STATINTL
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WASHINGTON STAR
13 DEC 1972

Air America: Flying for U.S. and Profit in Asia

By JOHN BURGESS
Special to The Star-News

BANGKOK — "The flying is non-military; in other words, civilian flying. You are flying for the U.S. government, that is government agencies such as USOM, USAID, USIS, etc. While these agencies may be under CIA direction, you don't know and you don't care. The government agencies direct the routings and schedulings, your company provides the technical know-how and you fly the airplane."

Thus an unnamed American pilot describes "civilian flying" in Southeast Asia for Air America and the lesser known Continental Air Services — both private companies on contract to the U.S. government. The pilot's comments are part of a confidential, 16-page brochure available at certain Air Force personnel offices. It is shown to Air Force pilots interested in flying for one of the companies upon completing their military service.

The brochure lists no author or publisher, but it offers an illuminating view into the internal operations of Air America, which has played a crucial role in the Indochina war theater since the 1950s. Air America, along with the other companies, has airlifted troops, refugees, CIA agents, American politicians, war material, food and occasionally prisoners all over Southeast Asia.

Extravagant Salaries

The brochure, dated June 29, 1972, boasts that Air America ranked as one of the most profitable corporation in the United States in 1969, a year when most of the world's airlines lost heavily. Air America's customer is the U.S. government.

It employs about 436 pilots, according to the pamphlet, of which 384 are working in Southeast Asia. The center of Air America's operation is Laos, where the presence of military or military-related personnel is prohibited by the much-abused Geneva Conference of 1962.

Air America's profits are high despite the somewhat extravagant salaries it pays for flying personnel. According to the report, a pilot with 11 years experience flying the UH-34D helicopter based at Udorn air base in Thailand an average of 100 hours monthly, will take home $51,525. All salaries are tax free.

A newly hired pilot flying a C-7 Caribou transport based in Vientiane, averaging 100 hours flying time monthly, would earn a minimum $29,442. The U.S. commercial pilot average is $24,000.

Also available to Air America personnel, in addition to a liberal expense account, is life and medical insurance, two-weeks leave, tickets on other airlines at 20 percent normal cost, PX and government mailing privileges and educational allowances for dependents. Many Air America pilots are retired military men receiving military pensions.

'Good' Investment

Americans can also become "air freight specialists", commonly called kickers. Their job is to push cargo out over drop zones. Salary is $1,600-$1,800 per month. Qualifications: American citizenship, air borne training, experience with the U.S. Air Force preferred.

Air America, Inc., is owned by a private aviation investment concern called the Pacific Corp. Dunn and Bradstreet's investment directory places its assets in the $10-$50 million category, and rates it "good" as an investment risk. Air America itself employs altogether about 8,000 persons, ranking in size just below National Airlines and above most of the smaller U.S. domestic airlines.

Formerly called Civil Air Transport (CAT), Air America was organized after World War II by General Claire Chennault, commander of the American fighter squadrons in Burma and China known as the Flying Tigers. CAT played a major role in post-war China supplying Nationalist troops. CAT also supplied the French during their phase of the war in Indochina.

Air America is commonly considered an arm of the CIA. In Laos, the CIA for the past 10 years or more has maintained an army of hill tribemen, mainly Thai and Lao mercenaries. Most of the air supply and transport needs for this army have been handled by Air America.

Military Assistance

Though the brochure does not mention opium explicitly, it hints at the subject of contraband:

"Although flights mainly serve U.S. official personnel movement and native officials and civilians, you sometimes engage in the movement of friendly troops, or of enemy captives; or in the transport of cargo much more potent than rice and beans! There's a war going on. Use your imagination!"

Air America works hand-in-hand with the U.S. Air Force. At Udorn air base in Thailand, Air Force mechanics repair the airline's transports and helicopters, many of them unmarked. The Air Force has reportedly leased giant C130 transports when the planes were needed for operations in Laos. In the section on Air America's benefits, the brochure lists in addition to normal home and sick leave: "Military leave will be granted appropriately" — an apparent acknowledgement that there are military people working directly with Air America.

One should not conclude, however, that the salaries, excitement and tax advantages mean that Air America pilots hope the war will continue. As the brochure's author notes in a typed postscript:

"Foreign aid situation unclear pending outcome military situation in RVN (Republic of Vietnam), but it looks as if we'll finish the war (and peace terms favorable for our side); if so, it is expected that a boom among contract operators will result when implemented, due to inevitable rehabilitation and reconstruction aid in wartorn areas. . . . Job market highly competitive and you'll need all the help you can get."

According to Pacific News Service, the following men sit on the Air America board of directors:

Samuel Randolph Walker — chairman of the board of Wm. C. Walker's Son, New York; director of Equitable Life Assurance Society; member of Federal City Council, Washington, D.C.; member of Action Council for Better Cities, Urban America, Inc., and life trustee, Columbia University.

William A. Reed — chairman of the board of Simpson Timber Co.; chairman of the [illegible] Co.; director of Crown Simpson Timber Co.; director of Seattle First National Bank; director of General Insurance Co.; director of Boeing Co.; director of Pacific Car Foundry Co.; director of Northern Pacific Railroad; director of Stanford Research Institute.

Arthur Berry Richardson — foreign service officer in Russia, China and England from 1914 to 1936; chairman of the board of Cheeseborough Ponds, Inc. from 1955 to 1961; director of United Hospital Fund, New York; trustee of Lenox Hill Hospital.

James Barr Ames — law partner in Ropes & Gray, Boston; director of Air Asia Co., Ltd., director of International Student Association; member, Cambridge Civic Association and trustee of Mt. Auburn Hospital.

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BOSTON, MASS.
HERALD TRAVELER &
RECORD-AMERICAN
DEC 9 1972
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Conflict Between Two Government Agencies Aids Heroin Smugglers

By HARRY KELLY
Herald Traveler Record American
Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON — The General Accounting Office has reported to Congress that a jurisdictional conflict between Justice and Treasury Dept. agencies has impeded efforts to curb the wholesale smuggling of heroin into the United States.

Treasury's Customs Bureau and Justice's Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD), the GAO noted, accused each other of failing to cooperate or to share intelligence information.

"Customs is charged with the control of smuggling, BNDD with the control of narcotics," observed the GAO. "The interface of the two elements — smuggled narcotics — is a source of conflict between the two agencies."

The inter-agency battle, which has continued on and off for years, reached the point, the GAO found, that the White House stepped in to recommend guidelines and a special message — involving the White House, State Dept., Central Intelligence Agency, and Treasury and Justice Depts. — was issued last July 28 noting that the two agency heads "had agreed on the fullest possible cooperation."

The BNDD cited the following case as the kind of problem its agents have had with Customs:

A BNDD undercover agent arranged to act as a middleman in receiving a package of narcotics from a seaman aboard a foreign ship in New York drydock for delivery to three other traffickers.

The BNDD asked Customs to clear its personnel away from the dock area so that the deal could go through and narcotics agents would be able to arrest the three cohorts when they received the narcotics.

Customs refused, saying it was against its policies. The BNDD said the Customs agents then went ahead and searched everyone leaving the ship, frightening off the three traffickers and wrecking a carefully planned trap.

Customs, on the other hand, has charged BNDD with failing to pass along intelligence on suspected routes and smuggling methods "because of BNDD's desire to conduct independent smuggling investigations."

"Cooperation and coordination between law enforcement agencies are vital in the government's battle against heroin trafficking," said the GAO. "To the extent that cooperation is not fully realized, the government's effort is impeded. The mere existence of overlapping jurisdiction is always a threat to cooperative efforts. Sometimes, as has been the case with these two agencies, the threat becomes actual."

To improve the gathering and sharing of information about heroin smuggling, a special narcotics intelligence office has been set up in the Justice Dept. under William Sullivan, former assistant director of the FBI.

The GAO noted that both agencies informed it in September that efforts to "reach working arrangements had been successful and that lack of cooperation and coordination between the two agencies was no longer a major problem."

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DAILY WORLD STATINTL
6 DEC 1972

[redacted]

Drugs called by YWLL a ruling class weapon

STATINTL

By DONNA RISTORUCCI

NEW YORK, Dec. 6 — "Drugs are a form of chemical warfare by the ruling class against youth." So declared Mike Zagarell, educational director of the Young Workers Liberation League, at a meeting last weekend of the YWLL central committee.

The committee, after a discussion of three and a half hours, concluded that the YWLL position on both "hard" and "soft" drugs had to take into consideration more than their medical aspects.

Zagarell, as an example of how the ruling class used drugs to undermine the struggles of youth, cited the way in which Seattle businessmen several years ago countered an anti-war demonstration with a rock concert during which pot was used openly, with police cooperation.

A number of other speakers cited similar experiences. They said that the level of political struggle always went down when drug use of any kind increased. They agreed with the discussion document, prepared by the CC Executive Committee, which said drugs are deliberately made easily available to youth through collusion among the government, the CIA, police and drug pushers "to derail, divert, weaken and divide" youth, particularly Black and Brown youth, who are fighting for social change.

Role in 'pacification'

"Drugs are one of the main U.S. government 'pacification' programs for youth on the domestic front," stated the document. "All drugs, whether heroin, LSD, amphetamines or marijuana to one degree or another serve as forms of escape from reality and struggle.,. It is far easier for the ruling class to deal with a generation that is high than with a generation that is ready to take on the ruling class... and is well organized and disciplined..."

The discussion and document also placed stress on the genocidal use of drugs against Black and Brown youth.

"A flood of drugs has for years been poured into the Black and Spanish-speaking communities, revealing the racist and genocidal character of the huge drug business, a business which robs these communities of millions of dollars and thousands of lives—mostly youth — each year," the discussion document stated.

Speedup stimulant

Jay Schaffner, chairman of the Illinois section of the League, was one of several speakers who noted how drugs are used in the shop.

"Where I worked," he said, "drugs were what made speedup tolerable for most young workers. The foreman used to give out reefers in the shop."

John Lumpkin, who is a medical student at Northwestern University and recently got over 17,000 votes as a Communist Party candidate for University of Illinois Trustee, asserted that marijuana (as well as excessive alcohol) "leads to difficulty in functioning" and "interferes with building a political movement.

"Grass is an individual solution," he said. "I've been in situations where people have been smoking pot and I couldn't relate to them. They couldn't relate to anyone but themselves, and you can't build a political movement that way."

Roque Ristorucci, chairman of the New York YWLL, linked the promotion of drugs, including marijuana, with the promotion of prostitution, homosexuality and pornography and pointed to the similarity with Germany during the rise of Nazism.

"Drugs are directly related to fascism," he said. "In Germany the government was partaking in and pushing drugs while claiming to oppose them, and it's the same thing here."

He asserted that the term "drug culture" was "no accident," and pointed to many topselling books and movies today which project as heroes leaders of organized crime, drug users and pushers, [illegible]

James Steele, YWLL leader in Athens, Ohio, said that the Nixon Administration's claim of opposing drugs were "demagogic."

He, along with others, expressed agreement with the discussion document, which said, "Drug pushing is a big business, reaching into the highest levels of government, the CIA, police and the monopolies. Drugs are highly profitable. For every $8,000 worth of heroin that is smuggled into this country, drug peddlers profit about $250,000 when they sell it in the street, according to JET magazine, which adds that over $10 billion leaves the Black community each year to pay for drugs.

Change in laws urged

While opposing the legalization of marijuana, there was agreement that there was a need for a change in drug laws, particularly pertaining to marijuana with the present outrageous penalties for young drug users, especially Black and Brown youth and political activists.

Scott Douglas, chairman of the Nashville, Tenn., YWLL and a Communist Party candidate for Congress in the last election, said that in Nashville, for example, when "Black youth are arrested on drug charges for the second time they are sent to jail, while whites are sent for further psychological study and out-clinics."

Examples were cited of Black youths being sentenced to long years or even life imprisonment for possessing a couple of ounces of marijuana.

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4 DEC 1972

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War & Heroin—an Expensive Habit

THE POLITICS OF HEROIN IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. *By Alfred W. McCoy, with Cathleen B. Read and Leonard P. Adams II. Harper & Row. 464 pp. $10.95.*

BRUCE M. RUSSETT
Mr. Russett teaches political science at Yale University.

Most Americans used to think that the costs of an interventionist foreign policy were low. For relatively small expenditures of foreign aid money, arms, or occasionally the presence of American troops, one could build bastions of the Free World all around the globe. Anti-Communist governments in the underdeveloped countries could be supported or created, and anti-Communist politicians subsidized. Indeed, as in the Shan states of Burma or the Indonesian islands, separatist forces could be encouraged—if the ruling government could not be overthrown, or at least persuaded to move in desired directions. Some of these efforts might also bring enlightened governments and policies to the countries in question. Others would succeed at the cost of strengthening or imposing corrupt, oligarchic, reactionary governments. Many others would fail, at the cost of death and misery for the peoples who lived in those distant countries. But the costs to the United States would be minimal, easily tolerated by the world's richest power. And those small costs to us seemed far preferable to living in a world of Communist or neutralist-nationalist states.

Our innocence about the costs of an interventionist foreign policy has been lost in the wake of Indochina. Even if we could (as many still would) ignore the costs of our war to the wretched peoples of that area, we now have felt some substantial costs to ourselves. Fifty-six thousand young Americans dead, $200 billion spent, an economy and foreign trade balance badly out of kilter, intense strains on our domestic, social and political system—these we now recognize as part of the price we pay. In this new book Alfred McCoy and his associates show us another cost, very possibly the grimmest of all, resulting from our addiction to interventionism: the heroin plague.

Drug addiction has of course been a curse of men for many centuries, and the United States has had thousands of heroin addicts since about sixty years ago. Neither the CIA nor Dean Rusk nor Henry Kissinger invented heroin addiction. But every designer, executor, or enthusiast for an interventionist foreign policy (and that includes me and probably you in our less-enlightened days) contributed by failing to know or to care much about the more subtle consequences of that policy.

As McCoy points out, there were around 20,000 addicts in the United States in 1946; the best estimates are that the figures then grew to about 57,000 in 1965, 315,000 in 1969, and 560,000 in 1971. The avalanche of addiction was made possible by an evil combination of supply and demand. Demand means the ability of American drug consumers to pay high prices, social conditions feeding the desire for an escape, and the enthusiasm of pushers prepared to distribute free samples generously. Under such circumstances the market will grow as fast as supply will permit. The supply comes from abroad: formerly from Turkey and Iran, now largely from Southeast Asia—60 to 70 per cent of the world's illicit opium from the "Golden Triangle" of Burma, Laos and Thailand. It is grown by peasants, shipped to the United States and distributed by Corsican and Mafia underworld gangs, and moved from the peasants to the gangs with the assistance of such friendly Freedom Fighters as Gen. Phoumi Nosavan of Laos, and Ngo Dinh Diem and Air Marshal Nguyen Cao Ky of South Vietnam. After enormous and carefully documented exposition McCoy finds that the United States:

> . . . has acquired enormous power in the region. And it has used this power to create new nations where none existed, handpick prime ministers, topple governments, and crush revolutions. But U.S. officials in Southeast Asia have always tended to consider the opium traffic a quaint local custom and have generally turned a blind eye to official involvement. . . . However, American involvement has gone far beyond coincidental complicity; embassies have covered up involvement by client governments, CIA contract airlines have carried opium, and individual CIA agents have winked at the opium traffic.

This important book should not be interpreted as a piece of yellow journalism or as an exposé of scandals in the CIA. It details none of the classic sort of corruption for personal enrichment on the part of CIA men or of any other U.S. Government officials (though there is plenty on the part of the locals). The corruption is of a more subtle sort, stemming from the enthusiasm of "good" men for doing a good job. The job was defined as halting communism; the choice of means or of allies was not so important. One worked with the tools available. If this meant Corsican gangs in Marseilles, the Mafia in Sicily, or opium runners and their accomplices in Southeast Asia, that was just the way it had to be. In any case, it usually seemed to be the citizens of the countries far away, not Americans, who paid the price of such alliances. Until 1970, for instance, opium grown in the Golden Triangle stayed almost entirely in Southeast Asia for Southeast Asians. Only in that spring did the great flood of heroin to GIs in Vietnam begin, and only later still did it start to flow directly to the United States. And it was not until that time that senior officials in the U.S. Government decided that the Southeast Asian heroin trade should be suppressed.

McCoy and his colleagues show us, convincingly, that the heroin trade grew with the acquiescence and sometimes with the assistance of men in our government. Without our government's history of single-minded anti-communism, and of meddling in the politics of foreign lands, our government and our people would now have a heroin problem of much smaller proportions: Official American complicity in the drug trade has to stop. No matter how much some cold-warrior leaders may like the foreign policy of a particular foreign government, if that government is condoning heroin traffic, American military and eco[illegible] aid should be withdrawn. The

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THE AMERICAN MERCURY
WINTER 1972
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Is the Government a Partner in Red China's 'Death Trade'?

For some mysterious reason, the Nixon Administration is lying to the people about imports of opium and heroin from Red China

STATINTL

BY KENNETH JOHNS

HOW MUCH of President Nixon's re-election was engineered by "blood money" from the Red Chinese narcotics "death trade?" This is the question that many observers are asking as they speculate about the sources of the large sums of money contributed to Nixon's campaign committee whose donors were not publicly identified.

The informed guess is that these sums were payoffs from those who control the traffic in opium. Several Washington correspondents pointed out that the "missing item" not discussed by President Nixon and Chinese Communist leaders during the meetings earlier this year was the question of stopping the deadly shipments of heroin and its source material, opium, from the China mainland.

The rapidly growing number of dope addicts is considered by experts to be the number one danger to this country's health and internal security.

Extremely suspicious also is the repetition of statements about stopping the flow of opium from Turkey. This country grows only a small part of total world production, about 400 tons, compared to 1,000 tons in Southeast Asia and an estimated 10,000 tons in Red China.

A substantial part of world production ends up in the United States to supply its estimated 600,000 heroin addicts. Yet, the Nixon Administration and its spokesmen constantly play down or deny the existence of large imports, especially from China.

Noteworthy also is the fact that while official pronouncements are made deploring the "evil" from President Nixon down, the Nixon Administration has assigned *only ten agents to all of Asia* to intercept shipments. As one expert put it, "If he's [Nixon] really interested in stopping the flow he would see that the CIA, FBI and other agencies assign 500 to Hong Kong, 500 to Bangkok and 500 to Saigon. These are the major trans-shipment points to the U.S. This would make a dent in the supplies reaching the U.S."

See No Evil, Hear No Evil . . .

Preposterous as it may sound, the Administration's *official policy is that no heroin or opium comes from Red China.* Why this outright lie in the face of what all experts and foreign government officials know is not so?

Red China's involvement in the opium traffic has been known to informed people, both in and out of government, for years. One of the first government experts to point out the existence of the "death trade" was Harry J. Anslinger, director of the Bureau of Narcotics from 1949 to 1962. In 1955 he told the Senate Judiciary Committee

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CIA: The Myth and the Madness (Saturday Review Press) was written by ex–CIAnik Patrick McGarvey, who served in various intelligence agencies for 14 years. Were it not so basically melancholy, it would be a marvelous farce. McGarvey tells stories so bizarre they must be true. The CIA wanted to know the state of King Farouk's health, so it tapped two urinals in a john at a Monte Carlo casino. When the plump monarch went to the loo, an agent sitting in a stall peered out through a crack and, by coughing, signaled to a colleague on the other side of the wall which urinal Farouk was using. Presto! A specimen by remote control. McGarvey tells of stupefying bureaucracy, costly duplication, an avalanche of information so overwhelming that the important is often overlooked, and just plain incompetence. Perhaps the biggest intelligence fiasco of recent years was the capture of the spy ship Pueblo by North Korea. When the White House instantly fired off a rocket to the Defense Department's intelligence agency, the desk officer there didn't have the vaguest notion what the ship had been up to. Nobody had told him. Nor had he received a warning from the National Security Agency (the one concerned with electronic intelligence) that the Pueblo would be in danger if it went too close to the coast, for the North Koreans were clearly undertaking a more aggressive counterintelligence program. And, anyway, the intelligence the Pueblo was supposed to gather was already being adequately collected by another agency. There's a lot more like that, and when McGarvey is finished, there's not much left of the CIA myth. More damaging—but this one politically—is ***The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia*** (Harper & Row), written by a Yale Ph.D. candidate, Alfred W. McCoy, with two other grad students, Cathleen R. Read and Leonard P. Adams II. McCoy accuses the CIA—which did its best to discredit the book before publication—of supporting traffickers in opium and heroin. He charges that high-ranking Thai officials close to the U. S. and high-ranking South Vietnamese and Laotian officials entirely dependent on American support are directly involved in the sale of heroin to American Servicemen and in the shipment of heroin for sale on American streets. According to McCoy, the Nixon Administration knows exactly what's happening but will do nothing effective to stop the drug flow because that would undermine U. S. favorites in Indochina. It's a terrible accusation, but the documentation is strong. It sounds like the real McCoy.

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NEW YORK TIMES
28 NOV 1972

Stage: 'Politics of Heroin'

Satire Marks 'Dragon Lady's Revenge'

By MEL GUSSOW

Political theater often sacrifices art for the sake of politics, but this is not the case with the San Francisco Mime Troupe. It is clear from "The Dragon Lady's Revenge," a scathing musical cartoon (with dialogue), that the Mime Troupe is a superb ensemble of theatrical artists, polemicists and satirists. "The Dragon Lady" opened this weekend at the Washington Square Methodist Church, where it will run through Dec. 10.

This is a simplified (which is not to say, untrue) modern immorality play about "the politics of heroin in southeast Asia," and for documentation the handbill program directs us to Alfred McCoy's book by that name.

"The Dragon Lady" treats the drug trade as Hollywood Oriental movies treated the white-slave trade, except that "The Dragon Lady" is intentionally comic. The spoof is indebted perhaps equally to Josef von Sternberg's "Shanghai Gesture," "Fu Manchu," and daily newspaper headlines. It is played in a style somewhat like that of the Ridiculous Theatrical Company.

There are intrigues within intrigues, forked-tongue triple-dealers, spies spy on spies, and a spiraling plot that never loses sight of its tale. Everyone is a dissembler, but it is the Westerners who are most inscrutable, particularly those representing the Counter Insurgency Agency (abbreviate that at your own peril). Not just the Americans, but the British, French and Vietnamese are maliciously indicted. There are also jabs at an array of cure-alls, from methadone to missionaries.

The action sifts from the American ambassador's mansion to the nefarious White Monkey Bar to the streets and sewer of Long Pinh, a city in which hypodermic needles as well as pistols serve as weapons. Watch out for that stranger in cassock and dsneakers, brandishing a cruci-fix, which he keeps jabbing into the arm of the hero, the ambassador's son (Ed Levy), until he is turned into a doddering, glassy-eyed sleepwalker.

In command of the White Monkey is the Dragon Lady (Andrea Snow), a slinky Gene Tierney in blue backless gown, very amusingly exuding nastiness as well as sensuality. In charge of the country, or so he thinks, is General Rong Q, who is played by Sharon Lockwood with nervous, jerky movements like an old newsreel version of Mussolini. The meddlesome ambassador promises the general the presidency for life. How? "Through free and democratic elections," answers the ambassador matter-of-factly.

There are also Tim Drooley (Michael Christensen), the malevolent omni-agent; Tran Dog, the wily servant; Blossom, the sharp-eyed B-girl. These caricatures duck in and out of alliances (one motto: "The enemy of my enemy is my ally for now") and face insant death and sometimes sudden rescue.

The devious melodrama is played to the tune of a tinny neo-Weill score, plinked by a combo that varies in number from three to six. The script, music and staging are not individually credited. Collectively, this is a singular effort.

"The Dragon Lady" is presented on a tiny stage with curtains for scenery and hurried costume changes in partial view of the audience. The Washington Square church is not an ideal location. The acoustics are uneven, the space lacks intimacy, and sight-lines are difficult, but none of this matters in the slightest. The play scores its serious points with antic humor. Laughter and provocation combine to form essential political theater.

The Cast

THE DRAGON LADY'S REVENGE, a musical. Written, directed, designed, composed, built, costumes, staged, painted, publicized, produced and performed by the San Francisco Mime Troupe. At Washington Square Methodist Church, 133 West Fourth Street.
WITH: Larry Pisoni, Ed Levy, Michael Christensen, Daniel Chumley, Jason Harris, Sharon Lockwood, Melody James and Andrea Snow.

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PARIS, LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR
27 Nov - 3 Dec 1972

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HÉROÏNE : LES POURVOYEURS

Michel R. Lamberti et Catherine Lamour ont fait le tour du monde pour remonter toutes les filières qui mènent aux vrais patrons de la drogue

« *Si nous ne venons pas à bout de ce fléau, c'est lui qui viendra à bout de nous* », s'exclamait, le 17 juin 1971, le président Nixon devant des dizaines de millions de téléspectateurs. Les Etats-Unis ont, en effet, le triste privilège de compter le plus grand nombre d'héroïnomanes du monde : plus d'un demi-million actuellement, dont trois cent mille pour la seule ville de New York. Plus de 50 % des crimes perpétrés dans les grandes villes sont directement liés à la drogue : on tue pour se procurer l'argent nécessaire à l'achat d'une dose d'héroïne.

Le phénomène n'est pas seulement américain : tous les pays européens voient croître à une vitesse vertigineuse le nombre de leurs héroïnomanes. En France, où la pénétration de la drogue n'a été sensible qu'à partir de 1968, on en compte déjà vingt mille. Et le ministère de la Santé estime que le pays pourrait compter cent mille héroïnomanes en 1976.

Couper la source

La drogue n'est plus un simple problème de police. Partant du principe évident, exposé dernièrement à un journaliste américain de « U.S. News and World Report » par l'ancien directeur des Douanes américaines, Myles J. Ambrose, et selon lequel « *on ne peut pas devenir toxicomane si l'on ne trouve pas de stupéfiants* », Washington a décidé de remonter à la source, c'est-à-dire à la production même de l'opium, dont l'héroïne est un dérivé.

Couper la source d'approvisionnement des trafiquants, c'est intervenir dans les affaires des pays producteurs : de policière, la lutte contre la toxicomanie est devenue politique. Se posant une fois de plus en « gendarmes du monde » mais, cette fois, pour une cause dont personne ne songe à discuter le bien-fondé, les Etats-Unis se sont lancés dans une croisade que d'aucuns jugent d'avance vouée à l'échec.

On produit, en effet, chaque année, dans le monde, assez d'opium pour approvisionner les cinq cent mille héroïnomanes américains pendant cinquante ans : deux à trois mille tonnes, dont la moitié seulement est destinée à l'industrie pharmaceutique. Le reste passe sur le marché entre les mains des trafiquants qui approvisionnent les fumeurs d'opium et les héroïnomanes.

Les trafiquants peuvent se fournir à deux sources différentes :

● 1) Les pays dans lesquels la culture du pavot est légale et contrôlée par l'Etat, mais où une partie de la récolte échappe aux autorités administratives.

● 2) Les pays dans lesquels la culture du pavot est en principe interdite, mais qui n'ont pas les moyens matériels et politiques — ou le désir — de faire respecter cette loi.

La Turquie, troisième producteur mondial, entrait dans la première catégorie. Jusqu'à ce que le gouvernement d'Ankara décide de proscrire la culture du pavot sur tout le territoire turc à partir de 1972, 25 % de la production d'opium était détournée vers le marché clandestin, alors qu'elle aurait dû, en principe, être entièrement achetée par l'Etat. Ce pays n'est pas le seul à connaître pareil problème, une enquête effectuée par le service stratégique des renseignements du Bureau des Narcotiques américain (B.N.D.D.) donnait, pour 1971, les chiffres suivants :

	Production (1) écoulée sur le marché licite	Production écoulée sur le marché clandestin
Turquie	150	35 à 50
Inde	1 200	250
Pakistan	6	175-200
Iran	150	?
U.R.S.S.	115	?
République populaire de Chine	100	?
Yougoslavie	0,83	1,7
Japon	5	—
Triangle d'or (Thaïlande - Birmanie - Laos)		750
Afghanistan		100-150
Mexique		5-15

(1) En tonnes.

Contrairement à ce que l'on pourrait penser, les « fuites » ne sont pas proportionnelles à l'importance de la production licite ni à celle des superficies cultivées en pavot. Elles dépendent du plus ou moins grand sous-développement administratif du pays concerné et de la capacité des autorités locales à exercer un contrôle effectif sur les paysans, au moment de la récoltes.

Pourtant, même des contrôles rigoureux ne suffisent pas à éviter les détournements, compte tenu de la différence de prix pratiqués sur le marché officiel et sur le marché clandestin. L'exemple de l'Inde le prouve, où, en dépit d'un système de contrôle gouvernemental cité en exemple par toutes les instances internationales, les fuites s'élèvent à 18 % de la production totale. La Yougoslavie laisserait échapper près de 70 % de sa production. Le Pakistan, enfin, qui produit légalement six tonnes d'opium, contribuerait pour près de deux cents tonnes à l'approvisionnement des trafiquants.

Le pavot partout

Dans une deuxième catégorie de pays la production de l'opium est illégale. Il n'existe évidemment aucun organisme d'Etat chargé de contrôler une production qui, en principe, n'existe pas. Clandestine la récolte d'opium est entièrement écoulée sur le marché parallèle. Selon le B.N.D.D. ces pays contribueraient pour huit cent cinquante à mille tonnes à l'approvisionnement du trafic.

D'autres régions, sur lesquelles on possède absolument aucune information, produisent de l'opium en quantité appréciable : le Népal et, probablement, la Syrie et le Kurdistan irakien. On signale aussi l'apparition de champs de pavots en Afrique du Sud. Contrairement à ce que l'on a souvent affirmé, la culture du pavot ne requiert pas de conditions géographiques ou climatiques exceptionnelles. Elle réclame seulement une main-d'œuvre abondante et bon marché car la récolte demande beaucoup de soins et de minutie.

Nombre de pays qui ne sont pas producteurs traditionnels d'opium pourraient, s'ils le voulaient, se mettre à cultiver du pavot. C'est le cas tout récent du Japon. La production d'opium a, de ce fait, tendance à croître en fonction de la demande et pourrait encore augmenter considérablement. Des indices nombreux m

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BLITZ (India)
25 Nov 1972
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CIA & drug traffic in South-East Asia

By BOMAN H. MEHTA

FORTY YEARS AGO, the students in Berlin shrieked: "We spit on freedom". That attitude of mind of the German nation enabled Adolf Hitler to bamboozle the electorate and seize power.

In 1972, another facet of the diseased human mind led Mrs. Patricia Nixon and her hen-witted daughter, Julie Eisenhower, to proclaim in defence of Richard Nixon's Vietnam policy that they were willing to immolate themselves on behalf of the Saigon stooge, Thieu.

THAT EXPLAINS TO A CERTAIN EXTENT WHY THE AMERICAN ELECTORATE BROUGHT ABOUT A LANDSLIDE VICTORY FOR RICHARD NIXON, THE MOST CONTEMPTIBLE, THE MOST UNLOVED FIGURE IN AMERICAN POLITICS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY.

BLACK RECORD

Richard Nixon's re-election as President of the US proves complete erosion of moral values in American society. What has been the record of this man as President of the US in the last four years?

Notwithstanding the pantomime mimicry of Dr. Kissinger's secret negotiations with Hanoi, Nixon has intensified the Vietnam War. He has devastated North and South Vietnam with fifteen million tons of bombs and a million Asians dead. And one is inclined to agree with I.F.Stone, the celebrated American columnist, that the Vietnam War may go on until 1976.

Richard Nixon has lowered the respect for the United States Supreme Court by appointing non-entities ready to carry out their master's will.

He has bullied the national press into subservience and with his secret electoral funds of £45 million, provided by the military-industrial complex, bought television to portray him every night as a man of peace hijacking his way to Peking and Moscow.

He has employed electronic devices to spy on his political opponents. The list can go on.

Two tons of opium and morphine were seized aboard a junk in Hong Kong harbour. This was the second biggest seizure. The two-million-dollar worth of contraband narcotics is part of the CIA-masterminded drug traffic to South-East Asian countries to lull them into submission to the American will.

One would have thought that this repulsive record was enough for any decent man to renounce Nixon in disgust. However, the American ballot box turned out to be another idiot box. And the most affluent society in the world showed itself as the most sick society. Consequently one must say farewell not only to the American Dream but to freedom at large.

SICK SOCIETY

To advance my thesis I must turn to The New York Review of Books of 21 September, 1972, the sea-mail copy which has just arrived in Bombay. Before doing so I may be permitted a pertinent aside.

In the midst of all this, the "White Russians" of Indian society are up in arms as their originals were trying to attack and dislodge Lenin. The Indira Government is subjected to the most vicious attacks from the deshi "White Russians." They seem to forget that drought is not an Indian phenomenon only. It prevails in the Soviet Union and in Maoist China as well as in India. It has compelled Russia and China to buy American wheat worth billions of dollars in hard cash.

Drought is not the only Indian calamity. Corruption at all levels in our society has brought about a state of affairs which can only end in chaos. We are a corrupt and degraded lot. There is no doubt about it. But who is there in our country today to replace Indira Gandhi?

The alternative to her seems to be chaos and not revolution. For revolution we require character and integrity. Alas, we cannot boast of these characteristics and we witness the dismal spectacle of politicians who blatantly defend the CIA activities in our country.

POLITICS OF HEROIN

It is in this connection I give below a summary of the account which has appeared in The New York Review of Books of 21 September 1972. A book entitled The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia by Alfred W. McCoy was to be published by the well-known publishers, Harper & Row.

On June 1, 1972, Cord Meyer, a CIA official, visited the New York office of Harper & Row and requested the management to provide him with a copy of the galley-proofs of McCoy's forthcoming book.

THE REASON WAS THAT IN THIS BOOK MR. McCOY WAS SHOWING THE COMPLICITY OF THE CIA AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT IN ORGANISING SOUTHEAST ASIAN DRUG TRAFFIC SINCE 1950.

At this very time the author, Alfred McCoy, was testifying before the Senate Appropriations Committee his findings into the Southeast Asian drug traffic. McCoy's researches included during 18 months of study more than 250 interviews with heroin dealers, police officials and intelligence agents in Europe and Asia.

It was Cord Meyer's contention that Mr. McCoy's book would be full of inaccuracies. It would embarrass the United States government and perhaps involve the publishers in libel suits. (As a CIA official, Cord Meyer had been in the past in charge of providing financial subsidies to organisations such as the National Students' Association, Encounter magazine, and the Congress for Cultural Freedom.)

CIA CENSORSHIP

The publishers got in touch with the author and informed him that they had decided to let the CIA examine the galley-proofs. The reasons given by the publishers were two:

continued

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WASHINGTON POST
23 NOV 1972

STATINTL [redacted]

Soviets Accuse CIA Of 'Heroin Policy'

MOSCOW, Nov. 22 (UPI)—The Soviet newspaper Literary Gazette accused the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) today of providing heroin to dissident groups in Europe.

The CIA "policy of heroin" has been under way for five years in Italy, West Germany and France, the newspaper said. "In almost every big town, in universities and clubs for young people, the CIA installs its opium agents (very often they're pretty girls) among the potential young dissidents. Eventually some of the dissidents become addicts," the paper said, and "at this stage the CIA starts its ideological infiltration of their minds."

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WASHINGTON POST

21 NOV 1972

[redacted]

Jack Anderson

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

CIA Echoes—CIA agents accused of fostering the opium traffic in Southeast Asia can take consolation from a precedent set 30 years ago in the same area by the old Office of Strategic Services. In a book soon to be published, called "The OSS in Work War II," author Edward Hymoff writes that OSS agents parachuted into Burma with silver coins and opium to pay anti-Japanese Kachin irregulars. "If there was any moral considerations," writes Hymoff, an ex-OSS man himself, "they were overcome by the realities of war and military operations."

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DAILY WORLD
14 NOV 1972

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

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DAILY WORLD
18 NOV 1972

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STATINTL

Youth

Fight drugs by creating jobs

By DONNA RISTORUCCI

Use of drugs—marijuana, "soft drugs" and heroin—is rampant in New York City's secondary schools, according to the Fleishmann Commission, a special commission formed to make an overall evaluation of the NYC school system.

The commission's report, recently released, estimates that nearly half of NYC high school students and approximately one-fifth of the junior high school students use drugs of some sort.

Will Riggan, the commission's associate director of research, said the students' use of drugs is generally more than "occasional."

Fifty percent of "inner city" crime in the United States is said to be heroin-connected.

Recent reports have estimated that the number of drug addicts in the nation has reached 600,000, arguing that previous surveys underestimated the extent of drug addiction.

The National Industrial Conference Board of New York said last year that a survey of 222 companies showed 53 percent reported some drug abuse among employees.

Despite claims by President Nixon last month that Federal anti-drug funds increased elevenfold since 1969, that arrests doubled in the same period and that a recent sharp increase in heroin prices on the East Coast suggests that the "supply is drying up," drug usage and addiction have dramatically increased, particularly among youth.

John Finlator, who retired last January as deputy director of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, charged that "we are in worse shape in the war against drug abuse today than on the day the present Administration took office."

Jarvis Tyner, national chairman of the Young Workers Liberation League and candidate for Vice President on the Communist Party ticket, has commented often on the apparent inability (or unwillingness) of the FBI, the CIA, local police departments and the entire Nixon Administration to crush organized crime and put a halt to the billion-dollar drug trade, while they seem to have no trouble harassing and arresting thousands of Black, Chicano and Puerto Rican youth for no reason and disrupting and intimidating movement organizations and leaders.

The role of the CIA and the military in the drug smuggling trade, particularly from Thailand, Laos and Burma has been established, as has police cooperation in drug pushing in cities like New York. This must be stopped.

Equally important, however, is the need to get rid of the causes of drug usage among youth.

A basic cause, Tyner has pointed out, particularly among Black youth, is unemployment. The Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs says the majority of young drug addicts are without steady employment.

"Lack of jobs turns large numbers of ghetto youth towards drug addiction," Tyner says. "People's spirit can take but so much without working for long periods of time. Some youth have come out of school and have never had a job. You can understand how drugs seem like a way out."

He added, "We believe this is a conscious policy on the part of the Administration."

Yet, jobs programs and guaranteeing that youth and young exaddicts are given jobs with meaning and a decent salary, are not a major part of a drug rehabilitation or drug prevention programs.

It was recently revealed in a survey commissioned by the Labor Department that the question of jobs in relation to drug rehabilitation has been largely ignored by the drug treatment programs and employers.

"Employers are actively excluding people with a history of drug problems from the labor force in the belief that these people constitute bad business risks and endanger the productivity of the company," the report said, and added that "drug programs do not see vocation training or job placement as playing an important role in the rehabilitative process."

The program of the YWLL and the election platform of the CP advocate, in addition to establishing a massive drug-abuse education program in the schools, getting to the root of the drug problem. The program calls for a massive construction of decent low-cost housing, medical centers, schools, recreation and cultural centers which would create millions of jobs for youth and at the same time meet their basic social needs. The funds for this would come from ending the Vietnam war, dismantling U.S. military bases all over the world and generally drastically reducing the military budget. Along with education and drug rehabilitation programs, this would greatly contribute to ending drug addiction and the widespread drug usage that is plaguing youth.

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SAN DIEGO, CAL.
UNION

M - 139,739
S - 246,007
NOV 5 1972

Heroin Traffic Examined

THE POLITICS OF HEROIN IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. By Alfred W. McCoy, Harper & Row, $10.95).

Heroin didn't always have a bad name. Around the turn of the century it was hailed as a "miracle drug" and approved by the AMA for general use. In fact, it didn't even have a name until Germany's Bayer chemical combine invented "heroin" as a brand name and put it on the market as a cough medicine.

But this fascinating bit of drug lore is only incidental to the central theme of this devastating book; that because of its commitment to contain communism in Southeast Asia, the U.S. government helped create a generation of junkies.

Southeast Asia's "golden triangle" — where Laos, Thailand and Burma meet — has been an opium-growing area for centuries. But what McCoy and his fellow authors are concerned about is how within the last 20 years the "triangle" has expanded its production until today it accounts for 70 per cent of the world's illicit supply of heroin.

For this the authors hold the United States responsible. They specifically charge that in their clandestine war against the Communists, U.S. agencies, notably the CIA, allied themselves with elements known to be engaged in the drug traffic; ignored and even protected the activities of known drug traffickers, and allowed American military aircraft to be used to transport drugs

The charges are difficult to refute because, in the main, they happen to be true, McCoy has done his homework. Critics may quarrel with some of his facts and dispute many of his judgments, but he convincingly demonstrates, for example, that the G.I. heroin epidemic in South Vietnam could not have happened without the active participation of greedy generals and government officials who owed their jobs to the United States.

