salt and pepper for seasoning." To the House in uproar she explained: "I'll knock him dead. He is even dirtier than I ever was!"

Saigon democracy, the handiwork of the magi-

cian Bunker, also shines abroad. One day in early 1971, Dr Nguyen Quang Luyen, who "represented" Gia Dinh province, went on a mission to Thailand. He held quite important functions: deputy Speaker of the Saigon Lower House of Parliament and Chairman of the Viet Nam branch of the Asian Parliamentary Union. Yet, at Bangkok airport, customs officers of that "friendly country" determinedly seized his suitcase and opened it. Their eyes goggled out of their heads: it contained no less than fifteen kilograms (more than thirty pounds) of illegal gold. So, he was whisked off to a police station in spite of his twofold immunity — diplomatic and parliamentarian!

Another case: Representative Phan Chi Thien was a priest turned politician. Completely disregarding his dignified demeanour, the police searched his bag and found four kilograms (more than eight pounds) of heroin worth tens of thousands of dollars. Caught red-handed, he tried to get away with it by declaring that it was a business undertaking whose returns were to go to a presidential candidate's electoral fund — so after all it was no dirty drug-smuggling but a political act. This did not prevent the police from carting him off to prison.

Innumerable parliamentarian "missions" have been carried out in the same way. Saigon "representatives" went to South Korea, Taiwan, Paris, Rome, etc., nominally for "State affairs" but in fact for fruitful deals in gold, diamonds, heroin or pornographic materials.

Some of the House sessions are rather gloomy affairs. They perfunctorily deal with "the people's life." Not many representatives attend. Their number is even surpassed by that of the "public" looking on from the upper gallery: police, plainclothes men, secret agents, and American "friends," most of them political advisers to the American embassy and journalists.

The jolliest and most important session ever held was that during which it was decided to increase the parliamentarians' allowances to more than a million piastres a year apiece, so that freed from material cares they could wholeheartedly devote themselves to working for the welfare of the people! Following the one-man election of Thieu in late 1971, the relationship between the legislative and executive powers in Saigon has displayed even more histrionics likely to provide entertainment to the Saigonese. For instance, the Saigonese "senators" were unable to stomach Thieu's one-man race and voted to cancel his election. For his part, Nixon didn't bother to wait for the Saigon "Supreme Court" to decide on the issue, and immediately sent a telegram of congratulation to his flunkey. The Saigon press wrote that Thieu was not elected by the "5,700,000 ballots cast by 94.34 per cent of the electorate" as boasted by official propaganda organs (after all the magician Bunker could have

conjured up any numbers of voters he pleased) but by a single ballot sent over from the White House across the Pacific! The paper *Dan Chu Moi* (New Democracy) likened Nixon's message of greeting to an imperial edict bestowing investiture upon a vassal.

The new Saigon Lower House of Parliament held its first session in early 1972. The new faces are no cleaner than the old ones. Immediately after his election, Representative Diep Van Hung was caught in the act of smuggling prohibited goods into the country by Tan Son Nhut airport police. But no one any longer paid any attention to such trifles which had become routine business. The new thing

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that happened with the Lam Son Theatrical Company was the heightened tension between the so-called "opposition" and the valets of the regime. New scophants replaced Tran thi Kim Thoa and her ilk in the unending task of "expressing gratitude to our great ally the USA".

In the eyes of the Saigon people, both the Saigon Upper and Lower Houses of Parliament are but cheap gewgaws for a new kind of "democracy": one-man rule, Thieu's rule!

Relations between the legislative and executive powers in the Saigon regime are not in the hands of the Speaker, old Nguyen Ba Luong formerly, Old Nguyen Ba Can at present.

They are the preserve of Nguyen Cao Thang, a former druggist who has become political assistant to "President" Thieu and is considered to be in charge of the President's secret funds, stuffed with American greenbacks. Political observers in Saigon hold that in major votings the parliamentarians always keep an eye on the ballot box and the other on Mr Thang's billfold. None other than Nguyen Cao Thang himself has admitted that Law 10-70 was passed at the cost of 15 million piastres in "gifts" to Messrs Representatives. The rewards were brought to the homes of the co-operative voters in fat envelopes accompanied by a letter of thanks from the Presidential Assistant, signing for the President.

But money is not the only string linking the legislative to the executive powers in the Saigon regime. Beware, Messrs Representatives of the "Opposition"! Remember the fates of such oppositionists as Truong Dinh Zu and Au Truong Thanh. The former is still in prison. The latter after a few months in police custody was forced into self-exile abroad. Each time they look out into the Lam Som square, the "oppositionists" cannot help feeling uneasy. A monumental sculpture featuring gun-toting "Republican Combatants" with their weapons trained on the Parliament building reminds them that the only law prevailing in their "Republic" is that of the jungle!

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THANH NAM

(Continued)

5. THE PIMP MAYOR

THE Saigon regime which nestles in the shadow of the American Embassy is worthily represented not only by the Lam Son theatrical troupe but also by the 39,372 officially registered prostitutes aged 16-45. Indeed the professional whores number more than 70,000. If one adds to them the semi-pros--most of them masquerading as "waitresses" in the more than 300 "snack-bars" -- the figure will surpass the 200,000 mark! A thriving industry of the regime! A figure all the more eloquent if one recalls that the total number of college and school teachers, medical doctors, engineers and pharmacists in Saigon is less than one-tenth of it.

US culture has also brought Saigon more than one hundred Turkish baths, to which Formosan culture has contributed 370 young women specializing in "scientific" massage. Along Nguyen Van Thoai and Vo Tanh streets as well as Tran Hung Dao and Tran Quoc Toan boulevards there have mushroomed motley signboards carrying suggestive drawings and inscriptions in English advertising steam-baths and cabarets with such names as "Lovely Bath," "Queen Bar," "Moon Bar," etc.

The army of harlots is the product of the war imposed by foreigners. Its numbers have skyrocketed since 1965-66. Following each "sweep," each plan for setting up "strategic hamlets," each operation for "special pacification," "accelerated pacification" or "complementary pacification," each displacement of civilians, each spraying of toxic chemicals, population figures in the towns and cities would shoot up. Carrying their belongings on their backs, the refugees would stream on foot, or in crowded buses and sampans, into the towns, where, failing assistance from relatives or friends, they would pitch camps on sidewalks, waterfronts or in bus stations and public squares. The girls would fall preys to pimps and brothel-owners, who would give them some money for cosmetics and dresses and entertain them with special films and novels aimed at arousing base passions and desires. Country girls with pure hearts and simple minds would soon be acquainted with lewd scenes on the streets of Saigon and pressed by material enticements and soaring prices into selling their bodies. A lawyer with some concern for social morals has observed: "In this city of Saigon teeming with Americans, the fact that the men have become cannon-fodder and the girls have been compelled to offer the use of their bodies in order to eke out a living, is only a matter of course."

But the leaders of the regime look at things from a quite different angle. Minister for Social Affairs Tran Ngoc Lien has gleefully declared: "In this country, prostitution has developed into one of the best - organized trades ever!" A representative blurted out in the Lower House of "Parliament": "The Americans need girls; we need dollars. Why should we refrain from the exchange? It's an inexhaustible source of US dollars for the State." And so important personages have set up big organizations dealing in human flesh covering whole districts and ranging from cheap brothels to the supply of deluxe courtesans of various nationalities -- Vietnamese, Japanese, Thai, Formosan -- to wealthy customers: American ambassadors and deputy ambassadors, CIA chieftains, as well as Saigon presidents, vice presidents and Cabinet ministers.

In the 1969-70, Saigon was shaken by anguishing news: girls of 13 or 14 were kidnapped and taken to sinister dens. So-called Okinawa V.D. microbes, resistant to antibiotics, were introduced into the country by

American soldiery. The city was rife with all sorts of rumours about the wives of such and such Saigon civil servants, officers, professors or representatives catering for the lusts of the Americans and being paid by the day or by the hour. Unbelievable things happened: mothers and sons, brothers and sisters ran into each other in brothels!

Who stands at the top of this prosperous and shameful industry? The Saigoneses have come to know the answer to this intriguing question: he is none other than the Mayor of their city, Do Kien Nhieu.

Nhieu is a native of Long An province. In French times, he was a constable and later became a corporal in the native auxiliary troops. He was known as a drunkard and a debauchee. Under Diem, he made a profitable career for himself by "exterminating Communists" and massacring innocent people. Later he was promoted chief of Long Xuyen then An Giang provinces. When Diem and his brother Nhu were made away with through CIA machinations, Nhieu bitterly grieved at the bad news. In June 1968, Thieu appointed Nhieu Mayor in replacement of Van Van Cua and promoted him to be a full colonel. He is Thieu's right-hand man and reigns despotically over the 160 square kilometres of the city's area. All the pimps and brothel-owners of the eleven city districts have been put under the unified control of his own aunt and elder sister. Other relatives of his have been entrusted with other business in human flesh. For instance providing "wives" to GIs, transferring "wives" from departing GIs to newly-arrived ones, supplying women seduced by American officers with marriage certificates and helping them acquire American citizenships, etc.

Nhieu also holds indirect sway over such "cultural activities as cabaret singing, strip-tease dancing, at such "cultural centres" as Kilby Dance Hall in Nguyen Hue boulevard, Ritz Restaurant on Tran Hung Dao street, Maxim's Theatre in Tu Do avenue, or Melody Dance Hall in Cho Lon. The owners of these profitable businesses have to pay him fat kickbacks.

With Hoang Thi Tho, who has brought the "art" of presenting decadent, psywar-oriented music and singing to the level of a profitable industry responsible for the moral ruin of a whole generation of city youth, Nhieu entertains special relationship, that between two professional panders.

Owing to the Mayor's solicitude and the effective assistance of American advisers, Saigon has witnessed the coming into existence of a host of strange characters calling themselves "local hippies" and numbering over 10,000 early this year. They are playing a very efficient role in diffusing the "culture" of the "free world" in this enslaved part of our country.

Most of them are children of VIPs -- ministers or generals... -- or wealthy families who by fits grow tired of life only to become crazily pleasure-seeking at the next moment. The boys grow long hair while the girls wear it very short; both sexes wear drain-pipe trousers and gaudy shirts, make love in the streets, quarrel noisily in public, dash along crowded streets on their Honda or Yamaha motorbikes at breakneck speed, linger in cabarets and nightclubs where they perform wailing and syncopated outlandish music, are inveterate marijuana and heroin addicts, and indulge in looting and riots. They set up gangs carrying such evocative names as "Dust of Life," "Black Star," "Bloody Hand," "Human Skull," etc. Indeed they greatly contribute to the moral pollution of the already heavily-polluted atmosphere of Saigon.

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Recently, owing to the departure of sizable numbers of GIs, the prostitution industry has been on the downgrade. The massage parlors and opium dens are facing a dwindling clientele. Nevertheless, Do Kien Nhieu, the Mayor, after four years in business, has amassed a great fortune. Once during a drinking bout, he noisily boasted: "I am richer than any brigadier or major general in this country! I am a millionaire in... US dollars!" As a matter of fact, Nhieu holds fat accounts in Hong Kong banks. He has readjusted his business activities to fit new nine urgent economic measures decreed by Thieu. Score of new taxes have been promulgated aimed at sucking dry the cityfolk.

Do Kien Nhieu, a major public figure in Saigon, is also a typical representative of the Thieu regime. This pander-cum-black marketeer is still doing a thriving business. He will no doubt be promoted general by his "President" very soon. But together with the latter, he is heading for inevitable ruin.

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THANH NAM

(Continued)

VICE-PRESIDENT HUONG'S "INTEGRITY"

THE worries and miseries that beset the people of Saigon are multifarious. Many spring from the necessity to offer bribes, which involves many hardships and much humiliation.

To get a job as a longshoreman on the wharves at Chuong Duong or Thuong Cang, one must offer the superintendent a bribe equivalent to two months' wages. A highschool graduate who wants to be a clerk in a government department will have to cough up between 100,000 and 500,000 piastres, depending on what kind of job he is after. If he wishes to enter an American agency, he will have to offer money to a multitude of people: from the district police to the personnel chief of the agency concerned.

A father who wishes his son or daughter to enter a general-education school must offer presents to the head-master and to officials of the City educational service. A man who falls ill and needs some kind of treatment at the hospital will have to give the doctor in charge a shot of Vitamin M (M for money) before he could hope to get some care and medicine in return. The military hospitals are so crowded that wounded soldiers who are fortunate enough to be brought back to Saigon from, say, An Loc, lie on the cement floor in the verandas. Whether one such soldier wants a glass of water to quench his thirst after an operation, or a pill to soothe his pain, or a new bandage to replace the stinking old one, he will have to pay for it. If he can't afford it, he will just lie there and moan out vain pleas for help.

A bus ticket to Central Trung Bo for instance generally costs three times its normal price. A trip to France will cost a stowaway about 1,000 US dollars for a hiding-place on a ship. A regular exit visa costs 5,000 US dollars: everything can be bought provided you have the money.

Children of wealthy parents never bother to study hard for their exams. They spend their time at seaside resorts with their sweethearts, or go for pleasure rides on their Honda motorbikes. About a week before the exams, they can buy the subject of the tests for between 100,000 and 200,000 piastres. The only condition, besides the money, is that they should burn the incriminating papers after using them. That racket about test papers is in the hands of Education Minister Ngo Khac Tinh and his associates. For his talents he has been dubbed Minister of Un-Education.

Now about the draft. If you want to evade it, you must of course find a hiding-place, whether it be a cellar, a cupboard, or a dark corner in your own kitchen. But the point is that you must have a wad of banknotes in your hand, between 20,000 and 50,000 piastres just in case military police find you out. If you want to take a walk in the streets, you'd better have some money with you, for at each check-point you'll have to offer some dough to the officers on duty: in 1966, about 3,000 piastres, now more than 10,000! As you can see, prices have skyrocketed, ever since the proconsul Bunker revealed his intention to charge the colour of the corpses on the battlefields.

Suppose they get you somehow and you are impressed into the "Republican Army." If you don't want to be sent to far-away places up in Central Trung Bo or in Cambodia or Laos, if instead of going to "hot" battlefields you prefer safer jobs like standing guard before government offices, your parents will have to pay up to 300,000 piastres for the favour. Just ask the sentries on duty before the City Hall or the Saigon Special Command, you'll learn that most of them are sons of wealthy Chinese merchants in Cho Lon who in order to get them these soft jobs have paid astronomical sums to high-ranking officers: 500,000 piastres down, and then 20,000 piastres each month.

From 1971 onwards, because of galloping inflation, the bribe-takers, instead of fat envelopes stuffed with 500-piastre bills, would prefer presents in kind: a few ounces of heroin in plastic phials, or a Japanese television set, or a big refrigerator, or a Honda motorbike, or a dozen wrist-watches...

Even those who are not seeking any special favour must sometimes offer bribes, to district chiefs or to security officers, if they just wish to be left alone to mind their peaceful and law-abiding businesses. Otherwise they would be summoned from time to time to police headquarters to be questioned about distant relatives or childhood friends who, so they are told, have joined the Viet Cong! After greasing the palms of various officials, they would be allowed to return home, only to be summoned back a few months later, for more questions and more... palm-greasing!

To be fair, we must say that the Saigon administration has promulgated quite few decrees against "corruption." Discussions have been held in Parliament and the lawcourts. Vitable "campaigns" have been launched with the participation of police, customs officers, military gendarmes, etc., and the whole court-and-prison machinery put in motion. Tens of thousand of arrests were made, in January 1972 alone. But, as a Saigon judge candidly said: "These campaigns only hit at the small fry. Nobody ever dares to touch the big fish!" The small traders complain: "Whom are the authorities striking at in their drive against corruption? They only smash the rice bowl of the poor people by confiscating smuggled goods from petty peddlers." The only instance of punishment meted out to "big fish" was the execution of the rich Chinese merchant Ta Vinh. But this served only as a smokescreen to cover thousands of much bigger fish. Some people also hold that the shots that felled Ta Vinh in fact ushered in a new stage in the history of wealthy circles in Saigon: the decline of the "old millionaires" and the rise of new ones, who wear military uniform and hold absolute and exclusive control over the country's economic resources.

The Saigonese know that the anti-corruption drives are in fact golden opportunities for more corruption: police, customs officers, military gendarmes, judges, etc., seize upon these occasions to get fat bribes and kickbacks. Indeed, one can say that in Saigon, the law-makers, law-enforcers and law-breakers are just the same people, and that the watchword: "Fight corruption!" in fact means: "Long live corruption!"

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However, it would be unjust if we were to include in that rapacious gang the ordinary rank-and-file of the Saigon army. In the "free world," they are indeed the lowest-paid mercenaries. The salary of a PFC is 3,800 Saigon piastres; that of a non-com ranges from 5,000 to 8,000 piastres. In comparison, let us observe that a glass of beer costs 80 piastres; a bowl of soup, 100; a kilogram of pork, 600; an egg, 22; and a packet of cigarettes, 80. How could they ever hope to make ends meet? True, the Saigon administration has on a few rare occasions raised their salaries, but while prices ride away at a gallop, wages and salaries creep along at a snail's pace. A paratroop NCO with some education uses this mathematical parallel: "While prices increase by geometrical progression, salaries are raised only by arithmetical progression."

It is routine practice for a PFC or NCO back home after service hours to hastily swallow his bowl of rice, don civilian clothes and drive a motor-cycle taxi for some extra earnings to supplement the family income. The case has been reported of a sergeant living at Bay Hien crossroads who had been compelled by financial necessity to let his wife provide entertainment to sex-hungry GIs. She caught VD, the family was ruined by the costs of medical care, and the neighbours got wind of the matter. Finally the wife committed suicide by drowning and the sergeant, left with 6 young children to look after, was driven to near insanity.

Soldiers and non-coms with some special skill—signalmen, engineers, mechanics...—try to earn some extra money by working on evenings and Sundays repairing typewriters, radio and television sets, calculators, cars and motorcycles, etc. All have work very hard indeed if they are to feed their wives and children.

Among the junior officers, some succeed in getting rich through using their influence and power as battalion or regiment commanders. They grow up into wealthy big shots too. For them, their salaries only serve as pocket money. Their main income is drawn from elsewhere.

Let's listen to what Major Le Van Ngai, the commander of a 600-man battalion of the Fifth Infantry Division stationed at Lai Khe, has to say about his extra earnings: In normal times, when no operations are under way, the quarter-masters give him kickbacks of up to 100,000 Saigon piastres every month, from funds earmarked for supplies and maintenance. These earnings really shoot up when things get hotter on the battlefields. Soldiers die or desert, but their names remain on the company lists, and their salaries go to their company commanders, who send half of that wind-fall to Major Ngai. The latter's cornucopia also includes a fat percentage of the operational funds (combat rations, special expenses, etc.) and the war booty: pigs and chickens, articles of clothing, gold and jewels mercilessly stolen from the civilians. Meanwhile the battalion's rear-base hums with profitable activities: under the supervision of the Major's trusted lieutenants, military lorries are hired to private traders for the transport of goods, most often smuggled ones, or are used to ferry "surplus supplies": firewood, oil and lubricants, etc., to confidential middlemen. And so, after a mere two years as battalion commander, from a penniless captain, he has risen to be a millionaire-major, a faithful member of the *Khaki Party*,

His colleague, Major Huynh Cong Do, deputy chief of the 3rd district of Saigon city, has filled his pockets at a still greater speed, thanks to President Thieu's favour. Major Do's bonanza springs from many sources: one is the damages paid by the American embassy to Vietnamese civilians killed "by mistake or accident" by American bombs, shells, bullets, or military trucks. These damages amount to 34 dollars per victim, the price of 20 kilograms of pork, as bitterly observed by the Saigonese. Forty per cent of that money is pocketed by Sir deputy district-chief for the simple reason that "were it not for his intervention the Americans wouldn't have paid a cent!" Another Pactolus is the kickback from gambling-den owners, who will *ipso facto* benefit from police protection. Another mint of money: the junk yard at Long Binh, the great American logistical base. It's the biggest military refuse dump in Asia, sprawling over tens of hectares, a huge mountain of discarded jeeps, scout-cars and trucks, typewriters, air-conditioners, refrigerators, radio and guns, tin sheets, iron and copper wire, articles of clothing, blankets, shoes, belts, canteens, and what not! Tens, hundreds of tons of them. On orders from the American brigadier commanding the Long Binh base, that enormous mass of junk is handed over to Major Do, to be sold to the "district people, with priority to families with orphans and widows who are especially sympathetic to American and allied armies," at prices as low as one-tenth of those on the Saigon "black" market. But as soon as the goods are out of the stockade, Sir deputy district-chief hastens to put the "district people and families with widows and orphans" out of his mind. The merchandise is quickly sold out at the most profitable prices thanks to the efficient cooperation of the Major's henchmen.

Major Do's "extra earnings" have brought him several apartment buildings and luxurious villas, for rent and for use by his attractive young concubines, as well as big cars -- American, French and Japanese -- for ferrying his wives and children to seaside resorts on holidays...

In the reign of President Thieu, the great friend of the Americans, a princely life is the happy lot of the members of his party, the *Khaki Party*.

THANH NAM

(To be continued)

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(Continued):

7.— THE KHAKE PARTY

THANKS to solicitous care from the fortress-embassy, political parties have mushroomed in Saigon, like fungi on decaying wood. No less than 123 political parties and organizations are registered with the Ministry of the Interior and the City administration. Proconsul Bunker can indeed take pride in the fact that, quantitatively at least, Saigon "democracy" has outstripped American democracy, which can boast only two contending parties.

The *Viet Nam Quoc Dan Dang* has split into three factions, with three headquarters. One under the thumb of Vu Hong Khanh, who had moved south after 1954; one controlled by Nguyen Hoa Hiep, and one, calling itself the "unified VNQDD" and having Nguyen Dinh Luong as its bellwether. Each faction claims to be the genuine VNQDD and of course disclaims all American subsidies and string-pulling.

The *Dai Viet* has also burst asunder: the Bac Ky (Northern) faction is under the sway of Dang Van Sung, the Trung Ky (Central) faction is led by Ha Thuc Ky, and the Nam Ky (Southern) coterie by Nguyen Ton Hoang. The Saigonese give the party as a whole the sobriquet of *Dai Vit*, which means Great Hoax.

The *Dan Na* is an avatar of the "Labour and Personalism" organization set up by Ngo Dinh Diem and his brother Nhu. Its aim is to restore the Ngo dynasty, and it maintains close relations, political and financial, with Thieu and other Saigon generals, and also with CIA chieftains responsible for the murder of Diem and Nhu.

The list could be indefinitely prolonged: *Phuc Viet*, *Cach Mang Nhan Dan*, *Viet Nam Hung Quoc Dang*, *Cong Hoa Dai Chung*, *Doan Ket*, etc., not counting the *Mat Tran Cuu Nguy Dan Toc* (Front for National Salvation) hastily rigged up by the Americans in an effort to rally all anti-Communist parties behind Thieu.

Many of those "parties" can boast only a few dozen members. Some are possessed only of an "Executive Committee" of ten members or less, a headquarters and an emblem, all serving the sole aim of getting hand-outs from the Americans. Before attempting to recruit any follower at all, a "party leader" should first get himself a fashionable "politician's suit" from Adam, the tailor in vogue in Saigon, a black Mercedes sedan, and an attaché case which he would stuff with... old newspapers. These accoutrements will allow him to knock at Bunker's door, hat in hand.

One party stands out among all those American-financed organizations. It has neither rules, program, headquarters, emblem nor any other paraphernalia normally connected with a political party, yet is especially pampered by the Americans. The Saigonese dub it the *Khaki Party*. It is made up of the generals and colonels promoted on the recommendation of the proconsul Bunker and has had a meteoric career which is a cause of bitter envy and deep resentment on the part of the other parties.

Once Phan Huy Quat, who served as Prime Minister under Nguyen Khanh's military rule, said with a shrug

at the front. Yet they intrude into every field and grab every post: president, vice-president, prime minister, ministers, province chiefs, etc. Here in the South, there is one only political party left, the *Khaki Party*."

For the last four or five years, the *Khaki Party*, the pampered child of the Americans, has driven all other parties into the background.

"Senator" Dang Van Sung, a *Dai Viet* chieftain, who has close ties with the CIA and was once General Taylor's favourite, is quite spiteful about the *Khaki Party*. At a dinner in company with his close collaborators on the terrace-roof of the Continental Hotel, he shook his head and complained with bitterness in his voice: "We are at the end of our tether. What's the use of founding a party? The Army Party is ruling the roost."

On the Saigon political stage, gun-toting army men play all parts. All power is in their hands. Streets are controlled by sergeants, precincts by lieutenants, districts by majors and the city itself is headed by a colonel mayor. At the National Cultural Congress, the tune was also called by men in khaki uniform: Air Vice Marshal Nguyen Cao Ky, whose main cultural interest is cock-fighting, gave his "instructions," and psywar officers delivered lengthy speeches in praise of "literacy" works by Paratroops Captain Nguyen Vu, and so on and so forth.

Things are even more obvious in the economic field. The *Khaki Party* controls all national resources. Everything is in the hands of generals, ex-generals, and their wives, concubines, relatives and friends: chemical industry (Dosuki and Co in Dong Khanh boulevard, owned by Generals (ret.) Don, Xuan, Kim, Thuan); import-export trade (with yearly imports worth over 500 million US dollars), banking (Ex-Defence Minister Nguyen Huu Co is now the owner of a big bank)... Every source of wealth and profits is controlled by them: wood and forest products in the Central Highlands, cinnamon bark and pine resin in Quang Nam and Lam Dong, fish, brine and other sea products in Phan Thiet and Phu Quoc, even the frozen-shrimp trade at Vung Tau. The real-estate business is also quite firmly in the hands of khaki-clad bigwigs: high-rise buildings in Saigon, Nha Trang, Cam Ranh, Da Nang, luxurious hotels and villas, complete with tennis-courts and swimming-pools, in Cong Ly and Hai Ba Trung boulevards, etc.

Lesser figures in the *Khaki Party* control such profitable businesses as snack-bars, brothels, Turkish-baths, massage parlors, and laundry shops catering for American GIs.

Time and again, Parliamentarians attempting to safeguard the interests of civilian traders and businessmen have vociferously condemned the brazen-faced encroachments of the military, but in vain. The men in uniform rejoin that "free enterprise" is the supreme rule of the land and that anyone with enough money and drive can engage in profit-bringing activities. It's all very well, but how can anyone compete with the generals when they wield such power and influence, have access to military and economic secrets, hold control over US-aid goods, and, supreme argument, over the guns! Many wealthy businessmen who had gone south after 1954 have been driven to bankruptcy by competition from the khaki-clad entrepreneurs. One of them, a notoriously prosperous entrepreneur in Hanoi, has taken his own life out of despair and impotent anger.

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There are top-ranking people who have taken the defence of the president Trah Van Huong, who is now nearly 80 and has been connected with the regime for decades. In one parliamentary debate, he had this clincher: "If we should eliminate all corrupt elements, no one would be left to work for the States!"

In the electioneering campaign of October 1971, when Huong was Thieu's running mate for the vice-presidency, he was praised by his sycophants for his "integrity and honesty." According to them, he was "a righteous man who lives close to the people and stays away from all temptations." Then in early 1972, a pretty kettle of fish was uncovered. It was proved by political opponents that Huong was no more honest than any other big fish of the Saigon regime. Immediately after he agreed to be Thieu's running mate, the American Embassy presented him with a gift of 10,000 US dollars. Thieu himself offered him a luxurious villa on Phan Thanh Gian boulevard, and Dang Van Quang, Thieu's financial manager, brought him two million in cash for "the furniture."

Later, Huong also pocketed a check for 20,000 US dollars. But what made him most happy was the "special fund" of the vice-presidency, put at his disposal by the Saigon Finance Ministry after approval by Bunker personally and by USAID headquarters: from five million, the fund was increased to thirteen million piastres!

Huong was indeed wholly correct when he said that a truly effective anti-corruption drive would drive all Saigon officials from office, and that no one would be left to work for the "State," neither civil servants, police, gendarmes, parliamentarians, soldiers, senators, nor president, vice-president and premier! Corruption is the miraculous force which keeps the State machinery in motion. It is the cement that holds together all components of the Saigon regime.

No one should worry about the lack of industrial development in the US-occupied part of South Viet Nam. Corruption and prostitution, thanks to the solicitude of the Americans and their flunkies Thieu, have reached a level of development equal to that of any industry in the world and could indeed supply the "free world" with top-notch experts.

(To be continued)

THANH NAM

2 Oct 1972

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(Continued)

8.—SEA TIGERS AND BLACK VULTURES

THE "get-rich-quick" methods of the Saigon generals have brought them new records. The legendary wealthy figures of French colonial times have now been relegated to the background: the latifundist Tran Trinh Trach, who had enough rice in his granaries to food hundreds of thousands of people; Nguyen Huu Hao, the father-in-law of ex-Emperor Bao Dai, the *doc phu su* who owned immense areas of ricefields in My Tho and Bac Lieu; the rich Chinese merchants of the Hui Bon Hoa type, who had rows of tenement houses. Even in their heyday, they could in no way stand in comparison with present-day generals. Because, in the words of a wealthy Bac Lieu landowner, their fortunes are to the generals' what a little knob is to a whole TV set!

In these years of 1970-71, for the first time in history, there have appeared Vietnamese millionaires (if their wealth is counted in US dollars) or billionaires (if it is reckoned in terms of Saigon piastres). International bankers now show a healthy respect for Vietnamese moneybags and put them on an equal footing with American, British, French and Japanese nabobs. Of course President Nguyen Van Thieu and General Cao Van Vien are counted by Saigon and international business circles among those Croesuses.

These men have invented very effective ways for filling their pockets.

Take for instance the case of Admiral Tran Van Chon, the commander of the Saigon Navy. He and his predecessor, Admiral Chung Tan Cang, now military governor of Saigon, together with their subordinates of the Saigon naval forces, have all got rich "at the speed of PT boats" according to the colourful simile of their rank-and-file.

Every three months or so, the admiral would send groups of officers and men to the United States to take over warships handed over by the US Navy to its Saigon ally. These are golden opportunities both for those entrusted with the job and their bosses at home. While living in posh hotels in various port cities along the Californian coast, they have plenty of occasions to familiarize themselves with American "culture" and market conditions. Their cargoes of heroin, opium and marijuana quickly change hands, bringing them wads of greenbacks. Trips to the Philippines and Okinawa (Japan) to fetch military hardware and get their ships checked are also highly lucrative and entertaining. No wonder it happens that ship collisions are sometimes deliberately provoked by Saigon naval officers to provide them with opportunities for sailing over to Manila for "repair."

The coasts of South Viet Nam are under close surveillance by the Navy, whose ships can cast anchor wherever they see fit and have besides "special security zones" put at their exclusive disposal. It also owns the multitude of rivercraft which ply South Vietnamese canals and rivers. Vice-admiral Lam Nguon Tanh has many friends and relatives among the wealthy Chinese merchants of Cho Lon. And so the trade of sea-products is of course in the hands of Messrs senior officers of the Saigon Navy and their clans: fish, lobsters, *nuoc mam* (fish brine) of top quality and swallow's nests which fetch high prices on the Hongkong market.

The holds of Navy vessels are crammed not only with such valuable merchandise as cinnamon bark from the forests of Trung Bo or fresh fruit and vegetables from the delta kitchen gardens and orchards, but also with all kinds of drugs and narcotics for GI customers stationed in Cam Ranh, Da Nang, Cua Viet and other ports. One must add of course the "war booty" that has been mercilessly stolen from the coastal population and fishing-folk in frequent raids, incursions and round-ups: gold and jewelry, clothing and furniture, watches, radio sets, motorbikes, even fishing boats and gear. After each such raid, the lesser items are distributed to the small fry, while the more valuable ones or the proceeds from their sale are moved up the ladder, each level of the hierarchy taking its pre-determined share. All senior commanders of the Saigon Navy, vice-admirals and admirals, are millionaires; the ship captains and commanders of rivercraft groups are also very wealthy men. The land-lubbers, green with envy, call the sailors "corsairs who not only rob the population but also steal from the State." Indeed in the open-air markets of Saigon, at Thoi Binh and Cau Ong Lanh, one can find every item of Navy equipment put up for sale on the pavement: buoys, compasses, blankets, hammocks, electric generators and what not!

The airmen, for their part, do business in their own way, with the speed and efficiency worthy of the jet era, under the leadership of such men as "Air Vice Marshal" Nguyen Cao Ky formerly and General Tran Van Minh at present. They deal in light-weight, high-value merchandise: gold, either in foil or bars, diamonds, heroin... Missions to Phnom Penh, Vientiane, Bangkok, Manila or Taipei are highly profitable occasions in which base, wing and flight commanders operate in close cooperation with Southeast Asia-based international dealers. The goods travel under the protection of air-force military police and leave the airports in special air-force vans or even helicopters, which completely stymie customs officers and economic police. Air-force officers at the big Tan Son Nhut base also run a transit business catering for private traders with especially valuable goods to ferry to various places of the speed and security with which the precious cargoes travel: 200,000 Saigon piastres for the transport of a kilogram of heroin from Saigon to Nha Trang; 300,000 to Da Nang; and 350,000 to Phu Bai, further north. The money is given in advance and no receipt is of course given. The sender gives the address at which the goods are to be delivered, usually a public square or a posh restaurant, and also the sign at which the receiver is to be recognized.

Big money also comes to the airmen from the sale of US-supplied equipment: spark-plugs (2,000 piastres apiece), special pilot's watches (40,000), plane wreckages (50,000 piastres a ton)...

The Marines' worship of Mammon cannot be so discreet. The Saigon press is replete with unpleasant news and rumours which greatly anger Major-General Le Nguyen Khang, the burly, green-bereted Marine commander whose headquarters is at No. 15 Le Thanh Tong Street on the Saigon waterfront. Marine officers, who wear the black-vulture badge, still speak with nostalgia of the great 1970 bonanza: the invasion of Cambodia in the Neak-luong region. It costs the Marines nearly a thousand lives. but the survivors had a jolly time

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plundering the food and textile depots of their "ally" Lon Nol. Approved For Release 2001/07/27 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000900040001-1
 "ally" Lon Nol included, of all their property: gold, jewels, Vespa scooters, Honda motorbikes... which were piled up on military lorries and whisked to open-air markets which had mushroomed along the frontier. A Marine brigade commander, on the advice of no less a figure than General Le Nguyen Khang himself, sent his own wife to Neakluong where she quickly organized, jointly with the spouse of the Cambodian local commander, Colonel Tasayat, an efficient channel linking Saigon to Phnom Penh through Neakluong for profitable trade in opium and diamonds. Thus was "friendship" built up and consolidated, under the Americans' benevolent eyes, between the "States" and "armies" headed by Nguyen Van Thieu and Lon Nol. The year 1970, in retrospect, proved to be the apex of the fortune of Le Nguyen Khang, and of his Black Vultures as well. For according to wags at the Saigon General Staff, the pitiful show the Marines performed in Southern Laos in 1971 was due among other things to the absence of such stimuli as gold and opium, which were hard to come by in the thick jungle of that theatre of operations.

However, in this rat race, the men in the Commissariat of the Saigon army are the fastest of them all. The name of this department in Vietnamese is *Quan Tiep Vu* (Military Supply Department), *QTV* for short. It takes care of all the stores and supplies of the Saigon army, and the whole of US military and economic aid to this army passes through *QTV* services. The *QTV* men have grown so prosperous that the acronym has been read by Saigon wags to mean *Quan tim vang*, or Gold Rushers. Indeed they have learnt quite a few tricks from their American counterparts, who run the *PX* stores and engage in thriving black-market activities.

Let us pay a visit to the *PX* on Nguyen Tri Phuong street, the biggest of them all. In spite of all the official announcements of American "troop withdrawals," it is still crammed with GIs. The shop assistants, with painted lips and rouged cheeks and suggestive miniskirts, cast sheep's eyes at their American customers in the hope of getting generous tips. The rooms are filled with all kinds of goods: motorbikes, refrigerators, television sets, tape-recorders, cameras, fabrics, the newest gadgets from the US, Japan, France, Canada...—sold at specially low prices.

In principle the *PX*'s are off limits to the Vietnamese. Yet black-marketeers wait in throngs at the door with wads of 500-piastre bills in their pockets, for the kind-hearted GIs are ready to help them get any commodities they want, against hard cash of course. Getting a 9-inch TV set for them will bring the GI 15,000 piastres' net profit; a Honda moped will fetch them 10,000. The whole deal takes five minutes and twenty steps down the street. No wonder that many GIs have sung the praise of Saigon as a new Eldorado.

US commissaries, however, look down on such paltry deals. Theirs are of a quite different magnitude. Let us follow for instance an American convoy (usually from 5 to 20 trucks) carrying military supplies along one of the main highways leading from Saigon to Vung Tau, Tay Ninh or even nearby Bien Hoa. At a given place, the convoy would screech to a sudden stop and some lorries would be quickly unloaded. The crates are dumped onto the roadside and quickly taken by waiting men to convenient hiding-places, and the convoy would start rolling again. The whole operation lasts only a few

minutes. There is no discussion, no haggling. The prices have been fixed in advance and paid on delivery—16,000 for a smaller one. Their contents are not known in advance, and that is the spice of the deal, which is as fascinating as a roulette game. When the crates are opened, the Vietnamese buyers, civilians or *QTV* men, hold their breath: if the boxes are filled with blankets of articles of clothing, they will give a contended nod, for the profits will be quite sizable. But they are really mad with joy if the goods turn out to be watches, electronic radio valves, or lighter flints. On the other hand, they will put on a long face if confronted with heaps of GI training manuals, MP white helmets, rolls of toilet paper, or some metal or plastic machine parts of uncanny shapes. These will have to be quickly disposed of. But don't feel sorry for the gambler-buyers, they will make up for the losses later, and with a vengeance.

This original way of doing business has begun to be practised by *QTV* men along such routes as the Saigon—Baria, Saigon—Lai Khe and Da Nang—Chu Lai highways.

Recently a big scandal erupted in Saigon about the theft of 420 tons of copper hardware and electronic equipment from the giant Long Binh US logistical base. The stolen goods were loaded on the cargo ship Dong Nai bound for Singapore, at a time when the price of copper was shooting up on the world market. The deal involved big shots in many services, both American and Vietnamese: the Economics Ministry, the port administration, the customs service, American senior officers, etc. Palmgreasing, as it was later revealed, took as much as 30 million piastres, but it apparently failed to satisfy everybody, for the beans were eventually spilled by some malcontent. The goods, according to the exposure, had been taken to the wharves by American military lorries during fifteen consecutive nights, in curfew hours of course! They consisted of brand-new artillery shell-cases (the warheads had been unscrewed and sold out to junk-yard dealers in Cholon) and costly military signal equipment.

Outstanding among the Vietnamese names mentioned in connection with this big deal are those of General Dong Van Khuyen, head of the Commissariat, and other *QTV* senior officers. Their fortunes rival those of other top brass of the Saigon army: Admirals Chung Tan Cang and Tran Van Chon, Air-force Generals Tran Van Minh and Vu Xuan Lanh, Marine General Le Nguyen Khang, Paratroop General Du Quoc Dong, and other hierarchs of the *Khaki Party*. Small wonder that they are bemused by the prospect of American withdrawal and the wobbling posture of their ringleader Nguyen Van Thieu.

(To be continued)

THANH NAM

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(Continued)

7.— THE NUMBER ONE MAN AND HIS PROFESSION OF FAITH

WHEN, in late 1970, a number of parliamentarians met in the Dien Hong Conference Hall which stood among the bank buildings near the Chuong Duong docks, and kicked up a row about corruption among the bigwigs in the government, the name of Major-general Do Cao Tri was the subject of vehement debate.

In the coffee houses along Tu Do (Freedom) Boulevard and the posh refreshment stalls along the Saigon-Bien Hoa expressway, the name of Do Cao Tri, President Thieu's right hand man, became a byword of plunder and embezzlement.

At the Joint General Staff Headquarters, junior officers doing clerical work amidst the scream of jets from the Tan Son Nhut airfield agreed that the major-general was indeed the number one embezzler and bribe-taker of the Saigon army. Behind him stood three other-generals in this order: Daug Van Quang, Lu Lan and Dam Van Quang.

Who was Do Cao Tri? His name was a household word among the paratroopers. He joined the French colonial army at the age of 17, was sent to France for training and made his first parachute jump at the age of 18, whereupon he was promoted second lieutenant. It was in 1946. Later Tri liked to reminisce about his French superiors at the time, Colonels Gilles, Ducourneau, Konal and others, and about his participation in operations of the French expeditionary corps along the Sino-Vietnamese border and in the North-west, in the years 1950-1952. He never forgot to boast that he had been awarded the Legion d'Honneur in 1951. "I was only 23," he would proudly stress, "yes sir, only 23." He never tired of repeating to his subordinates: "I made my first jump before General Nguyen Chanh Thi, and General Cao Van Vien, the Chief-of-Staff, did theirs."

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In 1966, in the course of a ceremony held by the Paratroops Division, Tri was dubbed King of Paratroopers. But he was better known under the less flattering sobriquet of King of Embezzlers, Gamblers and Whore-hoppers.

How did he go about his business? In 1970, when he was commander of the Third Corps Area and Military Governor of Saigon, he was appointed commander of the Saigon forces invading Cambodia. When his infantry and paratroop unit entered the rubber area of Chup and Mimot (20,000 hectares each) Tri lost no time appointing a special Task Force for requisitioning all property of the French plantation-owners and Cambodian local population. While the rest of his forces were being crushed under the artillery barrages and decimated by the ambushes of the VC, Tri efficiently fulfilled their assignment.

Soon, on the highway leading from Chup to the frontier and on to Saigon, long convoys of American-made military trucks with QC (Quan Canh: Military Police) escorts started rolling. Under the tarpaulins they carried 10-12 fat oxen or buffaloes apiece. About 4,000 head of cattle thus passed the frontier in one week. But what particularly enraged the French plantation-owners was the looting of their rubber stocks. Nearly a thousand tons of raw rubber were thus taken away by 200 truck convoys, this operation being given priority even over the evacuation of Tri's wounded soldiers. The bales bore inscriptions in French "Plantation Chup," or "Plantation Mimot."

After the warehouses were nearly emptied, aircraft were called in to drop incendiary and napalm bombs. Called to account by angry Cambodian senior officers, Tri answered with a shrug of the shoulders: "The latex is so inflammable! A few Viet Cong shells were enough to set it ablaze. As for the cattle, well, they just stampeded away when the battle started and we couldn't do a thing about it, could we?"

Cao Tri truly deserves the name his parents gave him, which means The Wily One. A captain of the 18th Infantry Division later supplied some details about the operation, in the course of a carousal: "Everything went like clockwork. The convoys were welcomed at the frontier by no less a figure than Brigadier Lam Quang Tho, commander of the 18th ID. Under his troops' protection, the goods were taken to points plotted beforehand on the map, from which they were later directed to secret warehouses or confidential middlemen. The security men couldn't lift a finger for the escort officers were all their senior in rank, majors or lieutenant-colonels, and moreover covered by mission orders signed either by General Do Cao Tri himself or his chief-of-staff Brigadier An. Such mission orders, as you can guess, are worth millions of piastres apiece."

At the peak of the Cambodian operation, Chinese merchants with a great flair for profitable deals went by night to the open-air markets in Go Dau Ha on the frontier and brought back truckloads of the plunder seized by General Tri's troops: woollen and silk fabrics, medicines, tobacco, watches, radio sets, bicycles, motorbikes, not to mention the innumerable household items taken by force from the population, down to the poorest strata. On General Tri's orders, electric generators were brought in to provide these thriving centres of business with all favourable conditions for carrying on their activities at night. And so, while the soldiers of the Third Paratroop Brigade and the 258th Marine Brigade were dying by the thousand at the foot of rubber trees, hundreds of thousands of US dollars, in greenbacks as well as in red (military-issue) dollars, kept streaming into the coffers of their commanding general.

But that was not all. There were even bigger windfalls. For instance two suitcases stuffed with bundles of bank-notes — US dollars, Saigon piastres, Cambodian *riels*, Lao *hips* — taken from the safes of the French rubber plantations and the pockets of the local population, and totalling, according to estimates by intelligence officers of the Third Corps Area, over four thousand million Saigon piastres. It was a great scandal and Saigon parliamentarians kicked up a shindy about it. But barely three days later, General Tri sharply upbraided them: "It's an unforgivable insult to generals in the field, and a slander aimed at staining the national prestige." The rebuke was accompanied by a challenge to Senator Pham Nam Sach to come to his headquarters in Bien Hoa to thrash out the matter by discussion and, if need be, by a pistol duel! Needless to say,

the Senator quickly drew in his horns, for he was not such a fool as to risk his life by entering the tiger's den. It was public knowledge that Tri enjoyed "President" Thieu's complete confidence and protection, and his truculence naturally knew no bounds. Indeed, the mere sight of him would frighten the ordinary citizen out of his wits: a burly figure with fierce features, jumbo-sized dark glasses, a black beret tipped at a sharp angle, and enormous pipe pugnaciously sticking out of a corner of his mouth from which came an unending flow of foul language, one hand waving a silver-tipped ebony swagger-stick, the other ready to whip out a .45-caliber Colt pistol at the least displeasure.

Tri's career had been meteoric. His climb from ordinary paratrooper in the French colonial army to major-general in Thieu's army had been all smooth sailing. Made commander of the most important of

the four Corps Areas of the Thieu regime, then commander-in-chief of the 50,000 Saigon troops invading Cambodia, he had good reasons to believe that his star would keep rising. Financially speaking he had made quite a few lucky strikes. In 1955 he had pocketed heaps of money in the operations ordered by Ngo Dinh Diem, his then master, against the Binh Xuyen. In late 1963, he was serving in the First Corps Area when Diem and his brother Nhu were liquidated at CIA instigation. Tri received orders from his new masters to arrest Diem's brother Ngo Dinh Can, the satrap of Central Trung Bo, whom he used to respectfully address as "Elder Uncle." Among the latter's confiscated property was a box of diamonds, the most precious item in the immense fortune of the "Tiger of Trung Bo." A Tri aide who was present when the box was seized recalls that his eyes goggled out of his head when Tri emptied it to count his booty: no less than 242 diamonds in all, of which 30 were of the first water and worth tens of thousands of dollars apiece.

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From 1965 onwards, as the war expanded, Tri's fortune also knew a fantastic rise. One of his younger brothers was appointed commander of the Bien Hoa sector, the family's native region. Another was given a lucrative job in the forestry administration while a third worked in the army's security forces, a good position from which to "protect" the business deals of the Do Cao clan. The Saigon press talked a great deal about the Do Cao "warlords" who, under the wings of General Tri, planned to become financial magnates as well.

In March 1972 General Tri's career came to an abrupt end when his helicopter, in which had also taken place his closest American advisers, was shot down by Tay Ninh guerillas soon after taking off from the Trang Lon airstrip.

It was reported that Thieu wept bitterly when accompanying Tri's remains to the military cemetery at Bien Hoa. The dollar-scented relationship between the two was well-known: a sizable part of the Thieu family's income came from Tri's contribution, through the channel of the "sisterly" rapport between Sau, Thieu's wife, and Kim Chi, Tri's third spouse, who incidentally was the daughter of Nguyen Huu Tri, the governor of Tonkin in French times.

Soon before his death, Tri had uttered what could be considered the profession of faith of the *Khaki Party* and the Saigon generals' guideline for action. The French journalist Jean Larteguy, who interviewed Tri in Tay Ninh town, recounts that after reminiscing about his past services to the French and his former superiors in the French colonial army -- Colonels Gilles and Vanuxem among others -- Tri talked about his philosophy of life. After drawing a long puff at the French cigarette Larteguy had offered him (the Frenchman gave him four more at his request to satisfy his nostalgic yearn for things French) Tri confided: "In war there are usually two kinds of people: Those who make it, and those who get rich from it. I do both. Yes sir, I make war and at the same time take fat profits from it." He burst out laughing and added sententiously: "Life is so short one should make the most of it!"

Four days later, Tay Ninh guerillas put an end to his life.

(To be continued)

THANH NAM

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(Continued)

10. The Highlands Satrap

DO Cao Tri died before he could fulfil his dream of commanding the big operation involving 40,000 troops into Highway 9 and Southern Laos, in replacement of Major-general Hoang Xuan Lam who was ill-fitted for the job (the Saigon press considered Lam to be at best suited for a regimental command). Almost at the same time a big scandal erupted around the name of General Ngo Dzu.

Ngo Dzu was called the Highlands Satrap. A major-general since 1968, he was appointed commander of the Second Corps Area, the largest, an immense region stretching from the mountains to the sea and containing tremendous wealth. It was populated by many ethnic minorities and looked upon as of great strategic value. A Saigon paper observed in 1970: "President Thieu's right hand, General Tri, holds Saigon, while his left hand, General Dzu, takes a firm grip of the Highlands."

Why then did Ngo Dzu fall into disfavour? The story, as circulated in the posh restaurants of Cholon, is as follows: It all began with an outburst of anger from President Nixon in May 1971. Drug-addiction had reached an alarming rate in the US expeditionary corps. A special report by the federal narcotics administration on drug-addiction among returned GIs as well as among the US expeditionary corps in South Viet Nam struck Nixon and his advisers with understandable anguish. The addiction rate was not a mere 15% as anticipated, but as high as 32%, and even 40% in the Americal Division. Other reports from American Congressmen, doctors and lawyers who visited South Viet Nam in June and July contained descriptions of a wretched state of affairs: depravation and indiscipline were rampant among the GIs, who refused to go to battle, murdered their mates and even killed their commanders. The reason for this was their disillusionment with the war, a murderous and meaningless war. This moral decay was spreading to American troops in Western Europe and the US itself. Panic-stricken members of Congress suspected a devilish trick of the adversary, whose "secret weapon consisted in having the drugs sold at dirt-cheap prices to the GIs through a network of ubiquitous pushers." Saigon newspapers also sounded the alarm: "A heroin war has surged in Viet Nam!"

Soon, however, a top-secret CIA report, which had been compiled by special agents and brought to Nixon by CIA chief Richard Helms personally, leaked out. The CIA men had come to the region dubbed Golden Triangle, which lies at the meeting-point of the frontiers of Viet Nam, Laos and Burma, where 1,200 tons of opium were being produced annually. They took a close look at the channels of distribution of the drug (including those run by the CIA itself, which link the place to Long Cheng, Vientiane and Bangkok) and concluded: "Heroin has been supplied to the GIs through the business undertakings of the Vietnamese (Saigon) generals." An appended list cited 42 names with functions and ranks, all pillars of Thieu's regime. Ngo Dzu's name topped the list.

After a full debate by the National Security Council of the mortal danger facing the American troops, President Nixon wrote a personal letter to Thieu in which he curtly demanded that an end be put to that systematic poisoning of the GIs and punishment be meted out to those who for the sake of base material interests were luring hundreds of thousands of their American "allies" to slow but certain destruction.

The content of the letter somehow leaked out. Major-general Ngo Dzu was greatly shocked or rather feigned great shock, and hastily came to Saigon for an "explanation" campaign in which he went so far as to challenge to a pistol duel anyone who "dared to drag in the mud the generals of the Republic and sully national prestige."