U.S. involvement in the drug traffic was, as the authors contend, an "inevitable consequence" of our involvement in Southeast Asia, where opium was a way of life. But it did not become an "American problem" until it touched American lives.

The book is not quite the scholarly work that it pretends to be. It is as much an indictment of the Vietnam war as it is a documentation of the drug traffic. The authors suggest that all will be well if President Nixon is defeated and the United States pulls out of Southeast Asia lock, stock and barrel.

Maybe so. But the sad thing is that the book's chief victims are a handful of dedicated CIA men who went to Southeast Asia to do a job. That job was to fight communism, not reform a society.

—Chicago Daily News

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DENVER, COLO.
ROCKY MT. NEWS
M - 192,279
S - 209,887
NOV 5 1972

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STATINTL
STATINTL

New book delves into problem

Airline accused of shipping opium

By JIM MORRELL
For Pacific News Service

A doctoral candidate in Chinese History at Harvard University, Jim Morrell has previously written for scholarly journals in the Asian Studies field.

WASHINGTON, D.C. — "It's a damned lie. You can say THAT!" We were asking Arthur Berry Richardson of New York, about reports that his airline, Air America, was one of the biggest opium shippers in the world. "We've discussed them at our board meeting, these scurrilous articles. There's no substance to them."

Last month Harper & Row published Alfred McCoy's long-awaited book, "The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia." The heavily documented book is based on some 240 interviews with CIA agents, Bureau of Narcotics officials, top Laotian military commandes, and opium-growing Meo tribesmen. And it presented striking evidence that Air America has been flying Meo-grown opium out of north- and northeast Laos ever since 1965.

When asked specifically about McCoy's interviews with the Meo opium farmers whose harvest was flown out on Air America, all Arthur Richardson would say was: "Some guy thinks he's clever. Just take my word for it. Goodby!"

Interviews with the publicity-shy directors of Air America tend to be brief but emotional affairs. For years Air America, the CIA's "private" charter airline in Southeast Asia, has indignantly denied any involvement in the Southeast Asian heroin traffic. This year, though, fewer people than ever seem inclined to take their word for it.

MOTTO IS NO IDLE BOAST

Air America's motto is "Anything, Anytime, Anywhere — Professionally" and it is no idle boast. From dusty airstrips in the Meo hill country they have been airlifting the raw opium to laboratories in Long Chieng or Vietiane where it is refined into No. 4 heroin (90 to 99 per cent pure), then smuggled abroad by Corsican gangsters or Laotian diplomats for ultimate disposal in U.S. markets.

The Opium Trail leads from the poppy fields of the Southeast Asian "Fertile Triangle" (of Burma, Thailand, and Laos which now produce over 70 per cent of the world's opium supply) to Saigon, Hong Kong, or Marseilles, and then right to the waiting arms of America's estimated one million heroin users.

In separate interviews, Laotian Gens. Ouane Rattikone and Thao Ma both told McCoy that Air America began flying opium to markets in Long Chieng [illegible]

Rattikone was until last year owner of the largest heroin refinery in Southeast Asia. Gen. Thao Ma is former commander of the Laotian Air Force.

After several more interviews in Vientiane, McCoy told us he took a bus out of Luang Prabang, hitched a ride in a government truck and, when the road gave out, started hiking over the mountains. By nightfall he reached a small village, spending a sleepless night under a thin thatched roof.

"There was always the sound of a plane somewhere," he said. "Sometimes it was far away and sometimes it seemed right overhead. And every so often you would hear the sound of its mini-guns going off—600 rounds a minute at who knows what, anything that sets off its infrared detectors, anything that moves or breathes or gives off warmth."

The next morning McCoy and an interpreter walked down from the mist-enveloped mountains into the village of Long Pot, 10 miles west of the Plain of Jars. There, under the shadow of 6,200-foot Mt. Phou Phachau, which dominates the entire district, McCoy had reached the head of the Opium Trail.

TRADITION OF POLITICAL POWER

The village of Long Pot is a Meo community of 47 wooden dirt-floored houses. It is one of 12 Meo and Lao Theung villages that make up Long Pot District. One of the oldest Meo villages in Northeast Laos, it has a tradition of political power and is the home of District Officer Ger Su Yang. According to Ger Su Yang, the village households produce 15 kilos (33 pounds) of opium apiece. They are guaranteed an adequate food supply by Air America rice drops.

In return, officers of the CIA's "clandestine army" (led by the Meo Chieftain Vang Pao) pay them a high price for the opium. The source of Vang Pao's money, of course, is the CIA.

Long Pot is one of the few remainig areas in Northeast Laos where opium history can still be observed: close enough to Long Chieng still to be controlled by Vang Pao but far enough to escape the fighting. The Meo tribesmen's only cash crop is opium, and the CIA's deal with Vang Pao, badly put, comes to this: you send us soldiers and we'll buy your opium.

The 47 households' harvest of 700 kilos of opium will yield 70 kilos of pure morphine base after it has been boiled, processed and pressed into bricks. Then further processed in one of the region's seven heroin labs, the Long Pot harvest will yield 70 kilos of No. 4 heroin. Worth $500 to the villagers of Long Pot, it will bring $225,000 on the streets of New York or San Francisco.

Formerly Long Pot's opium harvest was bought up by merchant caravans, but these [illegible]

and 1965. They were replaced by pony cara[illegible]. But the 1969, 1970 an[illegible] 1971 opium harvests were flown out in Ai[illegible] America UH-1H "Huey" helicopters.

RENDEZVOUS IS DESCRIBED

District Officer Ger Su Yang described th[illegible] rendezvous with Air America: "Meo officer[illegible] with three or four stripes (captain or major[illegible] came from Long Chieng to buy our opium[illegible] They came in American helicopters, perhap[illegible] two or three men at a time. The helicopte[illegible] leaves them here for a few days and they wal[illegible] to villages over there (swinging his arm in[illegible] semi-circle in the direction of Gier Goot, Lon[illegible] Makkhay and Nam Pac), then come back her[illegible] and radio Long Chieng to send another helicop[illegible] ter for them. They take the opium back to Lon[illegible] Chieng." The pilots were always Americans[illegible] and the Meo army traders did the buying.

The head man of Nam Ou, a Lao Theun[illegible] village four miles north of Long Pot, confirme[illegible] the district officer's account. In 1969 and 197[illegible] Meo officers helicoptered into Tan Son village[illegible] hiked to Nam Ou, and purchased the opium[illegible] harvest, then continued on their way to Nar[illegible] Suk and Long Pot.

The harvest of 1971 may well have bee[illegible] Long Pot's last. In return for the rice drops an[illegible] opium purchases, Vang Pao and the CIA kep[illegible] demanding soldiers. USAID (United States Ag[illegible] ency for International Development) built[illegible] school in the village, and "Mr. Pop" (Edga[illegible] Buell, then the CIA's chief operative in Laos[illegible] had high hopes for the place, but in 1970 Van[illegible] Pao demanded that all the young men in th[illegible] village including 15 year-olds join his army[illegible] fighting the Pathet Lao. Ger Su Ynag complie[illegible] and they were flown away by Air America hel[illegible] copters in late 1970.

But reports of heavy casualties came in an[illegible] the village refused to send more. Ger Su Yan[illegible] described what happened next: "The Amer[illegible] cans in Long Chieng said I must send all th[illegible] rest of our men. But I refused. So they stoppe[illegible] dropping rice to us. The last rice drop was i[illegible] February this year."

ANSWER TO THE VILLAGERS

Fight or starve — this was the CIA's answe[illegible] to the villagers of Long Pot. Air America fle[illegible] the village's young men away to fight and re[illegible] turned their corpses to the village — profes[illegible] sionally wrapped in sanitary plastic bags.

For the CIA the Meos offered a convenien[illegible] instrument for keeping alive their war in Laos[illegible] but for the Meos their alliance with the CIA an[illegible] Air America has only brought disaster. The[illegible] have been decimated and the survivors hav[illegible] fled the hills for the refugee camps aroun[illegible] Long Chieng.

Long Pot's 1972 opium harvest was destro[illegible] ed when "allied" fighters napalmed the villag[illegible] and three nearby Lao Theung villages. An[illegible] Vietnam's National Liberation Front reporte[illegible] that on Jan. 10, 1972, units of the Lao People[illegible] Liberation Army took Long Pot.

Because of the fighting, in fact, Laos w[illegible] only account for a fraction of Southeast Asia[illegible] estimated 1,000-ton 1972 harvest, and Ai[illegible] America may be shipping more dead bodie[illegible] than opium this year.

Revelations like these in McCoy's bo[illegible] made the CIA so nervous that they contacte[illegible] the publisher and insisted on a prior review, a[illegible] unprecedented move. After considerable arm[illegible] twisting, Harper & Row reluctantly agreed, h[illegible] found the CIA's critique of the book unimpr[illegible] sive and went ahead with publication anyway.

Since the CIA is Air America's major co[illegible] tractor, the trail of responsibility leads dir[illegible] to the Executive Branch of the U.S. Gover[illegible] ment. It neatly undercuts all the "law a[illegible] order" statements flowing from the Wh[illegible]

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ATLANTIC
NOV 1972

STATINTL

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LIFE & LETTERS

HEROIN AND THE CIA

by Flora Lewis

THE POLITICS OF HEROIN IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
by Alfred W. McCoy
Harper & Row, $10.95

One fact is beyond dispute: heroin is flooding into the United States in sufficient quantities to support an ever growing number of addicts. Estimates about the drug traffic are unreliable, but trends are painfully clear in mounting deaths, young zombies stumbling through city streets, crime to the point of civic terror. There are said to be some 560,000 addicts in America now, twice the number estimated two years ago and ten times the level of 1960.

Another fact goes unchallenged: suddenly, in 1970, high-grade pure white heroin, which Americans prefer to the less refined drug more normally consumed by Asians, appeared in plentiful and cheap supply wherever there were GI's in Vietnam. The epidemic was a vast eruption. It took the withdrawal of the troops to douse it, for the fearful flow could not be staunched.

Beyond those facts, the sordid story of drug trafficking has been a shadowy, elusive mixture of controversial elements. It was obvious that there must be corruption involved. It was obvious that there must be politics involved, if only because the traffic continues to flourish on such a scale despite the energetic pronouncements of powerful governments. It takes a map of the whole world to trace the drug net.

Since the United States suddenly became aware of the sinister dimensions of the plague and President Nixon bravely declared war on drugs (unlike the persistently undeclared war in Indochina), it has been customary for U.S. officials to pinpoint the poppy fields of Turkey and the clandestine laboratories of Marseille as the source of most of the American curse. Nobody denied that the bulk of the world's illicit opium (some say 70 percent, some say 50 to 60 percent) is grown in Southeast Asia and particularly in the "golden triangle" of mountains where Burma, Thailand, and Laos meet. But the U.S. government insisted, and continues to insist in the 111-page report on the world opium trade published in August, that this supplies natives and seldom enters American veins.

Not so, says Alfred W. McCoy, who spent some two years studying the trade. And further, it is certain to become less and less so as measures which the United States demanded in Turkey and France take effect in blocking the old production and smuggling patterns. This is of crucial importance for two reasons. One is that firm establishment of an Asian pattern to America means that the crackdown in Turkey and France will be next to futile so far as availability of heroin in the United States is concerned. The second is that focusing attention on Southeast Asia would bring Americans to understand that the "war on drugs" is inextricably involved with the Indochina war, and has to be fought on the same battleground from which President Nixon assured us he was disengaging "with honor."

McCoy, a twenty-seven-year-old Yale graduate student, worked with immense diligence and considerable courage—for the opium trade is dangerous business and the combination of opium, politics, and war can be murderous—to document the facts of the Asian pattern.

A good deal of it has been common gossip in tawdry bars of Saigon, Vientiane, and Bangkok for years. But the gossip mills of Indochina are a long way from the streets of Harlem and the high schools of Westchester County. The general knowledge that the rumors reflected is a long way from precise, confirmed detail. So the Asian pattern had never come through clearly in the United States.

Now, in his book *The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia,* McCoy has set it down. To show how it developed, he had to backtrack. The use of opiates in the United States has a long history. It wasn't until after World War I that widespread opprobrium, added to growing understanding of the dangers, turned the trade into an underworld monopoly. But World War II disrupted the supply routes. Unable to get drugs, American addicts were forced to quit the hard way. The market diminished, and, with a modicum of enforcement effort and international cooperation, might have been wiped out.

A single U.S. official act, McCoy believes, turned that chance around and enabled the creation of a worldwide octopus of evil almost beyond

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STATINTL

27 OCT 1972

THE WEEK

■ "Oscar Sequella-Avendano, a former Air Force officer, the founder of military parachute training in Chile, is having a hard time. He is sick, suffering from recurrent asthma attacks, and is in an Atlanta, Georgia jail. The CIA has accused [him] of being involved in drug traffic along with a group of deviates whom he cannot even identify on sight. Sequella's future is tragic. In his letter to Chilean friends, he demonstrates his great moral courage and his deep love for his country."

Ultima Hora
Santiago, Chile, June 21, 1972

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BALTIMORE NEWS AMERICAN
26 OCT 1972

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Burma Heroin Hoard Destined for U. S.

STATINTL

By ROBERT KAYLOR

BANGKOK, Thailand -- (UPI) — Narcotics traffickers have stockpiled hundreds of pounds of pure heroin in North Burma and are trying to establish a connection to lucrative markets in the United States.

In the meantime, U. S. and Thai narcotics agents who have tightened their grip on routes for heroin and opium traffic are watching from across the border.

Informed sources here who have watched the stockpiles build up, say a wary standoff has developed in the "Golden Triangle" the border area of Thailans, Laos and Burma where the Southeast Asian narcotics trade is centered.

INTELLIGENCE reports indicate that narcotics traffickers—mostly overseas Chinese—have considered killing U. S. narcotics agents to clear the bottleneck.

"Eventually they'll start to move the stuff," said a local source, "and things will start to happen. The question is when."

Sources who monitor the narcotics traffic say producers in North Burma have on hand several hundred pounds of neatly packaged, pure grade no. 4 white heroin, which looks like soap powder.

Manufactured in refineries that are in some cases almost in sight of the Nam Ruak River forming the boundary between Burma and Thailand more than 400 miles north of Bangkok, the heroin was intended for the American GI market in South Vietnam, the producers were caught unawares by the U. S. withdrawal, the sources say.

TRAFFICKERS ARE now looking for connections in other markets, including the United States, which now gets an estimated 5 to 10 per cent of its heroin from Southeast Asia.

"These boys haven't even tapped the U. S. market yet," said one source here.

That they are interested was demonstrated by the arrest of two Chinese who sold a suitcase full of heroin to an undercover narcotics agent in New York's Chinatown this summer. The heroin was traced to Southeast Asia.

Narcotics authorities estimate that about 700 tons of opium are produced each year in the jungled mountains of the Golden Triangle, mostly in Burma. While Thailand and Laos cooperate with the United States in combating narcotics traffic, Burma does not.

THE AUTHORITIES believe half of the opium is used in the area where it is grown and another 200 to 250 tons used in Hong Kong and other places in Southeast Asia where there is a large addict population. That leaves 50 tons or more unaccounted for—enough to produce at least five tons of high-grade heroin.

The major route for the opium has been across the borders into Thailand, then by highway to the Bangkok area and from the Thai coast by fishing trawler to Hong Kong and the rest of the world.

About a dozen U. S. narcotics agents have moved into Thailand, some of them operating in the far northern Thai sector of the triangle.

The Thai police last April formed a 30-man special narcotics operation (SNO) to work in North Thailand. While U. S. and Thai agents cannot work across the Burmese border, they have formed their own network of informants and also enlisted the aid of the CIA, which has been active in the area for the past 20 years.

SINCE SNO STARTED work it has seized more than five tons of opium, heroin and other drugs and broken up smuggling networks which used dummy gasoline tank trucks and opium runners in Thai army officers' uniforms to get past checkpoints.

Much of the SNO success has been through cash awards running up to $2,000 for large drug seizures. The money is paid to the Thai investigators who make the haul, and they distribute it among their informants.

Sources here say the reluctance of traffickers to move large quantities of opium since two big seizures in July totaling more than 6,000 pounds is proof the system works.

Heroin is still plentiful in Bangkok and at the U. S. military bases in Thailand, as was discovered by a more efficient system of testing GI's which went into effect in July.

TESTS SO FAR indicate that up to 1,575 of the approximately 45,000 GI's in Thailand use heroin, compard with about 255 discovered earlier. A vial of pure heroin that will sell for $500 in the U.S. can be bought for $5 in Thailand.

Authorities say big-time traffic through Thailand has dried up temporarily, however. They cite the crackdown and temporary loss of a big market as the cause.

"What keeps a connection together is a combination of faith and trust in the guy you're dealing with," said one source here. "It takes time to build that up."

The sources added that heroin is a product that does not deteriorate sitting on the shelf, and that the men who run the Golden Triangle drug traffic can afford to wait.

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THE DRUG PROBLEM STILL GROWS

HON. CHARLES B. RANGEL
OF NEW YORK
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Friday, October 13, 1972

Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Speaker, the failure of this country to stop or even slow the soaring rate of drug addiction has left it at the mercy of this cancerous habit which knows no mercy.

Heroin addiction is the greatest single cause of crime, and that problem too is worsening—up 33 percent in recent years. Heroin addicts spend more than $5 billion a year on their habit, making criminal narcotics traffic one of America's largest industries. That $5 billion is paid by the victims of the millions of burglaries, robberies and thefts committed by heroin addicts each year. It amounts to a "heroin tax" of $100 a year for every American family of four.

Heroin addiction is no longer isolated in the urban ghetto. It has spread to all parts of society. Nor is heroin addiction an isolated problem of the addicts. It is a serious problem that affects everyone who is a victim of their crime.

Heroin addiction has spread to epidemic proportions. In late 1969, the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs estimated the number of heroin users in the United States to be 315,000. At the end of 1971, the estimate was 560,000.

A year ago the BNDD estimated that 5 to 6 tons of heroin were being smuggled into the United States each year. Today their estimate is 6½ to 10 tons.

A major reason for the failure of the war on drugs has been the Nation's failure to prevent Southeast Asia from emerging as a major source of heroin. One quarter to one third of the heroin entering the United States comes from Southeast Asia. If present trends continue, Southeast Asia will replace Turkey as the major source for heroin entering this country.

The reason that this Nation has been unable to prevent this is that our allies in Laos, Thailand, and South Vietnam are involved in the narcotics trade. The United States does not crack down on them because officials have placed the need for airbases in Thailand, Lao mercenaries and Vietnamese soldiers over the safety of this Nation's population from the drug invasion.

While a law that I authored enables aid to be cut off to countries that refuse to stop contributing to our drug problem, columnist Jack Anderson, in a column which appeared in the New York Post on Friday, October 13, points out that classified CIA documents give evidence that Southeast Asian leaders are either protecting drug smugglers, or are, themselves, participating in the traffic in illegal drugs to America.

More than $200 million in military aid annually goes to the Souvanna Phouma government in Laos. Yet one CIA document quoted by Anderson said:

> A broad spectrum of Lao society is involved in the narcotics business, including generals, princes, high-level bureaucrats and province governors.

Laotian generals, it seems, are providing the transportation for drug smugglers. Ironically, according to the reports in Anderson's possession, the planes and trucks to transport the American-bound narcotics are paid for by the U.S. military programs which Congress has said should be cut off in just this kind of situation.

This secret report goes on to say, according to Anderson, that the difficulty of cutting off aid is great since "the risk of jeopardizing some part of the military is high."

Our $340 million aid to Cambodia goes to help support one of the major shipment points for Southeast Asian heroin and the unstable corrupt government that protects this operation.

Anderson goes on to quote from the report:

> If U.S. aid were withdrawn, the government's ability to withstand Communist aggression would be weakened to the point of collapse.

Are we to believe that the prospect of the collapse of a tiny corrupt government on the other side of the world is more important than the deaths of hundreds of our young people, black and white, because of heroin?

The story is no better in South Vietnam. While the Thieu regime has mouthed promises to stem the flow of heroin from its mountainous areas, Anderson quotes this report as saying, "the corruption among government, civilian, military and police officials, some of whom have been participating in the narcotics traffic themselves" makes the prospects of stopping South Vietnamese heroin traffic without drastic action very dim.

As for these drastic actions, the report is further quoted to say:

> It is not in the U.S. interests to implement an air cut-off, even to punish Vietnam for failure to control drugs.

Thailand and much of South America repeat this same depressing story. Obviously, the war on drugs has become the victim of the war in Southeast Asia.

Up to 100,000 American GI's sent to fight in Vietnam since 1969 became addicted to heroin produced and marketed by our Southeast Asian allies. This same heroin is now taking its toll in our own country.

Claims of impressive seizures, important arrests, and international cooperation can simply not hide the failures. Ridding America of the heroin plague should be a seriously pursued national goal. When we spend $60 billion to fight North Vietnam and less than $1 billion to fight drug addiction, the priorities are anything but correct.

In September 1970, a leading Federal narcotics officer said:

> Every time one addict is cured, more take his place because of the ever-increasing amounts of heroin available.

A year ago, the American people were told that opium production was being phased out in Turkey—which had in the past accounted for 80 percent of the heroin being smuggled into the United States.

For Americans today, this elicits several questions which should be asked.

If opium production in Turkey is being phased out, how can heroin importation—and addiction—be increasing?

And why is the overall problem worse than ever after all the calls for special action?

The answer, again, lies in the region known as the Golden Triangle where the borders of Thailand, Burma, and Laos converge. One year's crop of 700 to 1,000 tons can be refined into enough heroin to supply America's addicts for 10 years. More and more of this heroin is reaching the American market.

Southeast Asia has been a major producer of opium and has had opium addiction problems of its own for some time. But only in 1969 did the white pure No. 4 heroin prized by American addicts begin to be produced in Southeast Asia.

When it appeared, it appeared in earnest. John Ingersoll, Director of BNDD, said:

> Our first indication of the presence of (No. 4) heroin in Southeast Asia came in December of 1969. In 1970, the trickle turned into a stream, and in 1971, the stream turned into a torrent of heroin pouring out of the "Golden Triangle."

Since there was no indigenous demand for No. 4 heroin anywhere in Southeast Asia, its appearance signified an intention to supply the U.S. market. The first victims were our soldiers in Vietnam.

Now that many of our GI's have come home and the market for No. 4 has diminished in Southeast Asia, Southeast Asian heroin is being marketed in America.

The United States has always tolerated corruption on the part of our allies in the war in Southeast Asia as long as they fight at least part of the war and follow at least some of our policies. Black marketeering, stealing U.S. aid, currency manipulation and smuggling are tolerated and all are rampant. Narcotics trafficking has not been treated any differently.

A vast military and political apparatus was built up in Indochina by the United States. We ignored the fact that virtually every link in that apparatus was simultaneously becoming part of a vast opium producing, refining, and smuggling apparatus which today is well on the way to replacing Turkey as the major source of heroin entering the United States.

The basics of the development of the Southeast Asian opium and heroin trade are these:

In Laos, opium is grown by the Meo tribesmen we organized into General Van Pao's "secret army." In fact, once the United States began providing them with liberal food supplies to assure their allegiance, many of them were able to switch to opium as virtually their only crop.

In Burma, opium is grown by the Shan rebels, the biggest opium growers in the world. They are armed with American weapons provided by the CIA or which were acquired by trading opium with government officials in Laos and Thailand for guns supplied by—and stolen from—the U.S. military aid program.

Opium is also grown by hill tribesmen in Thailand.

Opium from Burma is transported into Thailand by remnants of the Nationalist

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SAN DIEGO, CAL
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Kleindienst suspects news leak in ranks

By MARK MONDAY

Atty. Gen. Richard Kleindienst told a news conference in San Diego last night that it appears someone in the Justice Department is leaking information to the news media. He has not found out who it is.

When he does, he intends to ask for the person's resignation.

In a news conference in the Hilton Hotel Kleindienst also:

—Defended the government's investigation into the Watergate bugging case.

—Said his department is not investigating press charges that a presidential appointments secretary is linked indirectly with a figure in the Watergate bugging case.

—Discounted reports that the Central Intelligence Agency is linked with traffic in hard drugs from Southeast Asia.

—Urged California voters to defeat the marijuana-decriminalization initiative, Prop. 19.

—Skirted a question as to what the federal government would do if the initiative were passed.

Kleindienst held the conference before addressing the California Narcotic Officers Assn. at the Hilton.

He told the law officers his department is proposing stricter legislative restrictions on the granting of bail and parole, and mandatory jail sentences for sellers of heroin and cocaine.

Asked if there was any indication that persons in the Justice Department are leaking information on the Watergate bugging case to the press, Kleindienst responded: "If you mean do I recognize (information) when I see it in the newspaper, yes."

Kleindienst suggested the press "curb its temptations" to get and print such confidential FBI files from the Justice Department.

"Much of what you see in an FBI file is rumor, hearsay and unsubstantiated gossip," he said.

The attorney general said that, in the course of investigations, law enforcement officers have to rely on people giving them leads and information which may be only rumor.

He said that if people are reluctant to assist law-enforcement officers because their comments and rumor may be disclosed by the press, "law enforcement will be set back a long way."

Kleindienst denied there is any footdragging in the investigation or prosecution of the Watergate bugging case, in which Democratic party officials have charged that high-level Republicans were involved in an effort to spy on Democratic campaign planning.

He said FBI agents and U.S. attorneys involved in the case are career professionals and largely Democratic party oriented.

He added that he has taken an oath of office which he will not fail to uphold.

Kleindienst said the best indication that the case is being well handled and that there are no political cover-ups is that no one has leaked any such information to the news media.

Asked if any of his agencies are investigating newspaper reports that presidential appointments secretary Dwight L. Chapin is linked with a figure in the Watergate bugging case, Kleindienst said "it hasn't come before my department. No one has alleged anything is wrong."

The New York Times has reported that Donald H. Segretti, a California lawyer who has been linked to allegations of political sabotage, had 28 calls charged on his phone



RICHARD KLEINDIENST

credit card to the White House office of Chapin, Chapin's home and to E. Howard Hunt Jr., a former White House consultant charged in the Watergate case.

Kleindienst also discounted reports in a recently published book that the CIA is linked with the production and transporting of hard drugs in Southeast Asia.

He termed the charges "incredible" and said they didn't deserve an answer. "The CIA is not in the business of fostering people who engage in narcotics traffic," he said.

Of the California marijuana initiative, he said he is "absolutely, unequivocally 100% opposed" to the idea.

He said that he could not imagine the President proposing it at the federal level.

Kleindienst said "everyone agrees" marijuana is dangerous, that most of the nations in the world ban it and that "you just can't compare it to alcohol."

The initiative would remove criminal penalties from the possession for private use of marijuana for those persons 18 or older. The initiative affects only state law and not federal laws dealing with possession of marijuana.

Asked what the federal government would do to enforce its marijuana laws should the initiative pass, the attorney general said it "presents a pretty difficult question. There is a question of concurrent jurisdiction. I hope that the people of California will not present that problem to the United States."

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LIFE

20 OCT 1972

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

A packet of high-quality heroin

LIFE BOOK REVIEW

The book the CIA couldn't put down

THE POLITICS OF HEROIN IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
by ALFRED W. McCOY (Harper & Row) $10.95

One cool, clear January morning in 1970, I journeyed upward through the jungle-covered hills on the Thai-Burma border to interview a contingent of the Kokang Revolutionary Force, a band of Burmese guerrillas, about their revolt against the government in Rangoon. The talk around the campfire that day was not of revolutionary struggle, however, but of smuggling opium. And their chief worry was not the Burmese army but the remnants of Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist Chinese whose gear-wheel flag could be seen floating over Thai territory on the next mountaintop.

Even as recently as 1970 the muddled politics of the opium-growing hill tribes and the American agents who operate among them like white gods seemed the stuff of Eric Ambler novels, a problem for Asians perhaps but not a big worry for Americans. But even then the pure heroin refined from Southeast Asian opium was finding its way into the bloodstreams of American GIs. The infection now shows every sign of following them home.

Alfred McCoy, a 27-year-old Yale Ph.D. candidate, has spent the last two years unraveling this complex situation. It is his thesis that Southeast Asia is rapidly replacing Turkey as the main source of heroin in the U.S. By supporting the very people who are most involved in the trade, moreover, our government has itself become involved in the passage of opium as "simply an inadvertent consequence of its Cold War tactics."

The CIA has given a boost to the book's sales by foolishly asking to read the manuscript before publication. The CIA's lawyers said the book "could create an accepted myth that the CIA has been involved in the drug traffic." Yet their written criticism of the manuscript seemed pathetically thin. For example, the CIA denied any "substantial" contact with the Nationalist Chinese forces in Southeast Asia after 1951. But McCoy puts his sources, including a former CIA operative, on the record to the contrary. The debate breaks down over the meaning of the word "substantial." Again, the CIA denies that Air America, the CIA contract airline in Laos, carries opium. But Air America pilots are contract soldiers of fortune, and, in the bars of Vientiane, they often admitted to it.

One should remember, however, that opium-growing has long been a way of life to the hill tribes, and as such is neither illegal nor immoral. Once the political decision was made to arm the tribesmen in the anti-Communist cause it became inevitable that the agency would become at least tangentially involved in opium. Ironically, the CIA-based clandestine Meo army have been all but run out of the opium-growing areas of northeast Laos.

The book is much more than an exposé of CIA activities, however. McCoy lays out the whole history of the opium trade, going back to colonial and precolonial times, and explains in detail how the system works today. But though he paints a clear picture of governmental corruption in our client states and of the political vacuum in northern Burma, where most of the world's opium grows, it is still difficult to accept his conclusion —that the answer to the problem lies not in curing addiction at home or in smashing the syndicates, but in eradicating production in Southeast Asia. "The American people will have to choose between supporting doggedly anti-Communist governments in Southeast Asia or getting heroin out of their high schools," he concludes.

Unfortunately, the long history of our involvement in Southeast Asia has shown that we seldom have the leverage over our clients required to impose this kind of solution. It is questionable whether even the most intensive economic or diplomatic pressure could completely cut out the deeply ingrown opium business from that region. And if not Southeast Asia, are there not other fields in which poppies can grow? If we have found we cannot be the world's policeman, can we hope to become the world's narc?

by H.D.S. Greenway

Mr. Greenway is a former chief of TIME*'s Bangkok bureau.*

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WASHINGTON POST
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17 OCT 1972
STATINTL

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

Nixon Forces Accused of Dirty Tricks

By Jack Anderson

Men in power don't relish having their cozy relationships exposed, and their sources of money bared, and their errors and embarrassments publicized.

It is not surprising, therefore that the Nixon Administration doesn't like this column. So the President's dirty tricks department tried to play a few tricks on us.

The dirty tricks operation, otherwise known as the "Offensive Security Program of the Nixon Forces," was established chiefly to bewitch and befoul Democratic presidential candidates. It was funded out of a secret, fluctuating Republican slush fund.

The Washington Post has charged that the dirty tricks included forging phony letters to embarrass the Democrats, leaking false information to the press, tailing family members of Democratic presidential candidates and throwing campaign schedules into disarray.

The Watergate incident—breaking into Democratic Party headquarters, tapping party leaders' telephones and stealing party documents—was part of this sordid operation.

In our case, the dirty tricks were pulled by political operatives and government gumshoes alike. Their objective, apparently, was two-fold: (1) to discredit the column by undermining our credibility; and (2) to shut off our sources.

A host of investigators participated in the project. Government agents, watching through binoculars from a nearby knoll, staked out my house. With walkie-talkies, they directed waiting government security cars to tail me wherever I went. Sources inside the Justice Department provided me with the descriptions and license numbers of the cars. So it didn't take long to locate them lurking in hiding places near my home.

McCord's Report

The President's campaign security chief, James W. McCord Jr., joined in the investigation. In an "interim report" to the White House, he accused me of "close association with the operating arm of the Democratic Party." Ironically, a Democratic Party spokesman later accused me of close association with McCord's operation after we published an embarrassing memo from party files.

Sources inside the White House, meanwhile, warned us of attempts to discredit the column. Not long afterward, the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs called a press conference. We were tipped off that the bureau would challenge our story about Thailand's great opium hoax.

The Thai authorities with considerable whoop-de-doo staged a million-dollar opium burning to dramatize how they were cooperating with the U.S. crackdown on drugs. We reported, however, that they really burned cheap fodder mixed with opium.

Nixon aides went to elaborate lengths to knock the story down. They prepared pages of refutation for the press, set up a movie of the opium burning and produced an "expert" to testify how wrong we were. Not only narcotics officials but White House and Justice Department aides were involved in the arrangements.

But thanks to our advance tip, my associate Les Whitten showed up at the press conference with a stack of secret CIA documents and detailed notes from other documents. He quoted evidence right from the government's secret files that the Thais had burned fodder instead of pure opium. An administration spokesman sheepishly admitted that Uncle Sam had paid a cool $1 million for the ashes.

Air Force Attack

More recently, the Pentagon furnished the editors of Air Force Magazine with material for a blistering attack on us. They challenged our report about Air Force research on a laser beam that would explode the eyeballs of enemy soldiers at a distance of more than a mile. Blinded soldiers, the research noted, would be more of a burden to a fighting force than dead soldiers.

We based our story on a copy of the actual study, which speaks more than five times of the violent effects of laser beams on eyeballs. Twice, the study cites "massive blast" effects; in another place, it tells of a "micro-explosion" in the eyes. The water fluids in the eyes, adds the study, would "rise to about 100 degrees Centigrade" — the boiling point.

Although we had a copy of the study, we also contacted two Air Force researchers at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base where the research was reviewed. They would confirm only that they had been involved in classified research on laser weapons.

Finally we located the physician-researcher, Dr. Milton Zaret, who directed the study for the Air Force. To make sure our story was absolutely accurate, we read it back to him word-for-word. He suggested a few minor technical changes, which we made.

After Air Force Magazine called our story false, we reached editors Claude Witze and John Frisbee. The attack on us was written by Witze who admitted he had never seen the study he accused us of misrepresenting. He also had never tried to reach the scientist who prepared it nor, for that matter, had he bothered to seek our side of the story.

"My understanding was that (the Pentagon version) was the whole package," said Witze. "I rely on them fairly heavily."

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CHICAGO, ILL.
NEWS

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OCT 13 1972

War on Laos opium evokes no hurrahs

By Keyes Beech
Daily News Foreign Service

VIENTIANE, Laos — To the Americans who came to Laos more than a decade ago to fight a clandestine war against the Communists, the poppy was a red paper flower you bought on Veterans Day.

Today, as the United States struggles to extricate itself from the Southeast Asian quagmire, the poppy has quite a different meaning. It is a sinister flower that, if not exactly the root of all evil, has corrupted governments, made heroin addicts of thousands of GIs, tarnished America's image and besmirched the reputation of dedicated public servants.

Now, after what one critic called a policy of "benign neglect" toward Laos' uninhibited opium trade, the U.S. mission here has declared war on all narcotics.

SINCE THE DRUG traffic in Laos was perfectly legal until a year ago, when U.S. officials forced an anti-narcotics law through the national assembly, the campaign has a long way to go.

Already some assemblymen are agitating for repeal of the law because, they say, it has worked a hardship on the opium-growing Meo mountain tribesmen who are America's chief allies in northern Laos in the long-running Central Intelligence Agency-backed war against the Communists.

One tribal leader has three tons of opium to sell and no takers because of the U.S. crackdown. Since opium is, or was, Laos' only cash crop, the tribesmen have a legitimate economic complaint.

WASHINGTON, it is understood, is considering "selective buying" of the Laos opium because it isn't altogether happy with the results of its purchases in Thailand and Turkey.

If the United States did buy up Laos' surplus stock, there is no assurance the primitive tribesmen wouldn't regard Uncle Sam as a steady customer and produce more, not less, opium.

Like other U.S. mission chiefs in Southeast Asia, Ambassador G. McMurtrie Godley has felt the heat of President Nixon's global war on narcotics. Here, as in neighboring Thailand, the war on the drug traffic seems to have taken precedence over the war against communism.

"It is as if the United States were fighting two fires at once," said an old Southeast Asia hand, "communism and drugs — and the irony is that the drug problem is a direct result of the fight against communism."

GODLEY HAS come under attack by Alfred W. McCoy, a young Yale graduate, for being "soft" on the drug traffic and allegedly attempting to cover



Beech

Asia's drug pipeline

Last in a series

Godley has issued a vigorous eight-page single-spaced rebuttal to McCoy's charges as contained in a Harper's magazine article. McCoy is the author of a newly published book, "The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia," the product of 18 months' research.

The CIA is McCoy's chief target. It his contention that the CIA, by working with corrupt local officials who were engaged in the drug traffic, has contributed to America's addiction problem.

THE EMBASSY'S position was not helped earlier this year when French police confiscated a suitcase containing 60 kilos of Laotian heroin. The suitcase belonged to Prince Sopsaisana, newly appointed ambassador to Paris.

The American Embassy was almost as embarrassed as the prince, who returned to Vientiane after the French government refused to accept his credentials. For, as McCoy states, Sopsaisana was widely regarded by the Americans as "an outstanding example of a new generation of honest, dynamic national leaders."

ONE LITTLE-KNOWN fact is that Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma was an opium tax collector in French colonial days. And Gen. Ouan Rathikun, former commander of the Royal Laotian Army, will freely discuss his role in the drug traffic with almost anybody who takes the trouble to go around and see him.

After all, says the general, there was nothing unlawful about it, and opium has been a rich source of government revenue in Laos since French colonial days. It was also a rich source of revenue for the general, who seems amused by U.S. efforts to stamp out the traffic.

"If somebody wants to accuse us of being shortsighted," said a CIA official with unaccustomed passion, "that is one thing. But to say that we deliberately fostered the opium traffic as a matter of policy is an absolute lie."

BUT ONE FACT is inescapable. The CIA could not ask the Meos to fight on the American side and at the same time demand that they give up their opium-growing.

The handful of CIA men who have worked with the Meos over the years may have felt they were fighting for democracy. But the Meos were fighting for their land — and the right to grow opium on that land.

In their long war with the Communists the Meos have been driven from most of their mountain retreats by relentless Communist pressure. Since opium doesn't grow well below 3,000 feet, production has declined from an estimated 100 tons 10 years ago to 30 tons today.

"The more territory the Communists take, the less opium," said one cynical observer. "That may be the ultimate solution to the drug problem in Laos."

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WASHINGTON POST
30 OCT 1972

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STATINTL

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

Drug Peddlers Ignore Nixon Threat

By Jack Anderson

At a recent narcotics conference, President Nixon declared dramatically that keeping narcotics out of the country is "just as important as keeping armed enemy forces from landing in the U.S." The President then announced sternly that he would cut off aid to countries whose leaders "protect the activities of those who contribute to our drug problem."

Predictably, these bold words drew election-year headlines for the President and warm approval from a public alarmed over the drug danger. Yet classified documents in our possession show that the President has refused to cut off aid, despite evidence that certain foreign leaders are protecting the drug smugglers.

The smuggling operations in Laos, for example, illustrate the difference between what Mr. Nixon says in public and what his intelligence documents show in secret. To prop up the Souvanna Phouma government, he has poured in more than $200 million in military aid annually. Yet his reports from the CIA and other agencies give him every reason to cut off this aid.

Says one document: "A broad spectrum of Lao society is involved in the narcotics business, including generals, princes, high-level bureaucrats and province governors."

The CIA specifically advised that Laotian generals are providing the transportation for drug smugglers. Incredible as it sounds, the planes and trucks used to carry the U.S.-bound narcotics are provided by the U.S. military programs which Mr. Nixon has sworn to cut off.

The secret documents make clear that the President is putting his military policies in Asia ahead of the drug invasion. "The difficulties of undertaking such drastic action (as aid cutoffs) cannot be overemphasized," declares another document on Laos, "since . . . the risk of jeopardizing some part of the military effort is high."

In Cambodia, President Nixon also continues to bolster an unstable dictatorship with $240 million worth of U.S. aid a year. Yet Cambodia is an important transshipment point for dope. An intelligence document explains why Mr. Nixon, however, has no intention in Cambodia of carrying out his threat to cut off aid:

"If U.S. aid were withdrawn, the government's ability to withstand Communist aggression would be weakened to the point of collapse."

Saigon Smugglers

In South Vietnam, as well, the documents attest to "the corruption among government civilian, military and police officials, some of whom have been actively participating in the narcotics traffic themselves . . ." But again there is no real thought of cutting off aid.

The secret documents bluntly give the reason: "It is not in U.S. interests to implement an aid cutoff, even to punish Vietnam for failure to control drugs . . ."

President Nixon's double talk on drugs is nowhere more apparent than in Thailand which gets over $100 million in U.S. aid a year.