But no one was fooled. Anyone who set foot in Da Lat, the fashionable resort in the Central Highlands, knew in what kind of business the general had been engaging. You could hear it openly discussed in the lounges of the posh hotels, such as the Palace and the Lang Biang. In Da Lat you can easily get things that are rather hard to come by in Saigon: such costly drugs as "yellow" LSD pills could be had at 10,000 piastres a bottle; green ones at much lower prices. Tablets that are a mixture of mescaline and LSD, much sought after by wealthy revellers of both sexes, could be obtained in any amount. Prosperous American business executives and globetrotters are unanimous in their praise of Da Lat. The air is cool (never more than 16° C., day or night), the streams and pine groves beautiful. What is more, you can get things that are hard to obtain even in such places as Marseilles (France) and Los Angeles (USA), and at such low prices you couldn't believe your ears: Red Rock heroin (95% pure) costs two dollars a bottle (100 in the US); a packet of 20 filter-tipped marijuana cigarettes, 50 cents.

All the channels, big and small, were controlled by Ngo Dzu and his underlings. Thousands of tourists—American, French, West German, Japanese, Filipino, Indonesian,—were freely spending their dollars in Da Lat. They could drink and dance all night, go boating, play tennis, and for their orgies, rent luxurious villas or repair to plush night-clubs.

The lion's share of the dividends from those business naturally found its way into Ngo Dzu's pockets. In May 1971, the liberation forces attacked Da Lat. The Saigon army's military academy and staff college fell into their hands. The pleasure-seeking tourists hastily disbanded. They cursed Ngo Dzu who barely a month before had boasted that "never could the Viet Cong penetrate into Da Lat!"

However busy he was massacring local minority people (Ba Na and E De tribespeople especially) and herding them into "strategic hamlets," Ngo Dzu always found time to come to Da Lat at least once a week to supervise the work of his subordinates and to immerse himself in revelry. A colonel of the 22nd Infantry Division, who had occasion to accompany the general to his "headquarters," was quite impressed. The building was a luxurious villa which had belonged to Nguyen Huu Hao, the father-in-law of "Emperor" Bao Dai. Built on top of a hill with a fine view on neighbouring landscapes, it had changed masters several times: Bao Dai and his consort, French Governor General Decoux, the Japanese commander-in-chief in Indochina, French Marshal De Lattre de Tassigny and most recently, Ngo Dinh Nhu (brother and adviser to Ngo Dinh Diem) and his wife, Ngo Dinh Nhu, an opium-addict, had had a room on the second floor specially fitted out for his drug-taking sessions, during which he was able to enjoy a splendid view of pine-covered hills.

Along the Saigon—Da Lat highway, in such towns as Blao and Tung Linh, Ngo Dzu's men had set up whorehouses and opium and gambling dens, the resorts of playboys, most of them children of VIPs, scions of wealthy families, smugglers, and prosperous wholesale dealers in vegetables, one of the main products of Da Lat. All benefited from General Ngo Dzu's generous, but by no means disinterested, protection. International smugglers also maintained a close relationship with the satrap.

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Scores of quintals of processed opium were ferried by helicopter from a remote region in Luang Prabang to Pleiku, Kontum, Da Lat, Pakse, Long Cheng, from which they were distributed to the American clientele through the general's network of military transport.

In early 1971, while the Lam Son 719 operation into Southern Laos was running into deep trouble, Ngo Dzu, on Abrams's order, twice went by chopper to Pakse on the bank of the Mekong, the headquarters of the Fourth Military Region of the Vientiane army. There he met General Phasouk, commander of the Military Region and satrap of Bassac, a rich area of the Country of the Million Elephants, the colourful name by which Laos is often designated.

The two parties discussed prospects for incursions into the Saravan-Attapeu highlands in order to hamper the liberation forces' strategic supplies. But the plan was eventually abandoned for lack of troops and fear of annihilation. Yet, Ngo Dzu's time was by no means wasted. He concluded a fruitful deal with Phasouk whereby an opium—and heroin—ferrying line was set up between Pakse and Pleiku, and business progressed apace until the fall of Dakto and Tan Canh cost Ngo Dzu his post.

It was public knowledge that Dzu's father was the owner of an import-export undertaking with branches in many cities of Trung Bo: Quang Ngai, Da Nang, Qui Nhon... and of course had a finger in the heroin pie.

Ngo Dzu's greed knew no bounds. In this, he was a typical representative of the top brass of the Saigon regime. In 1970, he had thought out a scheme which fitted very nicely into Mr Nixon's plan for "Vietnamization." After the transfer by the American Fourth Infantry Division of a base at Duc Co to the Second Corps Area Command, Ngo Dzu ordered that the base be auctioned off, and the proceeds incorporated into the Corps Area's special fund. Anyone who has had occasion to pass by an American base knows that it is worth a great deal of money: hundreds of rows of military huts with pinewood beams and walls and tin roofs, air-conditioners, electric generators, radio and television sets, electric fans, safes, filing cabinets, costly plumbing, bath-tubs, duralumin-framed furniture, typewriters, mimeograph machines, etc. The American troops have lost the war, all right, but they remain none the less a modern and wealthy army. And the Americans are always very "generous" towards their "allies." On Washington's orders, all American bases in South Viet Nam, together with all their equipment and installations, are to be transferred to the Saigon army to help it "grow as strong as its big brother." But Ngo Dzu had his own conception of "Vietnamization." Within two weeks, everything at Duc Co had disappeared, sold off lock, stock and barrel. To whom? To the generals of course, their relatives, and their underlings. At about one-tenth of market prices. The lion's share naturally came to Ngo Dzu, whose million-dollar account in a Hong Kong bank grew noticeably fatter.

The subsequent "Vietnamization" of other American bases greatly benefited from the experience thus acquired. It no longer took as much as two weeks, but a mere two days to dismantle each of the American bases at Duc To, Le Thanh, Plei Mrong, An Khe... Long columns of military lorries had been assembled, outlets found, prices fixed. The Americans complained to General Cao Van Vien and "President" Thieu, but all they got was a polite, "Thank you, we'll have a look into the

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... matters. Of course both of Ngo Dzu's superiors were in the know but their mouths were kept tightly shut by means of enormous bribes, amounting to millions of piastres. Colby, the head of USAID, asked "Premier" Khiem to put an end to that "sabotage" and got this polite, but firm, rejoinder: "Once handed over to the Vietnamese side, the bases become Vietnamese property and the Vietnamese know best what to do with them." The only resort left to the infuriated Colby was to curse the "incompetent and venal generals" of Saigon.

It was the only case in which the Saigon top brass, who as a rule are at the Americans' beck and call, dared to defy them.

After the disaster at Tan Canh and Dakto in late April 1972, Ngo Dzu was recalled to Saigon, "pending investigation." He was often seen in company with General Hoang Xuan Lam, the general cashiered after the fall of Quang Tri, at the city sports club. Clad in immaculately white sports clothes, they were playing a lively game of tennis and enjoying it enormously.

Let military disaster follow military disaster. Let Saigon troops get their noses bloodied in one place after another. This in no way interfered with the generals' comfort. The only difference was that they now had plenty of time to enjoy the tremendous wealth they had amassed over the past decade or so thanks to the blood shed by their soldiers. The threatened "investigation and trial" did not worry them in the least. They knew it was a put-up job aimed at soothing public opinion and allaying the despair and bewilderment in the Saigon army. The worst that could happen to them would be their appointment to some ambassadorship abroad. A Saigon lawyer observed: "In this country the administration of justice follows a very strange course indeed. It's just beyond the ordinary man's grasp. The sentences meted out sometimes cause the accused to jump for joy, for they mean no punishment at all, but actual reward." Hoang Xuan Lam and Ngo Dzu could thus wait for their trials with tranquil hearts. New favour would no doubt be bestowed upon them by their boss, the leader of the *Khaki Party*: Nguyen Van Thieu.

The replacement of Ngo Dzu as head of the Second Corps Area was also carried out in typical Saigon fashion. The new appointed was Brigadier Nguyen Van Toan who, as commander of the Second Infantry Division in Quang Ngai, had been brought to book on several occasions for such offenses as the rape of a 12-year-old girl, looting civilian property in broad daylight, accepting several million piastres in bribe from a subordinate against the promise, never fulfilled, to promote him to higher rank, plundering tons of cinnamon bark, marketing them with the complicity of Hoang Xuan Lam's wife and sharing the proceeds with her, etc. It was clear that he was made Ngo Dzu's successor solely by virtue of his proven ability to run the profitable business set up by the latter on behalf of Thieu, Khiem, Vien and Co.

(To be continued)

THANH NAM

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(Continued)

11. — The four pillars of the corrupt regime

THE four pillars of the corrupt regime in Saigon stood in this order: Do Cao Tri, Dang Van Quang, Lu Lan and Dam Van Quang. All four were major-generals (Tri was posthumously promoted to be a four-star full general).

The higher your rank, and the bigger your power, the more mercilessly you rob the people—such is the law governing the Saigon administration and army. Let us take a quick look at the careers of "President" Thieu's four cronies.

Dang Van Quang used to be the commander of the Fourth Corps Area (the Mekong Delta) where he had had plenty of opportunity to plunder its rice. Lu Lan, formerly head of Quang Ngai province then commander of the Second Corps Area, was also notorious for his venality and especially for his looting of relief rice for flood victims. He is now inspector general at the Ministry of Defence. Dam Van Quang, formerly a staff sergeant in the French colonial army, was later promoted to be "Emperor" Bao Dai's aide-de-camp, then commander of his personal guard. In the American-financed regime in Saigon, he was put in command of the Special Forces and earned a solid reputation as a dollar trafficker, American aid embezzler, and inveterate gambler. He is now Lu Lan's deputy.

In the Saigon regime, where "corruption is the prime mover, fuel and lubricant of the State machinery," as admitted by one of its stalwarts, the four major-generals play indeed a major role. They maintain close and effective liaison between the satraps in the four Corps Areas, the Presidency and the General Staff. Having themselves worked in the various Corps Areas, they are quite conversant with all available opportunities for profitable businesses there.

How rich are they? It's difficult to say. An indicator is Dang Van Quang's boast in the course of a drinking bout that his own fortune had grown even larger than that of Nguyen Huu Co, the former Defence Minister and now a big bank owner, whose known wealth is believed to have passed the 6 million US dollars' mark. Each month Co and his wife draw two million Saigon piastres' rent from their real estate alone: a three-storeyed apartment house in Da Lat, 60 bungalows rented to Americans at the Nha Trang seaside resort, a luxurious villa in Vung Tau, two modern hotels in Saigon, etc. The real estate, according to the estimate of experienced building contractors, is worth billions of piastres. But the cash and bank accounts remain a well-guarded mystery. There are only a few eloquent pointers. For instance this story about Mrs Co, whose great passion is gambling. Once, having struck a bad streak, she lost 300,000 piastres in one single evening. Lighting a cigarette, she said casually, with a shrug of the shoulders: "It's nothing, nothing at all. The price of three soldiers."

What is certain is that the fortunes of the Saigon generals far surpass that of the Ngo Dinh Diem family, which in fact had been incorporated into theirs after Diem's fall in 1963. The so-called "confiscation of the Ngo clan's property for the benefit of the State" was just eyewash—the throwing away of a sprat to catch a whale.

Some of the staff of the Saigon Supreme Court know every nook and cranny of the affair, the files of which lie in their safes, but they prudently keep their mouths shut. They rarely talk about this ticklish subject, only in private conversations with trusted friends.

During their time in power, Diem, his brother Nhu, and Nhu's wife, Le Xuan, had their hand in just every profitable business in the land. They held the monopoly of the rice trade in Trung Bo and the export of such products as cinnamon bark, white sand (for glass making), scrap iron, rubber, frozen shrimp, duck feathers, etc. to Japan, Singapore, Hongkong, France, the USA; West Germany... which brought them several billion piastres each year in profit. The general manager was Diem's elder sister, Ca Le. At present this Pactolus flows into the pockets of Ngo Dzu, Hoang Xuan Lam, Dang Van Quang, and company.

One of Diem's achievements in "industrial development" was the setting up of the Tan Mai firm in Bien Hoa, which held the monopoly of timber exploitation and wood processing. A government decree forbade all trade in wood in order to "protect national wealth", i.e. this monopoly. Now the Tan Mai undertaking has been entrusted to a retired general, one of Dang Van Quang's cronies.

Diem possessed great interests in the textile industry. He held large shares in such undertakings as Intertexco, Dofitex, Vinatexco, and Vimitex. His brother, Bishop Ngo Dinh Thuc, owned the Cogido paper-mill in Bien Hoa, where he gave his blessings to 300 workers to compensate them for their starvation wages, the lowest in the trade. The mill has been developed into a large plant entrusted with "supplying paper for national defence" and is now firmly controlled by Generals Cao Van Vien and Lu Lan.

In the food industry, Madame Nhu in her tin had set up the Intraco Company, which owned a meat-packing factory in Gia Dinh, a fish-canning one in Phan Thiet, a zoo-hectare breeding area for lobsters in Vung Tau, a freezing plant for shrimps in Van Don (Saigon). The major shareholders in these undertakings are now senior officers in the Saigon General Staff.

Diem in his time was surrounded by such faithful servant-managers as Nguyen Van Buu, his own nephew, who ran the cinnamon and shrimp businesses in Trung Bo, or Nguyen Huu Khai, who supervised the vegetable-growing "cooperatives" in Lam Dong and the marketing of their products in Saigon or even as far as Singapore. The Saigon generals' retinue is much more numerous. It is made up of their brothers, nephews, cousins and of course their parents and wives. Not to mention their subordinates — staff officers and commissaries — who will do their utmost to please their bosses and get promoted to higher ranks.

The official title of Dang Van Quang: security adviser to the President, should not be taken too seriously. His job is rather to look after the security of the President's... purse, and to ensure a steady flow of income from his opium and political traffic. He works most of the time with Thieu's wife and manages the Thieu family's bank accounts in Rome and Berne. "A real Kissinger," quipped a journalist to a parliamentarian, who quickly replied: "Kissinger can't hold a candle to Quang as far as financial management for the boss is concerned."

The generals' spouses are at least as notorious as their husbands. The press often carries reports about visits paid by the First Lady of the Second Republic of Saigon (Thieu's wife), accompanied by such social luminaries as the wives of Generals Dang Van Quang and Lu Lan, to wounded soldiers at the Republican Hospital. "Charity" activities are a convenient screen for less innocent under-

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takings. Thus Mrs Thieu is president of the Women's Serve Society association, while Mesdames Quang, Lan and Quang are members of its central committee. The Saigonese are quick to point out that in fact they only serve their own private coffers by corrupting society. For their numerous financial deals they have an army of efficient aides and can devote most of their time to American-style orgies. They are numerous enough to form a special privileged stratum. For although there are only 137 generals (from brigadier up) the number of their consorts is much larger, perhaps a thousand or so. Once a brigadier-general was killed in battle; no less than eight widows came to his funeral (it was the first time they ever met), from places as distant as Da Nang, Hue, Da Lat, Can Tho and one from each of three Saigon districts. Each tried to express her grief louder than the others, hoping thereby to justify claim to a larger share of the 600-million-piastre heritage.

As said about, "charity" is the favourite occupation of the generals' wives. Victims of natural calamities, war refugees, widows and orphans are the object of their watchful solicitude. Indeed they are watching for the least typhoon that may swoop down on their unfortunate compatriots. Not that they are much concerned about their fate. But they are terribly interested in the share that they never fail to get from the relief funds collected: usually no less than 60 per cent.

These last few years, Dam Van Quang has been entrusted by Thieu with the problem of the oilfields. With a bulging brown leather briefcase under his arm, Quang often comes to meet the American oil experts at USAID headquarters. Indeed he is the liaison man between Thieu and the big American oil companies. Together with Thieu and some of the Saigon top brass, he dreams of becoming an oil magnate in Southeast Asia. Oilmen come to Saigon from all corners of the world. From the Boeing 717s which land at Tan Son Nhut airport there alight prosperous-looking businessmen from the USA, France, West Germany, the Netherlands, Japan, Australia and even Indonesia. This has become a veritable rush, in contrast to the relative discretion of a few years ago, when American oil executives passed themselves off as mere tourists and went home after a period of three to six months. During their stay, they lived in hotels, in rented villas, or at the headquarters of Shell, Caltex or Standard Oil Saigon branches.

A special department at USAID studies the natural wealth of South Viet Nam, oil in particular. In early 1971, sensational news was unofficially "leaked," from that department: South Viet Nam was literally floating on an ocean of oil. Wherever you drill, so it was rumoured, in the Central Highlands, in Trung Bo, in the Mekong Delta, oil gas would gush forth. What is more, the oil was said to be of the low-sulphure kind, highly valued in the industrially developed countries, which are particularly sensitive to the menace of pollution. In the posh restaurants and cabarets, American, Dutch and Japanese politicians and businessmen whispered into each other's ears thrilling hints of the fabulous importance of the prospective oilfields: the reserves were estimated to be a hundred, nay, a thousand times bigger than those of the Middle East. A striking simile was circulated: the Middle East oil deposits when compared with the South Vietnamese ones would look like a stamp stuck on the rump of an elephant. These rumours were in fact discreet calls by Bunker and Thieu addressed to American business circles, who were urged to invest in a field where nothing concrete had really been found.

In the latter part of 1971, more "men of good will" came by the hundred, people ready to "help" the country move away from its economic backwardness. Their briefcases were stuffed with maps and blueprints about the sites of future wells, pipe-lines, storage tanks, refineries and plants producing all kinds of goods from oil. To these 27

the hundreds of thousands of GIs who had laid down their lives would not have died in vain. A luxurious Esso headquarters rose on Thong Nhat boulevard opposite the "Independence Palace". In late 1970, Thieu had promulgated Decree 11-70 which laid down rules and conditions, very liberal ones indeed, for foreign companies to conduct surveys and open up oil wells on an area totalling 400,000 square kilometres. "An outright gift to foreign investors," estimated a Lybian oil expert. The Saigon press quickly pointed out: "President Thieu is ready to sell out the whole of the country's wealth for just a few score million dollars in anticipation of the day when he will leave the country for a comfortable exile in Switzerland."

However, in spite of all efforts by Thieu to cajole and entice foreign investors, USAID and the Saigon Economics Ministry were unanimous in recognizing that the undertaking, far from progressing at a "cosmic" speed, was proceeding at a snail's pace.

In the early part of 1972, an elderly American wearing gold-rimmed spectacles could be seen taking a walk every afternoon along the tree-lined Thong Nhat boulevard. He looked tired and worried. He was a top-ranking expert of the American Bristol oil company, who had been in Saigon for several years and had kept in close touch with Thieu and Quang. Once he confided to a Vietnamese friend in the Saigon Economics Ministry:

"Safety, absolute safety, that's what we need. You know what has been happening in the Middle and Near East. Let trouble erupt and the oil wells will go up in flames. Oil and bombs should be widely separated. Both are inflammable!" He added with a wry smile: "There may be an oil war, but in actual life oil shouldn't be too close to war!" A pause, then he continued: "Absolute political stability, that's the second thing we need. The nationalizations effected by those new governments in South America have been hard blows to us. Unfortunately both the things we require, safety and stability, can't be found here." He looked at his friend who seemed lost in thought, and explained: "Trading in oil is not like trading in heroin. We have to build big storage tanks and long pipelines. No amount of armed guards could ensure their absolute safety. A two-pound explosive charge could cause billions of dollars' worth of oil to go up in smoke. Mr Bunker's bunker itself has been proved not to be immune from attack. What about oil tanks? How could we think of setting up business here?" He looked discouragingly to the north, where according to a recent MACV communiqué the fuel and ammunition depots at Cam Ranh had been burning for several days, then to the west, where several million litres of gasoline at an Esso storage depot near Phnom Penh had vanished into thick black smoke.

The dream harboured by Thieu and his cronies to become oil magnates has also vanished. Perhaps this is the reason why they are more than ever persuaded that the most fruitful trade they could engage in remains the banter of the cannonfodder constituted by their soldiers against American greenbacks. With "Vietnamization" being pursued by the Americans, the Saigon soldiers' dead bodies remain the principal source of dollar dividends for the leaders of the *Khaki Party*.

(To be continued)

THANH NAM

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(Continued)

12.—Inside the Dragon's Head Palace

The *Khaki Party* had no officially proclaimed leader. But the Saigonese know very well who is at the top. In fact they know all about his past and present. Bunker has been warmly praised by Nixon for the acumen he displayed when he put that man in the Dragon's Head Palace.

When in late 1963, Ngo Dinh Diem was made way with at CIA instigation, the Americans found themselves in a quandary. Coup followed coup at such a tempo that, as said an English newspaper, "no one knows on waking up each morning what government has come to power." It was then that Bunker made his judicious choice of a man worthy of the confidence of the "free world." He was the "statesman" Nguyen Van Thieu. Of course there were a few snags. For instance the fact that Thieu had been staff sergeant in the French colonial army. It was rather awkward to put an understrapper of the French colonialists at the top of the government of an "independent nation." But Thieu knew how to make up for his shortcomings.

Before becoming the bellwether of the *Khaki Party* Thieu had fed on corn from every bin. He had been a member of the Dai Viet Party, then had joined the Labour and Personalism Party of Ngo Dinh Nhu, and called himself a Buddhist before becoming a fervent Catholic, in order to please the then President Diem as well as his own Catholic wife. A complete and succinct description of Nguyen Van Thieu could be found in this conversation he might have with an imaginary interlocutor: "Are you a Dai Viet?"—"Sure." "And a member of the Labour and Personalism Party as well?"—"Of course." "A follower of Ngo Dinh Diem?"—"Yes." "Didn't you oppose Diem?"—"Why shouldn't I?" "Are you a Catholic?"—"You bet." "And a Buddhist too?"—"Correct." And so on and so forth...

Saigon politicians have dubbed Thieu "The Master Turncoat," for his skill in forsaking the French for the Americans, Diem for Minh, Minh for Khanh, etc. and in taking care of number one. Once he made common cause with Lam Tan Phat and Duong Ngoc Lam but left them in the lurch when the going got tough. The deputy Ngo Cong Duc calls him the "Six-faced Die."

Thieu has just turned 49. News leaked out from the "Dragon's Head Palace" said that as preparations were under way for a tremendous birthday party for the "President," everything was spoilt by the gloomy reports from Highway 9 where all the strong points built by the Saigon army had collapsed. And so, when the festivities were held on the night of April 5, 1972, to mark the entry of the "President" into the 50th year of his life full of intrigues and plots, the whisky drunk for the toasts tasted like gall and wormwood. And no wonder, said a soothsayer with a political turn of mind living on Confucius Road, for this year will prove to be one of hoodoo for the "President."

Thieu attracted the Americans' attention as early as the days when he was attending military training courses at Fort Leavenworth in the USA. He was

interviewed by General Taylor personally. Ever since then he has tried hard to groom himself for a career as a "statesman." For instance, he avoids drinking and revelling in public. But his political machinations are far from innocent.

What Nixon and his proconsul Bunker have been seeking has been a Diem government without Diem, a Diem line without Diem. There are many pointers. The role played by Tran Kim Tuyen for instance.

After Diem and his brother Nhu met their death in an American-made armoured car, people say that their evil spirits jointly appeared in human form in the person of their former aide Tran Kim Tuyen. Tuyen had built and controlled the whole network of secret agents of the Ngo dynasty and was notorious for his machiavellian schemes. In late 1967, after his entry into the "Dragon's Head Palace," Thieu got Tuyen out of prison and had him installed in a luxurious villa linked to the Presidential office by a direct telephone line. Tuyen thus became a major, albeit hidden, Presidential adviser. People see his hand in such murky affairs as the murder of Professor Nguyen Van Bong and the ouster of such right-hand men of Nguyen Cao Ky as Le Nguyen Khang,

governor of Saigon, and Linh Quang Vien, Minister of the Interior, at a time when Ky himself, as Vice-President, was having his office in the same palace as Thieu. More recently, when Ky and Big Minh were prevented from competing with Thieu in the one-man "presidential" race — that brazen act of dictatorship in the midst of a show of "democracy" — the credit for that cunning scheme also went partly to Tran Kim Tuyen.

Thieu lives in the "Independence Palace," also dubbed by the Saigonese "Dragon's Head Palace," protected by stringent security measures. The iron fence which had been partly knocked down in the Spring of 1968 has been replaced and reinforced. Two heavy M.48 tanks stand by in a corner of the grounds in the shade of mango trees, as well as three grey-painted HU.1 helicopters further to the left. In the backyard, two M.113 armoured personnel carriers point their heavy machine guns outward. Both vehicles and pedestrians are banned from Huyen Tran street, which runs along the back side of the palace. The nearby Ong Thuong stadium and Tao Dan park have been turned into a huge camp, where 200 paratroopers in camouflaged uniform and armed with quick-firing M.16 submachineguns have pitched tents, together with clusters of jeeps and military lorries. Policemen, clad in white in the daytime and olive drab at night, patrol the surrounding streets. They are armed cap-a-pie and number at least two battalions, for surveillance over an area of less than one square kilometre. Behind each tree, lurk two or three uniformed policemen. As for the plainclothes men, their number is difficult to ascertain.

Quite memorable were the security measures taken at Thieu's inauguration on October 31, 1971. In front of the "Independence Palace," along Thong Nhat boulevard stood no less than 42,000 troops and police under the direct command of Brigadier Cao Hao Hon, assistant to the Interior Minister. They were there to ensure safety for the less than 10,000 people who attended the ceremony: high-ranking functionaries, foreign guests and American officials. As for the 3.5 million Saigonese, they were kept behind close doors, the

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continued

best way of the man whom Nixon had just praised as "one of the major leaders in Asia."

After crossing the lawn and the flower-beds, where "Longevity" chrysanthemums are grown, we enter the main hall. Behind immense doors of polished wood is the ceremonial room where big receptions are usually held, attended by such pillars of the regime as Ambassador Bunker, Generals Abrams and Weyand, the director of USAID, Saigon generals with their bejewelled spouses and senior officers of "allied" armies: South Korea, the Philippines, New Zealand, Australia, Thailand... sporting Saigon medals awarded them for their "exploits" in massacring South Vietnamese civilians. In short, the cream of Saigonese society, viewed from the angle of Thieu and Co. But intelligent and honest people hold quite different views. A Saigon lawyer, for instance, has called the habitués of such gatherings "a refuse heap that the people will sweep away."

At the far end of the ceremonial room stand a pair of elephant tusks in a glasscase. Next to it is a door of polished wood which leads into Thieu's office. The floor is covered by a red carpet. Thieu sits behind an immense desk of bulky shape, in an armchair upholstered in flowered silk, with a cushion to support his aching back. Here Thieu discusses "State affairs" with his close advisers. Topping the list is Hoang Duc Nha, his press secretary and number-one counsellor. Others are Nguyen Phu Duc, his mentor on foreign affairs, Dang Van Quang, family adviser, and Nguyen Ngoc Linh, former director of Viet Tan Xa, the Saigon official news agency, now a millionaire whose wily schemes are greatly appreciated. Thieu's son-in-law, Trang Si Tan, has recently been admitted to those meetings, where the most notorious frame-ups of the "Second Republic" have been thought out. They have resulted in the arrests of Tran Ngoc Chau, secretary general of the Lower House; Truong Dinh Dzu, Thieu's runner-up in the presidential race of 1967;

Au Truong Thanh; and the bonze Thich Thien Minh, later sentenced to ten years of hard labour and five of solitary confinement...all for their anti-war attitudes. Also in this room have been devised such cunning schemes as the law which compelled all presidential candidates to produce evidence of support by at least 40 members of the "National Assembly" or 100 members of provincial councils -- a hurdle which tripped Nguyen Cao Ky even before the race began. Ky was so embittered that even now, in his Nha Trang retreat, he often clenches his teeth in the midst of a tennis game and gives the ball a whacking blow accompanied by a curse addressed to that "s.o.b. Thieu!"

Other decisions, adopted on direct instructions from the Americans, are taken in another room, on the second floor of the left wing. It is a big drawing-room with furniture upholstered in purple velvet and light-yellow carpeting. Every time he comes, Bunker would stalk straight down the corridor, up the stairs and into the room, followed by his host, who walks with a bad limp due to sciatica. Hoang Duc Nha alone is allowed to be present at such meetings.

Political circles in Saigon have been wondering whether Hoang Duc Nha is the man of Thieu, or Bunker, or both. While Thieu puts up a show of filial respect for Bunker, he is often annoyed at the latter's peevishness. Thieu is Hoang Duc Nha's maternal uncle. Nha received thorough training in the United States from the age of 25 to 28 (he is

now 37) at Stamford and Pittsburgh universities, majoring in history and economics. A taciturn man with eyes hidden behind thick-lenses, he is a reputedly ambitious and wily politician. He and Thieu completely agree on this guideline for action: The end justifies the means. This highly practical motto perfectly suits the taste of the Americans, but contributes to the accusation brought against Thieu by his political opponents, who consider him a treacherous and unscrupulous individual. "After shaking hands with Thieu," they say, "you'd better make sure you still have all your fingers left."

Even now Thieu's participation in the November 1963 coup, which overthrew Ngo Dinh Diem, remains a complete mystery. It is true that at dawn on November 2, 1963, two battalions of the 5th Infantry Division under Thieu's command did launch an assault on the "Independence Palace," but by that time Diem and his brother Nhu had escaped to Cho Lon. At 7 in the morning, when Big Minh made a triumphant entry into the palace grounds, on the spur of the moment he hugged Thieu and pinned two stars on the collar of his uniform. Thieu thus became the only Saigon colonel ever promoted major-general without passing through the rank of brigadier. However, officers of the 5th ID gave another version of what had happened. When Thieu ordered his troops to move to Saigon from Bien Hoa on the afternoon of November 1, according to these officers, he had told them: "Duong Van Minh has staged a rebellion. We must come to Saigon to save the President (i.e. Diem)."

Recently, on the occasion of the 8th anniversary of the death of Diem and Nhu (November 1, 1971), Thieu himself gave this account: "On the morning of November 2, when I opened the door of that M.113 armoured personnel carrier and saw the bodies of His Excellencies Diem and Nhu lying in a pool of blood, I stood at attention, took off my cap, and shed tears of sorrow." Could it be that for once he was telling the truth? If so, he had switched his loyalty from Diem to the putschists only when the former's fate appeared to be sealed.

In December 1964, barely a year later, he received his third star from the hands of Nguyen Khanh as a reward for his betrayal of Duong Van Minh. But just at the time when he was fawning upon Nguyen Khanh, he was already plotting with General Lam Van Phat and his friends Duc, Ton and Thao to overthrow his boss. When the scheme was discovered, Thieu quickly disengaged himself. In answer to Phat's revelation about his participation in the conspiracy, Thieu flatly said that it was only a ruse which had allowed him to penetrate the dark designs of the "rebels." He even became a member of the court-martial which sent his former "comrades" to face the firing squad.

(To be continued)

THANH NAM

(Continued)

Of all the schemes hatched in the "Dragon's Head Palace" the most heinous is incontrovertibly the invitation extended to the US to send a 500,000-strong expeditionary corps to South Viet Nam. It accounts for the nickname of "Le Chicu Thong of the Second Republic" given to Thieu by the Saigonese. Le Chicu Thong, let us recall, is that felonious prince who towards the end of the 18th century called in Tsing troops to help him save his regime in decomposition, and whose name has become a byword for cowardice and treason.

Still alive in the people's memory is that picture of Thieu and his crony Nguyen Huu Co standing on the flight-deck of the aircraft-carrier *Independence* in mid-1966. Thieu was putting his signature to a 500-pound bomb which was to be dropped on North Viet Nam by American aircraft. The American generals present nodded approval but eye-witnesses recount that many of the sailors hooted or spat. That signature put on an engine of death can never be forgotten by the Saigonese, and especially by those who had come from the North and still have relatives and friends there.

Thieu's financial deals go hand in hand with his political machinations. He is the leader of a new class of men in military uniform who hold sway over the country's economic and financial resources. The size of his bank accounts is of course a well-guarded "State secret." But indiscretions from his entourage give us some rough idea of his wealth.

When he was the colonel commanding the 5th Infantry Division stationed north of Saigon in the years 1962-63, Thieu once boasted to his chief-of-staff that he had a nest-egg of some 20,000 US dollars tucked away in a Hongkong bank, the equivalent of eight million Saigon piastres. By the time he became chairman of the "National Leadership Committee," that bank account had swollen to at least fifty times that amount, and his wife, in one of her trips abroad, went to Rome, ostensibly to visit the Vatican, in fact for financial operations, which involved important deposits in Italian banks and the purchase of a large villa in the western suburbs of that capital city. In 1966, some representatives back from a foreign tour supplied hints of the princely life led by Nguyen Van Hieu, Saigon ambassador to Australia and Thieu's elder brother. In French and Japanese colonial times, Hieu was a notoriously cruel and corrupt mandarin in Yen Dinh, Thieu Hoa and Ninh Thuan. Now besides his "diplomatic" functions, he makes trips by PanAm jets to Paris, Rome, Geneva, etc. to look after the overseas financial interests of the Thieu clan, dropping casual remarks about "my brother the President" at diplomatic cocktail parties.

Nguyen Van Kieu, Thieu's younger brother, was at one time head of the "Relief Funds to Flood Victims in Trung Bo" and is now widely travelling abroad to prepare for the comfortable "withdrawal" of the whole Thieu tribe to Taiwan or Switzerland.

A relative newcomer to the "Independence Palace" (*Dinh Doc Lap* in Vietnamese, and often read by Saigon wags as *Dinh Co Lap*, or Isolation Palace) is Trang Si Tan, the lieutenant-colonel commanding the city police and the right-hand man of the pimp mayor Do Kien Nhieu (see *supra*). He is Thieu's son-in-law and has been dubbed "Prince Consort of the Nguyen Court." He is a swarthy, burly fellow, with slant eyes and a breath reeking of alcohol. His special skill resides in torturing, which he does with cold-blooded ingenuity. Besides such routine business as the electricity or water torture, he relishes such sadistic practices as sticking US-made needles into the nipples of girl students suspected of anti-Thieu feelings. It is due to such beastly "innovations" that from a police underling he has

risen to his present position and can look forward to being promoted a full police colonel pretty soon.

Each Monday, Wednesday, and Friday morning the sentries at "Isolation Palace" would see a black Mercedes and a dark-blue Mercury drive past the gate into the grounds of the palace. There would alight from them Dang Van Quang, Do Kien Nhieu and Trang Si Tan. At these regular meetings, usually chaired by Hoang Duc Nha, Thieu's press secretary and closest adviser, they would discuss the security situation in the city, with special reference to the stability, or rather instability, of the Presidential posture, and how to remedy it. The agenda is a crowded one, for new headaches crop up every day. Anti-American feeling has run so high lately that Bunker has ordered the 30,000 or so Americans still in the city "to avoid all contacts and clashes with the Vietnamese, to beware of linguistic misunderstandings, and to make themselves scarce whenever some ugly incident involving Americans occur." Also on the rise has been open opposition to Thieu ever since he scored that walk-over in the infamous one-man presidential race. The number of "recalcitrant and uncooperative" deputies has shot up while "insolent" editorials have been appearing regularly on over 40 daily publications. Thieu's advisers are also preoccupied with the attitude of the intellectuals -- lawyers, doctors, professors... In their retreats in Hoc Mon, Thu Duc, or Go Vap, they have suddenly ceased to devote their time to raising song-birds and wild orchids, as they have been doing in recent months to show their coldness to the regime. Now they start engaging in heated political debates, in which such explosive remarks as the following have been heard: "It's impossible to live with the present regime!" -- "This regime is a challenge to human dignity!" -- "To sit with folded arms is to condone crime!" etc. A priest, Truong Ba Can, writes in the *Dien Tin*: "Mr Thieu is the only obstacle on the road to peace." A bonze, the Venerable Giap Duc: "Thieu is the war president." Others, like the Catholic priests Chan Tin, Nguyen Dinh Thi and Nguyen Viet Khai, denounce the Saigon regime as "rootless," "anti-national," while praising the achievements of the North. Small wonder that on orders from Thieu, a veritable war has been started against the press. Small wonder too that, following each of the above-mentioned meetings of his right-hand men, more people are flung into jail or sent to the penal island of Con Son (Poulo Condor). The *Khaki Party* is fast becoming the Cudgel Party, whose very survival depends solely on repression -- naked, unscrupulous, brazen-faced repression.

In this veritable war, Thieu has attained new records: in May alone, he ordered the confiscation of no less than 165 newspaper issues, the highest peak in his crackdown on the press so far. Indeed he had no choice, for the press has been publishing highly "subversive" stuff. For instance, this item in *Dan Chu Moi* (New Democracy) which follows a scathingly ironical essay on "The GI Problem": "The children in the North dig their own air-raid shelters, wear plaited-straw protective helmets, feed on cassava, and successfully stand up to American aircraft. They truly spring from a heroic people!"

In the "war against students," the Thieu administration has ordered the arrest of such student leaders as Bui Chi, secretary general of the Association of Creative Students, in Hue, and Nguyen

Continued

Duy Hien, the capital of the South, in the same city, together with over 300 other students. Still another war, that "against the Third Force" has been waged against those who stand for peace, neutrality, and national concord, whose numbers have been increasing among intellectuals and other strata, including deputies and religious leaders. But the most fiercely waged of them all has been the war against the over three million Saigonese with a view to press-ganging ever more people and grabbing ever more wealth for the war against the patriotic forces, which threatens to bring about the collapse of the whole regime. More than 200,000 civilians have been pressed into the army and inflation has passed the 200 billion piastres mark. These staggering figures are the topics of heated discussions among the Saigonese for the policies worked out in the "Dragon's Head Palace" are depleting their already very lean pocketbooks, and threatening not only their livelihood but their very lives and those of their dear ones. This is the thing that is likely to toll the knell of the Nguyen Van Thieu dynasty.

While alarming reports have been streaming into the "Independence Palace" from every quarter, rumour has it that the relationship between the American proconsul and "President" Thieu has become heavily tinged with bitterness. Thieu and his aides, Quang and Nha, have been perusing the newly-disclosed secret papers of the Pentagon, particularly the chapters on the decisions taken by President Kennedy in the course of those five fateful meetings of the National Security Council held in the period from August to November 1963, which resulted in a plan to overthrow Diem and Nhu, an operation which was to be headed by a CIA chieftain and to involve many generals of the Diem army itself.

In the light of those documents, the praise recently bestowed upon Thieu by President Nixon: "You are a talented leader, equal to your responsibility, etc." took on a sinister meaning when one recalls a similar commendation given to Diem by President Kennedy.

Over the past few years, Thieu has never failed to order fairly sumptuous commemorative ceremonies on the occasion of the anniversary of Diem's death. Requiem masses are as a rule held at the Church of the Virgin Mary. On October 1, 1971, when a 400-strong procession marched out from the Church along Hai Ba Trung boulevard to the cemetery on Mac Dinh Chi street for a wreath-laying ceremony at Diem's grave, Thieu's wife distinguished herself by the particular loudness with which she vented her grief. The Saigonese were not surprised, for they knew that the tears were in fact being shed over the impending doom of the Thieu regime itself.

The Saigon press has made this observation about three outstanding sites in the city: the "Independence Palace," the American Embassy, and the Mac Dinh Chi cemetery. These three symbolic places are all situated in the same district and are separated by equal distances (about one kilometre), which causes them to stand at the apexes of an equilateral triangle. Incidentally, the Mac Dinh Chi cemetery used to be called the "Cemetery of the French Ghost."

(to be continued)

THANH NAM

(Concluded)

13.—TWILIGHT OF A REGIME

SAIGON, May 1972.
 Long convoys of military trucks are bringing wounded soldiers back from An Loc through Lai Khe. They are heading for the Republican Hospital.

Highway 4, which leads to the provinces, is blocked for long hours at a time.

On the morning of the 10th, the whole city is astir. Martial law has been clamped down on the whole of the territory of South Viet Nam, a measure without precedent over the past 25 years. Even in Diem's time, only a state of emergency was sometimes decreed. At nightfall, the streets are all deserted.

The draft, which hits men from the age of 17 to 43, set the town agog. The press remarks: "It takes everyone, from striplings to hoary heads."

US Vice-President Spiro Agnew sent to Viet Nam on an inspection tour, thought he could not stay in Saigon overnight for security reasons. On hand at the airport to greet a worried and irritable Agnew was Thieu, who had suddenly grown old. In late 1970, he had had to dye a mass of his hair at the back of his head a dignified grey so as to make him look more like the venerable "father of the Republic" he had been trying to set himself up as. But since then, no dye had any longer been necessary to turn part of his head white.

One Friday morning, the Proconsul Bunker flew by helicopter from his fortress-embassy to the Tan Son Nhut airfield to welcome General Alexander Haig, the security assistant of President Nixon, who had come on a fact-finding mission. Bunker's back was hunched up and his cheeks were sagging. He didn't even bother to wave a greeting to the American officials present. He is too old, people say, nearly 80, and too much depressed by the impending doom of his President's policy of "Vietnamization." It is rumoured that he is about to retire. His greatest grief has been his failure to build a viable political party in Saigon, one which has a broad popular base and might serve as a "Labour and Personalism" party without its bellwether Diem. The *Khaki Party*, his pampered child, has been a big flop.

Talking to a friend in a small villa in Thu Duc, a college professor said: "The Old Fridge can't sleep because of the deterioration in the military situation, and he has been crying over the political decomposition that has taken place." The professor was of course right. The Americans want the Saigon generals to fight the patriots, but all they care for is their coffers. Of the four Corps Area commanders, one, Tri, has been burnt to ashes in his downed helicopter; two, Lam and Dzu, have been dismissed and are awaiting trial. The fourth and only one remaining, Truong, has been hastily sent from the Mekong Delta to the northernmost provinces of Tri-Thien. But Truong is only an incompetent swashbuckler. An American officer at MACV says: "Truong is a hot-headed bully, whose only way to get himself obeyed by his men is to bawl insults at them and threaten them with prison and firing squad."

Things are even worse on the political front. Ever since his "triumph" in the one-man presidential race, Thieu has turned practically every man against him. Most of the "Senators" oppose him and his valets. The press clamours: "The regime is dying. It has reached the lowest depth of infamy. We are witnessing the twilight of the Thieu regime." And a doctor who has kept abreast of the situation asserts: "For Thieu the situation is beyond retrieve. He is but a political corpse which has started rotting."

During a Senate session at the *Dien Hong Hall*, a Senator shouted: "The Americans have brought Thieu to power. It is now up to them to remove him from office. When the roar of American B.52s and the millions of tons of American bombs stops, then the Vietnamese will be able to hear the voices of each other."

But in his *Isolation Palace*, Thieu is not resigned to his fate. More and more people have been

arrested by his police. In the old imperial city of Hue, nearly 300 students were rounded up in one single night and taken Heaven knows where. In Saigon, a stifling atmosphere prevails in all eleven districts. Police Chief Trang Si Tan is flinging himself about. At police headquarters, all detention rooms are filled to capacity and in the torture chambers near the Zoo, the lights are on all night.

The Saigon government needs 200 billion piastres to rebuild its badly-battered army. Little is left of American aid, and so slogans are put out for "self-reliance" and "Vietnamization." A hundred new taxes are decreed. Business slumps. It becomes ever harder to earn one's bowl of rice.

The nights are still. The streets are empty. A storm is brewing. In the workers' quarters at Khanh Hoi and Lo Sieu, the children are singing:

*To stand on our own feet
 And have enough to eat
 Let's topple Thieu
 And knock down his whole gang.*

Saigon under Thieu in 1972 is just like Saigon under Diem in 1963, say many people. The same chaos and tension, the same stifling, unbearable atmosphere.

There is one difference, though: anti-Americanism, i.e. the disgust at, scorn for, hatred of and opposition to the Americans, has become even more open and widespread.

Over the last five or six years of contact with "GI civilization," the Saigonese have come to realize more fully than ever that nothing can be more precious than the spiritual values of one's own nation. Material wealth unaccompanied by a spirit of independence and self-respect only leads to moral ruin. Many school and college students, who formerly liked, believed in, and admired the Americans, now turn against them and enthusiastically join movements with such slogans as: "Let's go back to our nation's roots" and "Let's speak to our compatriots and listen to them." They want to cause the stream of the people's strength to gush forth even more strongly and to immerse themselves in it.

Here is what a patriotic woman teacher said in the course of a recent meeting: "How fortunate that after such a long occupation by US troops our fellow-countrymen still stick to their national *baba* silk garments, relish their milk-apples and mangoes, love their fragrant rice and sweet folk melodies... How fortunate that neither American miniskirts, Californian rice, nor GI music have succeeded in catching their fancy."

continued

When, following the fall of Quang Tri to the liberation troops, Thieu had to go there to try to bolster up his troops morale, the conversations in Saigon tea-houses naturally turned to this topic. People said to each other: "Nixon is asking for more cannonfodder, and Thieu has of course to comply. Now is the time for him to repay his debt to the American President. Over the past few years, the GIs have died by the hundred of thousands for Thieu to remain in the Independence Palace. Now, it is the turn of Thieu's soldiers to die for Nixon to remain in the White House." What a penetrating remark! It hits the nail on the head: many American and Saigon soldiers have indeed paid with their lives for the consolidation of two wobbly presidential seats on either side of the Pacific!

SOS calls keep coming from Saigon generals in Tri Thien, in the Central Highlands, in An Loc, Binh Dinh and other places. They are so busy fighting for their lives that they have to put a temporary halt to their wheeling and dealing. The whole of that social stratum, which we shall call the *military-comprador, bureaucratic clique* and which includes all the infamous members of the *Khaki*

Party, has been thrown into confusion and bewilderment. For years, they have drawn comfort and support from American money and troops. Now, dollars are coming only in dribbles and many GIs have left. The backbone of that clique is now made up of the 13 puppet regular divisions. But seven or eight vertebrae of that backbone have already been smashed. The pillars of the *Khaki Party* turn their anxious look to the Independence Palace, Thieu's residence. They know that if Thieu goes, nothing can save the *Khaki Party*, which has neither popular roots nor following, from immediate collapse.

In the sweltering days of this summer, neither Thieu nor his henchmen seem to have much confidence left in each other and in their American and Vietnamese friends. In early May, Thieu's wife again set out on trips to Italy and Switzerland and the generals began accelerating the flow of their money transfers to Hongkong and France. At the booking office of Air Viet Nam at No. 116, Nguyen Hue street, wives and children of VIPs are queuing up, lugging heavy suitcases. The Boeings and Caravelles flying to Hongkong, Paris and Rome are full to capacity. In the Lower House of Parliament, deputy Do Sinh Tu shouted: "While appealing to all of us to fight to the bitter end, why should Mr Thieu be sending his wife and his money abroad? Let him stop doing it!"

It is very difficult indeed for Thieu and other members of the *Khaki Party* to comply. Every morning, at 4:30 sharp, the people in the whole of District One of Saigon city can hear the engine of a chopper revving up: it is the special HU.1 helicopter on standby duty on the grounds of the presidential palace. It is piloted by a captain who is a nephew of Mrs Thieu's. And here is the message that the noise of its engine is carrying to all Saigonese: "I, President Thieu, am still here. So beware. And let me tell you this: If it comes to pinch, I won't rush headlong into a tunnel, like that fool Diem, and die like a rat. I will just hop off in that American helicopter!"

There is enough room in the helicopter for Thieu, his wife, his financial manager Dang Van Quang, his police chief and son-in-law Trang Si Tau, and his close adviser Hoang Duc Nha, who has sworn to swim or sink with him. On the navigation charts these routes have been carefully plotted: Saigon-Bangkok (from which PanAm flights could be taken to Paris, Geneva, etc.) and Saigon-Yankee Station (where American aircraft carriers are standing by).

10 p.m. Sirens start howling, announcing the troops remain in the streets. Military and civilian police stalk about. The US embassy is a windowless fortress. The MACV headquarters is in a bustle. The USAID building is astir. The "Independence Palace" looks strangely isolated, as the night descends on Saigon.

The men living in those headquarters, building and palace are lumped together by the Saigonese under one designation: "that gang." As the 3 million Saigonese go to bed, they wish with all their hearts that in the morning, when they wake up, they will find their city swept clean of "that gang" which have been proliferating in the shadow of the American embassy. Saigon—pure, clean and happy—will again be a shining Pearl of the Orient.

"That gang are shaking with fear," the Saigonese think, "for they are now resorting to martial law, round-ups and frantic massacres. They are heading right for the abyss."

Dawn will soon be breaking for the people of Saigon—rosy, pure and fresh.

May 1972

THANH NAM

AUG 1972

U.S. Electronic Espionage: STATINTL

A Memoir

ABOUT THIRTY MILES NORTHEAST of CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia, right off the Baltimore-Washington expressway overlooking the flat Maryland countryside, stands a large three story building known informally as the "cookie factory." It's officially known as Ft. George G. Meade, headquarters of the National Security Agency.

Three fences surround the headquarters. The inner and outer barriers are topped with barbed wire, the middle one is a five-strand electrified wire. Four gatehouses spanning the complex at regular intervals house specially-trained marine guards. Those allowed access all wear iridescent I.D. badges — green for "top secret crypto," red for "secret crypto." Even the janitors are cleared for secret codeword material. Once inside, you enter the world's longest "corridor"—980 feet long by 560 feet wide. And all along the corridor are more marine guards, protecting

the doors of key NSA offices. At 1,400,000 square feet, it is larger than CIA headquarters, 1,135,000 square feet. Only the State Department and the Pentagon and the new headquarters planned for the FBI are more spacious. But the DIRNSA building (Director, National Security Agency) can be further distinguished from the headquarters buildings of these other giant bureaucracies —it has no windows. Another palace of paranoia? No. For DIRNSA is the command center for the largest, most sensitive and far-flung intelligence gathering apparatus in the world's history. Here, and in the nine-story Operations Building Annex, upwards of 15,000 employees work to break the military, diplomatic and commercial codes of every nation in the world, analyze the de-crypted messages, and send on the results to the rest of the U.S. intelligence community.

Far less widely known than the CIA, whose Director

STATINTL

Harper to Show CIA Proofs of New Book on Asian Drug Traffic

Marchetti Book on CIA Still Under Suit

Harper & Row has decided, after much consideration, to honor a request from the Central Intelligence Agency to see page proofs of Alfred W. McCoy's controversial September 13 book, "The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia," and to consider "factual" corrections that the CIA may offer. The publisher, however, has made no advance commitment to accept any requested changes.

In his book, written with Cathleen B. Read, Mr. McCoy, a 26-year-old student in Yale's Ph.D. program in history, alleges that French, Vietnamese and U.S. personnel have used the traffic in opium and heroin in Southeast Asia for their own ends, and that the CIA and other U.S. agencies have either accepted or have responded inadequately to the situation. Mr. McCoy told Congressional committees early in June (including the foreign operations subcommittee, headed by Sen. William Proxmire, D., Wis., of the Senate Appropriations Committee), that he had had more than 250 interviews about the drug traffic, including talks with CIA and South Vietnamese officials, and that President Thieu and Premier Khiem were involved: he gave details of many allegations which appear also in the book. B. Brooks Thomas, Harper vice-president and general counsel, tells *PW* he and the editors have worked closely with Mr. McCoy on the manuscript, have insisted on documentation of all material points, and have had outside experts read it. As a result, Harper & Row is convinced that the book is well-documented, scholarly and deserves to be published.

A chapter from the book, adapted, appears in the July *Harper's* magazine. The magazine has received a letter from the CIA's executive director, W. E. Colby, denying allegations involving the CIA. *Harper's* reportedly plans to publish the letter soon. Mr. Colby and an officer of Air America (a contract airline which does work for CIA in Southeast Asia) also wrote to the *Washington Star*, disputing allegations picked up by a *Star* columnist from Mr. McCoy's findings. In these protests, and in its approach to

Harper & Row, the CIA is said to be departing sharply from its usual policy of silence concerning criticism.

Harper & Row was approached early in June, when a representative called upon Cass Canfield, Sr., former chief executive, now a senior editor for the firm, and said the agency understood the McCoy manuscript contained serious allegations about CIA and other agencies—allegations that he said might be libelous to individuals or severely damaging to the national interest. The representative spoke also to M. S. Wyeth, Jr., executive editor of the trade department. The Harper officials said the manuscript was not yet ready to be read, but that the request would be considered.

In weighing their decision, Harper & Row officials and editors talked among themselves and with respected publishing colleagues, including experts in the field of the freedom to read. On June 30, Mr. Thomas wrote to the CIA asking the agency to state its request, with reasons for it, in writing. The reply, dated July 5, came from Lawrence R. Houston, general counsel of the CIA. He wrote that the CIA was in no way questioning Harper & Row's right to publish the book, but said, "We believe we could demonstrate to you that a considerable number of Mr. McCoy's claims" about the CIA were "totally false" or "distorted" or "based on unconvincing evidence."

Harper & Row then decided to let the CIA see the book—subject to the author's approval, without which, Harper & Row president Winthrop Knowlton told *PW*, the CIA's request would not be accepted. The author finally accepted the decision, to let the CIA look at page proofs only, and to give a quick reply, with Harper & Row reserving all its options and reaffirming its right to publish.

"As head of the house of Harper & Row," Mr. Knowlton told *PW*, "I am sensitive, like all my colleagues in publishing, to the problem of censorship, and if I felt this request involved censorship we would not be agreeing to it. In view of the gravity of the allegations, we simply think this is the most responsible

way we can publish this book."

Ironically, in view of CIA efforts to refute the charges by Mr. McCoy and others, personnel of CIA, State and the Department of Defense completed in February a report to the Cabinet Committee on Narcotics Control which buttressed many of the charges, according to Seymour Hersh in a front page New York *Times* story, July 24. Mr. Hersh reviewed the Harper-CIA discussions in the *Times* of July 22.

The CIA's procedure with respect to Mr. McCoy's book is in sharp contrast to government action on an as-yet-unwritten book, a nonfiction work about the CIA, which Victor L. Marchetti is under contract to prepare for Knopf. In that case, the Justice Department obtained in April a restraining order to prevent Mr. Marchetti from publishing the proposed book, on the ground that it would be likely to divulge currently classified information in violation of a secrecy agreement that Mr. Marchetti had made as a CIA employee. Mr. Marchetti worked for the CIA for 14 years and resigned in 1969. He then wrote a novel, "The Rope Dancer" (*Grosset*), based on his observations.

Judge Albert V. Bryan, Jr., U.S. District Court, Alexandria, Va., in issuing the restraining order, ruled that Mr. Marchetti's agreement with the CIA "takes the case out of the scope of the First Amendment." The American Civil Liberties Union, representing Mr. Marchetti, denies this and argues that the author cannot in fact sign away his First Amendment rights. The Association of American Publishers and the Authors League have filed *amicus curiae* briefs supporting Mr. Marchetti in further court proceedings. (See *PW*, April 24, June 5, June 12.)

30 JUL 1972

STATINTL

**HOW IT LOOKS
TO THE OTHER
SIDE**

No one knows how many Vietnamese lives have been lost in this seemingly endless war--1 million, 2 million, 3 million?

More important yet, how many Americans truly care?

That question was asked of Intelligence Report recently by a North Vietnamese representative in Moscow.

The North Vietnamese, at least many of them, if this official is to be believed, are convinced that if President Nixon cannot end the war by negotiation, he will end it by extermination.

With seven U.S. aircraft carriers discharging fighter-bombers daily, with more than 200 B-52's dropping tons of bombs, with the new "smart" laser bombs in action and the even smarter "Maverick" TV bombs forthcoming, U.S. air and naval forces can exterminate most of the North Vietnamese population within 60 days.

It is a long-held Kissinger belief that extermination will not be necessary, that the North Vietnamese can stand only so much destruction and devastation before they accede to ending the war by negotiation.

The North Vietnamese told us that they prefer extermination to negotiation under duress.

Many of them are convinced that they will soon die by drowning. They point out that U.S. planes have been systematically bombing the areas around the Red River dikes which protect the Plain of Tonkin from flooding. By weakening the dike foundations, they contend, the Americans are making certain that the monsoon rains will collapse

the dikes, causing the death by drowning of a large portion of the 14 million North Vietnamese who live on the Plain of Tonkin.

President Nixon was asked on April 30th, this year, at the John Connally barbecue in Floresville, Tex., if he intended to order the bombing of the Red River dikes.

"That is something," he answered, "that we want to avoid. It is also something we believe is not needed."

He also said that "with regard to dams or dikes... while it is a strategic target and indirectly a military target, it would result in an enormous number of civilian casualties."

Nixon, however, did not foreclose on his option to bomb the dikes, which the North Vietnamese claim our Air Force is already doing.

That the American public will support a continued air war so long as it results in relatively few American deaths is a Nixon tenet which has been proved correct.


Nixon and Kissinger, as well as countless military men, are convinced that under continued bombing, the Communists must eventually cry "uncle."

The North Vietnamese maintain that their ultimate pain threshold is death.

The Soviets, on the other hand, believe that the war could end tomorrow if only we would order the C.I.A. to assassinate Nguyen Van Thieu, President of South Vietnam.

"You people arranged to have Diem assassinated in 1963," one Soviet journalist explained. "Why can't the C.I.A. do the same thing with Thieu? Or at least arrange his abdication to Singapore where we understand he has already bought a home? Once Thieu is out of the picture, really out of the picture, a coalition government can be formed in South Vietnam, a cease-fire can take place, the war is over, and you can get your prisoners back. It is all really quite simple."

The Soviets, of course, are cynical.



Heroin and the War

STATINTL

Alfred McCoy, a Yale graduate student who interviewed 250 people, charges that the Central Intelligence Agency has known of Thai and South Vietnamese official involvement in heroin traffic, has covered up their involvement and has participated in aspects of the traffic itself. The CIA has publicly denied these charges, in the process even persuading Mr. McCoy's publisher, Harper & Row, to let it review his book manuscript before publication. But now there comes an internal government report—done by the CIA and other agencies—on the difficulties of controlling the narcotics trade in Southeast Asia. The report states:

"the most basic problem, and the one that unfortunately appears least likely of any early solution, is the corruption, collusion, and indifference at some places in some governments, particularly Thailand and South Vietnam, that precludes more effective suppression of traffic by the governments on whose territory it takes place."

That is to say, a private report by agencies including the CIA confirms the thrust of charges which the CIA publicly denies. The White House contends the report, completed in February, is "out of date."


Now, we are aware that the Nixon administration has worked with great vigor and much effective-

ness to curb the international narcotics trade. The fact remains that the largest supplies of the filthiest poison of them all apparently come from or through Thailand and South Vietnam, if one is to take the CIA's private word—as against its public word—on the matter. Nor should it stretch any reasonable man's credulity to understand that the United States has had to accept certain limitations on its efforts to get those governments to stop drug dealing because it has wanted to ensure their cooperation in the war against North Vietnam. In the final human analysis there is simply no place in the pursuit of honor and a just peace in Southeast Asia for an all-out honest effort to control traffic in heroin. This is the infinitely tragic fact flowing from continued American involvement in the war.

Would heroin addiction among Americans have swollen to its current dimensions and would the amount of heroin reaching the United States from South Vietnam and Thailand have reached its current levels if the war—and power politics—had not gotten in the way of effective American pressure upon the governments in Saigon and Bangkok? If President Nixon needs any further reason to make good his pledge to end the war, this is almost reason enough by itself for what it says about the character of regimes this country has gotten into the habit of supporting—lavishly and indiscriminately—in the name of our "national security" and "world peace."

Rear Guard

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THE DENVER POST
ALPHEUS



reau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs shall prepare and submit to the Congress a report, in two parts, concerning the illegal international narcotic traffic.

"(c) The first part of such report shall include a survey of (1) the cultivation and processing of narcotic drugs (which are illegal in the United States) in each country where these operations are known to, or believed by, the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs to occur; (2) the routes of transport of such drugs to the United States; (3) the means by which such drugs are brought into the United States; (4) the financial and banking arrangements which support such illegal international narcotics traffic; (5) changes in the international patterns of cultivation, processing, and shipping of such drugs for the United States markets which, in the opinion of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, have occurred since calendar year 1969, and an evaluation of those changes.

"(d) The second part of such report shall include—

"(1) a list of the countries which, in the opinion of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, are currently major centers in illegal international narcotic traffic;

"(2) a summary of the programs and other actions undertaken by such countries for the suppression of such traffic; and

"(3) an evaluation by the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs of the effectiveness of such programs and actions, including reasons for their effectiveness or ineffectiveness.

"(e) Each Federal department or agency having the responsibility for the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States, or for programs and other actions related to the suppression of the illegal international narcotic traffic, shall, upon the request of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, make available to the Bureau such information and other assistance as may be requested."

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MONDALE. I yield.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that there be a 10-minute time limitation on the pending amendment, the time to be equally divided between the manager of the bill, or whomever he may designate, and the author of the amendment. I understand it has to do with a report on international drug traffic through the Narcotics Bureau.

Mr. GOLDWATER. I did not hear the Senator.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I understand it has to do with a report on international drug traffic through the Narcotics Bureau.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the unanimous-consent request? Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, this amendment is, I think important, and yet uncomplicated. It would require the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs to submit to Congress within 6 months a comprehensive survey and analysis of the illegal international narcotics traffic.

I shall not go into details of all the reasons why this amendment is needed. I think the Senate is quite aware of the growing seriousness of the illegal international narcotics traffic. This amendment would require the Bureau of Nar-

cotics and Dangerous Drugs to submit a report to Congress which would contain information, which would then be available to the Congress and to the public in two general categories: The first, it would report a survey of the cultivation and processing of narcotics drugs in each country where these operations are known to, or believed by, the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs to occur; the routes of transport of such drugs to the United States; the financial and banking arrangements which support such illegal international narcotics traffic; changes in the international patterns of cultivation, processing, and shipping of such drugs for the United States markets which, in the opinion of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, have occurred since 1969, and other information in this general area.

The second part of the report would include a list of the countries which, in the opinion of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, are currently major centers in illegal international narcotic traffic; a summary of the programs and other actions undertaken by such countries for the suppression of such traffic; and an evaluation by the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs of the effectiveness of such programs and actions, including reasons for their effectiveness or ineffectiveness.

Last year we adopted an amendment which I offered, which, among other things, authorized this Government to terminate foreign aid to any country which was known to be willfully involved in the production or sale of illegal drugs and which ultimately ended up in the United States.

It is estimated that the amount of illegal heroin entering this country will be nearly 40 percent greater than that brought into this country a year ago.

A front-page story in the New York Times describes a secret Cabinet level report that concludes "There is no prospect" of eliminating the smuggling of narcotics in Southeast Asia "under any conditions that can realistically be projected."

I ask unanimous consent that the article appearing in the New York Times appear at the conclusion of my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. MONDALE. This amendment will help the public and the Congress better understand the essential elements of this vicious problem so that we know better what to do.

I am hopeful that the distinguished floor manager will accept this amendment.

EXHIBIT 1

REPORT TO UNITED STATES SEES NO HOPE OF HALTING ASIAN DRUG TRAFFIC

(By Seymour M. Hersh)

WASHINGTON, July 23.—A Cabinet-level report has concluded that, contrary to the Nixon Administration's public optimism, "there is no prospect" of stemming the smuggling of narcotics by air and sea in Southeast Asia "under any conditions that can realistically be projected."

"This is so," the report, dated Feb. 21, 1972, said, "because the governments in the region are unable and, in some cases, un-

willing to do those things that would have to be done by them if a truly effective effort were to be made."

The report, prepared by officials of the Central Intelligence Agency, the State Department and the Defense Department, noted that "the most basic problem, and the one that unfortunately appears least likely of any early solution, is the corruption, collusion and indifference at some places in some governments, particularly Thailand and South Vietnam, that precludes more effective suppression of traffic by the governments on whose territory it takes place."

The report sharply contradicted the official Administration position and Government intelligence sources say its conclusions are still valid today. In May, Secretary of State William P. Rogers told a Senate subcommittee that "we think all the countries are cooperating with us and we are quite satisfied with that cooperation."

Similarly, Nelson G. Gross, Senior Advisor to the Secretary of State and Coordinator for International Narcotics Matters, testified before Congress in June on the subject of narcotics smuggling that "the governments of Thailand, Laos and Vietnam have already joined us in the fight and, while we have a long way to go, we feel that during the past year some real progress has been achieved."

All officials concerned with the drug problem acknowledge that the United States agencies, under personal prodding from President Nixon, have begun an intensive effort to stem the international narcotics traffic. But critics contend that the effort is far less effective today than Administration officials say it is.

CRITICS' CHARGES BACKED

Two leading critics of what they allege to be the Government's laxness in stopping the flow of narcotics are Representative Robert J. Steele, Republican of Connecticut, and Alfred W. McCoy, a 26-year-old Yale graduate student who has written a book on narcotics in Southeast Asia. The New York Times reported Saturday that Mr. McCoy's allegations concerning the C.I.A. and the drug traffic had been the subject of an intense and unusually public rebuttal by the agency.

The Cabinet-level report, made available to The Times, buttressed many of the charges made by the two critics, particularly about the pivotal importance of Thailand to the international drug smugglers. Thailand is also a major Air Force staging area for the United States.

In a report on the world heroin problem last year, Mr. Steele wrote that "from the American viewpoint, Thailand is as important to the control of the illegal international traffic in narcotics as Turkey. While all of the opium produced in Southeast Asia is not grown in Thailand, most of it is smuggled through the country."

Mr. Steele's report, filed with the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, noted that many American citizens had established residence in Bangkok, and had moved into the narcotics trade. The report added that the inability of the United States to have a few notorious smugglers deported had led some intelligence officials to conclude that the men were paying Thai officials for protection.

Mr. McCoy said in testimony before Congressional committees last month that hundreds of tons of Burmese opium passed through Thailand every year to international markets in Europe and the United States and that 80 to 90 per cent of the opium was carried by Chinese Nationalist paramilitary teams that were at one time paid by the C.I.A.

There are a number of opium refineries along the northern Thai border, he said, and much of the processed high-quality heroin is shipped by trawler to Hong Kong.

24 JUL 1972

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Report to U.S. Sees No Hope of Halting Asian Drug Traffic

By SEYMOUR M. HERSH

Special to The New York Times

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"Even though they are heavily involved in the narcotics traffic," Mr. McCoy testified, "these Nationalist Chinese irregular units are closely allied with the Thai Government." He said that Thai Government police units patrol the northern border area and collect an "import duty" of about \$2.50 a

pound of raw opium entering Thailand. All this activity, he said, is monitored by United States intelligence agencies.

Thai-U.S. Agreements Cited

Mr. Gross, the State Department's adviser on international narcotics, said in his Congressional testimony that "during the past year the Thais have increased their efforts in the drug field with United States and United Nations assistance." He cited two agreements, signed in late 1971, calling for more cooperation and more long-range planning between Thai and United States officials to stamp out the trade.

"Based on all intelligence information available," Mr. Gross testified, "the leaders of the Thai Government are not engaged in the opium or heroin traffic, nor are they extending protection to traffickers." He added that the top police official in Thailand had publicly stated that he would punish any corrupt official.

The cabinet-level report, submitted to the Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control, asked "highest priority" for suppression of the traffic by Thai trawlers, noting that each trawler "would represent something like 6 per cent of annual United States consumption of heroin."

The report said that the trawler traffic should have priority because "it is possible to attack the Thai trawler traffic without seeking the cooperation of Thai authorities and running the attendant risks of leaks, tip-offs and betrayals."


After such a seizure, the report said, the United States Embassy in Bangkok could "repeat with still greater force and insistence the representations it has already often made to the Government of Thailand" for more effective efforts "to interdict traffic from the north of Thailand to Bangkok and also the loading of narcotics on ships in Thai harbors."

At another point in the report, a general complaint was voiced. "It should surely be possible to convey to the right Thai or Vietnamese officials the mood of the Congress and the Administration on the subject of drugs," the report said. "No real progress can be made on the problem of illicit traffic until and unless the local governments concerned make it a matter of highest priority."

Representatives Steele, Lester L. Wolff, Democrat of Nassau County, and Morgan F. Murphy, Democrat of Illinois, have sponsored legislation that would cut off more than \$100-million in foreign aid to Thailand unless she took more action to halt the production and traffic of heroin. Their measure cleared the House Foreign Affairs Committee on June 21


and is included in the Foreign Assistance Act, now pending.

During a Congressional hearing into drug traffic last month, Representative Wolff disputed the Administration's contention that it was making "real progress" in stemming the narcotics flow and said, "we think the trade has got so much protection in high places in Thailand that the Administration is afraid they'll tell us to take our air bases out if we put too much pressure on them."



The New York Times

Nelson G. Gross asserted that there has been progress against smuggling.



United Press International

Robert H. Steele charged the Government is lax in halting flow of drugs.

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C.I.A. AIDES ASSAIL ASIA DRUG CHARGE

Agency Fights Reports That It Ignored Heroin Traffic Among Allies of U.S.

By SEYMOUR M. HERSH
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 21 — The Central Intelligence Agency has begun a public battle against accusations that it knew of but failed to stem the heroin traffic of United States allies in Southeast Asia.

In recent weeks, high-ranking officials of the C.I.A. have signed letters for publication to a newspaper and magazine, granted a rare on-the-record interview at the agency's headquarters in McLean, Va., and — most significantly — persuaded the publishers of a forthcoming expose on the C.I.A. and the drug traffic to permit it to review the manuscript prior to publication.

The target of all these measures has been the recent writings and Congressional testimony of Alfred W. McCoy, a 26-year-old Yale graduate student who spent 18 months investigating the narcotics operations in Southeast Asia. His book, "The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia," is scheduled to be published by Harper & Row in mid-September—barring delays caused by the intelligence agency's review.

In his book, Mr. McCoy alleged that both C.I.A. and State Department officials have provided political and military support for America's Indochinese allies actively engaged in the drug traffic, have consciously covered up evidence of such involvement, and have been actively involved themselves in narcotic trade.

C.I.A. officials said they had reason to believe that Mr. McCoy's book contained many unwarranted, unproven and fallacious accusations. They acknowledged that the public stance in opposition to such allegations was a departure from the usual "low profile" of the agency, but they insisted that there was no evidence linking the C.I.A. to the drug traffic in Southeast Asia. One well-informed Government official directly responsible for

monitoring the illegal flow of narcotics complained in an interview that many of Mr. McCoy's charges "are out of date." "Go back three or four years," he said, "and no one was concerned about this. It wasn't until our own troops started to get addicted, until 1968 or '69, that anyone was aware" of the narcotics problems in Southeast Asia.

This official said that in the eyes of the C.I.A., the charges were "unfair." He said of the C.I.A., "they think they're taking the heat for being unaware and not doing anything about something that was going on two or three years ago."

Based on 250 Interviews

During two Congressional appearances last month, Mr. McCoy testified that his accusations were based on more than 250 interviews, some of them with past and present officials of the C.I.A. He said that top-level South Vietnamese officials, including President Nguyen Van Thieu and Premier Iran Van Khiem, were specifically involved.

In July, 1971, Representative Robert H. Steele, Republican of Connecticut, said during a House Foreign Affairs subcommittee hearing that the United States Government possessed "hard intelligence" linking a number of high-ranking Southeast Asian officials, including Maj. Gen. Ngo Dzu, then commander of the South Vietnamese II Corps, with involvement in the narcotics trade. Mr. Steele's accusations were denied and mostly ignored.

Mr. McCoy also alleged that Corsican and American syndicate gangsters had become involved in the narcotics trade. He said that such information was known to the C.I.A. In a chapter of his book published in this month's Harper's Magazine, Mr. McCoy further charged that in 1967 the infamous "Golden Triangle"—an opium-producing area embracing parts of northeastern Burma, northern Thailand and northern Laos—was producing about 1,000 tons of raw opium annually, then about 70 per cent of the world's supply.

The bulk of Mr. McCoy's accusations—both in the magazine and during the Congressional hearings—failed to gain much national attention. Nonetheless, the C.I.A. began its unusual public defense after a Washington Star reporter cited some of Mr. McCoy's allegations in a column.

Letter Sent to Paper

Two letters were sent to the newspaper for publication. One, signed by Robert Colby, the executive director of the C.I.A., and the other by Paul C. Velte Jr., a Wash-

ington-based official with Air America, a charter airline that flies missions for the C.I.A. in Southeast Asia. Both categorically denied the allegations linking C.I.A. personnel to any knowledge of or activity in the drug traffic.

A similar letter of disavowal, signed by Mr. Colby, was sent for publication to the publisher of Harper's Magazine within the last week. Robert Schnayer, the magazine's editor, said that the letter would be published as soon as possible.

The C.I.A. began its approach to Harper & Row in early June, apparently after learning of Mr. McCoy's appearance before the Senate subcommittee. Cord Meyer Jr., described as a senior agency official, met with officials of the publishing concern and informally asked for a copy of the manuscript for review prior to publication.

On July 5, a formal letter making the request, signed by Lawrence R. Houston, general counsel of the C.I.A. was sent to Harper & Row.

Mr. Houston's request was not based on national security, but on the thesis that "allegations concerning involvement of the U.S. Government [in drug traffic] or the participation of American citizens should be made only if based on hard evidence."

The letter continued: "It is our belief that no reputable publishing house would wish to publish such allegations without being assured that the supporting evidence was valid." If the manuscript were handed over, the letter said, "we believe we could demonstrate to you that a considerable number of Mr. McCoy's claims about this agency's alleged involvement are totally false and without foundation, a number are distorted beyond recognition, and none is based on convincing evidence." A copy of the letter was made available to The New York Times.

Mr. McCoy, in an interview, said that the book had been commissioned by Harper & Row and carefully and totally reviewed by its attorneys with no complaint until the C.I.A. request was made.

B. Brooks Thomas, vice president and general counsel of the publishing house, said in an interview in New York, "We don't have any doubts about the book at all. We've had it reviewed by others and we're persuaded that the work is amply documented and scholarly."

"We're not submitting to censorship or anything like that," Mr. Thomas said. "We're taking a responsible middle position. C.I.A. should have the chance to review it." If Mr. McCoy

did not agree, he added, Harper & Row would not publish the book.

In a subsequent interview, Robert L. Bernstein, president of Random House and president of the Association of American Publishers, Inc., said that his concern had twice refused official C.I.A. requests for permission to revise manuscripts. "In general," Mr. Bernstein said, "our opinion would be that we would not publish a book endangering the life of anybody working for the C.I.A. or an other Government agency. Short of that, we would publish any valid criticism."

In a series of interviews with The New York Times, a number of present and former officials of the C.I.A. acknowledged that smuggling and "looking the other way" was common throughout Southeast Asia during the nineteen-sixties. But many noted that the agency had since taken strong steps to curb such practices.

One official, who spent many years in Southeast Asia, said, "I don't believe that agency staff personnel were dealing

in opium. But if you're talking about Air America hauling the stuff around, then I'll bet my bottom dollar that they were in it."

Another former C.I.A. agent described Mr. McCoy's published writings as "1 per cent tendentious and 90 per cent of the most valuable contribution I can think of."

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JUN 21 1972

Who's the most hated man in all of Saigon?

The American GI, of course By Tom Tiede

SAIGON (NEA) — There is a monument in this city — appropriately next to a Chase Manhattan Bank advertisement — which reads: "The noble sacrifice of allied soldiers will never be forgotten."

Ah, these Vietnamese. Already they tend to forget.

Nearly three million soldiers from a half-dozen nations have suffered 60,000 dead and 350,000 casualties in the last decade of the Vietnamese war. But the man in the street, if he acknowledges it at all, may just shrug and say, "Yes, but what have you done for us lately?"

Some here who are aware that several neighbors, such as Thailand and the Philippines, have contributed troops, dismiss it as insignificant. The Australians, they say, never did much. And the Koreans, have just strutted about feeling superior.

As for the Americans — who did the most, who fought the most, who in effect purchased the entire allied commitment — as for them, well, "Americans No. 10," say many of the children of Saigon.

Vietnamese officials deny it, U.S. diplomats try desperately to explain it away, but the icy fact is that after all this time and all this blood the United States is unloved in this country. Women fear us, merchants cheat us, peasants ignore us, students deplore us. The \$10 billion a year (on average) Americans have spent in this land has bought some cooperation, but neither respect nor appreciation.

"The only people who smile at me here are the beggars," says an Air Force colonel. "On the streets I feel like my forehead is marked."

The situation — call it anti-Americanism, was perhaps inevitable. Two and a half million GIs have been in and out of Vietnam since 1961, plus thousands of sundry diplomats, civilian workers, newsmen and seekers of erotica. Few of them, with the occasional exception of diplomats, have strengthened any international bonds. It's not that the Yanks are so bad, just that they are different. Vietnamese women have never gotten use to being pinched on the boulevard and Viet-

namese men have never gotten use to seeing it happen.

The troops, perhaps, because of sheer numbers, have done the most to wrinkle the Oriental brow. A drunk GI is hard to take in Galveston, much less Gia Dinh. Not long ago in Da Nang, a trooper from the 196th Light Infantry Brigade, tipsy of course, ran down a Vietnamese child with a truck. It was the last straw for the nationals of the area. Hundreds of angry locals stormed the truck, threatened the driver and hinted of open war. Indeed, it was war of a sort, and the 196th had to seal off the area, helicopter reinforcements in and finally agree to pay retribution to the victim's father.

The same sort of thing is happening from the Delta to the DMZ. A newsman in Hue was recently set upon by three Vietnamese soldiers who stole his pack, his camera and his sunglasses. U.S. troops traveling through the off-limits town of Bien Hoa do so with guns loaded, cocked and pointing at anybody who comes near. A military policeman with the 504th recently lost a color television when he stopped his vehicle to avoid hitting a boy, then could not get going before a swarm of alerted nationals relieved him of his cargo. Fights. Shootings. Name it. The Nams are at the Yankees' throats.

Even the North Vietnamese spring offensive has not sobered the citizens' sentiments. Vernacular newspapers have hinted — good grief! — that the invasion was a CIA plot to "coldly test" South Vietnam's military mettle. And a young legislator, who knows better, says privately: "It wouldn't surprise me if Nixon and Mao (Tse-tung) have plotted out a coalition government for Saigon. The invasion could be the ploy to convince us that we can't stand by ourselves. Therefore we should hasten to accept any generous Hanoi offer of peace."

So it goes here. The walls of Hue University are covered with anti-American slogans ("American GIs eat water buffalo drop-

pings"). An airline clerk in Pleiku tells a Yank traveler to "buy a ticket to My Lai." There are several urban slums where U.S. types walk at their own peril. "Not everybody here hates us," says an executive of a U.S. engineering firm "Some just don't care one way or the other."

The situation is sad. And maddening. And the forecast is the United States may spend the next decade here spending money trying to buy the friendship it lost spending money in the last. But, say the cynics, there is at least one hope to Vietnamese anti-Americanism: "Maybe it's a sign. Maybe these people aren't passive after all. Maybe one day they'll hate their enemies as much as they hate their friends."

Letters to the Editor

SIR: I refer to the letter of W. E. Colby, executive director of the Central Intelligence Agency, who rebutted the charges made by some American newspapermen that the CIA was involved in opium trafficking. I do not question Colby's good faith, neither do I say that the CIA, as an entity, traffics in opium; but, I am sorry to say that there is more to these charges than mere "gossip, conjecture and old history."

I also know what I am talking about because I was involved in security matters for the South Vietnamese government under President Ngo Dinh Diem. In effect, one day, the President told me to investigate into the activities of our chief of secret police, chief of our own "CIA" and chief of military security, and to report directly to him, because, as he put it: "I cannot ask my own chiefs of police, 'CIA,' and military security to investigate into themselves."

I found out the corruption of two chiefs, and the President took very drastic measures against them. I have kept the contact with my security agents ever since. They firmly confirm that a few CIA agents in Indochina are involved in opium trafficking. But above all, a line must be drawn between Indochina and the rest of the world, because, due to the fact of the counter-insurgency warfare, the operations of the American CIA in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia are extremely important when they are compared to operations of the same agency in other countries. In Indochina, the CIA is a real army with his own aerial fleet. A number of CIA operatives deal directly with Vietnamese, Lao, or Meo warlords or officials at the highest level, with whom they share the proceeds of the opium traffic. For good American citizens in the United States, it is very difficult to imagine the influence and power of these operatives in Indochina. Their power, in fact, is unlimited—they are the true rulers of Indochina; their desires are orders—no Vietnamese, Laotian or Cambodian official would dare resist their orders. Corruption growing from a de facto power affects some of these CIA operatives.

The traffic of opium involves a relatively large number of persons. Outside a few Americans, there are Vietnamese, Laotians and Meo who are involved. Since these persons have their clans, families and friends who live from this traffic, the total number of persons concerned become so great that it is impossible to keep secret the operations.

I also do not question the good faith of CIA Director Richard Helms when he said that "as an agency, in fact, we are heavily engaged in tracing the foreign roots of the drug traffic for the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs. We hope we are helping with a solution; we know we are not contributing to the problem . . ." However, as I said previously, a line must be drawn and a distinction must be made; for circumstances are not the same—there is not the vaguest resemblance between CIA operatives in Indochina and their colleagues operating in other countries.

In conclusion, CIA Director Helms and Colby, Miss Randal, and McCoy said the truth and did not contradict one another; they perhaps did not talk about the same country.

Tran Van Khiem,
Attorney, Former Deputy,
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Chevy Chase, Md.

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JUL 19 1972

Pell to Probe Alleged Shift In Weather

Sen. Claiborne Pell announced yesterday that a subcommittee he heads will hold hearings next week on allegations that the Defense Department has changed the weather over Southeast Asia for military reasons.

The senator said his Senate relations subcommittee on oceans and international environment will hold hearings next Wednesday and Thursday.

"There have appeared in the press recently very disturbing reports that the United States has used weather modification extensively in Southeast Asia," Senator Pell said.

The hearings will focus on a resolution introduced by Senator Pell in March with 14 cosponsors which urges negotiation of a treaty prohibiting the use of environmental or weather changing techniques as weapons of war.

A story which first ap-

peared in the Providence Sunday Journal on June 25 reported that cloud seeding operations were begun in the mid-1960s to create rains to wash out portions of the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

The New York Times ran a story a week later saying that rainfall was first begun over Hue in 1963 to prevent Buddhist demonstrations in that city against the South Vietnamese government. The story quoted unnamed agents of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Senator Pell said witnesses from the State Department, the Pentagon, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Council on Environmental Quality, and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration have been invited to testify.

Ellsberg Lawyer Raps Judge's Jury Selection

By Sanford J. Ungar
Washington Post Staff Writer

LOS ANGELES July 14 — The defense in the trial of Daniel Ellsberg and Anthony Russo today attacked U.S. District Judge W. Matt Byrne Jr. for allegedly failing to take necessary steps to assure the defendants an impartial jury.

Leonard B. Boudin, who represents Ellsberg, complained that Byrne's questioning of prospective jurors was characterized by a "lack of probing" and was a "pro forma examination" which met the technical requirements but did not elicit useful information for choosing a jury.

"Without an impartial jury," Boudin said in an emotional plea before the judge this morning, all other precautions about keeping the trial fair would become "worthless."

He also complained that Byrne, who originally estimated that a jury could be selected to try the espionage conspiracy and theft case in three days, is motivated more by a desire for speed than by evenhandedness.

With jury selection now in its fifth day, the judge has lengthened daily court sessions and suggested that he may hold Saturday sessions as well.

Boudin and Leonard I. Weinglass, chief counsel for Russo, contend that this is because of "undue pressure" from the prosecutors handling the case, who have repeatedly asserted that some of their witnesses — government officials in Washington — have had to postpone their vacations because of delays here.

Late today, chief prosecutor David R. Nissen said that the

pace of jury selection jeopardizes the appearance of a "necessary witness" for the government who is available all next week but then must enter a hospital for serious surgery. He declined, however, to name the witness.

In a comment that he has characteristically employed during the past week, Byrne reacted to the defense complaints by saying, "I'll deem that a motion and deny it."

The judge specifically refused once again to permit the lawyers on both sides of the case to conduct the detailed examination of each potential juror.

He also turned down a renewed defense demand that all prospective jurors who have security clearances or other connections with Southern California defense industries be automatically excluded from service.

The defense contends that such jurors cannot be objective in judging Ellsberg and Russo, who are charged with criminal violations in connection with disclosure of the top secret Pentagon papers, a history of U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia.

Although openly annoyed with the escalated defense attacks on his conduct of jury selection, Byrne did expand the scope of his questioning as the day went on.

As he began interrogation of a new group of 16 prospective jurors called on Thursday, the judge began asking, for example, what kinds of "briefings" they had had about security matters in the defense-oriented jobs.

But at the same time, Byrne began to incur the wrath of

chief prosecutor Nissen who complained that the judge was putting too much emphasis on the presumption of innocence in his jury examination.

"The presumption of innocence is not a badge of partiality to be worn by either side," Nissen exclaimed. When the defense pressed for an explanation of that remark, Byrne interjected, "Never mind what the prosecutor says."

During interrogation today, some of the new prospective jurors expressed their views on the American involvement in Vietnam.

Edward H. Knapp, a retired mechanical inspector for Los Angeles County, said, "The only thing I object to is the country spending too much over there. It hurts the economy."

Douglas W. Silver, who had held a string of civilian jobs with the military, said that, "Originally I believed in the involvement. But as it progressed and the government of South Vietnam seemed unstable, I began to realize that it was a mistake."

Another potential juror, Richard Mascher, whose stepbrother was killed in Vietnam last year, told the judge, "I think we're trying to give the Vietnamese people something they don't want. I think we shouldn't be there."

Mascher also indicated his skepticism about the security classification system, which will be a major issue in the case. While in the Navy, he said, he saw "a lot of things" stamped secret which he felt should not have been.

The day's biggest surprise in court came when Jan Sirois, who is from an almost totally military family, proclaimed during examination by the judge that, "a person who has access (to secret documents), if they find something wrong, has a moral obligation and should let the public know."

That is exactly the position taken by Ellsberg and Russo.

Mrs. Sirois, a 24-year-old student beautician, said that she would not be affected by the fact that her father was a career military officer and that her brother served with the CIA in Vietnam if she should serve on the eventual jury.

14 JUL 1972

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U.S. Election Absorbs Many South Vietnamese

By MALCOLM W. BROWNE

Special to The New York Times

SAIGON, South Vietnam, July 13—Never has an American election seemed more important to politically informed South Vietnamese than the coming race between Senator George McGovern and President Nixon.

Many South Vietnamese see the election as a clear contest of opposing points of view on the Vietnam war and one in which the future of Vietnam will be decided.

The assumption by most Vietnamese seems to be that President Nixon will pursue his present course, which, in their eyes, means fighting the Communists, come what may.

Senator McGovern is seen as an enemy of President Thieu and military rule, and, more importantly, as someone who would bring peace to Vietnam by allowing the Communists to prevail sooner or later.

Consequently, the attitudes of any South Vietnamese toward the two candidates can be predicted exactly if it is known how he feels about the war, communism and President Nguyen Van Thieu.

'We Mistrust Both'

"There is another factor I must mention if I am to be completely frank," a fairly high-ranking South Vietnamese civil servant said. "There has never been a time when Vietnamese of all political stripes disliked Americans more than they do now. That is to say, we dislike and mistrust both Nixon and McGovern, for the irrational reason they are both Americans.

"But for me, and perhaps just for that reason, I prefer McGovern. He has pledged to get America out of Vietnam, and that's all I need to know about him."

Despite the speaker's high position in the Government, his views are clearly not typical of supporters of President Thieu.

Over the years Mr. Nixon has repeatedly visited South Vietnam, and a succession of military governments has made him feel welcome. By comparison, Senator McGovern was greeted with tear gas and official derision when he visited Saigon last September.

Ngo Khac Tinh, Minister of Education and a cousin of President Thieu, said of the McGovern candidacy: "As Vietnamese we all wish to see an American President who can deal strongly with the Communists. I think President Nixon has been tough. McGovern is too soft, too flexible."

Nixon Victory Expected

Opposition politicians, pacifists, most journalists and probably a majority of the younger intellectuals would like to see Senator McGovern in the White House.

Ho Ngoc Nhuan, an opposition Deputy said: "If Mr. McGovern wins in November then I think he will be the one United States President who can bring about an honorable and most satisfactory solution to the Vietnam war."

The general assumption here is that President Nixon will win re-election.

The body of gossiping politicians, journalists, lawyers and others who make up the Saigon coffee-house set already fears for Senator McGovern's life.

"Nixon will have him murdered, you'll see," a prominent lawyer said. "That's how politics in America work these days. The microphones the Republicans tried to plant at Democratic headquarters show what's going on. Some mysterious killer, like the one who almost got Wallace, will get McGovern. The C.I.A. will never let a dove into the White House."

Most South Vietnamese believe that the United States, like Vietnam, moves politically mainly within a context of conspiracies and counterconspiracies. There is doubt that the electoral process in America is much more than a sham that conceals a behind-the-scenes President-making process.

Those few South Vietnamese who have visited or lived in the United States view the coming election more realistically, and some confess they are in a quandary about it.

"If we Vietnamese could vote in your election," a wealthy and well-educated Saigon doctor said, "this would be a difficult one for me."

'A Time To Be Counted'

He added:

"The issues are perfectly clear, a vote for McGovern is a vote against my supposed class and for the Communists. If the Communists take over, it will mean the destruction of me. I will lose everything.

"But I'm going to surprise you and tell you I would vote for McGovern anyway. The time has come for nationalists and if Nixon stays in office, Vietnam will be destroyed economically and socially.

"One of the reasons for the great anti-American feeling here now is Nixon's support for a very unpopular president in Vietnam," he continued.

"Nixon will win, of course, but I would like to see a McGovern victory followed by a gradual transition here. The Communists will run all of Vietnam eventually, but the main thing is that they should assume control not suddenly, but gradually, and let us all get used to each other a little at a time."

Although most South Vietnamese and foreigners living here say they know how the people of this country think on any given issue, nothing seems harder to gauge than South Vietnamese public opinion.

South Vietnam never had a free election, and the few past efforts to take polls have been largely thwarted by the war and the prevailing fear that truthful answers can lead to trouble with the police on one side or the Communists on the other.

There seems little question that South Vietnamese who want continued armed resistance to the Communists are hoping for a Nixon victory in November; those who want an end to the war look to Senator McGovern.

What McGovern Has Said on Some of the Issues

Following are excerpts from statements by Senator George McGovern on a number of issues:

Vietnam

Let us not talk about Nixon's war or Johnson's war or the Pentagon's war or the C.I.A.'s war. Let us take hold of this war as citizens and as elected representatives, and let us vote to end it.

Many years ago, the ancient Biblical prophet wrote: "I have set before you life or death, blessing or cursing; therefore choose life that thou and thy seed may live."

Let us choose not cursing but blessing, not death but life. (Senate Speech, May 7, 1970.)

Future Commitments

In cases similar to what we have seen in Vietnam, we should examine any request for American involvement in the light of these points:

Are those asking our help

the appropriate elements for us to be supporting, both in terms of what they stand for and in terms of our national interest?

If so, are they unable to bear the responsibility themselves for the protection of their position?

If they are not, we should try to determine if the international community, through the United Nations, can provide them the aid they need.

If such a U.N. role is not possible, then we should investigate the possibility of multilateral action.

If that approach is unworkable, then we should be prepared to consider a commitment by the United States. (Response to Congressional Quarterly questions.)

Welfare

There is a fundamental alternative to the President's Family Assistance proposal—an alternative whose potential as an antipoverty strategy far exceeds the poor people's

approach of the President—a Human Security Plan which looks toward insuring each of our citizens against the risk of poverty and doing so simply because we believe that this kind of minimal financial security should be a right of citizenship in our country.

I will offer an amendment [comprising] four major components—components which would protect each of us against the four major causes of poverty in America. *First*, it would include a children's allowance to secure the future of our children. *Second*, it would guarantee a job at a decent wage for every able-bodied working-age citizen. *Third*, it would improve Social Security for the elderly and disabled. *Finally*, it would provide a small, federally administered special Public Assistance plan to protect the few who would remain in need for additional income maintenance. (Speech to Citizen's Com-

mittee for Children, New York City, Jan. 20, 1970.)

Crime and Justice

All these apparently hard-nosed proposals, which would actually result in making reduction of crime harder to accomplish, are part of a great illusion that has been fostered ever since Richard Nixon began to campaign for the Presidency in 1968. It is the illusion that crime is ravaging the nation because the police, the prosecutors and the judges are too soft on the criminals. . . . The Administration hopes to blame Congress and the courts for striking down an alleged attempt to stop crime. This will be the Administration's response to the inevitable demonstration that the Nixon promise to end the crime crisis is to be unfulfilled. The promise will be unfulfilled because the harder constructive task has been largely avoided. (Senate speech, July 21, 1970)

LOUISVILLE, KY.
TIMES

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JUL 1 1 1972

Will it rain on your protest?

Every war, no matter how unpleasant, produces benefits for some of those who survive it. Outdoorsmen, for instance, can thank World War II for jeeps and lightweight sleeping bags. Korea speeded up the development of helicopters and jet airplanes. And now Vietnam has given us a remarkable new crowd control technique known as "weather modification."

On various occasions during the war, according to the *New York Times*, the CIA arranged for rain to fall on civil disorders in Saigon and Hue. Torrential downpours, the CIA discovered, were useful in persuading uppity Buddhist monks and other protesters to go home and quit embarrassing South Vietnam's democratic government. All it took to maintain order in the streets was a little cloud seeding on the day of a demonstration.

The question now is whether the government will use similar methods here in the United States. Miami Beach, the scene of both national political party conventions this sum-

mer, would be an ideal testing ground. Instead of calling up the National Guard to quell a riot and risking a bloodbath, the President could simply send up a CIA cloud-seeding team. Even the most militant yuppies, gay libbers and poor people would be forced to retreat when hit by Miami's first monsoon.

Politics being what it is, we rather doubt Mr. Nixon will modify the weather to help the Democrats. Anything that embarrasses them helps him, so he will surely be content to sit back and watch heads get bashed on nationwide TV. Sudden cloudbursts are much more likely if demonstrators get out of hand when the GOP meets in Miami late in August.

At the moment, however, it appears that peace will prevail in the streets of Miami this week. The authorities have taken the security measures needed to preserve order in an open society. Concertina barbed wire has been rolled out, troops are on alert, and tear gas has been stockpiled.

What's really significant, however,

is that the Miami Beach City Council and Police Chief Rocky Pomerance are trying something quite radical: they are being nice to the protest groups. Demonstrators have been allowed to camp in Flamingo Park, and policemen assigned to crowd control won't carry guns or clubs. When a problem develops, negotiations will be tried first, force second. In other words, every effort is being made to avoid the violence of 1968.

All bets are off, of course, if Sen. George McGovern should somehow be denied the nomination. But it now appears that while the candidates shed each other's blood inside Convention Hall, cops and pot-heads will smile at each other outside in the Florida sunshine.

Law and order Republicans, on the other hand, may not tolerate this permissive coddling of effete intellectuals. So if you are planning to demonstrate at the Republican convention for transvestite liberation or government aid to middle-aged adults, better take along a couple of raincoats and a water-repellent sign.

GARDEN CITY, N.Y.
 NEWSDAY

E JUL 1 0 1972

GOP Attractions: Vietnam, Beer

By Bruce Lambert Jr.

Roslyn—When the several hundred youths at a Republican conference here broke up into seminar groups, only half a dozen or so showed up for the one on reelection of President Nixon.

Despite that disappointing turnout, the President got virtually unanimous support at the day's most popular seminar, on Vietnam. Thirty youngsters gathered for it, and, unlike the other groups, their number grew.

In fact, the Vietnam seminar nearly tripled in size and lasted close to two hours, long after the other seminars ended their discussions on women, colleges, ecology, offshore oil, transportation, busing, the courts, narcotics, and the State Legislature.

The Vietnam seminar had not even been scheduled, but the Nassau County Republican organization running the all-day youth meeting accepted a speaking offer from a young man who identified himself as Daniel Teodoru, a Romanian refugee and former correspondent in Vietnam. He did not say what news organization he had represented.

Teodoru said the effectiveness of Nixon's war policies had been confirmed by unpublicized Communist documents captured by the Central Intelligence Agency and the military. "When you've got the President and the enemy telling you the same thing, you've got to believe it," he said.

Teodoru described Sen. George McGovern as "an out-and-out liar" who "coordinates his political campaign with Hanoi's military campaign." Referring to his own youth, Teodoru also claimed that McGovern "bombed me and other innocent civilians" while serving as a pilot in World War II. And he said that the media have been "vicious and vile" in distorting news from Vietnam.

His remarks drew several rounds of applause from the youths. One objected that the war was based in U.S. economic interests and another specified oil. Teodoru challenged them for details and got none.

"I ended up being a defense of Nixon," one 19-year-old girl said. "But he [Teodoru] was able to back himself up with facts while they weren't. They had no facts. Generally, I think the Republicans are making an effort for youth." Another girl said the seminars were "really excellent."

More popular than any of the seminars, however, were the free attractions: several swimming pools, a trampoline, a pond, shady trees, fried chicken box lunches, beer on tap and a dinner of hot dogs and hamburgers. One teenage girl said to another, "Oh, let's stay. There's nothing else to do."

Nearly 1,000 of the 18-to-25-year-olds registered during Saturday morning and afternoon, but a late afternoon rain threatened to end the program, and the crowd dwindled to 40. With an ice cold can in his hand, one youth said, "Well, we've still got the free beer."

9 JUL 1972

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Pentagon:

Weather As a Weapon Of War

WASHINGTON—Dr. Gordon J. F. MacDonald, a prominent geophysicist who had just completed a tour as vice president of the Defense Department's Institute of Defense Analysis, published in 1968 a little-noted but chilling study on the military potential of meteorological warfare. He listed a number of options available to those who would choose to tamper with nature. Among them:

- Altering the world's temperature by rocketing materials into the earth's upper atmosphere to either absorb light (thereby cooling the surface below) or absorb outgoing heat (thereby heating the surface below). This technique could be targeted at a specific area.

- Triggering tidal waves by setting off a series of underground explosions along the edge of the Continental Shelf, or by producing a natural earthquake. A guided tidal wave could be achieved by correctly shaping the energy-release sources.

- Changing the physical makeup of the atmosphere by creating, with a rocket or similar weapon, a "hole" in the important ozone layer between 10 and 30 miles up, that is responsible for absorbing much of the ultra-violet light cast from the sun. Without the protective layer of ozone, a molecular form of oxygen, the radiation would be fatal to all human, plant and animal life that could not take shelter in the affected area below.

Dr. MacDonald (who is now a member of the White House Council on Environmental Quality) made it clear that his essay was based only on speculation. Last week, however, it became known that at least part of his macabre weather arsenal had been secretly in use by the United States since the 1960's.

Air Force planes, supported by the Central Intelligence Agency, have been

waging a systematic war of rain on the infiltration trails of Laos, Cambodia, North Vietnam and South Vietnam. The intent: suppress enemy anti-missile fire, provide cover for South Vietnamese commando teams penetrating the North and hinder the movement of men and matériel from North Vietnam into the South.

The first experimental rain-making mission was flown by the C.I.A. in South Vietnam in 1963, but it was not until 1965 that a group of Air Force scientists officially was ordered to start thinking of ways to turn nature into a military tool.

"We all sat down in a big brainstorming session," said one of the scientists who participated at the Air Force Cambridge Research Laboratories at Hanscomb Field near Bedford, Mass. "The idea was to increase the rain and reduce the trafficability in all of Southeast Asia."

Within a year, the Air Force and C.I.A. began a highly secret rain-making project over the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos, known as "Operation Pop-Eye." There were heated protests from the State Department, and eventually a directive from the Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara ordering a halt to the project. Instead, well-qualified sources said last week, "it went underground—into the dark."

From 1969, through at least early this year, weather warfare was a covert operation being directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff with White House acquiescence.

The fact that the program existed at all came to light only last week in The New York Times. But, despite an extensive investigation, it could not be learned how successful the program had been, how many missions were conducted or whether it was still being used in connection with the heavy bombing of North Vietnam that followed the enemy offensive last April.

Making rain has long been technically feasible. Scientists have learned that rain fall can be increased by as much as 40 per cent after seeding clouds by aircraft with silver-iodide particles. Other chemicals, including dry ice, also have been used with success, both in the United States and in Southeast Asia.

Military and Government specialists acknowledge that there is little precise scientific knowledge of the short-range impact of cloud seeding and practically none of the long-range ecological effect of changing the amount of natural rainfall. Some scientists have

published data suggesting that weather modification, in combination with other ecological stresses such as air pollution and pesticides, may have a synergistic effect—that is, result in collective changes far greater than either abuse would have caused by itself.

In Indochina, where heavy bombing already has robbed much of the landscape of its natural water-holding capability by destroying foliage and trees, artificially induced rains may result in far greater flooding than expected, along with heavier soil erosion.

Technically, there are no interna-

tional agreements outlawing such warfare. But Government officials made clear last week that the weather-making activity of the Air Force was shielded from public view because of White House sensitivity to what could be regarded as the impropriety of the action. The issue, one well-informed official said, was one in which Henry A. Kissinger, the President's national-security adviser, took a personal hand. "This kind of thing was a bomb," the official said, "and Henry restricted information about it to those who had to know."

—SEYMOUR M. HERSH

9 JUL 1972

John P. Roche

War Command Chaos

GEN. JOHN D. Lavelle's private war with North Vietnam has justifiably touched off quite a stir. Lavelle, it will be recalled, was commanding general of the 7th Air Force and apparently decided to use the ambiguity of "protective reaction" as a justification for some preemptive strikes against North Vietnamese military installations. He had the records of these strikes doctored up in such a fashion that they indicated compliance with the rules of engagement. However, because the President subsequently authorized wider bombing, the chances are that many people will write off the Lavelle incident on the ground that he was premature but sensible.

Actually the Lavelle initiative is symptomatic of a far more basic problem than simple battlefield improvisation. Leaving aside the Strange-love scenarios which have local commanders joyously firing off Minutemen, what occurred was a complete failure of the command structure that should concern all of us. It was far more than a breakdown in civilian control over the military; it was a breakdown in military control over the military. Not since Abraham Lincoln put U. S. Grant in command of the Union armies have we seen such a shambles as the command structure of the Vietnamese war.

WHO IS theoretically the top American official in South Vietnam? The chief of mission, Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker. What was the official function of Gen. William Westmoreland and, later, Gen. Creighton Abrams? They were the ambassador's subordinates in charge of the Military Assis-

ance Command (MACV). That is, in theory, these four-star generals had exactly the same status as, say, the colonel who is in charge of an American military assistance group in some Latin American nation.

For openers, then, the commanding general, MACV, worked for the ambassador, just like the local director of the Agency for International Development or the local head of the Central Intelligence Agency. Then came the war and half a million American troops—Army, Air Force and Marines, plus the assets of the Seventh Fleet in the Gulf of Tonkin. Now who was in charge? Well, if you can believe it, the ambassador.

At this point General of the Army George C. Marshall must have been spinning in his grave. Vietnam was never made into a military theater of command with the highly structured lines of control that existed in World War II (and even then there were problems; George Patton, for instance, had a do-it-yourself view of strategy). Nor were our ambassadors, either by character or conviction, willing to take on the job of consul.