"We believe that major punitive measures (such as) withdrawal of aid, denial of Most Favored Nation status, etc. . . . would probably undermine our cooperative relations with Thailand and jeopardize ongoing security activities . . ." says a U.S. intelligence document.

The President's threats could also be carried out in Iran, which the CIA fears may soon become a major supplier for U.S. drug traffickers. But the CIA reports:

"The Shah has spoken out on a few occasions . . . against addiction (and) rumors persist that some members of the royal family and parliament are narcotics users. Swiss authorities recently charged an Iranian Prince who accompanied the Shah to Switzerland with having transferred pure opium to Geneva."

Throughout Latin America, the same look-the-other-way policy prevails.

President Nixon, for instance, praised Paraguay for extraditing a notorious French narcotics smuggler, Auguste Ricord, to face trial in the U.S. What Mr. Nixon neglected to mention was that Ricord was relinquished only after we wrote a series of columns about Paraguay's government-backed drug smuggling and after Democratic congressmen began talking of cutting off aid to Paraguay themselves.

If the President really wants to do something about Paraguay, he has CIA reports that two Paraguayan generals and the chief of its secret police are abetting the drug traffic. However, insiders say there is no real move to end the $12-million a year aid to Paraguay.

In Panama, which gets $18 million annually in aid, the President has intelligence reports saying: "One of the more glaring examples of official corruption in the country of Panama . . . General Omar Torrijos and President Lakas appear to be controlling factors in the narcotics traffic."

All over Latin America, the intelligence documents say, "the greatest detriment to effective enforcement is corruption. The corruption goes all the way to the top of some Latin American governments."

But in Latin America, too, President Nixon's vows to cut off aid to offending lands have been ignored. The documents say explicitly: "Coercive measures, such as reduction or termination of AID programs . . . generally have proven to be ineffective."

Footnote: The stack of documents in our hands also tells similar tales of rampant drug activity with various kinds of government collusion or inaction in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Mexico, Lebanon, India, Peru, Bolivia, Hong Kong and Syria.

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E - 434,849

OCT 12 1972

Asia's drug pipeline

Tachilek: world opium capital

Fourth in a series

By Keyes Beech
Daily News Foreign Service

MAE SAI, Northern Thailand — A narrow, muddy stream spanned by a 100-foot concrete bridge marks the Thai-Burma border at this frontier trading post.

Across the river, at the foot of mist-shrouded green hills studded with golden pagodas, lies Tachilek, a sleepy, undistinguished town of perhaps 10,000 people, so insignificant that it doesn't merit mention on most maps.

But Tachilek is the capital, the stock exchange, the processing and refining center of the golden triangle, the wild, mountainous region of northern Laos, Thailand and Burma that produces about 70 per cent of the world's illicit opium.

THE POPPY fields of upper Burma produce an estimated 500 tons of opium annually. Except for what is consumed locally, almost all of this opium finds its way southward to Tachilek by mule train or sometimes by truck.

The pattern has changed little over the years. The opium caravans, which number as many as 1,200 mules guarded by 1,000 armed men to fight off hijackers, reminded one anonymous witness of Wild West wagon trains.

"If you saw it in the movies," he said, "you'd never believe it."

Tachilek offers complete facilities for the opium traffickers — barracks for the private armies of the opium lords, storage sheds, housing for Hong Kong Chinese chemists and 24 refineries for reducing raw opium to morphine brick or heroin.

MOST of the drugs are channeled into Southeast Asian markets. "Cooked" opium and No. 3 "Red Rock" smoking heroin find a ready market in Hong Kong.

But No. 4 heroin, which provides an instant jolt, is destined for the U.S. market. Unlike French-produced heroin, which resembles talcum powder, Asian heroin looks like a brand-name detergent.

The profits are staggering. Ten pounds of opium worth $200 to the hill tribe poppy grower is worth $100,000 as adulterated heroin in the streets of New York.

HONG KONG chemists, who may receive as much as $10,000 for their work, are the scientific elite of the industry. "They have to know what they're doing," said a U.S. narcotics agent, "or they'll blow themselves up. They're dealing with volatile chemicals."

Like good businessmen, the drug producers take pride in their work. Over the years they have established quality control.

Two lions rampant on a globe is the trademark of the Double-Globe brand which warns users, "Beware of bogus goods," guarantees "100 per cent purity" and promises: "All things changed and rejuvenated. Favorable winds in your sails."

THE DRUG traffic rests on a solid foundation — money. But the major irony of the situation is that the countries that are engaged in the traffic profit least. Rather, it is the overseas Chinese who dominate the drug trade, just as they dominate the economies of all Southeast Asia.

"The Chinese buy and sell heroin just as they would buy and sell copra or tobacco," said one U.S. agent. "The difference is that the profits are so much greater. So, of course, are the risks."

Almost without exception, dope smugglers arrested in Thailand are ethnic Chinese with Thai citizenship. They, however, are the small fry.

"THE REALLY bigtime operators, the people who provide the brains and the capital for the traffic, are the ones who never get caught," said a U.S. intelligence source. "They are the men who own the gold shops, the hotels and the shipping companies of Bangkok and Hong Kong. And they are all Chinese."

To all outward appearances, they are respectable businessmen, many of them are highly influential in their communities. And many of them have close connections with members of the Thai government, some of whom are themselves ethnic Chinese.

This has led to the suspicion, right or wrong, that top members of that Thai government are getting a rakeoff from the [illegible] one thing, proof is another.

APART from the Chinese connection, the other common denominator of the Southeast Asian drug traffic is politics. Politics and drugs are so closely intertwined they cannot be separated.

"We could wipe out the poppy fields of Northern Thailand by spraying them with herbicides," a U.S. agent said. "But that isn't the answer.

"We would be wiping out the livelihood of the hill tribes, and that would drive them straight into the arms of the Communist insurgents."

DRUGS are part and parcel of the various insurgencies or independence movements that flourish in northern Burma. All these movements have bases in Thailand and they operate with the tacit approval of at least some top members of the Thai government.

To buy guns, the insurgents must traffic in drugs. One recent example came to light when three Thais were arrested and shot for arms smuggling in northeast Thailand.

A Chiengmai-based insurgent leader was stricken with grief upon hearing the sad tidings. "Those guns were destined for me," he said.

NEXT: War on drugs has a long way to go.

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CHICAGO, ILL.
NEWS

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OCT 11 1972

Asia's drug pipeline

Mysterious Lo, the opium king

Third in a series

By Keyes Beech
Daily News Foreign Service

CHIENGMAI, Northern Thailand — "The marvelous thing about the drug traffic in this part of the world," said an enthusiastic young U.S. narcotics agent "is that it's just as romantic as it sounds—and just as deadly."

So it is. The reigning romantic figure is a 37-year-old Burma-born Chinese named Lo Hsing-han, who has fought his way up to become king of the Golden Triangle, a wild, rugged, uncontrollable region where the gun is law, smuggling is a major industry and opium is a way of life.

To American narcotics agents Lo is the first link in the devious drug chain that begins in the poppy fields of the Golden Triangle — the upper reaches of Burma, Thailand and Laos — and ends on the streets of New York.

ALTHOUGH his operations are well known, the elusive Lo has remained something of a mystery to both narcotics agents and the CIA, which has thrown its intelligence gathering resources into President Nixon's global war on the international drug traffic.

But Lo is no mystery to his former schoolteacher, Jimmy Yang, a Shan from upper Burma who manages the Rincome Hotel, Chiengmai's best, and in his spare time commands a dissident army of 750 like-minded Shans who would dearly love to overthrow the present Burmese government.

"A very reckless fellow, this Lo," Jimmy says disapprovingly, consulting his files. "Age 37. Weight about 135 pounds. Getting a little fat. Born in Kokang State on the Chinese border. Speaks Yunnanese dialect and good Mandarin. Middle class family, if you know what that means in northern Burma."

JIMMY ISN'T sure that Lo is very bright. But his record belies disparagement. A man with charisma and considerable organizational skill, Lo commands a 1,500-man private army that controls the old mule route from the poppy fields of northern Burma to the southern town of Tachilek, where raw opium is converted into heroin and morphine base for the export market.

Lo's younger brother runs the Tachilek end of the operation.

Although by no means the only major trafficker, Lo has proved himself perhaps the most determined and resourceful. Last year it took him six months to move about 70,000 pounds of opium down from the poppy fields to Tachilek.

"He was fighting all the way against hijackers, Communist insurgents and sometimes the Burmese army. At one point he made a deal with the Burmese army to join forces against the Communists in return for some trucks to replace his mule train. You gotta hand [illegible] American admirer.

RECENTLY one of Lo's caravans, following an opium trail more than a century old, arrived in Tachilek with 60 tons of opium, 800 troops excluding muleteers, and 1,200 mules.

"He has to have a quick turnaround to make money on an operation that big," observed a narcotics agent. Lo's problem right now is a drug surplus. Or, to put it more accurately, it is the buyers' problem.

A joint U.S.-Thai crackdown during the last six months has netted drugs with an estimated New York street sale value of $347 million. The bulk of this came from Burma.

"WE DON'T deny that the stuff is coming through Thailand," said a Bangkok banker, "because Thailand is a natural conduit. And we don't deny that we have some crooked officials who are in on the racket.

"But that doesn't mean that all of us are crooks. And after what I've read about your New York City police force, I don't think you Americans are in a position to moralize. You're asking us to control the drug traffic when you can't even control it yourselves.

"We're tired of being picked on by visiting congressmen and smart-aleck journalists. Why don't you ever criticize Burma, which is where most of the stuff is coming from?"

THE ANSWER to that question is that it doesn't do any [illegible] and he is not receptive to outside advice, there is very little Burma's "strongman" ruler, Gen. Ne Win, can do about the drug traffic.

The fiercely independent hill tribes of northern Burma have been growing opium poppies for more that a century—ever since Portuguese traders first introduced the drug and the British came along to put the trade on a brisk businesslike basis.

Even in the palmiest days of British colonialism, the British were never able to subdue the hill tribesmen, many of them Christian converts who later fought with the Allies against the Japanese in World War II.

AFTER MORE than two decades of independence, the Burmese government in Rangoon has been even less successful than the British.

So what the government has done is to make an uneasy peace with the local warlords to help fight Communist insurgents in return for home rule, including the right to produce opium.

"That way, everybody is happy," says Jimmy Yang. "Ne Win is happy, Lo Hsing-han is happy and the opium growers are happy."

But not quite. At any given moment in upper Burma there are at least half a dozen insurgencies under way. When the hill tribes aren't fighting the Burmese army or the Communists, they're fighting each other.

"IT'S WARLORD politics pure and simple," said a CIA agent, "and the way it works the system is self-perpetuating.

"Without the opium, the warlords wouldn't be able to buy guns. And without the guns they wouldn't be able to maintain their private armies. And without the armies they wouldn't be able to protect their turf."

NEXT: It is not on most maps but Tachilek is where the opium comes from.

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

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CHICAGO, ILL.
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OCT 19 1972

STATINTL

U.S. fights Asian tradition in its drug war

Second in a series

By Keyes Beech
Daily News Foreign Service

CHIENGMAI, Northern Thailand — Not long ago a visiting American congressman asked a U.S. narcotics agent in Bangkok if the hill tribesmen of Southeast Asia had any idea of the havoc their product, refined to heroin, was creating in the streets of New York.

For a moment the agent was speechless at the question. Then taking a deep breath, he replied: "Sir, they never heard of New York."

They never heard of Bangkok, either.

The question is indicative of the wall of ignorance that separates most Americans from the history and realities of the drug traffic in Southeast Asia.

FOR FOUR centuries, beginning with the aggressive prodding of greedy European colonialists, Asians have been cultivating the poppy that yields the opium that yields the morphine that yields the heroin that is now finding its way into the United States.

Up through World War II and beyond, every Southeast Asian government had its opium monopoly. Everywhere it was a major source of revenue, like other government monopolies including salt and tobacco.

In the middle of the last century the British fought a war to win the right to sell opium to the unwilling Chinese. Hong Kong had its own opium "farm." And not until 1946 did the British outlaw the drug traffic in Hong Kong.

FOR THE ASIANS opium was, and still is, an escape from the pains of reality just as alcohol is an escape for so many Americans. Some Asians become addicts — a growing number, in fact — just as some Americans become alcoholics.

Opium [illegible] more ways than one. An American woman may swallow a pill to ease the pain of her menstrual period. The hill tribe woman of Southeast Asia's golden triangle — the upper reaches of Burma, Thailand and Laos — will smoke a pipe or two of opium.

Opium also happens to be the only cash crop of the hill tribe people, their only means of acquiring some of the minor luxuries of the outside world. Their economy is as dependent on opium as the lowlanders are on rice.

DURING all those earlier years, to Americans opium was an Asian affair. But two years ago, when heroin addiction hit epidemic proportions among American GIs in South Vietnam, the Asian narcotics traffic suddenly became America's business.

Now the GI market almost has vanished with the withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam. But the drug problem lingers on — a legacy of the Vietnam War as the heroin traffickers seek new outlets in the United States to replace their lost GI market.

At the same time President Nixon has declared global war on the international drug traffic. As a result, stopping drugs has become almost as important as stopping communism among U.S. objectives in Southeast Asia.

IN AT LEAST three countries — Thailand, Laos and South Vietnam — all the resources of U.S. embassies have been thrown into the campaign to choke off the flow of heroin to the United States.

Embassy political officers, accustomed to routine diplomacy, have been diverted to full time narcotics assignments. "One way or another, we spend at least 50 per cent of our time on narcotics," said a senior embassy officer in Bangkok.

"Hell," said a young foreign service officer recently transferred to narcotics work. "I love it. It's a lot better than shuffling papers."

THE CIA, stung by charges that it has contributed to the drug traffic by collaborating with opium-growing hill tribesmen and corrupt Asian officials, has thrown all its intelligence-gathering resources into the antidrug campaign.

On top of all this, agents of the U.S. Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs have made their appearance in Asian capitals from Tokyo to Hong Kong to Bangkok in increasing numbers.

For 10 years there was one U.S. narcotics agent in Bangkok. Today there are 12 operating in all Thailand, "making cases" in co-operation with Thai police.

SINCE Thailand is the natural conduit for drugs coming from the golden triangle, the biggest effort has been centered there.

"When the heat is on from the White House," said one U.S. official, "you jump. No one questions the desirability of cutting off the drug traffic, although some of us wonder if there isn't an element of overkill in the current campaign."

If there is an element of "overkill" — and that is debatable — the reasons are understandable. Mr. Nixon is running for re-election and the "Asian drug connection" could easily become an explosive campaign issue.

Next: The drug traffic — romantic and deadly.

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TIMES
OCT 31 1972
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THE BOOK REVIEW

Saga of the Politics of Heroin

BY ROBERT KIRSCH
Times Book Critic

President Nixon's recent statement that he would cut off military and economic aid to any government which protected drug traffic, with his singling out the Central Intelligence Agency for what he termed a "superb" performance in fighting the international drug trade, seemed designed as a commentary on THE POLITICS OF HEROIN IN SOUTHEAST ASIA (Harper & Row: $10.95) by Alfred W. McCoy with Cathleen B. Reed and Leonard P. Adams.

The form of the work, understated, scholarly and meticulously documented, is in contrast with the subject matter. Drug smuggling, gangsters, corruption, are more often the themes of suspense novels and hyped-up journalistic exposes.

Indeed, some of the points made here have been made before. Seventy percent of the heroin produced in the world originates in the "Golden Triangle" where Laos, Thailand and Burma meet. People high in the government of South Vietnam have joined others in the government of the other three countries are involved in protecting every stage of the process.

First Time

But this is the first time that so complete and careful a study has been published. This is not only the result of library research but of extensive interview and field work. Many of the people who supplied incidents and information, students, past and present government officials, law enforcement personnel and journalists, have had to remain anonymous. But there is no anonymity for those involved in the production, processing and distribution of heroin. If their names are known and their activities documented, they are given.

It is no accident, given so convincing a framework, that the book was attacked by the CIA prior to publication and President Nixon saw fit to make his comments. In fact, in a certain way his statement on cutting off aid is at least an acknowledgement that much of what is written in this book about the history of drugs and politics in Southeast Asia is true.

Foreign Aid

"If America's lavish foreign aid and military assistance programs cannot be used positively to force the governments of Laos, Thailand, and South Vietnam to get out of the opium business, then logic would seem to dictate that an immediate cessation of foreign aid might bring about the desired results. . . . A cutoff in foreign aid and military assistance might finally convince these governments that the United States is really serious about ending the heroin traffic," the authors write.

". . . 1972 is shaping up as the year of decision for the international narcotics traffic . . . If President Nixon is reelected he will probably continue his policy of giving unqualified support to President Thieu's administration in [illegible] right-wing governments in Thailand and Laos. As long as there is no serious threat of a cutoff in foreign aid or a withdrawal of political support, these governments cannot be subjected to any serious pressure and the narcotics traffic will continue unabated."

One does not have to accept this as the only option. What cannot be shrugged off is that since the end of World War II, the opium boom shifted eastward. The authors give a fascinating history of heroin as a "miracle drug" which turned out to be a curse, of the underworld entry into the narcotics traffic, of a policy of "clandestine realpolitik" in which the underworld and the CIA made mutually effective local alliances, and beyond that where the syndicate or Mafia dealt with local anti-Communist leaders who were either financing their movements through the drug trade or lining their own pockets.

From the French experience in Indochina to our own, the drug pattern emerged and grew. Pressures on the opium sources of the Middle East and Turkey made the Southeast Asia opium boom. Wartime conditions allowed the crops and laboratory processing to function by paying out vast sums.

A Chinese Nationalist general left without funds by his government, Tuan Shi-wen, ". . . To fight the evil of Communism . . . you must have an army, and an army must have guns, and to buy guns you must have money. In these mountains the only money is opium."

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THE SYDNEY, AUSTRALIA MORNING HERALD
2 Oct 1972
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STATINTL

Drugs and the CIA

incomplete as received.

From a staff correspondent in New York

publication of a chapter from his then forthcoming book in "Harper's Magazine" and similar accusations made by Mr McCoy before a Congressional hearing.

The allegations attracted little national attention at that stage.

But, in July, the CIA made a formal request to the publishers, Harper and Row, to review the manuscript, stating that Mr McCoy's claims were "totally false and without foundation."

Although affirming their belief that Mr McCoy's "scholarship is beyond reproach" and refusing to promise to make any changes in the text, Harper and Row agreed to make the manuscript available to the CIA.

That decision caused controversy in publishing circles because of the precedent of allowing the CIA to review a book before publication.

However, Mr B. Brooks Thomas, vice-president and general counsel for the publishing house, explained: "We are not submitting to censorship or anything like that. We are taking a responsible middle position."

When the CIA's critique of the book was submitted at the end of July, Mr McCoy and his publishers regarded it as an anti-climax.

Mr Thomas stated that the publishers were "underwhelmed" with the CIA's reply. Harper and Row made a point-by-point refutation of the CIA's defence and announced that they would publish the book unchanged.

General NE WIN

General VANG PAO

American reviewers have hailed the book as the first work of near-scholarship on the popular subject of heroin smuggling.

While the book adopts a New Left, anti-CIA and anti-American foreign policy stance, it is a fascinating history of the world's opium and heroin trade.

Mr Colby flatly denies the charge that the South-East Asian opium trade in any way "depends on the support (money, guns, aircraft, etc) of the CIA," as claimed by Mr McCoy.

He said that the US Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs had publicly stated that the CIA for some time had been its strongest partner in identifying foreign sources and illegal trade in narcotics.

The CIA, he said, had no evidence that General Vang Pao was involved in the Laotian drug trade.

"Because his forces are the principal Laotian deterrent to North Vietnam aggression, many US Government personnel have been in constant contact with General Vang Pao for a number of years," he said. "No evidence has come to light connecting him with narcotics traffic."

Mr Colby said that Air America had long had an effective inspection system, and recently had introduced a more rigid system to bar even the inadvertent transport of narcotics.

Mr McCoy, in his determination to indict the Nixon Administration and the CIA, fails to give credit for strenuous efforts the American Government has made in recent times to combat the narcotics trade.

James A. Markham, a writer on the drug problem for "The New York Times," says that, in certain parts of the world, "American diplomats give almost monomaniacal attention to persuading frequently indifferent or corrupt officials to do something about poppy cultivation, heroin refining and heroin trafficking."

Mr Nelson G. Gross, senior adviser on international narcotics to the US Department of State, said recently that the intensive drive mounted by the Government over the past year-and-a-half was beginning to have a noticeable impact on the trade.

"The availability of heroin on the streets is less than it was a year ago. The quality is not as good. The wholesale price is higher and the retail price is higher," he said.

The Government, he said, was moving fast to prevent a major new route of drug traffic developing from South-East Asia.

With the US Secretary of State, Mr William P. Rogers, he had met Chairman Ne Win of Burma to explore means of helping the Burmese Government combat heroin processing and transport.

The frightening extent of heroin addiction in American cities and the street crime it spawns make drug traffic an emotional subject in this country.

If Mr McCoy's book helps step up the campaign against drug trafficking it will serve a good purpose.

But the campaign will not be helped by his politically motivated and exaggerated accusations.

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THE YALE ALUMNI MAGAZINE
Oct. 1972

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3

Yale Graduate Student Causes a Stir with Book on Heroin and the C.I.A.



Every now and then the University community discovers that one of its members just happens to be the author of a best-selling book, or at least a book that is causing a lot of talk. It's happening again.

"The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia" (Harper & Row), by Alfred W. McCoy, a Yale graduate student in Southeast Asian history, may not rise to the top of best-seller lists but it has caused a considerable stir in government and publishing circles because it reveals, among other things, the complicity of the Central Intelligence Agency in the world heroin trade.

The book is the product of 18 months of research—four in Southeast Asia—and 275 interviews, many of them in the "Golden Triangle" region where Laos, Thailand and Burma meet and where 70 per cent of the world's illegal opium poppies are grown.

McCoy's book documents in exhaustive detail the route and manner in which refined heroin travels from the hillsides of northern Laos to the streets of America's cities. The opium trade generates the major financial resources for the U.S.-allied Meo guerrillas of northern Laos, McCoy charges. He further insists that C.I.A. personnel in the region not only tolerate the opium trade, but abet it and profit from it.

Back home, the C.I.A., aware of McCoy's research and familiar with his testimony on the matter before a Senate subcommittee, disagreed with his charges and demanded to see a pre-publication copy of the book. Harper & Row, while insisting that it was not submitting to censorship, gave the C.I.A. a set of galleys—a move which McCoy "totally opposed." The C.I.A. returned the galleys with a list of minor factual objections but failed to refute the author's main thesis, and on Aug. 17 Harper & Row published the book without a single change from its original version.

McCoy is taking the fall semester off from the Graduate School. He doesn't have time, he says, for school *and* all the business surrounding the publication of "The Politics of Heroin." He says he enjoys celebrity and has had quite a bit of media exposure lately, though he is still $1,000 in the red as a result of research and travel costs associated with writing the book.

McCoy, who co-edited another book about Laos in 1970, still hasn't completed a portion of his doctoral comprehensive exams at Yale and hasn't had time to work on a dissertation, although he has a topic. Meanwhile, Harper & Row has three more ideas for books it would like him to write.

Why not ask Yale to credit the work he has already done toward the requirements for a doctoral thesis?

"Aw, come on," he says, "you know Yale well enough to know it doesn't work that way."

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STATINTL App[redacted]

DETROIT, MICH.
FREE PRESS
OCT 1 1972
M - 530,264
S - 578,254



The Vientiane Connection: Trading Drugs for Peace

THE POLITICS OF HEROIN, by Alfred McCoy (Harper and Row $10.95).

"The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia," is not an easy book to read, and not much fun really. Even with the old sure-fire spy-gangster-three spook elements it's not much fun, because there is something disturbing about the subject, or subjects.

There is nothing very charming about the heroin trade anymore, because it is hurting too many people, has pitted too many lives; and there is precious little enchantment left in the work of our foreign cryptoperatives because it can lead to some very dirty, very enduring situations.

But the subjects are very much with us, and need to be treated, and that gets done here pretty well.

THE BOOK GOT started by accident, author Alfred McCoy explains. A member of the Antiwar Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars, in 1970 he coedited "Laos: War and Revolution" for Harper and Row, and included a section on the role opium traffic played in Southeast Asian politics.

Editor Elizabeth Jakab took a run up to New Haven where McCoy was (and is) working on his doctorate in Southeast Asian history and persuaded him to do a book on the junk trade and tradition. It's hard to say what she envisioned, but McCoy saw a quick-in-and-out. Perhaps 250 pages, paperback, to be finished by September 1971. He was off by one year, 150 pages and a cover.

He went to Europe, began talking around Paris with old French Indochina hands: Refugees from the Diem regime of Vietnam, exiles, former French colonial, army and intelligence officials.

One of the former French officials "sort of sat me down and ran down to me very tersely, very neatly how they ran the opium trade," McCoy says. "I was fascinated."

He talked with Col. Roger Trinquier, who was among the leaders and losers against the Viet Minh in 1954, who told him how the French sought to cement relations with the Meo tribesmen in the Indochinese uplands "To have the Meo, one must buy their opium."

"And he said he wold expect the Americans were involved in the opium traffic the same way he was," McCoy recalls. "It was just an economic imperative for anybody who's going to treat with that tribe."

And at that point, history turned into journalism.

WHAT McCOY found in Southeast Asia was not an American duplication of the French opium traffic role. He found evidence of opium moving on CIA airlines, found opium growing, moving through territory which [illegible] under CIA dominion: "They did carry the stuff. They were shipping it. They were [illegible] it. It's a level of very, very extreme complicity that actually becomes involvement.

"It's not like it's French military intelligence actually managing and directing traffic for profit and as a source of financing. But they [illegible] from it because by providing facilities for their allies (the Meo, remnants of Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintag, Laotian government officials, others) they are enforcing the political strength of their allies, providing them with a national base."

He says conversations with a former USAID (United States Agency for International Development) official indicated a heroin refinery was operating [illegible] CIA's Long Cheng headquarters in Laos.

"It's as if you were allowing a heroin refinery to be operating in your garage in your back yard, not attached to your house. The fine line of involvement . . . I think you'd be put in for aiding."

The CIA must have thought it could get "put in" for something because early last summer, after McCoy testified in Senate narcotics hearings, the CIA asked for a look at the book before publication. This reaction from the normally invisible, unflappable agency was extraordinary.

After Harper and Row agreed, the CIA studied the doument, specified objections, the publisher decided they were without merit, and publication came a month ahead of schedule.

American allies, or former allies, implicated by McCoy in the drug trade include former South Vietnamese Vice President Ky, the late Ngo Dinh Nhu. And Americans contributing to the growing complicity include more than the CIA shadow-men. Writes McCoy:

"Rather than sending U.S. combat troops into Laos, four successive American presidents and their foreign policy advisers worked through the CIA to build the Meo into the only effective army in Laos. The fundamental reason for American complicity in the Laotian opium traffic lies in these policy decisions . . ."

DEALING historically—opium, morphine and heroin trade has a position of long standing in Southeast Asian economies—and politically—the traffic has been fostered by a succession of governments, colonial and native—McCoy's major point becomes a matter of little dispute: American heroin users are getting more and more of their drug from the "golden triangle" area of Laos, Burma and Thailand. Official estimates of U.S. heroin sources used to attrubute no more than five percent to Southeast Asia; now the figure is rising to 25 percent, McCoy says.

The book, says this historian-scholar, is primary a heroin book: "What I hoped it would do is fill an informational function, and raise a debate.

"And I hope somewhere in the smoke the substance doesn't get lost—that people begin to understand that the old image—the Turkey-Marseille-New York route is something of interest to moviegoers and historicans and that it is a part of the present, but not part of the future."

The Vientiane Connection? McCoy says he has already talked with one moviemaker about the possibilities.

JAMES HARPER, Free Press Staff Writer

STATINTL

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Oct 1972

STATINTL

[redacted]

A16 Friday, June 2, 1972 THE WASHINGTON POST

General Linked To Drug Ring In S. Vietnam

By George C. Wilson
Washington Post Staff Writer

Thieu, Ky Linked to Drug Trade

WASHINGTON (AP

S... Linked to Heroin

LAWRENCE L. KNUTSON
Associated Press

Pepsi-Cola Plant Used As Front

heroin traffic in southeast asia

To judge from yet another study of the uncommonly unpleasant subject, there seems to be about as much chance of getting the drug business out of Indochina as there is of getting the officials of Indochina out of the drug business.

The prospects for reform are seemingly limited—at a time when the U. S. military is having mixed results in trying to detoxify addicted American GIs—and the situation is one more deadly, degrading element associated with U. S. involvement in Southeast Asia.

Some of the latest facts have been presented by Yale graduate student Alfred W. McCoy, who testified before a Senate foreign aid appropriations subcommittee that a flourishing narcotics trade in South Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and Thailand is carried on with the direct, active support of the highest government officials—and that U. S. officials make virtually no effort to intervene.

Perhaps such attempts would be ineffectual. The "Vietnamization" of the drug trade may be out of our hands as long as we remain resolved to "see it through with Thieu."

NEW YORK POST, 6/3/72

A-10 THE EVENING STAR Washington, D. C., Friday, June 2, 1972

Heroin: Viet Chiefs Linked to Trade

S. Viet officials (heroin racket ch

Associated Press

Saigon's Drug Merchants

Is CIA linked to dope?

U.S. Aides Rapped in Drug Study

He Calls Us Guilty For Asian Dope

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[redacted]

COMMENTARY

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STATINTL

STATINTL

Interrupting its usual silence, the CIA has provided Harper's *with a rare public document. It is an official letter of protest against our July cover story, "Flowers of Evil," an extremely compromising report by Alfred W. McCoy about the CIA's complicity in the heroin trade in Southeast Asia. "I trust," writes W. E. Colby, the Agency's executive director, "you will give this response the same prominence in your publication as was given to the McCoy article."*

The letter appears below in full, together with Mr. McCoy's reply and the testimony of a former USAID representative who witnessed the CIA's participation in the Laotian drug traffic. This exchange, we hope, throws further needed light on a little-known stretch of the sewer that runs between Washington, Saigon, Vientiane, Pnompenh, and Bangkok.

Beyond all that, we are surprised by Mr. Colby's use of the word "trust." We may well be reading too much into it, but that word, and indeed the whole tone of the letter, suggests that Mr. Colby expected an immediate mea culpa *from* Harper's. *Is the CIA that naïve? Mr. Colby, who once presided over the notorious Phoenix program in Vietnam,* is hardly an innocent. Still, his entire letter reflects a troubling simplicity, an unquestioning trust in the goodness of his own bureaucracy. He asks us to share that trust, whatever the stubborn facts may be. As conclusive evidence of the Agency's purity, for example, he even cites Director Richard Helms' public-relations argument that "as fathers, we are as concerned about the lives of our children and grandchildren as all of you."*

Such curious expectations of trust apparently motivated the Agency to ask Harper & Row to hand over the galleys of Mr. McCoy's book, The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia, *from which he drew his magazine article. The Agency declared that it simply wanted to check the book for factual inaccuracies, possible libel, or damage to national security. To deliver this unusual request, the Agency dispatched Cord Meyer, a man with the proper Establishment connections who, as the CIA's overseer of the since-transformed Congress for Cultural Freedom,** might be said to have once been in the publishing business himself. Although the galleys were duly sent to the Agency, the CIA's subsequent complaints about Mr. McCoy's research failed to impress Harper & Row, which has since confidently published the book, unchanged. Apparently there are limits to trust, even among gentlemen.*

Although Mr. McCoy won't agree with us, our own reaction to this episode is to feel a certain sympathy for the beset bureaucrats of the CIA, who seem to be impaled on the defensive notion, "The Agency, right or wrong." By definition the CIA finds itself involved with a good many questionable people in Southeast Asia. That is a condition of its mission—a mission it did not invent but simply carries out on White House orders—and we suspect that the public would trust the Agency a good deal more if it either acknowledged the facts or remained silent. Alas, the CIA now seems determined to revamp its image into something like a cross between General Motors and the League of Women Voters. But so endeth our sermon. Let the reader draw his own conclusions.

THE AGENCY'S BRIEF:

Harper's July issue contains an article by Mr. Alfred W. McCoy alleging CIA involvement in the opium traffic in Laos. This allegation is false and unfounded, and it is particularly disappointing that a journal of *Harper's* reputation would see fit to publish it without any effort to check its accuracy or even to refer to the public record to the contrary.

Normally we do not respond publicly to allegations made against CIA. Because of the serious nature of these charges, however, I am writing to you to place these accusations in proper perspective and so that the record will be clear.

The general charge made by Mr. McCoy that "to a certain extent it [the opium trade in Laos] depends on the support (money, guns, aircraft, etc.) of the CIA" has no basis in fact. To the contrary, Mr. John E. Ingersoll, Director of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, in a letter to Representative Charles S. Gubser of California on May 27, 1971

*Phoenix is a campaign of systematic counterterror designed to root out and destroy Vietcong sympathizers. As U.S. pacification chief from 1968 to mid-1971, Ambassador Colby headed CORDS (Civil Operations and Rural Development Support), which ran Phoenix in cooperation with the South Vietnamese police. Mr. Colby has testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that, in 1969 alone, Phoenix agents "neutralized" 19,534 suspected Vietcong, killing 6,187 of them in the process. Critics argue that Phoenix uses assassination methods and that Mr. Colby's figures are extremely conservative.

**The CCF, among other activities, at one time published a dozen or so serious anti-Communist magazines throughout the world. The best known is *Encounter*, which now has a different sponsor.

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STATINTL

Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R[redacted]

OUI
October 1972

I make money off the war.
I'm over here for one thing — the big [redacted]
At least I'm not a hypocrite.

The CIA's Superpilots Spi [redacted] lle Beans

[illegible]

continued

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Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R0010
STATINTL

PORTLAND, ORE.
OREGONIAN

M - 245,132
S - 407,186
SEP 30 1972

STATINTL

Heroin airlift

To the Editor: In response to your Sept. 19 editorial denouncing the charges Sen. McGovern directed at the Nixon Administration's involvement in the Southeast Asian opium traffic, I feel it my duty to inform you that McGovern's charges are not "innuendos without verified facts," as you stated.

There is undeniable evidence that American funds and equipment have been utilized to transport raw opium from field to refinery in Southeast Asia's golden triangle region.

Gen. Ovan Rathikun, former commander-in-chief of the Laotian army, has publicly admitted his own involvement in the opium business and has discussed the cooperation he has received from the CIA. Ronald Rickenbach, a former USAID representative in Laos, has testified that he personally watched hundreds of pounds of raw opium being loaded onto a Laotian air force aircraft, which in reality is an American aircraft paid for by American taxpayers.

Alfred W. McCoy, in his forthcoming book "The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia," has interviewed scores of people directly involved in the drug traffic of Southeast Asia, and all evidence indicates that the CIA, the American embassies in Southeast Asian countries, and the Administration itself, are not as innocent and law-abiding as they would have us believe. And for our President to brag about rising heroin prices on the East Coast as an indication of increased government vigilance is pure hogwash. It Mr. Nixon happy that the pushers are making more money now? Is he happy that addicts are suffering more and stealing more from our communities to pay for the higher priced heroin?

ANDRE ALLAERT,
4936 SE Brooklyn St.

STATINTL

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STATINTL
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ST. LOUIS, MO.
POST-DISPATCH
SEP 29 1972
E - 326,376
S - 541,868

Heroin And The War

Some inquisitive voters may have wondered why President Nixon, after long silence concerning the havoc wrought by heroin among the troops in Indochina, took occasion during his political foray into Texas to visit an anti-narcotics checkpoint on the Mexican border. There he proclaimed his firm determination to crush the heroin trade in the United States.

What inspired Mr. Nixon to depart from his announced intention to do no early personal campaigning? Why did war against heroin become, at the moment, his outstanding posture before the public?

Perhaps the answer lies in certain developments in the world of books. On Aug. 17 Harper & Row published "The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia," by Alfred W. McCoy. Based on a year and a half of incessant probing in that part of the world, it included more than 250 interviews with persons familiar with the drug traffic there. His conclusions, documented in stupendous detail, are summed up in a letter to his publisher:

"As you well know, the book implicates the CIA in the narcotics traffic which is rampant in Southeast Asia. Thousands of American GIs fighting in Vietnam have become heroin addicts and Southeast Asia is fast becoming the major source of heroin entering the U.S. The CIA, the State Department, and the whole U.S. apparatus in Indochina is aiding and abetting this narcotics traffic" and "by putting top priority on U.S. military and political gains in Indochina, to the detriment of anti-narcotics work."

McCoy's book has not proved to be a bombshell. Governmentally, it was pretty well taken care of by official silence aided by the prevailing moral torpor. The big bomb was dropped four or five days before President Nixon set off for Texas, when The New York Review of Books published nine pages of correspondence between the CIA and Harper & Row, covering a two months' attempt by the CIA to induce the publisher to drop the book or tone down its contents.

The page proofs asked for by the CIA were delivered and letter after letter was written and answered. I have not read the book, but I have read the CIA defense. If ever a public body destroyed itself, the CIA achieved that by a combination of evasion, obvious coercion of helpless witnesses, and unconvincing denials.

On the heels of this devastating publication, President Nixon went to the Mexican border and launched his crusade against the [illegible]

Eugene, Ore.

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STATINTL

DETROIT, MICH.
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SEP 28 1972
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S - 578,254

CIA Cover Up

TOM BRADEN'S nasty rebuttal to Alfred McCoy's allegations that the CIA is involved in Southeast Asian heroin traffic struck some very sour notes with me.

Although I have heard many such rumors, I never felt there was much validity to them. That is, until I heard a supporting story, no matter how fallaciously conceived, from a man who was supposedly rebutting the charges.

I found especially ironic Mr. Braden's lines about not refusing information from a man who beats his children. This would almost be excusable, except that this man is beating our children as well as his own.

The article seems to be designed to keep Middle America ignorant about the depth and character of U.S. involvement in Indochina.

LANE K. TRUBEY
Royal Oak

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FRESNO, CAL. BEE
29 Sept 1972

STATINTL

Commentary

The CIA Goes After A Book

By James Wrightson, Associate Editor

STRIKE — One thing is certain about the US Central Intelligence Agency. No one knows where it will strike next. Figuring out where the cloak-and-dagger fellows will turn up is like guessing the number of jelly beans in a jar or predicting when they will finish the street repairs in front of your house or when your in-laws will drop in for dinner the next time.

Of course there are certain events the CIA is NOT interested in — apple pie bake offs, watermelon contests, a Burlington Liars Club get-together, an apple bob, spin-the-bottle or a backgammon game.

When the fellows from the woodsy CIA campus in Langley, Va., get interested in something they go all out. And when they do their policies are right out of King Herod. It must have been a CIA operative in the crowd who started shouting: "Give us Barrabas."

The latest example is the Central Intelligence Agency's ham-handed attempt to stop publication of a book by Alfred McCoy, a Yale graduate student, called: "The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia."

McCoy's book charged the Central Intelligence Agency has known of Thai and South Vietnamese official involvement in heroin traffic, has covered up their involvement and has participated in aspects of the traffic itself.

DENIED — The CIA, of course, has denied all this. We are not concerned here with the pinpoint accuracy of McCoy's book or his methods of research, although the CIA could turn up no gross errors in fact.

What is of deep concern is the way the CIA, a powerful and prestigeous government agency, applied pressure to Harper & Row not to publish the book.

In an exchange of letters, the general counsel of the CIA asked to see the book prior to publication saying: "It is our belief that no reputable publishing house would wish to publish such allegations without being assured the supporting evidence was valid."

Admittedly under fire in the book, the agency said it should have the role as the validator.

The publisher, probably with the Clifford Irving hoax in mind, was supersensitive to the axiom: A publisher has the ultimate responsibility for checking the reliability of the material he proposes to publish. So overriding the author's objections, it got the galley proofs of "The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia" and a courier from the CIA headquarters came to New York and took them back to Virginia.

Apparently after a page-by-page review the CIA could not, try as it did, demonstrate the author's evidence did not support his assertions.

REVIEW — In a letter to the general counsel of the CIA the publisher said: "Based upon careful review, it is our sincere opinion Mr. McCoy's scholarship remains unshaken and we do not see any reason for making any changes in the text."

That would end it, except for the fact this is neither the government's nor the CIA's first venture into the dangerous business of trying to impose prepublication restraints on words and ideas the citizens of this country are to read and consider.

The memory of the Justice Department's outcry against the Pentagon Papers is still green. The CIA has an unenviable record in this regard. In recent years the agency has tried to use its influence on Random House, Putnam, Harper and has gone into court to try to dictate what the people of this country shall read about the CIA.