Which brings us to Gen. Lavelle and the 7th Air Force. Who was Lavelle's boss? In one capacity, he worked for Abrams; in another, for the commander in chief, U.S. Forces in the Pacific (CINCPAC)—an admiral in Hawaii; in still a third, for the chief of staff of the Air Force in Washington.

THE SAME sort of command chaos permeated all the services. Indeed, if one looked at the chart, he sometimes wondered how anything ever got accomplished. But, conversely, such a labyrinth is perfectly designed for a general who wants to go into business for himself.

In political terms, it is a classic case of hardening of the categories. Even though the character of the war radically changed between 1963-66, the fiction was maintained that we were merely providing "military assistance." Thus we fell between two stools: there was no theater commander to run the show; there was no ambassador willing or able to exercise his theoretical responsibilities.

I have often thought in this context that perhaps President Johnson's greatest error was in not accepting Robert F. Kennedy's offer to go to Saigon as ambassador. With Bobby at the head of the table there would have been no ambiguities in the command structure.

King Features Syndicate

Joseph Kraft is in Hanoi. His column will be resumed this week.

8 JUL 1972

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STATINTL

ANNALS OF WAR

VIETNAM

II-SOVEREIGN OF DISCORD

NGO DINH DIEM—the name meant a great deal at one time, in Washington as well as Saigon. On a trip to Vietnam in 1961, Lyndon Johnson called Diem “the Winston Churchill of Asia.” Whatever the other points of resemblance between him and that British statesman, the man who undertook the American project of barricading the southern against the northern half of Vietnam certainly provoked hyperbole from Americans. For a period in the mid-nineteen-fifties, Diem was the hero of the American press. According to an article in *Life*, he was a “tough miracle man,” who had “saved his people from [the] agonizing prospect” of a national plebiscite; and he was widely given credit for halting “the red tide of Communism in Asia.” The word “miracle” affixed itself to Diem’s name with the adhesion of a Homeric epithet. Diem had performed the “political miracle” of creating a strong government, the “economic miracle” of rebuilding the economy of South Vietnam from the ruins of war. In 1957, Diem travelled to the United States on the American Presidential airplane. Welcomed by President Eisenhower at the airport, he addressed a joint session of Congress and visited New York, where Mayor Robert Wagner called him “a man history may yet adjudge as one of the great figures of the twentieth century.” Six years later, Diem was to die in a dark alley of Saigon, denounced as the petty tyrant who had destroyed South Vietnamese society and prejudiced the cause of the free world in Asia.

Any history of the Diem regime would have to be written in vivid, novelesque colors. To start with, there was Ngo Dinh Diem himself—a shy, self-righteous Catholic mandarin who had taken a vow of chastity and revealed an ambition to serve as a moral example to his people. He wished, in effect, to be the emperor of an enlightened Confucian state, in the classic pattern of Vietnamese history. Four of Diem’s brothers played important roles, especially the

Nhu, whose life was a succession of plots, ruses, and metaphysical dogmas. And there was Mme. Nhu, the beautiful, outspoken, and wholly outrageous woman whom the American journalists called “the Dragon Lady.” For nearly a decade, the Ngos dominated all conversation in Saigon; Americans and Vietnamese alike spent hours discussing the latest court intrigue or scandal, hours speculating on the intricacies of the family philosophy. The Ngos never disappointed them—not even in dying. Played out under the gaze of the television cameras, the fall of the Ngos was, in its way, pure theatre, the dénouement of a baroque tragedy.

The private psychological drama of Diem and his family was as nothing beside the grand strategies and global concerns of the United States in Vietnam, but, as the French historian Philippe Devillers once wrote, “in our age of mass society, where all history seems to be determined by forces so powerful as to negate the individual, the Vietnamese problem has the originality to remain dominated by questions of individuals. Indeed, the problem becomes almost incomprehensible if one transforms men into abstractions.” The notion may sound romantic, but it is not. In the first place, Vietnam in the days of Diem possessed a very small educated society; most of the prominent men knew each other as well as if they had been the inhabitants of one village. In the second place, the Vietnamese traditionally understood politics not in terms of programs or large social forces but in terms of the individual. And their perception was not unscientifically based, for, given the size and uniformity of the old society, the life of one man might stand as a model for the life of the society as a whole. If that one man was Ngo Dinh Diem, then the personal drama of the Ngo family, with its mysterious and violent ending, described the difficulty of the American project in Vietnam better than would a history of all the counter-insurgency programs or an analysis of all the larger social forces.

THE American decision to back Ngo Dinh Diem was not of itself a major policy decision. The policy of supporting a non-Communist Vietnam had been formulated some years earlier, and Diem himself was but one element of the fallback position hastily devised following the French debacle in 1954. By that time, the United States was paying eighty per cent of the costs of the French war, and it was not until June of 1954 that Secretary of State Dulles told the French definitely that the United States would not commit its own troops and planes to Indo-China. Even after the fall of Dien Bien Phu, Administration officials did not accept the Vietminh victory or the principle of a divided Vietnam. During the Geneva Conference, their ambition was not only to build up a government in Saigon but to undermine Ho Chi Minh’s government in Hanoi as well. In June, 1954, Colonel Edward G. Lansdale was sent out as chief of a Saigon military mission with orders to “beat the Geneva timetable of Communist takeover in the North.” By August, during the period of negotiated truce that had been agreed upon to precede the holding of national elections, Lansdale’s teams were scattered about the country from Hanoi to the Ca Mau peninsula conducting agitprop work and sabotage operations, in direct violation of the United States government’s promise at Geneva to “refrain from the threat or the use of force.” These teams had small success in the Vietminh-held areas. Their main achievement in the North was to lay the groundwork for the subsequent “flight” of the Catholics to the South. Their tactics were promises and “black propaganda,” or the falsification of enemy reports. Many of the rest of their activities were little more than terrorist acts. One team, for instance, managed to contaminate the oil supply in the bus depot of Hanoi in order to wreck the engines of all the city’s public transport.

The fact is that high United States officials could have had very little confidence in the success of Lansdale’s mission in either the South or the North. In Saigon, the French-sponsored government was in a state of near-collapse. Shortly after the Emperor Bao Dai ap-

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continued

Rainmaking Is Used As Weapon by U.S.

Cloud Seeding in Indochina Confirmed— Chemical Also Employed to Foil Radar

By SEYMOUR M. HERSH

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 2—The United States has been secretly seeding clouds over North Vietnam, Laos and South Vietnam to increase and control the rainfall for military purposes.

Government sources, both civilian and military, said during an extensive series of interviews that the Air Force cloud-seeding program has been aimed most recently at hindering movement of North Vietnamese troops and equipment and suppressing enemy anti-aircraft missile fire.

The disclosure confirmed growing speculation in Congressional and scientific circles about the use of weather modification in Southeast Asia. Despite years of experiments with rainmaking in the United States and elsewhere, scientists are not sure they understand its long-term effect on the ecology of a region.

Some Opposed Program

The weather manipulation in Indochina, which was first tried in South Vietnam in 1963, is the first confirmed use of meteorological warfare. Although it is not prohibited by any international conventions on warfare, artificial rainmaking has been strenuously opposed by some State Department officials.

It could not be determined whether the operations were being conducted in connection with the current North Vietnamese offensive or the renewed American bombing of the North.

Effectiveness Doubted

Beginning in 1967, some State Department officials protested that the United States, by deliberately altering the natural rainfall in parts of Indochina, was taking environmental risks of unknown proportions. But many advocates of the operation have found little wrong with using weather modification as a military weapon.

"What's worse," one official asked, "dropping bombs or rain?"

All of the officials interviewed said that the United States did not have the capability to cause heavy flooding during the summer in the northern parts of North Vietnam, where serious flooding occurred last year.

Officially, the White House and State Department declined comment on the use of meteorological warfare. "This is one of those things where no one is going to say anything," one official said.

Most officials interviewed agreed that the seeding had accomplished one of its main objectives — muddying roads and flooding lines of communication. But there were also many military and Government officials who expressed doubt that the project had caused any dramatic results.

The sources, without providing details, also said that a method had been developed for treating clouds with a chemical that eventually produced an acidic rainfall capable of fouling the operation of North Vietnamese radar equipment used for directing surface-to-air missiles.

In addition to hampering SAM missiles and delaying North Vietnamese infiltration, the rainmaking program had the following purposes:

• Providing rain and cloud cover for infiltration of South Vietnamese commando and intelligence teams into North Vietnam.

• Serving as a "spoiler" for North Vietnamese attacks and raids in South Vietnam.

• Altering or tailoring the rain patterns over North Vietnam and Laos to aid United States bombing missions.

• Diverting North Vietnamese men and material from military operations to keep muddied roads and other lines of communication in operation.

Keyed To Monsoon

The cloud-seeding operations necessarily were keyed to the

two main monsoon affect Laos and Vietnam. It was just trying to add on to something that you already got," one officer said.

Military sources said that one main goal was to increase the duration of the southwest monsoon, which spawns high-rising cumulus clouds — those most susceptible to cloud seeding—over the panhandle areas of Laos and North Vietnam from May to early October. The longer rainy season thus would give the Air Force more opportunity to trigger rainstorms.

"We were trying to arrange the weather pattern to suit our convenience," said one former Government official who had detailed knowledge of the operation.

According to interviews, the Central Intelligence Agency initiated the use of cloud-seeding over Hue, in the northern part of South Vietnam. "We first used that stuff in about August of 1963," one former C.I.A. agent said, "when the Diem regime was having all that trouble with the Buddhists."

"They would just stand around during demonstrations when the police threw tear gas at them, but we noticed that when the rains came they wouldn't stay on," the former agent said.

"The agency got an Air America Beechcraft and had it rigged up with silver iodide," he said. "There was another demonstration and we seeded the area. It rained."

A similar cloud-seeding was carried out by C.I.A. aircraft in Saigon at least once during the summer of 1964, the former agent said.

Expanded to Trail

The Intelligence Agency expanded its cloud-seeding activities to the Ho Chi Minh supply trail in Laos sometime in the middle nineteen-sixties, a number of Government sources said. By 1967, the Air Force had become involved although, as one former Government official said, "the agency was calling all the shots."

"I always assumed the agency had a mandate from the White House to do it," he added.

A number of former CIA, and high-ranking Johnson Administration officials depicted the operations along the trail as experimental.

The state of the art had not yet advanced to the point where it was possible to predict the results of a seeding operation with any degree of confidence, one Government official said. "We used to go out flying around and looking for a certain cloud formation," the official said. "And we made a lot of mistakes. Once we dumped

seven inches of rain in two hours on one of our Special Forces camps."

Despite the professed skepticism on the part of some members of the Johnson Administration, military men apparently took the weather modification program much more seriously.

According to a document contained in the Pentagon papers, the Defense Department's secret history of the war, weather modification was one of seven basic options for stepping up the war that were presented on request by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the White House in late February, 1967.

The document described the weather program over Laos—officially known as Operation Pop-Eye—as an attempt "to reduce trafficability along infiltration routes."

Authorization Needed

It said that Presidential authorization was "required to implement operational phase of weather modification process previously successfully tested and evaluated in same area." The brief summary concluded by stating that "risk of compromise is minimal."

A similar option was cited in another 1967 working document published in the Pentagon papers. Neither attracted any immediate public attention.

The Laos cloud-seeding operations did provoke, however, a lengthy and bitter, albeit secret, dispute inside the Johnson Administration in 1967. A team of State Department attorneys and officials protested that the use of cloud-seeding was a dangerous precedent for the United States.

"I felt that the military and agency hadn't analyzed it to determine if it was in our interest," one official who was involved in the dispute said. He also was concerned over the rigid secrecy of the project, he said, "although it might have been all right to keep it secret if you did it once and didn't want the precedent to become known."

The general feeling was summarized by one former State Department official who said he was concerned that the rainmaking "might violate what we considered the general rule of the thumb for an illegal weapon of war—something that would cause unusual suffering or disproportionate damage." There also was concern, he added, because of the unknown ecological risks.

A Nixon Administration official said that he believed the first use of weather modification over North Vietnam took place in late 1968 or early 1969 when rain was increased

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Seeding Clouds Over Vietnams By U.S. Charged

By BRUCE DeSILVA

Quoting unnamed Central Intelligence Agency and State Department sources, The New York Times News Service yesterday reported new evidence that the Pentagon is changing the weather over Southeast Asia for military reasons.

In a story by Seymour M. Hersh, the reporter who first broke the story of the My Lai massacre, the Times said the United States first began seeding clouds to increase rainfall over Hue in the northern part of South Vietnam in 1963.

According to a former CIA official, the action was taken to prevent Buddhist demonstrations in that city against the South Vietnamese government, the Times reported.

"They would just stand around during demonstrations when the police threw tear gas at them, but we noticed that when the rains came they wouldn't stay on," the former agent is quoted as saying.

The story repeats, as first reported in the June 25 Providence Sunday Journal, that seeding operations were begun in the mid 1960's to create heavy rains which washed out portions of the Ho Chi Minh Trail and impeded infiltration of supplies and men to the South.

Sen. Claiborne Pell said late last month he strongly believes the United States is seeding clouds in Southeast Asia for military reasons.

Reached at his home last night and informed of the Times story, the Senator said: "This provides additional foundation for my own belief, a belief that I have advanced for several months, that these activities have been conducted by the United States."

The Senator is planning Senate hearings for later this summer on his proposed treaty to ban the use of weather modification as a weapon of war.

In addition to impeding infiltration, the Times reported that the Pentagon rain-making program has the following purposes:

- To provide rain and cloud cover for infiltration of South Vietnamese commandos and intelligence teams into North Vietnam.
- To serve as a "spoiler" for North Vietnamese attacks and raids in South Vietnam.
- To divert North Vietnamese men and material from military operations to keep muddied roads and other lines of communication open.

The Times quotes a "former high-ranking official" as saying that by the end of 1971, the program was under the direct control of the White House.

Henry Kissinger, the President's special adviser for national security, felt the program was politically sensitive and ordered it kept a secret from all but a handful of administration officials, the official is quoted as saying.

The Times quoted a "well informed source" as saying Navy scientists developed a new chemical agent effective in warm stratus clouds that produces an acidic rain capable of fouling "mechanical equipment -- like radars, trucks, and tanks."

The story implies, but does not say, that the chemical was actually used over the North.

The Times reports that officials interviewed said the United States did not have the capability to cause heavy flooding during the summer in the Northern parts of North Vietnam last year. The flooding destroyed crops and reportedly killed thousands.

However, Sen. Pell and David Keaney, a member of the Senate foreign relations committee's professional staff, told the Journal they believe the United States does have that capability and was responsible for the floods.

In a letter to Senator Pell last year, Rady Johnson, the assistant secretary of defense for legislative affairs, said the Pentagon has the power to increase rainfall by up to 50 per cent.

A 50 per cent increase in the torrential monsoon rains of the region could obviously have a considerable effect.

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Wash. Staff

STATINTL

Asian Allies Help Cut Heroin Traffic

By MIRIAM OTTENBERG

Star Staff Writer

U.S. narcotics agents are making a sizable dent in the Southeast Asian dope traffic and—despite reports to the contrary—America's Asian allies and the CIA are helping them do it.

"We have seriously damaged the program of the narcotics traffickers," reported John Warner, chief of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs' strategic intelligence office. "It's becoming increasingly more difficult for them to operate, even though their profits are tremendous."

Warner countered testimony given recently by Alfred W. McCoy, a Ph.D. student, before a Senate Appropriations subcommittee to the effect that the governments of South Vietnam, Laos and Thailand are actively engaged in the heroin traffic and that the U.S. government has not moved to stop it.

"Corruption," Warner acknowledged, "is a way of life in Southeast Asia. It reaches to all levels. But the United States government has made it perfectly clear to all governments in the area that we will not compromise on the narcotics issue."

He cited as an example of increasing cooperation on instance earlier this year when 26 tons of opium were turned over to the government of Thailand by one of the insurgent forces along its border—presumably for reasons of its own.

Until recently, the opium would have found its way back into the traffic. But this

Second of 2 Articles

time, it was burned in the presence of American narcotics agents and samples were taken and analyzed by American chemists.

Even more significant are recent successes of Laos and Thai narcotics investigative units set up with U.S. aid.

Warner explained how they came into being and, in doing so, replied to the charges made by McCoy in his Congressional appearance.

McCoy had charged that the U.S. ambassador to Laos, G. McMurtrie Godley, "did his best to prevent the assignment" of U.S. narcotics agents to Laos.

Actually, Warner said, Godley has been one of the staunchest supporters of the anti-narcotics program in Laos, and requested U.S. narcotics agents as advisers long before they could be sent there. He was instrumental in persuading Laos to outlaw the opium traffic, Warner said.

Godley also persuaded the Laotian government to appoint an honest and competent general to head the new narcotics investigative unit which the U.S. Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs established and trained, Warner added.

In the short time the unit has been operational, Warner reported, it has made tremendous progress in arresting traffickers and seizing laboratory equipment and the chemicals used to make heroin.

The unit's latest score came on June 7 when it arrested a Meo deputy of the Laotian parliament and seized 10 kilos of No. 4 heroin (the injectable kind), 26 kilos of opium and a number of U.S. Army carbines.

Another special investigative force, trained and equipped by BNDD agents, has just gotten under way at Chingmai in northern Thailand. Chingmai is a road junction in the network of roads leading south to Bangkok.

It's particularly important to U.S. narcotics agents because they hope there to halt the movement of heroin out of the "Golden Triangle," the opium growing area bordering Laos, Burma and Thailand.

The new Thai unit has just scored its first success. On June 10, a joint BNDD and Thai task force raided a compound and seized 1,600 kilos of raw opium and processing equipment, he said.

Warner also reported that the Royal Hong Kong police also have stepped up their anti-narcotics program, making large seizures of narcotics, arresting traffickers and seizing two laboratories this year. At the time, both labs had quantities of heroin, opium and morphine base.

Burma, the other government touched by the opium traffic, has expressed its willingness to cooperate, Warner reported, but Burmese officials frankly admit their control over the border areas are very tenuous. It would require an army to make any impact on the border areas where insurgent forces protect the opium traffickers, Warner said.

In Laos an acknowledged important trafficker has been knocked out of business not by an army but by American diplomacy, Warner said.

Gen. Ouane Rattikone, former chief of staff of the Royal Laotian Army, had consolidated several opium refineries into one, and with his army, controlled and protected the Laotian narcotics traffic for years, Warner said.

"He was forced to retire in July, 1971. We have political clout in the area and Ambassador Godley exerted it."

Warner said similar action would be taken against Vietnamese figures if charges of narcotics trafficking were proven.

"Politics means nothing to us in BNDD," he said. If we had the evidence . . . the President would be informed and I know something would be done about it.

McCoy had said in his congressional testimony that the political apparatus of Gen. Nguyen Cao Ky (the former

president of South Vietnam) "demonstrates the importance of official corruption in Southeast Asia's drug traffic." McCoy also said Ky's sister is tied in with heroin smuggling.

Warner, however, said there is no evidence that Ky is involved.

McCoy, in his Senate testimony, said he had briefed BNDD on his findings and they corroborated much of his evidence. Asked about that, Warner said he had seen nothing of an evidentiary nature from McCoy "other than gossip, rumors, conjecture and old history."

McCoy had accused the CIA of providing substantial military support to mercenaries, rebels and warlords actively engaged in the narcotics traffic and of letting aircraft it chartered be used to transport opium harvested by the mercenaries.

Of those charges, Warner said the American-chartered aircraft now have security forces guarding against the transport of any narcotics.

Since President Nixon asked the CIA to assist in dealing with the Southeast Asian narcotics problem, Warner said, the CIA has been one of the most cooperative government agencies working with BNDD to develop the information on which BNDD and its foreign counterparts can act to interdict the traffic and make cases.

The weeding out of Asian officials heavily involved in the dope traffic, as well as the strikes against the traffickers themselves, are all fairly recent. And so is the BNDD involvement in the Pacific.

It's only in the last two years that American narcotics agents have come into the Orient in force. Since BNDD Director John E. Ingersoll pushed for more agents to fight the Pacific traffic in drugs, regional offices have been set up in Bangkok, Saigon and Tokyo, and district offices in Chingmai, Vientiane, Kuala Lumpur, Singapore, Hong Kong, Okinawa and Manila.

6 JUN 1972

Charge CIA and Thieu push heroin to U.S. GIs

Daily World Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON, June 2—Alfred W. McCoy, a Yale student working on his doctorate, told a Senate Appropriations subcommittee today that the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency and Saigon Dictator Nguyen Van Thieu are directly involved in the shipment of vast quantities of opium and heroin to the U.S.

McCoy, who has authored a book, "The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia," debunked President Nixon's campaign against heroin imported from Turkey.

He told the Foreign Operations subcommittee, headed by Sen. William Proxmire (D-Wisc), that the U.S. underworld has totally recouped the loss of the Turkish supply by turning to Southeast Asia sources.

In South Vietnam, McCoy said, the opium and heroin traffic is divided among the nation's three dominant military factions: Pres. Thieu's political apparatus, Prime Minister Kim's political organization, and Gen. Ky's political apparatus.

"Throughout the mountainous Golden Triangle region, the CIA has provided substantial military support for mercenaries, right-wing rebels, and tribal war lords who are actively engaged in the narcotics traffic and in Thailand the CIA has worked closely with nationalist Chinese paramilitary units which control 80 to 90 percent of northern Burma's vast opium export and manufacture high-grade heroin for export to the American market," McCoy testified.

"Some of President Thieu's closest supporters inside the South Vietnamese army control the distribution and sale of heroin to Americans GI's fighting in Indochina."

"Finally U.S. agencies have been actually involved in certain aspects of the region's drug traffic. In Northern Laos, Air America aircraft and helicopters chartered by the CIA have been transporting opium."

[Perspective]

Electoral Politics: The Candidates Reply

IN THE EDITORIAL ESSAY "Vietnam and the Elections" which opened the April issue of RAMPARTS we observed that the call for U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam, once dismissed as extremist or naive, had at last become politically respectable. Withdrawal had in fact become the dominant theme of Vietnam policy among this year's Presidential candidates. At the same time, we noted, the clear principle of this demand was being clouded and distorted in the turgid mainstream of American electoral debate. And we called upon the anti-war movement in the coming months "to sharpen the demand for withdrawal and establish the clearest possible mandate for it."

In an attempt to follow our own advice, RAMPARTS wrote to each of the Presidential candidates, presenting to them a list of seven questions on their plans for peace in Vietnam. We received replies from Rep. Chisholm, Sen. Humphrey, Sen. Jackson, Sen. McGovern and Sen. Muskie. The letters from Chisholm, Humphrey, McGovern and Muskie essentially consisted of the candidates' point-by-point responses to our questions over their signatures. In the following commentary we have taken these questions one or two at a time, and grouped together the answers of these four candidates' for comparison and analysis. Sen. Jackson's letter did not direct itself to the specific questions in a parallel way, so we are printing it in its entirety in a box on page 10. Of the Democratic candidates who remained in the aftermath of the Wisconsin primary only Wallace and McCarthy did not respond to our questions. Since Rep. McClosky had dropped out of the race in March and Richard Nixon didn't answer, we drew a blank on the Republican hopefuls.

We posed seven questions; while the original numbering is maintained, the results are discussed here in a different order. This allows us to set out first the common thrust of the four candidates' policies and in a sense proceed from the easy questions to the hard, from the shared assumptions to the problematic implications.

1. *Shall the United States permanently withdraw all its armed forces (Soldiers, sailors and airmen) from Vietnam on the sole condition of an agreement for the repatriation of prisoners of war, timed to coincide with our withdrawal?*

2. *Shall the U.S. similarly withdraw its armed forces from all of Indochina on the same single condition? What about U.S. bases in Thailand?*

CHISHOLM:

1. I firmly believe and stand for an immediate total withdrawal of all U.S. forces from Vietnam; with the sole condition being an agreement for the repatriation of prisoners of war.

2. I also believe that it is imperative that we withdraw our armed forces from all of Indochina. I must further support a withdrawal of U.S. influence on the lives of those who seek a preservation of their culture.

HUMPHREY:

1. Yes.

2. Yes, although in regard to Thailand the critical point is that these bases not be used for strikes in Indochina. The question of leaving these bases altogether is a longer term proposition, involving issues that go beyond the Vietnam war; this calls for further study at the Presidential level.

McGOVERN:

1. Yes. It is important to note, however, that leaving U.S. forces in South Vietnam to defend the Thieu regime is a circuitous method of achieving release of our prisoners. I am convinced that they will be returned within the framework of Article 118 of the Geneva Convention on prisoners of war, which provides that prisoners will be released without delay "after the cessation of hostilities." This requires a complete American disengagement from China. I want to point out, too, that I

do not regard this U.S. withdrawal as a negotiating position—it is instead a course of action which I fully intend to implement. The McGovern-Hatfield Amendment did not urge the President to negotiate our withdrawal; rather it required withdrawal by cutting off funds for the war.

2. Yes. The bases in Thailand have no justification other than to attempt to exert U.S. influence over the internal politics of Southeast Asian countries. The withdrawal must, of course, mean an end to all military operations, including bombing, anywhere in Indochina.

MUSKIE:

1. Yes. I have consistently supported this position in the last few years. On February 2, I urged that "We must set a date when we will withdraw every soldier, sailor, and airman, and stop all bombing and other American military activity, dependent only on an agreement for the return of our prisoners and the safety of our troops as they leave." I do not believe that an agreement for the safety of our troops as they leave would be in any way a problem; the basic exchange would be a complete end to American military participation in the Indochina war for the return of our prisoners.

2. My proposal includes our military activity and personnel in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. I would therefore not make use of our bases in Thailand and elsewhere in Southeast Asia for activities related to the Indochina war. I would otherwise approach the issue of bases in Thailand and elsewhere in Southeast Asia in the context of efforts not only to promote detente between the U.S. and China but also with regard to the effect that either maintaining or removing our various bases would have on the possibilities for accommodation among Asian nations themselves. Clearly, we do not need to maintain anything like the number and size of bases we have now in Southeast Asia.

6. *Shall the U.S. set a date by which it will carry out its withdrawal (as specified in the preceding answers) on the same single condition of an agreement on repatriation of POWs?*
7. *What date?*



**Exclusive
interview**

Madame Binh

answers Nixon's lies

By Wilfred Burchett
Guardian Staff Correspondent

Paris
President Nixon's advisor Henry Kissinger has visited Moscow, Peking and Paris in search of—as Nixon always puts it—a peaceful settlement to the war in South Vietnam and bearing “generous” offers of peace.

He has had 13 private sessions with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam's delegation in Paris, but he has never deigned to talk with those primarily concerned with the struggle in the South—represented in Paris by Nguyen Thi Binh, Foreign Minister of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam and head of its delegation in Paris.

There are undoubtedly elements of male chauvinism in this, but it is primarily the arrogance of the super-power psychology at the White House. An arrangement between “equals” with the other super-power, the Soviet Union could be tolerated. Next best would be a deal with People's China—at least a major power. But it was too humiliating to talk even with the DRV.

Each of Nixon's negotiators in Paris, from Henry Cabot Lodge to William Porter, have exhausted the language of contempt to make this clear. As for the PRG, it was seen as far beneath the contempt of the U.S.

It was with this in mind and due to the deliberate distortions of the PRG's views by Nixon and Kissinger that I put some questions to Nguyen Thi Binh:

Are you prepared to meet with Kissinger or some other competent U.S. negotiator and within the framework of the PRG's 7-point peace plan discuss the following concrete points:

(1) The question of the safe withdrawal of the remaining 60,000 U.S. troops in South Vietnam?

(2) The question of the release of U.S. POWs in South Vietnam as well as the captured pilots held in the DRV?

(3) Questions relating to President Nixon's concern about the “imposition of a Communist regime in Saigon?”

(4) Assure that there will not be a “long night of terror” in South Vietnam as Nixon expressed it on May 8 or a “bloodbath” as he expressed it in his April 28 speech?

Nguyen Thi Binh answered with the following:

“In order to deceive American and world public opinion, Nixon persists in repeating his lies and slanders, trying to justify his new extremely grave acts of war. We have many times declared and we repeat once again that as evidence of our good will and our sincere desire to arrive at a peaceful solution to the problem of South Vietnam, we are ready to engage in private conversation with U.S. representatives so they may still better understand our peace proposals. We are ready to discuss all matters concerning a solution.

continued. “However, I would like to clarify for American public opinion some of the points you have raised:

“Regarding the complete withdrawal of U.S. troops in complete security. On Sept. 17, 1970, in our 8-point peace plan, as on July 1, 1971 in our 7-point peace plan, we clearly stated that after the U.S. fixes a definite date for the total withdrawal of all U.S. military forces from South Vietnam, the parties concerned could agree on necessary measures to guarantee the security of U.S. troops during their withdrawal.

“Thus, if the list of soldiers and pilots captured, killed and wounded gets continually longer this is precisely because Nixon has refused to fix a concrete date for total withdrawal, refuses to negotiate responsibility on the basis of our reasonable proposal and continues to utilize U.S. troops and pilots in acts of war against our people.

“Regarding the freeing of U.S. POWs. This problem has also been dealt with exhaustively in our peace initiative. If until this day captured U.S. military personnel have not been able to return to their homes and their number increases all the time, this is also because Nixon refuses to fix a definite date for the total withdrawal of U.S. troops, refuses to discontinue his support for dictator Nguyen Van Thieu's clique and continues to wage war against our people. These captured military personnel are in fact prisoners of the policy of ‘Vietnamization.’ They are prisoners of Nixon and Thieu. If the U.S. had replied seriously to our 7-point peace plan, the POWs would long ago have returned to their families.

“Regarding the political regime of South Vietnam. There never has been a question for us of imposing on South Vietnam any sort of regime whatsoever other than one chosen by the South Vietnamese people. Still less do we wish to impose a communist regime as the Nixon administration continues to maintain. On the contrary, it is the U.S. that stubbornly continues to impose on the South Vietnamese people the pro-American, anti-communist, belligerent, dictatorial and fascist regime of Thieu.

Elections—with Thieu machinery

Nixon's proposals about ‘new presidential elections’ in South Vietnam, while Thieu's machinery of dictatorship remains means nothing other than a repetition of the one-man electoral farce of October last year. The National Liberation Front and the PRG have consistently advocated the formation of a truly representative government in South Vietnam, which would be mandated to organize really free general elections in South Vietnam to commit a free choice of representatives of a political regime. In the light of the present realities in South Vietnam, such a government cannot be any other than one of national concord, comprising three elements as we have proposed.” (That is, representatives of the PRG; of the present regime in Saigon as long as Thieu is no longer at

“It seems to me that the American government is presently well informed regarding our peace plan,” she

continued

An appeal from Hanoi:

To the conscience of the people of the U.S.

A delegation of American Communists arrived in Hanoi last month as American bombers roared overhead with their weapons of death and destruction.

The delegation consisting of Gus Hall, general secretary of the Communist Party of the United States and CP candidate for U.S. President; Jarvis Tyner, chairman of the Young Workers Liberation League and CP Vice Presidential candidate; Rasheed Storey, chairman of the New York State CP; and Joseph North, author and editor of the Daily World Magazine, was in Hanoi as invited guests of the Vietnam Workers Party.

Hurried into air raid shelters by their North Vietnamese hosts, the four Communists recorded their observations and issued, on April 19, "An appeal to the conscience of the U.S. people."

"We have now seen the crushed bodies of little girls and the bodies of small boys . . . the shattered hands of workers who will never again be able to provide for their families . . . (and) some who were blinded by the flying debris," the appeal, printed in full in the April 20 Daily World said.

Substantial portions of the appeal follow:

We saw with our own eyes that the main targets of the U.S. bombers were the heavily populated working class centers of Hanoi and Haiphong.

We saw the newly constructed working class apartment houses in Haiphong that were destroyed by the criminal pilots sent by the arch criminals of the Nixon Administration.

We saw the hospital and spoke to the women and children whose blood was smeared on the steps as we entered.

We saw the workers' quarters where the planes returned three times to complete their destruction.

This is no accident. Civilian targets are the main objective of the government. We saw market places bombed, restaurants bombed, factories bombed, waterfront warehouses bombed, vital water mains bombed.

We saw British, Soviet and German Democratic Republic ships attacked in the harbor. As we crossed a bridge entering Haiphong, crowded with families of mothers, fathers and their children, a U.S. plane streaked above us and people scrambled for their lives.

We saw the same in the beautiful capital of Hanoi where we experienced two waves of bombers. It was the same in peaceful country villages by the rice paddies where we met a farmer whose friends, a family of seven, had been killed in that morning's raid.

We have now seen the crushed bodies of little girls who only moments before played peacefully with their dolls, and the bodies of small boys whose friendly games of marbles were disrupted forever by the massive tonnage of bombs. We saw the shattered hands of workers who will never again be able to provide for

their families. We saw some who were blinded by the flying debris.

In the name of our own children we appeal to all Americans to save the children of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. We appeal to your humanity, common sense and reason.

We know these murder policies of aggression are dictated not by the will of the people, or even of the U.S. Congress, but by the giant monopoly corporations—the Rockefeller, Morgan, I.T.T. interests, etc., who maintain and extend their riches through the destruction and suffering of the Vietnamese and other peoples of the world.

We must see, though, that we bear a responsibility as long as these acts of barbarism are perpetrated in our name.

The bombings are the work of desperate men gone insane, Nixon, Kissinger, Agnew, these Dr. Strangeloves of Washington.

The victories of the Vietnamese National Liberation forces have created a totally new situation. They have virtually destroyed the best of the puppet troops. They have shattered once and for all Nixon's hoax of Vietnamization. As the Pentagon-trained Thieu mercenaries turn their guns and tanks on U.S. puppet troops, the arrogant predictions of General Creighton Abrams and Defense Secretary Melvin Laird go up in smoke.

But we in the United States have the main responsibility. In meeting this challenge we will be fulfilling all the people of the world.

We appeal to all Americans, to all secret shop workers, to all members of the trade union movement, to all peace and democratic-minded Americans, to all Black Americans, to all Chicano, Puerto Rican, Indian and

Asian Americans, to the youth, to the students, to the women, to the veterans, to the unemployed, to the intellectuals, to all who feel the impact of the war in a thousand different ways—on our living standards, on our taxes, on the decline of our cities, on the escalation of racism, and the destruction of democratic rights.

We appeal to all whose sheer humanity is violated by this war.


This moment in history cries out for unity in action! This is a moment when we must unite and concentrate our total efforts to end this criminal war, to end this mass murder, to end this imperialist aggression.

An absolute precondition for the right of the Vietnamese people to determine their destiny is the total withdrawal of all U.S. military forces from Indochina. These actions must continue on every level and in all localities. These actions must be intensified in depth and scope, until the U.S. Government returns to the Paris negotiations in good faith, until it accepts the just seven-point program of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam.

These actions must continue until the U.S. government sets the date for the withdrawal of all forces from Southeast Asia—the ground troops, the U.S. Navy, the U.S. Airforce, the C.I.A. and all supportive personnel!

There have been many important actions in the U.S. on behalf of peace since this war began. The moment cries out now for the greatest united actions of us all—to achieve the end of this war on behalf of our people and the peoples of Vietnam and all Indochina, on behalf of human progress, on behalf of our children and all children of the world.

We make this appeal from the air-raid shelters of Hanoi.



Editorials

Halt the assassins!

The "language of naked power": that is the "kind of language the President is now speaking."

The words are those of Agriculture Secretary Earl Butz, defending Nixon's latest violence in North Vietnam.

The words describe the regime that Nixon would impose on the world, the regime he would instal at home.

Those words — the "language of naked power" — describe also the attempt to assassinate Governor George Wallace.

They express the violence of Nixon and Spiro Agnew and the late J. Edgar Hoover, the violence which they repeatedly incited against the advocates of peace and democracy during the 1968 campaign.

That violence is of a piece with the scarcely-cloaked charges of treason which the White House hoodlum brigade has flung at those political leaders who do not support Nixon's new violence against Vietnam.

It is the violence which the Pentagon and the merchants of death have incorporated into the most profitable business in America — at whatever cost to the nation and the world.

The "language of naked power" is the language that U.S. imperialism introduced into Indochina a quarter century ago, the language which it has spoken more and more harshly since then. It is the language in which the death sentence on Ngo Diem was spoken during the Kennedy administration, by killer generals and their patron, the CIA.

It is the language of napalm and bombs and torture and defoliant chemicals and bacteriological agents and rigged elections and chain-store brothels and "tiger cages." It is U.S. imperialism in Indochina.

The "irrational murderous" attack on Governor Wallace occurs, as Gus Hall, Communist presidential candidate said, "in an atmosphere produced by the escalated, genocidal war of aggression against the people of Vietnam."

Nine years after a fateful assassination— The Cult of Diem

By ROBERT SHAPLEN

AMONG the ever-increasing scores of graves in Mac Dinh Chi cemetery, the oldest and most prestigious one in Saigon, now spread across several blocks near the American Embassy in the downtown area, are two unmarked slabs of marble around which miscellaneous mourners occasionally place wreaths or scatter a few flowers. Each week fresh pots of blooming plants are set on the tombstones by the gravekeepers, who are paid by members of the family of President Ngo Dinh Diem of South Vietnam and his Rasputinlike

ROBERT SHAPLEN is Far East correspondent for The New Yorker.

brother and closest advisor, Ngo Dinh Nhu, both of whom were murdered in midmorning of Nov. 2, 1963, approximately 20 hours after the start of the military coup that overthrew them.

Following the assassination of the two brothers, which took place in an armored car after they were captured in a Catholic church where they had sought refuge, the two shot and bayoneted bodies were originally buried in a corner of the military headquarters compound on the northern edge of the city close to Tan Son Nhut airport. They were placed there as a precaution to avoid further mutilation by anti-Diemist fanatics. At 3 o'clock one morning two years later, the remains were said to have been secretly brought to the Mac Dinh Chi cemetery. It was believed that the generals who planned and executed the coup did not want the embarrassment of having the ghosts of their two victims permanently haunting them at headquarters, particularly since Saigon at the time was full of rumors of new coups and counter-coups.

Until two years ago, the two graves, originally just small mounds without any marble topping, were scarcely noticed. A handful of relatives and friends of the two men paid homage to them each Nov. 2 and sometimes on Sundays during the year. But on the anniversary of their

deaths in 1970, between 1,000 and 2,000 people, including the wife of President Nguyen Van Thieu — Thieu's father is buried alongside—appeared at the graves in what can be said to have marked the formal beginning of a revival of Diemism in South Vietnam. Last Nov. 2, more than 5,000 mourners visited the graves and attended a requiem mass at the Saigon cathedral that was previously announced in the newspapers by a committee of Diem's admirers. Several thousands more who were simply curious passers-by, and a sprinkling of anti-Diemists as well, helped cause a huge traffic jam.

These reverential demonstrations in behalf of Diem are a manifestation of the psychological and political changes that have taken place in Vietnam in the decade since his death. But in seriously re-evaluating Diem's historic role and analyzing his complicated personality, the ceremonial and nostalgic tributes, in themselves, can be easily misconstrued. They are symbolic and symptomatic performances, typically Vietnamese in their hidden meanings, flagellative and purgative, and their message is one of both longing and admonishment. On the surface, they represent the natural and human inclination to look upon the past more favorably than the present. Under the circumstances of the long and destructive war the Vietnamese have suffered since 1963, and especially since the large-scale American involvement after 1965, the days of Diem now seem peaceful and golden to many people who feel themselves worse off today than they were before. However, that is not true of all Vietnamese, and if one stands back and regards the image of Diem in a larger historical light, the picture is considerably more complicated.

DISCUSSIONS about Diem nowadays are particularly haunting in the light of the new Communist offensive in South Vietnam, which may well be a climactic one. Many experienced observers believe that had Diem lived the "big war" would never have materialized and the South Viet-

namese would not have suffered anywhere near 120,000 dead and 500,000 wounded—100,000 of them permanently incapacitated—or that today there would be 350,000 war orphans. These figures date back to 1961, when the American involvement that has cost us 55,000 lives began on a small but gradually increasing scale, with advisers and funds. By the time of the coup, there were 12,000 advisers in Vietnam, but those who knew Diem best feel that neither he nor Nhu would ever have invited or allowed 550,000 American soldiers to fight in their country, and to permit the devastation caused by air attacks, including bombing and defoliation. There is evidence that shortly before the coup took place—and for several months afterward—the first tentative efforts were initiated both by the Saigon Government and the National Liberation Front to come to some sort of accommodation. These efforts might well have led to nothing, as so many subsequent ones involving Hanoi and Washington as well as the Front and Saigon have, and the war might have continued anyway, although on a much smaller scale than came to be the case in the post-Diem era.

If there had been a smaller war, or if a political agreement had been reached in the days before Hanoi completely dominated the N.L.F., South Vietnam might well have come under some form of Communist domination one way or another within two or three years. This remains a political possibility today, and if that happens, despite Vietnamization and despite continued American air and other logistical support, it will be due primarily to the inability of the many governments that succeeded Diem's to create a nation capable of withstanding the more united, patient, dedicated, and better-led Communists. Still and all, looking back in 1963 with all the imponderables of the past and almost all

14 MAY 1972

STATINTL

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Old Hands Reflect on End of 'People's War'

STATINTL

By RICHARD CRITCHFIELD

Star Staff Writers

"What fascinates me," former Vietnam pacification chief Robert W. Komer observed last week, "is that the war is ending with a conventional bang."

Komer's feeling that the old Vietcong insurgency has been completely overtaken by the overt North Vietnamese invasion and President Nixon's military moves against the North seems to be generally shared by a number of Americans who had most to do with shaping U.S. counter-insurgency doctrine and strategy in Vietnam over the past 20 years.

Among those interviewed were Henry Cabot Lodge, Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor and Frederick E. Nolting, all former ambassadors to Saigon; Walt W. Rostow, a chief foreign policy advisor to Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson; Maj. Gen. Edward G. Lansdale, Ngo Dinh Diem's first American adviser; and Barry Zorthian, former U.S. information chief in Saigon.

As most of them see it, the war has now become a straight old-fashioned military contest between two geographically distinct states in which the better army, conventionally organized and equipped with tanks, rocks and heavy artillery, will defeat the weaker one.

So far American tactical air power has failed to provide the necessary margin of assistance to the South Vietnamese, and the military effectiveness of the Northern sea blockade remains to be proven. Nor have those of the Southern Vietcong guerrillas who survived the defeat of 1968 as yet shown they can play anything but a supporting role.

THE IMPORTANCE of so complete a transformation of the war, it is felt, is that Hanoi has destroyed its own propaganda.

It can no longer claim a victory will validate the doctrine of "people's revolutionary war." The importance to the North Vietnamese of still doing so is evidenced by the title and content of General Vo Nguyen Giap's recent essay setting down the ideological basis for the current offensive, "People's War, People's Victory."

In it, Giap predicts the war will end in a climactic military victory. The collapse of South Vietnam's 3rd division at Quang Tri, followed by smashing blows against Hue, Kontum and An Loc, had paved the way for his grasp.

But it will be done contrary to all North Vietnam's declared strategic doctrine, with its credos that the victorious soldiers must be drawn from the supporting masses of people around them or native-born South Vietnamese.

Following the Chinese Communist model, North Vietnamese doctrine as declared by Giap and others has always held that the revolution must pass through three phases: first, the defensive, when the population is taken in hand while leaving the enemy to control the main centers; second, offensive guerrilla warfare, which obliges the enemy to split up his forces while the organization of Communist regular and local units is actively continued on a battalion and regimental scale; finally, the third phase, Giap's climactic military victory, whose object is to crush the enemy's main forces in preparation for seizure of the cities.

North Vietnam's major departure from this doctrine by sending its regular divisions into the South provided the argument for the original U.S. intervention in 1965. It also provoked bitter Chinese disapproval, since the more conventional the war became, the more Hanoi became dependent on modern Russian arms and the less its victory would vindicate Mao Tse-tung's revolutionary idea.

Today, North Vietnam may be close to winning, but it has had to send almost its whole army into the South and by sending its army it has destroyed its own pretensions about the nature of the war.

IN THE VIEW of some of the Americans most deeply involved in Vietnam in the past, it is even possible this may have some effect on what happens next, especially should the North Vietnamese forces mount an offensive directly against Saigon, the provinces around it and the Mekong Delta.

More than 70 percent of the country's population, mostly native-born Southerners with a distinctly different dialect and culture from the North, live in this rice-rich region. Regionalism among these Southern rice-growing peasants, it is felt, is as strong as Austrian resentment against the Prussians, or southerners against Yankees in the American civil war, and Hanoi cannot predict accurately how much they might resist wholly

AMONG THE AMERICAN old hands, Gen. Lansdale, who today lives in retirement in Alexandria, said he believed Hanoi could not collapse the government of President Nguyen Van Thieu without mounting an offensive against the capital itself.

"Hue's falling would be tremendously traumatic," Lansdale said, "but that wouldn't be enough to topple the government. I think we'll see Saigon threatened. That will be the real climactic moment."

Lansdale, who first went to Vietnam in 1953 and was Ngo Dinh Diem's American adviser in 1954-56 after helping Ramon Magsaysay defeat the Huk guerrillas in the Philippines, has always held the view that the growth of Communist power in Vietnam fed on peasant grievances. His recommended counter-insurgency strategy was a mixture of charismatic leadership, land reform and agricultural modernization, restraint on military power and restoration of traditional Confucian ethics.

Today, Lansdale said, the overt North Vietnamese invasion has changed the nature of the ideological struggle, since victory now will only prove the Communists had a superior army not necessarily that they had a superior political idea.

In the American search for a counterinsurgency doctrine to combat "people's war" over the years, one school of thought was to put primary emphasis on civil government. This was most closely associated with the British and such authorities as Sir Robert Thompson, who agreed that top priority must be put on establishing law and order through a central government with a strong public posture of morality, decency and legality, a large, competent police force and an effective civil administration.

An American who shared this view was former ambassador Nolting, who resigned his post in August 1963 to protest the Kennedy administration's withdrawal of its support for Diem.

Like all of those interviewed, Nolting felt the lack of respected leadership in Saigon was perhaps the most potentially fatal weakness in the present situation. Lansdale said, "I think Thieu is trying but there's little charisma or respect there. Corruption's been such and so commonly known and his people have been in on the take so obviously, I doubt if he can rally the population as a war

continued

NEW ORLEANS, LA.
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MAY 4 1972

Antiwar Demonstrators March

About 100 anti-war demonstrators marched from Beaugard Square to Lafayette Square today where they gathered under an oak tree and listened to speeches condemning President Nixon's recent "re-escalation" of the air war in Vietnam.

The procession bristled with signs that said things like "Smash Imperialism, Not Women and Children," or "Who Profits From This War?"

The marchers chanted slogans such as "Stop the War Now," and "Prices up, Wages Down, Why war?"

Willie Gunther, a Vietnam veteran, led the list of speakers recounting that when he

worker as cryptographer in Vietnam he discovered some "truths" about the war "that the people of the United States are not being told about the war."

He said the government "is telling a lie," when it says North Vietnam is invading South Vietnam. He said the North Vietnamese troops coming south are merely advisers and support troops to the Viet Cong.

Gunther said the President's attempt to suppress the Pentagon Papers indicates that Nixon does not want the American people to know the truth. "Because if the American people knew the truth, Nixon would have the same

problem with them as with his own troops."

He said that since he arrived in Vietnam hard drug use has escalated and that the Central Intelligence Agency, working with poppy growers in Cambodia who are friendly to the U.S., is running "junk" in Vietnam.

He said studies by the Army have shown that troops on hard dope don't resist the army and that one general has recommended that hard drugs be allowed into domestic and foreign posts to keep GI's from protesting the war.

State Representative Johnny Jackson told the group the continuing Vietnam war is symptomatic of the U.S. con-

tinuing to hold the wrong priorities, particularly in regards to the black and poor communities.

Steve Cohen, who said he is with a group called "Air War," spoke of the anti-personnel bombs he said are being used in Vietnam.

He said the U.S. has used a progression of more and more destructive anti-personnel bombs. He said that recently the Flechettes, which are tiny nails with fins on the back, which could be dispersed from a bomb, strike humans and cause gaping wounds, have been replaced by plastic pellets which Cohen said are "even more nefarious."

May 3, 1972

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

of our GIs around the world. I am hopeful that U.S.O. will continue to serve them in the future. But I am afraid that from what I have been told, that there has been a serious scandal within U.S.O. that may possibly reach the very highest levels of administration officers in the organization.

If I can be of any further assistance to you or to anyone else in U.S.O. in conducting this investigation, please do not hesitate to call upon me.

Sincerely,

LES ASPIN,
Member of Congress.

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Washington, D.C., May 3, 1972.

The Honorable MELVIN R. LAIRD,
Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense,
The Pentagon, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: As you may know, I have been investigating the current scandal in the United Services Organization.

I share your concern that some individuals within U.S.O. have been responsible for allegedly illegal acts. U.S.O. has been of great service over the years to many of our GIs around the world, but it is becoming increasingly apparent if these allegations are true, that a major scandal, possibly reaching the highest administration levels of U.S.O., has occurred.

I am enclosing the testimony which I have released recently, which I hope may be of assistance to you in pursuing the investigation.

Thank you very much for your attention to this matter.

Sincerely,

LES ASPIN,
Member of Congress.

MR. HARRINGTON IN VIETNAM

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. O'NEILL) is recognized for 15 minutes.

Mr. O'NEILL. Mr. Speaker, our colleague (Mr. HARRINGTON) recently returned from an official inspection trip to South Vietnam and Thailand. He was accompanied on his trip by William Wasserman, his former administrative assistant, who is a newspaperman by profession. On their return, Mr. Wasserman wrote an interesting and thoughtful review of their activities which was printed in the North Shore newspapers, which Mr. Wasserman publishes.

Because of their compelling interest on a subject of critical importance to all of us, I insert these articles by Mr. Wasserman into the RECORD at this time:

AIR WAR SECRECY IS MOST FRIGHTENING
(By Bill Wasserman)

You can be frightened after a week in Southeast Asia that U.S. policy is not successful.

You can be even more frightened when you see that we are rigidly pursuing that same policy of failure, and perhaps widening it to include Thailand.

But you can be most frightened by the effort of the U.S. government to conceal the whole business from the U.S. public, and even from a Congressman who votes the authorization for all U.S. military programs.

After three days of intensive briefings and tours of the five U.S. air bases in Thailand, Congressman Harrington learned from a newsman that several shifts in squadrons and aircraft were shortly anticipated which would increase the fighter squadrons in the area.

"That newsman's information is remarkably good," we were told by an Air Force officer.

"Why wasn't I told about it?" asked Cong. Harrington.

"You didn't ask," said the Air Force officer. At Udorn Air Base in Thailand, a civilian pilot staying in the civilian hotel where I was billeted told me very openly that all Air America helicopter flights over Laos originated from Udorn Air Base. Air America is a contract airline paid by the American government, and presumed to be a CIA operation.

When Congressman Harrington asked the base commander at Udorn, "What is that squadron of helicopters over there?" pointing to the lined up aircraft,

"I don't know, sir," said the base commander. "Those are contract flights and I don't know anything about them."

A press association reporter who has spent five years in Thailand and has consistently sought to report on American air bases there, as reporters freely do in Vietnam, said that he has been unable to obtain permission to go on the bases. "The U.S. officials say 'Ask the Thais.' The Thais say 'Ask the U.S.'"

Craig Whitney, chief of the N.Y. Times bureau; Peter Osnos, Washington Post; Kim Willenson, United Press International; Don Sutherland, Christian Science Monitor—they have all tried and so far been refused permission to report first hand on the U.S. air war being waged out of Thailand.