The supersecret agency just cannot have it both ways. It cannot be a supersecret, never-to-be-spoken-of, behind-the-scenes intelligence-gathering agency, then come storming out of the shadows when it believes it might be hurt by something printed about its activities.

The CIA's action in trying to stop the publication "The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia" is about as helpful to the cause of freedom of information in this country as the Stamp Act was to King George.

STATINTL

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BOSTON, MASS.
MORNING GLOBE

M & S - CIRC. N-A

SEP 27 1972

The drug trade

In appreciation of the Sept. 21 excellent editorial, The Biggest Issue: the War. You left out one thing. Mr. Nixon vowed no aid to nations which abet drug trade. As you pointed out, that includes (or should include) South Vietnam, Laos and Thailand. (Burma used to be involved, I believe.)

But how about the United States? With the fairly well proven CIA involvement in the drug trade, is the President going to cut off aid to the United States?

(The usual irony: the CIA "has performed superbly" in fighting the trade — R.N.)

ALAN WINSLOW
Auburndale

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ST. LOUIS, MO.
POST-DISPATCH

E - 326,376
S 541,868
SEP 27 1972

Nonsense And Secrets

The American taxpayer is now paying our Navy and Air Force to keep the North Vietnamese from receiving shipments of rice through Haiphong harbor. At the same time the U.S. Government approves supplying wheat and airplanes to Russia and China. That makes no sense.

How much of the secret $10,000,000 Nixon re-election fund and of the $700,000 hand-carried from Mexico for the Nixon committee was contributed as a kickback for special favors at the taxpayers' expense, such as guaranteed government loans or the dropping of prosecution of anti-trust or other cases? How much was used to purchase special favors not available to other taxpayers, such as a federal bank charter or manipulation of price supports to favor the contributor? I, as a non-favored taxpayer, have a right to know. The Nixon Administration has gone to extreme lengths to keep those secrets.

I as a taxpayer have a right to know what the Government is doing or plans to do with my tax dollars. The Nixon Administration has concealed vital information from us with regard to the war in Vietnam, the secret war in Laos, the use of American advisers in Cambodia, the build-up of troops in Thailand, the use of CIA airplanes in the heroin traffic in Indochina, the siphoning of American tax dollars into private bank accounts of American-supported rulers of the countries of Indochina.

Even the past history of the Vietnam War, the story of how we got involved there, the Nixon Administration tried to keep from the American people. Those who have exposed the waste of the taxpayers' money, particularly waste in the Pentagon, have been harrassed, silenced, or fired from governmental positions.

I believe that George McGovern will bring honesty and openness to government. I know that his first act will be to end a war that has wasted our tax dollars, our non-renewable energy resources, and our sons' lives. Jane L. Weissman
University City

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Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R0

DAILY WORLD
26 SEP 1972

[redacted]

STATINTL

BOOK BEAT

By DAVID GORDON

U.S. Links to the Drug Traffic

The linking of U.S. firms, the Central Intelligence Agency, armed forces officials and U.S. government officials to the degenerate and corrupting international traffic in drugs and their importation into this country is outlined in a booklet composed of excerpts from the Congressional Record, stories from press services and articles published in various periodicals in the United States.

The pamphlet is published by the Indochina Resource Center, 1322 18 St., N.W., Washington, D.C., 20036, and costs 50¢. Some of the story headlines are: "Is CIA linked to dope?" "He calls us guilty for Asian dope." "Pepsi-Cola plant used as front." "Thieu, Ky linked to drug trade." "General linked to drug ring in S. Vietnam." You may have read many of these stories before, but when you see all of the stories in one spot, it seems a stronger and more convincing indictment against U.S. official morality.

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THE HOUSTON POST
25 Sept 1972
STATINTL
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Court confirms CIA's right to enforce secrecy agreements

By DONALD R. MORRIS
Post News Analyst

By a unanimous three-man decision on Sept. 11, a federal court of appeals upheld the Central Intelligence Agency's right to enforce secrecy agreements signed by its former employes. It was the first judicial recognition of the validity of the agreements, which thousands of federal officials have signed.

The decision stemmed from the activities of Victor Marchetti, a CIA employe from 1955 until 1969. Marchetti signed a secrecy agreement before entering on duty, and a second one on his resignation. Both in effect bound him not to publish undisclosed classified material which he had received as a result of his employment, unless specifically authorized in writing by the director.

Since his resignation, Marchetti has published a novel patently based on his CIA experiences and a magazine article criticizing CIA policies and practices. He has appeared on TV and radio shows and has given press interviews. The government took no action against these activities.

In March, 1972, Marchetti submitted an article based on his employment to various magazines, and submitted the outline of a proposed book to a publishing house.

The CIA went to court as a result of the proposed book. A district court ordered Marchetti to submit his fiction and nonfiction writings which bore on intelligence to the CIA 30 days before their release to any person or corporation, and a court of appeals has now upheld this order.

Clearly at stake was a possible infringement of Marchetti's right of free speech under the First Amendment. The court found for the government on the basis of the agreement Marchetti signed in 1955.

The court pointed out that freedom of speech and of the press were neither absolute nor irrational, and detailed numerous areas in which limitations were imposed on both speeches delivered orally or writing.

It also mentioned such special areas as accounts of criminal careers written by federal prisoners, a right used by the government to prevent certain publications in the Valachi case.

To these areas the court has now added the government's right to protect secret and confidential sources of information. Marchetti retains the same unimpaired right as any citizen to publish unclassified material or classified material which has been otherwise disclosed (such as the Pentagon papers). He is barred only from publishing previously undisclosed classified material to which he had access as the result of his employment.

The CIA, in turn, is bound to respond within 30 days to any material Marchetti submits for review. But the court added that it sees no reason for subsequent judicial review of any material the CIA chooses to object to.

The CIA has consistently maintained that it does not object to and will not take action against material attacking its policies and practices, but will act to bar publication of material bearing on the security of its collection sources, successes and techniques.

Since it is difficult to criticize policies and practices without touching on techniques, this statement is obviously open to misinterpretation, but the CIA's track record in the 25 years of its existence generally confirms its stand.

A considerable amount of material has in fact been published by former employes. Most of it, but far from all, has been submitted for review. When material is submitted, the CIA does not censor criticism as such (although it frequently offers material in rebuttal for the author's edification), but limits itself to marking disclosures of sensitive sources and techniques, the use of which it then "negotiates" with the author.

The majority of former CIA employes who do write about intelligence have a perfectly clear idea of what material is not yet known to opposition intelligence services (specifically the KGB), and avoid it. This results in the publication of a certain amount of material which, while perhaps new to the public, is in fact already known to the KGB and thus "surfaced."

Material emanating from non-CIA employes, not signatories to secrecy agreements, is in a different category. The CIA is again relatively uninterested in criticism, only in the disclosure of sensitive sources and techniques.

In a recent case, for example, a non-CIA employe wrote a scholarly book describing the drug traffic in Southeast Asia, in the course of which he accused the CIA of abetting the narcotics trade. The national security was not involved, and the CIA took no court action. It did, however, request advance review of the manuscript, which the publishers provided over the objections of the author. The CIA then provided material rebutting specific charges, the publishers chose to ignore the material and the book was published as written. The government took no further action.

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GREENSBORO, N.C.
RECORD
SEP 25 1972
E - 33,470

STATINTL

[redacted]

Statute Versus Treaty As Narcotics Control

On paper at least, September 18 looked like a great day for the good guys in their battle against international drug traffic.

There on Capitol Hill was the U. S. Senate ratifying by a vote of 69 to 0 a strengthening revision of a 90-nation treaty designed to clamp down on the narcotics trade.

Henceforth, the revision provides, the International Narcotics Control Board will see to it that the world production of dope is limited to the quantity needed for medical and scientific use. Production above that ceiling will be reported to the signatory nations and the United Nations General Assembly.

And there at the Department of State was President Nixon saying this country will suspend all American economic and military assistance to any government "whose leaders participate in or protect the activities of those who contribute to our drug problem."

Just which initiative will be the more productive is hard to say just now.

That of the Senate is dependent on devious channels and protocols, but it does have the advantage of being taken without benefit of George McGovern jawboning.

The route the president can take is a good deal more direct, if only he will follow it now that he has made a McGovern-nudged pitch for diligence.

But the chances for clamp-down would be a great deal fatter, one suspects, if the president had been right when he said he is "required by statute" to cut off aid to governments contributing to our drug problem.

The statute is not quite so forceful.

The rule, written into last year's Foreign Assistance Act, is that aid shall be cut off only when the president himself decides that a government has "failed to take adequate steps" to suppress dangerous drugs. The president is the sole judge of which countries are being helpful and which are not. He is "required" to take no action that his personal verdict on the evidence does not support.

His evidence, clearly, is not the same as that which has disturbed Senator McGovern.

The president, says his challenger, has failed to "crack down on the narcotics trade in Laos, Thailand and South Vietnam" because the administration needs "air bases in Thailand, Laos" and "mercenaries and Vietnamese soldiers to fight its war."

There may be more partisan testimony than hard evidence in that accusation, of course. Even so, the McGovern statement is not barren of corroboration.

There have been charges that the CIA's Air America has helped transport heroin in Southeast Asia. In his book, *The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia*, Arthur W. McCoy raised the question of CIA agents knowingly engaging in such traffic to help maintain alliances. And Mr. McCoy qualified with no question his assertion that officials in Southeast Asian governments allied to the U. S. have profited from the drug traffic.

To accuse is not to prove. But if Mr. McCoy's questions and statements are rooted in nothing firmer than supposition, they suggest that the president, even if not derelict, will have a difficult time being diligent in application of that statute.

The helpfulness (or, for that matter, the helplessness) of allies like South Vietnam and Thailand in areas other than drug control cannot fail to influence Mr. Nixon's reading of the evidence.

Not, that is, so long as a keystone of this nation's foreign policy is to prop up such allies.

Presidential options running afoul of presidential commitments, it's just possible the Senate has taken the swifter route

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STATINTL

VICTORY SOON IN FIGHT AGAINST DRUG TRAFFIC?

Interview With Nelson G. Gross, Senior Adviser, International Narcotics Matters, Department of State

A major national goal: to stem the flow of heroin into the U.S. What success thus far? What comes next? Answers are given by a leading expert in an interview in the conference room of "U. S. News & World Report."

Q Mr. Gross, has progress been made in curbing the flow of heroin into the United States?

A The intensive drive that we have mounted over the past year and a half is beginning to have a noticeable impact. The availability of heroin on the streets is less than it was a year ago. The quality is not as good. The wholesale price is higher, and the retail price—which is what addicts pay—is higher.

Q Do you have hard figures to show what is happening?

A Yes. Just as an example:

In the New York City area, the BNDD [Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs] reports that at the wholesale level the purity of heroin has been reduced in the last six months to a year from 51 per cent to 32 per cent. At the retail level—on the street—quality is as low as 2 and 3 per cent. That is considerably less than it was a year ago.

These figures are based on analysis of the considerable amount of heroin that has been seized by law-enforcement agents and by purchases by undercover agents.

As other examples: In Boston, the cost of one gram of heroin jumped from $418 to $785. In Baltimore, the pressure on supply has forced prices up from $10 to $15 a bag, and that bag is of lessened quality—the amount of pure heroin decreasing from 6 per cent to 4 per cent, and in some cases as low as 1 per cent.

Q How long does a bag of heroin last for an addict?

A The average addict is going to need three or four bags a day. That would mean $45 to $60 a day to support his habit—or some $15,000 to $20,000 a year at prices the drug now is bringing.

Q How many heroin addicts are there now in this country?

A Our most recent estimate is approximately 560,000, whereas the previous official estimate was in the range of 300,000 to 350,000.

Q An increase of that size would indicate a much bigger demand now. Could that be the reason for the dramatic increase in prices, rather than a reduction in the supply through the U. S. Government's efforts?

A No—because the present estimate on the number of addicts is based to some extent on better reporting techniques. We think that the higher figure results largely from this, rather than an actual increase in addicts that would be indicated by the two sets of figures.

—USN&WR Photo

Nelson G. Gross, 40, took charge of the State Department's worldwide drive against drug smugglers in August, 1971. He is a lawyer and a legislator from New Jersey with training in investigative work.

Q Is it true, as widely reported, that the greatest concentration of addicts is in the New York City area?

A That is correct. About 50 per cent of them are in or around New York City.

Q Are there other cities that have sizable concentrations?

A I think you could name almost any major U. S. city and you would find a concentration of addicted people there. But New York has an inordinate share of heroin users.

Q Why is there such a heavy concentration of drug addicts in the New York City area?

A We think it is the interaction of supply and demand. New York is where the problem of drug addiction originated in this country. It has flourished there from the beginning. One reason is that this has been the entry point for a large part of the heroin arriving along the established route from [illegible]

Q Is that the main line of drug traffic?

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KANSAS CITY STAR

E - 325,351
S - 396,682

SEP 24 1972

BOOKS of the Day

Maybe the CIA was just sneaky and not stupid

THE POLITICS OF HEROIN IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, by Alfred W. McCoy with Cathleen B. Read & Leonard P. Adams II (464 pages; Harper & Row; $10.95).

By H. G. Summers, Jr.

Suppose you were in the CIA, and the President had just declared an all-out war on drugs. Being devious and Machiavellian by nature, what would be the best way to implement the presidential edict?

How about taking a relatively good book by a team of young researchers, a book that already included an attack on the U.S. role in Vietnam which would appeal to persons who dote on such things, and spicing it up by some rather innocuous and dated attacks on the CIA. Already portrayed as the devil incarnate by the left, a few more attacks couldn't hurt.

Now then, how to get the book in the public eye? What better way than to demand censorship rights over the manuscript. That would raise a guaranteed hue and cry across the political spectrum because nothing—thank God—is so sacrosanct in American society as the rights of a free press.

Fanciful you say? Not nearly so fanciful as half of the sins Alfred McCoy accuses the CIA of in his book. And look at the results. The prepublication censorship was so weak (the publisher said that he was "underwhelmed" by the CIA comments) that reportedly not a word was changed in the manuscript. The news of the censorship was leaked to the press and sparked editorials in the New York Times, the Washington Post, and countless other newspapers. The Star had a section on it.

A brand you can trust?

The CIA, in effect, worked a double blessing. It insured high-level attention and publicity on McCoy's book, which is being faithfully reviewed by most of the major publications, and they focus public attention on the evils of government censorship. The taxpayers got their money's worth in this CIA caper.

Let me hasten to add that I claim no inside information on this caper. Maybe the CIA was just ham-handed enough to demand pre-publication censorship without malice of forethought . . . but I'd rather believe that our highest level intelligence agency was sneaky rather than believe they were merely stupid.

If you are naturally suspicious, there is other evidence as well. According to James Markham in the New York Times, "a former CIA agent" told Seymour Hersh that McCoy's assertions are "10 per cent tendentious and 90 per cent of the most valuable contribution I can think of. He's a very liberal kid, and he'd like to nail the establishment. But some leading intelligence officers inside the Government's program think that his research is great."

Not only that, but McCoy's book, which purports to attack the CIA, actually credits the agency with being 10 feet tall, of having history-bending powers, of saving (Godfather forgive us) the Mafia from extinction after World War II.

Disregard the "tendentious 10 per cent"—the rather puerile political judgements where McCoy wavers between condemning the CIA for being the policeman of the world, and demanding that the United States act as the policeman of the world in the Golden Triangle in Southeast Asia (how many divisions would it take to subdue the Shan States in Burma that neither the British nor the present Burmese Government could police and control?)

Disregard the sometimes juvenile writing style—"In 1852 King Mongut (played by Yul Brynner in the King and I) bowed to British pressure." That's like writing "At Gettysburg, Abraham Lincoln (played by Raymond Massey) said . . ." McCoy also notes "a brutal Chinese pacification campaign (in South China) rather similar to the one launched by the U.S. Seventh Cavalry against the Great Plains Indians." Why "7th Cavalry"? All they distinguished themselves for was getting massacred at the Little Big Horn. It's racist of McCoy to ignore the all-black 10th Cavalry which played a much more important role in the pacification of the West.

Disregard all that, for the book does give valuable insights into the mechanics of the heroin trade. McCoy's examination of the depth and scope of the Asian opium trade is particularly timely since this aspect was ignored until our own ox was gored. When only the "heathen Chinese" smoked opium, the U.S. was singularly uninterested in the problem.

Read McCoy's "90 per cent valuable contribution" that the CIA was kind enough to bring to your attention, but do not be mislead by his conclusion. It is a cop-out to say that "in the final analysis the American people will have to choose between supporting doggedly anti-Communist governments in Southeast Asia or getting heroin out of their high schools." It is not that simple.

As James Markham pointed out in his New York Times review, "American addicts need only 60 to 100 tons of opium a year to feed their habits . . . This amount of opium can be grown on five to 10 square miles of arable, upland country land—in Burma, in India, in Turkey, in Mexico, in Pakistan."

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SAN FRANCISCO, CAL.
EXAMINER
E - 204,749
EXAMINER & CHRONICLE
S - 640,004

SEP 24 1972

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BOOKS

The Politics Of Heroin Exposed

Reviewed by
Thomas Lask

THE POLITICS OF HEROIN IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. By Alfred W. McCoy, with Cathleen B. Reed and Leonard P. Adams II. Harper & Row; 464 pp.; $10.95.

ALTHOUGH "The Politics of Southeast Asia" is packed with information, some of it of considerable compexity, its charges (for that is what its conclusions are) are simple enough to be spelled out in a school primer.

Seventy per cent of the world's supply of heroin, the book asserts, has its origin in Southeast Asia in an area of northeast Burma, North Laos and North Thailand known as the "Golden Triangle."

It is transported in the planes, vehicles and other conveyances supplied by the United States. The profit from the trade has been going into the pockets of some of our best friends in Southeast Asia.

The charge concludes with the statement that the traffic is being carried on with the indifference if not the closed-eye compliance of some American officials and there is no likelihood of its being shut down in the foreseeable future.

Quick Controversy

These conclusions have been drawn by a young Ph.D. scholar from Yale who stu[died] the subject for 18 months and who has al[so] been embroiled with the Central Intelligence Agency over them.

'We have to continue to fight the evil of Communism and to fight . . . you must have money. In these mountains the only money is opium'

—A Taiwan gene[ral]

Before publication, his book was attacked by the CIA for what it said were unjust accusations that the agency knew of but failed to stem that heroin traffic. After reading the galleys (which the publisher had made available) and sending off a critique to Harper's, the CIA took no further action.

It is difficult for anyone not close to the field to assess the accuracy of McCoy's material. But it must be said that his book is a serious, sober, headline-shunning study with 63 pages of supporting notes, referring to a large number of personal interviews, newspaper accounts, previously published books, Congressional committee hearings, government reports and United Nations documents. It is so filled with information that it will take a great deal more than mere dislike of its contents to demolish it.

Official Acknowledgement

Perhaps the greatest guarantee of its accuracy is a cabinet-level report prepared by officials of the CIA, the State Department and the Defense Department that confirms the main findings of the McCoy book. The report, dated Feb. 21, 1972, said that "there is no prospect" of stemming the smuggling of drugs by air and sea in Southeast Asia and cited as one reason the fact that "the governments in the region are unable or in some cases unwilling" to make a truly effective effort to curb the traffic.

That drug smuggling is not a problem remote from us can be seen from the fact that a shipment of the Double U-O Globe brand, a bulk heroin manufactured in the Golden Triangle, was seized in an amount estimated by the police to be worth $3.5 million in the Lexington hotel in New York City last November and another shipment worth by police estimates to be $2.25 million was taken in Miami.

The politics of heroin — and in this book the emphasis is on the politics — is an artful one. McCoy cites the case of Ngo Dinh Nhu, brother of President Ngo Dinh Diem of South Vietnam, later murdered by his colleagues.

During his brother's regime, Nhu was head of the secret police and had set up a close

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THE NEW YORK TIMES BOOK REVIEW
24 Sept 1972

[redacted]

STATINTL

New and Recommended

THE POLITICS OF HEROIN IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, by Alfred W. McCoy, with Cathleen B. Read and Leonard P. Adams II. (Harper & Row, $10.95.) A history of the post-World War II drug traffic in Southeast Asia that brilliantly unsnarls its tangled intrigues.

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STATINTL

CHICAGO DAILY NEWS
2/3/74 Sep Daily

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Fact: CIA alliance with the drug traffic

STATINTL

THE POLITICS OF HEROIN IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, by Alfred W. McCoy (Harper & Row, $10.95).

By Keyes Beech

HEROIN didn't always have a bad name. Around the turn of the century it was hailed as a "miracle drug" and approved by the AMA for general use. In fact, it didn't even have a name until Germany's Bayer chemical combine invented "Heroin" as a brand name and put it on the market as a cough medicine.

But this fascinating bit of drug lore is only incidental to the central theme of this devastating book: that because of its commitment to contain communism in Southeast Asia, the U.S. government helped create a generation of junkies.

SOUTHEAST Asia's "Golden Triangle" — where Laos, Thailand and Burma meet — has been an opium-growing area for centuries. But what McCoy and his fellow authors are concerned about is how within the last 20 years the "triangle" has expanded its production until today it accounts for 70 per cent of the world's illicit supply of heroin.

For this the authors hold the United States responsible. They specifically charge that in their clandestine war against the Communists, U.S. agencies, notably the CIA, allied themselves with elements known to be engaged in the drug traffic; ignored and even covered up the activities of known drug traffickers, and allowed American military aircraft to be used to transport drugs.

The charges are difficult to refute because, in the main, they happen to be true. McCoy has done his homework. Critics may quarrel with some of his facts and dispute many of his judgments, but he convincingly demonstrates, for example, that the G.I. heroin epidemic in South Vietnam could not have happened without the active participation of greedy generals and government officials who owed their jobs to the United States.



A GI snorts heroin in Vietnam.

U.S. involvement in the drug traffic was, as the authors contend, an "inevitable consequence" of our involvement in Southeast Asia, where opium was a way of life. But it did not become an "American problem" until it touched American lives.

THE BOOK is not quite the scholarly work that it pretends to be. It is as much an indictment of the Vietnam war as it is a documentation of the drug traffic. The authors suggest that all will be well if President Nixon is defeated and the United States pulls out of Southeast Asia lock, stock and barrel.

Maybe so. But the sad thing is that the book's chief victims are a handful of dedicated CIA men who went to Southeast Asia to do a job. That job was to fight communism, not reform a society.

Keyes Beech is The Daily News' correspondent in Asia.

Fiction: An ex-CIA man's disputed thriller

COMPANY MAN by Joe Maggio (Putnam, $6.95).

By George Harmon

THE late Allen Dulles, quarterback of our World War II spies and later chief of the CIA, scoffed at the notion of the American diplomat or spy being a closed-mind blunderer too cynical to play by any rules but his own. He criticized such novels as Graham Greene's "The Quiet American" and Burdick and Lederer's "The Ugly American" for promoting "mischief-creating prejudices."

Dulles wrote that he preferred "taking the raw material which we find in America — naive, home-grown, even homespun — and training such a man to be a good intelligence officer, however long the process lasts." Those homespun boys, if we are to believe recent news accounts, are traveling much farther afield than Dulles seemed willing to send them.

THE BACKBONE of CIA activity apparently remains the clandestine listening posts and purloined letters which Dulles so loved. But now the charge is often made that the CIA tries to foment change rather than merely report it; in Uganda, for example; in Chile, in Laos.

So much is being written about the CIA, in fact, that its argot is creeping into American slang: a spy is a spook, to kill is to "terminate with extreme prejudice."

Now arrives Joe Maggio, a mercenary-turned-writer, who says he worked off and on for the CIA in places like Africa and Laos.

His novel tells of Nick Martin, a sort of comic book superhero and former Green Beret. A "home-grown" boy whom Dulles would have liked, he is recruited off a Florida campus by "the Company" (in-group slang for the CIA), and works part time, training Bay of Pigs invaders and shooting up Africa and the Tonkin Gulf. There is enough bad writing to fill three pulp magazines ("steel split the air overhead").

BUT MAGGIO'S book has an aura of authenticity about it, and few readers know enough about the CIA to dispute him — even though the question already has been raised: Is Joe Maggio the Clifford Irving of the barracks set?

W. E. Colby, executive director of the CIA, disputes the publisher's contention that "Company Man" is "a novel of facts," proclaiming it a "tawdry fabrication" filled with "lurid writing and innate contradictions." He denies that the CIA ever has carried out assassinations or has trafficked in drugs, as Maggio asserts.

Colby also says Maggio was "terminated for cause" during a six-month CIA training program and never went overseas for the CIA or undertook any of the "assignments" Maggio says he performed. But Maggio has obtained a government letter quoting the CIA as saying that he worked for the agency on contract.

In any event, Maggio writes enough like a soldier to convince the reader he has been one. He has produced an unprofessional but good example of thriller fiction.

George Harmon is a Daily News editor and writer.

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STATINTL

THE BULLETIN
24 Sept 1971

[redacted]

THE C.I.A. AND THE HEROIN TRADE

STATINTL

By ALFRED W. McCOY and KATHLEEN B. READ

"LADIES and gentlemen," announced the genteel British diplomat, raising his glass to offer a toast, "I give you Prince Sopsaisana, the uplifter of Laotian youth."

The toast brought an appreciative smile from the guest of honor, cheers and applause from the luminaries of Vientiane's diplomatic corps assembled at the farewell banquet for the Laotian ambassador-designate to France, Prince Sopsaisana. A member of the royal house of Xieng Khouang, the Plain of Jars region, the prince was vice-president of the National Assembly, chairman of the Lao Bar Association, president of the Lao Press Association, president of the *Alliance Francaise,* and a member in good standing of the Asian People's Anti-Communist League. After receiving his credentials from the king in a private audience at the Luang Prabang Royal Palace on April 8, 1971, he was treated to an unprecedented round of cocktail parties, dinners, and banquets. For Sopsai, as his friends call him, was not just any ambassador; the Americans considered him an outstanding example of a new generation of honest, dynamic leaders.

The final send-off party at Vientiane's Wattay Airport on April 23 was one of the gayest affairs of the season. Everybody was there; the champagne bubbled, the canapes were flawlessly French, and Ivan Bastouil, charge d'affaires at the French embassy, gave the nicest speech. Only after the plane had soared off into the clouds did anybody notice that Sopsai had forgotten to pay for his share of the reception.

His arrival at Paris's Orly Airport on the morning of April 25 was the occasion for another reception. The French ambassador to Laos, home for a brief visit, and the entire staff of the Laotian embassy had turned out to welcome the new ambassador. There were warm embraces, kissing on both cheeks, and more effusive speeches. Curiously, the prince insisted on waiting for his luggage like any ordinary tourist, and when his many suitcases finally appeared after an unexplained delay, he immediately noticed that a particular one was missing. Sopsai angrily insisted that his suitcase be delivered at once, and French authorities promised, most apologetically, that it would be sent to the Laotian embassy as soon as it was found. Sopsai departed reluctantly for yet another reception at the embassy, and while he drank the ceremonial champagne with his newfound retinue of admirers, French customs officials were examining one of the biggest heroin seizures in French history.

The ambassador's suitcase contained 60 kilos of high-grade Laotian heroin — worth $13.5 million on the streets of New York, its probable destination. A week later, a smiling French official presented himself at the embassy with the suitcase in hand. Although Sopsaisana had been bombarding the airport with outraged telephone calls for several days, he suddenly realised that accepting the suitcase was tantamount to an admission of guilt and so, [illegible] he flatly denied that it was his. Ignoring his declaration of innocence, the French government refused to accept his diplomatic credentials, and Sopsai remained in Paris for no more than two months before he was recalled.

DESPITE its resemblance to comic opera, the Prince Sopsaisana affair offered a rare glimpse into the workings of the Laotian drug trade. That trade is the principal business of Laos, and to a certain extent it depends on the support (money, guns, aircraft etc) of the CIA. Unfortunately, the questions raised by the prince's disgrace were never asked, much less answered. The French government overlooked the embarrassment for diplomatic reasons, the international press ignored the story, and the United States embassy demonstrated a remarkable disinterest in the entire subject.

Over the past 50 years, Laos has become something of a free port for opium. The delicate opium poppy grows abundantly at high elevations in the northern mountains, and under a sequence of different regimes (French, American, Laotian), the hill tribesmen have been encouraged to cultivate the poppy as the principal cash crop. Opium dens can be found in every quarter of Vientiane, and the whereabouts of the opium refineries are a matter of common knowledge.

The Laotian indifference to Prince Sopsaisana's misfortune therefore becomes easily understandable. The reticence of the American embassy, however, requires a few words of explanation. Sopsai had allegedly received his 60 kilos of heroin through the kind offices of a particularly [illegible] Vang Pao. Vang Pao also happens to be the commander of the CIA secret army in

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DES MOINES, IOWA
REGISTER

M - 250,261
S - 515,710
SEP 22 1972

Cracking Down on Drug Trade

President Nixon said he would comply fully and promptly with the statute which requires him to suspend aid to "any government whose leaders participate in or protect the activities of those who contribute to our drug problem."

Taken literally, the statute would require him to suspend aid to South Vietnam, Laos and Thailand, all of which have leaders deeply involved in the drug trade.

Formerly nearly all the heroin for Americans came from Turkish poppy fields via French processors and smugglers. In recent years the United States has been paying Turkey to cut off opium production and catching the French smugglers. So the traditional Southeast Asia opium trade has greatly expanded, begun manufacture of heroin and gone after customers among American soldiers in South Vietnam and in the world market. Burma is part of the chain, too, but Burma scorns U.S. aid.

If the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency were a foreign power (sometimes it acts like one), the President would have to cut off support for it, too. For years the C.I.A. has tolerated the opium and heroin trade of Southeast Asia in its search for "freedom fighters." The opium-growing Meos of Laos are C.I.A. proteges, and so, earlier, were the opium-growing Chinese Nationalist exiled guerrillas in Burma. The chain of smugglers who brought the opium from the interior highlands to processing and distribution points as heroin included Laotian and South Vietnamese generals and officials.

Unfortunately, all this is hard to prove in any individual case, though the general outlines are well-known.

The C.I.A. denies everything, and the Thai, Laotian and South Vietnamese governments do the same — and occasionally co-operate in crackdowns to keep the White House satisfied.

Still, the President would be wise to keep his pledge on file and consider actually carrying out the threat. America's "honor" and "face" have been hopelessly smirched by the long, cruel Indochina war, but he could still salvage a little honor by ending the whole war (not just for Americans on the ground) out of refusal any longer to co-operate with those who are corrupting American troops with heroin.

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STATINTL
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FT. WAYNE, IND.
JOURNAL GAZETTE
SEP 21 1972
M - 68,240
S - 105,850

Heading Off The Drug Problem

The country's fight against foreign drug traffic is developing its own version of a credibility gap. It was just about a year ago the administration announced a "significant breakthrough" in an agreement with Turkey to start eliminating opium production. Since then, however, there has been some new evidence to indicate Turkey was only a part of the problem.

Earlier this year, Secretary of State William Rogers reported to a Senate subcommittee that the countries in Southeast Asia also were cooperating to control the drug flow. But now there's substantial doubt about just how willing those countries are to aid the U.S. drive against drug importation. A new report has emerged, compiled by the Central Intelligence Agency, the State Department and the Defense Department, which found the drug business from Southeast Asia is vastly larger than had been estimated, and that there is no foreseeable prospect of stopping it. The study further blames "corruption, collusion and indifference" by various levels of government in Thailand and South Vietnam.

Although administration spokesmen immediately discounted the report, still another investigation by the Strategic Intelligence Office of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs also emphasized the amount of high-quality heroin that is coming out of Southeast Asia. That report further said there is evidence piling up to indicate organized crime is involved in the trade.

There is at least enough information to remove any doubt about the international scope of the hard drug production and supply network. It involves numerous countries, governmental corruption, and a wide range of smuggling channels. It also means the hard drug problem isn't going to come under control with a single approach.

One alternative is to disrupt domestic supply channels, and to make it difficult for them to do business. The administration is more nearly on target with its new proposal for a National Narcotics Intelligence Office to help fight domestic drug traffic, and for more money for addict treatment and rehabilitation. Another part of the effort is to create the kind of educational programs that can help youths avoid getting involved with drugs. That's where the impact is the most important, and where all the other social complications can be avoided.

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OAKLAND, CAL.
CALIFORNIA VOICE
SEP 21 1972
WEEKLY - 12,500

Politics and History of Heroin

By Mark Henriquez

Almost universally acknowledged as something akin to the great plague itself, it is often surprising to learn that heroin was once proclaimed to be the wonder drug of the age. The time was shortly before the turn of the century and the place was imperial Germany where heroin had just been developed as a cure for a more sinister addiction, that of morphine. As use of the drug became more widespread and its disadvantages more obvious, heroin quickly lost its priveleged position and the scientific institutions of the day renewed their search in other directions.

Quantities of heroin first appeared in this country around 1930. The principle importers of the drug were sailors and other global transients whose activities were confined primarily to the larger coastal cities. The ghettos for the most part remained untouched.

MORPHINE

With the coming of W W II the situation underwent a radical change and once more the use of morphine was involved. Standard procedure adopted by the U. S. armed forces for the treatment of wounds received in combat involved immediate massive injections of the drug to deaden the pain. So widespread was the use of morphine during the war that many G. I.'s were issued their own personal drug supply and hypodermic needle in the event that self treatment became necessary. Despite the fact that morphine was known to have been dangerously addictive some fifty years before the outbreak of the war, the drug had become an integral part of America's wartime medical machine.

It was with the release of many of these wounded veterans from service that the specter of widespread drug addiction first appeared. No one, it seems, had yet developed a cure for morphine addiction but heroin was a good substitute. Sailors soon found that they could make a lot more money selling heroin than they could on any ship and the rush was on to secure the most lucrative markets and methods of production.

EFFECT

Nowhere was the effect of heroin felt more dramatically than in the Black community. Seemingly overnight scores of young men, whose only misfortune was to have served



their country, returned home with only their wits between them and what was most often a slow agonizing death.

Five years after the close of W W II the pusher was already established as the new king of the ghetto. The post war baby boom, the newfound affluence of the ifties, and the Korean conflict in which even more Americans were introduced to use of narcotics all played a role in the rise of smack. As a result countless millions of young men and women, most of them Black, found themselves involved with heroin before reaching the age of twenty.

Black power advocates were the first to allege that heroin addiction was actually encouraged by this country's federal government as a means to further subjugate the Black population, and thereby avoid full scale revolution in the face of increasing repression. Stokely Charmichel, Rap Brown, the now defunct SNCC, Peace and Freedom Party and even a fledgling Black Panther Party (New York chapter) have all espoused this position at one time or another. Whether or not this charge is valid in and of itself, there is a substantial body of evidence to suggest that the United States government has actively encouraged large scale heroin production to further its own political ends.

The genesis of this intrigue began shortly before the actual introduction of American troduction of American ground troops in South Vietnam. Before the American army could embark it was necessary to determine the amount of local support they could expect. Since the South Vietnamese army was barely on the edge of destruction and the civilian population almost solidly behind the Viet Cong, or just as solidly neutral, the search concentrated on certain jungle tribesmen who inhabit the remote mountain areas that border Laos and Cambodia. It just so happened that these Meo (pronounced Mao) and Montingyard tribesmen traditionally engaged in running guns and opium to the lucrative markets of Thialand and Viet Nam.

As they were already doing a booming business on their own, some incentive was needed to push them into the uncertainties of war. It seems that since these tribesmen had little or no contact with any government, political appeals were largely ineffective.

COMPROMISE

What evolved was a compromise. Montingyard and Meo tribes would fight and provide intelligence for American troops if the Americans would, in turn, help them move greater quantities of opium and heroin.

The details as to how this compromise has worked have been the subject of numerous articles appearing in publications ranging from Ramparts to THE NEW YORK TIMES. Air America aircraft, a charter owned and operated by the CIA, certain aircraft belonging to the USAF, and in one case documented by CBS, even the personal aircraft of the American ambassador to Saigon have all been involved in the trafficing of heroin.

That a new generation of American soldiers becomes addicted while serving in Viet Nam is seemingly a small price to pay for the opportunity of stopping the insidious red hoards.

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Commentary

The CIA Loses A Book

By James Wrightson, Associate Editor

STRIKE — One thing is certain about the US Central Intelligence Agency: No one knows where it will strike next. Figuring out where the cloak-and-dagger fellows will turn up is like guessing the number of jelly beans in a jar or predicting when they will finish the street repairs in front of your house or when your in-laws will drop in for dinner the next time.

Of course, there are certain events the CIA is NOT interested in — apple pie bakeoffs, watermelon contests, a Burlington Liars Club get-together, an apple bob, spin-the-bottle or a backgammon game.

When the fellows from the woodsy CIA campus in Langley, Va., get interested in something they go all out. And when they do, their policies are right out of King Herod. It must have been a CIA operative in the crowd who started shouting: "Give us Barabbas."

The latest example is the Central Intelligence Agency's ham-handed attempt to stop publication of a book by Alfred McCoy, a Yale graduate student, called "The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia."

McCoy's book charged the Central Intelligence Agency has known of Thai and South Vietnamese official involvement in heroin traffic, has covered up their involvement and has participated in aspects of the traffic itself.

DENIED — The CIA, of course, has denied all this. We are not concerned here with the pinpoint accuracy of McCoy's book or his methods of research, although the CIA could turn up no gross errors in fact.

What is of deep concern is the way the CIA, a powerful and prestigious government agency, moved to block to Harper & Row not to publish the book.

In an exchange of letters, the general counsel of the CIA asked to see the book prior to publication saying: "It is our belief that no reputable publishing house would wish to publish such allegations without being assured the supporting evidence was valid."

Admittedly under fire in the book, the agency said it should have the role as the validator.

The publisher, probably with the Clifford Irving hoax in mind, was supersensitive to the axiom: A publisher has the ultimate responsibility for checking the reliability of the material he proposes to publish. So overriding the author's objections, it got the galley proofs of "The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia" and a courier from the CIA headquarters went to New York and took them back to Virginia.

Apparently after a page-by-page review the CIA could not, try as it did, demonstrate the author's evidence did not support his assertions.

REVIEW — In a letter to the general counsel of the CIA the publisher said: "Based upon careful review, it is our sincere opinion Mr. McCoy's scholarship remains unshaken and we do not see any reason for making any changes in the text."

That would end it, except for the fact this is neither the government's nor the CIA's first venture into the dangerous business of trying to impose prepublication restraints on words and ideas the citizens of this country are to read and consider.

The memory of the Justice Department's outcry against the Pentagon Papers is still green. The CIA has an unenviable record in this regard. In recent years the agency has tried to use its influence on Random House, Putnam, Harper and has gone into court to try to dictate what the people of this country shall read about the CIA.

The supersecret agency just cannot have it both ways. It cannot be a supersecret, never-to-be-spoken of, behind-the-scenes intelligence-gathering agency, then come storming out of the shadows when it believes it might be hurt by something printed about its activities.

The CIA's action in trying to stop the publication of "The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia" is about as helpful to the cause of freedom of information in this country as the Stamp Act was to King George.

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WASHINGTON POST
21 SEP 1972 STAT/NYT

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

Ray to Knock Out Hijackers Dropped

By Jack Anderson

Guerrillas and Dope

Intelligence reports charge that the Palestinian guerrillas in Lebanon are hampering U.S. efforts to cut off the illegal flow of heroin and hashish from the Mideast to America.

"Turkish opium and morphine base is smuggled into Lebanon," says one report, "directly or through Syria." From Lebanon, some shipments are routed to South America, others to Rotterdam for transshipment to the United States.

It's difficult to stop the dope smuggling out of Lebanon, suggests another classified document, because "internal security and the presence of about 30,000 armed guerrillas in the country pose a major threat to the government.

"The police are restrained from proceeding against the hashish production and trafficking in the Baalbeck area as there is strong parliamentary involvement in the traffic," the report adds.

In all fairness, the harassed Lebanese government has tried to control the Palestinians. But William Buffum, the American ambassador, has pointed out that "the Lebanese authorities have not dared to set foot in any of the country's 15 refugee camps for the past two years."

As evidence of the trouble the guerrillas are causing in Lebanon, the Central Intelligence Agency has summarized the Palestinian offenses, notably:

"A. Customs evasion, nonpayment of postal and telephone dues, flouting of vehicles registration regulations.

"B. The presence in refugee camps of large colonies of alien squatters.

"C. Refusal by individuals to comply with court orders, pay fines or answer summonses, under the protection both of the camp police and of their fedayeen aliases.

"D. Seizure and occupation of land outside the defined camp boundaries.

"E. Specific incidents of ill-discipline."