Yet the U.S. has about 26,000 airmen in Thailand and its five bases account for about 5 million dollars a day. We have invested billions of dollars in Thailand, and from these bases we are bombing Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, and now North Vietnam. We have nearly twice as many airmen in Thailand as in Vietnam. It is a gigantic effort, but it is concealed from the U.S. public.

One reason given for concealing the air war from the U.S. is "security"—

But monasans, Thai women, come on the U.S. bases in droves every day to do the house chores of the U.S. airmen. They clean the barracks. They wash airmen's clothes. With their children, and their washtubs, and their picnic lunches, they make a colorful sight squatting between the GI barracks at lunch hour. Along with Thai men who work on the base, they can easily be the cover for any hostile agent seeking general information about the airbase. To suggest that what they know as common knowledge cannot be available to the American public just doesn't make sense.

SOUTHEAST ASIA, WHERE THE UNITED STATES
PRACTICES A POLICY OF MAKE-BELIEVE
(By Bill Wasserman)

(North Shore Weeklies' publisher Bill Wasserman traveled with Cong. Michael J. Harrington to Vietnam and Thailand for 10 days from March 29 to April 8. In Vietnam they visited Saigon and DaNang. In Thailand, they were in Bangkok and Udorn, and Mr. Harrington visited four other air bases. Harrington spent his days being briefed on the military operations which he, as a member of the Armed Services Committee, oversees. Wasserman interviewed airmen, civilians and newsmen.)

Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, tall, patriotic and gracious, leaned forward, his hands folded, and said, "You must look at the whole picture, not just the military. You must see the economic side too. The military, however, is now working."

That was less than three weeks ago. Ambassador Bunker had received me before Congressman Harrington's arrival in Saigon because he was leaving for a week's trip over Easter to visit his wife, the U.S. Ambassador to Nepal.

It was a calm, sunny day in Saigon. We sat in comfortable chairs at one end of the

Ambassador's office. The Ambassador's youngest son had been my roommate in school for two years, and now, after catching up on family histories, he told me about Vietnam.

The U.S. initially had failed, said Mr. Bunker, to appreciate the need to provide the wherewithal for the South Vietnamese. "It was a new experience for the U.S. to be involved in a civil war and a war from without at the same time."

The Tet offensive in 1968, psychologically a blow to the U.S., had been the source of fresh determination by the Vietnamese, continued Bunker. They saw the need to be better armed, and, the Ambassador observed, the U.S. supplied M-16's. The ARVN (Army of the Republic of Vietnam) was modernized and expanded and now numbered 1.1 million.

The Ambassador dwelt on the economic development in the south. "I drove recently with President Thieu through the countryside. The farmers used to have bicycles. Now they have Hondas and tractors, radios and tv's, outboard motors for their sampans."

He urged me to arrange an air trip for Cong. Harrington over the delta to see the prosperity and to see, also, to the north towards An Loc—now the scene of desperate fighting—how air interdiction had not meant total destruction but selected destruction.

What Bunker was clearly saying was that Vietnamization was working, that we should on this trip pay attention to the broad, civilian achievements under President Thieu. He mentioned land reform, specifically.

As the interview drew to a close, the erect septogenarian who had completed a successful business career before joining the government, noted that he had served five Presidents. "Of course, I expected to stay here a much shorter time."

He smiled and described how President Nixon had arranged for him to visit his wife in Nepal regularly. "But that was impossible. It was so busy here—seven days a week, it used to be. It's better now," and he made a little joke about how he had to make this particular trip because his wife surely would not permit him to be absent over Easter.

Forty-eight hours later, the North Vietnamese offensive was underway. And within those few hours, Quang Tri and Hue, major bastions in the north, were threatened.

The American public at home was also calm as our trip to Vietnam took shape. One local newspaper even queried, "Why go?" Cong. Harrington, their editorial suggested, would do better to stay home and tend to his district. Going to Vietnam now, they said, was a junket.

In general it seemed the American public felt that the war was almost over. Casualties had almost disappeared—U.S. casualties, at least. Our troops were leaving. The air war? What was that? A distant war, Cong. Harrington said it needed seeing, it needed exposure. He suspected, but could not get firm figures that it was costing \$10 to \$20 billion dollars a year, and devastating three countries.

A gentle breeze swayed the palm trees over the ornate Buddhist temple while saffron robed young men, monks in training, strolled by. This was Thailand, where the people, commented the Air Force captain escorting me, were "very easy going and gentle," and where the U.S. now maintains its major Southeast Asian air bases.

Down the dirt road in front of the pagoda walked a young couple hand in hand. He was obviously American in his khaki trousers and sport shirt. She was obviously Thai. "Who would that be?" I asked.

"One of the guys from the base, and his girl," was the reply.

I was in Udorn, 30 miles from the Laotian border and the location of our largest fighter base in Thailand.

How We Sank into Vietnam

Joseph Buttinger

One of the most puzzling questions future historians will have to deal with is why the United States ever got involved in the contemporary struggle for Indochina that has been going on since 1945. Did the considerations that determined the course of American foreign policy after World War II make this involvement inevitable or could it have been avoided in spite of the tensions that arose after 1945 between the West and the so-called Communist bloc? On this point, opinions will probably always remain divided, but those who believe that no other course could have been chosen without damage to the West or the United States would do well to consider the following:

(1) no Indochina war would have taken place if France had not insisted on reestablishing its control over Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos after these countries had gained independence following the Japanese surrender in 1945;

(2) it is questionable that the United States would ever have reached the point of even considering intervention in Vietnamese affairs if it had refused from the beginning to support the reestablishment of French rule in Indochina.

It is indeed one of the important conclusions of the Pentagon Papers "that the Truman Administration's decision to give military aid to France in her colonial war against the Communist-led Vietminh 'directly involved' the United States in Vietnam and 'set' the course of American policy."¹

Yet this decision was made only in 1950, after the victory of Communism in China and the recognition of Ho Chi Minh's regime by the Soviet Union and Communist China. It would never have come about had it not been preceded by the decision made by the victorious Allies at the Potsdam Conference of July 17 to August 2, 1945, which gave the French not only a free hand but also Allied support for the reconquest of Indochina. This Potsdam decision, supported only by the British under both Churchill and Atlee, might not have been taken if President

Roosevelt had still been alive. It was opposed by Nationalist China under Chiang Kai-shek and certainly not favored by Stalin. Vigorous American opposition to it would probably have led to the acceptance of Roosevelt's concept of a United Nations Trusteeship for French Indochina as a first step toward full independence.

Surprisingly on this crucial point the conclusion of the Pentagon Papers is that Roosevelt "never made up his mind whether to support the French desire to reclaim their Indochinese colonies from the Japanese at the end of the war."² In view of the forceful statements Roosevelt made against the return of the French to Indochina to his Secretary of State Cordell Hull and to his son Elliot, as reported in their memoirs,³ this conclusion must be regarded as erroneous.

There has been much speculation about the question whether American massive military intervention in Vietnam might not have been avoided if President Kennedy had been alive. It is unlikely that this question will ever be answered with any degree of certainty. But it is probable that Vietnam after 1945 would have experienced a period of peaceful evolution toward independence, under a regime not unlike that of Tito's Yugoslavia, if Roosevelt had lived and succeeded in imposing his anticolonial solution for Indochina. Nor is it far-fetched to assume that Roosevelt would not have disregarded the appeals of Ho Chi Minh, in at least eight letters to Washington in 1945-46 for United States and United Nations intervention against French colonialism.⁴ "There is no record . . . that any of these appeals were answered."⁵ Not until publication of the Pentagon Papers did the American public hear of the existence of these letters.

Yet the Truman administration's policy toward Vietnam remained ambivalent for at least the first three years of the Indochina war. On the one hand, the U.S. "fully recognized France's sovereign position," as Secretary of State George Marshall said in a still secret State Department cablegram sent to the U.S. Embassy in Paris; on the other hand,

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 BOSTON, MASS.
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 S - 566,337
 APR 29 1972

'We have no right or reason to continue'

I had thought that there was no longer any need to set forth the nature and causes of American failure in Vietnam or the case for complete withdrawal, but the renewed bombing attacks on Hanoi and Haiphong demonstrate that there are still those who have the delusion that it will be possible to sustain a viable non-communist government in the South.

The notions of "Vietnamization" and an "honorable negotiated settlement" in Paris implied the delusion, but one could question how seriously they should be taken. When, however, we renew massive bombing raids with their indiscriminate slaughter, it seems clear that President Nixon and his top advisers either think that the South can survive as an independent entity, or they are committed to postponing its collapse until after the election. If it is the former, they are fools: if the latter, the most callous sort of political opportunists.

As a member of the infamous Michigan State University project in Vietnam from 1955-1957, I participated in that attempt to create an anti-communist regime in the South. By 1957 it was already clear that the Diem government was moving towards a police state to offset its declining popularity, and that the massive presence of the US was undermining Diem's legitimacy and encouraging his authoritarian tendencies. That was 15 years, 5 governments and how many dead and maimed Vietnamese ago? Everything we have done over the past 15 years has contributed to destroying the integrity, the rationality and the will of the people in South Vietnam while building up the commitment to national reunification in the North. We have trained a few people at the top of the South how to con us into great concern over the consequences of their defeat and therefore continuing support of their survival. Our leaders for 15 years have operated out of fear of being held responsible for a debacle (e.g. "who lost China"), and the false hope that they could create a regime that could survive.

The con artists in South Vietnam are not all venal. Some are; but many are just trying to exist in a terribly confused setting. What would happen to them if the North Vietnamese take over? The more corrupt, who have already made their fortunes, would probably flee, and wisely so. The rest would stay and try to make their peace with the new regime. I am sure that some of them would be killed and some imprisoned, but probably not many. There was no mass slaughter in the North in 1955 and 1956. Most Vietnamese with strong feelings about political freedom have already left the country and those who remain have learned how to compromise.

We have no right or reason to continue, much less to expand a completely corrupt and corrupting war either to save a few of our "friends" or to postpone an inevitable failure. We should recognize that there is absolutely no hope for an independent, anti-communist regime in the South. Given that fact, the only way we can help the Vietnamese people is to get out of the country completely — military, aid, CIA the whole works —

and let the Vietnamese work out their own accommodations and solutions.

The US Government by its recent actions has demonstrated that it neither accepts these propositions nor is it following a consistent policy of withdrawal. So long as this is true and the government remains unresponsive to the normal expressions of public opinion, there must be mass demonstrations as the only way of showing the degree of dissatisfaction with current policies. If such demonstrations can be kept non-violent and non-destructive they can help to build popular support for stopping the war. It is unfortunate that university buildings and research facilities become the lightning rods for absorbing the frustrations over tragic government policies. A more fruitful line of action is to assure that the person elected President next November is unalterably committed to stopping our involvement in the war.

DAVID C. COLE
 Center for International Affairs
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Cambridge

Washington Merry-Go-Round**Navy Fouled Up in Sewage Disposal**

By Jack Anderson

The sewage that ships dump into the open sea often washes up on the shore.

President Nixon, for one, has had personal experience with this problem at his Florida beach house where maritime wastes have fouled his swimming area.

To fight beach and harbor pollution, he assigned the Navy as the "lead agency" to set an example of maritime sanitation to the world's ships.

A 1978 deadline was set for the Navy to stop the discharge of sewage, garbage, oil and other debris into the sea. Locked in the Navy's confidential files, however, is sad evidence that this billion-dollar program is failing.

The Navy had counted heavily upon a complicated sewage system manufactured by Fairbanks-Morse. But Rear Admiral Nathan Sonenshein, the ships commander, has complained in a "Point Paper" to Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, the Navy chief, that the new sewage equipment is "unreliable" and "not operating" in the test ship U.S. Conopus.

Indeed, the failure of the sewage disposal units could cause a smelly incident at Holy Loch, Scotland, where the Conopus has been berthed.

Navy Odor

"In the interests of congenial relations with the Brit-

ish," Sonenshein warned the Navy's top admiral, "it is vital that these units be put back into operation as early as feasible."

On top of the "unacceptable reliability" of the new sewage units, they also take up too much room. This will have "significant impact on military performance . . . in the smaller, high population density ships," warns the documents. Old sea dogs are also sputtering over a plan to pull out guns to make room for sewage units on some destroyers.

All the trouble with the Fairbanks-Morse equipment has forced the Navy to fall back, at least temporarily, upon a system of "holding tanks." The tanks are supposed to retain all sewage while the ships are within 50 miles of the shore. Then, in theory, the sewage is supposed to be dumped at the pier when the ships dock.

But unfortunately, most piers aren't equipped to handle the sewage or, for that matter, the bigger naval vessels. To get around this, the Navy plans to spend millions to build special "lighter/barges for each naval port."

The Navy's sea-sewage experts explain delicately that the lighters will "collect and transfer . . . shipboard wastes" to shore. But the shipboard

salts, less delicately, are already referring to the lighters as "honey barges" and "doughnuts."

Summing up, the Navy documents concede that, on the one hand, their sewage units are a flop and, on the other, there are persistent "political pressures to demonstrate accomplishments."

Refugee Deaths

We reported on February 6 that U.S. officials in Vietnam had covered up rampant malnutrition, exposure, tuberculosis and pneumonia in three refugee camps.

As a result, 350 displaced Montagnard tribesmen, mostly the old and the young, perished while U.S. officials shuffled papers.

When word of the refugee conditions reached the headquarters of U.S. pacification chief William Colby, the facts were swept under the plush rugs of the U.S. offices in Saigon.

The number of deaths, ironically, were close to casualty totals in the infamous Mylai massacre. Yet only Rep. Les Aspin (D-Wis.) showed any concern.

In an outraged letter to AID Administrator John Hannah, the congressman demanded to know what had been done to punish those "directly respon-

sible for the tragic deaths of 350 innocent people."

A few days ago, Hannah sent back an evasive, self-serving memo prepared by his Vietnam specialist Robert H. Nooter. The memo reports that the Montagnards were transferred from their homes to the camps about January, 1971, by Vietnamese military commanders over the objections of American pacification officials.

"Montagnards exist at a marginal subsistence level, and with any loss in nutritional level, the prevalent diseases of diarrhea, malaria, pneumonia, and tuberculosis can prevail," explains the memo.

The deaths began to occur shortly after the relocation, the memo adds. "Some 350 of the very old and very young" had died by the time higher American officials discovered the problem, it is contended.

Once discovered, "prompt and remedial actions were taken," the memo claims. The AID officials admit, however, that it was April before "the situation was in hand."

The officials tried to pass the buck to military authorities for hushing up the facts. Any suppression of reports, declares the memo, "would involve reporting by military personnel in Pleiku Province through military channels."

STATINTL

Enough Of Covert Action

While the Administration has obtained a temporary order against publication of a book on the CIA by a former officer of it, Victor L. Marchetti, the public has reason to be thankful to the author. He has already provided outside of book covers some valuable insights and comments on an agency that deliberately hides from the public and Congress.

Without revealing any really hidden secrets, the author uses published reports to note that the nation's intelligence budget is 6 billion dollars a year, that the Central Intelligence Agency has 18,000 employes, and that 6000 of these are working in clandestine services, as opposed to intelligence collection.

As it is, however, the CIA is the President's baby. Congress has proposed various control measures, such as a limit on the CIA budget, or requirements for clearer information about it, or Senator Cooper's present legislation for the CIA to give intelligence briefings to Congress as well as the White House. Congress, after all, foots the bill, but it does not know for what.

CIA officials occasionally surface from secrecy to complain that critics concentrate on CIA failures. If so, that is because the public only hears about the failures, and they have to be big ones at that. They always seem to involve those covert or "paramilitary" operations, which range from a most qualified success in Guatemala to an unmitigated disaster at Cuba's Bay of Pigs. Mr. Marchetti says, "I don't think we've had a successful paramilitary operation yet."

The clandestine operations are worth review. There was the U-2 spy plane incident that torpedoed President Eisenhower's efforts to improve relations with the Soviet Union. There was the CIA's proud armed intervention to "save" Guatemala from leftists, leaving the country to oppression and terrorism. There was

the financing of Radio Free Europe which, when disclosed, stripped that station of every vestige of freedom or credibility. And there was the Bay of Pigs.

Then there was the CIA military operation to save the Dominican Republic from a rebellion to return a democratically-elected president. There was armed support for the overturn of a government in The Congo. Of course, there was the CIA's hand in the overthrow of the Diem dictatorship in South Vietnam, opening the way for another dictatorship more satisfactory to Washington. And there is presently war in Laos, which the CIA actively engendered without any visible success for the American position in Southeast Asia, much less for peace and order.

Aside from the fact that so many of these clandestine activities were inefficient and ineffective, even aside from the fact that they were bound to be failures for America's long-range prospects and reputation even if they did succeed, the ability of the CIA to engage in paramilitary functions represents a continuing ability to start hostilities without the knowledge of the people or Congress, and certainly without any declaration of war.

Author Marchetti is fair enough to say that so far various presidents have kept a measure of control over such activities. That is no guarantee for the future, however, and it is Congress, not the President, that is supposed to make decisions on war. Consequently, Mr. Marchetti recommends confining intelligence activities to a small and highly professional group, and eliminating the covert actions entirely.

Intelligence simply cannot work well when governed by an agency equally interested in activities ranging from propaganda to military action; that is a conflict of interest. The nation does need successful intelligence. It does not need a publicly-uncontrolled and unanswerable power to make war.

STATINTL

24 APR 1972

Letters To The Editor

Controlling Foreign Policy

Senators Aiken and Fulbright have promulgated a long overdue and crucial proposal in the amendment to the bill authorizing State and USIA funds, one which seeks in effect to determine why or how everybody and his half-brother is involved in foreign policy decisions.

Nothing should punctuate this desperate need more forcefully than the latest pre-emptory, policy-by-shock decision to mass bomb Haiphong for the first time in the war. Even as two other senators are en route to Peking, as the President jogs between Red China and Red Russia, as we demand our prisoners returned unharmed, as we "wind down the war," and parrot the rubricated claptrap that "it's Saigon's show now!", we intensify our role as if it were D-Day minus one. Or is it?

Worst of all is the continuous dropping of surprise policy bombs in the American midst as if we are all imbeciles, unfit to be informed or warned of anything so trivial as getting out or going back in. The Aiken-Fulbright proposal to probe the myriad agencies ginning up policy blastoffs such as this should be implemented fast, and with strong support from millions of American citizens in whose names Vietnam is being bombed into a senseless mass of cratered moonscapes and mangled bodies. Can we not at least stop our contributions to the continuing massacre of people year after year after year?

Anyone who has served responsibly in Vietnam knows that State, AID, USIA, CIA, DOD, the White House, and a few others all have "their" own foreign policy, as the Aiken proposition suggests. The chief of mission is often the last person to know what in hell is going on, and others who have met with them in mid-Pacific conferences have shown even less knowledge. Vietnam is horrendous enough. Another classic of hack policy handling is still stuck in our throats and that was the Bengali lunacy. Our rush to destroy Bangladesh is only matched by our current passion to recognize the place and provide aid!

If ever a country needed someone at the helm, the United States does today.

LAWRENCE HARKNESS.

Washington.

STATINTL

From Hanoi: An appeal to conscience of the U.S. people

Special to the Daily World

HANOI, April 19—A delegation of four U.S. Communists here who witnessed U.S. air raids upon Hanoi and Haiphong today issued an "appeal to the conscience of the people of the United States" to force the Nixon Administration to end the "mass murder" bombing.

The appeal was signed by Gus Hall, general secretary and Presidential candidate; Jarvis Tyner, Vice Presidential candidate; Rasheed Storey, N.Y. State Communist Party chairman, and Joseph North, author and editor, World Magazine.

The text of the appeal follows:

We who have now experienced the brutal bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong make this appeal to the conscience of the people of the United States.

We saw with our own eyes that the main targets of the U.S. bombers were the heavily populated working class centers of Hanoi and Haiphong.

We saw the newly constructed working class apartment houses in Haiphong that were destroyed by the criminal pilots sent by the arch criminals of the Nixon Administration.

We saw the hospital and spoke to the women and children whose blood was smeared on the steps as we entered.

We saw the workers' quarters where the planes returned three times to complete their destruction.

This is no accident. Civilian targets are the main objective of the government. We saw market places bombed, restaurants bombed, factories bombed, waterfront warehouses bombed, vital water mains bombed.

We saw British, Soviet and German Democratic Republic ships attacked in the harbor. As we crossed a bridge entering Haiphong, crowded with families of mothers, fathers and their children, a U.S. plane streaked above us and people scrambled for their lives.

We saw the same in the beautiful capital of Hanoi where we experienced two waves of bombers. It was the same in peaceful country villages by the rice paddies where we met a farmer whose friends, a family of seven, had been killed in that morning's raid.

We have now seen the crushed bodies of little girls who only moments before played peacefully with their dolls, and the bodies of small boys whose friendly games of marbles were disrupted forever by the massive tonnage of U.S. bombs. We saw the shattered hands of workers who will never again be able to provide for their families. We saw some who were blinded by the flying debris.

In the name of our own children we appeal to all Americans to save the children of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. We appeal to your humanity, common sense and reason.



We who have seen the iron will, the unprecedented courage, the unbreakable determination, the united, unflinching commitment of the Vietnamese people in their struggle for national salvation against U.S. imperialism appeal to all Americans who value human life and dignity.

We appeal to you to see the Vietnamese love of life as your own, to see the Vietnamese people's struggle for social progress as your own, to act now to save humanity from disaster.

Those who thought that the withdrawal of troops was intended to end the aggression in Indochina now see that it was Nixon's camouflaged way of escalating the war via criminal air power—the new Mylais of the B-52's—that are designed to undertake an impossible task to break the unshatterable will and determination of the Vietnamese people.

This is why the targets are heavily populated centers and not the so-called military objectives. This we saw with our own eyes—the genocidal policies of the Nixon Administration. Now that we know this, we must act now or accept the verdict of humanity of complicity by complacency in mass murder, in genocide.

As long as the aggression continues we cannot, as Americans, escape the stigma of what is a national shame. As long as the bombing goes on, we can never wash off the blood of the millions of victims of U.S. imperialist aggressors.

We know these murder policies of aggression are dictated not by the will of the people, or even of the U.S. Congress, but by the giant monopoly corporations—the Rockefeller, Morgan, I.T.T. interests, etc., who maintain and extend their riches through the destruction and suffering of the Vietnamese and other peoples of the world.

We must see, though, that we bear a responsibility as long as these acts of barbarism are perpetrated in our name.

The bombings are the work of desperate men gone insane, Nixon, Kissinger, Agnew, these Dr. Strangeloves of Washington.

The victories of the Vietnamese National Liberation forces have created a totally new situation. They have virtually destroyed the best of the puppet troops. They have shattered once and for all Nixon's hoax of Vietnamization. As the Pentagon-trained Thieu mercenaries turn their guns and tanks on U.S. puppet troops, the arrogant predictions of General Creighton Abrams and Defense

Secretary Melvin Laird go up in smoke.

The retaliation bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong has smashed to smithereens Nixon's phony "peace for generations" fraud. This insane act destroyed the illusion that Nixon's troop withdrawals were ever intended to lead to the end of the aggression in Indochina.

This is a moment of great danger. Nixon's irresponsible acts of desperation are those of a mad butcher and can lead to a world confrontation. But above all else, the very acts of desperation have opened up momentous possibilities of putting an end to the aggression now.

The escalation of the bombing has set into motion an escalation of the world's struggle against U.S. imperialism. It has created a new stage in that struggle. It will let loose the greatest waves of anti-imperialist movements to date.

But we in the United States have the main responsibility. In meeting this challenge we will be fulfilling our responsibility to ourselves and to all the people of the world.

We appeal to all Americans: to every shop worker, to all members of the trade union movement, to all peace and democratic-minded Americans, to all Black Americans, to all Chicano, Puerto Rican, Indian and Asian Americans, to the youth, to the students, to the women, to the veterans, to the unemployed, to the intellectuals, to all who feel the impact of the war in a thousand different ways—on our living standards, on our taxes, on the decline of our cities, on the escalation of racism, and the destruction of democratic rights.

We appeal to all whose sheer humanity is violated by this war.

This moment in history cries out for unity in action! This is a moment when we must unite and concentrate our total efforts to end this criminal war, to end this mass murder, to end this imperialist aggression.

An absolute precondition for the right of the Vietnamese people to determine their destiny is the total withdrawal of all U.S. military forces from Indochina. These actions must continue on every level and in all localities. These actions must be intensified in depth and scope, until the U.S. Government returns to the Paris negotiations in good faith, until it accepts the just seven-point program of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam.

These actions must continue until the U.S. government sets the date for the withdrawal of all forces from Southeast Asia—the ground troops, the U.S. Navy, the U.S. Airforce, the C.I.A. and all supportive personnel!

There have been many important actions in the U.S. on behalf of peace since this war began. The moment cries out now for the greatest united actions of us all—to achieve the end of this war on behalf of our people and the peoples of Vietnam and all Indochina, on behalf of human progress, on behalf of our children and all children of the world.

We make this appeal from the air-raid shelters of Hanoi.

Signed, Gus Hall, Jarvis Tyner, Rasheed Storey, Joseph North.

Delegation, Communist Party, U.S.A.

Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a minute? I use the time of the Senator from Arkansas for this purpose.

Mr. SYMINGTON. I am glad to yield to my friend from California.

Mr. CRANSTON. I thank the distinguished Senator for a very forceful and effective presentation. I think it is a particularly significant contribution to this discussion because of the Senator's background in military matters in the executive branch with high responsibilities. His service now on all key committees in the Senate also provides him with the opportunity to be better informed than almost all Members of this body on military and foreign relations matters.

I would like to make an observation and then to ask a question. I have noted this morning that in some of the debate we see what almost amounts to a "win the war" attitude again rearing its head in this Chamber. The distinguished Senator from Arizona (Mr. GOLDWATER), whose forthrightness and frankness I respect tremendously, stated he feels this is perhaps the worst managed war in history. He said that when you go into a war you go in to win, not in 10 years, but in 10 minutes. I wonder what that means. The Senator from Colorado spoke of the other side as a "losing horse."

The Senator from Missouri, and every other Senator, and every citizen in the country, know that we could—at least in a narrow military sense—if we went all out. The reason we have not done that under a Democratic President, Lyndon Johnson, and under a Republican President, Richard Nixon, is that we know we do not just face small North Vietnam with its limited population and limited resources; we face North Vietnam backed up by the Soviet Union and China. If we choose to escalate our aid to the South, they may very well feel that they must escalate their aid to the North.

I wish to ask the Senator this question in light of the circumstances now prevailing. Greater risks are being taken now than at any time in this war in terms of the escalation and possible reciprocal moves by the other side: Where can this end? What risks do we face if we decide once again not to lose, not to negotiate, but to break the backs of the other side? What are the risks in that policy?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, I yield myself 2 minutes under the same conditions.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is recognized.

Mr. SYMINGTON. I would say to the able Senator that, regardless of what the risks were, I would take them if I felt they were in the interest of the security of the United States.

When I first went to Vietnam, back in 1961, with Gen. Maxwell Taylor and Mr. Walt Rostow, I felt this war was necessary. After further examination over the years, however, I changed my mind, and so told my colleagues in the Senate in the fall of 1967.

It is interesting to note in General Taylor's recent book, "Swords and Plowshares," that he makes a statement which supports what I am told the distinguished Senator from Arizona said this morning on this floor. General Taylor's statement best illustrates how badly this war has been managed from a military standpoint by those who made the decisions.

He said that no one, not even the President, has the moral right to send a man into combat without giving him the best chance to do the job he is assigned, with least danger to his life. His exact quote reads as follows:

Our pilots were required to return through increasingly heavy enemy defenses to repeat attacks on targets deliberately hit previously by aircraft insufficient in number to assure their destruction in a single attack. This was a misguided attempt to translate the principle of gradualism and limited violence from the strategic to the tactical realm—a fallacy which ignored the fact that for the soldier or pilot in the presence of an armed enemy any war is total since his survival is at stake. No one, not even the President, has the moral right to put a man on the battlefield or in hostile air space and restrict him from taking all the measures needed for his survival and the execution of his mission. So in a variety of ways, gradualism contributed to a prolongation of the war and gave time not only for more men to lose their lives but also for the national patience to wear thin, the antiwar movement to gain momentum, and hostile propaganda to make inroads at home and abroad.

Military men constantly protested to me that they were being forced to attack useless targets. One who did was shortly killed; another, even though a major general, quietly resigned in protest. This all helped me to change my view about this war.

It is now clear said war is being escalated as a result of the President's decision to continue it even though in his campaign—and I have now placed it all in the Record—often he said, "If elected, I will stop it." He has had nearly three and a half years, but instead of stopping it, he has expanded it. There is now fighting in Cambodia where there was not fighting until he came to office. He has maintained the struggle in Laos, even though he switched it from being run by the Defense Department, if they ever ran it, to the Central Intelligence Agency, and now he is further escalating the war in Vietnam.

One of the ironies of what is going on brings us back to what I said in 1956, namely, that our policies are to be weak against the strong and strong against the weak. The recent visit to China and the planned visit to Moscow would appear incredible efforts to demonstrate our peace loving intentions at the same time we continue to destroy these little countries in Southeast Asia.

Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, if the Senator would remain on his feet, I wish to say I regret that, under the time restraints, I was unable to yield to Senators who have asked for time. We have had difficulty when they have asked us to yield because of the time limitation. I would like to ask if Senators who have contrary views would like to address questions to the Senator from Missouri.

Mr. GRIFFIN. Mr. President, we have

Senators who would like to get the floor in their own right.

Mr. CRANSTON. As the Senator knows, they will get the floor in their own right.

Mr. BUCKLEY. Mr. President, I will begin by making reference to the Senator from Missouri's statement about the devastations which have been visited—

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, on whose time is the Senator speaking?

Mr. GRIFFIN. Mr. President, is there time to Senators on this side?

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. CHILES). Yes.

Mr. GRIFFIN. Mr. President, I have been authorized by the Senator from Illinois (Mr. PERCY) to yield to the Senator from New York (Mr. BUCKLEY) such time as he may need.

Mr. BUCKLEY. Mr. President, I will start by commenting on the statement by the Senator from Missouri about the devastation visited on Vietnam.

The history of the Vietnam war has been one of complexities and confusion, a history on which men of good will have differed and shall continue to differ.

Yet with the recent massive invasion by North Vietnam of South Vietnam, a new phase of this war has been created. The facts are unambiguous; one sovereign nation has invaded another with conventional forces for no other purpose but the traditional one of all invading forces: to conquer the people and the territory of the invaded nation.

This savage and sudden end to certain fashionable myths which have hitherto masked the role of North Vietnam in this war has had certain salutary effects on world opinion. With the exception of North Vietnam's ideological allies, no nation has supported this attempt at conquest. The idea that what we are witnessing is a civil war has become a linguistic as well as historical absurdity.

While it would be worthwhile to examine in great detail those curious attempts we have heard during the past few weeks to switch the burden of blame for these latest developments from the North Vietnamese invaders to President Nixon whose decisive action has helped to halt the invasion, because of the brief time allowed me I will limit myself to an examination of some of the basic facts of the matter.

First, the facts of the invasion along the DMZ and of the bombing of the military targets in the Hanoi-Haiphong area:

The northern sector of South Vietnam has been invaded by a force of 45,000 to 50,000 seasoned NVA troops equipped with modern Soviet and Chinese Communist artillery and armor including three varieties of conventional and amphibious tanks.

With the exception of minor Vietcong units operating along the Cambodian border north of Saigon, the entire Communist effort within South Vietnam is being conducted by the North Vietnamese. Not less than nine NVA divisions are now employed in South Vietnam, sustained by huge quantities of weapons and trucks and fuel provided 85 percent by the Soviet Union.

The fact that the NVA is now employ-



Stop the mad bomber!

President Nixon's order to bomb Hanoi and Haiphong has opened the door to an international crisis, and involves a challenge to our Constitutional structure. **Democracy and world peace are imperilled.**

The message is unmistakable. North Vietnam has been under U.S. bomber attack for the first time since 1968, now for the 12th day. Four Soviet merchant ships and one from the German Democratic Republic have been hit in Haiphong harbor. Another squadron of F-4 Phantom jets has been deployed to Vietnam, this one from South Korea. The Soviet Union has stated clearly that it will continue to support, as it has, the liberation struggle of the people of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam against imperialist aggression.

These developments reflect an unprecedented aggravation of U.S. aggression abroad. The implications for democracy at home are inescapable, for imperialist aggression abroad and fascistic steps at home complement each other.

The situation demands a people's response of unprecedented proportions, for peace and democracy.

The demonstrations scheduled for New York, San Francisco and other cities Saturday, April 22, should be expanded far beyond their original scope in auspices and participation. They should become outpourings of hundreds of thousands united in the determination to turn Nixon from his mad course.

But the situation created by the bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong demands even wider action. The hour demands demonstrative action of all peace forces; in Seattle and Atlanta, in Chicago and Houston, in Albuquerque and Boston, in Cleveland and Minneapolis, in every city and town.

Nixon has put world peace in peril; he is prepared to bomb U.S. democracy as he is bombing Hanoi. If confirmation were needed of the world menace that Nixon's course represents, it was provided by Defense Secretary Melvin Laird's declaration that the Nixon Administration is planning to expand the U.S. stockpile of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, already in excess of 7,000.

The aggravated peril to peace, the desperate need to mobilize the majority of the American people for action against the war demands the maximum of unity for peace and democracy. In the face of this peril, the provocation of disunity — however "revolutionary" the gabble that may accompany it — is the side of the bombers, not of the people. The certain fact that the Central Intelligence Agen-

cy is determined to provoke such disunity as part of Nixon's more-war program, should alert everyone to the need for the utmost discipline.

The President's order to bomb Hanoi and Haiphong represents another step toward Presidential dictatorship, for further aggression abroad and at home.

The funds that should be used to sustain our public schools and hospitals, for example, are being used to destroy the women and children, the schools and hospitals of North Vietnam.

Every public official, in executive or legislative post, must be faced with the people's demand to speak out against this incitement of a greater war, this ruthless misuse of the nation's wealth in devastating Vietnam, the new steps toward dictatorial White House rule.

Every public official should be required to answer:
What are you doing to block the road to a bigger war?

The resolution on which the Gary, Indiana, City Council is scheduled to act tonight deserves emulation in every city. It calls upon Congress to "demand an immediate end to the bombing of North Vietnam, and an immediate end to American air and other logistic support for carrying on the war in South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos," and it demands that the White House set a "definite date for... complete withdrawal" from Southeast Asia.

Such demands should be introduced into every municipal and state legislative body, to save the peace and our democracy. Mass demonstrations for peace this Saturday will strengthen the prospects for people's victory — here and abroad.

APR 16 1972

M - 127,079

S - 174,257

Diem Assassination Was a 'Monstrous Blunder'

By S. L. A. Marshall,

Brig. Gen (ret.)

Times/Post News Service

IN HIS WELL-POLISHED MEMOIR, "Swords and Plowshares," Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor sees the murder of former South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Nhu and his brother, Ngo Dinh Diem, as a monstrous blunder in the Vietnam War, bringing about political confusion that vastly prolonged the struggle.

Though one might answer such a theory in the words of the French diplomat who said that it is an idle exercise in history to speculate on what might have happened had that which happened not happened, the Taylor opinion stays no less weighty in the aftermath of the military coup and the killings. Taylor became ambassador to Saigon and had to cope with the consequent chaos.

As he correctly puts it, the inexcusable mistake of all who conspired to overthrow Diem was that they had planned nothing better to replace him.

The passions and attitudes of that summer nine years ago almost inevitably generated a violent climax. Diem was under heavy fire. He was being viciously assailed by the American press in Saigon, who waged their vendetta because Diem scorned them and they were being starved of news.

Public opinion in the United States, seeing Diem as a lesser evil, vented its rage against Nhu because of his oppression of the Buddhists led by Tri Quang, who was just another Vietnamese racketeer in a saffron robe. The self-immolation of several Buddhist monks in protest against Nhu's measures also served to fire American emotion. Though Taylor indicates that Tri Quang had contrived these sacrifices to topple Diem, Madame Nhu, already an object of particular loathing to the American press, intensified the get-Diem movement by

referring to them as "barbecues." Thus, in the summer of 1963, several official statements came out of Washington that seemed clearly to signal that the U.S. government would welcome the ruination of Diem.

Gen. Taylor's freshly minted memoir lifts the lid on that subject more than a little. On Aug. 24, when he was chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, there came to his desk a U.S. State Department action paper already cleared and cabled to the embassy in Saigon. What he read alarmed Taylor as it did other defense principals.

The authors of the already cabled instruction were Undersecretary of State W. Averell Harriman, Assistant Secretary of State Roger Hillsman and a White House staffer, Michael Forrestal. They had cleared their paper with Undersecretary of State George Ball while he was playing golf and with the late President Kennedy via telephone, which signifies mainly that the clearers gave only passing attention to a major and convulsive change in American policy.

Significantly, the paper had not been cleared with Secretary of State Dean Rusk, who was not anti-Diem, or the Central Intelligence Agency or the Department of Defense.

The sense of the paper sent to the new ambassador, Henry Cabot Lodge, was that the United States would no longer tolerate the presence of brother Nhu in the Saigon government. Diem, however, must be given a chance to get rid of Nhu. At the same time, Lodge was to inform key South Vietnamese generals about this change in the U.S. position. Not only that, but if at any point the generals decided to get rid of President Diem, they were told the United States would directly support their action.

So what was in essence this instruction to the ambassador? Only a twisted mind would see it other than as a license for the South Vietnamese military

to form a cabal to gun down Diem and Nhu with the approval of the United States.

Inside official U.S. circles there was no protest against the course so definitely set forth. Some of those directly concerned such as Taylor might in their own minds question the wisdom of the instruction or policy shift. But none said clearly: "What we propose to do is immoral. It is beneath the dignity of the United States that we as a government would conspire to political assassination. My conscience won't take it. So I will turn in my suit." One by one the principals fell in line with what had become, if by default, White House policy. In the end, the deed was done.

Be it said in favor of the Vietnamese military brass that they were more loath to become the executioners of Diem and Nhu than were U.S. generals and diplomats.

Taylor, however, in noting the incident, writes: "I know of no evidence of direct American participation in the coup and certainly of none in the assassination."

An old Asia hand doesn't tell it all

In the Midst of Wars

An American's Mission
to Southeast Asia.

By Maj. Gen. Edward Geary Lansdale.
Illustrated. 386 pp. New York:
Harper & Row. \$12.50.

By PETER ARNETT

Before the Vietnam war turned sour and Americans could still believe in legends, there was an idealized cold-war warrior whose bravery, boldness and common sense were carrying the American Way to victory over Communism in Southeast Asia.

His legendary exploits and style became the model for the scores of young American operatives dispatched by various departments and agencies to that arena of big-power political intrigue. Like the idealized cold warrior himself, those operatives were armed with a moral certitude about their mission. It sustained them through the long hot nights in backwaters like Luang Prabang and Pakse cultivating minor princelings. And it justified their support of the shoddy political accommodations that passed for democracy in Bangkok, Saigon and Vientiane.

Then it all started to go bad. Deeds once thought bold and daring now seem to have been blundering acts of miscalculation that sucked the United States into an unforgiveable bloodletting in Vietnam.

Those who had a hand in shaping the recent history of Southeast Asia, however, feel differently from the average American about that history. One such man is the model cold-war warrior of them all, Edward Geary Lansdale. Novelists have tried to put him between covers: Graham Greene made a kindred idealist the antihero of "The Quiet American," and he was later featured as the hero of "The Ugly American" by William Lederer and Eugene Burdick.

Now, the 64-year-old Lansdale, former San Francisco advertising man, oriental kingmaker, frustrated, counterinsurgency expert, speaks for Peter Arnett is an Associated Press reporter who spent eight years in Vietnam.

himself with, "In the Midst of Wars: An American's Mission to Southeast Asia." But he remains as elusive as the legends, even after 378 pages, and the reason seems to be that his memoirs are strangely abbreviated; the narrative concluded with President Ngo Dinh Diem firmly in power in Saigon in 1956, the second Asian monarch helped to the throne by Lansdale. The first was Ramon Mag-

saysay of the Philippines. But with all we know of the later dramatic developments of the war, and with all Lansdale knows, his memoirs are like reading a history of the American Civil War that ends with the first election of Abraham Lincoln to the Presidency.

The record states plainly that in 1960 Lansdale wrote a bitterly negative report on the way the war was going in Vietnam, and later discussed his finding with President Kennedy who wanted to send him back to Saigon in a high position. But top Kennedy aides intervened because of his bureaucratic crockery breaking and independence. This same reputation apparently forced his retirement from the United States Air Force with the rank of major general at the age of 55. But none of this appears in his memoirs.

But if Lansdale is reluctant to evaluate his life's work or discuss his personal reverses, he has plenty more to say. His pages ring with the evangelistic anti-Communist rhetoric of the 1950's. Lansdale, an O.S.S. officer in World War II, remains an idealist who believes that the United States can prevail in distant, underdeveloped lands if she exports "the American way," a composite of "winning the hearts and the minds of the people" and expert leverage of American economic aid.

The former operative made plenty of enemies in his freewheeling days as Secretary of State John Foster Dulles's personal emissary in Indochina, but he names none in his memoirs, preferring to rail against the "back rooms of Washington policy makers," which are "too full of articulate and persuasive practitioners of the expedient solution to daily problems, of the hoary art of power politics, and of the brute usages of our physical and material means."

Lansdale's belief is probably sustained because of his first and lasting counterinsurgency success, the crushing of the Huk rebellion in the Philippines. He teamed with the then unknown Ramon Magsaysay, secretary of national defense, and mounted a drive against the Communist Huks that demonstrated superb coordination of political, military and social-psychology strategy and tactics. This dramatic campaign, which he details minutely in his memoirs, destroyed the Huks and led Magsaysay to the Presidency in 1953, with Lansdale's help.

By then Lansdale had become America's Number One counterinsurgency expert, and John Foster Dulles sent him to Vietnam to do the same there. In the Philippines Lansdale had a favorite maxim, "Dirty tricks beget dirty tricks," and in Vietnam he was given every opportunity to put his skills to use; his mission, among other things, was to launch paramilitary operations and political-psychological

warfare against North Vietnam a few days after the Geneva accords gave that country to Ho Chi Minh.

Lansdale's operatives were the first American fighting men in Vietnam, a fact not hitherto known until the Pentagon Papers last year revealed minute details of sabotage in Hanoi by Americans in 1954, including the pouring of contaminants into Hanoi buses to eventually destroy them. Lansdale mentions the teams in his memoirs, but he fails to include the contaminants, or his association with the Central Intelligence Agency revealed by the Pentagon Papers.

Lansdale's main contribution to the history of Vietnam was his success in propping up Ngo Dinh Diem, the obdurate Vietnamese nationalist appointed Prime Minister by the French in a power play in 1954 and saved from political extinction by Lansdale who saw in him the makings of another Magsaysay. Dulles, in April, 1955, had already agreed to a demand by his special envoy in Saigon, Gen. J. Lawton Collins, that Diem be dumped in favor of a coalition of Saigon politicians and sect leaders, when a dramatic cable arrived from Lansdale stating that Diem was successfully surviving a military

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Letters To The Editor

A South Vietnamese Soldier Writes

I have just received a letter from a South Vietnamese soldier in Vietnam (a former constituent) who retreated from the DMZ. His language is very straightforward, but I will not change anything because it will help the American people who are saturated with cliches and hypocritical euphemisms to know the other side of the story. Here are a few excerpts (when my correspondent says "we" he refers to himself and his South Vietnamese comrades in arms):

"Enemy fire was not so terrible really, I have known much worse; we were not afraid at all, we could have stayed, but we did not want to fight the Reds . . . What for? Why should we fight them? They have never harmed us. But the corrupted Vietnamese leaders in Saigon and the Americans who live in luxury and debauchery in Saigon have harmed us. These Americans and these Vietnamese traffic in heroin and opium; they share the proceeds with one another; the Vietnamese are the high officials; the Americans are U.S. officials which include military, civilian and CIA personnel; they live lavishly with villas, cars, mistresses; each of them spend in one night what we soldiers, with one wife and three or four children take one year to earn. That is why we all agree: (1) it is too stupid to die for nothing; (2) it is even criminal to kill the guys in front because they do not deserve to die, they are unfortunate fellows like us; we should kill instead the corrupted leaders in Saigon and their dirty Saigon-American friends . . . [note: he makes a distinction between the Americans who live in the U.S. and who are not involved and the despised Saigon-Americans who are war profiteers] . . . who have made shambles of our country.

Since the Americans killed [sic] President Ngo Dinh Diem and installed a new regime of yes-yes men, corruption stinks to the sky. We want to tear down the corrupted. Since the Communists want to do the same job, we leave it to them. What we want before all is independence, then we shall freely choose the leaders we respect. With the Americans sitting right on our head we are anything but free. That is why we are more and more mad at President Nixon. His withdrawal is interminable, hence we have no independence. His Vietnamization shall never work, because he is fighting not only the Communists but also the whole Vietnamese population which are mad at the corrupted Americans and Vietnamese who rule them.

"There is a brave U.S. major, who acted as adviser and who probably meant well, who saw us packing and leaving and who asked me—probably because I have many ribbons for gallantry on my chest—why we did not make the slightest effort to resist and save our country from communism, etc., etc. . . . I looked at him silently for a long moment, shrugged my shoulders, and went away without answering, because I cannot tell him what I tell you in this letter. Some of us, in other units, fight by sheer reflex, like robots, but they will quit too, because they also feel the same way as we do. For the time being we just quit the battlefield, but in our next step we shall join the Communist forces.

"We hate the corrupted. Why don't you come back to lead us?"

I concur, but I also advocate reunification and neutrality for the entire Vietnam.

TRAN VAN KHIEM,

Former Deputy, Vietnam National Assembly.
Chevy Chase.

Hanoi Improves Its Air Defenses, U.S. Pilots Say

Washington Post Staff Writer

DANANG—The Soviet Union has improved North Vietnamese aircraft defenses, according to U.S. pilots here.

They said the relatively safe layer between the low-altitude 57-mm. antiaircraft guns, which are radar-directed, and the high-altitude SAM-2 missiles is now harder to find.

Pilots interviewed did not know what technical improvements were made in the Soviet air defenses but listed the following as among the possibilities: an improved radar-aiming system for the 57-mm. antiaircraft guns, Soviet technicians making adjustments on the ground in North Vietnam to improve both range and accuracy.

A further complication, the pilots said, is that the North Vietnamese have moved SAM-2 rockets and antiaircraft guns southward to protect more effectively their troops advancing in Military Region I.

One tragic bit of evidence of the improved air defenses came several weeks ago when the chief pilot of Air America had his leg shot off while sitting in the rear of an aircraft flying at about 13,500 feet over northern Laos where the Chinese have been building a road.

James Ryan, the chief pilot for the CIA-financed airline, was dropping pamphlets out of a small plane when he was hit by what fellow pilots believe was a 57-mm. shell. The pamphlets Ryan was dropping offered a reward for any information about the whereabouts of the crew of an Air America

C-123 crew downed earlier in the same area.

Hanoi on Sunday claimed that a high altitude B-52 was shot down over Vinhlinh in the eastern portion of the Demilitarized Zone. The U.S. Air Force denied the claim.

If the pilots are right in crediting North Vietnam with better air defenses, and there is no reason to doubt them, this will complicate their job of assisting South Vietnamese troops under attack in the northern portion of the country.

Just suppressing the antiaircraft fire to clear the way for bombing runs could cost the United States and South Vietnamese an unusually high number of planes if the air defenses indeed are more effective.

CIA: THE PRESIDENT'S

VICTOR MARCHETTI

Mr. Marchetti was on the director's staff of the CIA when he resigned from the agency two years ago. Since then, his novel The Rope-Dancer has been published by Grosset & Dunlap; he is now working on a book-length critical analysis of the CIA.

The Central Intelligence Agency's role in U.S. foreign affairs is, like the organization itself, clouded by secrecy and confused by misconceptions, many of them deliberately promoted by the CIA with the cooperation of the news media. Thus to understand the covert mission of this agency and to estimate its value to the political leadership, one must brush myths aside and penetrate to the sources and circumstances from which the agency draws its authority and support. The CIA is no accidental, romantic aberration; it is exactly what those who govern the country intend it to be—the clandestine mechanism whereby the executive branch influences the internal affairs of other nations.

In conducting such operations, particularly those that are inherently risky, the CIA acts at the direction and with the approval of the President or his Special Assistant for National Security Affairs. Before initiating action in the field, the agency almost invariably establishes that its operational plans accord with the aims of the administration and, when possible, the sympathies of Congressional leaders. (Sometimes the endorsement or assistance of influential individuals and institutions outside government is also sought.) CIA directors have been remarkably well aware of the dangers they court, both personally and for the agency, by not gaining specific official sanction for their covert operations. They are, accordingly, often more careful than are administrators in other areas of the bureaucracy to inform the White House of their activities and to seek Presidential blessing. To take the blame publicly for an occasional operational blunder is a small price to pay in return for the protection of the Chief Executive and the men who control the Congress.

The U-2 incident of 1960 was viewed by many as an outrageous blunder by the CIA, wrecking the Eisenhower-Khrushchev summit conference in Paris and setting U.S.-Soviet relations back several years. Within the inner circles of the administration, however, the shoot-down was shrugged off as just one of those things that happen in the chancy business of intelligence. After attempts to deny responsibility for the action had failed, the President openly defended and even praised the work of the CIA, although for obvious political reasons he avoided noting that he had authorized the disastrous flight. The U-2 program against the USSR was canceled, but work on its follow-on system, the A-11 (now the SR-71,) was speeded up. Only the launching of the reconnaissance satellites put an end to espionage against the Soviet Union by manned aircraft. The A-11 development program was completed, nevertheless, on the premise that it, as well as the U-2, might be useful elsewhere.

After the Bay of Pigs, the agency had its first real test because it failed in its attempt to overthrow Castro. At the top of the agency's operations committee, which had been created in 1954, the agency's role was limited. Throughout the 1950s, the agency's operations against the Soviet Union and the Chinese were the same time, and the agency was deeply involved in overthrowing regimes in Laos and Cuba.

When the National Security Council reorganized the CIA in 1967, it exposed the agency's financial and cultural dependence on the State Department. Senator Fulbright's attempt to restrict the CIA's control over the CIA had been simply told by the President and get on with its business. The CIA was formed to look into the operations of the Secretary of State, the CIA. Some of the CIA's operations because they had been no longer thought worth

continued under improved cover. A few of the larger operations went on under almost open CIA sponsorship, Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty and Air America being examples. And all the while, the CIA was conducting a \$500 million-a-year private war in Laos and pacification/assassination programs in Vietnam.

The reorganization of the U.S. intelligence community late last year in no way altered the CIA's mission as the clandestine action arm of American foreign policy. Most of the few changes are intended to improve the financial management of the community, especially in the military intelligence services where growth and the technical costs of collecting information are almost out of control. Other alterations are designed to improve the meshing of the community's product with national security planning and to provide the White House with greater control over operations policy. However, none of that implies a reduction of the CIA's role in covert foreign policy action. In fact, the extensive review conducted by the White House staff in preparation for the reorganization drew heavily on advice provided by the CIA and that given by former agency officials through such go-betweens as the influential Council on Foreign Relations. Earlier in the Nixon Administration, the Council had responded to a similar request by recommending that in the future the CIA should concentrate its covert pressure tactics on Latin American, African and Asian targets, using more foreign nationals as agents and relying more on private U.S. corporations and other institutions as covers. Nothing was said about reduc-

My Lai, four years afterward

Cover-Up

By Seymour M. Hersh.