Reports also persist that the Palestinian terrorists are actually raising their arms money by smuggling dope. The intelligence data in our hands, however, fails to pin down this charge.

The United States, meanwhile, has brought quiet pressure upon the Lebanese authorities to crack down on the smuggling. Although they may be somewhat helpless to prevent it, the classified documents recommend as a last resort that the United States "expose Lebanon"—one of our few friends in the Arab sphere — "in the world press as source and transshipment country for hashish and opiates respectively."

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NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS
7 SEP 72

A Correspondence wi

Alfred W. McCoy

I

On June 1 of this year an official of the US Central Intelligence Agency paid a visit to the New York offices of my publisher, Harper and Row, Inc. This CIA official was Mr. Cord Meyer, Jr. (now the CIA's Assistant Deputy Director of Plans; formerly the CIA official in charge of providing covert financial subsidies for organizations such as the National Student Association, *Encounter* Magazine, and the Congress for Cultural Freedom).[1] Mr. Meyer urged several of his old friends among Harper and Row's senior management to provide him with a copy of the galley proofs of my history of the international narcotics traffic, *The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia*. In this book I show the complicity of various US agencies—particularly the CIA and the State Department—in organizing the Southeast Asian drug traffic since the early 1950s.

Mr. Meyer presented one of Harper and Row's senior editors with some documents giving the CIA's view on the Southeast Asian drug traffic. His manner was grave. He said, "You wouldn't want to publish a book that would be full of inaccuracies, embarrass the United States government, or get you involved in libel suits, would you?"

Harper and Row's management promised to consider Mr. Meyer's request and summoned me from Washington, DC, where I was then testifying before the Senate Appropriations Committee on my findings after eighteen months of research into the Southeast Asian drug traffic. This research included more than 250 interviews with heroin dealers, police officials, and intelligence agents in Europe and Asia.

At a meeting in New York on the afternoon of June 8, Harper and Row's president, Mr. Winthrop Knowlton, and its senior vice president, Mr. B. Brooks Thomas, told me that they had decided to provide the CIA with a copy of the galley proofs prior to publication for the following reasons:

First, the CIA would be less likely to seek a temporary court injunction barring publication of the book if the Agency were given a chance to persuade itself that national security was in no way endangered by portions of my book; and secondly, Harper and Row felt that a responsible publisher should have enough confidence in the veracity of any of its particularly controversial books to show them to any reputable critic for comment prior to publication.

At first I disagreed strongly with Harper and Row's decision, arguing that submitting the galley proofs to the CIA could set a dangerous precedent and ultimately weaken First Amendment guarantees concerning freedom of the press. Moreover, in view of what I had learned of the CIA's operating methods in Southeast Asia I was convinced that the Agency was capable of using unethical means—such as coercing my sources into retracting statements they had made to me about US complicity in the international narcotics traffic—in order to induce Harper and Row to withdraw the book from publication.

After a week of negotiations, however, Harper and Row told me that they would not be willing to publish the book unless I agreed to submit the manuscript to the CIA. Faced with what I believed would be lengthy delays if I took the book to another publisher and the prospect of losing my Harper and Row editor, Elisabeth Jakab, with whom I had worked closely, I capitulated. Thus began more than two months of lengthy negotiations between the CIA, Harper and Row, and myself. Most of what happened during these elaborate negotiations is in the correspondence reprinted below. I have added introductory notes to explain some of the attending circumstances.

Considered collectively, this exchange of letters provides us with another important reminder—perhaps the first since the National Student Association scandals of 1967—of the contempt this most clandestine of our governmental agencies has for the integrity of the press and publishing industry. As the CIA's letter of July 28, 1972, shows, it was unable to rebut effectively my analysis of its role in the international heroin traffic during the last quarter century. Since the CIA simply had no plausible defense against this charge, it tried to impose prior censorship in order to avoid public scrutiny of its record. If it was not already clear, it now should be obvious to publishers that the Agency cannot be regarded as a responsible critic when its public image is seriously threatened by what is written about it.

II

1 In this letter, written after Cord Meyer, Jr.'s visit, Harper and Row asked the CIA for official confirmation of their interest in seeing the book. Since the CIA had never before been quite so willing to defend itself publicly, neither Harper and Row nor [illegible] Agency.

STATINTL

and Row by stating categorically that it could rebut all my charges about its complicity in the international narcotics traffic. We were surprised, however, that the CIA made no reference to "national security" as one of its concerns in requesting to review the manuscript. Rather, the Agency made its request purely on grounds of government privilege.

Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

5. July 1972

Mr. B. Brooks Thomas
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc.

Dear Mr. Thomas:

Mr. Cord Meyer has asked me to respond to your letter to him of June 30th in connection with the book, *The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia*, by Alfred W. McCoy.

As you are no doubt aware, Mr. McCoy testified on 2 June 1972 before the Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee. His testimony included allegations concerning support of the international opium traffic by U. S. agencies, including the Central Intelligence Agency, and numerous other allegations concerning participation in the opium traffic by both Americans and local personnel in Southeast Asia.

In the light of the pernicious nature of the drug traffic, allegations concerning involvement of the U. S. Government therein or the participation of American citizens should be made only on the basis of hard evidence. It is our belief that no reputable

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Headquarters
EMPLOYEE BULLETIN

#326

20 September 1972

PRESIDENTIAL COMMENTS
ABOUT THE NARCOTICS CONTROL PROGRAM

The President on 18 September 1972 addressed the International Narcotics Control Conference about the global drug problem. His remarks about the Agency's role in the narcotics control program were very complimentary and are quoted below for the information of all employees:

"The men and women who operate the global heroin trade are a menace not to Americans alone, but to all mankind. These people are literally the slave traders of our time. They are traffickers in living death. They must be hunted to the end of the earth. They must be left no base in any nation for their operation. They must be permitted not a single hiding place or refuge from justice anywhere in the world and that is why we have established an aggressive international narcotics control program in cooperation with the governments in more than 50 countries around the world. That is why I have ordered the Central Intelligence Agency, early in this Administration, to mobilize its full resources to fight the international drug trade, a task, incidentally, in which it has performed superbly.

Let me interject here a word for that much maligned agency. As I have often said, in the field of intelligence we always find that the failures are those that are publicized. Its successes, by definition, must always be secret and in this area there are many successes and particularly ones for which this agency can be very proud.

The key priority here is the target on the traffickers wherever they are, to immobilize and destroy them through our law enforcement and intelligence efforts and I commend all of you on the fine initial progress which has been made in these programs."

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BALTIMORE SUN

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STATINTL

Nixon vows to cut off aid to lands in drug traffic

By JAMES S. KEAT
Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington—President Nixon threatened yesterday to cut off all economic and military aid to governments that connive in the illegal narcotics traffic to the United States.

"I shall not hesitate" to invoke authority granted him last year to take such a step, Mr. Nixon told a conference of narcotics control officials from the government here and from some 50 U.S. embassies abroad.

Some of the sting was taken from the President's threat when he singled out for praise for the anti-narcotics efforts taken by such nations as Paraguay, Thailand and Laos, nations that have in the past been considered laggards by some officials.

One official cited Burma as the only nation still regarded as recalcitrant in the international fight against the opium trade, which reaches the U.S. in the form of heroin. But Burma receives no U.S. aid.

The authority cited by Mr. Nixon was given him in an amendment last year to the legislation authorizing shipment of surplus agricultural commodities to needy nations. A White House spokesman said the possible use of the provision had been invoked in previous international discussions on combatting the heroin trade.

Speaking harshly of the drug traffickers, Mr. Nixon called them "the slave traders of our time." He said the fight against drug abuse, at home and abroad, "is one of the most important, the most urgent, national priorities confronting the United States today."

Mr. Nixon conceded that the effort to halt the narcotics trade is "enormously difficult," but he asserted that the administration is "beginning to roll up some victories in country after country around the world and in the United States as well."

More federally financed drug treatment facilities have been created in the past year than in the 50 preceding years, the President said. Arrests of drug traffickers in the year ended last June 30 was double the number three years earlier, he added. And he cited again the reported rise in price of heroin on the street as evidence police were squeezing supply lines.

Mr. Nixon spoke just a day after a sharp attack on his drug program by Senator George S. McGovern, his Democratic rival for the presidency. Senator McGovern contended that the administration has failed to deal effectively with the narcotics problem at home or abroad.

Diplomats summoned

Mr. Nixon's words were aimed at an audience larger than the U.S. diplomats who were summoned to the hastily organized conference which concludes tomorrow.

Several officials who conceded that the meeting would have little tangible result argued that the diplomats who have been prodding foreign governments for more strenuous efforts to stem the flow or heroin would be armed with the President's strong words in exercising suasion.

Praised CIA

At the same time, the Committee for the Re-election of the President tape recorded the President's speech at the State Department yesterday morning and advised any journalists who may have missed it that they would hear it by telephoning committee headquarters.

The President took pains to praise the "much maligned" Central Intelligence Agency, which he said has "performed superbly" in helping fight the drug traffic. The agency has been accused, mostly recently in a book, of ignoring or actually aiding narcotics activities by some American allies in Southeast Asia.

In the remainder of the narcotics control conference which was organized by the State Department in the last 10 days, the U.S. diplomats will hear a series of brief speeches by high-ranking administration officials concerned with the drug traffic and will exchange ideas among themselves.

All but one of the speeches for the private sessions of the conference are scheduled to last a half-hour or less, including time for questions. Many of the diplomats are of high rank, including a sprinkling of ambassadors or their deputies.

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WASHINGTON POST

10 SEP 1972

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

Tom Braden

Accusations Swirl Around CIA

THE Central Intelligence Agency is under fire again, this time accused of engaging in the heroin traffic. Despite our professed dedication to fact, we Americans are not immune to mythology. Where the CIA is concerned, we swallow almost anything.

For example, large numbers of Americans still believe the CIA encompassed the death of John Kennedy. The accusation used to make Robert Kennedy almost physically ill, but he was never able to scotch it, and you can still hear it whispered by those whose minds run to things that go "woosh! in the night."

The myth that the CIA is responsible for the vast quantities of heroin which enter this country probably has a similar goblinlike origin. When tragedy hits us we search for a culprit. Since World War II, the CIA has been at hand.

Unlike the death-of-Kennedy myth, to which no author or scholar ever gave credence, the heroin myth has now found respectable support. In a new book, "The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia," a young Yale student and antiwar activist named Alfred W. McCoy suggests that the heroin tragedy in the nation is the fault of the CIA.

"AMERICAN diplomats and secret agents have been involved in the narcotics traffic at three levels," he writes. "(1) Coincidental complicity by allying with groups actively engaged in the drug traffic; (2) abetting the traffic by covering up for known heroin traffickers; (3) active engagement in the traffic of opium and heroin. It is ironic," he adds, "that America's heroin plague is of its own making."

If I may adopt Mr. McCoy's style for a moment, I should like to be permitted the following comment: Some Americans who want to change the policy in Vietnam endanger their effort on three levels: (1) They attribute evil to those who are carrying out the policy. (2) As evidence of the evil, they offer the policy. To say the CIA moved certain farmers to get them off the battlefield and that the farmers were forced to raise opium in order to eat is evidence that the CIA, like the American Army, is engaged in the war. But that's all it is. Nor is it good enough to accuse an agency of the U.S. government with importing heroin by evidence such as "Chinese merchants report" or "according to several sources." (3) They thus contribute to the making of a dangerous myth.

In dismissing Mr. McCoy's charges it is important to admit guilt by association. Opium has always been a product of Southeast Asia. The presence of U.S. troops has increased its value. Therefore it is highly likely that the CIA, as well as the American Army, has from time to time gained information or given support to individuals or groups who were drug traffickers. Moreover, there are times when dealing with drug traffickers may be excusable. If the man knows where the enemy is hiding, you don't refuse to learn from him because you know he beats his children.

It is also probably true that individuals employed by the CIA have been guilty of transporting heroin, just as soldiers in the U.S. Army have been guilty. Would Mr. McCoy therefore conclude that the U.S. Army is actively engaged in the transport of opium and heroin?

THE FACT is that CIA Director Richard Helms will fire anybody in the agency who is caught trafficking in drugs, and that the use of drugs by agency personnel is also cause for immediate dismissal. CIA's policy on drugs is far more severe than that of the Army. Moreover, Helms and the agency are deeply engaged in an effort to spot the sources of heroin and identify the traffickers.

But saying this will probably not satisfy the mythmakers. Try citing the Warren commission to the next man you meet in a bar who tells you about the CIA and John Kennedy. "Oh," he will smile, knowingly, "the Warren Commission. That's the cover story."

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NEW YORK TIMES

18 SEP 1972

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STATINTL

Nixon Defends His Record In Combating Drug Trade

By ROBERT B. SEMPLE Jr.
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 18 — President Nixon, in another quick response to charges raised by his Democratic opponent, defended today his record on narcotics control and pledged to cut off aid to any foreign government whose leaders "protect" international drug traffickers.

Appearing before an international narcotics control conference at the State Department this morning, Mr. Nixon told a group of senior officers from United States embassies in 55 countries that his year-old "war" on drugs had shown measurable progress but that "we must do more to win this war and we must do it even more quickly."

Senator George McGovern, the Democratic Presidential nominee, charged yesterday in a statement issued in West Virginia that Mr. Nixon had failed to "crack down on the narcotics trade in Laos, Thailand and South Vietnam" because the Administration needed "air bases in Thailand, Laos mercenaries and Vietnamese soldiers to fight its war."

Name Not Used

In his comments this morning, Mr. Nixon did not mention Mr. McGovern by name. This has become his custom. Mr. Nixon also did not directly respond to the South Dakota Democrat's allegations.

He listed five countries — Laos, Thailand, Turkey, France and Paraguay—where United States officials, working "in partnership" with local authorities, had produced "important breakthroughs," including large heroin seizures and, in the case of Turkey, a decision to eradicate the opium poppy.

In addition, Mr. Nixon asked the embassy officials to convey a "personal message" to the foreign authorities when they returned overseas.

"Any government," he said, "whose leaders participate in or protect the activities of those who contribute to the drug problem should know that the United States is required by statute to suspend all American economic and military assistance to such a regime, and I shall not hesitate to comply with that law where there are any violations."

Mr. Nixon described international drug traffickers as "a menace not just to Americans alone but to all mankind."

"These people are literally the slave traders of our time. They are traffickers in living death. They must be hunted to the end of the earth. They must be left no base in any nation for their operation," he said.

The statutory basis for Mr. Nixon to suspend aid to foreign governments lies in Section 481 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1971. Mr. Nixon has yet to invoke the authority granted him, and despite his threat this morning, there are few officials here who seriously believe that he would order such strong sanctions against the Thais and the Laotians while the war in Vietnam continues.

At the same time, however, the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs has helped organize and subsidize a task force operating in northern Thailand to intercept opium, morphine base and heroin that flows southward from Burma. The bureau is now organizing a second such force in Bangkok.

The President's personal response to Mr. McGovern's charge fit the pattern of Mr. Nixon's campaign. Mr. Nixon and his subordinates have greeted nearly every McGovern charge, involving such varied matters as the role of women in government, the plight of flood victims in Pennsylvania and the broader issues of welfare and taxes, with virtually instantaneous rebuttal.

Remarks Taped for Radio

Underscoring the political nature of the argument were three other developments late today. The Committee for the Re-election of the President taped Mr. Nixon's remarks and then made them available to radio stations.

Meanwhile, the McGovern forces seized upon and distributed a statement by a former member of the Administration, John Finlator, supporting Mr. McGovern's allegations.

Mr. Finlator, who retired last January as deputy director of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, said that Mr. Nixon had allowed the "golden triangle" of Laos, Burma and Thailand to be the major supplier of heroin to the ellicit market places of this country and charged further that "we are not as well equipped against drug abuse today than on the day the present Administration took office."

Mr. McGovern, campaigning in Cincinnati, said that Mr. Nixon's remarks this morning left "decisive questions unanswered."

Charging that the Saigon regime was riddled with drug profiteers, Mr. McGovern challenged the President to invoke the authority of the foreign aid act and impose sanctions on the South Vietnamese Government.

Administration officials do not dispute the fact that the "golden triangle" is now a major source of supply. But they argue that Mr. McGovern's allegations of inaction are out of date, that the Thailand task force has made heavy inroads on drug traffic and that the Central Intelligence Agency, reversing long-standing policy, is now moving aggressively against traffickers in Indochina.

In support of his position, Mr. Nixon also said this morning that Federal antidrug funds had increased clevenfold since 1969, that arrests had doubled in the same period and that a recent sharp increase in heroin prices on the East Coast suggested that "the supply is drying up."

Treaty Change Voted

WASHINGTON, Sept. 18 (AP) —The Senate ratified today, 69 to 0, a revision of a 90-nation treaty on narcotics. The change is designed to strengthen international control of drugs.

Under the revision, the International Narcotics Control Board will be directed to limit worldwide production of narcotics to the quantity needed for medical and scientific use and to refer evidence of illicit production and drug trafficking to other nations and to the United Nations General Assembly.

The protocol also provides for international extradition of drug offenders.

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CHARLESTON, S.C.
POST

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SEP 18 1972

The General's Prophecy

Retired Marine Gen. Lewis W. Walt's prediction that American society will be in big trouble a decade hence if drug trafficking and addiction are not promptly and effectively checked warrants the attention of responsible government officials and citizens alike.

The general's prophetic conclusion was contained in a bulky report he made to a Senate subcommittee which hired him to make a worldwide study of heroin smuggling and use. As a former Marine Corps commandant, Gen. Walt can properly be regarded as a man given neither to snap judgments nor exaggerations. It is time to listen when he warns that if the current heroin addict growth rate continues, the impact on the U. S. will be of a magnitude that defies the imagination.

Gen. Walt offered several recommendations aimed at curbing traffic in heroin. Among them were satellite reconnaisance of opium crops, more U. S. funds for international narcotics investigations, a unified federal government structure to wage the war against heroin, and stronger laws. The death penalty for heavy traffickers would be justified, in Gen. Walt's opinion, because they engage in "genocide on a massive scale."

The legal status of capital punishment in the U.S. today argues against the death penalty recommendation, but senators should give full consideration to the list of Walt proposals.

It is disturbing that about the same time Gen. Walt was winding up his study, an American author was alleging in his new book that the CIA has been involved in drug trafficking in Southeast Asia. The charge—which the CIA denies—is not new. We make no judgment on its validity. Nevertheless, publication of such allegations and the almost simultaneous release of the Walt findings tend to create the unsettling impression that the U. S. government is not doing all it could or should to clamp down on heroin supply lines and those who keep them busy.

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STATINTL

Nixon Warns of Aid Cut To Drug-Dealer Nations

By GARNETT D. HORNER
Star-News Staff Writer

President Nixon today warned that he will not hesitate to cut off all American economic and military aid to any government whose leaders participate in or protect the drug traffic.

He also praised the Central Intelligence Agency for its role in fighting international drug traffic and said the agency has been "much maligned."

He said the CIA has "performed superbly" in fighting the international drug trade. "In the field of intelligence," he added, "we always find that the failures are those that are publicized. Its successes by definition must always be secret. In this area, there are many successes, and particularly ones of which this agency can be very proud."

Critics of the CIA have charged that the Agency has aided drug traffickers in Southeast Asia to help maintain alliances.

He spoke of "fine initial progress" in immobilizing and destroying sources of drugs coming into the United States.

He said, "France, Paraguay, Laos, Thailand and Turkey are just a few examples of the many countries where the work of American officials, from the ambassador down, in partnership with local officials, has produced important breakthroughs — huge heroin seizures, key arrests, or — in Turkey's case — the courageous decision to eradicate the opium poppy itself."

The President said he considers keeping dangerous drugs out of the United States "just as important as keeping armed enemy forces from landing in the United States" because the drugs can endanger the lives of youg Americans just as much as would an invading army.

Speaking at an international conference on drug control at the State Department, he asked American officials from around the world to convey to foreign officials with whom they deal "this persnal message" from me:

"Any government whose leaders participate in or protect the activities of those who contribute to our drug program should know that the President of the United States is required by statute to suspend all American economic and military assistance to such a regime.

"I shall not hesitate to comply fully and promptly with that statute."

Nixon said he has been "cracking the whip" over government agencies involved in dealing with dangerous drugs to get them to "quit fighting each other and start fighting the problem."

Citing some results, he said the number of arrests of drug traffickers in the last fiscal year was double the number arrested in 1969, and the seizures of heroin and other illicit drugs are at an all-time high.

"Very sharp increases in the prices of heroin throughout the eastern United States indicate that the supply is drying up and that the pressure is on the criminal drug trade," he said.

Nixon's statements apparently were in response to a statement yesterday by Democratic presidential candidate Sen. George S. McGovern.

McGovern said the number of heroin addicts in the United States had doubled since 1968 and charged that Southeast Asia had become a major source of heroin because the administration would not crack down on the narcotics trade in Laos, Thailand and South Vietnam.

Nixon made no direct reference to McGovern's charges, but his comments appeared to be a sharp counterattack.

The President's praise of the CIA role follows claims and official denials that the agency's Air America has helped transport heroin in Southeast Asia.

In a book called "The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia," that was published recently, Arthur W. McCoy raised the question of whether CIA operatives knowingly engaged in such traffic to help maintain alliances.

More specifically, McCoy accused officials in governments of U.S. allies in Southeast Asia—particularly in Saigon—of profiting from the traffic.

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STATINTL

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THE WASHINGTON POST B
27 Sept 19

The Poppies And the Pushers

THE POLITICS OF HEROIN IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

By Alfred W. McCoy

With Cathleen B. Read and

Leonard P. Adams II

Harper & Row. 464 pp. $10.95

By LAURENCE STERN

"ORDINARILY THIS AGENCY does not respond to public criticism," the CIA's general counsel wrote the general counsel of Harper & Row publishing company last July 5. "However in this case we are under the strongest directive to support the U.S. government's effort against the international narcotics traffic and are bending every effort to do so. We believe we cannot stand by and see baseless criticism designed to undermine confidence in that effort without trying to set the record straight. . . ."

The subject of this extraordinary letter was *The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia* by Alfred W. McCoy, a doctoral candidate at Yale University. Harper & Row provided the CIA with advance proofs of the book and after receiving a statement of rebuttal covering several of McCoy's allegations of Agency involvement in opium traffic, the book was published.

If the intervention had any effect, it has probably been to boost the sales of McCoy's book; certainly it turned its publication into something of a *cause célèbre*. Perhaps the Agency would have better served its own interests by following the time-honored intelligence precept of maintaining silence in times of adversity. Public accountability has never been its strongest suit.

By its nature as one of the world's most profitable illicit businesses, the opium and heroin trail is heavily canopied with underworld and official secrecy. In the Golden Triangle region of northeastern Burma, northern Thailand and northern Laos, the principal opium growing and processing area in Southeast Asia, the traffic is fed by highland tribes, minor warlords and paramilitary soldiers, and it is controlled by high-ranking officials of the three countries. This distribution system fed heroin into the veins of American soldiers in Vietnam and into the international heroin stream that surfaces terminally in the ghettos and suburbs of the United States.

LAURENCE STERN is the roving foreign correspondent of The Washington Post.

McCoy has done a sturdy and comprehensive reporting job. He has interviewed American and Southeast Asian sources who either played a direct role in the opium traffic or are highly competent to talk about it. It is his argument that when the United States embarked on the geopolitical objective of trying to contain Chinese and North Vietnamese power at their borders in Southeast Asia, it slipped inexorably into the narcotics traffic.

The international market had been created long before by the European colonial powers, chiefly Britain and France. Great Britain in the late 18th century took the first big step toward internationalization of the Asian drug traffic by establishing a government monopoly over India's opium harvest, helping finance the regime of the Raj by taxing the product, and beginning the massive export of Indian opium into China. When Chinese imperial authorities tried to stop it, Britain, with its gunships, blasted open the Chinese ports to European trade and Indian opium during the Opium War of 1839 to 1842.

Under the forced infusions of opium from British-ruled India the Chinese imports rose from a level of 340 tons in the first decade of the 19th century to 6,500 tons by 1880. It was in this period that the Chinese began a large-scale program of domestic opium production, much of it in the outlying provinces of Szechwan and Yunan. By the beginning of the 20th century, China had an addict population of 15 million. The wave of Chinese migrations into Southeast Asia spread the scourge of addiction southward.

The French played a similar role in expanding and monopolizing opium production under colonial authority. Centuries before the French arrived the Meo [illegible] opium, but more as a ceremonial intoxicant than to achieve the stupefaction of "living death" with which the Chinese coolies escaped their wretched life cycle of toil, poverty and disease. The French established their own monopoly and converted the Meo poppy harvests into an important cash crop which was taxed and sold to the growing addict population of Indochina. By the beginning of World War Two, according to McCoy's research, there were some 2,500 opium dens in Indochina serving about 100,000 addicts.

The Viet Minh war of independence eventually became a major challenge to French political rule and a drain on the colonial economy. In countering their guerrilla movement the French turned to the Meo tribal peoples in the Laotian highlands and to their poppy harvests. Meo opium became an important factor both in financing the war and in cementing the loyalties of the tribal guerrillas fighting on the French side. McCoy relates the case of the French Expeditionary Corps' "Operation X," a top-secret project for the collection and transport of Meo opium into the Saigon markets where it was turned over to the Binh Xuyen, an underworld secret society which the French occupation authorities permitted to take over civil authority in Saigon. By the time American influence replaced the French military presence, the poppy was the main cash crop in the Golden Triangle, the opium economy was fully developed, and there were well-rutted patterns for dealing with the tribal mountain guerrillas who had been enlisted by the French in the war against the Pathet Lao and Vietnamese Communist insurgents.

Here the argument begins. McCoy asserts that Central Intelligence operations became heavily involved in the opium-heroin traffic. He says that some of the Agency's chief Asian operatives and clients controlled it and that the CIA's contract airline, Air America, moved it toward the ultimate markets.

All this has long been a matter of conventional wisdom and surmise in the bars and embassies of Vientiane, where wags spoke of Air America as "Air Opium," but McCoy seeks to document the case with interviews (alas, some of the crucial ones anonymous) and hard evidence.

One of the most sensational allegations in the book is that Meo General Vang Pao, the most important field commander on the Royal Lao government side, arranged for the delivery of 60 kilos of high grade Laotian heroin (worth $13.5 million in New York) to Prince Sopsaisana, the Laotian ambassador-designate to France in April 1971. Sopsaisana returned to Laos after French

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BIRMINGHAM, MICH.
ECCENTRIC
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STATINTL

Black viewpoint

'The Choice' links drug traffic to CIA

By JIM INGRAM

The relationship between even "successfull" blacks and their government is appalling, whether one views it through the government's eyes or those of black people.

With the U.S. government spying on black leaders whether they be Nixon supporters or not, and as moderate as Roy Wilkens or Dr. Ralph Abernathy, creeping paranoia is one result. Ask any black man or woman under 30 "Who killed Malcolm X?" and the reply will invariably the "The CIA" (Central Intelligence Agency)

Sam Yette's book, "The Choice" strongly raises the possibility of Anglo-American genocide here and abroad and more and more black people have begun looking closer now, rather than laughing at such notions among black intellectuals. Many in the inner city believe strongly that, contrary to newspaper headlines of recent vintage which proclaimed blacks were "in control" of local drugs powerful whites have to have ultimate control, since blacks do not control U.S. borders, ports of entry the U.S. Customs department, nor the transportation industry.

* * *

AND IF HARPER and Row has its way, this idea may get added credence among growing numbers of Americans. The New York publishing firm is releasing a book on heroin and opium traffic in Southeast Asia, which strongly implicates CIA involvement in the traffic itself, with the CIA strongly involved, also, in attempts to make sure the book doesn't get published.

Another "Pentagon Papers" fiasco? Perhaps, but "The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia" already is interesting reading for the CIA's general counsel, Lawrence Houston. Houston was so interested that he obtained a copy of the work two weeks ago, then later penned a letter asking Harper and Row not to publish the book. Now, what does the all-powerful CIA have to hide?

* * *

AFTER PORING over the CIA "critique" of the book, Harper and Row let it be known they would proceed with release of the book as planned. The CIA harps that "No responsible publishing firm would print" the book. Researcher Alfred McCoy, author of the book, has scored CIA agents for "harassment" of the publishers and contends that he's been included in such tactics as the target of "visits, phone calls and letters."

According to McCoy, the CIA could only criticize "Two per cent of the manuscript". The book documents the movement of opium from the Golden Triangle in Southeast Asia with the use of CIA operatives and equipment. McCoy said that, even with the CIA criticism of his work, they admit that a CIA agent was involved in heroin production.

* * *

McCOY WENT on to say that the agency admitted that one of its mercenary army commanders, General Chao La, had kept a heroin laboratory in Northwest Thailand between 1966 and 1971. All this according to McCoy, with the full knowledge—and admission—of CIA officials. Strong charges that bear explaining? You bet, and the fact that the CIA now reports that General La's heroin lab was destroyed last year does not mitigate the seriousness of such charges as those raised in McCoy's book.

At Eccentric press time, the book ought to be in area bookstores. But if blacks are increasingly [illegible] they are, the ranks of those "just short" of being white radicals are swelling, too, as confidence in the American government receives an unhealthy "downer" from these and other observations and revelations. The CIA actually came out and said that The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia, would "do a disservice in the fight against narcotics trafficking in Southeast Asia."

* * *

A BLACK MAN on a street corner who had been talking with a white youth, recently summed up, I suppose much of the black view when he said: "If you had a race of people that you really didn't want to be totally free and wished to destroy them, wouldn't YOU use some form of chemical genocide as heroin? Where else but in America can you find people robbing and killing to purchase their own suicide?"

To which the white youth, supposedly radical, added: "Yes, and when you look at this in the context of the U.S. holdout in signing the U.N. genocide agreement, the hysterical detention of over 10,000 Japanese-Americans during World War II, and the current level of dope available despite all the busts the government keeps announcing you KNOW something's awfully wrong." Perhaps.

* * *

IT IS HARD to believe that a government rich and powerful enough to beat the Russians to the moon, a country so technologically advanced that is can readily transfer part of its litter problem to that part of the universe, cannot find the necessary funds, technology or personnel to crack down on the International drug traffic. Who will we believe?

Despite the immensity of the American public relations and propaganda machine, a government led by people who admit that they have lied to the American public before, now has a hard time ahead in clearing the air on this one. Further, although there is evidence that SOME media barons were intimidated by Spiro Agnew's repeated attacks on news media, some journalists and broadcasters have not slowed their work at all in ferreting out and questioning our government's real role in this and other is-

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DAILY WORKER

14 SEP 1972

CIA "secret army" crumbles in Laos

VIENTIANE—Units of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency's "secret army" of Meo tribesmen in northern Laos fled from the Plain of Jars Wednesday after coming under heavy attack by the Lao Patriotic Front forces. The four columns of "secret army" troops were reported about 12 miles north of the big CIA base at Long Cheng.

According to informed sources, the Meo tribesmen complained of a lack of U.S. air support and said that this justified their somewhat hasty withdrawal. But other observers said the Meos are being affected by the recent reports of CIA involvement in opium-smuggling in Southeast Asia. The entire Meo tribal economy is based on opium-smuggling, except for the CIA funds they receive.

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NATION
11 SEP 1972

'THE GREEDY WAR'

STATINTL

FRED J. COOK

Mr. Cook, a long-time contributor to The Nation, *is the author of many books, including the recently published* The Nightmare Decade: The Life and Times of Senator Joe McCarthy *(Random House).*

The most damning document to come out of the war in Vietnam has now struggled into the light in this election year. It was indeed a struggle: the disclosures were squelched for years by the highest arms of the American bureaucracy; the pith of the message was ignored by the Senate subcommittee, headed by Abraham Ribicoff, which exposed the PX scandals; the revelations were verified by one of *Life*'s top journalists—and pushed aside in favor of the incident on the bridge at Chappaquiddick; the truth set forth was too much for major American publishing houses, and in the end was published in Great Britain, coming to the American market on the rebound through the David McKay Company.

This bombshell is *The Greedy War*, a 278-page book written by the British journalist James Hamilton-Paterson and detailing the Vietnamese experiences of Cornelius Hawkridge, a dedicated anti-Communist who spent seven and a half horrible years in Russian and Hungarian prison camps before escaping to the United States. Hawkridge and Hamilton-Paterson call the war greedy and the contents of this book fully justify the epithet. Hawkridge was born in Transylvania, the son of a Hungarian mother and a British father, a colonel in the Hungarian police force. His passionate hatred of communism and the Russians led him into protests and guerrilla actions—and into those long years in prison. He came to America believing all the dogmas of the cold war and eager to aid as a security officer in what he considered a holy crusade.

The Dominican upheaval in 1965, in which Hawkridge could not find the Communists President Lyndon B. Johnson assured us we were opposing, was the first disillusionment. Then came Vietnam. Hawkridge's first day in the field there in 1966 was a shocker. He had his nose rubbed immediately in the stinking squalor of the refugee camps of Qui Nhon. More than 2,000 refugees were living in paper shacks built largely of discarded American packing cases. Three contaminated wells provided the only drinking water. There were no sanitary facilities. "The inmates defecated between the rows of paper homes and the slow seep of ordure crept up the pulp walls." Hawkridge asked a priest what had happened to all the USAID. "Stolen," the priest said simply. "It's taken by the Vietnamese Government."

Hawkridge soon discovered that virtually everything was being stolen. Only the smallest trickle of supplies and war matériel being shipped to Vietnam in such prodigious, multibillion-dollar amounts ever reached their intended destinations. The Qui Nhon marketplace, an area of a good-sized block next to the refugee camp, was stocked with "C-rations, K-rations, drink, clothing, guns, cannons, shells, cases of grenades, television sets, washing machines . . . the mounds seemed limitless." So Hamilton-Paterson writes describing Hawkridge's discoveries. "Wondering what limits there were he asked a Vietnamese stallholder whether he could buy a tank. Tanks are a bit difficult right now, this man admitted, but how about some armored personnel carriers? Or helicopters, of course. Or how about a heavy-duty truck?"

What the hell goes on?, Hawkridge thought. And he rushed to tell American authorities what he had found. They were bland, uninterested. Washington, in its holy-crusade delusion, had concluded agreements with the South Vietnamese that tied the hands of any security agent who tried to put an end to the national pastime—wholesale looting. Two provisions were critical: trucks could be driven only by South Vietnamese drivers; and only South Vietnamese police could make arrests. Even if an American security agent like Hawkridge trapped hijackers in the act, he was forbidden to lay a finger on them; he had to call in the South Vietnamese police. And when they arrived, they simply collaborated in the looting.

Here, in capsule form, are some of the things Hawkridge learned and some of his experiences:

¶South Vietnam all but sank into the sea under the weight of the tons of black-and-white television sets, radios, spin driers, untaxed diamonds and other commodities produced by a society of conspicuous consumption and shipped off to Vietnam to win what must be one of the most curious wars in history.

¶The port of Qui Nhon was clogged with shipping, a fleet that spread out to the horizon. Some of the ships waited for months to unload; meanwhile small boats plied out to them in the night and sometimes in the day; and so, when they finally reached a pier, some 60 per cent of their cargoes had vanished.

¶The United States shipped enough cement into South Vietnam to pave the entire nation, but there was a chronic shortage of cement to extend airfield runways and erect facilities. And the Vietcong always had a superabundance with which to build their individual bomb shelters.

¶On one occasion a truck containing several hundred TV sets was hijacked, tracked down in Tu Duc and turned over to the South Vietnamese police. Hawkridge went to reclaim this U.S. property, but was told he would have to get a Vietnamese driver to take the truck away. By the time he had found a driver, the truck had been stripped of its contents right in the police compound.

¶One night Hawkridge was following a hijacked truck, mystified because the Vietnamese were ripping open packages in disgust and tossing them into ditches at the roadside. Hawkridge kept stopping and picking up the packages. They were a consignment of aircraft parts for fighter squadrons at Bien Hoa. When Hawkridge arrived at the air base, he was hailed almost as a savior because several jets had been grounded for lack of spare parts.

¶Another time, Hawkridge chased a hijacked truck right into a compound belonging to the South Vietnamese Security Police. The panicked driver sped across the compound, forgetting there was a river on the other side, and braked to a halt at the last second with the front wheels

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STATINTL

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JOURNAL
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U.S. Planes Carry Dope

THE U.S. government has insisted for years that its unofficial CIA-run airline, Air America, has not been running opium in the mountain-bound Asian land of Laos.

But now, from the files of the CIA and other U.S. intelligence agencies, we have evidence that U.S. ground and air equipment —if not U.S. personnel—has formed the backbone of the Laos opium trade.

"SELECTED ROYAL Lao Army and Royal Lao Air Force units, utilizing air and ground equipment furnished by the U.S., provide the means for protecting, transporting and processing of narcotics," reports one intelligence summary on Laos.

"'A broad spectrum of Lao society is involved in the narcotics business, including Generals, Princes, high-level bureaucrats and Province Governors," says the report.

Another document, complete with a secret CIA map, reports unequivocally: 'Most of the refineries in Laos operate under the protection of the Royal Laotian Armed Forces...Some reports suggest that a senior Royal Laotian Armed Forces officer may hold an ownership interest in a few of these facilities."

To end narcotics running by the highest echelons of Laotian society, the documents propose drastic action.

"An important target group will be the air force generals and other Royal Lao Air Force personnel who command and operate the transport aircraft involved in shipping narcotics."

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WASHINGTON POST

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STATINTL

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

U.S. Is Backbone of Laos Drug Trade

By Jack Anderson

The U.S. government has insisted for years that its unofficial CIA-run airline, Air America, has not been running opium in the mountainous Asian land of Laos.

But now, from the files of the CIA and other U.S. intelligence agencies, we have evidence that U.S. ground and air equipment — if not U.S. personnel — has formed the backbone of the Laos opium trade.

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"An important target group will be the Air Force generals and other Royal Lao Air Force personnel who command and operate the transport aircraft involved in shipping narcotics.

"Officials high and low who are found to be involved in a substantial way will have to be removed from positions of influence," urges the memo. It recommends curtailment of some aid to Laos.

"This is aimed specifically at eliminating the use of all U.S.-owned aircraft operated by the Royal Laotian Air Force or U.S.-leased aircraft, including U.S. support items, in the transport of narcotics."

In recent months, America's spokesmen claim a new Laotian anti-heroin law is having some effect. But, in fact, only lowly opium hustlers are arrested; the generals and princes go untouched.

Jonah and the Whale

The Federal Reserve Board is supposed to supervise banks, not do their dirty work. But recently the Fed aided the banks in an attempt to take over an entire industry.

The victim of this power play was supposed to be the armored car and courier industry, a collection of small companies all over the country.

The banks would like to swallow up the industry, and the Fed has been deliberating whether to grant permission.

Unwilling to play Jonah to the banks' whale, the armored car and courier companies are fighting back. As part of their counterattack, one courier firm hired Dun & Bradstreet to survey how good a job the courier companies do.

They decided to survey the Fed's own outlying banks, figuring that if the Fed's own branches liked the courier service, this would be convincing argument that the industry deserved to survive.

Dun & Bradstreet gathered 20 interviews with Fed banks before their bosses in Washington got wind of the survey.

Off went a peremptory telegram. "It appears inappropriate for officials of Federal Reserve banks and branches to express any opinions about courier services," wired Board Secretary Tynan Smith, noting that a Fed decision on the takeover was pending.

To make absolutely sure the courier survey was stymied, Smith added: "Please keep us informed if you are contacted for such information." This so intimidated the regional Fed officials that two of them, who had already given interviews, tried to withdraw them. Other officials insisted their replies be totally anonymous.

Although the survey was aborted, the courier services did get some use out of it. Based on the incomplete returns, it showed the Fed banks were generally satisfied with the private courier services.

No Spanish Allowed

A top anti-poverty official has scolded subordinates for speaking Spanish at a recent meeting that included Spanish-speaking officials.

"I was appalled," wrote operations chief James Griffith, "to hear a meeting of in-house (anti-pvoerty) people closed with a statement in Spanish and answered in Spanish. This was absolutely uncalled for and taken as a direct insult by the persons in attendance."

Griffith's rebuke was directed at migrant staff official Pete Merilez. Asked for an explanation, Griffith told us: "We poor gringos who don't speak Spanish sometimes get embarrassed when we hear others speak it. We get the feeling they're speaking behind our backs."

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SEP 1972

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STATINTL

Nuevo Laredo 'Specializes' in Drugs, Death

BY LAURENCE STERN
Exclusive to The Times from the Washington Post

NUEVO LAREDO, Mex. — Oblivious to the violence, the American tourists tramp though the sun-baked early Metro-Goldwyr.-Mayer main drag, Guerrero Ave., pushing their way through the bazaars heaped with tax-free liquor, cigarets, cut-rate jewelry and handcrafted shlock.