Random House. 320 pp. \$6.95

Reviewed by ROBERT SHERRILL

Lest we forget, March 16 was the fourth anniversary of the most highly publicized and perhaps the worst war crime ever committed by U.S. troops, that being the day in 1968 when elements of the Americal Division descended on a cluster of hamlets in the Songmy area of South Vietnam and, without provocation, butchered several hundred unarmed civilians.

The army still refuses to say how many Vietnamese were killed that day by Company C, First Battalion, 20th Infantry, 11th Brigade when it destroyed the hamlet of My Lai 4. Seymour Hersh says the secret documents from which he developed this book show that at least 347 women, children, and old men died there.

This is twice as many as the highest previous estimate, and it is very close to the death count made at the time by the Viet Cong and circulated in propaganda leaflets, which, of course, our officials gave no credence to. Since the Viet Cong have been more accurate than the Pentagon about the whole matter, there is no reason not to take their word also that "there were twenty-six families killed completely—no survivors."

Their work done, the men of Charlie Company sat down among the bodies and ate lunch.

Meanwhile, in another hamlet nearby, this one known as My Khe 4, Bravo Company was getting in some practice. "We were out there having a good time," one of the participating GIs told Hersh. "It was sort of like being in a shooting gallery." Estimates of the dead at My Khe 4 range up to 155. Hersh's account of this episode is the first that has been made public, just as he was the first to report the My Lai 4 murders in 1969.

For the slaughter at My Lai 4, the army (after intense public pressures) eventually brought charges of murder or assault with intent to murder against 12 officers and men; but charges were dismissed against six, and of the others only Lieutenant William Calley was convicted.

For the murders at My Khe 4, nobody has been court-martialed, and apparently nobody ever will be.

So the evidence is all in now, and already becoming vintage his. Approved For Release 2001/07/27 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000900040001-2
the military's system of justice is incapable of coping with war crimes.

But that brings us to the even more important question, the question of why officers of the highest rank failed to investigate and prosecute the guilty immediately after the offenses occurred, at which time even the creaking court-martial system might have been expected to produce a reasonable quantum of justice.

Cover-Up, another of Hersh's awesome reporting achievements, is the best answer we are likely to get. It may be futile to argue about whether the murders at My Lai and My Khe prove that most young soldiers in moments of convulsive emotions can become war criminals; but certainly little doubt can remain, after reading the evidence here, that in moments of stress—as when they feel their careers imperiled—high field officers in the United States Army are quite willing to boil their code of honor down to the old practical barracks motto, "Cover Your Ass."

By the evening of the day it happened, nasty jokes about the My Lai "battle" were being made at division headquarters. It was the chief topic at the cocktail hour in Colonel Oran Henderson's mess hall. Henderson commanded the brigade. Many helicopter pilots in the 123rd

Aviation Battalion knew about the killings. South Vietnamese district officials knew about the mass murder within three days. So did Lieutenant Colonel William D. Guinn, the deputy province adviser, but he dismissed the report passed on to him by the native officials as invalid because—now get this—because "it was so poorly translated and the handwriting was so poor I could hardly read it."


Official reports of the assault stated that 128 "Viet

*"Their work done,
the men of Charlie Company
sat down among the bodies
and ate their lunch."*

Cong" had been killed after a heavy fight. But only three weapons were taken in the village and no Americans were injured by rifle fire. There were no requests for gunship support. For these reasons no alert officer would have let the battle report go unchallenged.

Some of the gossip quickly reached the ears of Major General Samuel W. Koster, commanding general of the Americal Division, and although he preferred that nothing create shock waves that might disturb his style of life (Koster's mess was noted for steak, lobster, engraved china, the best of hard liquors and wines, GI waiters dressed in white flunky coats, and the pleasant company of Red Cross nurses), still, he did tell Colonel Henderson that maybe he ought to investigate.

Henderson's idea of getting to the bottom of things was to stop a group of the soldiers who had been at My Lai 4—



COMMUNICATIONS

ITT's public relations fiasco

Despite the welter of testimony and newspaper stories implying questionable relations between International Telephone & Telegraph Corp. and the Justice Dept., the Central Intelligence Agency, and the White House, there has been no concrete evidence yet produced of any illegal conduct. Still, the publicity has damaged ITT's public image. Even sophisticated businessmen and investors are talking of the damage done to the reputation of business in general, describing ITT's recent conduct as arrogant and conscienceless. At midweek, the common stock hit a low for the year.

ITT is caught up in a full-fledged public relations fiasco, with an unaccustomed spotlight beaming on the office of Edward J. Gerrity, Jr., senior vice-president for public relations. Gerrity, 48, a onetime Scranton (Pa.) newspaperman, oversees ITT's far-flung corporate relations staff, including public relations, advertising, and dealings with government agencies. Dita Beard, the lobbyist whose alleged memo about the company's contributions to the San Diego Convention Bureau started the brouhaha, works for Gerrity.

The credibility. Gerrity's operation, which has a staff of 51 worldwide, has had a reputation for being effective but heavy-handed.

In 1967, for instance, three Washington reporters covering the Federal Communications Commission hearings into ITT's proposed acquisition of American Broadcasting Co. testified that ITT public relations staffers pressured them for better treatment. Eileen Shanahan, a *New York Times* reporter, said that Gerrity "badgered" her, and she later claimed that ITT asked a former employer about her character. Now, shredded documents, discrediting medical testimony, and ill-advised memoranda have all combined to make things look very bad for ITT.

When columnist Jack Anderson published alleged ITT internal memos implicating ITT in a scheme to block the election of Chilean president Salvador Allende, ITT public relations issued a statement describing as "without foundation in fact" Anderson's claim that the conglomerate "had participated in planning any plots or coup against him [Allende]."

Yet former CIA director John A. McCone, a member of the ITT board of directors since 1966 and a member of its executive committee, has confirmed that moves against Allende had indeed been discussed at ITT. McCone

company told the U. S. government, "If you have a plan, we'll help with it." Far from disavowing the authenticity of the memos published by Anderson, McCone says "those were staff." And he adds that suggestions of "economic repression" measures were "prudently, properly, and firmly rejected by Geneen and his operating people." McCone adds that ITT Chairman Harold S. Geneen and he are filled with "regret at the way that the memos were written and the way they have been read by the press so that our true policy has been distorted."

The image. The way they are being interpreted by the press is, of course, a problem for globally ambitious ITT, as well as for "Ned" Gerrity. What he and



ITT's statuette: A manneken pis for members of The Brussels Boys Club.

his staff think of it all is unknown, for Gerrity is refusing interviews "on the advice of our lawyers."

ITT is not a corporation known for hiding its light. Each year several hundred journalists, ranging from financial writers to police-beat hacks, gather at Manhattan's St. Regis Roof for a bash that ITT's public relations department calls "The Brussels Boys Club." The tone of the evening is set by a replica of Brussels' famed *manneken pis*, which directs a potable stream into the glasses of thirsty guests. "Members" get statuette of the *manneken*.

but apt. The giant ITT always has one eye fixed on 11 Boulevard de

of ITT-Europe. In 1971, Europe accounted for \$3.1-billion of ITT's total corporate sales of \$7.3-billion. Just last week, the 11-man executive committee of the ITT board flew to Brussels for a special presentation by ITT-Europe. Notably absent were Chairman Geneen and Gerrity, both preoccupied with the hearings in Washington.

Hanging over the meeting was the big question: Will the publicity tar the company with the image of a string-pulling, cloak-and-dagger operation?

Foreign affairs. If ITT's image is hurt in Europe, it could not come at a worse time. The now-famous deal it struck with the Justice Dept., which allowed it to retain Hartford Fire Insurance Co., set a limit of \$100-million on the size of a company it could acquire domestically. In effect, this means that ITT will have to look abroad—especially to Europe—for large acquisitions, and in Europe a favorable government attitude is a prerequisite.

A former ITT manager overseas concedes that marketing and politics go hand in hand in Europe. There is intense expense-account wooing of postal, telephone, and telegraph officials. And the same tender, loving care is devoted to selected French deputies and Spanish *deputados* as ITT lavishes on U. S. congressmen.

ITT also recruits influential allies. The board of Bell Telephone Mfg. Co., ITT's big Antwerp unit, includes former NATO Secretary-General Paul-Henri Spaak, while the late UN Secretary General Trygve Lie was a director of ITT-Norway. Such tactics apparently work: In the last 15 months, ITT has acquired six companies in four countries.

Foreign troubles. In Latin American operations, administered from New York, the experience has not been so happy. Foreign ownership of telecommunications systems there is out of style. Peru and Ecuador nationalized ITT subsidiaries in 1970, and even friendly Brazil declined to renew the franchise of ITT World Communications.

For all its overseas interests, ITT is not averse to waving Old Glory. For example, when Charles de Gaulle forbade an ITT subsidiary to ship highly secret radar installations to Vietnam, a former executive recalls, "We just slipped the blueprints to the CIA."

Public relations is a management problem, and the current image crisis at ITT is a serious blow to Harold Geneen's reputation for tight controls. An ITT public relations handout quotes a magazine evaluation of Geneen as "the greatest businessman," yet ITT's public relations operations somehow slipped from his grasp. Now, Geneen faces

this fall by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, looking into the influence of multinational corporations on U. S. foreign policy.

CIA... Dope Pushers

SAN FRANCISCO—Earth Magazine has announced the preparation of a law suit against a CIA-controlled airline it accused in its March issue of flying heroin out of Southeast Asia with the knowledge of that clandestine government agency.

San Francisco attorney Ron Leachman says the suit will charge Air America, a corporation set up by the Central Intelligence Agency, with allowing its facilities to be used for the trafficking of opium from the "fertile triangle" of poppy fields in Laos, Burma and Thailand.

The current issue of Earth documents in a feature article by University of California Prof. Peter Scott, the connection between the CIA, Air America and the heroin trade, Scott charges that "the opium-based economy of Laos is being protected by a coalition of opium growing CIA mercenaries, Air America planes and Thailand troops."

The article charged that much of the heroin wound up being used in Vietnam by U.S. troops or went to the streets of America.

At a press conference announcing the publication of the article, Earth editor James Goode angrily pointed out how corruption abroad has brought disaster back home:

"The CIA helped put our kids in Vietnam and CIA heroin traffic turned them on to smack," he said at the press conference. "And we're paying the CIA \$6 billion a year for these services."

The impact of this trafficking on American youth cannot be underestimated. In the article, Scott quotes Eliot Marshall's estimate

that 25% of all heroin in the U.S. comes from the fertile triangle region of South-east Asia

A further amplification of the problem came from research done by Mike Benner of WRIF news in a recent broadcast about the Earth magazine exposures.

He said, "Studies on the heroin problem in the United States have indicated that up to five billion dollars is spent annually on heroin by an estimated five hundred thousand addicts. More than half of the money spent each year on the purchase of heroin - two and one-half billion dollars - is

U.S. Government studies have indicated that as much as 50% of the crime in metropolitan areas is caused by addicts and medical officials report that heroin presently causes more deaths to people between the ages of 18 and 35 than war, cancer or car accidents."

Most observers feel that the CIA involvement in the heroin trade has not come about through a desire of the U.S. government to poison its troops and young people. But rather through a trap of political alliances with the dealers and marketers of opium, who were often the only forces in Southeast Asia willing to support the U.S. political and military adventures in that region, an area controlled by remnants of the Chinese Nationalist Army.

Several recent calls for attacks on the trade by the government are not being taken too seriously and Hubert Humphrey even suggested having the CIA itself hunt down the smugglers. Don Strachen writing in the

Staff newspaper in Los Angeles suggested that this was like asking the Nazi S.S. force to investigate atrocities at the Auschwitz concentration camp.

Earth Magazine and attorney Leachman want GI's vets or other persons with personal knowledge of the drug trade and who would be willing to help them in the suit against Air America, to contact Earth Magazine, The Agricultural Bldg. The Embarcadero at Mission, San Francisco CA 94115 or phone (415) 989-4300. Copies of the above mentioned article can also be gotten from that address

Nixon's Peace Offer

THE FUNDAMENTAL ISSUE at stake in the Indochina war has always been a relatively simple one; is the United States (or the French before it) to have a predominant voice in determining the political and social structure of Indochina, or will this question be settled by the Indochinese peoples themselves, relatively free from outside intervention? It has been fairly clear from the outset that, if external force were withdrawn, Vietnam would ultimately be unified under communist leadership, since the Viet Minh and its successors had "captured" the nationalist movement, as U.S. government analysts express it. In Laos, the Pathet Lao have been unmatched in their ability to construct a popular nationalist political movement, in this case, too, with revolutionary social content. U.S. intervention from the late 1950s has drawn North Vietnam increasingly into Laotian affairs, much as in South Vietnam and more recently Cambodia, where the March 1970 coup, very likely with a CIA hand, and the US-ARVN invasion that followed, shattered a fragile though conceivably stable neutralism and increased the probability that Cambodia too will be brought ultimately into a communist-led federation of some sort if outside force is withdrawn.

For reasons that need not detain us here, the United States has never been willing to tolerate the "loss" of Indochina, and remains unwilling today. The conditions of U.S. intervention have changed over the years, but not the essential goals. Furthermore, the basic problem facing the Western invaders has also changed little during the past quarter century. Several years ago, an American military spokesman formulated the problem clearly: the U.S. has enormous military force but little political power and must defeat an adversary with enormous political power but only modest military force. To this problem the U.S. must find the "proper response"—in Vietnam and elsewhere in the third world as well. (Jean Lacouture, *Vietnam: Between Two Truces*, 1966).

This problem dictates American strategy. The basic strategy has been, necessarily, to demolish the social and

political structures in which the indigenuous resistance is rooted, what is called "nation-building" by some of the more contemptible hypocrites spawned in the course of this endeavor, for example, Robert Komer, chief Presidential advisor on "pacification" in the Johnson Administration. Five years ago, he held out the hope that "erosion of southern VC strength" may be feasible because, though none of the American programs are very efficient, "we are grinding the enemy down by sheer weight and mass" (*Pentagon Papers*, Beacon, volume IV). After the Tet offensive of 1968, it became clear that the American public would not long tolerate the costs of a continuing military occupation in South Vietnam, coupled with a costly air war against the North. Consequently, the direct U.S. troop commitment was leveled off and then gradually lowered through "Vietnamization"—a policy suggested by Pentagon systems analysts in 1967—while a sharply expanded technological war reached its peak in the early months of the Nixon Administration.

Nixon and Kissinger are gambling that the massive destruction and forced population concentration in the South, with its devastating impact on the rural society, may create conditions under which the U.S.-imposed regime can survive. To use Robert Komer's terms, "thanks to massive U.S. military intervention at horrendous cost," a "favorable military environment" has been created "in which the largely political competition for control and support of the key rural population could begin again" in this "revolutionary, largely political conflict" (*J. of International Affairs*, 1971, no. 1). He fails to add that control of the "key rural population" may be facilitated by the fact that at least half the population, 85 percent rural in 1960, now lives in urban ghettos (J-C Pomonti, *Foreign Affairs*, Jan. 1972), part of the "horrendous cost" of "massive U.S. military intervention." Much the same is true in Laos and Cambodia. Nixon and Kissinger appear to be moving towards an effective partition of Indochina: the heavily settled areas of Laos, South Vietnam and Cambodia will, it is hoped, be separated from the resistance, controlled by an elaborate

military and police apparatus, and gradually absorbed within the U.S.-Japan Pacific system. The vast areas ceded to the resistance will be subjected to intensive bombardment which will continue to make an organized social life virtually impossible. Parts of Laos may be effectively incorporated within Thailand, as George Ball suggested years ago. It may be that the willingness of the Administration to concede the presence of Thai mercenaries in Laos (in conflict with explicit legislation designed to prevent this) reflects the need to prepare the public for this outcome.

As the very knowledgeable Australian analyst Peter King observes; such "successes" as have been achieved in this program are "no mystery": "It requires more than ordinary courage for civilians to maintain their political allegiances openly in the face of a semi-genocidal counter-insurgent strategy" (*Pacific Affairs*, Fall 1971), the prerequisite for Komer-style "nation-building." It is this counter-insurgent strategy and its results that lead General Westmoreland to believe: "I think particularly significant is that the enemy does not have the strong infrastructure and the guerrilla forces in large numbers, well equipped and highly motivated, that he had in 1968" (Peter Osnos, *Washington Post-Boston Globe*, Feb. 1, 1972). However, as King and many others recognize, "the durability of that success may be doubted."


Given the insistence of the U.S. public on scaling down the direct American involvement, it has been obvious for several years that it would become necessary for the U.S. to engage in some sort of political manipulations within the areas of South Vietnam that remain under U.S. control, or to "get ready for political competition in South Vietnam," as Harvard Professor Samuel Huntington put it in a paper before the May 1969 meeting of the Council on Vietnamese Studies of SEADAG. This collection of scholars, who claim to be concerned with support for research on Vietnam, struggled manfully with the problem of how to ensure control at the national level for "our side," given that the NLF remains "the most powerful purely political national organization," "the

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
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


Inside the RAND Corporation and Out: My Story

by Anthony Russo



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Books

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**IN THE MIDST OF WARS:
An American's Mission
to Southeast Asia**

by Edward Geary Lansdale
Harper & Row, 386 pp., \$12.50

Reviewed by Jonathan Mirsky

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Why is this important? Because if there is one word Lansdale uses repeatedly it is "help"—and he uses it personally, simulating a Lone Ranger-like urge to offer *spontaneous* assistance. Thus, the first day he ever saw Diem, "... the thought occurred to me that perhaps he needed help. ... I voiced this to Ambassador Heath. ... Heath told me to go ahead." The informal atmosphere continues when Lansdale, upon actually meeting Diem, immortalizes him as "the alert and eldest of the seven dwarfs deciding what to do about Snow White."

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The Ugly American and Flexible Response

a review by Taylor Branch

Two fathers of the Vietnam War published their memoirs in March.* General Edward Lansdale's *In the Midst of Wars* and General Maxwell Taylor's *Swords and Plowshares* record the statements of defense for men who symbolize the two doctrines that combined to produce American counter-guerrilla strategy in Southeast Asia. More importantly, Lansdale and Taylor represent two distinct schools of war supporters—those who saw Vietnam as a crusade and those who saw it as a burden.

Lansdale is America's first expert in counter-guerrilla warfare—the legendary figure who achieved fame in the fifties by teaching our cold warriors that the only way to defeat Asian revolutionaries, the guerrilla fish in a sea of popular support, was to learn how to paddle around a little ourselves. Mixing modern "psywar" (psychological warfare) techniques with James Bond derring-do and the kind of cultural savvy that later was coveted by exponents of foreign wars and foreign aid alike, Lansdale managed to position himself for exploits and lever-pulling in palaces and rice paddies, Asia's smoke-filled rooms.

Lansdale's knowledge of the players and the bystanders—the French, the Americans, the local warlords who were beset with kaleidoscopic personal intrigue—helped him contour Diem's strategy to fit both international politics and contending Vietnamese jealousies. Lansdale became mysterious and controversial—two

**In the Midst of Wars*. Edward Geary Lansdale. Harper & Row, \$12.50. *Swords and Plowshares*. Maxwell D. Taylor. Norton, \$10.

Taylor Branch is an editor of *The Washington Monthly*.

novels, *The Quiet American* and *The Ugly American*, are modeled on his doings. He helped move American military strategy from the conventional concerns of how you position your armored divisions, tanks, artillery, and nuclear weapons, to more political questions like where you put your psywar leaflets, why you need pacification teams, and how to win the hearts and minds of the people. As a counter-guerrilla man long before the fashion, Lansdale contributed about half the ideas that led to Vietnam.

General Taylor symbolizes another idea, flexible response, which, floating on a common sea of anticommunism with Lansdale's doctrines, helped direct troop ships across the Pacific. At the apparent end of a long, successful military career that began at West Point under Superintendent Douglas MacArthur, Taylor found himself a very dissatisfied Army Chief of Staff from 1955 until 1959. He dissented from the Eisenhower-Dulles strategy of massive retaliation (which essentially promised to nuke the communists if they made a move anywhere) because he considered it unlikely that the Russians would believe our threat to blow up the world if they seized the post office in Nairobi. Of course, Taylor also had bureaucratic reasons to oppose the Eisenhower nuclear strategy: the Air Force was getting missiles, the Navy was in line for nuclear subs, while the Army was getting little but budget cuts. His development of the flexible response posture paralleled a series of frustrated battles for more Army funds, which Taylor implies were lost because conservatives like Treasury

Secretary George Humphrey wanted a balanced budget so badly that they persuaded Ike to stick with a bargain-basement nuclear strategy.

Taylor retired from the Army in 1959 to write *The Uncertain Trumpet* and thereby take his case for flexible response to the public, where it was well-received because most people were chilled by so much talk about the bomb during the Eisenhower Administration. A powerful fear that nuclear vertigo might draw our leaders toward the button was activated especially among liberals, and its nerve endings remained exposed until after the Goldwater-Johnson race in 1964.

When President Kennedy and his dandies came to Washington in 1961 they regarded Maxwell Taylor as a cultural and strategic ally. Already alarmed at Khrushchev's speech proclaiming an open season for wars of national liberation, the President persuaded the general to become his military counselor (when Taylor turned down the top post at the CIA to help the Administration enshrine flexible response as official dogma and to apply this wisdom in trouble spots like Southeast Asia. Lansdale was already in Washington, working on Vietnam, and the Pentagon Paper record that by July, 1961, Lansdale presented Taylor with a long, classified report "in response to your desire for early information on unconventional warfare resources in Southeast Asia." The two vials were being poured together, and the Kennedy Administration bought both flexible response and counter-guerrilla warfare in a logically compatible package symbolized by the Green Berets.

Against the background, of the Eisenhower years, the thoughts of the two generals appear quite harmonious rising to the top of the new administration, but the memoirs show that their personalities were sharply different. While Taylor is a reserve pragmatist, Lansdale is a true believer, a gung-ho cold-war missionary, a man of action, whose writing calls for frequent crescendos of the nation's

Continued

1 APR 1972

Charging a Cover-up of Whitewash of a Massacre

Reviewed by
Ron Ridenhour

Books

In 1969 the reviewer wrote a letter to the Secretary of Defense and other highly placed persons that led to the revelations of the My Lai massacre and all that followed. He is now a student at Arizona State University and writes for *New Times*, an underground newspaper.

It came as a bitter shock to most Americans when the nation's young began filling the streets in protest against the Vietnam war, leveling charges against our own government and military that had traditionally been reserved for only our vilest adversaries. They were charges few Americans could accept.

But in November, 1969, Seymour M. Hersh, an enterprising free-lance journalist who specializes in covering the military, rocked the nation and the world with a series of articles exposed what became known as the My Lai massacre. The series won Hersh the Pulitzer Prize and later became a probably thorough book. Although most people refused to believe it, it began to look as if the worst charges made by the anti-war groups were true.

Now Hersh is back with a second book based on My Lai. It is potentially more explosive than the story of the massacre itself, raising serious questions that cut to the core of the military as an institution and laying open to question the integrity of our top military and civilian leaders as well as the American brand of justice.

"Cover-up" is based on 28,000 pages of testimony and documents gathered by the Army's investigation of the My Lai affair by a much ballyhooded blue-ribbon panel named after its chief, Lt. Gen. William R. Peers, plus Hersh's own extensive investigations. The purpose of the Peers inquiry was to discover what happened at My Lai, why it happened, and how it could have been undiscovered. The

COVER-UP. By Seymour M. Hersh.

(Random House, 305 pp., \$6.95)

Army was reacting, according to Hersh, to charges of a whitewash. The public was promised full access to the Peers discoveries after the military trials, barring the usual "national security" catch-all provision. The trials are now over except for Calley's appeal, but the Pentagon still refuses to release the report.

The reason, Hersh says, is that the investigation of the whitewash, is itself a cover-up.

- Hersh shows the Peers group collecting detailed evidence of a second massacre on the same morning by another company from Task Force Baker, Charlie Company's parent unit, but Gen. Peers denied any knowledge of it at a press conference announcing the investigation's results.

- He shows Lt. Calley sentenced to life imprisonment (later reduced to 20 years) while his two commanding generals are let off the hook by a fellow general in a deal that smacks of the "old boy" syndrome—even though each accuses the other of ultimate responsibility and both their testimonies are full of holes and hedging.

- He shows wholesale destruction and alteration of records by privates through generals.

- He shows the CIA's shadowy hand in operation and the part a CIA agent played in planning the My Lai operation.

- He shows a loose, unofficial but fiercely loyal alliance of field grade officers willing to break all the rules

to protect their fellow officers—even those they've never met.

Beyond these revelations, however, lies the deeper question of command responsibility, not only for My Lai but for all the undiscovered—publicly at least—massacres and atrocities of the war. Implicit in the handling of the My Lai affair by the administration and the Pentagon is the assumption that the massacre was an atypical incident, a kind of horrible aberration caused by a freakish and complicated combination of factors that could never be repeated.

"Cover-up" indicates that the atrocity syndrome was widespread throughout the Americal Division, at least, and that the military policies then in effect, policies designed in the highest military echelons made them inevitable. In the chapters Hersh devotes to the subject, one is struck by the identical line that issues from a variety of witnesses from numerous echelons: "Kill, kill, kill". If they are to be believed, the official emphasis was on body count and little else. There is hardly any conclusion left to draw except that as far as

the brass was concerned, what really mattered was not who was killed, but how many.

In Hersh's final analysis it becomes clear that not only was My Lai inevitable, but so was its cover-up and the cover-up's cover-up. Perhaps the most disturbing issue he raises is that what made it all so inevitable is integral to the United States Army today. And that raises some questions.

Hersh threads the story of My Lai and its sister massacre at My Khe, their investigation and the double cover-up, into a broad tapestry tightly stitched together with the most damning evidence of all—the testimony of the men who participated at every level and every stage of the whole sordid affair.

Years from now, when scholars attempt to understand the Vietnam phenomenon, "Cover-Up" is the one book to which they will all turn. And they will ask themselves, I suppose, why the vital questions raised by Hersh about an institution as powerful in and important to America as its army were allowed to go unanswered—as they surely will in a nation that has had the war up to here.

Thieu's Firm Grip Brings Political Calm to Vietnam

STATINTL

By HENRY S. BRADSHER
Star Staff Writer

SAIGON — In the half-year since South Vietnam's presidential elections ended with a whimper instead of a bang, this country has been politically more quiet than at any time in recent years.

The quietness is a sign of President Nguyen Van Thieu's political mastery, of the demoralization of his opponents, and of preparations for a possible eventual political contest with the Communists.

And it might also be taken as a sign of the narrow focus of Vietnamese politics on a small handful of people, with the bulk of the population knowing little about them and caring less—in the normal way of underdeveloped countries with strongman traditions.

In the offices and villas of those persons who consider themselves Saigon politicians, there is some desultory discussion these days of new political alliances. Thieu might once again be interested in gathering the support of some politicians, instead of spurning them all.

The An Quang pagoda group of Buddhists is busy cleaning house, the student movement is hardly visible, and war veterans are being taken care of fairly well. These are the groups that have caused the most political turmoil in recent years, but not now.

Few Pay Attention

Retired Gen. Duong Van Minh, the self-appointed savior of Vietnam from both Thieu and communism, has issued a few statements since deciding in August not to fight a losing presidential election campaign.

Not many people pay attention. Vietnamese politicians, journalists and other observers find it hard to imagine any future developments which could bring to Minh the call to national leadership that he wants.

The other man whom Thieu maneuvered out of the presidential race, former Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky, plays tennis and talks with his military cronies.

Now outranked by a former subordinate, he cannot return

to command of the air force which he held before becoming premier seven years ago. Besides, Thieu seems disinclined to give Ky any position of authority—not surprisingly, since Ky threatened in September to “destroy him and all his clique.”

Ky is not so easily written off as Minh, however. He has more determination and, at 43, he is younger. He can wait for the next presidential elections in 1975, when Thieu will be constitutionally unable to seek another term.

Way Charter Reads

Or at least that is the way the Constitution reads at the moment. But that American-inspired limitation may prove no more realistic for Vietnam than other ideas copied from the U.S. Constitution and later abandoned, like an independent judiciary.

Few observers would want to predict as far ahead as 1975.

But if Thieu is still running the same kind of government then, it seems likely that he might decide to emulate President Chung Hee Park of South Korea. A few years ago Park found himself so indispensable that he had to force through his parliament a change in the American-inspired two-term limitation.

Thieu works from behind a screen of Oriental aloofness. He tours the country extensively to meet with local officials, who form the basis of his political power, but he does not try to establish a popular image with the masses.

He has made little effort to explain his policies. The presidential palace provides almost no information to the Vietnamese press about what it is doing. More than just a reticence, there seems to be an absolute hostility toward the American press.

Parties Too Fractious

Thieu dickered in 1969 with the idea of uniting seven political parties behind his programs. But they proved too fractious. By early 1970 he was denouncing all politicians as would-be leaders without any followers.

signs that the president might

be coming back to the idea that organized political support can have a value beyond his use of local officials and army officers to rally popular backing and turn out voters.

The three parties that show signs of coalescing behind Thieu are the Workers' and Peasants' party, the Progressive party, and the Revolutionary Greater Vietnam party.

The first is primarily composed of union members led by Tran Quoc Buu. He has had strong American support since the days when the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency financed the creation of anti-Communist unions abroad.

The second party unites professional men and civil servants. Its highly respected leader, Prof. Nguyen Van Bong, was assassinated in November, weakening the party.

The third, part of the old Dai Viet semi-secret political movement, is led by a former minister of the interior, Ha Thuc Ky.

Position Strengthened

Thieu gave these parties some help of dubious legality in August's elections to the lower house of parliament, and they strengthened their position. Now, he might be looking toward next year's lower house elections.

If a constitutional amendment is to be passed allowing a third term, Thieu would need more parliamentary support than he now has.

The president is still presenting a stoutly anti-Communist determination to the world. But he has gained politically — and weakened his critics — by offering in January to resign and fight presidential elections against the Communists.

This helped Thieu to capture much of the credit for favoring peace which had been held by various opposition groups.

It has at the same time caused concern. After a six-week silence, the president of the upper house of parliament, Sen. Nguyen Van Huyen, who would run the country temporarily under Thieu's plan to resign for new elections, expressed guarded disapproval.

“No one has the right, through ill-considered acts, to go counter” to the constitution, Huyen said. Thieu's proposal to let the Communists contest elections would violate the anti-Communist provisions of the Constitution.

Cautiously Quiet

The opposition groups which had voiced desires for peace have been cautiously quiet.

The most interesting development among the opposition is an attempt by the An Quang Buddhists to purge Communist sympathizers from their own ranks, especially their student movements. After denying government accusations that they often served communist purposes, the church leaders now seemed concerned about this.

Their supreme patriarch recently accused both the Saigon and Hanoi governments as “merely acting as puppets for foreign powers.” This evenhanded condemnation was a change from attacking Thieu while being polite to the Communists.

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CIA Agent Blamed for My Lai Error

WASHINGTON — Author Seymour M. Hersh said an agent for the Central Intelligence Agency misled the planners of the 1968 attack on My Lai by telling them they would find a Viet Cong battalion there. The agent denied it.

The assault units met only old men, women and children in the South Vietnamese village. Many were killed by the American troops.

Hersh, who won a Pulitzer Prize for breaking the My Lai story, identified the agent in a new book as Robert B. Ramsdell, now a private investigator in Orlando, Fla.

"Ramsdell refused to speak specifically about the information he provided Task Force Barker before the My Lai 4 operation, but acknowledged that his intelligence undoubtedly was a factor in the planning for the mission," Hersh wrote in "Cover-Up," published Sunday by Random House.

Denies Charges

In a telephone interview, Ramsdell denied Hersh's allegations and said that although he was working for the CIA in the My Lai area at the time of the killings, he had nothing to do with intelligence reports to the Americans.

Of his role in the CIA, Ramsdell said, "My function was with the Vietnamese. I had very little to do with the Americans."

He said that information gathered by the South Vietnamese was at times relayed to U.S. troops, but added that he doubted those reports could have become the basis for the misleading information fed to planners of the My Lai assault.

Viet Cong Sought

In the My Lai court-martial of Lt. William L. Calley Jr. and others, there was testimony that the attack was made in the belief the village was the home of the 480th Viet Cong Battalion, which previously had inflicted heavy damage to American units.

The source of that belief was alluded to only as "intelligence reports."

Hersh said: "The link between Ramsdell and the poor intelligence for the March 16 operation was never explored by the Peers panel (the exhaustive Army investigation headed by Lt. Gen. William R. Peers). For one thing, none of the high-ranking officers on it had any reason to suspect that Ramsdell was poorly informed about Vietnam."

Ramsdell was sent into Quang Ngai Province, on Feb. 4—40 days before My Lai—to run the clandestine Operation Phoenix, Hersh wrote.

27 MAR 1972

Around the Nation**CIA in Mylai**

Author Seymour M. Hersh says an agent for the Central Intelligence Agency misled the planners of the ill-starred 1968 attack on Mylai by telling them they would find a Vietcong battalion there. The agent denies it.

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STATINTL

26 MAR 1972

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STATINTL

Was He Col. Hillandale or the Quiet American?

By RICHARD CRITCHFIELD
Star Staff Writer

IN THE MIDST OF WARS. By Maj. Gen. Edward Geary Lansdale. Harper & Row. 386 pages. \$12.50.

When Edward Lansdale returned to an almost-defeated Vietnam in the fall of 1965, he was already a fabled figure, the legendary Asian hand who had been the mentor of the Philippines' great anti-guerrilla fighter, Roman Magsaysay, as well as Ngo Dinh Diem's first American political-military adviser in the mid-1950s.

Although he was then 58, he still had an air of youthful idealism; with his haggard good looks and brown hair only tinged with gray, he might have stepped out of the pages of Eric Ambler or Ian Fleming. One saw at once why he had inspired major characters in both "The Ugly American," by William J. Lederer and Eugene Burdick, and Graham Greene's classic on the Indochina war, "The Quiet American."

BOOKS

In "The Ugly American," Lansdale was barely disguised as Colonel Edwin D. Hillandale, a harmonica-playing good guy who "loves to be with people, any kind of people." In a frankly admiring sketch, the authors wrote, "In 1952 Colonel Hillandale was sent to Manila as liaison officer to something or other. In a short time the Philippines fascinated him. He ate his meals in little Filipino restaurants . . . he even attended the University in his spare hours to study Tagalog . . . The counsellor up at the American Embassy always spoke of him as 'that crazy bastard.' But within six months the crazy bastard was eating breakfast with Magsaysay and he soon became Magsaysay's unofficial adviser."

BUT THERE was another way of interpreting Lansdale and Greene turned it into literature in his bitterly brilliant "The Quiet American." The novel is a despairing portrayal of a young idealistic CIA operative who blunders tragically through the intrigue, treachery and confusion of Vietnamese politics. Innocent and well-meaning, but naive, the American leaves a trail of blood and suffering in his wake.

Greene's young American was sent to Indochina in the early 1950s to help create an indigenous political force that could resist a Communist takeover when the French pulled out. In May, 1954, John Foster Dulles dispatched Lansdale to Saigon with secret orders to see if anything could be salvaged from the fall of Dien Bien Phu. Lansdale became Diem's adviser at the time the Vietnamese leader was defying the Geneva agreements, which both he and the United States refused to sign, resettling almost a million refugees from the Communist north and beginning to make South Vietnam a nation.

In the novel, the Lansdale figure, after becoming involved in a terrorist explosion in Saigon — an incident that actually took place before Lansdale went to Vietnam — is murdered by the Communists. Thus when Lansdale came back to Saigon in

1965, it was rather like Greene's quiet American coming back to Saigon in 1965, it was rather like Greene's quiet American coming to life again. Oddly, the Vietnamese started calling Lansdale "the phoenix" after one of their household gods. What would he do?

"What does a man do," Lansdale told us at the time, "when he returns to a country, 10 years later, with great stress on its social and political structure, great suffering, great pain. I have no great plan. One's got to move in with tremendous gentleness; these people have been divided and hurt and a lot of clumsiness could divide and hurt them more. But there isn't much time. They need rule of law, consent of the governed in how they are governed and a life in which kids have some hope of tomorrow. I feel the Vietnamese are in their last quarter. This is the ninth inning and we either do it now or not at all."

He was brimming with plans for sweeping land reform, rural electrification, bringing back all the able administrators purged for serving Diem, restoring Confucian ethics, putting strict restraints on American artillery and air strikes.

But he was quickly stripped of any real authority. On Jan. 21, 1966, Philip Habib, now ambassador to South Korea who ran the embassy's political section, sent Lansdale a memorandum, reportedly signed by Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, forbidding him further contact with the Vietnamese leaders. Lansdale the phoenix. Perhaps the Vietnamese should have remembered a line of Greene's in "The Quiet American": ". . . but nothing nowadays is fabulous and nothing rises from its ashes."

"IN THE MIDST of Wars" is his own discreet account of the years in Asia from 1950 to 1956, the brilliantly successful four he spent helping to defeat the Huks and elect Magsaysay president in the Philippines, the less successful two in Vietnam assisting Diem to unite the feudal religious sects, defeat the gangster army which ruled Saigon and begin a pacification effort against the budding Vietcong insurgency.

It is an invaluable historical document and an exciting adventure story, and like the author himself, rugged, humorous, compassionate, baffling, naive and a little infuriating. In the book's anti-climactical final paragraph, Lansdale briefly notes he returned to Vietnam again from 1965 to 1968, closing his book with the cryptic sentence, "But that's another story, quiet different from the experiences described in this book?"

Why another story? From his personal viewpoint, of course, he went back as a civilian in an enormous, disarrayed American mission torn by interagency rivalry in a war already going badly, and he was never allowed to come up to bat. But would his approach have worked if he had?

The book's final chapter is devoted to Lansdale's belief that irregular war is not just another aspect in the art of fighting but is a complex primarily political struggle for political ends.

"Fundamentally," he writes, "the people of a country are the main feature on a battleground of Communist choosing, since the ensuing struggle becomes one between the Communists and the government over which side will have the allegiance of the people. Whichever side wins that allegiance will win the country. . . . In other words, a country's strength

continued

Cold war condottiere

In the Midst of Wars

An American's Mission to Southeast Asia.

By Edward Geary Lansdale.


Harper & Row. Illustrated. 386 pp. \$12.50

Reviewed by SHERWOOD DICKERMAN

To Graham Greene's jaundiced British eye, he was a model for Pyle, the naïvely dangerous "Quiet American." Burdick and Lederer took an approving, American view of him as Colonel Hillandale of *The Ugly American*. In Jean Lartéguy's *Yellow Fever*, he was Colonel Teryman, astute, somewhat sinister and, of course, anti-French.

Now Major General Edward Geary Lansdale has finally written his own book about himself. *In the Midst of Wars* covers the six years from 1950 through 1956 when Lansdale, in the Philippines first and then in South Vietnam, was Washington's leading agitprop agent for American-style democracy and against communism. An Air Force intelligence officer well connected with the Central Intelligence Agency, Lansdale was a cold war condottiere.

Sherwood Dickerman spent five years in Southeast Asia as a foreign correspondent.



Madame Nhu, Diem, Lansdale, 1956

who became possibly the most influential single American in Southeast Asia and certainly the most controversial. As the close friend and adviser of Ramon Magsaysay, Lansdale helped to defeat the Communist Hukbalahap rebellion in the Philippines and to get the idealistic Magsaysay

ected president despite the opposition of the corrupt Filipino political establishment. In South Vietnam, he did his best to perform the same role in a more difficult situation with Ngo Dinh Diem.

Throughout, Lansdale promoted his belief that democracy on the American model was exportable, desirable, and an effective method of countering Communist "people's wars." In his view, the theories of Washington, Jefferson, and Lincoln were both morally and tactically superior to those of Lenin and Mao Tse-tung, and his evangelism was unabashed:

In sharing our ideology while making others strong enough to embrace and hold it for their own, the American people strive toward a millennium when the world will be free and wars will be past.

The Washington officials to whom Lansdale addressed this message were, he notes, "not too happy" over it. In the sadder and wiser America of the 1970s, perhaps most Americans would not be happy with Lansdale's sense of global commitment to democratic panaceas. (Yet the Lansdale spirit is not so dated as it may sound; it survives, perhaps in more sophisticated forms, among able and intelligent men at the U.S. Embassy in Saigon, and elsewhere.)

In trying to realize his ideal, Lansdale was ingenious and ruthless. He was an early student of Maoist military theory and psychological warfare. "Dirty tricks beget dirty tricks," he writes, and the premise is that the other side played dirty first. Thus he writes approvingly of a Filipino psywar squad that drained the blood of an ambushed Huk through punctures in his neck to terrify the man's comrades of a vampire. Lansdale also recalls his success in causing a mass work stoppage in Hanoi at the time of the Communist takeover there through distribution of phony leaflets proclaiming a one-week victory holiday.

He does not tell all, however, which is probably one reason why the book by Lansdale reads less melodramatically than the ones about him. Through the Pentagon Papers, it is known that Lansdale's American agents in Hanoi also sabotaged the city's bus fleet at that time to embarrass the Vietminh and that American-trained Vietnamese guerrillas, the "Hao" and "Binh" teams, were infiltrated into Haiphong under his direction for anti-Communist underground activity. It may not be surprising for a retired career officer to omit such secret and sensitive material, but in Lansdale's case there are grounds for suspecting that he may have omitted more than he put in. His protests about exaggerated news reports of his activity in Vietnam sometimes have a hollow tone.

Certainly Lansdale's 386-page book is no comprehensive record of the U.S. involvement in either the Philippines or Vietnam during this period. Neither are there any major historical revelations. What does emerge strongly is the personal philosophy and style of America's best-known "nation-builder" in Southeast Asia at a time when the nation-building concept was generally accepted and applauded. Anecdotes alternate with moralizations. Out of these, Lansdale appears as idealistic and courageous (he notes offhandedly that he was marked for assassination in both Manila and Saigon), a warmly sentimental man toward Asian friends, and a quick-study improviser and

2 MAR 1972

Thieu fires a general to help reelect Nixon

Daily World Combined Services

American B-52 heavy bombers yesterday made their heaviest attacks in two weeks against the northern provinces of South Vietnam. In Saigon, more evidence of political skulduggery emerged, in the case of a Saigon puppet general fired by puppet President Nguyen Van Thieu at the beginning of the week on the "recommendation" of U.S. adviser John Paul Vann.

Gen. Le Ngoc Trien, commander of the Saigon puppet 22nd Infantry Division, was relieved of his command on Monday by Thieu at what was described as a "high-level" military conference at Nha Trang, 190 miles northeast of Saigon.

Nha Trang was formerly U.S. Special Forces headquarters in South Vietnam and is also a center of U.S. Central Intelligence Agency operations. Vann, the U.S. adviser — not otherwise described — recommended that Gen. Trien be fired because he was suffering from "a case of nerves and can't hack it." Trien's forces are stationed in the Kontum-Pleiku region of the Central Highlands and the coastal province of Binh Dinh.

Tied to U.S. elections

What made the U.S.-inspired move by Thieu significant was that Thieu on Monday tied in the defense of the vital Central Highlands region to Nixon's reelection goal. Thieu asserted that "the Communists" would try to defeat Nixon by gaining military victories in the Central Highlands and thus disproving Nixon's "Vietnamization" scheme. The firing of Gen. Trien therefore is a move

within the context of U.S. domestic politics.

Thieu's remarks appeared on Tuesday in two Saigon newspapers: Tin Song, which is financed by his own private secretary, Hoang Duc Nha, and the newspaper Chinh Luan, which was described by United Press International as having a "special relationship" with the (Saigon puppet) presidential palace. Chinh Luan is also known to be in the good graces of the Saigon National Police.

Thieu declared, according to these papers, "1972 is the last year for the Communists to achieve final success. To help bring about Nixon's defeat, North Vietnamese must try to demonstrate the failure of Vietnamization by inflicting a crushing military defeat."

He asserted that the "Communist thrust" would be aimed at Gen. Trien's area, and thus Trien was being fired.

It was not until yesterday that U.S. newsmen dug up the fact that Thieu's action and the reasons behind it all originated with the U.S.

The Central Highlands region of South Vietnam has been a center of fierce struggle against the Japanese, the French colonialists, the Saigon puppets and their U.S. masters.

In the 1946-54 war against the French, the Central Highlands were regarded by the French command as a center of Viet Minh strength; among the French lower ranks, being posted to the Central Highlands was regarded as the equivalent of a death sentence.

In the 1954 Geneva discussions, the Vietnamese patriots argued that the Central Highlands should be included in the area under their control but agreed to the region temporarily being assigned to the French zone until scheduled elections were held in 1956. The elections were never held.

Heavy fighting was reported raging yesterday in the Central Highlands and the adjoining Binh inh coastal province. Seven separate B-52 air strikes were called in a single, 450-square-mile area in the region, while in other areas, U.S. fighter-bombers were called in to drop napalm and bombs around encircled Saigon puppet army units.

BELLINGHAM, WASH. Herald
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MAR 1 1972

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Morse warns students of executive supremacy

By HUNTLY GORDON
 Of The Bellingham Herald

Former U.S. Sen. Wayne Morse of Oregon told a Western Washington State College audience Tuesday, numbering no more than 100, that the nation is well on its way to "government by executive supremacy and secrecy."

Morse, one of the Senate's earliest doves, used the series of "presidential wars" as an example of presidents exceeding their constitutional authority.

"The President has no power to make war—that power is solely invested in the Congress," he said. He blamed the present situation on political cowards in Congress. He is currently a candidate for the U.S. Senate seat of Sen. Mark Hatfield.)

Back to Wilson

Tracing his premise of growing executive supremacy, he took it back to the time of President Woodrow Wilson. He said that if Wilson had used the constitutional provision of the advise and consent clause in advance of his peace measures, the world could have been different today.

He rapped Presidents John Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon for not sending up a war message seeking declaration of war in Vietnam. He said they didn't dare to seek a declaration of war because the action is "untenable and illegal."

He said "the mess we're in in Asia" began in 1953 with the Eisenhower military containment policy in Asia. The policy — to stop communism — was not constitutional, Morse said.

"Eisenhower didn't get his power from the Constitution, if he got it from God, he never released the text of the conversation," the Oregonian said.

Morse, considering himself a strict constitutionalist, said of constitutional law: "I didn't teach it all my life to walk out on it."

Morse retraced the years of his obstruction on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, during which he called the Eisenhower administration's top men "liars."

He accused then Secretary of State John Foster Dulles of sitting at the conference table in Geneva working out a peace for Indochina while secretly seeking alliances from Britain and France to perpetuate the war, and Eisenhower of "honeycombing" Vietnam with Central Intelligence Agency agents.

He criticized the U.S. action following the 1954 treaty, which created only one Vietnam.

Product of U.S.

"South Vietnam was the product of the U.S., set up in Saigon with a puppet ruler," he said. He also criticized the conversion of the 17th parallel from a military demarcation into a political demarcation.

He moved on to criticize the Formosa resolution of 1955, which, he said is now causing the nation embarrassment in its new relationship with China.

He rapped Kennedy's escalation of the Vietnam war, but added that shortly before his death, he had seen "his errors," and would have pulled out militarily had he lived. Morse said: "The Gulf of Tonkin resolution

he criticized because the entire incident had been falsified, he said. He said the ship which had been attacked wasn't 65 miles at sea and its mission had been spying.

He said because of the nature of the ship, the international doctrine of hot pursuit prevailed.

And secrecy, too

He criticized government secrecy which made the resolution possible and said: "If 5 per cent of the truth had been known, it would never have gotten out of committee."

Although he criticized Congress for failing to halt presidential power encroachment, he was just as tough on the courts. He said the Supreme Court has failed to take cases which examine presidential usurpation of constitutional power.

He said a free and open press is necessary to the proper conduct of government. He praised Daniel Ellsberg for exposing the Pentagon Papers and Jack Anderson for releasing classified documents so the people could really know what was going on.

"This afternoon, we're involved in a major war in Laos. There are American officers and mercenaries fighting an illegal war, which we continue to fight," he said.

Only with the secrecy stripped away from government can the Congress, let along the people, know what is going on.

GREENSBORO, N.C.

RECORD

MAR 1 1972

E - 33,470

Editor, The Record:

Because Americans so much want to believe their president and want to believe that what is happening in Indochina is all right and that our position is improving, if slowly, it is hard to keep the basic facts of the situation in full perspective. What are these facts?

1. In Cambodia most of the countryside is in the hands of revolutionaries of many types, including hard core communists and also followers of Prince Sihanouk. They are consolidating their positions and setting up an infrastructure so that when they take over the capital that they can set up an effective government and resist attacks. The Lon Nol regime is maintaining its precarious position on the basis of support from the U.S., by using mercenaries and foreign troops, and by training Cambodian soldiers in South Viet Nam under the C.I.A.

2. Our clients in Laos are also in a steadily worsening position.

The Royal Laotian Army is essentially moribund. The forces holding the communist Pathet Lao at bay are: a. Thai troops and the threat of further Thai commitments backed by the U.S., b. Meo tribesmen (an ethnic minority) under the pay, support and direction of the C.I.A., and c. U.S. air power. The Meo tribesmen have been worn down to using even nine year olds as soldiers. The communists now have sophisticated anti-aircraft defenses and, despite heavy air attacks, are making increasing use of artillery and tanks and thus overrunning government positions previously considered secure. Our bombing has depopulated much of northern Laos and caused intense hatred of remaining and displaced tribesmen.

3. In South Viet Nam the "new" army of Thieu and others has given up to sorties into Cambodia and other contested areas and has basically withdrawn behind a ring of American air power to take up defen-

sive positions around population areas. Thieu has still not established any significant popular support other than the landlords, and has had to use extreme measures to repress students, workers, Buddhists and Catholics some of whom still dream of setting up a genuinely neutral "third force" government and thus stopping the killing.

In sum, the military, political and economic situation in all three of our client nations is not good, is deteriorating, and is being sustained by massive American aid. This situation is not deteriorating so fast that it will embarrass Nixon before November. His reelection game plan just might work. But let's be clear just what is happening. We are prolonging the agony of millions of local peoples in Indochina, killing and maiming untold numbers in our "uninvolved" air war. We are still draining our treasury and killing our youth. We are continuing to damage our military morale. We are still dividing our own nation

in deep and long lasting ways. We are delaying return of American prisoners of war. We are deflecting national attention and energy from many severe domestic needs. We are prolonging the draft and all its attendant problems.

Is it worth all this just to get Nixon reelected? Can people really support a politician like Nixon who would place his own political future ahead of so many crucial national needs. The coming primaries in North Carolina will be a good indication of just how badly America wants to forget, to put out of mind, our national agony.

PATRICK W. CONOVER
Greensboro.

RICK GUDSTADT

STATINTL

Asia, CIA and dope: a big, happy family?

Not long ago the counter-culture's own superstar, Allen Ginsberg, appeared on the Dick Cavett Show. After first chanting a Hindu psalm for some two minutes (watch out, Dick, your ratings are slipping), Ginsberg began weaving an enchanting web of mystery, high intrigue and crash exploitation—a tale of the CIA's involvement in the heroin trade of Southeast Asia.

In a straight forward manner Ginsberg told of a cocktail party, a la radical chic, which he attended with the CIA's chief, Richard Helms. It seems the two made a friendly wager. Ginsberg accused the CIA of maintaining an open market for opium (from which heroin is derived) at Long Cheng, a CIA-built stronghold in Laos. Helms denied this, and so they made the bet. If Ginsberg lost, he was to turn over his Hindu scepter. If, however, Ginsberg's accusations were correct, Helms was to meditate every day for a year—a thought as frivolous as watching Richard Nixon turn on for a national television audience.