Most of them are unaware that two other specialties of this Rio Grande border town are mutilated corpses and narcotics traffic. The relationship between the two is more than a casual one.

The machine gun and the machete have taken the lives of some 85 Mexican police, customs officials, drug pushers and hapless Americans within the past year. It has created what one local journalist calls a "psychosis of terror" in Nuevo Laredo.

Day after day the newspapers have published photographs of the blood-spattered or decapitated bodies of the latest victims of the violence. One of the newspapers, El Manana, had its plant machine-gunned and its presses sabotaged late last year as an admonition against identifying local hoodlums.

Violence has long been endemic to the Mexico border, where men still slouch at the bar with a gun tucked under their belt.

Dope at Root

But the recent bloodshed has far surpassed even Nuevo Laredo's gory standards of tolerance.

The underlying reason for the violence of Nuevo Laredo, [illegible] gence as the principal "Mexican connection" along the 1,200-mile Texas-Mexican border for the smuggling of heroin, opium, cocaine and marijuana into the United States.

Mexico itself has in the view of veteran narcotics officials become the principal narcotics pipeline because of the tightened surveillance of the ports of entry along the American Eastern seaboard and the Canadian border.

And Nuevo Laredo now lies along a major narcotics thoroughfare that runs northward from Mexico City and Monterrey along Highway 85, funneling into the valley of Texas.

The border region is a sieve to smugglers. Thousands of cars and pedestrians swarm across the international bridge into Laredo, Tex., each day. In many places the Rio Grande can easily be forded by a determined man with a backpack.

Easy Access

There are many points at which cotton grows and cattle graze in the river bed and a truck can drive across its width. Hundreds of small, private planes used for crop-dusting and ranch-to-ranch transport can easily be converted into drug conveyers.

Within the past year the Nixon Administration has sought to prod the Mexican government into stricter enforcement activity in an area where police officials have traditionally tended to wink or doze or enrich themselves.

President Nixon has conferred with Mexican President Luis Echevarria. Director John E. Ingersoll of the Justice Department's Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs has met with Mexican Atty. Gen. Pedro J. Ojeda Paullada. Ojeda's son summered this year with the family of U.S. Atty. Gen. Richard Kleindienst.

The amity, at least at the highest level of official[illegible] thick on both sides of the border. But at the operational level—on the streets of Nuevo Laredo — the frustations of the lawmen, both American and Mexican, are considerable.

One narcotics official, speaking of recent reverses in the joint campaign to reduce the drug flow across the border, refers despondently to the "Mexican dis-connection."

Such is the setting in which the violence has flourished here for more than a year between police and rival gangs, such as the Reyes Prunedas and the Gayton Clan who once feuded fiercely for control of the lucrative drug stream that flowed along Highway 85 past their ranches.

Principal Figure

Police on both sides of the border as well as knowledgeable residents of Nuevo Laredo identify as the principal figure in the town's underworld elite Francisco Javier Bernal Lopez, who seems to relish the two nicknames that the press has conferred upon him: El Padrino (the Godfather) and El Abogado Del Diablo (the Devil's Advocate).

Bernal, an attorney, is a heavy-set, moustachioed man of imposing presence who habitually carries a gun in his belt and sometimes a .45-caliber machine gun at his shoulder. He openly acknowledges that his clientele consists of drug traffickers as well as the tough pistoleros, or hired guns, who drift up from the interior's farmlands to make a quick dollar and others engaged in what is not conventionally considered as upright enterprise.

Bernal emerged from obscurity some 10 months ago to preside over the feuding criminal factions in this border region. Police and Mexican federal authorities ascribe to him an important role in governing Nuevo Laredo's drug smuggling under[illegible] world.

"He is the only one with the brains to run the organization," said one high-ranking Mexican law enforcement official sent here to bring the lawless state of affairs under control. "The rest are illiterate hoodlums."

Bernal denies the accusations. He replies that the CIA and FBI were responsible for some of the killings. "I do my work. And my work is defending people," Bernal said at a recent street corner press conference.

On Aug. 29 he walked into the federal building with two bodyguards to answer a subpoena issued by a special attorney for the government, Salvatore Del Toro Rosales. Authorities questioned Bernal, for more than two hours on events that led up to the assassination last July 28 of Federal Police Commandant Everardo Perales Rios, who has run an aggressive campaign against drug smuggling during a six-week tenure that ended with his death.

Signal Event

The murder of Perales, who was sent to Nuevo Laredo to head the Mexican federal policy presence in the state of Tamaulipas, was a signal event in the border drug war.

During his short-lived incumbency Commandant Perales hauled in more drugs than had been seized in Nuevo Laredo in the previous quarter of a century, according to narcotics officials, including a kilo of heroin with a retail value of $200,000, three tons of marijuana and caches of cocaine and opium.

As the pace of his anti-smuggling activities picked up momentum there were threats both against Perales and against an American narcotics agent working with him along the border. Word filtered back that a $3,000 contract had been issued on the U.S. agent's life and his superi[illegible] of Narcotics pulled him back above the border.

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DAILY WORLD
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THE OPIUM POPPY

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STATINTL

WASHINGTON POST

6 SEP 1972

U.S. Fears Increased Flow Of Heroin From New Sources

By Stanley Karnow
Washington Post Staff Writer

American narcotics specialists are privately expressing concern at the prospect of an increase in the illegal flow of heroin into the United States from South and West Asia as the supply of drugs from other foreign sources dwindles.

Confidential studies prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency and other U.S. government bureaus warn that the halt in Turkish opium cultivation may spur international drug traders to tap fresh sources of narcotics in India, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran.

Turkey's legal opium production is scheduled to end this year as a result of U.S. subsidies aimed at encouraging Turkish farmers to grow other crops. Most heroin reaching the United States is refined in France from opium of Turkish origin.

The CIA studies, made available to The Washington Post by columnist Jack Anderson, estimate that about half of the total world raw opium supply of 2,500 tons is produced in India, Pakistan and Afghanistan. Iranian output has jumped to 156 tons in 1971 from eight tons in 1969, when Iran legalized opium production.

Until now, little of the opium grown in South and West Asia has served as the raw material for heroin smuggled into the United States. But according to the CIA "the withdrawal of Turkey from the illicit world market" threatens to attract narcotics merchants seeking new sources of supply.

The U.S government studies calculate that India produces about 200 tons of illegal opium per year. Most of this opium enters a domestic black market serving some 300,000 Indian addicts. So far, the studies say, India has not been a significant narcotics exporter.

The studies caution, however, that India could become a supplier of the U.S. market unless the New Delhi government acts to suppress its internal narcotics trade. Or as one of the reports puts it:

"India is frequently cited in United Nations bodies as a model for controlled opium production and distribution. From the U.S. standpoint, this myth has been detrimental even though India is not a source of U.S. heroin supply.

"Because the myth absolves New Delhi from dealing seriously with its own addiction and traffic, it has been able to strike a pose of moral superiority internationally. This blocks U.S.-Indian cooperation on narcotics matters and diverts India from a potentially useful role in developing effective multilateral programs in the United Nations, which is a focal point of U.S. policy strategy."

The U.S. report urges that actions be undertaken by the Nixon administration to "expose the existence of India's illicit markets," adding that "the United States might lose some good will in the process of exposure but not on a scale to offset the likely gains."

Turning to Pakistan and Afghanistan, the CIA studies assert that "laxities in law enforcement" in those countries "appear to offer a trafficker easier access to tribal producers" of opium than in other parts of the world.

According to another classified U.S. government report, Pakistan produces about 175 to 200 tons of illicit opium per year, most of it cultivated in the country's northwest tribal regions.

The report blames the Pakistan government's failures to suppress the drug trade on inefficiency and "official corruption." It also points out that the Pakistan authorities are unwilling to tackle the drug problem because they fear "a hostile response from the politically sensitive frontier tribal areas."

Recalling that "a number of diplomatic representations" made by the United States to the Pakistan government have had no "apparent effect," the report recommends that the Nixon administration apply "pressures and inducements" including a halt in U.S. aid to persuade the Pakistanis to deal with their drug output.

According to the U.S. studies, Afghanistan produces between 100 and 125 tons of opium a year, cultivated mainly by Pushtun tribesmen in the eastern parts of the country. Most of Afghanistan's narcotics output, a study states, is exported illegally. "Smuggling is a way of life in Afghanistan," it says.

The study further warns that drug networks operating out of Afghanistan are ripe to be taken over by international traffickers because the Afghan authorities take a benign attitude toward narcotics traders.

The U.S. study attributes the continuation of the Afghan narcotics trade to "official corruption" as well as to a lack of interest on the part of the country's authorities.

The report warns against vigorous U.S. actions that might increase Afghan dependence on the Soviet Union. It further concludes: "It is unrealistic to expect Afghanistan, which suffers little from the narcotics problem itself, to give its solution the highest priority in view of the extremely limited human and financial resources of the country."

A CIA memorandum issued on June 9, meanwhile, voices alarm at the growth of opium production and addiction in Iran.

The memorandum stresses that Iran could become a transit area for illegal drugs moving from South Asia toward Western Europe and the United States. Some 170 tons of illicit Afghan and Pakistani opium are currently smuggled into Iran every year. Accord[illegible] document, an Iranian prince who accompanied Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlavi was recently charged by the Swiss authorities with carrying opium to Geneva.

After a 14-year ban on opium output, the Shah legalized the production of drug in 1969, partly in order to stop a drain on the country's foreign currency reserves through smuggling. His decision was denounced by the United Nations at the time as "tragic" for both Iran and other nations.

Since then, says the CIA memorandum, Iran has registered about 90,000 narcotics addicts. But this represents only one-fourth of the estimated 400,000 drug users in the country.

This year, the memorandum calculates, the demand for opium in Iran will total about 350 tons—roughly two-thirds of which will come from domestic production and the rest from contraband supplies.

The CIA document estimates, however, that Iranian opium production should soon satisfy and even exceed internal needs. At that point, the memorandum warns, the country could become a narcotics exporter and also a drug transit channel.

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WASHINGTON POST
5 SEP 1972

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

New Drug Wave Points Westward

By Jack Anderson

President Nixon's herculean effort to stop drug smuggling has at last slowed the flow of heroin from Turkey and Southeast Asia. But a new tidal wave is rising in Afghanistan, India and Pakistan.

Even our mideastern ally, Iran, has started to grow its own opium under government control, but the government may not be able to stop illegal shipments from being diverted to America.

This is the warning of the Central Intelligence Agency, which has also reported ominously: "Rumors persist that some members of the royal family and parliament are narcotics users. Swiss authorities recently charged an Iranian Prince, who accompanied the Shah to Switzerland, with having transferred pure opium."

Secret documents from the CIA and other intelligence agencies describe dangerous opium buildups in South Asia. This could be a shot in the arm for the Mafia, whose supplies in Turkey and the Thailand-Laos-Vietnam area are slowly beginning to dry up.

The new smuggling menace was raised by the CIA's Directorate of Intelligence in memos dated June 26 and June 9.

"Whether or not substantial quantities of South Asian opium are diverted to the U.S. and Western Europe will depend, in the final analysis, on the Western traffickers," reports the CIA.

"Tribal producers in Afghanistan and Pakistan undoubtedly would be willing to sell to Western traffickers . . . The potential for substantial diversions of opium westward exist . . .

"Laxities in South Asia would offer a distinct advantage to international traffickers if they should decide to tap the South Asian opium market."

Opium Gum

In Afghanistan production is up. Starving peasants, "lacking adequate food supplies because of recent droughts, have resorted to chewing opium gum to ease hunger pains."

In Pakistan, too, production "may have risen sharply since 1969," says the CIA. In both countries "penalties for narcotics violations are minimal."

The intelligence documents also suggest that the Mafia would have no trouble corrupting officials in both countries.

In Afghanistan, the documents report, "official corruption including high-level protection of narcotics dealers is . . . a problem" and "smuggling is a way of life."

In Pakistan, "official corruption is reported to be a serious problem" among the Land Customs, Sea Customs, provincial police and para-military forces.

Worse, "the existing hashish network in Afghanistan and Pakistan could be used to send substantial quantities of opium westward," warn the intelligence documents. Afghans already have "professional and sophisticated" means of getting hashish by air to Tehran, Beirut and Frankfurt and by sea to Karachi. Some has reached the U.S.

As for India, the documents say it now produces about three-quarters of the world's legal opium for medical purposes. The widely held view that India is effectively controlling its opium production is a "myth," the documents allege.

Iran still doesn't produce enough legal opium for the country's registered addicts, who receive the drug under a national program. But the opium harvest is increasing.

Meanwhile, allege the documents, "the estimated 160-300 tons currently being smuggled into Iran, that could become available, exceeds the total opium equivalent needed to supply the U.S. market."

Diplomatic Grievances

Diplomats at the State Department have been complaining about undiplomatic treatment from their bosses. This week the squabble among the striped pants set will boil over into a House Foreign Affairs subcommittee.

Chairman Wayne Hays (D-Ohio) is finally yielding to Senate pressure and holding hearings on a bill to give State Department workers an independent grievance board.

Two present and one former foreign service officers are breaking the gentleman's code of silence and spilling their woes.

One witness is John Hemenway, a conservative diplomat who claims he was fired because he argued with his bosses over U.S. policies in Berlin.

A present foreign service officer, John Harter, who fought and won an appeal against shabby treatment from the department, has told his story in a letter to Hays. Even State's grievance board upheld Harter, urging that he be promoted, given a new job and reimbursed for his lawyers' fees.

The State Department, however, has largely ignored the recommendations which are now eight months old.

While the Hays hearings have made the State Department anxious over what further horror stories may surface, some of their fears are unwarranted. Hays has confided that he does not expect a bill out of his committee until the next session.

This means that the Senate would have to go through the entire process of passing their version of the measure again before any grievance board is set up outside the department's own jurisdiction.

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TIME
4 SEP 1972 STATINTL
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Search and Destroy—The War

AT a third-floor window of a Lower Manhattan hospital, a team of federal agents huddled behind a battery of cameras. Below them, other agents strolled along the sidewalks, or cruised down Gold Street in unmarked cars. One group waited in a windowless minibus parked across the street. Not far away, another group, posing as an emergency crew, sat under a yellow canvas work tent over the open manhole in which they had set up a communications center. Precisely at 8:40 p.m., two undercover agents drove up Gold Street in a green 1970 Cadillac. They pulled to a stop in the No Parking zone in front of the hospital—and waited.

Minutes later the hidden agents —there were 40 in all—got the word over their short-wave radios: "Suspects are proceeding down Spruce Street, headed for Gold." In the third-floor observation post, one agent cracked to TIME Correspondent James Willwerth, "The Chinese are very punctual." So they were—right on time for the most important narcotics bust this summer.

At 9 p.m., two wary men walked up to the green Cadillac: Kenneth Kan-kit Huie, 60, self-styled "unofficial mayor of Chinatown," and Tim Lok, 35, known to federal agents as "the General" for his ramrod-stiff posture. The four men—two undercover narcotics agents, and the two "connections" whom they had been trying to nail for four months—wasted no time. The agents opened the trunk of the Cadillac and showed the Chinese the contents of an olive-drab attaché case inside: $200,000 in $50 and $100 bills.



UNDERCOVER AGENTS SHOW HUIE & LOK $200,000 IN TRUNK
In hollowed-out heels, false-bottomed suitcases, cars, girdles and boa constrictors,

Then the General led one of the agents off on a meandering excursion that ended up in a Chinatown sportswear shop. There it was the agent's turn to inspect the wares: a cardboard box packed with 14 plastic bags containing 20 lbs. of pure No. 4 white heroin from Southeast Asia. Street value: $10 million.

The agent and the General then went back toward Gold Street in a taxi, followed in a gray Dodge station wagon by a third Chinese, Guan Chow-tok, bringing the heroin. But Guan, owner of the sportswear shop, doubled back and dropped the heroin in a vacant lot, arriving empty-handed. He seemed worried about police. The agent and Guan argued in the street in front of Beekman Hospital for several minutes, and finally the hesitant Chinese agreed to make the deal. The four men piled into the green Cadillac and followed the gray Dodge station wagon to a dark, deserted street, under the shadow of the Brooklyn Bridge. Following the General's directions, one undercover agent walked through waist-high grass into the vacant lot. Suddenly, he knelt down and said loudly: "This is the package; this is the package."

On that signal, the night fairly exploded with armed men and flashing lights. Two unmarked cars squealed to a stop at opposite ends of the street, blocking the escape routes. Agents waving pistols and shotguns sprinted out of the shadows from all directions. Huie, the General and a fourth Chinese accomplice surrendered immediately. Guan jumped into his gray Dodge—and found himself staring into the muzzle of a .45 automatic in the hands of an agent who was leaning through an open window.

Though last week's Chinatown bust was motion-picture perfect, to U.S. narcotics experts it was another bittersweet element in an increasingly frustrating, not to say disastrous situation. True, the raid was the latest in a number of successful skirmishes in what President Nixon describes, more and more plausibly, as a global "war on drugs." In Montreal and Saigon, narcotics officers have recently nabbed some of the bigger wholesalers. Washington, mean-



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while, is awaiting the imminent extradition by Paraguay of Auguste Joseph Ricord, French-born boss of a Latin American connection that is alleged to have piped heroin worth $1.2 billion into the U.S. over a five-year period (TIME, Aug. 28).

But the bad news about narcotics far overshadows such success. The "skag" seized at the Brooklyn Bridge last week was the second large shipment of Asian heroin to be intercepted in New York. The first seizure came last November when a Philippine diplomat and his Chinese partner were arrested at Manhattan's Lexington Hotel with 38 lbs. of heroin in their luggage. The two busts tend to confirm the gloomy forecasts of U.S. narcotics experts that as some of the old drug trade routes from Europe become more dangerous, new ones will open up from Asia. The emergence of Asia, with its immense opium production, as a major exporter of narcotics, promises to make the drug trade a truly global problem.

New Routes. Through most of the postwar years, drugs had flowed from the poppy fields of Turkey and the labs of Marseille direct to the U.S. via the famed "French connection." In the past two or three years, more and more heroin has been routed through Latin America and the Caribbean, where law enforcement is spotty and protection cheap. But as the Latin connection begins to feel more and more heat, and if Turkey phases out remaining opium production under pressure from Washington, the drug trade is expected to swing increasingly to Asia, drawing on the vast surpluses of opium grown in the remote, misty hills of Burma, Thailand and Laos, source of 58% of the 1,200 tons of illicit opium the world produced last year. State Department narcotics experts already see several routes developing, including one to the U.S. via Hong Kong and Britain.

The present flow of narcotics to the West is capable of supporting a savage rise in consumption—and with it, savage rises in crime, in crippled lives and in deaths. Hard statistics are hard to come by, but the best Government estimates put the U.S. heroin-addict population at 560,000—ten times the level of 1960 and almost double what it was only two years ago. On the average, a U.S. addict spends $8,000 a year to support his habit; in New York City, with an addict population of more than 300,000, as much as 50% of all crime is related to addiction. The U.S. has become a heroin market worth $5 billion a year to the international drug trade.

As other countries are discovering to their horror, it is an expanding market. In Canada, recent estimates place the addict population at 14,000 and rising. Turkey now has a small heroin-addict population—a development that defies Moslem strictures against drugs and the powerful conviction among Turks that narcotics reduce sexual po-



NEW YORK TIMES

THAILAND DRUG TRADERS DELIVERING OPIUM IN OPEN TRUCK



BUREAU OF NARCOTICS & DANGEROUS DRUGS

MULE TRAIN HAULING OPIUM DOWN FROM THAI MOUNTAINS

South Vietnamese, who have picked up a taste for hard drugs from the departing American soldiers. All over Western Europe, which once idly dismissed hard drugs as "an American problem," officials now reckon that they have a growing addict population of about 100,000. Says a U.S. State Department official: "They're real scared about what the late 1970s will bring."

So is Washington. One day last January, John E. Ingersoll, blunt-spoken chief of the Justice Department's Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, went to the White House to report personally that an "astonishing variety" of drugs—heroin, cocaine, amphetamines, hashish, marijuana—was continuing to pour into the U.S. Nixon, by all accounts, was in a rage. "But dammit," he said at one point, "there must be something we can do to stop this."

The result has been a dramatic change in the U.S. approach to drugs. Only two years ago, U.S. narcotics agencies operated on a miserly $78 million budget. Now the White House is asking Congress for $729 million next year for a flock of new agencies.

The agencies are charged with what is essentially a broad-gauged search-and-destroy mission. In the U.S. the Justice Department's eight-month-old Office for Drug Abuse Law Enforcement has 300 investigators tracking down street pushers, while the Internal Revenue Service has 410 special agents checking distributors' tax records.

The Bureau of Customs, charged with policing thousands of miles of wide-open frontier, is due to add 330 new men to its hard-pressed 532-man border patrol force. Last month Nixon ordered the Air Force to help out by installing new extra-low-level radar at sites in Texas and New Mexico where it will be used to track the airborne smugglers who scoot across the Mexican border in light planes, avoiding de-



HENZELL—ISLAND RECORDS

MARIJUANA PICKUP IN JAMAICA

And diplomatic couriers.

Force and Air Guard squadrons have been ordered to maintain their F-102 and supersonic F-106 interceptors on alert status, ready to scramble in five minutes. Besides the heroin smugglers, their targets will also include the light planes that deliver something like a ton of Jamaican marijuana daily, mostly at airfields in Florida.

The heart of the strategy is a U.S. effort, one with no precedent in history, to tear up the major international drug routes. [illegible] Washington "war room" of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, magnetic

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dicate the location of the bureau's 1,610 agents—up from 884 two years ago. In each of the key drug-traffic countries, such as France, Mexico, Turkey and Thailand, eight to 15 BNDD men act as advisers to their local counterparts, gather intelligence on their own, and, when necessary, engage in what is known in CIA argot as "dirty tricks."

BNDD men talk as if their job is to tear up the Ho Chi Minh Trail, not the international drug trade. "We'll never dry up the supply lines," Ingersoll tells war-room visitors. "But we can disrupt the lines and reduce the flow to a tolerable irritant. That's our goal."

The Administration's boast that "the tide has turned" is vastly exaggerated, but there are encouraging signs. American agents in and out of the U.S. so far this year have helped seize 3,966 lbs. of heroin, a sixfold increase over three years ago. The amount represents less than 20% of the estimated 11½ tons of heroin that U.S. addicts used last year —a measure of how far the war is from being won. But the effect is being felt on the street.

Evidently because of recent busts in Canada, France and New York, addicts are shuddering through the third month of a major heroin drought. In Montreal, a major port of entry for French heroin, one dealer complained last week that "the stuff is scarce as hell. I can pay but my man can't deliver." In Marseille, the price of a kilo of heroin has risen in past weeks from $2,500 to $5,000, partly as a result of the shortage, partly because the heat is on.

Another sign of hard times is slipping quality. Even after being cut with sugar and powdered milk, retail heroin used to be about 10% pure; now the range is from 3% to 7%. So low is the potency nowadays that the "good stuff," when it is available, may kill an unwary addict. San Antonio has had twelve overdose deaths in the past nine weeks because someone—perhaps an inexperienced pusher—has been peddling heroin that is 53% pure.

To Myles J. Ambrose, a hard-bitten former federal prosecutor and Customs Bureau chief who heads the domestic side of the Justice Department's

TURKISH WOMEN HARVESTING OPIUM GUM

SLASHING POPPY BULB FOR GUM

drug effort, the shortage proves that the Administration strategy is on the right track. "The name of the game for the big-time pushers is moving the stuff into the U.S.," he says. "We belt 'em at one place, and they move someplace else. When we catch the stuff, that's when they lose their money."

Of late, the big-time pushers and traffickers have been losing their money, goods and sometimes their freedom at an encouraging rate. Some of the bigger catches over the past year:

SAIGON: South Vietnamese police and BNDD agents nabbed Joseph Berger, 66, a pudgy, balding American who arrived in Southeast Asia 16 years ago and skillfully worked his way up to the top of the drug-smuggling heap. Narcotics agents believe he is the only American to have had face-to-face dealings with "the Phantom," the ubiquitous Chinese who until recently reigned supreme over drug traffic out of Indochina. Four months ago, Berger hauled a 400-lb. load of opium down Thai country roads, bullying his way past police checkpoints into Cambodia. He arrived in Saigon in June for a scheduled meeting with the Phantom, but was arrested. When the Phantom arrived at Tan Son Nhut airport, Berger fingered him. He turned out to be one Wan Pen Phen, a middle-aged Chinese with both Taiwanese and Thai papers. Police say Phen routed 4,500 lbs. of opium monthly through the area. In July, the cops arrested Luu Phuc Ngu, a prominent Saigon hotel owner, his son Luu Se Hon, and Phen's No. 2 man, Am Nui. The three organized the South Viet Nam end of the opium trade for the Phantom. Under interrogation last week, both Phen and Nui denied any knowledge of any drug dealings.

MARSEILLE: The shrimp boat *Caprice des Temps* (Whim of Time) attracted the attention of French customs agents last March when its captain refused an order to cut his engines. The captain, Marcel Boucan, 58, was already being watched for his dealings with cigarette smugglers. The agents also noticed that though the 60-ton boat had made two trips to Miami, it never ventured near the shrimp-fishing grounds. After cus-

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

BERGER (LEFT) & PHEN IN SAIGON POLICE HEADQUARTERS
"We belt 'em at one place, and they move some place else."

toms agents forced the *Caprice* back to port; Boucan dived overboard. He was picked up the next morning, exhausted, near Marseille's harbor fortress. Finding nothing illegal, police were about to release Boucan when they noticed that the concrete ballast was slightly awry. On investigation, they discovered 937 lbs. of pure heroin hidden in the ballast. It was the largest narcotics haul in history, worth up to $400 million on the New York streets.

NEW YORK: Louis Cirillo, 48, posed as a Bronx bagel baker making $200 a week. In fact, police say, he was one of the biggest narcotics distributors in the U.S., supplying a ton a year to street pushers. Cirillo got his heroin from a French ring that smuggled it into New York concealed in expensive automobiles. After intercepting a heroin-laden car that had been shipped to the U.S. from Europe, French and American agents indicted 28 members of the ring, including Cirillo, another Bronx man, John Anthony Astuto, 20 Frenchmen and an Austrian national; a number of them are still at large. For his role in the case, Cirillo was sentenced in May to 25 years in prison. After his conviction, federal agents dug up $1,078,000 in cash from his backyard.

LA PAZ: When three men and two women checked into a La Paz hotel in February, an alert desk clerk recalled that one of the men had checked in four years before under a different name and passport. Bolivian police arrested the man, who turned out to be a Uruguayan wanted in Miami for drug trafficking. The cops let the others go, but BNDD agents were convinced that the ones who got away were important and traced the two couples to Mexico City. There they were identified as Jean-Paul [illegible] Sarti, 34, a native of Marseille, and their mistresses. The two men were top operatives for the notorious Auguste Joseph Ricord. Their mission: to set up a new route for getting drugs into the U.S. Agents moved in on them after two months' surveillance. Angeletti, who was nude in bed when agents kicked in the door, surrendered and was extradited to France. Sarti shot it out and was killed. In his possession were ten stolen passports from four countries, which enabled him to pose at will as a Uruguayan diplomat, a Panamanian student or an Italian businessman.

ANKARA: Turkish Senator Kudret Bayhan told friends in Ankara last February that he was going to France to buy a dress for his daughter. Nothing unusual about that. The high-living Senator was well off, and he had made frequent trips to France in the past. This time Bayhan failed to reckon with the newly coordinated French and Turkish narcotics enforcers. The Turkish Ministry of the Interior had sent out an all-points bulletin for Bayhan's rented Turkish-made Anadol automobile. When the Senator got to the French-Italian Mediterranean border, the "Route 66" of drug traffic to Marseille, police stopped the car and found 300 lbs. of morphine base. The case has led to three other Senators, although, said Turkish police last week, "it is too early to make an announcement."

The classic example of greenhorn clumsiness is that of a former Vice President of the Laotian National Assembly, Prince Sopsaisana, who arrived in Paris in April 1971 as his country's new Ambassador to France. One key item of his luggage was not passed by customs at Orly airport: a valise containing 123 lbs. of pure heroin. Informed of the incident, President Georges Pompidou refused to accept Sopsaisana's credentials and the smuggler-prince was [illegible]

Amateurs are frequently recruited to smuggle drugs, particularly between Latin American cities and the U.S. Carriers bring in heroin (or cocaine) in innumerable ingenious ways—including, on one occasion, stuffing it inside a live boa constrictor. A more common method, however, is for women airline passengers to travel to Miami with cocaine or heroin hidden in their girdles or in false-bottomed suitcases. Near Santiago there is a factory specializing in making suitcases with hidden compartments. The agents are catching more and more such carriers, in part through use of a secret "smuggler's profile"—a telltale behavior pattern apparently common to amateur smugglers.

One courier who fell afoul of customs was Carole Dale Robinson, a 19-year-old model from San Francisco. She arrived at Mexico City airport last March clutching a stuffed toy llama from Peru. Customs officers split it open—and found 8 lbs. of pure cocaine inside. She protested that she was merely carrying the toy as a favor for someone else, but in fact U.S. agents had been watching her since she left California. She is now awaiting sentence, which may run as high as seven years.

The amateur who shows up in Montreal or some other point with heroin in the hollowed out heels of his shoes may not be able to find a buyer at any price. The professionals deal only with other professionals; they almost never move drugs on speculation, and they prefer to deal in lots of 50 or 100 kilos. The biggest operators are shadowy figures, little-known and rarely seen. Much of the international trade is still dominated by the fabled, Marseille-based French Corsican families who developed the deadly business back in the 1930s *(see box, page 24)*.

In Southeast Asia, the U.S. State Department has long been following the operations of one Lo Hsing-han, a Chinese of mysterious background who is said to enjoy absolute rule over drugs in the mountainous region of Burma,



CAROLE DALE ROBINSON WITH TOY LLAMA
Tough going for amateurs

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Thailand and Laos known as the Golden Triangle, the richest poppy growing area in the world and the source of the Asian heroin now reaching the U.S. in growing quantities.

Opium production is outlawed in Burma, but Lo has what the State Department describes as "a contract" with the Burmese government: he keeps his turf clear of Communist insurgents, and the government allows him to deal in opium as he pleases. Lo has had no trouble in keeping up his end of the deal. He maintains a private army of some 5,000 local tribesmen and deserters from Chiang Kai-shek's old Kuomintang 93rd Independent Division.



WHERLE-GAMMA

RAIDED LAB NEAR MARSEILLE
"Chemists" turn morphine into heroin.

Typically, the big-time operators deal in more than just drugs. After they deliver their opium to smugglers on the Thai border, Lo's huge caravans—often 200 mules and 200 porters, guarded by 600 troops—frequently return to Burma with contraband ranging from trucks and airplane parts to bolts of cloth and auto engines. Lo, says one U.S. official, "doesn't go empty-handed either way."

Similarly, drug traffickers in Uruguay, Argentina, Peru and Brazil dabble on the side in cigarettes, TV sets, whisky, radios and watches. By some accounts, French smugglers are into something far more complex. It is said that the SDECE, France's CIA, has quietly engaged Paris- and Marseille-based smugglers to move arms to a number of Middle East countries. These secret arms shipments are said to enable France to bolster its export arms industry and its influence in the Middle East, while it continues to adhere publicly to its 1968 total embargo on weapons sales to the belligerent nations of the region. The theory goes that arms and ammunition are turned over to established smugglers and shipped in compartments concealed in specially fitted vehicles. The underworld then takes advantage of the arrangement: on the return trip, the same compartments are filled with drugs.

Narcotics experts say that big drug dealers share something approaching a community spirit. On one occasion a trafficker loaned a competitor 20 "keys" (kilos of narcotics) in order to make up a shipment. The real common denominator in the business is an addiction to immense profits. At the labs in Marseille, a dealer must shell out anywhere from $120,000 to $350,000 for 100 kilos of heroin refined from Turkish opium. On delivery to a U.S. wholesaler, however, the 100-kilo package is worth about $1 million. After expenses, the net profit can be as high as $750,000.

Those profits attract investment funds from a variety of sources. Switzerland is so fretful about an influx of tainted narcotics money that the government has announced a special drive to screen numbered bank accounts for illegal uses. While there is no financial "octopus" for drug money in Switzerland, there are ways in which capital flows into narcotics. Money invested in clandestine companies registered in the name of a "manufacturer's representative" or "legal representative" often

Portrait of a Narc: Death Is Never Far Away

THE 1,610 agents of the Justice Department's Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs are the advance scouts and front-rank skirmishers in the U.S.'s war on narcotics. The BNDD agent's business is basically intelligence; he deals with small-time pushers and "mules" (couriers), as well as international traffickers, in any number of situations and any number of languages. He must be, in short, the compleat narc.

Roughly 45% of the BNDD's agents are stationed abroad, in as many as 57 countries. They sometimes operate out of a U.S. Embassy or consulate but they have a passion for anonymity and independence. If they work with anyone, it is the local narcotics agents—especially in France. French narcs, says one U.S. agent, "work like we do. It's all in the approach. They will stay on the job 24 hours a day for as many days as it takes to break a case."

At any one time, an agent may be working on a dozen cases spread out over several countries. U.S. agents, with budgets that are the envy of their foreign counterparts, depend heavily on informants. Such sources, who have led the way to major busts, have been paid as much as $30,000—well over the average agent's annual salary. The overseas agent is usually careful to pass his information over to local authorities, and let them make the bust. Abroad, agents must not only be resourceful undercover operators but also diplomats, especially in countries sensitive to U.S. meddling in internal affairs.

One such agent-diplomat is Nick Panella, 39, a graduate of The Bronx, Manhattan's Hunter College, and most of the world's drug trade centers: New York, Rome, Istanbul, Marseille, Montreal and Paris. Dark and compact, Panella describes his appearance as "the stereotype of the Italian wise ass"—a distinct asset in the trade. "Up in East Harlem," he says, "nobody's going to introduce any bright-eyed, 6-ft. Ryan to anybody worth talking to in drugs. But I fit right in. They'll sell to someone who looks like me."

Panella, who earns $25,000 a year, lives with his Italian-speaking wife Sylvia and their three children in a comfortable Parisian suburb. In his current role as deputy director of BNDD's key Region 17, which includes Marseille, Panella's wardrobe runs to sporty suits. When he operated as an agent, he added a big pinky diamond and, frequently, a cigar. "By the time you're through with a case," he says, "you sometimes think you're a trafficker. You sure as hell look like one."

The toughest place Panella has worked in was Turkey. Frequently he posed as a buyer and approached the wagon trains by which heavily armed Turkish opium farmers moved their wares at night. "I never made a case in the interior when there wasn't shooting," Panella says, "but nobody ever got hit. The confusion is unbelievable. You just close in when the time comes and grab as many farmers as you can."

"You're always nervous when it begins," says Panella. "You never get used to those first few minutes—you know, with the guns and all that." The closest call he has ever had was in Beirut, when he arranged the bust of a small-time dealer. "We got to the building where I was going to pick up the stuff. The police were supposed to stay at the top of some long narrow stairs until I climbed up there with the trafficker. But they started to come down too soon. I felt the automatic in my back. When I heard the hammer click, I dived forward and prayed. There were bullets all around, as usual, but none in me—or the smuggler, for that matter. He got away."

Eleven BNDD agents have been killed in the past four years. The chief occupational hazard is the "little guy," who is apt to panic when he finds he has been dealing with an agent. A regular trafficker would "just back off and split," says Panella. "These guys don't like messy stuff." They do not hesitate to rub out a suspected informer.

Many agents admit a respect for "the other team." Says Panella: "It's professional stuff. When you get them, they know you've played a good hand. When they get away, you know you've still got something to learn from them."

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finds its way into the drug underworld.

A big operator may never even see the drugs he deals in. They are handled by a small platoon of hirelings: "plant men" who package the stuff, "chemists" who turn morphine base into pure heroin for $400 a kilo, and "mules" who will carry it to its destination for $1,000 plus plane fare. The narcotics trade has been a boon to Paraguay's so-called "Mau Mau" pilots. The pilots fly contraband drugs north to the U.S. from Buenos Aires or from any of 500 tiny airstrips that dot Paraguay. The pilots joke that they have a "Cessna 500" (which can carry 500 lbs. of cocaine) or a "Cessna 130" (130 kilos of heroin).

Panama has become the Grand Central Station of Latin American smuggling, partly because it has nearly 100 remote World War II landing strips, partly because it is the closest place to the U.S. with anonymous, Swiss-style numbered bank accounts. The fact that Panama has 33 major international banks, up from only six in 1963, indicates that those accounts are in heavy demand. Until recently, as many as 20 aircraft a month would arrive in the U.S. from various South American countries via Panama's Tocumen International Airport, where they had been cleared through without any inspection. One of the cleared planes, tracked by U.S. agents to one of the 83 small airstrips that dot southern Florida, was found to have 94 lbs. of heroin aboard.

What could the U.S. narcs do about it? Plenty, as it turned out. One evening in February 1971, the acting Tocumen transit chief, Joaquin Him Gonzáles, a baseball addict, drove into the U.S.-controlled Canal Zone to see a local game, and the feds pounced. Flown to the U.S. and tried in Dallas, Him is serving a five-year rap for narcotics conspiracy in a Texas jail. Washington has

Strongman Omar Torrijos and his brother Moisés, who is Panama's Ambassador to Spain.

Latin America poses other worries besides heroin for U.S. narcotics agents, and more serious ones than the tons of marijuana that are smuggled across the border daily. Along the continent's Andean spine, the peasants of Bolivia and highland Peru, who have long chewed the coca leaf for pleasure, are now selling more and more of it as a cash crop —cocaine. The drug, which is psychologically if not physically addictive, has become popular in Europe and in parts of the U.S. Ingersoll worries that "in the long run, the cocaine dilemma is going to be more serious than heroin."

To really stop the flow of hard drugs, the U.S. must somehow attack the source of supply, a crucial role that has fallen to the State Department. The U.S. outlawed heroin in 1924, becoming one of the first nations to do so. Since then, narcotics have been the target of no less than nine separate international agreements. The latest one, the U.N.'s 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, calls for what are essentially voluntary restraints on the cultivation, manufacture, import and export of opium and its derivatives.

Washington, seeking a more muscular approach, is focusing direct diplomatic pressure on a list of 57 governments that are concerned with the narcotics trade in one way or another. Secretary of State William Rogers, who as chairman of a Cabinet-level International Narcotics Control Committee is the top man in the U.S. anti-drug effort, is thus doubly concerned with the role of his department. That has been to remind other governments forcefully that under Section [illegible] of the Foreign Assistance Act the Administration must cut off aid to countries that do not co-



KEYSTONE

SWEDISH BILLBOARDS WITH NAMES OF DRUG VICTIMS

The outlook is for a protracted and bitter war.

field, U.S. ambassadors have been charged with driving the point home. In Turkey, Ambassador William Handley told friends: "In this embassy, careers depend on getting opium banned." In drug matters, the U.S. has been receiving close cooperation from Yugoslavia and even Bulgaria, but State Department officials gripe that "it's damned hard to get an Italian or a Belgian even to think about pollution, let alone drugs." In Latin America, only Mexico has been really responsive. Chile has flatly refused to help.

Turkey agreed last June to complete a gradual phase-out of its opium-poppy production this year, rather than maintain severely limited production for medical use, as originally planned. The government did not find the decision hard to make, in view of the fact that Washington seemed to hint that the U.S.'s $140 million Turkish aid program hung in the balance. The U.S. is easing the country's cold-turkey withdrawal from poppy production with $35 million in special funds, to be used, among other things, for the construction of a sunflower-oil processing plant near former poppy fields. But many Turks are now having second thoughts. Istanbul's influential daily *Hürriyet* has protested that "we feel sorry for American heroin addicts, but it is unjust to put the burden on the Turkish economy." With elections looming next year, Premier Ferit Melen's opposition has introduced two bills that would repeal the poppy phase-out. The vote, worried U.S. officials say, "could go either way."

Poppy Problem. The reason is that out on the parched plains of Anatolia, where towns have names like Afyon (opium), the white poppy is central to the local way of life. It is a source of seed, fodder and fuel, of a low-cholesterol cooking oil and of cash. An acre of poppy brings a Turkish farmer $235 at government prices and even more on the black market; by contrast, wheat brings $100 an acre at best.

International traffickers have been moving through Anatolia's medieval villages for months, buying and salting away quantities of opium. Says a Turkish narcotics official: "We will still be finding it four or five years from now."

Turkey has been a sobering experience for U.S. opium warriors. "There was at first too much enthusiasm, too much optimism," says Assistant Secretary of State Nelson G. Gross, boss of narcotics affairs at Foggy Bottom. Some Washington officials still talk of achieving a "drastic" reduction in the drug flow within two or three years, but others are skeptical. Veteran agents, among them New York's Daniel P. Casey, doubt that detective work can ever stop any more than 50% of the total drug flow. As a U.S. agent based in Latin America puts it: "We need 16,000, not [illegible] to stop this traffic. As fast as we close one route, they come up with two others."

What is the solution? Nixon has ar-

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guerrillas [illegible] to end the drug traffic is to end poppy cultivation. The U.S. already has satellites in orbit that can locate poppy fields on the earth's surface. In *The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia*, a new study that attempts, with only partial success, to blame U.S. policy for the vigor of the world drug trade, Author Alfred W. McCoy, a Yale graduate student, suggests that Washington might consider paying the hill peoples of the Golden Triangle area not to grow their poppies. If they were paid the going price in the area of $50 a kilo, by McCoy's reckoning, the cost to the U.S. would be $50 million.

Tough Strategy. But that is hardly realistic; the dollar has not always served the U.S. well in Indochina, and there is little reason its luck would be any better in the hills of Burma, where the poppy is deeply embedded in the local culture. What are the alternatives then? India, which dominates the world trade in legal opium used in medicine, is widely regarded as having one of the best control programs in the world. That is somewhat mythical, however. In New Delhi, there are 800 registered addicts, served by two government opium shops —but another 30,000 or so unregistered addicts can get opium under the counter at tea stalls or from cigarette vendors in the city.

The U.S. would hardly accept drastic measures like those of China, where opium dealers were shot on sight in the 1950s and 1960s, or Iran, which has a chronic addiction problem. In 1955, when that country was plagued with 2,000,000 addicts in a population of 25 million, the Shah ordered Iran's opium fields burned and addicts bused off to camps for a forced withdrawal program. Addiction dropped way down, but it was only a temporary reprieve. The addict population is back up to 400,000 and still climbing, even though Iranian troops regularly fight gun battles with Turkish and Afghan opium smugglers along the borders.

The U.S.'s war on heroin is only getting under way, and it is not without its critics, who variously contend that it is too little too late, and that the effort is diffused because some narcotics agents go after marijuana dealers with the same zeal they apply to the heroin traffic. Yet barring any unexpected developments—an international agreement for a total ban on the poppy, say, or discovery of insects that attack the plant, or a medical breakthrough in treatment of addiction—the outlook is for a protracted war. There will be little deviation from the present U.S. strategy of tough, front-door diplomacy with the countries along the drug supply lines and back-alley skirmishing with the traffickers. That strategy will not bring victory in the drug war, but even a draw would be a plus—provided that the respite is used to develop a social and educational approach to the problem of addiction.

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THE NEW YORK TIMES BOOK REVIEW
3 September 1972
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The Politics Of Heroin in Southeast Asia

By Alfred W. McCoy. With Cathleen B. Read and Leonard P. Adams II. Illustrated. 464 pp. New York: Harper & Row. $10.95.

By JAMES M. MARKHAM

A movie natural, with a part for the C.I.A.

It looks as though *Papaver somniferum*, the rather beautiful opium poppy, is going to provide us with a new genre of film, fiction, journalism and, even, scholarship. This is understandable. Heroin addiction is savaging our cities. "Any nation that moves down the road to addiction, that nation has something taken out of its character," President Nixon observed last March shortly after his return from China, once the most addicted of nations. Mr. Nixon has declared "war" on heroin at home—and galvanized his emissaries abroad. In certain parts of the world, American diplomats now give almost monomaniacal attention to persuading frequently indifferent or corrupt officials to do something about poppy cultivation, heroin refining and heroin trafficking.

Moreover, from the perspective of a journalist or film-maker, the subject is a natural, replete with ignorant hill tribesmen hacking away at their poppy fields in remote corners of Asia, ragtag paramilitary smugglers leading vast mule caravans across cloud-shrouded mountains, shadowy Chinese middlemen bribing high-ranking officials to look the other way, cosmopolitan Corsican intriguers arranging for stewardesses to strap on "body packs" of No. 4 heroin and fly to New York, intrepid undercover agents trying to foil all of the aforementioned and—last, but by no means least important—the junkies on our streets, symptoms and carriers of disquieting diseases.

This book, the first work of near-scholarship in the new genre, comes to us redolent of controversy [see The Last Word]. Before it was even in galleys—on June 1—the Central Intelligence Agency dispatched an employe to Harper & Row in New York to warn the company that the book could well be inaccurate, libelous and "damaging to the interests of this country," according to the recollection of Executive Editor M. S. Wyeth. The next day Alfred McCoy testified before a Senate subcommittee about alleged involvement of high-ranking South Vietnamese officials, Air America and others in the opium business. Alarmed, the C.I.A.'s General Counsel, Lawrence R. Houston, stepped up the pressure, and on July 5 asked to "see the text prior to publication" in order to point out its inaccuracies.

In a display of post-Irving caution—and over the author's objections—Harper & Row agreed on July 19 to let the C.I.A. consider the galleys for a week and submit its criticisms, on the understanding that the publishers would be under no obligation to make any changes. The mountain at Langley, Va., labored and produced a mouse. The 1,500-word critique the Agency returned to Harper & Row on July 28 understandably "underwhelmed" the editors (who appeared to have been concerned mainly about libel suits) and they decided to proceed with the publication of the book.

The C.I.A.'s clumsy intervention—particularly when linked to its ongoing efforts to prevent a former agent, Victor L. Marchetti, from even writing a book about the Agency for Alfred A. Knopf—is seriously disturbing. So is Harper & Row's submission of the book for prepublication criticism; it sets a worrying precedent even if the company maintains, as it does, that this was a special case. But the C.I.A. assaulted the McCoy book like a bull lunging at a matador's outstretched cape. For what the 27-year-old Yale graduate student has given us is not—as advertised—an expose of "C.I.A. involvement in the drug traffic" but rather a fascinating, often meticulous unraveling of the byzantine complexities of the Southeast Asian opium and heroin trade. To be sure, McCoy weaves a New Left anti-C.I.A. leitmotif throughout his pages and at times lapses into the error (usually made by angry non-Americans) of crediting American espionage with history-bending powers. Thus, in the early (and weakest) chapters of the book we are led to believe that if the O.S.S. had not backed the Mafia in Sicily at the end of World War II and if the C.I.A. had not sponsored Corsican mobsters as anti-Communist strikebreakers on the Marseilles waterfront, these two underworld groups would have subsided into well-deserved oblivion and never gotten into heroin trafficking.

As a former C.I.A. agent told Seymour Hersh (who unearthed the pre-publication fiasco), McCoy's assertions are "10 per cent tendentious and 90 per cent of the most valuable contribution I can think of." "He's a very liberal kid," the ex-agent continued, "and he'd like to nail the establishment. But some leading intelligence officers inside the Government's program think that his research is great." Well they might. For McCoy has done his homework, and, unlike most authors of books about spooks and mobsters, he gives us a rich set of footnotes. It is too bad they are not at the bottom of the pages, because this is a book to be read in tandem with its footnotes. Some assertions in the text are stronger than the footnotes they rest on; many are not.

The book's strength does not lie in its finger-wagging approach to history, but in its astounding-but-true tales of exotic rivalries that make up the heroin trade. Have you ever heard, for example,

continued

James M. Markham, who was a correspondent for The Associated Press in South Asia and Africa, now reports frequently on drug problems for The Times.

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THE NEW YORK TIMES BOOK REVIEW
3 September 1972

The C.I.A. as Book Revie

The Last Word

By RICHARD R. LINGEMAN

Time was when the Central Intelligence Agency was accused of some particularly dirty trick by the press it would reply blandly, "The C.I.A. neither confirms nor denies the charge." Recently, however, the agency has departed from its customary inscrutability; it has doffed the cloak, drawn the dagger and intervened openly in the book-publishing process. The most publicized of these interventions has been its demand to examine, prior to publication, the manuscript of "The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia," by Alfred W. McCoy, which as the review in this issue points out, makes some serious allegations about the C.I.A.'s inadvertent involvement in the heroin traffic. In another less publicized case, the agency enjoined a book by a former agent named Victor Marchetti which had been contracted for but not yet written.

The background of the McCoy affair is, briefly, this. After Mr. McCoy's charges had become public knowledge in June, Cord Meyer Jr., a C.I.A. official, called on Harper & Row and reportedly raised questions regarding the book's accuracy, libel and the national interest. On July 5, the C.I.A. formally asked to see the manuscript, saying that "Mr. McCoy's claims . . . are totally false and without foundation"; libel and the national interest were not mentioned. On July 19, Harper & Row, through its counsel B. Brooks Thomas, agreed to make the manuscript available under certain conditions (including confidentiality) despite the firm's belief that "Mr. McCoy's scholarship is beyond reproach." In addition Mr. Thomas wrote, "We do not mean to imply that we will make changes in the work because you request them or even because you believe the statements made to be harmful to some agency of our government."

The C.I.A. critique of the manuscript was sent on July 28; in its reply of Aug. 4, Harper & Row, after consultation with the author, made a rather devastating point-by-point refutation and announced it would publish the book unchanged.

So what is the problem? After all, submitting books to prior review by experts in the field is nothing new. It is done frequently by scholars who send early drafts to colleagues in their field for criticism. To inject a personal note, I wrote a book on drug abuse and was glad to accede to the publisher's suggestion that an expert read it over for possible errors. And, of course, Harper & Row says that "The Politics of Heroin" was read "by independent authorities" before the C.I.A. entered the picture.

But the case of McCoy v. the C.I.A. is distinguishable, as the lawyers would say. Because of the highly secretive nature of the C.I.A.'s operations, the information uncovered by Mr. McCoy could only have been obtained by independent investigation. Further, Mr. McCoy's allegations were taken by the C.I.A. as highly embarrassing—so embarrassing that they jarred the agency into abandoning its traditional low profile. Letters from high C.I.A. officials were fired off to The Washington Star and Harper's magazine, which had published some of Mr. McCoy's material, attempting to impeach his veracity. The battle lines were clearly drawn.

It should be made clear at this point that Mr. McCoy's book does not raise problems of classified information or national security. Although a C.I.A. representative reportedly mentioned libel and the national interest at one point, these words did not come up in their official letter of July 5—probably because there were no grounds for urging them. It is curious, then, that in a letter to The Village Voice defending Harper & Row's action, Mr. Thomas summoned up the spectre of possible legal action. "One of the reasons for volunteering the book," he wrote, "was in the hope of avoiding such expense [of a trial] by convincing the C.I.A. that they had no case for court action."

And yet Cord Meyer told The Times's Seymour Hersh, "We at the agency at no time thought we had any right to suppress the book." Certainly there is no threat of legal action in the Harper & Row-C.I.A. correspondence; if avoidance of a court battle was one of its motives, Harper & Row was being super-cautious, to say the least.

In any case, it is not the universal practice in publishing to let the C.I.A. review every book about it before publication. According to Robert Bernstein, president of Random House, his company twice refused such requests.

That there are circumstances under which the C.I.A. wants to play the role of pre-censor is shown by the Marchetti case. Mr. Marchetti, who had already written an unimpressive novel about a C.I.A. man, signed a contract with Alfred A. Knopf for a nonfiction work about the agency. In April the agency went to court and got an injunction against the book on the grounds that as a former employe of C.I.A. Mr. Marchetti had signed a secrecy oath and must obtain C.I.A. permission before the book is published. The case raises several interesting questions: Can a man contract away his First Amendment rights? Are former employes under a blanket prohibition from writing *anything* about the C.I.A.? And what of the public's right to know more about the C.I.A. than they do now? Must Mr. Marchetti confine himself to anonymous tips to Jack Anderson? At any rate, the case is now on appeal, with the American Civil Liberties Union acting in Mr. Marchetti's behalf.

As for Mr. McCoy's book, clearly h and the C.I.A. are in an adversary rela tionship; the only seemly place for the to fight it out is in the marketplace o ideas, not in the privacy of the publisher office. No interest could be served b having the C.I.A. go over the manuscrip prior to publication; it is like puttin one's head in a man-eating tiger's mout to verify if he is hungry. Pre-review b a governmental agency, where the line of difference are as clearly drawn as the are here, is next door to prior restrain Harper & Row may argue that it retaine the final say throughout, but in fact caved in and acted under a principle b which any governmental agency criticize by a book could demand to see it, ca doubts on the author's integrity with i own version of the "facts" (this at a tim when publishers' memories of the Irvin hoax are still fresh) and perhaps eve cause its suppression if the publisher timid and the author refuses to mak changes. Governmental agencies, inclu ing the C.I.A., are not by definition liar but in some cases a plausible version the truth that differs from "official" tru will surface; it should be protected, rath than submitted to bureaucratic bullying.

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Drugs and Death: The Mexican Connection

By Laurence Stern

Washington Post Foreign Service

NUEVO LAREDO, Mexico, Sept. 2—Oblivious to the violence, the American tourists tramp through the sun-baked Early Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer main drag, Guerrero Avenue, pushing their way through the tax-free bazaars heaped with tax-free liquor, cigarettes, cut-rate jewelry and hand-crafted schlock.

Most of them are unaware that two other specialties of this Rio Grande border town are mutilated corpses and narcotics traffic. The relationship between corpses and narcotics is more than a casual one.

The machine gun and the machete have taken the lives of some 85 Mexican police, customs officials, drug pushers and hapless Americans within the past year. It has created what one local journalist calls a "psychosis of terror" in Nuevo Laredo.

Day after day the newspapers have published photographs of the blood-spattered or decapitated remains of the latest victims of the violence. One of the newspapers, La Manana, had its plant machine-gunned and its presses sabotaged late last year as an admonition against identifying local hoodlums.

Violence has long been endemic to the Mexican border, where men still slouch at the bar with guns tucked under their belts. But the level of bloodshed has far surpassed even Nuevo Laredo's gory standards of tolerance.

The underlying reason for the violence of Nuevo Laredo has been its emergence as the principal "Mexican connection" along the 1,200-mile Texas-Mexican border for the smuggling of heroin, opium, cocaine and marijuana into the United States.

Mexico itself has, in the view of veteran narcotics officials, become the principal narcotics pipeline because of the tightened surveillance of the ports of entry along the American eastern seaboard and the Canadian border.

And Nuevo Laredo now lies along a major narcotics thoroughfare that runs northward from Mexico City and Monterrey along Highway 85 funneling into the valley of Texas.

The border region is a sieve to smugglers. Thousands of cars and pedestrians swarm across the international bridge into Laredo each day. In many places the Rio Grande can easily be forded by a determined man with a backpack.

There are many points at which cotton grows and cattle graze in the riverbed and a truck can drive across its width. Hundreds of small, private planes used for crop-dusting and ranch-to-ranch transport can easily be converted into drug conveyers.

Within the past year the Nixon Administration has sought to prod the Mexican government into stricter enforcement activity in an area where police officials have traditionally tended to wink or doze or enrich themselves.

President Nixon has conferred with Mexican President Luis Echeverria. Director John E. Ingersoll of the Justice Department's Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs has met with Mexican Attorney General Pedro J. Ojeda Paullada. Ojeda's son summered this year with the family of U.S. Attorney General Richard Kleindienst.

The amity, at least at the highest level of officialdom, has rarely run so thick on both sides of the border. But at the operational level—on the streets of Nuevo Laredo—the frustrations of the lawmen, both American and Mexican, are considerable.

One narcotics official, speaking of recent reverses in the joint campaign to reduce the drug flow across the border, refers despondently to the "Mexican disconnection".

Such is the setting in which the violence has flourished here for more than a year between police and rival gangs, such as the Reyes Prunedas and the Gayton clans, who once feuded fiercely for control of the lucrative drug stream that flowed along Highway 85 past their ranches.

Police on both sides of the border as well as knowledgeable residents of Nuevo Laredo identify the principal figure in the town's underworld elite as Francisco Javier Bernal Lopez, who seems to relish the two nicknames that the press has conferred upon him: El Padrino (the godfather) and El Abogado del Diablo (the devil's advocate).

Bernal, an attorney, is a heavy-set, moustachioed man of imposing presence who habitually carries a gun in his belt and sometimes a .45 caliber machine gun at his shoulder. He openly acknowledges that his clientele consists of drug traffickers as well as the tough pistoleros, or hired guns, who drift up from the interior's farmlands to make a quick dollar and others engaged in what is not conventionally considered as upright enterprise.

Bernal emerged from obscurity some 10 months ago to preside over the feuding criminal factions in this border region. Police and Mexican federal authorities ascribe to him an important role in governing Nuevo Laredo's drug smuggling underworld.

"He is the only one with the brains to run the organization," said one high-ranking Mexican law enforcement official sent here to bring the lawless state of affairs under control. "The rest are illiterate hoodlums."

Bernal denies the accusations. He replies that the CIA and FBI were responsible for some of the killings. "I do my work, and my work is defending people," Bernal said at a recent street corner press conference.

He also contends that in several drug seizures and arrests Mexican police stood back while more aggressive U.S. narcotics agents took the initiative. It is Bernal's one accusation that some law enforcement officials concede is not wholly without foundation.

Under the protocols governing American narcotics operations here, U.S. agents can offer various forms of assistance at the request of Mexico. Such acts of assistance, say knowledgeable officials, have at times taken an active form. This was recently made evident by underworld threats here to kill an American agent assigned to work with Mexican federal police.

Authorities questioned Bernal last Tuesday for more than two hours on events that led up to the assassination last July 28 of Federal Police Commandant Everardo Perales Rios, who had run an aggressive campaign against drug smuggling during a six-week tenure that ended with his death.

The murder of Perales,

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Continued

WASHINGTON, D.C.
NATIONAL OBSERVER
WEEKLY - 524,212
SEP 2 1972

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STATINTL

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When the Embarrassed Chuckling Stopped

Our Allies, Opium, and the CIA

By Michael T. Malloy

We were just about to take off from one of the many secret airstrips the Central Intelligence Agency had cut into the mountains of northern Laos, when a tribal soldier hurried up, spoke briefly to an American CIA agent, and threw a big, white canvas bag aboard. I already half knew the answer, but as we buckled our seat belts I asked the agent what was in the bag.

He looked embarrassed. "Opium," he said.

Embarrassment was the strongest emotion that American officialdom showed a decade ago if anyone mentioned the wide-open dope traffic conducted by our allies in Southeast Asia. Narcotics smuggling was more often viewed with amused tolerance as just another Asian peccadillo like corruption, gold smuggling, and night clubs that advertised "Twenty Fresh Girls Just Arrived From Bangkok With Medical Certificates."

White slavery and gold smuggling still rate little more than an embarrassed chuckle at some of our Southeast Asian embassies ("we're here to fight communism, not to play missionary"), but narcotics is something else. The epidemic of opium-based heroin that struck our armies there in 1970 and the frightening inroads the drug has made among high-school students at home have turned that amusing peccadillo into a deadly menace to our own national well-being.

Staff Writer Malloy spent several years in Southeast Asia as a correspondent for United Press International.



'The book is so thoroughly researched, so carefully annotated, and so specific in its accusations that even the Central Intelligence Agency has crawled out of its accustomed shell of secrecy to issue 11 pages of denials.'

Free Publicity

So *The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia* couldn't have been published at a worse time for the men who direct our policies in that bloody and controversial corner of the world. Newspapers, magazines, and television reporters have described allied involvement with the narcotics trade in the past, without generating more than *pro forma* evasions and denials. But this book, published Aug. 17, is so thoroughly researched, so carefully annotated, and so specific in its accusations that even the Central Intelligence Agency has crawled out of its accustomed shell of secrecy to publicly issue 11 pages of denials.

The agency should have stayed in its shell. It guaranteed the book an enormous amount of free publicity by asking Harper & Row to suppress its publication. It trapped itself in a "put up or shut up" corner by telling the publishing company it could demonstrate that author Alfred McCoy's allegations were "totally false." It failed to demonstrate any such thing when Harper & Row broke publishing tradition by giving the agency an advance look at the book and a chance to explode its charges. Instead of preventing its publication, the president of the 155-year-old publishing house said the CIA's response merely "reaffirmed" his company's confidence in the book.

McCoy is a 27-year-old graduate student at Yale. His book is a monumental piece of scholarship in a field that sometimes resists investigation to the point of killing the investigators. He has interviewed spies, gun runners, opium farmers, mercenaries, policemen, and generals along a trail that ran from dusty European libraries to mountaintops in the no man's land of northern Laos. He produced a fascinating tale of mercenary armies, lost battalions, commando raids on Communist China, and wild mountain tribesmen led by hard-drinking American adventurers who sometimes pay cash bounties for enemy ears. It is right out of *Terry and the Pirates*, and it is all more or less true.

McCoy's chief conclusion is that "American diplomats and secret agents have been involved in the

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THE WASHINGTON MONTHLY
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Let Them Eat Bombs

by John Everingham

STATINTL

Author's Note: *From March, 1968, to May, 1972, I made seven treks to the jungled villages of Long Pot District in north central Laos. The district is located approximately 32 miles to the northwest of Long Cheng, headquarters for General Vang Pao's American-trained army, and 30 air miles to the southwest of the now deserted Plain of Jars.*

In 1968, Long Pot was made up of slightly less than 2,000 people living in 11 separate villages. Five of these were populated by the Meo clan, five by the Hill Lao, and one by the people of the Mekong River lowlands. Long Pot is the name of the district and also the name of the Meo village serving as district headquarters.

It was a three-day walk to Long Pot village from the nearest motor road. When I first arrived, I saw clusters of thatch and bamboo houses gripping the sides of a man-scraped ridge. The cries of small children scampering on the rust-colored clay mingled with the grunts and squeals of fat pigs rooting in the underbrush. It was a peaceful scene.

I was shown to the home of the district chief. He was a short, vigorous man in his late fifties, with a high forehead and the melancholy dignity of a senior statesman. Gair Su Yang wore loose black pants of traditional Meo cut and a U. S. military fatigue jacket; he wore no shoes.

According to Gair Su Yang, the first helicopter landed in Long Pot in 1960. The pilots were American, but a Meo officer climbed out to talk with him. The officer spoke of an alliance between the Americans and a Meo colonel of the Royal Lao Army named Vang Pao. He said that American officials had made a pact with Vang Pao; promising to build for the Meo their own army and independent state in the mountains. They guaranteed that the tribesman would not fall under the control of either faction of lowland Lao then girding for civil war. The officer painted a picture of future prosperity for the Meo. All they had to do was become anti-communist, helping the Americans to fight the Pathet Lao revolutionaries controlling sections of Laos' northern provinces.

One of the problems that the people of Long Pot had in accepting the deal was that they were not sure who Vang Pao was. But there was a more basic problem—though Gair Su Yang did not inform me of it until sometime later: "If we joined the alliance, the Pathet Lao would have become our enemy and would have threatened our village. . . . I told him that Long Pot would not join Vang Pao and the Americans." According to Gair Su Yang, the officer then became angry and threatened that Vang Pao and the Americans considered those not friends to be enemies, and "enemy villages would be attacked and captured by Vang Pao's men."

"We couldn't do anything," Gair Su Yang later contended, pointing out that only fear of a helicopter-load of soldiers descending upon Long Pot forced him to accept involvement in the war venture.

By the end of 1960, every man in Long Pot village had received an M-1 rifle or carbine. Many had been flown to Long Cheng for three to four months' training by U. S. soldiers. (These were probably U. S. Special Forces, whom it was common to see in small up-country towns of Laos until 1968-69. Thereafter CIA "civilians" were used to train Vang Pao's army.) Long Pot's men were then given rank in irregular battalion 209.

Long Pot had been militarized in defense of "Meoland" nearly eight years when I first visited. It had not, however, gone to war. The M-1s were used for shooting squirrels and birds. Men, women, and children slashed, burned, and planted to reap harvests of rice, corn, and, of course, the opium poppy. Opium was the main cash crop, which from 1960 onwards had been bought by Meo soldiers and transported both by pony caravan and American-piloted Air America helicopters from Long Cheng.

October, 1970

During the summer of 1969, the Bureau of Public Roads, Laos Division (an arm of USAID), opened war-abandoned Route 13 running [illegible] with the royal capital at Luang Prabang. The new road put Long Pot only a half-day walk from motor transport. A companion and myself traveled up Route 13 by motorcycle and walked the rest of the way to Long Pot village. As we arrived, 20 teenage boys in U. S. army uniforms, dragging M-1 carbines and rifles often too big for them, paced through mock-military maneuvers, periodically diving to the ground in a half-hearted manner that would have gotten them killed if bullets had really been flying. A few days earlier, they had returned by helicopter from Long Cheng. There, they said, U. S. soldiers had put them through three months of military training. Another helicopter would arrive that afternoon, they said, and take them off to Moung Soui district, about 30 miles to the northeast, where the Pathet Lao were in the midst of attacking and taking the town.

The boys' eyes revealed their fear and demoralization as they talked about the coming helicopter ride and their destination. And as we all waited, bombs could be heard peppering the hills in the distance, in the direction of Moung Soui. The bomb blasts, though 15 to 20 miles away, shook the hill under our feet and shattered the young soldiers' nerve. Several mothers were crying as they fussed over their soldier-boys; lucky charms were stuffed into baggy pockets. District Chief Gair Su Yang was at the center of the gathering handing out new U. S. army uniforms, pep-talking his recruits. But Gair Su Yang's voice was flecked with anger and did nothing to ease the funereal atmosphere.

No, said every boy I asked, they didn't want to go to fight the Pathet Lao. They said their village headmen had chosen them; they must go. And they went. Early next morning, I ran out from breakfast in Gair Su Yang's house as a helicopter finally whoop-whooped in to land. "Air America" was clearly printed down the side of the silver and blue craft. Boys clambered aboard. The helicopter rose and swept away toward Moung Soui. In three swift trips, 20 village boys were gone. None ever saw home again—except for one. His body was returned for burial 12 months later.

Tong Ouie is a village of Hill Lao people about an hour's walk from Long Pot village. The Hill Lao are a less prosperous, less colorful race who share the mountains with the Meo. But such distinctions are obscured in khaki. Early in 1970, Long Cheng demanded men from Tong Ouie to boost the failing Meo forces. The headman recounted the story bitterly: he had first refused to send a single man up to Long Pot village to fill out the district's quota. "The Americans are crazy. So is Vang Pao. They send more and more men against the Pathet Lao each year and they all get killed. Why should our people fight and die for the Meo or the Americans?"

John Everingham is a reporter for Dispatch News Service International. He is currently reporting from Laos, where he has been for the past three years.

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THE NEW YORKER

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STATINTL

BOOKS

THE POLITICS OF HEROIN IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, by Alfred W. McCoy, with Cathleen B. Read and Leonard P. Adams II (Harper & Row). The authors say that the highlands of Southeast Asia are the most productive opium-poppy area in the world, and the source—via local crooks and politicians, the Chinese equivalent of the Mafia, the Corsican equivalent of the Mafia, and the Mafia itself—of most of the heroin that comes into the United States; they add that the great increase in poppy-growing and heroin manufacture is the result of American policy, especially the misbehavior of the C.I.A. The book causes one to ponder both its reliability and its message. It contains allegations—such as that So-and-So heads the heroin trade in the United States—of a kind that make good reading but are rarely proved in courts of law. The authors' mention of the Marshall Plan suggests that they have fallen hard for the fad of blaming everything wrong with the world on American foreign policy since the Second World War. The introduction of irrelevancies and of statements first offered as probabilities and then considered facts are irritating, too. Yet, on the other hand, the executive branch of this government appears to have forgotten that it is not allowed to keep secrets from the American people, and every revelation of governmental secrecy has created a justifiable suspicion. A reader may very well feel that there is something to the authors' story. Even if only a few accusations are true, that could make the worst of the Harding Administration's scandals look rather quaint.

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Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01 [redacted]

SAN FRANCISCO, CAL.
CHRONICLE
SEP 1972
M - 480,233

World of Books

'Politics of Heroin In Southeast Asia'

William Hogan

NEWS STORIES this week made much of President Nixon's pledge to cut off aid to any foreign government whose leaders "protect" international drug traffickers. This was in response to Senator George McGovern's earlier charge that the administration had failed to crack down on the narcotics trade in Southeast Asia because it needs "air bases in Thailand, Lao mercenaries and Vietnamese soldiers to fight its war."

Senator McGovern's charges could have been based on the documented book by the young Yale scholar Alfred W. McCoy, "The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia." Harper & Row released it, uncut, after the Central Intelligence Agency had sought to have Harper stop publication and to discredit McCoy's investigative reporting.

★ ★ ★

McCOY presents the CIA-Harper controversy in a lengthy exchange of letters and memos prior to publication. Documentation on those strange and, for the CIA, very open pressure tactics appears in the September 21 issue of the New York Review of Books. McCoy calls these tactics "the strongest evidence of the folly of allowing government agencies to help decide what will be published."

Harper, over McCoy's objections, did allow the CIA to see page proofs of the book which analyzes the CIA's role in the international heroin traffic. But Harper rejected the agency's suggested editing of the book. After a careful review of the manuscript and study of the CIA's objections to it, "it is our sincere opinion," a Harper's executive replied, "that Mr. McCoy's scholarship remains unshaken and we do not see any reason for making any changes."

"The Politics of Heroin" takes a long look at the Golden Triangle, where Laos, Thailand and Burma meet; it produces 60 per cent of the world's supply of heroin, including the Double UO Brand that has increasingly turned up in the New York and Miami areas. The Double UO lab was formerly owned by General Ousane Rattikone, commander-in-chief of the Royal Laotian Army in CIA-controlled territory.

★ ★ ★

HEROIN and opium, McCoy states, have been transported in American planes (the CIA-chartered Air America). U.S. personnel may not be directly involved in the trade, but they tend to look away because drug trafficking is a tradition in that part of the world. Yet looking the other way, McCoy's book emphasizes, has increased drug addiction among Americans, both GIs and those at home.

McCoy's reply to CIA pressure: "If America's publishers are not careful to defend their own constitutional prerogatives, then the CIA, for one, seems only too willing to help them wither away."

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STATINTL [redacted]
RADIO TV REPORTS, INC Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R001000050001-8
41 EAST 42ND STREET, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10017, 697-5100

STATINTL [redacted]

FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF

PROGRAM TEN O'CLOCK NEWS STATION WNEW-TV

DATE AUGUST 28, 1972 10:00 PM CITY NEW YORK

HEROIN

BILL JORGENSEN: Heroin, a drug that is destroying lives all over the world. In a cover story this week, TIME MAGAZINE says that the narcotics trade is expected to center in Asia in the future because of the surplus of opium grown in Burma, Thailand and Laos. Thousands of our young men have returned home from the Indochina War hooked on drugs. And there are charges that the Central Intelligence Agency is involved in opium traffic through its charter airline, Air America.

A young doctoral student, Alfred McCoy, has written a book, which claims that our C.I.A. and State Department are helping drug traffickers for political reasons. The C.I.A. says it's a lie, and tried to pursuade Harper and Row not to publish the book. But McCoy says he can document his allegations.

ALFRED MC COY: What I can't understand is why the C.I.A. came after my book. Why the C.I.A. took these unprecedented moves in an attempt to discredit me. My only feeling, the only way I can explain it is that somehow they know that what I'm saying is accurate enough or documented enough, and put together in a convincing enough way that they're afraid.

REPORTER: Afraid of what?

MC COY: They're afraid that I'm going to be believed.

(LAUGHTER)

REPORTER: Well what would you think would be the end result of your being believed?

MC COY: I really can't predict that. All that I'll say is that I've tried to document three major points--one, that in the wake of the reduction of opium production in Turkey and the crackdown by the French Government on heroin laboratories in Marseilles, the crackdown on the Italian Government on the Sicilian Mafia, the international narcotics industry has shifted

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OFFICES IN: NEW YORK • DETROIT • LOS ANGELES • WASHINGTON, D. C. • NEW ENGLAND • CHICAGO

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GARDEN CITY, N.Y.
NEWSDAY
AUG 2 7 1972
E - 427,270
STATINTL

Mob Rethinking Its Heroin Ban To Do 'a Service to the Country'

By Tom Renner

New York Cosa Nostra leaders are considering a proposal to reenter the international narcotics traffic to increase income for restless and money-hungry young Turks of the mob and to take drugs out of the suburbs and confine them to the ghettos, a federal source said yesterday.

The question of whether the New York-New Jersey crime families should get back into the business of wholesaling heroin and cocaine, the federal source said, was discussed at an Aug. 12 meeting of the Cosa Nostra Commisson on Staten Island. The same subject, the source said, also was discussed at a meeting of crime family consigliers (advisers) in the New York area last week.

Since shortly after the jailing of the late crime boss Vito Genovese and Bonanno underboss Carmine (Lillo) Galente for narcotics conspiracy in early 1960, the five New York crime families and a majority of the 27 crime families across the country have had a firm rule against its members' dealing in narcotics. The rule was invoked because of federal narcotics laws that had resulted in long jail terms for those convicted of dealing in narcotics. The decision to get out of the traffic did not stem from any moral concern for those who bought heroin but from a fear by the bosses that those arrested dealing narcotics might turn informer to lighten their jail terms. Informers, in turn, would endanger the structure of Cosa Nostra, its captains and its bosses, by talking about other criminal activities.

Before the narcotics ban, mentioned in 1963 by mob informer Joseph Valachi, the three major New York families dealing in drugs were those of Bonanno, Profaci and Colombo. The Gambino family dealt very sparingly in drugs and New England families did not handle them at all. Narcotics were sold mainly in ghettos to blacks. When the ban was imposed after Genovese's jailing, blacks and Puerto Ricans rushed into the vacuum. By the mid '60s, after a massive influx of Cubans to the area, that ethnic group cornered the New York market, with a paramilitary organization.

Recently, younger members of the Cosa Nostra anxious for the quick, large profits, have agitated for reentry into the trade. So far they have been held in check, at times violently.

But the outside profit has remained a temptation.

"The question of reentering the narcotics trade was proposed by the Natale Evola crime family," the source said. "Their history as the old Joseph Bonanno family was steeped in narcotics deals. They had the lines of communication from the U.S. to Canada to France through their Canadian members." The Canadian branch of the family, he said, now is a separate crime family controlled by Guiseppe Cotroni, identified before congressional investigating committees as a prominent narcotics trafficker.

The federal source said no firm decision was reached at the commission or at the consigliere meeting. "What is amazing was their reasoning for reentering the dope traffic," he said. Aside from the profit motive, "they felt that they would be doing a service to the country. They said that narcotics had become a widespread, national problem only after Cosa Nostra got out of the business. They had kept it in the ghettos; now it's in the suburbs because of other groups, including the blacks and Cubans who are the principal distributors and sellers."

The source said that commission members from New York wanted to meet with Santo Trafficante of Florida, because they believed he had close contacts with a criminal group known as the Corsicans, a Mafia-style organization that was formed on the Isle of Corsica and was known as "Unione Corsa." The Federal Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs and the U.S. State Department have said the Corsicans were the principal wholesalers and smugglers of heroin in Europe. A recent State Department survey said the Corsicans were an "ethnic group above all others that has controlled the heroin traffic in France." Investigators have found that opium shipped from Turkey, the largest source of raw opium, is smuggled into France for processing. West Germany also was cited as a major storage depot for stocks of smuggled opium and morphine.

The federal source said that between 1961 and 1968, Trafficante and his organization were in financial trouble. He said that in 1969, Trafficante made a trip to Hong Kong and then sent a courier to Saigon for a meeting with Corsican representatives. He said the Corsicans, in addition to their other involvement with drugs, were primarily responsible for supplying heroin to U.S. troops in Vietnam. The source said Trafficante then made a secret trip to Saigon to meet with Corsican representatives. The meeting, he said,

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HOUSTON, TEX.
CHRONICLE
AUG 2 6 1972
E - 303,041
S - 353,314

STATINTL

Drug war can't be limited

The federal government's antidrug campaign is showing encouraging results.

The Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs and the Customs Bureau seized 3966 pounds of heroin in the fiscal year ending in June, compared with 1651 in 1971; the total for heroin, morphine base, opium, cocaine, codeine-morphine and hashish was 26,144 in fiscal 1972 and 22,758 in 1971; for marijuana the total was 446,496 pounds in fiscal 1972, 218,905 in 1971.

Federal drug arrests increased from 12,947 in 1971 to 16,144 in 1972.

Federal task forces set up in 34 key cities, including Houston, have resulted in more than 1000 drug arrests and identification of about 3000 pushers since January.

Internal Revenue Service has seized $9.9 million in currency and property over the past year in income tax investigations aimed at possible bigtime drug operators.

Yet America's gains in the battle against drugs cannot be properly evaluated without considering the worldwide picture, which isn't too rosy.

A recent survey by the State Department, Central Intelligence Agency, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, Customs Bureau and the Treasury Department shows that the emphasis here and abroad on stopping the flow of illegal drugs has barely made a dent in international heroin traffic.

There are too many variables involved to find easy solutions to the problem worldwide.

In many countries the growing of opium poppies or the refining or smuggling of drugs is a traditional source of income. In many cases governments have been hesitant to interfere. Government indifference and corruption also play a part.

Applying pressure in one quarter too often means only an increase of activity in another. High profits continue to be a strong incentive.

The federal survey appears to be an honest but rather disturbing assessment of the world picture, and emphasizes the need for international cooperation to make internal control meaningful.

With an estimated 500,000 to 600,000 heroin addicts and the very real threat of seeing the blight spread to hundreds of others, including the young, America has a major role to play both in reducing the demand for drugs and in cutting off the supply.

For the past few years, the United States has been increasing its world involvement in fighting the drug traffic, by using its economic clout against offending nations, by stationing narcotics agents overseas and by participating in international efforts such as the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control.

The government statistics are enough to indicate that the antidrug campaign here is making a difference. President Nixon is seeking $135.2 million in supplemental funds for the campaign and is asking Congress to set up a new office of national narcotics intelligence in the Justice Department. Both are reasonable requests.

The only way to solve the complex problem is to keep fighting, and the United States is shouldering its responsibilities both internally and internationally. When all the other nations of the world do likewise, then there will be hope for curbing the activities of those who are contributing so much to human debasement.

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CINCINNATI, OHIO
HERALD
AUG 26 1972
WEEKLY - 17,500

[redacted]

STATINTL

OUR MAN IN WASHINGTON

A joint report recently released by the CIA, the State Department, and the Defense Department has admitted that "there is no prospect" of halting the smuggling of narcotics by air and sea from Southeast Asia into the United States "under any conditions that can realistically be projected."

This shocking admission contradicts the Nixon Administration's optimism with respect to its war against the illicit entry of opiates into the United States. In appalling frankness, this high-level report revealed the futility of stemming the influx of narcotics until the "allied" nations of Southeast Asia restrict the growth transportation, and refining of the opium plant. While the governments of South Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand are openly stating their willingness to continue to cooperate with American officials in stamping out the opium traffic, the fact is that opium traffic has become ingrained in the economic fabric of these countries to such an extent that the Asian authorities approach the enforcement of their anit-smuggling laws with a grin and a wink.

Yet the U.S. taxpayer, in his commitment to subsidize the governments of these impoverished nations, is indirectly supporting authorities in countries where the ssmuggling is widespread. Eighty to ninety percent of the opium traffic from the Orient is estimated to travel through Thailand, yet known refineries, says the report, dot the shore of this nation around the Gulf of Siam providing easy access to the trawlers which transport the refined opiates to Hong Kong and then point east, or to European ports.

While much is said about Turkey as a farmland for opium, the Asian nations of Thailand, Laos, and South Vietnam [illegible] the plant which infects the lives

Mr. Anderson

of so many Americans. Furthermore, American money has much more to say about what happens in these Asian nations which are so economically dependent upon American support. Nevertheless, although the CIA knows about the location of the opium fields, and although the CIA knows about the paramilitary Nationalist Chinese units which transport the opium through Thailand, and although the CIA constantly monitors the shipment of heroin out of the Thai ports, these governments ironically seem totally unable to stem the flow.

Needless to say, there must be many an American on the payroll of these smuggling organizations. Needless to say, there are dazzling profits to be reaped in this illegal business where the demand is incessant and where there are no taxes to pay. Needless to say, this admission by such a high level of American federal agencies is an alarming revelation of the weakness of a free nation which prides itself on the glories of entreprenvership. Certainly, this is not the type of unbridled capitalism which we are urging these Asian nations to maintain.

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STATINTL

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NEW YORK, N.Y.
POST

EVENING - 623,245
WEEKEND - 354,797
AUG 25 1972

By LINDSY VAN GELDER

Daily Closeup

HE ALMOST JOINED THEM

McCOY

For the first 17 years of his well-bred, accomplished life, Alfred McCoy was an eager recruit for the military establishment. "My fondest dream," he now recalls with irony, "was to go to West Point. But I had bad eyes."