As Ginsberg was rapping this bit of people's folklore, he was all the time waving that very same Hindu scepter, as if he was exorcising the evil powers-that-be with a magic wand.

The rest of Ginsberg's story is history—past and future—as set out boldly in the May, 1971 issue of Ramparts.

Such an open market for opium, in the true capitalistic sense, does in fact exist at Long Cheng—with the open blessings of the powerful, clandestine CIA. This much has been told by as many as eight journalists who have managed to slip past the ultra-high security structure of Long Cheng, as the Far Eastern Economic Review reported last year.

Carl Strock, one of the reporters, gave an eye-witness account tells of "American crews loading T-28 bombers while armed CIA agents chatted with uniformed Thai soldiers and piles of raw opium stood for sale in the market (a kilo for \$52) . . ."

Where much, if not most, of this money earned from opium goes is towards the support of "friendly" capitalistic governments in Southeast Asia. For example, Newsweek has said that General Ouane, former chief of the Laotian general staff, was forced into a premature retirement due to excessive exposure of his role in the opium trade. General Ouane, who, the New York Times said, "has never denied allegations that he is in charge of the opium traffic in Laos," even confided to newsmen that supporting opium traffic is a "good thing." Not only does this occupation provide the Meo tribesmen with a livelihood, Newsweek reported Ouane as saying, but it keeps them from the control of the Communist Pathet Lao. It is by now common parlour talk that these same Meo tribesmen are equipped and instructed for warfare, in a most thorough manner, by the "freedom-loving" CIA.

Although not as clearly documented, there is a preponderance of evidence of dealings in opium traffic at the highest level of South Vietnam's government. In a broadcast reported by the N.Y. Times, NBC charged President Thieu and Vice President Ky with profiting from the drug traffic, and the Vietnamese police were accused of pushing illegal drugs (note the parallel with New York City). In that same broadcast NBC reported that the biggest pusher was said to be Thieu's closest adviser and special assistant for military and intelligence affairs, Lieut-Gen. Dang Van Quang. All NBC's charges were attributed to "extremely reliable sources."

So much for a mere spattering of the suspected truth. What all this suggests, incredible as it might seem, is that the United States government, directly or indirectly, is supporting a procedure which results in the heroin addiction of hundreds of thousands of American citizens.

We should all know that Nixon has proudly proclaimed a "most significant" deal with Turkey, a country which, according to Nixon, exports two-thirds of the world's heroin. This fact is somewhat contradicted, however, by a report by the UN Commission on Drugs and Narcotics. Referred to by both Ramparts and Ginsberg, this report stated that since 1966, 80% of the world's 1,200 tons of illicit opium comes not from Turkey, but from Southeast Asia.

Viet Prisoner-Rescue Unit to Be Disbanded

Fate of Secret Squad Parallels That of Other Clandestine Operations in S.E. Asia

BY GEORGE McARTHUR

Times Staff Writer

SAIGON—A secret command of American soldiers specially trained for prisoner rescue raids in hostile territory is scheduled to be disbanded some time this month.

According to an officer long involved in clandestine operations, the move will take from the U.S. command in South Vietnam its last cloak-and-dagger outfit specifically honed to fight its way in and out of prisoner camps.

(The secret unit being disbanded was trained for use in the jungles of South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia and not for such spectacular as the unsuccessful raid on Son Tay in North Vietnam in November, 1970.)

Scattered Around

Though there are plenty of toughly skilled Americans in South Vietnam to mount such raids if the chance arises, they are scattered among many units. There are also small outfits — like Navy seal teams—available for such things, but they are not specifically trained and kept in readiness for prisoner rescue grabs.

Consequently the stand-down of the secret prisoner rescue group has stirred heated words within the headquarters of U.S. Gen. Creighton W. Abrams.

Abrams, who has an ill-concealed suspicion of the value of elite units superimposed on the Army's regular structure, has reportedly resisted arguments to go lightly on the withdrawal of such outfits.

Since the prisoner rescue unit was formed after the big influx of American troops in 1965-66 it has not succeeded in res-

cuing a single American prisoner held by the Viet Cong, though it has helped snatch a small number of South Vietnamese captives from jungle camps.

The unit had a parallel mission of saving downed pilots in cases where ground commandos might be required in addition to the crews of Air Force rescue helicopters known as Jolly Green Giants. If any such operation was ever mounted it has not been revealed. Some officers hint, however, that some operations of this type took place.

Not Many Captives

One reason the unit has few successes to its credit is that it was used sparingly and under the strictest limitations. To avoid endangering the lives of any captives with "fishing expeditions," special raids were ordered only when intelligence turned up hard and immediate information on the location of Viet Cong POW camps. Thus, while the unit had few successes it could equally boast few failures in the sense of botched or sloppy efforts.

The number of American captives in Viet Cong camps is also very small. Casualty figures list 463 Americans missing in South Vietnam. The United States claims 78 of these were known from various sources to have been alive at the time of their capture and were consequently listed as war prisoners. Of these, however, only 20 have been acknowledged by Viet Cong propaganda broadcasts as prisoners.

The justification for the

special prisoner-rescue commando of a relative handful of men is therefore small in the face of the overall troop withdrawal demands—the U.S. force level is now 127,000 men and the current goal is 69,000 by May 1.

The withdrawal, however, underscores the unpublishable decline in all clandestine operations which has paralleled the pullout of regular troops.

CIA Cutback

This actually began about 1969 when the Central Intelligence Agency began to sharply trim its involvement in many programs. Part of this was caused by Abrams, who disliked having Army types under CIA command as was the case in several areas. At any rate, the CIA began to withdraw provincial agents from the Phoenix program—aimed at rooting out and killing Viet Cong "Phantom government" officials—and quit funding (and controlling) such programs as the training school at Vung Tau which turned out government Revolutionary Development cadre.

Though the CIA's tentacles still reach all the sensitive areas of control in South Vietnam, the emphasis now is less on "operational" areas and more on pure intelligence gathering.

Paralleling the CIA's appreciably lower silhouette, the Green Beret troopers of the 5th Special Forces Group were pulled out a year ago—their clandestine operations being absorbed by an outfit known as SOG—the Studies and Observations Group. SOG is a cloak-and-dagger grabbag at Abrams' headquarters, incorporating a dozen or so outfits which do everything from super-secret long-range patrols to analyzing documents and interrogating top-rank prisoners.

Less Visible

The operations of SOG are noticeably less visible today than they were a



few years ago when a subsidiary unit known as the B-57 Detachment precipitated what became known as the Green Beret case. That case — which involved the execution of a suspected double agent—blew the cover on how extensive clandestine operations had grown in South Vietnam. It also caused a number of heads to roll within the U.S. establishment and resulted in a general hunkering down of cloak-and-dagger types.

Military spokesmen say that a number of SOG personnel have been dribbling out for several months. Its future will probably be sharply diminished within the next several months when the troop withdrawal program enters its final phase.

Paralleling these declines in the "secret war" is the increased use of sensors and computers requiring fewer men in the field and more brainpower at headquarters.

Long-range patrols into Cambodia, Laos and even North Vietnam have been virtually eliminated by the seeding of the Ho Chi Minh Trail with electronic sensors. Much of the computerized analysis on the readouts from these sensors is now done from a secret Air Force establishment in Thailand and not in South Vietnam (though the results are still channeled into 7th Air Force headquarters at Tan Son Nhut where the air war continues to be run).

While clandestine operations on the ground have lessened, the Air Force has also cut the number of planes that were part of the "secret war." These planes were in conglomerate outfits known as special operations squadrons. They included everything from helicopters for dropping penetration agents to radio-packed executive jets equipped to pick up messages from agents deep in enemy land. The squadrons also



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18 FEB 1972

 *Editorials***Activities of Nixon's aides**

President Nixon's promise of a "generation of peace" should be considered in the context of the latest war moves from Washington. They include:

VIETNAM: The indefinite postponement of the Paris peace talks by Ambassador William Porter.

This follows on the jingoistic declamations by the former CIA agent at the meetings in the past couple of months, and his filthy slander of the Versailles conference last weekend.

VIETNAM: The prolonged and massive bombing of South Vietnam.

A new dimension has been added to the barbarous destruction of the land, its people, dwellings, means of livelihood. Hitherto, the air assaults have been carried out from Thailand and the three U.S. carriers in the Gulf of Tonkin. Beginning Monday, B-52s recently flown to Guam and based there have been assigned to the so-called "Limited duration" devastation program.

GREECE: Establishment of a U.S. naval base at Piraeus.

In return for U.S. support, the dictatorial junta has agreed that the U.S. establish a home port for the U.S. Sixth Fleet and for 10,000 Naval personnel and dependents, at the port for Athens.

SOVIET UNION: In preparation for the Defense Department's campaign to extract new billions from the Federal Treasury, Secretary Melvin Laird has pitched higher the Administration's hysterical warnings of Soviet peril and has demanded billions for new weapons, including a one-billion-dollar appropriation for a new advanced missile submarine.

These and other manifestations of the glaring contradiction between Nixon's words and his government's deeds have moved the Senate to enact —

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GOP Parley To Be Peaceful, Spock Says Here

By SHERLEY UHL
Press Politics Editor

There may be more activity on the outside than on the inside at the Republican National Convention in August, but any demonstrations will be peaceful, Dr. Benjamin Spock predicted here today.

The widely recognized pediatrician, running for the presidency on the People's Party ticket, said anticipated protests in San Diego are "well along in planning."

Permits Sought

He said youth groups even now are negotiating with officials there for permits and other arrangements necessary to conduct "nonviolent" demonstrations at the convention.

"It won't be a civil disobedience type of thing," he explained. Instead, he insisted, it will be an orderly attempt to "keep the pressure on" in demands for troop withdrawals and peace.

Spock said he is not aware of what might occur at the Democratic convention in Miami Beach, but he described the 1968 demonstrations in Chicago as "infinitely worthwhile."

"They radicalized tens of millions of young people," said Spock. "It was brutal . . . America will never be the same."

Spock, one of the godfathers of the youth protest movement, was in Pittsburgh to rustle up not only interest in his candidacy, but also signatures on petitions, required to put his name on the ballot.

March 8 Deadline

The Peoples Party needs 36,000 signatures by March 8, and, said Spock, it probably will be necessary to collect 65,000 to overcome all challenges.

At a news conference, he outlined his platform, including an immediate halt in



DR. BENJAMIN SPOCK
Won't be "intimidated."

withdrawal of "troops, mercenary and paramilitary (Central Intelligence Agency) forces."

He also would withhold economic support from the Thieu government.

Spock contended it was "outrageous" for presidential assistant H. R. Haldeman and others to impute treasonous motives to war critics.

"The American people voted for his (Haldeman's) boss because Nixon promised a quick end to the war in Vietnam," said Spock. "I hope American people won't be intimidated by that kind of rubbish."

In response to questions, Spock said he is dedicated to the U. S. and, "It's our government that is lousing up our relations with other nations."

He speaks at 8 p. m. today at Lawrence Hall, Point Park College, downtown, and later will attend a beer fest at Peoples Party headquarters in Oakland.

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U.S. Diplomats in Vietnam Said to Face Moral Issue

By BENJAMIN WELLES
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 29—Assignments to Vietnam—particularly to the pacification programs there—have caused many young career diplomats to face a serious “moral dilemma,” according to an article in the December issue of the Foreign Service Journal.

The critical question, the article says, is how far they should go in exposing incidents “which they knew to be wrong.”

One Foreign Service officer, now back from Vietnam and on his way to another overseas assignment, is reported by the article to possess a file of “documented atrocities, including photographs.”

“He has written extensive reports on these apparent war crimes he investigated in Vietnam,” the article states. “As far as he knows, no action has ever been taken to punish the guilty,” it says.

The article, which is entitled “Vietnamization of the Foreign Service,” goes on to say that the owner of the file will not make his information public because he is a “supporter of the President’s Vietnam policy and fears the effect on that policy of additional war crime controversy.”

He is also “aware of the negative result disclosure would have on his career prospects,” the article states.

Press Reports Cited

State Department sources said that the alleged atrocities were investigated by the department and were also reported in the United States press on Jan. 12, 1970. They are said to have concerned the South Korean “Tiger” Division, one of two South Korean infantry divisions serving in Vietnam, and not United States forces.

A State Department spokesman said that “implications in the article that United States forces were involved or that there was a cover-up by the State Department are just plain inaccurate and misleading.”

A Pentagon spokesman said that officers in its Southeast Asian section had not been able to obtain the details of the Foreign Service Journal and thus could not comment.

“When we’re given the facts,” a Pentagon spokesman said, “we always look into atrocity charges.”

The magazine article is signed with the name “John Claymore,” a pseudonym, the journal explains, for a former diplomat who served in Vietnam and whose primary reason for subsequently resigning from the Foreign Service was “disagreement with United States policy on Southeast Asia.”

Congressional and diplomatic sources have identified the author as John D. Marks, who served in the pacification program in Vietnam from 1966 to 1968 and later resigned to become a foreign policy consultant to Congress. Mr. Marks has confirmed his authorship.

The Foreign Service Journal has a circulation of approximately 10,000 copies throughout the executive branch and in Congress. It is published monthly by the American Foreign Service Association, a voluntary group comprising approximately 8,000 active and retired Foreign Service personnel.

The article notes that nearly 3 million Americans have now served in Vietnam, including career diplomats, or approximately 20 per cent of the Foreign Service.

Approximately 350 — the great majority of them junior officers—have been assigned to the pacification program, known as Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support, or CORDS. They have functioned as advisers to the South Vietnamese civilian and military administration — trying, the article says, to make the Government of South Vietnam “a viable force in the countryside.”

Generation Gap ‘Sharpened’

Service in Vietnam, the article says, is a unique experience. In no other country have perhaps 20 per cent of the foreign service officers experimented with soft drugs, but “that is the case in Vietnam,” it asserts.

“And in no other country,” it adds, “do foreign service officers have their own personal training in how to life a grenade-launcher before they go.”

The article says that the Vietnam experience has “sharpened the generation gap” between young and older diplomats. The younger officers, it says, often returned disillusioned with what they regard as deliberate suppression by senior officers of criticism either of the Vietnamese authorities or of the United States military.

The political section of the huge United States Embassy in Saigon is especially subject to criticism on these grounds, the article asserts.

“Almost all foreign service officers who served in the pacification programs and most junior members of the embassy staff itself give examples of how their reporting was distorted and suppressed in Saigon in order that the embassy might be consistent with the prevailing ‘line’ in dispatches to Washington,” the writer declares.

Combat Experience

“Statistics they knew to be merely worthless were constantly being quoted by the President of the United States as an indication that progress was being made in Vietnam,” it says.

Other points made in the article included these:

While there was no clear State Department policy, most Foreign Service officers in the field were expected to bear arms. Many participated in combat operations and even called in air strikes or artillery fire on enemy positions;

The State Department decided during President Lyndon B. Johnson’s second term that it must contribute 150 diplomats to the approximately 1,000 United States personnel—military as well as aid, intelligence and other civilians—in the CORDS program. Its policy of making duty in the pacification program mandatory for junior officers split the Foreign Service until it was scrapped last August. Now as the United States presence in Vietnam is reduced, only volunteers who have previously served in at least one other diplomatic post are being sent.

A few Foreign Service officers have resigned as a result of disagreement with the Vietnam war, but “they are definitely the exception and in each known case they have been very junior officers.”

The article maintains that, despite the recruiting Foreign Service per-

sonnel for Vietnam, “the majority enjoy the experience once they go.”

Living conditions often are pleasant and, the article says, they find “the country and especially the women fascinating.”

When these officers are assigned elsewhere, it states, “the return to a more traditional Foreign Service assignment is often a letdown.”

STATINTL

John S. Knight's Notebook

NBC Hindsight Is 20-20 On Folly Of Vietnam

WITH THE PASSING of another Christmas, joyous for some and not so happy for others, my thoughts turn to our prisoners of war in Vietnam and the cumulative casualty lists since the beginning of our folly in that tragic land.

Since 1961, 45,626 of our youth have died and another 302,367 are listed as wounded in a jungle war fought for unattainable and mistaken objectives.

The cruel drama of this repulsive war, together with the fateful decisions taken during the Kennedy administration, has never been more vividly portrayed than in NBC's "Vietnam Hindsight," a remarkable two-part documentary which stripped away all of the noble self-serving rhetoric and bared the bones of an unspeakable tragedy.

First With Diem

IN THE Eisenhower administration, several hundred U.S. advisers were in South Vietnam to assist Ngo Dinh Diem, the first provisional president who was afterward reelected in 1961.

President Diem was an extraordinarily strong ruler and a despot in deed and fact. Eisenhower promised Diem financial aid and military training for Diem's Army, provided South Vietnam's ruler made a number of indicated reforms. Sadly, no reforms were ever made.

In the United States, Diem had the strong support of Joseph P. Kennedy, patriarch of the family, the late Cardinal Francis Spellman together with organizations of Americans determined to "stop communism" in Southeast Asia.

Later, Vice President Lyndon Johnson was to call Diem "the Winston Churchill of Southeast Asia."

Pressures Grew

FOLLOWING John F. Kennedy's election in 1960, the pressures for U.S. intervention became greater. By 1963, we had 16,000 troops in South Vietnam and were facing some very difficult decisions indeed.

Jack Kennedy was a sorely troubled man as he contemplated his earlier statements that the struggle in Asia was not worth the life of a single American, and the growing awareness that the United States had become precariously involved.

His chief concerns arose from Diem's absolutism, rumors of a planned coup against Diem and the chilling news that Saigon was losing the war.

Within the White House, Kennedy advisers were divided on how to proceed. After many fact finding missions to South Vietnam and long consultations with Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, a reluctant and tormented Kennedy decided that Diem must go.

Bloody Plot

THE CIA'S principal agent in Saigon had been in close contact with Maj. Gen. Duong Van Minh, leader of the plot against Diem. He informed "Big Minh" that the signals were green and on the first days of November, 1963, the Diem regime was overthrown.

Although President Diem and his brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, had been offered safe conduct by Ambassador Lodge, Gen. Minh, by a vote of the conspirators, ordered their assassination. A third brother, Ngo Dinh Can, was also executed on May 9.

Their blood was on our hands. In effect and by not opposing the coup, the White House had decreed their fate.

Within three weeks of President Diem's murder, John F. Kennedy — 35th President of the United States — was shot and fatally wounded by an assassin as he rode in a motorcade in downtown Dallas.

Bad Judgments

THE NBC documentary further reveals in stark detail the appalling degree of confusion and mistaken judgments which led to Lyndon Johnson's escalation of the war in 1965.

Cabot Lodge is shown to have been a man rigidly inclined to imperious dictums. Defense Secretary McNamara was fighting a war with computers and

STATINTL

A Canadian Perspective Amnesty When?

Toronto

At his November 12 press conference, Mr. Nixon was asked if, once the war was ended, he would grant amnesty to young American men who went abroad to avoid the military draft. He was obviously unprepared for the question. He had no circumlocutions or rhetoric at hand. He replied, "No."

There are approximately 50,000 American war resisters in Canada, most of them "guilty" of breach of Selective Service or military law. They have been flowing across the border in a steady stream since the mid-sixties. Canada has granted those who qualify by education, skills, job offers, etc., "landed immigrant status" leading to citizenship. No question may be asked concerning their draft or military status in the process of "landing." Once landed, they are not extraditable by Canadian-US treaty. They have not committed an offence punishable within Canada.

They are a mixed lot. Some are educated, reflective young men who after attending Vietnam war sit-ins, rapping with their political science professors, and hassling the Selective Service system as long as possible, have come to Canada prepared and have assimilated quickly. Others, less privileged, poorly educated, who got caught up in military service and who split for Canada impulsively when on order to Vietnam, have naturally had greater difficulty in adapting.

What the articulate among them are saying goes something like this: "Amnesty is not our problem; it is the problem of guilt-ridden American liberals. We have done nothing for which we need to accept forgiveness. In a choice between being criminals in Southeast Asia, being treated as criminals in American prisons and stockades, and a new life in Canada—we chose Canada. The land of the free and the home of the brave has killed, crippled, jailed and exiled thousands of its young. Those Americans who find this fact hard to live with will try to make partial amends by amnesty or 'second chance' legislation. The likelihood of their succeeding in time to benefit any appreciable number is negligible. If and when amnesty comes, we shall be launched on Canadian careers, have Canadian wives, and Canadian children. Amnesty will mean being able to take the kids to visit their grandmother, instead of her having to visit them here. Americans in Canada with their heads screwed on right are not making any decisions concerning their future based on talk of amnesty."

Rather than amnesty, war resisters in Canada prefer to focus upon what they call "repatriation." Repatriation is the right to return to the United States without any recrimination for breach of Selective Service or military law. It is amnesty with the indignity of ac-

cepting forgiveness removed. Discussion of repatriation among expatriates is usually in the context of the realities of the ongoing war. All they see happening is a change in the color of skin among some of the ground troops. American boys are being returned in time and in sufficient numbers to affect the '72 election, while the horror continues unabated. Those who took a stand against the war and chose exile are saying that when the war ends completely— all troops, planes, advisors and CIA agents withdrawn— then and only then, the right of exiles to return may be considered along with other matters— US war guilt, release of political prisoners, reparation to the peoples of Indo-China. Repatriation is not thought of exclusively in terms of the return of exiles. The word is used to include the release of prisoners and the surfacing of those who have gone underground.

If the reaction of exiles is negative to amnesty proposals implying their guilt, imagine their feelings about proposals which link them with war planners and criminals. There are suggestions abroad which call for amnesty for all war-related offences— for the Lt. Calleys as well as draft and military offenders. As a Women's Strike for Peace newsletter recently expressed it, "This would solve the problem of war guilt by sweeping everyone under the rug together— those who refused to kill along with those who killed indiscriminately. Then we could forget the past and march on united to even greater national glory."

The ideal of repatriation which the exiles hold up as just will never be realized. The US is not going to confess criminality, stage its own Nuremberg trial, and acknowledge the right of unqualified restitution to those who broke its laws resisting this war. The US may grant amnesty when it is politically expedient to do so, and when it can pass it off as a gesture of magnanimity and strength. That is what Senator Robert Taft, Jr. seems to have in mind, when he proposes amnesty for these "however misguided" young men who "are entitled to a second chance."

When will this be? Perhaps when the political fight to renew Selective Service legislation the next time around does not seem worth the effort. 1974? A gesture of largeness of heart in the bicentennial year of 1976? In the meantime, young Americans in Canada are not holding their breath. Nor are they, in the nice phrase of one Vietnam veteran and deserter, "standing here at the border crying."

Robert Gardner

MR. GARDNER has been travelling across Canada this year, visiting, helping, interpreting young American exiles. He is the coordinator of the ministry to US draft age immigrants, sponsored by the Canadian Council of Churches.

8 DEC 1971

A documentary that really turns back time

By JUDY BACHRACH

"It is in the interest of the U.S. government that the coup shall succeed."

Cable from John F. Kennedy to Henry Cabot Lodge.

Well, last night gave us part II of the illustrated Pentagon Papers, otherwise known as Hindsight. And if anything, NBC's second episode was more fascinating than the first.


Yesterday's segment dealt with the events, the decisions, and the non-decisions that led up to the death of Diem. It focused less heavily on early Sixties footage than did the previous segment, preferring to concentrate almost exclusively on testimony from men who were then involved in our complicity to overthrow a government that had turned against us. And according to the show, our complicity was well nigh wholehearted by the time the coup of the generals took place.

Chief among the subjects was Lt. Col. Lucien Conein, a key CIA agent in Vietnam who now claims that as early as August, 1963, he was given orders not to thwart a possible coup of the Diem regime. It's hard to remember when there has been a more avid testifier than Colonel Conein, or one more anxious to relay contemporary history as he knew it and lived it.

It was embarrassing

In 1963, the United States was growing increasingly dissatisfied with Diem. He was getting repressive, he instituted martial law, Buddhist monks were immolating themselves, it was embarrassing.

Also, Diem was starting to make deals with North Vietnam, and this was more than a little distressing to our government. "His brother told me" said Colonel Conein, "that [Diem] was dealing with the



HANS CONREID

people of North Vietnam. So the generals knew this too. And they considered this a danger, because what were they fighting for if he negotiated behind their back?"

What indeed? Diem wanted above everything else to reunify his country. Mr. Kennedy and his advisors were appalled at the idea of supporting a man who would sell them down the river. But the first coup was never pulled off. Robert Kennedy wanted to get out of Vietnam totally and some advisers concurred that withdrawal would be preferable to supporting Diem. Only Robert S. McNamara wanted to delve a little deeper into the situation, and tripped off on a visit to Vietnam. According to Roger Hilsman, President Kennedy let him because he wanted to avoid divisiveness among his cabinet.

From that time on, however, it became too late to remove ourselves entirely from a situation that even the President

was having second thoughts about. We had 16,000 men in Vietnam; we had Henry Cabot Lodge, who seemed anxious to stay. And, as the program implied, by that time there were only two alternatives: to reform Diem or to overthrow Diem. We withdrew our aid to Diem. As George Ball said, this was a hint to the rebellious generals "to go ahead and try another government . . . This was inevitable."

It became too late

Watching last night's show, one was almost completely unaware that it was a documentary. And that's probably the highest compliment you can pay any documentary. If this year's economy has resulted in a paucity of news specials, and the political pressures in an even greater paucity of good news specials, Hindsight more than made up for the deficiency.

—0—

It's exceedingly difficult to speak about the unspeakable. WBAL-TV aired a children's special (translate "cartoon") last night. Very likely the crudest animation I have seen in a long time; clumsy drawings, insipid story line, and a few sad voices, the most notable of which belonged to Hans Conreid. There's nothing like hearing those prophetic words "Wait till the Messiah comes. He'll fix those guys," to make you doubt your sanity. And if I see one more dog who woofs on command, I'm notifying the city pound.

22 DEC 1971

NBC Claims Diem Death Inside Story

Seventeen generals and colonels of the South Vietnamese army voted unanimously to kill President Ngo Dinh Diem in 1963, and were not particularly discouraged by a high-ranking U.S. CIA official, an NBC report scheduled to be telecast tonight discloses.

The report is Part 2 of "An NBC News White Paper: Vietnam Hindsight," and deals with the origins of America's involvement in that Southeast Asia country.

The report presents the first supposed inside account of Diem's assassination, disguised as a political coup, and includes statements by Alvin Davis, associate producer of the program, and Lt. Col. Lucien Conein, the key CIA man in South Vietnam during the time of the coup.

It is "quite inconceivable" to Conein that Gen. Maxwell Taylor and others were not aware of the timing of the coup, Conein says on the program, which depicts Diem's death as a Diem maneuver that backfired.

The decision to kill Diem is reported to have developed over a series of eight meetings and arguments, and, finally, a vote. Three who would have voted to save Diem were assassinated before the vote was taken. Four others, including the present Prime Minister, Khiem, were deliberately excluded from the vote.

Many among the 17, however, wanted him killed from the start, and the only overheard phrase spoken in French rather than in Vietnamese was by Big Minh, might-have-been presidential contender in the October, 1971, election, who said, "The pig must be killed."

After that, the vote went like this: Big Minh, kill; Gen. Don, kill; Gen. Xuan, kill. Col. Nghia, kill. At the end there was total unanimity, and a vow of silence was taken. The silence is to be broken tonight, Davis says.

Diem had asked for full honors, and a "graceful" exit from Vietnam to exile in another country, but refused to ask Big Minh—who in turn was furious at the slight.

Between 6 and 9 p.m. Nov. 2, the day of Diem's death, he refused again to speak to Minh, then finally spoke to him on the telephone, but Minh, outraged, hung up. On the third try, Diem gave in, asking only for safe conduct.

At this point Col. Conein said he was told by Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge not to instigate, encourage or discourage a coup, which was in the planning stages throughout October, 1963. But Diem, Conein said, had his own plans for a phony coup, after which he and his family would be brought in honors, by popular acclaim, back to Saigon from their place of exile, Pleiku.

What happened, apparently, is that both the phony coup and the real one came off at the same time, fooling Diem and his brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu.

Conein, in an attempt to get Diem out of the country, says he asked his embassy for a plane, but was told that he would have to wait 24 hours for it.

"I spoke for the U.S. government and I was authorized, and I informed the junta (Diem's organization) that I had an aircraft, but it would take me 24 hours to have that aircraft on the ground."

"Instead?" Davis asked.

"Instead, he was shot by a major in the Vietnamese army," Conein says on the telecast.

STATINTL

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*world in revolution**ASIA***VIETNAM-CAMBODIA**

President Nixon was busy stepping up the war last week, sending Asian client troops into battle on three fronts. Inside Cambodia about 20,000 Phnom Penh troops were thoroughly defeated; on the Cambodia-Vietnam border some 25,000 Saigon soldiers couldn't find the "enemy" alleged to be operating there; and in South Vietnam some 15,000 Saigon troops were sent into the Central Highlands on Nov. 27. Reports of the drive were not published until several days after it occurred and a week afterward there was still no word on its results. (Under new press rules put into effect Nov. 30 in Saigon, no news of the war may be published unless it is released by high U.S.-Saigon officials or their spokesmen.) . . . American pilots reported last week that for the first time since 1965, North Vietnamese MIG fighter planes fired air-to-air missiles at U.S. B-52 bombers. The pilots' report—not confirmed by

GI TOLL: 359,467

The following casualty figures for Indochina are based on U.S. government statistics. They are lower than U.S. casualties reported by the liberation forces. Figures are from Jan. 1, 1961 to Nov. 27, 1971. Figures in parentheses are for the week Nov. 20 to Nov. 27. Killed: 45,613 (9); "Non-combat" deaths: 9,954 (7); Wounded: 302,283 (78); Missing, captured: 1617.

the U.S. command—said North Vietnamese Russian- and Chinese-built MIGs had made about 10 passes in the last two weeks at U.S. bombers flying over Laos. Said a senior pilot in Saigon in an interview with the New York Times, "I'd say the MIGs represent a serious new threat, not a potential threat but a real one." . . . With Indochinese doing all the fighting, U.S. troop withdrawals are continuing. By Nov. 30 there were 182,400 GIs in Southeast Asia. The last of the Navy's "Seals" are also leaving Vietnam. The operations of this special unit were stopped, according to the Times, "because some members

of the commando teams in the field have become afraid their activities might bring down on them the kind of prosecution that convicted Lt. William Calley in the massacre of civilians at Mylai." The "Seals' " work included support of the CIA's infamous "Phoenix" program. A sign posted by the "Seals" at one of their bases on the Mekong Delta said: "People who kill for money are professionals. People who kill for fun are sadists. People who kill for money and fun are Seals." . . . At a meeting of the China-Cambodia Friendship Association in Peking Nov. 9, 18th anniversary of the independence of the Kingdom of Cambodia, a report on the excellent battle situation and high morale of the liberation forces was made by Ieng Sary, special envoy of the Cambodian government in exile. He said, "Under the leadership of the National United Front of Cambodia, . . . our people are determined to unite on a wide scale, wage resolute struggle, overcome all difficulties and hardships, win more and greater victories, make no compromise or retreat, wipe out the enemy, smash the enemy's espionage activities and psychological warfare and defend the liberated areas. Imbued with firm revolutionary optimism, the Cambodian people and the people's armed forces of national liberation are confident of the inevitable defeat of U.S. imperialism and its running dogs, the Lon Nol-Sirik Matak-Son Ngoc Thanh traitorous clique."

U.S. Plan Fails to Wipe Out VC Cadre

By Peter Osnos

Washington Post Foreign Service

SAIGON, Dec. 13 — The Phoenix program, devised four years ago by the CIA as the way to wipe out the Vietcong's political infrastructure, remains today one of the most notable failures of the war.

This is the view expressed by many senior members of the U.S. establishment here, sometimes in the boldest possible terms. "It's a lousy failure," one top-echelon American said loudly at a reception the other night.

Despite the recognized importance to the Saigon government's future of eliminating the Vietcong's clandestine political apparatus, it is apparently no longer considered an achievable goal.

The Vietcong infrastructure consists of enemy agents responsible for recruiting, collecting taxes, spreading propaganda, infiltrating legitimate groups and generally undermining government influence. The cadre of about 70,000 called VCIs are homegrown and deeply rooted.

This summer the U.S. and South Vietnamese officials decided to offer bounties as high as \$11,000 for high-ranking VCIs. The plan was never carried out, sources said, because it was realized that it wouldn't work.

"The Vietnamese are never going to turn their own people in," said an American with many years of experience in Vietnam, "and they certainly won't take sides politically until the outcome of the war is absolutely clear."

"Survival (in South Vietnam) has often meant and largely still means sitting on the fence," explained one young official.

Advisers Withdrawn

For some months now, American military advisers to the program have been gradually withdrawn, officially as part of the overall phaseout. A small complement of men from the Central Intelligence Agency will remain.

But considering the importance attached to Phoenix as recently as a year ago and the fact that only a few hundred Americans were involved even at the peak, the pullout at this stage is seen by many observers as an admission that there is simply very little more that can be done.

"The military didn't know how to advise the program and the Vietnamese didn't want to learn," said an American civilian who has watched Phoenix closely.

Official Vietnamization figures show that about 20,000 agents are "neutralized" (killed, captured or rallied to the government side) each year. But Americans acknowledge that practically all of this probably inflated figure were low-level village and hamlet operatives and the basic leadership still remains.

A very small percentage of even these are killed or captured because Phoenix intelligence ferreted them out. What usually happens is that persons rounded up in routine military operations are subsequently listed as VCIs.

"Statistics show that for every one neutralization of a previously identified VCI we are neutralizing four that were not previously identified," the senior American adviser in Binhduong Province wrote recently.

Phoenix (known properly by its Vietnamese name Phuong Hoang — all-seeing bird) has been in trouble from the start. It was drawn up by the CIA as a "systematic effort at intelligence coordination and exploitation"

— a way to prevent clumsy overlap. It was turned over to the Vietnamese in 1968.

Agents were to be identified, apprehended and punished by local authorities.

War critics in the United States promptly attacked Phoenix as a counterterror organization, utilizing assassination and torture as its principal tools. Periodically, abuses.

These reports, along with the cloak and dagger aura of CIA involvement and specially trained and paid Vietnamese agents known as PRU (provincial reconnaissance units), gave the program a sinister reputation that overshadowed its continuing inability to accomplish the job it had been assigned.

"The most important thing about Phoenix," one official commented early in 1970, "is that it is not working."

Reason For Trouble

One reason frequently offered for Phoenix's troubles is that it involves an extraordinarily complex meshing of information and personnel from any number of Vietnamese military, paramilitary and civilian groups. Leadership is nominally vested in the national police and its elite special branch. In fact, the military often predominates. The interest and personality of the province chiefs and their principal aides are also instrumental.

Information is gleaned from a variety of sources, including armed sources, gauda teams, revolutionary development cadre and plain villagers. The data is collected and maintained at district and province intelligence and interrogation centers.

Raids are entrusted to the PRU, the CIA-sponsored squads who are the action arm of Phoenix. Sometimes militia units and the police are also involved. American helicopters are used frequently to ferry the PRU.

'Undisciplined Country'

In cases where wanted VCIs are apprehended, trials are conducted by provincial security councils, made up of the province chief, various police and military officials and whom ever the province chief selects.

In practice, all this turns out to be a haphazard business. Among other things, frequently bribe their way out,

province and police officials misuse their authority to settle grievances and innocent people are jailed or worse.

In Angiang, the country's most pacified province, a man was recently truncheoned to death before it was discovered that he had been picked up by mistake. The killer was an enlisted man in the militia assigned to the local intelligence unit.

The case was reported in the Vietnamese press and informed U.S. sources said a sergeant had acted on his own without authority and would be tried later.

How many of these incidents go undiscovered is anybody's guess. "This is an undisciplined country at war," said a high-ranking U.S. pacification official, "and Phoenix is about what you'd have to expect."

MIAMI, FLA.

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**Jack Kofoed Says**

Is the Secretive CIA Worth the Expense?

The Central Intelligence Agency has laid off 5,000 spies, and only 134,000 employes are left on the payroll. Nobody knows how much the CIA costs us, because it doesn't have to account publicly for its spending. The expenditures run into billions.

The spies, who managed to keep their methods secret for years, haven't been successful at that recently. It has been disclosed in Vietnam that torture is one of their gimmicks for obtaining information from close-mouthed people. They've ordered murder, as in the case of a double-crossing agent in Vietnam. The CIA apparently is answerable to no one, which makes it the most dangerous government agency the United States has ever known.

The intelligence beagles haven't been as successful as they'd have us believe. Pearl Harbor should have been anticipated. Douglas MacArthur scoffed at Chinese intervention in Korea two days before the Reds moved in. His G2 should not be saddled with all the blame, for the male Mata Haris of the CIA

were supposed to know.

And, what about the Bay of Pigs? There was a perfectly fouled up job, based on completely unreliable intelligence. We don't seem to be getting adequate information for the billions we're spending.

STATINTL

After the Pentagon Papers— A Month in the New Life Of Daniel Ellsberg

By J. ANTHONY LUKAS

September 22

NORMAN MAILER and Rip Torn flounder together in the island grass, Mailer bleeding from his hammered head, Torn's ear half bitten off. They rise and exchange maledictions:

Mailer: Kiss off!

Torn: Walk on!

Mailer: Kiss off!

Torn: I'll leave the kissing to you!

The lights come up. The preview audience at the Whitney Museum moves disbelievingly toward the outer gallery where cocktails and canapés await them among Edward Hopper's melancholy seascapes. I spot José Torres, Buzz Farber, Mailer himself and then, suddenly, Daniel Ellsberg and his wife, Patricia. We wave and shrug our shoulders. Only a few days before, the Ellsbergs had agreed to let me trail them about for a few weeks; but I'm not scheduled to start until the following day.

I ask Ellsberg what he thought of the film, Mailer's "Maidstone." He says he was struck most by the two-page mimeographed prospectus handed out at the door which said "Maidstone" was created out of "a deep and revolutionary conviction" that a film must probe "the mystery of life, in all of its fathomless complexity." Ellsberg says it read like "all those prospectuses, the Government prepared for the pacification program in Vietnam—how they were going to win the minds and hearts of the Vietnamese people. This time it's the minds and hearts of the audience. The guys in Vietnam never realized

J. ANTHONY LUKAS, a staff writer for The Times Magazine, is the author of "Don't Shoot—We Are Your Children!"

how badly they failed. Do you think Mailer realizes how he failed?"

Abruptly, he's off on a different tack, his blue-gray eyes snapping electrically. An enthusiastic amateur photographer, he's intrigued by the *cinéma vérité* technique in the film.

"All through it, I heard him saying, 'If Mailer can do it, anybody can do it.' Maybe I should make a film."

September 23

AS prearranged I reach the Ellsbergs' 14th-floor apartment on Sutton Place South at 1:15 P.M., in time for us to dash to the airport and catch the 2 P.M. shuttle to Washington where Dan is scheduled to receive the "Federal Employee of the Year" award that night from the Federal Employees for Peace.

But I find him far from ready to leave. He has mislaid a spiral notebook containing his notes for that evening's speech. For 15 minutes, he ransacks briefcases, bookshelves and a desk piled high with notes and documents for the book he is doing for Simon and Schuster. "This is terrible. I know I had it with me when I went to see the lawyer yesterday." But no luck. We're going to miss our plane, so I phone for reservations on a 2:30 flight. (I'm reminded of the afternoon I phoned to broach the proposal for a magazine piece. Ellsberg said he had to catch a train and couldn't talk long, but he talked nearly 10 minutes. Then he called an hour later to say, "We missed the train. You might as well come over now.")

We are to be joined on the trip by Peter Schrag of the Saturday Review who has been interviewing Dan that morning. While Ellsberg continues his hunt, Schrag and I admire the apartment, actually Patricia's bachelor digs (she is the daughter of Louis Marx, the millionaire toy manufacturer). The Ellsbergs, who now live in Cambridge, have kept it as a New York *pied à terre* and refuge for Patricia in case Dan goes to jail after his trial next spring for unlawful possession and use of the Pentagon Papers. Meanwhile, it's quite a *pied à terre*. Three large windows present a spectacular view of the East River. The décor is expensively modern. Two deep brown leather couches confront each other across a silver lamp arched halfway across the room. On a

dining table near the windows, a French maid has now set lunch: Melon, chicken, tomatoes, ginger ale. But we barely have time to munch some chicken before rushing to the airport.

IN the taxi, Ellsberg betrays some disappointment about this evening's event. Leaders of the Federal Employees for Peace report difficulties in rounding up an audience. Most Government agencies have refused to let them post notices on their bulletin boards. "It's too bad," he says. "I'd hoped they could use my appearance to do some real recruiting—particularly at State, Defense and the C.I.A. I wanted to see posters with my picture on them all over the Pentagon: 'Come hear Dan Ellsberg speak for peace.'"

About half an hour before the banquet is due to begin, we enter the ballroom of La Gemma, a catering hotel four blocks from the White House. Ellsberg learns to his delight that the evening is a sellout, more than a thousand people are expected. Now, he's a little worried because he never found his notebook and still hasn't written his speech.

"Couldn't I just find a little room here where I could eat alone and write?" he asks.

"Oh no," says Susan Strauss, one of the evening's organizers. "All these people want to watch you eat."

At 8, the ballroom is packed with lawyers from the Justice Department, desk officers from State, tax men from Internal Revenue and squads of fluttery secretaries. When Ellsberg walks onto the rostrum they give him a standing ovation.

I find myself sitting next to Richard Strout of The Christian Science Monitor (who is the New Republic's T.R.B.). Strout tells me that back in July he got a phone call from

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
NBC Promises New Information in Viet Nam 'Hindsight' Specials

STATINTL

"To emphasize the point that we are not seeking to find villains and assess blame, as there is blame enough for everyone, the title was changed to "An NBC News White Paper: Viet Nam Hindsight."

Thus did Reuven Frank, president of NBC News, announce that a documentary originally entitled "The Death of Diem: An NBC News White Paper on John F. Kennedy and the Viet Nam War" would be expanded and the emphasis changed.

In an earlier announcement, the network described the documentary as "television's first attempt to document the decision-making process that led to the nation's deepening involvement in the Viet Nam war during the Kennedy administration."



Ngo Dinh Diem

The broadcast, which was to be an hour long and cover the period 1961 to 1963, has now been expanded to two hours. The first hour, entitled "How It Began," will be seen at 7:30 p. m. Dec. 21, and the second, "The Death of Diem," will be seen at 9 p. m. Dec. 22.

Transcripts of the two programs will not be released until just prior to broadcast, but it is said that key figures in the decision-making process will appear with their recollections.

Producer Fred Freed is said to have obtained new information on the assassinations of President Ngo Dinh Diem and his brother, Nhu, and the role played by United States intelligence officers.

"As the material developed not only in volume but in scope," said Frank, "those of us who watched it come in were struck by its importance and powerful narrative thrust. New material was coming out about a time of unique significance in recent American history and new insights about information eight, nine, and 10 years old that was ignored or at least underestimated at the time."

"Perhaps the most interesting insight," Frank continued, "was that after President Diem and his brother died in the coup, Viet Nam and all related problems were in the forefront of American attention. Until then such problems as Berlin, the Cuban missile crisis, and even Laos were considered more important."

Some 20 officials involved in Viet Nam war strategy have been interviewed by NBC News. Among the participants are Gen. Maxwell Taylor, the President's military adviser and later chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Gen. Ten That Dinh, who commanded troops in the Saigon area at the time of the coup; Rufus Phillips, who directed the strategic hamlets program in the Delta area of Viet Nam and ran U. S. aid missions; Frederick Nolting, ambassador to the Saigon government until August, 1963, when he was replaced by Henry Cabot Lodge; George Ball, then secretary of state; John Kenneth Galbraith, who told President Kennedy the U. S. could not win in Viet Nam with Diem, that we should not send in U. S. troops"; and Michael Forrestal, the President's principal adviser on Viet

30 months of Nixon slaughter bared by DRV

In 30 months of power, with his "Vietnamization of the war" aimed at implementing the "Nixon doctrine" in this part of the world, President Nixon not only obstinately continued and prolonged the war of aggression in South Vietnam, but also embarked on new military adventures... against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, overtly extended the U.S. war of aggression into Cambodia and Laos, whose undertakings were accompanied by innumerable crimes against the peoples of the three Indochinese countries, and seriously jeopardized peace in Southeast Asia.

I. In carrying out "Vietnamization," the Nixon administration prolongs the U.S. war of aggression with countless concomitant fresh crimes against the South Vietnamese people.

1) The Saigon army feverishly beefed up and an important contingent of U.S. troops maintained in South Vietnam.

Under the U.S. plan, the Saigon junta feverishly drafted troops from 15-year-old adolescents to fifty-year-olds to raise the strength of their army from half a million to a million-odd men. Besides, it reorganized the police into an armed force with 20 men per village, 300 per district, 3,000 per province, and tens of thousands at the central echelon to lay an iron grip upon the population and repress them. Over a million people, mostly aged, women and children were forced into "civil defense" units.

With a great sense of urgency, the U.S. equipped the Saigon army with all types of weapons and war means. Since the beginning of the "Vietnamization" program alone, it has supplied 640,000 M.16 rifles, 20,000 machine-guns, 34,000 grenade-throwers, 870 guns, 10,000 81mm mortars, 210 M41 tanks, 1,000 armored vehicles, 44,000 military lorries and 40,000 transceivers. . . .

As regards the Saigon air force, the U.S. provided it with some 650 planes of various types and has intended to bring this figure to 1,200 by 1972. To the Saigon navy, the U.S. turned over an estimated 1600 ships and craft of different kinds. The annual credit allocated by the Nixon administration to the Saigon junta for general expenses was brought to 2 billion dollars.

Up to June 30, 1971, the Nixon administration still kept in South Vietnam about 240,000 U.S. troops, not including nearly 20,000 men in the 7th Fleet and coast-guard units and 32,000 others in the USAF stationed at American airbases in Thailand. . . .

2) Relentless furtherance of "pacification" work — backbone of the Nixon administration's "Vietnamization" — along with intensified bombardments and sweeps against civilians.

The U.S. approved for release 2001/07/27 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000900040001-1 and entrusted the U.S. Defense Department and

the CIA with the direct conduct of a new "pacification" effort called "rural defense and local development" program, beginning May 1, 1971. According to an assigned quota, within a year, the Saigon agents have to liquidate 14,000 patriots and force four million more people into the "civil defense" organization.

Following were the principal measures taken to implement the Nixon administration's "pacification" program:

In 30 months under Nixon, the U.S. used in South Vietnam an amount of explosive equal to the total of U.S. bombs expended in both 4 years' World War II and two years' Korean War (Bomb tonnage used in the Europe and Pacific theatres: 2,682,244 tons; that used in Korea: 635,000 tons).

Under Johnson, the yearly average of U.S. bombs used in both South and North Vietnam ran to 800,000 tons. Under Nixon, the quantity of bombs dropped on South Vietnam alone yearly average 1,377,000 tons. According to the U.S. Defense Department's data from the beginning of 1969 to August 1970, the U.S. rained 2,131,334 tons of bombs and fired 2,292,125 tons of shells in the Indochina theatre, mostly in South Vietnam.

The French newspaper Le Monde on July 29, 1970 stated: in 1970, on an average, the U.S. discharged on the Indochina theatre a quantity of explosive equivalent to 11 20-kiloton A-bombs, the sort released by the U.S. on Hiroshima in 1945.

The U.S. command in Saigon unilaterally delineated "free fire zones," making of entire large populated-areas its targets. . . . B-52 strategic bombers, in particular, redoubled their carpet-bombings without distinction of targets. In March 1969, right after taking office, U.S. Defense Secretary M. Laird decided to ask for an additional credit of 52 million dollars in 1969-70 to increase B-52 activities from 1,600 to 1,800 missions a month. . . .

Over 2,500 artillery pieces of all calibers. . . positioned everywhere on the mainland and based on warships. . . . Everyday, tens of thousands of shells of different calibers were pumped into villages and hamlets. Quang Tri alone, in a single day, received over 20,000 shells. . . .

Sweeps against civilians, villages and hamlets

In the period under review (January, 1969-June, 1971) U.S.-Saigon and satellite troops mounted over 50,000 mopping-up operations of battalion size upwards throughout South Vietnam, blotted out more than one-fourth of the total of hamlets in the South, and perpetrated hundreds of new Son My-type massacres, many of which had been disclosed by GPs themselves.

. . . In the two provinces of Quang Tri and Thua Thien, out of 870 hamlets, nearly 500 were levelled. . . .

In Quang Da province, till late 1970, out of 441 hamlets, 351 were erased. Bin Doi district had 20 of its 27 villages flattened. Go Noi area, composed of 6 villages with 40,000 inhabitants, was razed to the ground. The surroundings of Da Nag, 25 miles long by 10-15 miles wide,

were turned into no-man's land. In Ben Tre province, in 1969-1970 alone, the U.S.-Saigon troops launched 6,000 sweeps, slaying 4,300 people, maiming 3,500, imprisoning over 4,000, burning nearly 4,000 houses and levelling hundreds of hamlets.

The periphery of Saigon, stretching 60 miles from Saigon to Tay Ninh, was cleared off. Twenty villages along the Vam Co Dong river, Long An province, were changed into deserts.

Many an operation lasted for months on end, such as the raid beginning December, 1968, and ending late in April, 1969, on numerous areas in My Tho and Ben Tre provinces, during which the soldiery killed and wounded almost 3,000 people, burnt 1,000 dwellings, blotted out dozens of hamlets and herded tens of thousands of villagers into concentration camps. . . .

. . . The "U Minh campaign" from December 1st, 1970 to late April 1971 in Ca Mau and Rach Gia, supported by hundreds of U.S. aircraft and artillery pieces, during which the troops, according to their own profession; murdered 2,411 civilians, injured hundreds of others, abducted hundreds of people, impounded tens of thousands in concentration camps and set on fire tens of square miles of forests. . . . In Ca Mau alone, from pril 1970 to pril 1971, the raiders raped or killed 575 people of female sex, including children and wounded 334 others. . .

Data from the U.S. Senate, stated (though still below the reality) that the U.S.-Saigon forces in 1970 killed or injured 125,000 people, one-third being children under 13 years of age.

Colby, the man in charge of the US. "pacification" program in South Vietnam, admitted on April 21, 1971, that from the beginning of the war to April, 1971, 5,800,000 civilians (one-third of the South Vietnamese population) were killed, injured or made homeless.

3) Stepping up population concentration to control and exploit them and to squeeze manpower and material sources for the U.S. war of aggressica.

The U.S.-Saigon forces carried out indiscriminate bombings and strafings, chemical sprays and sweeps against the civilians, used series of huge bulldozers of over 20 tons with special "Rome plow blades" against houses, gardens and hamlets, thereby levelling whole villages into no-man's lands.

With such atrocities, millions of inhabitants were made homeless and forced to leave their villages, and mine away in disguised concentration camps. . .

Once the people were cooped up there, "purification" programs started and "Vietcong" or "Vietcong" suspects were executed.

A network of spies, scouts, civil guards, policemen and "pacification" men was set up in such camps to control and supervise the detainees and spot, arrest and assassinate those who did not submit to the enemy during the so-called "Phoenix" or "Swan" campaigns.

About the "Phoenix" campaign, the Baltimore Sun wrote on May 26, 1971: the campaign dragged on for 3 or 5 years and an average of 1,500 people were killed or jailed in a month, surpassing the plan by 1,200. In 1970, a monthly average of 1,850 people were disposed of. . . .

Early in 1971, some 10,000 minority people in 60 hamlets on the High Plateaux were forced into concentration camps in the lowland. . . .

Those who demanded to return to their villages and refused to suffer such harsh conditions were persecuted. A case in point was the airbombing of 359 detainees in Keng-Ho-Rinh concentration camp in Kienhinh province on Feb. 22, 1969.

Repression and persecution in urban centers

The U.S.-Saigon rulers also carried out the "pacification" plan in urban areas. . . .

In operation "Thach Loc" in 1970 in Hue, Quang Tri provincial capital and Dong Ha township, the enemy as

applied electricity to the breasts of women detainees and forcibly enlisted 1,500 young people. . .

All repressive measures were taken against students movements, such as closing down schools and forcing them to take military training or go into the army, encircling or brutalizing their meetings, demonstrations or sit-ins.

The crackdown of the press was still more blatant. In 1969, the Saigon papers were confiscated 40 times. . . . In 1970, 230 times, and in the first six months of 1971, 250 times. The Ting Sang (Morning News) has been banned 127 times since March 13, 1970.

Higher taxes were imposed on townspeople.

Living costs rose in proportion. According to official statistics, in 1969 the living costs shot up 60 percent as compared with 1968. In 1970 they again soared by 70 percent. 100 kg (220 lbs.) of rice of the best quality in 1969 cost 500 piastres but this year 10,000 piastres, the price of an egg grew from one piastre to 22 piastres.

The U.S. magazine Look wrote on June 11, 1970—since 1965 (when the U.S. expeditionary corps was directly involved in the war of aggression) the living costs in South Vietnam had gone 600 percent higher.

4) Continued chemical warfare coupled with attempts to deceive public opinion.

Alongside bombings and strafings, the Nixon administration continued chemical warfare. . . . Toxics laid waste over 1,800,000 hectares (one hectare equals 2.47 acres) of rice and other crops, orchards and jungles; poisoned nearly 900,000 people, mostly women, children hundreds of them lethally.

. . . The U.S. wantonly lobbed gas or chemicals, bombs and shells on villages. Gas and toxic chemicals were also sprayed by U.S. and Saigon troops into underground trenches, shelters, houses, wells and other drinking water sources during their actions. In the 1970-1971 fiscal year, the Nixon administration spent 3 billion dollars on chemical warfare and has planned to drop 1,300,000 more gallons of "Blue" and "White" agents on South Vietnamese soil.

Since the beginning of this year, U.S. aircraft have been flying more chemical sprays over numerous areas in the provinces of Quang Tri (March, 1971), Thua Thien (May, 1971) Phu Yen (March and April, 1971), Tra Vinh (February, 1971), Rach Gia (February, 1971), Ca Mau (January, March and April, 1971), etc.

. . . The Nixon administration is training the Saigon army and equipping it with chemical warfare facilities to continue such atrocities in South Vietnam.

The continued and intensified use of chemical products in high concentration and on vast areas for many years by the U.S. in South Vietnam has had serious effects on the population and the environment there, effects unforeseeable for the immediate or distant future.

The U.S. chemical war crimes in South Vietnam were exposed and strongly condemned by the Paris International Conference of Scientists (December 1970) and the second session of the International Commission for Inquiry into U.S. war crimes held in Oslo (June, 1970).

Harsher prison regime and medieval torture

Beside a sum of \$3,761,000 for paying U.S. advisors on prison and covering the cost of the maintaining of prisons in South Vietnam, the Nixon administration has spent 100 more million dollars for the enlargement of the prison system.

After the denunciation of the 150 "tiger cages" in Con Son island (July, 1970) the Nixon administration, on the one hand; ordered the abolition of the "tiger cage" regime, but on the other, has secretly built 324 new "tiger cages". . . .

AFP estimated on April 29, 1971, at 400,000 the South Vietnamese prison population. Current were such horrors as applying electricity to the breasts of women detainees

and to the guards of their prisoners, driving nails into their fingers and toes, immersing them in water, strap-pado, tearing out their teeth with pincers, driving skewers into the privy parts of female inmates including teenage girls, repeatedly for many days.

Pham The Truc, a member of the Saigon "parliament" testified that in the first six months of 1971, in inh Thuan province alone, nearly 8,000 civilians were unwarrantedly imprisoned and savagely tortured. According to Kieu Mong Thu, a woman member of "parliament," the warders at Tan Hiep jail used quick lime and acid against women prisoners, inflicting grave injuries on many of them.

II. Continual and serious encroachments on the sovereignty and security of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

In blatant violation of the U.S. Government's commitment to end definitively and unconditionally all bombardments and other acts of war against the DRVN, in the thirty months of its rule, the Nixon administration (ordered the following):... aircraft of various kinds, including B-52 strategic bombers, and its artillery based south of the demarcation river and on the Seventh Fleet in repeated reconnaissance flights and murderous bombing and shelling missions against many heavily populated areas in North Vietnam.

U.S. planes flew 31,215 reconnaissance sorties over 25 provinces and cities in North Vietnam, and the tempo of such flights had not ceased growing. From a monthly average of 650 in 1969, it went up to 1,150 in 1970 and 1,600 in the first half of 1971.

U.S. tactical aircraft made 2,714 and B-52 strategic planes 601 strikes releasing a total of 184,167 demolition and blast bombs, 2,858 cluster-bomb units (CBU) many missiles, rockets and 20mm shells on many populated areas from Vinh Linh (17th parallel) to Vinh Phu province (21st parallel) and even letting off missiles and rockets on the outskirts of Hanoi and Haiphong.

On March 21, 1971, 40 waves of jet planes including F-4, F-105 and other types in 15 air actions in succession dropped 150 demolition and blast bombs and 22 CBUs, fired many missiles, rockets and 20mm shells on population centers in Ky Anh and Huong Khe districts, Ha Tinh province, killing or wounding over 30 civilians, destroying 27 houses and a primary school.

The rate of U.S. air strikes increased day after day. In 1969: the monthly average of tactical aircraft missions was 50, that of B-52's was four.

In 1970: the figures rose respectively by 150 and 45 times. In the first half of 1971 the monthly rate was 137 times for tactical planes and 46 for B-52s.

III. Direct invasions of Cambodia and Laos extend the Nixon administration's war of aggression to the whole Indochina.

To salvage its "Vietnamization" program in South Vietnam, the Nixon administration not only continued to violate the sovereignty and threaten the security of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam but also expanded the aggressive war to Cambodia and Laos, thereby adding to its records fresh war crimes against the Indochinese.

On March 18, 1970, following the U.S.-masterminded coup d'etat against Head of State Norodom Sihanouk the Nixon administration set up a lackey administration in Phnom Penh. At the end of April 1970, it hurled tens of thousands of U.S. and Saigon troops into an invasion of Cambodia...

The Nixon administration continued to introduce military personnel, weapons and strategic goods into Vietniane to step up its special war in Laos. The Central Intelligence Agency spent hundreds of millions of dollars on the organizing, training and officering of the mercenary army of the Meo nationality headed by Vang Pao for inroads into the liberated zone of Laos. The U.S.

... continued to bring more battalions of Thai mercenaries to Laos to join the rightist army...

The U.S. kept a high level of bombing in Laos. U.S. senator Paul McCloskey recently disclosed that the tonnage of bombs dropped on Laos had doubled since Nixon assumed office. Since September 1970, it has been flying a daily average of 500-600 tactical aircraft and 50-60 B-52 missions against Laos.

Early in February, 1971, the Nixon administration mobilized nearly 2,000 planes, more than 40,000 U.S. and Saigon troops in aggression against Southern Laos. However, the disorderly rout of this aggressive army after losing an important part of its manpower vividly demonstrated the bankruptcy of "Vietnamization," whose purpose is to shift on to the Saigon army the war responsibility of U.S. troops.

Along with these criminal operations, the Nixon administration has endeavoured to instigate the rightist party in Vientiane to torpedo every effort of the Lao Patriotic Front to solve the Laos issue peacefully.

IV. Universal indignation of the heinous crimes of U.S. imperialism and the Vietnamese people's resolve to carry on their resistance till final victory.

The past 30 months of the Nixon administration have been thirty months of progress along the path of the neo-colonialist war of aggression against Viet Nam and the whole Indochinese peninsula...

According to the estimates of William Wallace Ford, retired U.S. Army Brigadier (New York Times July 2, 1970) in South Viet Nam alone, the U.S. war of aggression has had the following consequences: 300,000 civilians killed, over 1,000,000 others injured, 105,000 incapacitated, 258,000 orphans and 6,000,000 D.P.s and homeless...

Wherever and whenever the crimes of U.S. imperialism were brought to light, they triggered off outbursts of anger against the Nixon administration's flouting of all norms of morality and international practice and untold crimes against the peoples of Viet Nam, Laos and Cambodia. These have played havoc among the present generations of these countries and will have incalculable effects on the future generations. They have reached the level of genocide and of systematic destruction of life and the living environments.

Together with the progressives in the United States who have been courageously and persistently pushing up their actions against the policy of aggression and the crimes of war of the U.S. ruling circles in Indochina, a front of the world people has practically taken shape to back the just fight of the Indochinese peoples under the common slogan urging the Nixon administration to stop immediately its aggression in Viet Nam and Indochina, bring home speedily all the U.S. troops and let the Vietnamese and the other peoples of Indochina settle their own affairs without U.S. interference.

Recently, the disclosure of the Pentagon's "secret study" on Viet Nam by the American press has further substantiated the denunciations made by the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam over many years past concerning the root cause of the Vietnam war, and the aggressive nature of the United States.

For their part, the Vietnamese people from South to North, while being deeply grateful for the allround support of the fraternal socialist countries, the nationalist countries and the forces of peace and democracy throughout the world and eagerly longing for peace which, however, must be a peace in real independence and freedom, are determined with the peoples of Laos and Cambodia at their side to keep up their war of resistance to U.S. aggression for national salvation, till complete victory.

Over the past two and half years, defying all difficulties and hardships, the Vietnamese people in conjunction with the successful fight of the Lao and Cambodian

peoples, have inflicted heavy reverses on the U.S. aggressors and their henchmen: more than 1,150,000 enemy troops including 365,000 GIs and tens of thousands of tons of weapons and a considerable amount of war materials of the U.S. have been put out of action.

The bellicose and corrupt lackeys of the U.S. in Saigon are more isolated than ever. Over the same period, 138 U.S. aircraft have been shot down in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, bringing to 3,395 the total of U.S. planes grounded between August 5, 1964, and June 30, 1971.

Note: The accompanying record of Nixon Administration crimes in Indochina, circulated as an official document by the United Nations, will be an eye-opener for many Americans who believe Nixon is "winding down" the Vietnam war. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam in this memo shows that, under the cover of "Vietnamization," the U.S. has stepped up the war in every way.

The DRV study covers the 30 months from January, 1969, to June, 1971. In that period, the U.S. has had its puppet Saigon regime more than double the size of the Saigon army, from 500,000 to more than a million men, and furnished it with hundreds of new warplanes and ships, hundreds of thousands of new weapons.

A new U.S.-sponsored "pacification" program has been started, backed by \$1 billion in U.S. funds; bombing and shelling of South Vietnam has sharply escalated, involving hundreds more air raids and tens of thousands more bomb-tonnage dropped. On the ground, hundreds of hamlets have been destroyed and their inhabitants massacred.

During the Nixon years, millions of South Vietnamese have been herded into concentration camps and prisons, while the entire countryside has been sprayed with poisons, destroying several million acres of crops and affecting 900,000 people. New invasions of Cambodia and Laos were carried out under Nixon orders, broadening the war. The air war against Cambodia and Laos has risen in intensity every month, and there have been renewed air attacks against the DRV.

Despite the Nixon aggression, "Vietnamization" has failed and the peoples of Indochina have continued to inflict severe reverses on the U.S. and its puppets. The Vietnamese, Lao and Cambodian peoples are determined to fight on until complete victory, and have the support of all the world's peace-loving forces.

The Democratic Republic of Vietnam's memorandum on Nixon war crimes in Indochina was circulated to all United Nations member-states on Oct. 14 by UN Secretary-General U Thant at the request of Dr. Zdenek Cernik, UN Ambassador of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic.

—D.W. Foreign Department

"CORDS comes home to Washington,

Pacification has just begun,

Still so many hearts and minds to be won."

—from "Songs to Alienate Hearts and Minds By"

Vietnamization Of the Foreign Service

NEARLY three million Americans have now served in Vietnam. Of these, about 600 have been Foreign Service officers.

Thus, roughly 20 percent of the Foreign Service has been exposed to many of the stimuli which have turned "nice" kids from Middle America into peace freaks, hawks, junkies, and even assassins.

For the FSOs, however, the experience generally has not had the radicalizing effect that it has had on many of the military men. The FSOs tended to be older and less malleable than the American soldiers in Vietnam, and their personal thought processes were more subtle and less striking than those of the GIs. Some FSOs were essentially untouched by the whole experience, reacting no differently than if they had been in Paris or Rome. But for most, and especially the young, Vietnam meant change. It meant a violent breaking away from the traditional diplomatic life and an exposure to the realities of war.

About 350 FSOs have been assigned to the Pacification program (CORDS). They functioned as advisors to the Vietnamese civilian and military administration in an effort to make the Government of Vietnam a viable force in the countryside. Few, if any, had any back-

JOHN CLAYMORE

John Claymore is the pseudonym of a former FSO who served in Vietnam. The primary reason for his resignation from the State Department was disagreement with US policy on Southeast Asia. He is not using his real name because of a limitation on publishing in his current job, but he would be glad to correspond or meet with anyone interested in discussing his article.

ground for this assignment; yet most have acquitted themselves well, within the context of the programs they were working in.

Nevertheless, FSOs have been affected by the same pressures that have been widely reported in relation to the military.

Many served in proto-combat roles with command responsibility. While not participants, they received reports of war crimes and what often seemed like the unnecessary loss of human life. Some were faced with the moral dilemma of how far they should go in exposing incidents which they knew to be wrong.

One FSO currently serving in Washington possesses a file of documented atrocities including

photographs. He has written extensive reports on these apparent war crimes he investigated in Vietnam. As far as he knows, no action has ever been taken to punish the guilty. Because he is a supporter of the President's Vietnam policy, and because he fears the effect on that policy of additional war crime controversy, he has not chosen to make his information public. He also is undoubtedly aware of the negative result disclosure would have on his career prospects.

His example is extreme, but it points up the fundamental proposition that serving in Vietnam is not like serving elsewhere.

With respect to no other country could it be said that perhaps 20 percent of the FSOs had experimented with soft drugs, but that is the case in Vietnam. And in no other country do FSOs have their own personal automatic weapons and receive training in how to fire a grenade launcher before they go.

Vietnam is different.

VIENTNAM has undoubtedly sharpened the generation gap between young and old FSOs. In some of the junior grades, a disproportionately large number have been to Vietnam. Almost all return with a

continued

Getting Thieu Through '72

Richard Nixon does not intend "to see this nation accept the first defeat in its proud 190-year history," and the corollary of that is that he does not intend to preside over the collapse of our client regimes in Indochina. But in the modern world not even the most super super-power can indefinitely maintain satellite governments 8000 miles from its shores (6000 miles, if we are thinking of Hawaii). And even assuming the viability and the reliability of the governments of our choosing and our financing in South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, the American people are bound to become increasingly skeptical about whether the huge investments required are worth it. Other great powers have played this game - the French, the Italians, the British, the Germans. Japan tried to make it work as late as 1940; Portugal is still at it. But remote control by money and technology has a limited life. The Nixon Doctrine will soon seem as antiquated as Empire or the co-prosperity sphere. Meanwhile, the President thinks he can pull it off: winning a civil war in Southeast Asia by repeated, heavy doses of US air and naval power, and aid, and disarming his domestic critics by keeping the casualty rate low and bringing most of the combat troops home. In the short run he might succeed - getting Thieu through '72 and Nixon too. In the longer run he won't. The Asians will take charge.

"Cambodia is the Nixon Doctrine in its purest form," the President told the press on November 12. It took form initially with the invasion of Cambodia by US forces in April 1970, staged, the President reported, "to protect our men who are in Vietnam and to guarantee the continued success of our withdrawal and Vietnamization program." A week later, he remarked that if he were to follow the advice of the doves and simply withdraw from Indochina, the enemy would "come into Vietnam and massacre the civilians there by the millions." Four days later he judged the Cambodian expedition an "enormous success," so much so that he thereupon requested an additional \$250 million in aid for Cambodia (about \$240 million more than was authorized the preceding year), and invited "third countries . . . to furnish Cambodia with troops or material." The \$250 million, the President said, was "probably the best investment in foreign assistance that the US has made in my political lifetime." In the following year and a half, he withdrew a substantial number of

continued

combat soldiers in Vietnam. He also requested \$341 million for Cambodia for fiscal '72, which suggests that the fewer the number of men whose withdrawal must be protected, the more it will cost. The \$341 million is not all that will be spent, of course. It does not include CIA operations, or the surplus arms and equipment the US will turn over to the Cambodians. Nobody knows how much in the way of surplus arms has already been dumped into Southeast Asia. Senator Symington has been trying for months to find out, without much success. Senator Fulbright has asked for a monthly report from the Pentagon on exactly what we are doing, what we are putting into Laos and Cambodia; he is not told. Bureaucracy is expert at passing the buck. "A large part of the data requested by you," the Pentagon informed Fulbright earlier this month, "is not known to the Dept. of Defense because it concerns the operations of other government departments or agencies."

What we do know is that the amount is enormous and the end is not in sight. Whatever the Nixon Doctrine promises, it doesn't promise total withdrawal. "This idea that somehow or other the Nixon Doctrine means that we will not have air or sea power in Asia," Mr. Laird says, "is a great mistake because that isn't part of the partnership theory under which we are operating." The President adds that in the absence of a negotiated settlement, we must keep "a residual force" over there, "in order to continue our role of leaving South Vietnam in a position where it would be able to defend itself from a Communist takeover." However, that is not Mr. Nixon's only reason. "A very primary reason" for keeping a residual force in Vietnam, is that we must have "something to negotiate with, with regard to our prisoners." Five hundred thousand American troops could not pry the prisoners loose, but 50,000 might help do it! At no time has the President bothered to acknowledge or treat seriously Hanoi's repeated statement that once he sets a withdrawal date, it will provide for the safety of our forces as they pull out, guarantee the release of all POWs and prevent reprisals. The President would not like to have it put this way, but in effect Hanoi has given him a choice between abandoning Thieu or abandoning the prisoners. He thinks he dare not give up either; that is his dilemma. And not his only dilemma. For his doctrine requires constant transfusions of dollars and arms to anti-Communist military regimes in Southeast Asia, while he simultaneously seeks a detente with those billion Chinese, in fear of whom the US intervened in Indochina a decade ago.

Some idea of the costs can be glimpsed by surveying past and planned military assistance to the three Indochinese states. The figures the public has access to understate the reality, for they do not include a variety of hidden expenditures. Even so, whereas aid to Cambodia in fiscal 1970 was \$8.9 million, two years later the requested authorization was over 37 times higher.

For Laos, the 1970 aid bill was \$118.4 million; for the coming fiscal year it will be at least \$189 million. Military aid for South Vietnam in 1970 was \$2,049,100,000; in fiscal 1972 it is expected to be about two and a half billion dollars.

The cost to the Indochinese is incalculable by any dollar measurement; they pay in the currency of refugees, orphans, cripples, corpses. From 1966 until June of this year, our fliers had flown 25,546 sorties over Cambodia; 280,000 over North Vietnam; 505,000 over Laos; 762,650 over South Vietnam. The air war goes ahead full speed. We are dropping about 70,000 tons of bombs each month over Indochina, and by the end of this year twice the weight of bombs will have fallen on this area - the size of Texas - as were dropped in World War II and the Korean war.

Congress could set the country on a different, less destructive course, but not by such ambiguous and open-ended declarations on withdrawal as the one it attached to a \$21.4 billion bill for weapons and Pentagon research, and which the President simply dismissed last week as "without binding force or effect."

In 1968, Mr. Nixon said he had a plan to end the war. He did; he is following it; it is to get peace by winning the war but without losing the next election - a refinement of an early and abandoned Lyndon Johnson plan to let Asians fight Asians. In its "purest form," the doctrine is bull.

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STATINTL

Phoenix: a Controversial Viet Program

BY STEWART KELLERMAN
UPI Staff Writer

SAIGON—It was a rainy evening and the villagers huddled in their wet straw huts warming themselves by smoky fires. Outside, two young Vietnamese crawled through knife-sharp elephant grass to the outskirts of the village.

One of the youths buried an olive-painted claymore mine in the red-brown mud of the only trail leading into the village. The other strung a wire to a plunger hidden behind a clump of bushes.

The two young men—on the payroll of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)—could soon hear the splash of footsteps as the local Communist political leader returned home to spend the night with his family.

They waited patiently, rubber sandals sunk in the mud. The moment the Communist leader reached the mine, they pushed down on the plunger, shattering the evening calm with a deafening roar.

The killing was the work of the Phoenix Program, an allied project aimed at wiping out the political leadership of the National Liberation Front (NLF) with some of the same terrorist tactics the Communists have used against Saigon government officials.

U.S. Involvement

A U.S. Army intelligence officer described the incident to newsmen but demanded the names, location and date be kept secret. His caution was typical of American officials with knowledge of one of the most controversial and least understood programs in Vietnam.

Reliable American sources said the United States, which thought up Phoenix almost four years ago, is still deeply involved in it.

Aside from CIA participation, the U.S. Army has helped set up a massive intelligence apparatus which critics claim has given the Saigon government "big brother" power over much of the population. The sources said U.S. Army intelligence officers also sit unofficially on boards determining the fate of suspected Communists.

Officially, the object of the Phoenix Program is the "neutralization" of the Viet Cong infrastructure (VCI), bureaucratic jargon for the Communist shadow government in South Vietnam.

Reason for Killings

The program, started by South Vietnam in 1968 with the encouragement of U.S. intelligence experts, claims to have neutralized 83,899 Communists since then—20,936 killed, 40,880 jailed and 22,083 talked into switching sides.

Allied officials working in the Phoenix Program usually say the killings have been the result of suspects resisting arrest.

"We don't want to kill any of them," one U.S. adviser said. "We want live ones. A dead man is just a statistic. He can't give us any information. And we have to bury him."

U.S. officials working in related programs and some former Phoenix advisers, however, occasionally tell a different story when speaking anonymously.

"Of course we're doing a lot of VC and torturing a lot of them," one American said. "What else can we do? We're just doing the same thing to the enemy as they're doing to us."

Communist terrorists have made life just as dangerous for government officials. The Saigon government has reported Communist terrorist incidents last

year alone, principally against local officials and their relatives:

It was suppertime in a small, rice-farming village in the central highlands of South Vietnam.

The kitchen sounds—scrapping of pots, clinking of glasses and clacking of plates—drowned out the noise of two young Communists walking toward the village.

Family Gunned Down

The two youths, dressed in black pajamas and carrying Soviet-made rifles, walked down the only path leading into town, their rubber tire sandals slapping against the earth.

Without hesitation, they pushed open the door of the biggest building—an unpainted wooden shack where the Saigon government village chief had just sat down for supper with his wife and two children.

The young men then mechanically emptied their rifles into the room and casually walked out of the village, leaving behind four bodies slumped across the table between pieces of broken dishes and glasses.

It was one more Communist terrorist attack against local government officials, village councilmen and ordinary civilians in South Vietnam. Dozens of terrorist attacks take place every day across the country.

"It's easy for somebody to stand up in Congress back in the States and complain about how immoral the Phoenix Program is," one U.S. official said. "But once you've seen the VC gun down village chiefs, kill innocent women and children, you don't feel that way anymore. They're just animals and they've got to be destroyed."

"The only way to fight these animals is to kill them," a U.S. police adviser said. "It's too bad but we haven't done enough killing around here lately. We only got four of them

Controversial Group

Without a doubt, the most controversial men on the Phoenix team are the PRUs, members of province reconnaissance units organized and financed by the CIA, according to Allied intelligence sources.

The sources said the PRUs, mainly former criminals and Communists recruited from jails, are the triggermen for the program's political assassinations. They said the PRUs are also used to arrest especially dangerous suspects and to administer the roughest tortures.

At the start of the program, the typical assassination squad would be made up of four PRUs and two Americans, the sources said. Nowadays, however, the PRUs usually work alone.

They said the PRUs used to get paid piece rates—that is, by the head. But the CIA switched them over to straight salaries—substantially higher than pay scales for South Vietnamese soldiers and police.

Program Aim

Linh is a poor farmer. He grows rice on an acre of land near the South China Sea. He lives with his wife and three children in a cramped hut made of straw and mud.

Linh—like millions of others—has been forced by the South Vietnamese government to spy on his own family for the Phoenix Program.

"I don't want to get into trouble," Linh said through a translator. "That's why I tell the government what they want. I don't tell them everything, of course. Just as much as I have to."

The Phoenix Program has tried to get a gia truong (family head) like Linh to report in every hut, house and shanty in South Vietnam. They're the lowest rungs on a mas-

Continued

NOV 1971

Vietnamese Catholics Turn Against Thieu

By Mark Frankland
London Observer

SAIGON—The Roman Catholic community in South Vietnam, once considered to be the nation's anti-Communist hard-core, is now providing some of the most vigorous opponents of President Thieu's regime.

There are young Catholics among the student militants who have been burning American cars on the streets of Saigon these past few weeks. Tin Sang, the major opposition newspaper, is run by a group of young Catholic deputies.

Even the more moderate Catholic politicians in the Senate, led by the Senate's chairman, protested against President Thieu's one man re-election. A group of young Catholic priests provided the opposition with an intellectual backing more radical than that of the Buddhist monks associated with the militant An Quant pagoda.

It never was true that the Catholics, who make up one-tenth of South Vietnam's population of 17 million, were all aggressive anti-Communists. This reputation was really won by the Catholic communities who emigrated to the South when Vietnam was divided into two zones at the Geneva Conference in 1954.

Inevitably these groups, which resettled as communities still under the leadership of their old parish priests, were eager allies of the Saigon government; all the more so because that government was headed from 1954 to 1963 by the pious Catholic Ngo Dinh Diem.

The Diem government settled a good many of the refugees from the North around Saigon, and the nearness of these militants, who were always ready to take part in demonstrations in the capital, gave the impression of an entirely militant Catholic community.

But, in fact, the southern-born Catholics were often different.

Those that lived in the countryside often had to co-exist with the National Liberation Front. Sometimes the Communists' attitude towards these Catholics was tough; it was accommodating. In either case the Catholics and their priests had to learn to live with the Communists as best they could.

Today children of the Northern emigres are among the most active of the clerical and lay opposition. Why do they think so differently from their parents? One very important reason is that they have come to look very critically at the whole history of Vietnamese Catholicism.

Catholicism was, of course, brought to Vietnam by European missionaries. It was the most eminent of these who gave the Vietnamese language its Roman script. A French bishop became the first great Western interloper in Vietnamese affairs by helping put the Emperor Gia Long on the throne of a united Vietnam in 1806.

Gia Long's successors were less friendly towards the Catholics and the cries of help from French missionaries encouraged France to take the country over.

The young Catholics today know that the fate of Christians in South Vietnam has been often used to justify the present war against the Communists. They know, too, that many Catholics have collaborated closely with the Americans in Vietnam. This alliance with foreigners against the Vietnamese is, of course, a serious crime in the eyes of many people. (One of the easiest ways to destroy someone's reputation in Saigon today is to call him a CIA agent.)

Like many young and intellectual people the radical Catholics feel a strong sense of guilt about their church's French, and now with the

Americans. It explains why they, more than any other opposition group (excepting of course the Vietcong) are prepared to accept the consequences of a total American withdrawal however unpleasant they may be.

The militant Buddhists are far less certain on this point. Perhaps this is partly because they do not feel they have any guilt to expiate. But it is also because many educated Catholics, and not only the radicals among them, believe that the church will survive in some form or other whatever happens. The Buddhists, with no world-wide organization to give moral support from outside, are considerably more gloomy about their future in a Communist South Vietnam.

But the young opposition-minded Catholic priests are also left wing. They welcome the egalitarian ideas of the Communists and feel the true church has nothing to lose by them. "If you have nothing to lose you have nothing to be afraid of," said one of them.

What counts most for Vietnamese Catholics is the attitude of their bishops, and the bishops are usually conservative. But even among them there are signs of change.

The Pope's conference at Manila last year, when he proclaimed a "Church of the Poor", authorizes a move to the left. The bishops clearly do not want to be identified with the present Saigon regime just because President Thieu is a Catholic. They have given, and will give, no endorsement to Thieu's uncontested re-election.

The Archbishop is not going to back the radicals in the church openly: He is too cautious a man for that. But some of the young priests believe he accepts that theirs may be the way of the future. Whether that is true or not the church has, potentially, a far more open mind about the future than many have supposed in the past.

The Education Of an American In Hoa Hao

By Ron Moreau

The writer does interpreting and photography for The Washington Post's Saigon bureau.

MY FRIEND, Vo Van Bao, always knew when I entered his house even though he was blind. It was a thatched house with a mud floor, typical of Buddhist dwellings in the Mekong Delta. The walls were made of cardboard and decorated with U.S. magazine ads. The focal point of the front room was the family altar, on which were placed artificial flowers and fruits, pictures of deceased forefathers and a bright, sawed-off artillery shell for incense.

I had come to Vietnam as a volunteer for International Voluntary Services (IVS) in mid-1969 from the University of California at Berkeley, where Vietnam had been the main topic of conversation. Everyone had pet theories on the war, but no one had been there. I wanted to be there.

I had opposed U.S. intervention in Vietnam and had been peripherally involved in the antiwar movement. My draft board granted me conscientious objector status, accepting IVS service in Vietnam as a satisfactory alternative to military duty.

In Hoa Hao (pronounced wah-how) village where I stayed for 1½ years, in Vietnam's flat delta region near the Cambodian border, most foreigners were viewed as intruders, tolerated only for their money. Naked and ragged children would shout, "American, American" in Vietnamese, pointing and occasionally throwing objects as I rode past. The older people generally would ignore me. But after I learned Vietnamese and local customs, I gained a degree of acceptance, and I made a few close friends. Bao, a 60-year-old farmer, was my best friend.

I lived in a marketplace some five miles from him, and I kept my motorbike at his house on a bumpy dirt road that followed the river. The rural delta people do not live in clusters as in most other regions of Vietnam. Rather, the delta houses extend along the intricate canal network that runs tendrillike through the region.

When I would arrive at Bao's house, he would invite me to sit down for tea. Some of the furniture was fashioned out of empty rocket crates. Local cookies made of rice flour and a pat of tea were placed on the table by his daughter, who greeted me with downcast



By Ron Moreau

*A Hoa Hao villager
smokes marijuana from
a water pipe made out
of an American beer can.*

COLUMBUS, Ohio
DISPATCH

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Ex-Spy Removes Cloak From CIA

By MELANIE CROKER
Of The Dispatch Staff

The powerfully built male who drives around in extravagant cars and is surrounded by beautiful women isn't likely to be a spy. Look for "a married man with children who goes to PTA meetings and dresses and looks like a normal diplomat."

The description of the all-life spy was provided by a man who should know. Victor Marchetti served with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) for 14 years, resigning in 1969 as executive assistant to the CIA deputy director.

MARCHETTI, who was fed up with bureaucracy, resigned to write and help the public understand intelligence work.

He was in Columbus Wednesday to publicize his new book, "The Rope Dancer," which details many real-life experiences. Such experiences, along with some fictitious ones, would set his book apart from spy novels, he said.

UNLESS THE CIA has changed things drastically in the last two years, Marchetti said, in an interview, it still spends two-thirds of its money on clandestine activities — "playing games for games sake."

One such game, he said, was played in Vietnam.

"We knew Vietnam was wrong — a disaster," he said. But he said, there was nothing that could be done to convince government officials of the

"WE THE (CIA) only had 100 Vietnamese analysts, and thousands were working on operations such as counter-terror efforts," he said. He explained the CIA has two responsibilities, to gather intelligence and to conduct operations. He said the two operations do not fit together.

"Besides, the military was telling the President all was hunky-dory. So the President took the military's advice and the CIA continued the operations," he said.

He said operations often used enemy-terror tactics. If the Viet Cong brutally killed a village chief who would not comply, the operators would utilize the same tactics in another village, he said.

MARCHETTI characterized such CIA activity as "designed to make themselves look as innocent as possible."

He said the CIA has been defusing everything he has said. But he believes his conferences with U.S. senators and representatives may be helping. He said President Nixon last week called for CIA reform, including a study of outside control, finances and military influence.

Lying in Politics: Reflections on The Pentagon Papers

Hannah Arendt

"The picture of the world's greatest superpower killing or seriously injuring a thousand non-combatants a week, while trying to pound a tiny backward nation into submission on an issue whose merits are hotly disputed, is not a pretty one."

—Robert S. McNamara

I

The Pentagon Papers, like so much else in history, tell different stories, teach different lessons to different readers. Some claim they have only now understood that Vietnam was the "logical" outcome of the cold war or the anticommunist ideology, others that this is a unique opportunity to learn about decision-making processes in government. But most readers have by now agreed that the basic issue raised by the Papers is deception. At any rate, it is obvious that this issue was uppermost in the minds of those who compiled the Pentagon Papers for *The New York Times*, and it is at least probable that this was also an issue for the team of writers who prepared the forty-seven volumes of the original study.

The famous credibility gap, which has been with us for six long years, has suddenly opened up into an abyss. The quicksand of lying statements of all sorts, deceptions as well as self-deceptions, is apt to engulf any reader who wishes to probe this material, which, unhappily, he must recognize as the infrastructure of nearly a decade of United States foreign and domestic policy.

Because of the extravagant lengths to which the commitment to non-truthfulness in politics went on the highest level of government, and because of the concomitant extent to which lying was permitted to proliferate throughout the ranks of all governmental services, military and civilian—the phony body counts of the "search-and-destroy" missions, the doctored after-damage reports of the

air force, the "progress" reports to Washington from the field written by subordinates who knew that their performance would be evaluated by their own reports²—one is easily tempted to forget the background of past history, itself not exactly a story of immaculate virtue, against which this newest episode must be seen and judged.

For secrecy—what diplomatically is called discretion as well as the *arcana imperii*, the mysteries of government—and deception, the deliberate falsehood and the outright lie used as legitimate means to achieve political ends, have been with us since the beginning of recorded history. Truthfulness has never been counted among the political virtues, and lies have always been regarded as justifiable tools in political dealings. Whoever reflects on these matters can only be surprised how little attention has been paid, in our tradition of philosophical and political thought, to their significance, on the one hand, for the nature of action and, on the other, for the nature of our ability to deny in thought and word whatever happens to be the actual fact. This active, aggressive capability of ours is clearly different from our passive susceptibility to falling prey to error, illusion, the distortions of memory, and to whatever else can be blamed on the failings of our sensual and mental apparatus.

A characteristic of human action is that it always begins something new, but this does not mean that it is ever permitted to start *ab ovo*, to create *ex nihilo*. In order to make room for one's own action, something that was there before must be removed or destroyed, and things as they were before are changed. Such change would be impossible if we could not mentally remove ourselves from where we are physically located and *imagine* that things might as well be different from what they actually are. In other words, the ability to lie, the deliberate denial

change facts, the ability to act, are interconnected; they owe their existence to the same source, imagination.

For it is by no means a matter of course that we can *say*, "The sun shines, when it is actually raining (the consequence of certain brain injuries is the loss of this capacity); it rather indicates that while we are well equipped for the world, sensually as well as mentally, we are not fitted to it as one of its inalienable parts. We are *free* to change the world and to start something new in it. Without the mental freedom to deny or affirm existence, to say "yes" or "no"—not just to statements or propositions in order to express agreement or disagreement, but to things as they are given, beyond agreement or disagreement; to our organs of perception and cognition—no action would be possible; and action is of course the very stuff politics is made of.³

Hence, when we talk about lying, and especially about lying among acting men, let us remember that the lie did not creep into politics by some accident of human sinfulness; moral outrage, for this reason alone, is not likely to make it disappear. The deliberate falsehood deals with *contingent* facts, that is with matters which carry no inherent truth within themselves, no necessity to be as they are; factual truths are never compellingly true. The historian knows how vulnerable is the whole texture of facts in which we spend our daily lives; it is always in danger of being perforated by single lies or torn to shreds by the organized lying of groups, nations, or classes, or denied and distorted, often carefully covered up by reams of falsehoods or simply allowed to fall into oblivion. Facts need testimony to be remembered and trustworthy witnesses to be established in order to find a secure dwelling place in the domain of human affairs. From this, it follows that no factual statement can ever be beyond doubt—as secure and attack as, for instance, the statement that two and two make four.

Continued

U.S. INTELLIGENCE: CONSPIRACIES, SUBVERSION, ESPIONAGE

PART II

To be sure, the CIA concentrates first and foremost on actions against the countries of the socialist community and the progressive regimes in young national states. Another major target of its subversive activity is the Communist and Left organizations in the capitalist countries, which the monopolies and hence intelligence regard as a force potentially dangerous to the very existence of imperialism and its mainstay the United States. Furthermore, it is a task of the CIA to counteract the national liberation movement in the colonial countries, where the United States still hopes to step into the shoes of the outgoing old colonial powers, to retain these countries within the capitalist system. Finally, much attention is paid to the states of Latin America. Regarding this continent as its strategic rear, the United States employs the combined forces of diplomacy, intelligence, the police apparatus and the Pentagon to stabilize the reactionary regimes there and thereby to preserve the domination of its monopolies.

Suffice it to enumerate some of the aggressive foreign policy actions of the United States in the past two decades to see that the CIA is working precisely in this direction: the intrigues of U.S. intelligence in Iran; the military putsch in Guatemala; the deposition of Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma of Laos in 1958, the armed intervention against people's Cuba; the coup d'etat in the Dominican Republic; the anti-government conspiracy in Iraq; the military coup in Brazil; the preparation of armed intervention against Vietnam; the coup in Cambodia and this is a far from complete list.

PENTAGON INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

Pursuing their aggressive ends, the U.S. ruling circles are seeking as much information as possible about the socialist countries and above all the Soviet Union. The intelligence services of the Western powers are sparing no effort to obtain information about the military-economic potential of the USSR and its Armed Forces, about the internal situation in the Soviet Union and the

latest achievements of Soviet science and technology.

Speaking of the position of military intelligence, i.e. of the Pentagon's organ, in the intricate system of U.S. intelligence services, it should be noted that immediately after the end of World War II, referring to the experience accumulated, it started laying claims to the leading role among all the intelligence organizations of the country. Inasmuch as after the establishment of the CIA Allen Dulles strove to "politicize" the entire strategic intelligence and turn the CIA into an organ not merely co-ordinating intelligence activities but making "big policy", the Pentagon openly voiced its resentment of this line. For some time the struggle among the different intelligence organs was waged "in camera", within the bounds of the Intelligence Community, but before long it emerged to the surface. The military had the upper hand; in August 1961 the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) was

States was accompanied by the expansion and consolidation of military intelligence.

THE "BRAIN TRUST"

The DIA is the supreme organ, the "brain trust" of U.S. military intelligence. Just as the intelligence organs of the three armed services, the DIA sees its principal task in obtaining information about the military-economic potential and armed forces of the Warsaw Treaty states. According to the DIA statute endorsed by the Secretary of Defense, the chief of the DIA is subordinated only to him personally and to the Intelligence Board. It is to supply intelligence information to military institutions (through the Joint Chiefs of Staff) and to the Secretary of Defense (through the latter's secretariat).

Although the DIA is vested with certain rights in regard to the military intelligence services, the latter have retained independence in the fields of direct interest to them (except through the system of military attachés, which in 1965 passed to the jurisdiction of the DIA

Evidently this is in large measure due to the increased role of the American military, naval and air attachés and military missions, who together with their official personnel make up the basis of the modern legal foreign apparatus of U.S. military intelligence. This function of military attachés has been particularly widely developed in the practice of the U.S. diplomatic service.

The department directing the work of military attachés forms a part of the DIA apparatus. It works out its instructions and gives assistance to the attaché system in close contact with State Department offices. At present attachés of the Defence Department are

accredited to 92 countries, with larger states having attachés of all three armed services. For instance, air attachés are to be found in 67 countries, and in 24 of them they are senior attachés. The question of which attaché is to be senior is decided by the secretaries of the Army, Navy and Air Force, depending on which armed service in a given country is of greater interest to the United States. As General MacClaskey writes, since Russia's air power is of the greatest interest to the United States, the U.S. air attaché holds seniority there.

The DIA widely applies data processing techniques. At the beginning of 1963 a special centre for the automatic processing of intelligence data was set up. Attached to the DIA is the military intelligence school es-

17 NOV 1971

Nixon fiddles while Vietnam burns

STATINTL

By Richard E. Ward
Guardian staff correspondent

Paris

Theatrical gestures have become the hallmark of the Nixon administration: grandiose pronouncements or actions designed to project a public image quite different from actual U.S. policy.

The administration's longest running play goes by the name of "Vietnamization." Since he ran for the presidency in 1968, Nixon has been pledging to end the war in Indochina. Needless to say, "Vietnamization" has not been a drama of peace; it has been act after act prolonging one of the most barbarous wars of aggression in history.

The White House has focused a spotlight on its troop withdrawals in the hope that the applause would detract from U.S. efforts to strangle the liberation struggle in Vietnam, the continuation of bombing, extension of full-scale wars of devastation to Laos and Cambodia and its backing for the fascist Saigon regime.

Now the administration is apparently going to announce further troop withdrawals in Nixon's address to be made on or before Nov. 15. If the press reports are accurate—and there have been no denials from the White House—Nixon will announce the "end" of the U.S. ground combat role in Vietnam by the end of this year or nearly 1972 and further troop reductions, "leaving a residual force of about 40,000 men—air crews and advisors for South Vietnamese forces," according to a Nov. 8 Washington Post report on Defense Secretary Melvin Laird's recent visit to Saigon.

"In a Honolulu stopover en route to Washington," the Post added, "Laird told newsmen he did not want it 'misunderstood' that U.S. military men would lack adequate protection.

"As we turn over air, artillery and logistical responsibilities [to Saigon], it is necessary for us to protect the American forces now serving in these capacities," he said. In other words, the U.S. "advisors" will continue to engage in combat activities and the "tremendous progress" of Saigon's military forces, claimed by Laird, is a pure myth.

Other American press accounts, also based on administration briefings, have spelled out further details of U.S. plans for the coming

regimes in Cambodia and Laos, including air support, maintenance of U.S. air bases in Thailand and U.S. naval activity off the coasts of Vietnam and Cambodia, the continuation of U.S. bombing throughout Indochina and the continued use of clandestine CIA personnel as combat "advisors" and the "accelerated pacification" and "Phoenix" programs in South Vietnam.

U.S. goal still victory

In summary, on the eve of the expected White House announcement on the ending of U.S. ground combat in Indochina, the Nixon administration, by its acts and statements, shows that it is still harboring hopes that with its puppet and mercenary forces and U.S. air and logistics support, the U.S. can gain a military victory or at least a position of strength sufficient to force the liberation forces in Indochina to accept U.S. neocolonialism in South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.

These aims have been underscored by the conduct of the U.S. delegation here at the peace talks under Ambassador William J. Porter, who has been the most arrogant and bellicose of any American delegation chief to date. At the most recent session of the talks on Nov. 4, Porter delivered a long diatribe trying to justify the U.S. position, claiming that the Vietnamese liberation forces were responsible for the U.S. "Vietnamization" program. This is the logic of Nazi Germany which justified its aggression by pretending that the European peoples that refused voluntarily to submit to German domination during World War II were responsible for the Nazi attacks and SS and gestapo atrocities.

Also at the Nov. 4 session, the U.S. press spokesman, Stephen Ledogar, responding to a journalist's question, said Porter's statement followed White House instructions to the letter. Ledogar himself went even further in his attacks against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and Provisional Revolutionary Government delegates by calling them a bunch of "clowns." In line with this arrogance, the U.S. has not yet tabled a single proposal in the 134 sessions of the quadripartite Paris talks that could form the basis for genuine peace negotiations.

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Conflict Waged Wrong Way, MSU Expert Says

By George J. Barinann

Did Nixon Muff Chance in Vietnam?

EAST LANSING, Mich. — Fundamentally, the fight in Vietnam has been political, not military. And the American record in these last days, with victory still elusive, is one of failure, lost opportunities and — even worse — of destruction of the very aims we set out to reach at the beginning.

Indeed, this departure from Saigon and the paddy fields that, from the air, shine like stained glass, leaves the South Vietnamese trapped in authoritarian government — a situation far removed from those first hopes for national political stability in that unhappy land.

Dr. Wesley R. Fishel of Michigan State University turned around in the chair in his office on the campus here, after making those points, and said:

"Yes, we have finally managed to fail. Shall we say, we wrested defeat from the jaws of victory?"

The bouncy little professor, a longtime authority on Southeast Asia — he has been an active student of events there for 21 years, with a special interest ever since the U.S. involvement — was speaking of the United States in Vietnam "in a political sense," he explained.

"If we are talking in a military sense," he said, "there is no question but that we have managed to prevent the Communists from taking over. Without American intervention, they would have conquered South Vietnam and, therefore, in that sense, one could say it was a worthwhile involvement.

"But it was an inordinately costly one. It was not the way the conflict should have been fought. It should have been fought politically. We did not have to intervene massively."

WESLEY FISHEL HAS special credentials to talk about Vietnam and Southeast Asia.

The 52-year-old professor of political science and international relations served from 1954 to 1955, as adviser to the prime

minister of Vietnam. He was chief, from 1956 to 1958, of the controversial Michigan State University advisory group in Vietnam, on contract to Saigon and Washington.

Fishel has written extensively on Asian affairs in books, monographs and articles. He is the editor of "Southeast Asia, an International Quarterly." His most recent book is "Vietnam: Anatomy of a Conflict," a hefty collection of expert opinion — and judgment — on that conflict.

Perhaps Fishel is best known off campus for his work with the MSU Advisory Group. This drew considerable criticism a few years ago, chiefly through an article in "Ramparts" magazine. The article, "The University on the Make," said, among many things, that the project was a front for the CIA and that "Wesley" was a pretty big man in Saigon.

But Fishel, a native Clevelander and graduate of Cleveland Heights High School (1937), was talking at the moment about his feelings in view of the U.S. windup and of the South Vietnamese election of Oct. 3, in which Nguyen Van Thieu became president because he was the only candidate.

"Well," said Fishel, examining a copy of a column he wrote recently for the New York Times, "Government by Force" — which attracted a great deal of interest — "let me read this paragraph, which expresses my feelings at the present. I'm afraid they're not very happy ones."

Fishel wrote:

"FOR A GENERATION, Americans have spoken hopefully and optimistically of helping into being in South Vietnam a 'broadly based government of national unity.' Now, after 17 years of total involvement in Vietnamese internal affairs, the United States has sanctified in power a polished and ruthless military Machiavellian, heading a one-party military regime, authoritarian, institutionalized in its corruption, and lacking support among the people.

"In addition, we leave an undermined and American-weakened national assembly and a discredited supreme court. As both Duong Van Minh and Nguyen Cao Ky have warned, henceforth Thieu can govern only by force."

"You see," Fishel said, putting the paper down and speaking slowly and deliberately, "the key in my own thinking has been what initially interested me: the possibility of the Vietnamese developing a palatable alternative to the Communists and the French. I'm going way back now, you notice, back to 1950.

"My acute unhappiness now with our current policies stems, in some measure, from the fact that I think we have undermined — and possibly we have even destroyed — the very thing we set out to help achieve: the middle road of non-Communist national leadership.

"It's very interesting that President Nixon, who has been so bold with respect to China and on the economic front, has taken an essentially timid and rigid position with respect to South Vietnam. In a sense, while nothing, you know, is sure in political life, it seems to me that some kind of bold and imaginative approach to Vietnam might well have produced dividends for us."

Nixon "had a fine chance to leave something worthwhile behind" with the American departure.

"But I'm afraid he muffed it," Fishel said.

"WE HAD A CHANCE TO USE our leverage—and it's still there even if it's


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talk of the world

The French press remarked on Paris's difficulties in recruiting men for the government's counter-espionage agency. The trouble is in finding Chinese-speaking agents. France has only a handful of China experts to call on (against an estimated 10,000 in the U.S.). Even their attempts to recruit Chinese-speaking Vietnamese living in France have met with frustration:

The majority of candidates had to be rejected because they either sympathized with the Viet Cong or were already being paid by the C.I.A.



"Good heavens, so that's what I do!"

Waite in THE SUN, London

November 1971

HEROIN

Peter Arnett has been covering South East Asia and the Vietnam War for more than a decade. His reporting has won such varied accolades as The Pulitzer (1966) and Sigma Delta Chi (1968) prizes, expulsion from Indonesia (1962), and the government closing of his weekly paper based in Vientiane, Laos (1969).

An Associated Press reporter since 1960, Arnett recently wrote a series of articles with Bernard Gavzer about the heroin traffic in South East Asia and the ways that heroin gets to US troops in Vietnam. UR interviewed him shortly after his return to New York, and asked him about the nature of the drug traffic there.

An American Grignis up a cigarette in Saigon. He poured grains of white heroin powder into the menthol cigarette, from which he had first removed some of the tobacco.

Wide World Photos

Everyone is against the use of heroin or at least they say they are. But beyond the basic idea that people take heroin because their life is a bummer, there are only a lot of charges and counter-charges about who is letting/helping/pushing/or profiting from the heroin trade.

We think that the heroin trade is a typical issue of our time. For example, how is it that heroin can be transported thousands of miles over all sorts of obstacles to poison millions, while we cannot possibly figure out how to get food to starving people?

We hope to do a series of articles and/or interviews about heroin presenting a variety of views and evidence. We have started with South East Asia because it is the largest source of opium in the world, and also because the heroin usage by American soldiers in Vietnam has led to increased information on this issue becoming available, such as the confidential government documents that we partially reprint here.

We do not imagine that we can cover this by ourselves and we hope that anyone who has information, documents, or knowledge will help us with this

UR: Has the CIA been part of the drug traffic in South East Asia?

Arnett: The CIA has indeed been involved, as has the US Government, for years in the drug business, but it's essentially for political reasons — as a political necessity.

Now, why is it a political necessity? At the beginning of the '60's, South East Asia was seen as greatly threatened by Communist China. There was great fear that revolutionary war by people's armies would sweep across South East Asia, to Vietnam, Thailand, Formosa and all the rest. So the American officials out there — the CIA, the American Military, and the Embassy people — figured that any approach would be acceptable if it was in order to resist that great a threat. Eventually, of course, it led to a commitment of half a million American troops in Vietnam. But even before Vietnam, any act to prevent the Communists from taking over the area was considered acceptable, and this included the drug business. Here's an example of how it worked.

In Laos you have this tribe, the Meo. They came down from central China but they are nomadic and they are squatters. They move in family groups and live above the 5000 ft. level in the mountains.

They farm crops, including opium, and they have a fairly well-developed culture based on silver ornaments and home-made weapons. The CIA and the American Government considered them important because they were the buffer between China and the rest of South East Asia. So it was in the interest of the American Government to win their allegiance. They were just another arm of the American war effort.

However, in the early '60's the Communists started pressing into Laos. Up to that time these people had been growing opium and other little crops, but opium was their only cash crop. The average family could make \$40 or \$50 a year from it, and that would be enough to buy some silver ornaments and to pay for the pigs for the harvest celebrations.

As the Communists started coming through they started to cut the old trails that these people had been using to unload their opium. The Meo were stranded in the mountains and the CIA figured that the least they could do was to help them in harvesting and distributing their crop. So, on the numerous American airfields you had a liaison