The eyes are now encased in wire-rims, and Al McCoy is slumped in a chair in his publisher's office after a hard day on the talk-show circuit. The boy who wanted to be a cadet is today the author of "The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia," and the military establishment is not pleased.

McCoy's book—based on first-hand research in the Golden Triangle where Laos, Burma and Thailand converge, and where 70 per cent of the world's opium crop is farmed—concludes, among other things, that the American-supported governments of Southeast Asia "are deeply and lucratively involved in the growing, processing, transport and distribution of narcotics." He also accused the CIA of supporting such elements and charged that American aircraft have been "knowingly" used for the transport of narcotics.

* * *

As long as the U.S. continues to prop up these governments, he warns, there will be no pressure to end the drug trafficking; addicted GIs will continue to bring their habits home and Mafia syndicates who work hand-in-hand with the Asians will continue to flourish. "Indeed, in the final analysis," says the last sentence in the book, "the American people will have to choose between supporting doggedly anti-Communist governments in Southeast Asia or getting heroin out of their high schools"

Earlier this summer, the CIA contacted Harper & Row and demanded to see the book prior to publication. Over McCoy's objections; the publishers acceded, but were unconvinced by the CIA's charges that portions of the study were "totally false" and "distorted beyond recognition." The book was published with no changes, Harper & Row said.

Harper & Row also released a statement noting that McCoy "has supplied us with documentation for every material allegation of a controversial nature" and that the book had also been "read by independent authorities in the field. As a result, we are convinced that the work is scholarly and documented to an exceptional degree."

Alfred William McCoy was himself the son of a career Army officer, the late Alfred Mudge McCoy Jr., who was later director of the Defense Communications Satellite Program, and the author feels his research was aided by the fact that "I get on really well with military people. That's my upbringing." He came to Southeast Asia with "excellent contacts" and his interviews were conducted on the basis that he was doing a book about "politics" or "corruption." Only after talking for a while would he raise the subject of drugs.

Born in Concord, Mass. on June 8, 1945, McCoy came from a family that had distinguished itself in several fields. His mother, Margarita Piel McCoy ("You know Piel's Beer? That's the family") is now an urban planner with the University of Southern California and recently published a study showing that residents of Los Angeles' Watts ghetto pay proportionally more taxes than their more affluent suburban neighbors.

His sister, Margarita, is now a second-year law student at Harvard and an activist in women's liberation.

McCoy attended the prestigious Kent School in Connecticut, where "I was a jock," winning varsity letters in football, wrestling and rowing. He was of the freshman crew at Columbia, majored in Japanese and European history, and learned about anti-war politics first-hand in 1968 when SDS closed down the university.

Asked about his involvement in the Columbia dispute, McCoy offers a smiling "no comment" but he insists that his reporting on his current book was "unprejudiced" by his own political view of the war.

McCoy, who speaks "fair" Japanese and "reasonable" French, got his master's in Asian studies from Berkeley in 1969 and then went on to Yale.

He is currently living in a $70-a-month apartment in New Haven (he is separated from his wife, Cathleen B. Read, who was one of two researchers for the book) and is working on a Yale Ph.D. in Southeast Asian history. Research for the book took him away from his studies, and, he says, left him $1000 in debt.

A great deal of McCoy's investigation involved interviews with Asian government officials, some of whom, he remarks drily, "have tortured more people in their lifetime than I've shaken hands with." He also went into remote villages in the Golden Triangle, interviewed villagers, and on one occasion was fired on by troops.

* * *

On one occasion, he maintains, the CIA had maneuvered to cut off rice supplies to an opium-growing village in Laos that was "terribly embittered toward the Americans" because of the combat deaths of its young men. The village had declined to send more men into battle, and, according to McCoy, was being starved out:

"They were in that distended-stomach phase. Appalled, McCoy went to the media and "after all kinds of denials by officials, 1000 pounds of rice were flown in."

McCoy, who is also the co-editor of another book, "Laos: War and Revolution," (Also Harper & Row) has testified in Washington about his findings and plans to return to Southeast Asia after he receives his degree. "It's a dynamic part of the world," he explains.

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THE VANGUARD
(The viewpoint of the Communist Party of Australia)
24 Aug 1972

STATINTL

CIA accused of drug link

NEW YORK, August 16. —A book alleging that the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency helps international heroin traffickers is to be published this week — despite objections from the Government agency, which rarely breaks its silence.

The controversial manuscript by Alfred McKoy, a 27-year-old Yale graduate, was made available to the CIA and — despite its challenges — went to press without a word being changed, according to the publishers, Harper and Row.

Entitled **The Politics of Heroin in South-East Asia**, the book claims that many of the Government's and military men in South-East Asia are profitably involved in the production and transportation of drugs.

McKoy says they receive aid and support from the U.S. Government and its agencies, including the CIA.

The U.S. Government is involved in at least three ways, according to McKoy — ignoring the activity of known heroin traffickers, knowingly allowing American aircraft and crews to be subverted for the transport of heroin and opium, and allying with groups engaged in drug traffic.

Before publication, the CIA approached Harper and Row asking to read the manuscript. It said it could show that some of the claims about the agency's involvement were false or distorted and none was based on convincing evidence.

The publishers said they allowed the CIA to study the manuscript. 'Although no specific factual errors were cited, some of Mr. McKoy's sources were questioned and others flatly contradicted," Harper and Row said.

Brooks Taylor, vice-president of Harper and Row, said, "They tried to persuade us not to publish. On the basis of what they told us, they certainly hoped we would not publish."

In Washington, a CIA spokesman declined to comment on the book.

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WASHINGTON POST

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STATINTL

[redacted]

Spooking the First Amendment

The CIA Mounts an Operation on a Book

By Roger Wilkins

A FUNNY thing happened to author Alfred W. McCoy on the way to his publication date. He and his publisher, Harper & Row almost got spooked by the CIA in a gambit that does little credit to our secret overseas operatives. It seems that in his book, "The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia," Mr. McCoy argues that American diplomats and secret agents have been significantly involved in the narcotics traffic in the "golden triangle" of Laos, Thailand and Burma. The CIA, upon learning something of the content of the book, apparently decided that it had cause for the expression of some concern. As a result, the author alleges, the agency resorted to "extralegal measures" such as CIA visits to the publisher, telephone calls and letters in an attempt "to harass and intimidate me and my publisher."

I am not concerned with the accuracy of Mr. McCoy's text or his methods of scholarship. I do, however, wonder about the way in which the government expressed its interest in his work. Whether there were visits to the publisher or phone calls, as Mr. McCoy alleges, is not the point. It is clear that the general counsel of the CIA wrote and asked to see the book prior to publication. While he denied that the agency's interest affected in any way the publisher's right to publish, the general counsel went on to apply some heavy pressure, saying "it is our belief that no reputable publishing house would wish to publish such allegations without being assured that the supporting evidence was valid."

HARPER & ROW, for its part, told the agency that it desired to publish the book but also to "live up to the traditions and responsibilities of a great publishing house as we see them." Overriding the author's protests, the publisher decided to submit the book for an unusual pre-publication review by the CIA. A source at Harper & Row reports that the agency wrote the firm saying that it could "prove beyond doubt" that McCoy's facts were wrong. After reviewing the book, the agency attempted, in an 11-page critique, to demonstrate that the author's evidence did not support his assertions. Apparently, after reviewing the CIA critique, Harper & Row decided the agency



had not proved its case. "They just didn't do it," the source reports. So, the book will see the light of day.

Unfortunately, this is neither the government's nor the CIA's first venture into the murky business of attempting to impose pre-publication restraints on the words and ideas the citizens of this country are to read and consider. The Justice Department's thrust against the Pentagon Papers is still fresh in memory. And the CIA has a rich history in this business. In recent years, the agency has flitted from Random House to Putnam to courtrooms and to Harper & Row trying to influence what the rest of us do or don't read about the CIA.

But the agency cannot have it both ways. It cannot hide away in the woods when it pleases and then tell the mirrors of the world what to show when it becomes edgy. Its message to Harper & Row was especially pernicious. While disclaiming any intention to inhibit publication, the agency suggested more than once that no reputable or responsible publisher would want to publish a book without first validating the facts. And then the agency offered itself as chief validator. I am not sure whether the publisher needed to go as far as submitting the galley proofs of the book to the CIA for pre-publication review in order to ascertain the agency's views or whether, indeed, that decision was entirely wise. But to its credit, Harper & Row resisted the pressures and retained the ultimate publishing judgment.

THAT IS all to the good, for the CIA, in offering its services as ultimate validator of the author's source material, was dangling a lure that leads down the path to acquiescence in censorship. If Clifford Irving's caper taught us anything, it was that the publisher has ultimate responsibility for checking the validity of the material he proposes to publish. It is clear that the publisher upon learning that serious questions have been raised about the reliability of material it has on hand, should at least talk the questions over with any responsible doubter.

But finally, the responsibility rests with the publisher, it cannot and should not be shifted to any other party, particularly not to a secret agency of the government. Any other course would lead to the erosion of a publisher's most precious right, the first amendment right of free speech, which is his only guarantee of his ability to promote the free flow of information and ideas throughout society, and our only guarantee as well.

[redacted]

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[redacted]

STATINTL

August 21, 1972 STATINTL

Mr. William B. Ray, Chief
Complaints and Compliance Di
Broadcast Bureau
F.C.C.
Washington, D. C. 20554

Dear Mr. Ray:

On July 28, 1972, NBC presented in its Chronolog series a documentary on the narcotics traffic in Southeast Asia.

We have analyzed this program and have concluded that it fails to meet the Fairness Doctrine requirement that the licensee provide a balanced presentation of all sides in programming that deals with controversial issues of public importance. We therefore wish to file a complaint of violation of the fairness doctrine against all NBC-owned and affiliated stations that carried the program.

There appear to be three principal controversial issues involved in the NBC documentary.

1. The documentary dealt with the question of whether or not America's allies in Southeast Asia--Thailand, Laos and Vietnam--are important sources of supply of heroin for the American market.

2. It discussed the charges that U. S. Government agencies have been involved in assisting those who are trafficking in narcotics in Southeast Asia and the accusation that our Government has not been aggressive in fighting the traffic because we did not want to do anything to hinder the war effort.

3. It discussed charges that the Governments of Thailand, Vietnam and Laos are not cooperating adequately in combatting the narcotics traffic, charges that have led to legislative proposals that aid to these countries be terminated.

Our analysis suggests that all of these issues were deliberately treated in a manner that was intended to lead the viewer to the conclusion that American allies in Southeast Asia were important sources of heroin for the American market, that the governments of Thailand, Laos and Vietnam were not cooperating adequately in putting down the traffic and that U. S. agencies were themselves involved in supporting the traffic.

Moreover, we find that NBC has managed to give support to these conclusions and to avoid presenting evidence that would lead to contrary conclusions by its news programming. For example, perhaps the largest amount of opium ever deliberately destroyed was burned in Thailand on March 7, 1972 by the Thai Government. This event was not reported on the NBC evening TV news program at that time. Never-

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NEWSWEEK
21 AUG 1972
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Sparks or Sputters?

A Washington drawing room was the scene last year of an unlikely encounter between poet Allen Ginsberg and Richard Helms, director of the Central Intelligence Agency. The subject of the post-poetry-reading confrontation was opium—and Ginsberg insisted that the CIA was deeply involved in shipping it around Southeast Asia. So totally false did Helms consider the accusation that he agreed to a fascinating bet with the poet: Helms promised that he would sit down for an hour of meditation each day for the rest of his life if the charges were proved correct.

The same accusations—true or not—boiled again last week. This time, the CIA, which almost never takes a public stand on any issue, clashed with the respected publishing firm of Harper & Row. At issue is a book—"The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia"—in which author Alfred W. McCoy presents a heavily documented argument that the CIA has assisted in the flow of opium and its by-product, heroin. The CIA challenged the book before publication, and Harper & Row reluctantly allowed the agency to peruse the galleys. Then, despite a list of objections specified by the CIA, Harper & Row announced that it was satisfied that the book was sound and would publish it this week—a month ahead of schedule.

McCoy, a 26-year-old Yale graduate student, first made his accusations during Congressional testimony in June. McCoy charged that because drug traffic is such a local custom in Asia—and U.S. allies, from guerrillas to government officials, are so deeply involved—the CIA not only overlooks their dealings, but sometimes even helps them transport opium and heroin. Soon afterward, the CIA's general counsel, Lawrence Houston, wrote to Harper & Row: "We believe we cannot stand by and see baseless criticism ... without trying to set the record straight."

After considerable deliberation, Harper & Row sent the agency a set of galleys. Seven days later, the CIA weighed in with a lengthy critique—which Harper & Row editors judged rather light. B. Brooks Thomas, vice president and general counsel of the publishing house, then replied to Houston: "We believe the best service we can render the author, the CIA and the general public is to publish the book as expeditiously as possible, and that is what we intend to do." Privately, the Harper & Row lawyer commented, "We were underwhelmed by their criticism."

Why did the CIA—usually the most silent of government agencies—take on Harper & Row so publicly? One agency insider observed that McCoy's charges had been made before—mostly in underground or fringe publications. "But what I think has got the backs up around here," he suggested, "is that the charges are now showing up in Harper's magazine and in a Harper & Row book. That is hitting where these people live," he said, gesturing around him at CIA headquarters. "These are people with vast contacts in the academic community and government. They can't let this ridiculous falsehood be accepted as fact."

McCoy is content to let readers make up their own minds. "I had hoped that my work would be interesting enough to spark a public debate," he says. "Now the CIA, by attempting to suppress the book, has itself sparked the debate." Still, there is no indication that CIA director Helms has been convinced by the book's charges; he has not disclosed any plans to begin daily meditations.

John Everingham—DNSI



Robert R. McElroy—Newsweek

McCoy interviewing Laotians, and his provocative book

STATINTL

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GRAND RAPIDS, MICH.
PRESS

E - 133,419
S - 138,539
AUG 2 0 1972

STATINTL

Censorship by Fear?

A young man named Alfred W. McCoy has written a book, "The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia," in which he charges—as he did in a congressional hearing in June—that the Central Intelligence Agency has assisted in the flow of opium out of Southeast Asia.

When the CIA got word that Harper & Row, one of the country's most respected and careful publishers, announced that it was publishing the book, the CIA wrote the company that it could not "stand by and see baseless criticism . . . without trying to set the record straight."

After considerable deliberation, Harper & Row sent the CIA galley proofs of the book. A week later the CIA replied in a lengthy rebuttal that, in the words of a Harper & Row lawyer, left the publisher "underwhelmed."

McCoy has regarded the actions of the CIA in this case as an attempt to suppress his book. That may be too strong a statement; but it is hard to believe that the CIA wasn't trying at least to intimidate author and publisher and persuade them to tone down McCoy's charges.

In any event, it should be considered an obnoxious procedure on the part of any federal agency to attempt to censor a book of this nature before publication.

The CIA's intervention in this instance brings to mind the experience of another publisher with a book that recently has appeared, Winter-Berger's "Washington Payoff." Grove Press was to publish the book. It had its own legal authorities check it thoroughly for authenticity before deciding to take it on. Grove Press books are distributed by Random House. That organization decided, for reasons it has not disclosed, to refuse to distribute it. Lyle Stuart, who has made a fortune publishing controversial books, took on "Washington Payoff" and it has been selling at a lively clip. And so far there have been no libel suits.

The question here is whether some kind of silent censorship or intimidation led Random House to back out. The possibility that federal agencies and officials may be attempting by either subtle or overt means to prevent the publication of books that show them in an unfavorable light ought to be of deep concern to every American. It is through such efforts that dictatorships begin and perpetuate themselves.

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THE HOUSTON POST
20 AUG 1972

STATINTL

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STATINTL

Smuggling? Yes; collusion? No

Despite its full commitment to the fight against the narcotics trade, the CIA runs into continual accusations of engaging in the traffic itself.

The accusations center around Air America, an airline operating in Vietnam and Laos and into the "Golden Triange" where 70 per cent of the world's illicit opium is produced.

It is an open secret that Air America was covertly established by the U.S. government to provide safe and adequate air services in a part of the world where commercial carriers provided neither.

The capital to start it was funneled through the CIA, which still serves as a funding mechanism for operating costs, but it is a semi-autonomous organization whose employes are all civilians under contract to the airline and not to the CIA or the U.S. government.

AIR AMERICA RUNS scheduled flights throughout Vietnam and Laos, and it is used by all manner of passengers with official travel orders.

In Laos, it is also used on a charter basis to support the irregular war effort against the North Vietnamese, transporting supplies, equipment and food as well as advisers and the Meo tribesmen and their families from hilltop airstrip to hilltop airstrip.

Throughout the "Golden Triangle" — which is beyond all formal administration, no matter what the lines on the map say — no currency has much value, and raw opium serves as the basis of what passes for an economy.

The CIA does not and never has paid its assets in it and does not and never has dealt in it. The tribesmen with whom the CIA works, however, do deal in it, and raw opium in small amounts has undoubtedly moved on Air America flights in the bundles of Meo personal possessions.

AIR AMERICA WILL stop this when it can, but it isn't easy. No U.S. airline, for example, has yet discovered how to prevent even shotguns from being smuggled aboard their flights. The problem is in any event inconsequential, since the amounts are small and destined for use only as currency in Meo village barter.

Far more serious is the problem of ranking Laotian diplomats and military notables who smuggle large quantities of opium and heroin out of Laos and into the world market.

The diplomats are immune to search when they travel, and an Air America employe — a resident alien in Laos — would be on a sticky wicket if he tried to search the luggage of a senior Laotian official in Laos itself.

The responsibility, moreover, is not that of the airline but of the customs service in the country of arrival. Here again, diplomatic luggage is immune to search, as are certain official aircraft used by the military, and a country that insists on an illegal search had better find what it is looking for.

THE JULY HARPER'S magazine features an extract from the forthcoming book "The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia," by Yale Ph.D. student Alfred McCoy. The extract starts with a detailed description of the arrival at Orly Airport in Paris on 25 April 1971 of Prince Sopsaisana, the new Laotian ambassador to France.

Despite the presence of a large reception party, the prince insisted on waiting for his numerous official suitcases like an ordinary tourist, and when they arrived he at once noticed one was missing. He angrily demanded that it be produced, but was forced to depart with the promise that it would be delivered to the Laotian embassy as soon as it was found.

The suitcase contained 132 pounds of pure heroin. France refused to accept Sopsaisana's credentials, and he had to return to Laos.

The gist of McCoy's article is that the drug trade in the "Golden Triangle" flourishes with CIA support. His argument runs:

- All the leading figures in Laos are deeply involved in the drug trade.
- The CIA works closely with many of these figures.
- Ergo, the CIA is supporting the drug trade.

While the first two statements are correct, the conclusion is not valid and is not borne out by any evidence.

McCoy might, for example, have asked who tipped the French government off to this particular shipment. Customs officials do not take it upon themselves to search an ambassador's luggage. Authority for that can only come from the highest levels, and takes days to arrange.

The Orly officials, moreover, knew precisely which suitcase to sequester. They removed the right piece of luggage and let the rest go in a matter of minutes, obviously before there had been any chance to search all of them. In short they had heard from Vietiane exactly what to look for, and this tip did not come from the Laotian government.

The U.S. government, through the State Department and the CIA, is doing all it can to scotch the trade. The government of South Vietnam has had impressed on it that collusion between its customs officials and arriving smugglers is a serious matter, and it has arrested both its own citizens and halted and searched ranking foreigners.

In short, neither the CIA nor any other U.S. agency has ever deliberately engaged in, fostered or cast a deliberately blind eye on narcotics smuggling, although it has worked in other fields with officials who have been privately active in that one.

Raw opium has undoubtedly been transported on Air America flights in the past, but only as a private venture of a foreign passenger, and never with the connivance of an Air America employe. And the CIA has done what it can to prevent the use of Air America for such purposes.

The stories will no doubt continue, as long as there is a need for air services in Indochina, and as long as opium holds the peculiar place it does in the economy of that part of the world. But the stories must be seen in perspective, and in no way will they support the contention that the U.S. government, through the activities of the CIA, has deliberately furthered the international narcotics trade.

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ROANOKE, VA.
TIMES
AUG 21 1972
E - 49,146

[redacted] STAT INTL

Misdirections in War on Drugs

There have been only a few brave individuals in Congress willing to take on the whole of the Nixon Administration's war on international drug trafficking.

The reasons are obvious. No one in his right mind wants to be placed in the category of being pro-heroin, and on the surface, the opposition of Rep. Robert Steele, R-Conn., and a few others would appear to be a misjudgment. In addition, the complexities of the traffic are so great that one has to know his facts before venturing any opinion; those who couldn't even follow the plot line of "The French Connection" would be totally lost after one pass at the real world of drug trade.

But the opposition has some good points, and it turns out that Rep. Steele and the others are not, after all, suggesting that addiction can be fun. What they are suggesting is that the administration's 18-month-old drug trade abatement program may be both self-defeating and aimed in the wrong direction, toward European labs and Turkish sources.

It is self-defeating, some of the critics say, because if the flow of heroin into this country is appreciably slowed, it will only guarantee that the price for the commodity will rise and that a price rise, in turn, will cause more drug-related crimes.

There is no answer to this objection except the British system of drug-maintenance for addicts. A law professor at Stanford, Herbert Packer, mainttains that decriminalization of heroin and related activities would dry up the tremendous profits in drugs overnight. That may be an exaggeration; but the British solution would make such trade and sales less profitable. However, the strain of Puritanism in America, which would equate such a drug maintenance program as trafficking with the Devil, runs strong enough to make prospects for such a program dim for the foreseeable future.

The second charge—that the U.S. program is misdirected, is based on the contention that the Nixon efforts are largely overlooking the tremendous role of Southeast Asia in the international heroin picture. Alfred McCoy, a student of Southeast Asian history at Yale, makes the case (in a book excerpted in Harper's magazine) that the greatest potential source of heroin is the "Golden Triangle" of Burma, Thailand and Laos. He claims, also, that the CIA, in its long struggle to organize the tribesmen of Laos in a counter-insurgency war, has provided the logistics for vastly increased heroin traffic and has refused to admit the terrible implications of that traffic because some of its most important "clients" are making profit from that traffic.

The Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs has admitted, belatedly, that there is some truth in the McCoy argument. In a recent secret report that leaked out, the agency says that the Southeast Asian heroin sources are larger than previously thought and that there is evidence that the potential of the "Golden Triangle" is not being lost on organized crime. That area has produced as much as 70 per cent of the annual production of opium, the source of heroin; and if the CIA continues to build airfields and prop up corrupt local generals, production might even increase.

The administration should be listening to the voices of dissent. Drug trafficking, like prostitution, is not so much rooted out as temporarily inconvenienced. If the demand continues, the administration had better face up to some of the real problems of pinched supply.

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THE HOUSTON POST
20 AUG 1972
STAT INTL

[redacted]

CIA helps to curb, not aid, dope trade

By DONALD R. MORRIS
Post News Analyst

It is still not common knowledge that in 1971 President Nixon ordered the CIA to join the fight against the international narcotics trade, or that, according to John E. Ingersoll, director of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, "much of the progress we are now making in identifying overseas traffic can, in fact, be attributed to CIA cooperation."

It seems, at first glance, a strange choice. The CIA has no executive powers at home or abroad, and no expertise in narcotics or in criminal police work. Why, then, was it deployed on this particular firing line, and what contribution has it made?

The answers can be found in the complex nature of the drug trade.

Most of the world's raw opium originates in Turkey or in the "Golden Triangle" of the Burma-Thailand-Laos border. Tightly organized and constantly changing channels bring it to such diverse areas as Vientiane, Bangkok, Hong Kong or Marseille for processing, and equally complex routes via still other countries bring it to the borders of America.

The current attack on the trade is two-pronged: By diplomatic pressures to reduce raw opium and finished heroin production, and, since production can never be eliminated entirely, to increase the effectiveness of the U.S. Customs Bureau by timely forewarning of specific smuggling shipments.

None of the countries touched by the trade can do this alone. The Turkish government can move against raw opium production; French, British and Thai police can crack down on processing and smuggling, with varying degrees of success.

Some powerless

Some countries can do little or nothing; the opium areas in Burma and Thailand are controlled by autonomous insurgent groups depending on the opum for economic survival, while no government in Laos —there are several — has any real control over the landscape. Other countries, used for transhipment, may not be aware of what is going on.

But, sophisticated or not, what these countries cannot do is coordinate their activities, because with the best will in the world the liaison mechanisms on the proper levels do not exist.

The French police, for example, can be as effective as any in the world. But if they are operating against a processing installation in Marseille with an input from Izmir, they simply cannot get in touch with the local Turkish police to coordinate their plans. They have neither the funds, manpower, nor charter to do so. They can only report within their own government, until at the proper level their information is passed to the Turks through diplomatic channels, after which it must filter down on the other side.

The CIA is made to order to broker such exchanges. CIA stations and bases throughout the world have direct liaison contact with local security forces, and they maintain a superb communications network. The agency can serve as a link between countries and organizations which have never been in touch with each other before, and which would have formidable problems if they tried, passing timely and accurate intelligence to the exact level where it is required.

The CIA also can collect operational intelligence on the sprawling ramifications of the trade, especially in countries which cannot do this for themselves.

From raw production through processing to the final smuggling attempt, a narcotics chain may involve scores of people in a dozen countries, and because security is at apremium, its organization parallels that of a clandestine intelligence network.

The techniques employed to penetrate both are identical, and the CIA's stock-in-trade is its skill in spotting, developing, recruiting and managing agent assets for the collection of intelligence.

The French and the British, of course, can do this work themselves, and CIA entry into their domestic criminal work is out of the question. Other, less developed countries, however, cannot manage such activities themselves without the training that CIA liaison can provide.

The CIA also has the requisite headquarters establishment to support and coordinate such a world-wide program, setting up and maintaining the multi-national files involved, running traces and analyzing and collecting the raw information so that finished intelligence can be passed to appropriate authorities for action.

The CIA does serve to fund Air America, but it cannot practicably detect all the narcotics taken aboard, some by immune high officials

Coordination

The CIA, in fact, probably is the only organization in the world that can do such a job, and it has recently established a special headquarters branch to coordinate the work. The field stations were long ago ordered into the battle.

One of the first fruits of CIA labor has been a lengthy report to the Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control, which promises to become the guide book on which the fight will rest.

In considerable detail it covers the entire world opium situation country by country, tracing out licit and illicit opium production, processing and distribution, as well as summarizing the problems faced by the individual countries and the multilateral control efforts. The report is unclassified.

continued

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STATINTL
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DAYTON, OHIO
JOURNAL HERALD
AUG 19 1972
M - 111,867

Drug Failure

. . . heroin addiction rises despite curbs

Heroin addiction in the United States continues to increase despite the efforts of the federal government to halt the flow of the drug into this country, a federal study discloses.

"The rising level of seizures (of smuggled heroin)," the report states, "still represents only a small fraction of the illicit flow." This is hardly surprising when one realizes that any diminution in the supply of the drug increases its price, which already is high. A kilogram of heroin purchased for $5,000 in Marseilles sells for about $220,000 in New York. Such profits encourage a seemingly endless number of entrepreneurs to assume the risks involved in heroin traffic.

The very success of efforts to curb the traffic tends to make the ultimate goal of stopping the traffic more difficult to achieve. Drug seizures rose from 1,161 pounds in fiscal year 1971 to 1,626 pounds in fiscal year 1972, and arrests by federal agents rose from 12,947 to 16,144 in the same period. The net result seemed to be to increase the price of heroin and to stimulate traffic in the drug.

This paradox might be only marginally significant except for two very ugly side effects of heroin traffic: rampant crime committed by addicts to obtain money for drugs, and the wholesale corruption of law enforcement authorities—at every level of government. The dimensions of police corruption revealed by the Knapp Commission in New York City alone are enormous and frightening in their implications for public safety. Drug-related crimes, chiefly burglaries and armed robberies, are helping to make areas of some of the nation's cities almost unlivable.

This sordid picture, we believe, is the inevitable result of a national policy of attempting to control narcotics by prohibiting them. However well intentioned, that course seems self-defeating. Heroin must be brought out into the open, where it can be controlled by laws regulating its manufacture, its uses and its sale. This would eliminate the enormous profits that grow out of attempts to suppress heroin.

The federal study by the State Dept., Central Intelligence Agency, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, Customs Bureau and the Treasury Dept. is a sharp indictment of the futility of current policy and, by implication, it is an eloquent plea for a new approach.

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Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01

WASHINGTON STAR

19 AUG 1972

[redacted]

STATINTL

SECRET VS. PUBLIC

U. S. Drug Reports Differ

By MICHAEL SATCHELL
Star-News Staff Writer

While secret intelligence reports over the past 18 months have presented a gloomy assessment of America's worldwide efforts to hamper international narcotics trafficking, the White House and the Justice Department have carefully fostered the opposite image — that the government was making significant gains in the fight against opium, heroin and cocaine smuggling.

In speeches and press releases, officials heralded Turkey's agreement to halt opium poppy production, the increased cooperation with foreign governments and record seizures of narcotics as hard evidence that the battle was well on its way to being won.

Dr. Jerome Jaffe, special consultant to the president on narcotics, and John E. Ingersoll, head of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, called them "major breakthroughs" and "milestones in the cooperative effort with foreign governments."

Thursday, the government released a report entitled "World Opium Survey, 1972" that reflected in part what intelligence networks had been saying for months.

But while the report acknowledged that things were not as rosy as pictured earlier, it still glossed over most of the facts and conclusions contained in Central Intelligence Agency and BNDD summaries that suggest the United States has only touched the tip of the world narcotics problem.

These summaries, stamped "Secret, No Foreign Dissemination," survey narcotics production and smuggling throughout Asia, Europe, Central and South America.

They detail widespread complicity by officials in several countries, suggest "extra-legal" actions the United States could consider, emphasize that the Turkish agreement will have little effect on the U.S. heroin problem, note that Vietnam war requirements have hampered the narcotics fight, and conclude that the massive effort by the United States and other nations has had little real permanent effect on the complex narcotics trade.

Among the major points in the summaries:

- Prohibiting the growth of opium poppies in Turkey is no guarantee against illegal cultivation, which has been around 100 tons a year.
- The Turkish agreement will have minimal impact on well established European smuggling pipelines that will easily switch from Turkey to Yugoslavia, Persia and Afghanistan for opium supplies.
- "Extra-legal actions such as flooding markets with harmless or aggravating heroin substitutes to destroy the trade's credibility, destruction of narcotics factories by hiring criminal or non-official elements, pay-offs of corrupted officials as an income substitute, and defoliation, are highly problematical, but should not be rejected out of hand."
- The trade cannot flourish without corrupt civil servants and police in key positions. In the "Bulgarian Customs Game" for example, government officials sell to French traffickers opium that Bulgarian customs officials have confiscated from smugglers. The smugglers often pay small fines and can even buy back their own narcotics seized earlier.
- Despite increased narcotics seizures, no critical shortage has been observed on the illicit market.
- The probability of eliminating the trade in cocaine — currently the fastest growing hard narcotic used in the United States — is nil.

The CIA and BNDD intelligence summaries spell out in vivid detail the enormous problems facing the United States in trying to curtail the highly organized and immensely profitable international narcotics trade.

Illicit opium production, for example, is estimated at something between 1,200 and 1,400 tons each year. To produce enough heroin to satisfy American addicts and users, only 40 tons of opium are required.

Turkish opium was furnishing about 80 percent of the heroin destined for the United States, with the remainder coming in from Mexico and a small amount from the Golden Trangle area of Laos-Thai-

The CIA reports state that in Burma, the most important nation in the Golden Triangle and which produces about 460 tons of opium annually, the United States is virtually impotent in its enforcement opportunities.

"Opportunities to exert influence are extremely limited," the reports say. "Lack of U.S. leverage suggests the best hope lies with the United Nations. Burmese customs and military officials are reported in collusion with smugglers."

In neighboring Thailand, the reports state, "officials of the Royal Thai Army and Customs at the several checkpoints along the route to Bangkok are usually bribed and 'protection' fees prepaid by the smuggling syndicate or by the driver at the checkpoints."

In the Vientiane to Hong Kong pipieline, the CIA summaries report, "most of it is probably smuggled aboard military or commercial air flights including Royal Air Laos and Air Vietnam, often by or in collusion with the crew."

In recent years, the Golden Triangle area has begun to produce finished heroin products for shipment rather than simply raw opium or morphine base from which the heroin is made.

"The technology of refining opium into heroin is no more complex than making bootleg whisky in the United States," a CIA report says, countering the popular image of complicated heroin "laboratories."

Pressure in Europe is creating shifts in smugling patterns with West Germany emerging as a major narcotics storage and staging area with Munich, Frankfurt and Hamburg the principal centers.

The role of Bulgaria in recent years has "increased tremendously" and the Communist nation is used as safe haven from which major narcotics operations are directed.

"Sofia has been described as the new center for directing narcotics and arms trafficking between western Europe and the Near East," the reports state. "French and United Kingdom officials have also voiced their belief that Bulgarian government officials may be actively involved in selling seized Turkish narcotics to French traffickers."

As South America emerges as an important transshipment pint for narcotics entering the United States, there are indications of increased production of opium poppies in some Latin countries including the Columbia-Equador border and Costa Rica.

Cuban exiles and Puerto Rican nationals are playing key roles in the trade and production is switching from marijuana to the more profitable cocaine and heroin.

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STATINTL

QUINCY, MASS.
PATRIOT LEDGER
AUG 19 1972
E - 65,785

GLOBAL CONNECTION

Two U.S. government reports released this week show the size and complexity of the drug problem and point to some gloomy conclusions about the effectiveness of attempts to control it.

A "World Opium Survey, 1972," put together by the State Department, Central Intelligence Agency, Bureau of Narcotics, Customs Bureau and Treasury, found that the international heroin market, controlled by international criminal "cartels," continued to have enough heroin to supply the world's users despite increasing crackdowns and seizures. A minimum of 200 tons of opium (from which heroin is refined) were estimated on the world market in 1971; in the same year, about one-tenth of that amount was seized by law-enforcement agencies world wide. This year, seizures are running somewhat higher than last year.

The report estimated that 100 kilograms of heroin, representing an investment of less than $300,000 to the French Corsicans who control the European trade, would ultimately sell for $22 million on the streets of New York.

Although efforts are under way to control the growing of the opium poppy, notably in Turkey, the report said those efforts are unlikely to be successful in various areas unless accompanied by "serious changes in a number of long-standing social and economic traditions."

An illustration of the complexities involved in the opium trade is the case of the Meo hill tribesmen of Laos. The Meo tribesmen have been an important force in the U.S. effort to support the Laotian government in its war with the Communists. On the other hand, the principal cash crop of the Meo is the opium poppy.

The other report this week was on an investigation by the Government Accounting Office of drug abuse control programs in the U.S. military services. The report found that although the Defense Department has actively cooperated in the enforcement of laws against drug trafficking, there is no way of telling whether its drug education programs are effective.

The study suggested that enforcement crackdowns may have contributed to the replacement in the drug trade of marijuana, which is bulky and easily detected by smell, by more dangerous drugs such as heroin.

And, said the report, military programs offering exemptions from prosecution for drug users who voluntarily turned themselves in for treatment had resulted largely in confusion, distrust and resentment among both troops and their immediate superiors. Further, said the accounting office, rehabilitation programs for drug users have met with very limited success.

The conclusions to be drawn are as familiar as they are cheerless: the drug problem is a reflection of deep and complex problems in the modern world, and most of our attempts to deal with it to date have been hasty, shallow and insufficient.

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DAILY WORLD
18 AUG 1972

STATINTL

[redacted]

Free (drug) enterprise

Perusal of news dispatches about the Federal "World Opium Survey 1972" discloses several deficiencies in the report.

It does not deal with the role of the Central Intelligence Agency in conspiring in the opium traffic in the "golden triangle" in Burma, Thailand, and Laos. That CIA role is dealt with in detail in Alfred W. McCoy's "The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia," published yesterday by Harper & Row.

The Survey is, thus, a coverup for the CIA's drug operations.

The Survey does not deal with the drug traffic in Saigon where several of President Thieu's generals are major operators. That traffic has been protected by the U.S. command. One consequence has been the massive drug addiction among GIs, addiction which has returned to the U.S. with them.

The Survey reveals one useful consequence of President Nixon's visit to Peking. For years the U.S. Narcotics Bureau, and Harry Anslinger, its chief, carried on a slanderous war against the Peoples Republic of China as the main source of the world's opium traffic. The present report admits, in effect, that that was a lie. There is "no reliable evidence that China has either engaged in or sanctioned the illicit export of opium or its derivatives," it says.

The Survey concedes that, world-wide, government "seizures... represent only a small fraction of the illicit flow."

The obvious conclusion is that the flow of opium through the capitalist world is made possible by massive corruption of government officials, police agents, etc.

The inspiration for the massive business in opium is the same one that inspires other business — profit. In this respect, it is a shining example of "free enterprise."

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STATINTL

[redacted]

MIAMI, FLA.
NEWS

E - 93,538
AUG 17 1972

CIA asked publisher not to print heroin-link book

Reuters News Service

NEW YORK — A book alleging that the CIA helps international heroin traffickers was released today — despite objections from the government agency which rarely breaks its silence.

The controversial manuscript by Alfred W. McCoy, a 27-year-old Yale graduate student in history, was made available to the CIA and, despite its challenges, went to press without a word being changed, according to the publishers, Harper and Row.

Entitled "The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia," the book claims that much of the government and military in Southeast Asia are profitably involved in the production and transportation of narcotics.

McCoy says that they receive aid and support from the U.S. government and its agencies, including the CIA.

The U.S. government is involved in at least three ways, according to McCoy: ignoring the activity of known heroin traffickers, knowingly allowing American aircraft and crews to be subverted for the transport of heroin and opium, and allying with groups engaged in drug traffic.

Book Topics

Before publication, the CIA approached Harper and Row asking to read the manuscript. It said it could show that some of the claims on the agency's involvement were false or distorted and none was based on "convincing evidence."

The publishers said they allowed the CIA to peruse the manuscript. "Although no specific factual errors were cited, some of Mr. McCoy's sources were questioned and others flatly contradicted," Harper and Row said.

Brooks Taylor, vice president of Harper and Row, said the CIA merely objected to the book and in no way tried to censor publication.

"They tried to persuade us not to publish. On the basis of what they told us, they certainly hoped we would not publish," he told Reuter.

In Washington, a CIA spokesman declined to comment on the publication. CIA Director Richard Helms told a newspaper editors' meeting last year "there is this arrant nonsense, for example, that the Central Intelligence Agency is involved in the world drug trade. We are not.

"We are heavily engaged in tracing the foreign route of the drug traffic for the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs. We hope we are helping with a solution. We know we are not contributing to the problem."

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THE VILLAGE VOICE
17 August 1972

STATINTL

Victory over the CIA

Dear Sir:

Although one has the feeling that to respond to Nat Hentoff's recent column about Harper & Row allowing the CIA to see a book prior to publication (Voice, August 10) is only to encourage him to even more dubious efforts, the enormity of his assertions and their potential impact on the author community compel me to put Harper's side on the record at least once.

Stripped of its rhetoric, Hentoff's article boils down to the assertions that Harper & Row "surrendered" to "pressure" from the CIA by giving it the opportunity to see the book prior to publication (which Hentoff says is the same as giving them the power to revise it), and that the publisher unfairly persuaded the author into going along with its point of view despite his own feelings to the contrary.

Hentoff's claim that what is involved here is prior restraint is a classic exercise in bootstrap logic. Although he admits that the CIA's request (which he has apparently not seen, although everyone else has, and which is not, as he says, "confidential") is only for permission to *review* the book, he nevertheless asserts that "what the CIA is after, the wording of the letter makes clear, is permission to *revise*." Later in his article he escalates this to "an attempt at prior restraint (review)."

Since the real nature of the CIA's request (demand) is central to the issue, I will quote from it: "In the light of the pernicious nature of the drug traffic, allegations concerning involvement of the U. S. government therein or the participation of American citizens should be made only if based on hard evidence. It is our belief that no reputable publishing house would wish to publish such allegations without being assured that the supporting evidence was valid . . . we believe that we could demonstrate to you that a considerable number of Mr. McCoy's claims about this agency's alleged involvement are totally false and without foundation, a number are distorted beyond recognition, and none is based on convincing evidence."

Clearly what is involved here is not a threat but a request, not an attempt to revise but an offer to prove matters which, if they *could* be proven, might well lead both publisher and author to make changes of their own free will. To refuse even to entertain such an offer seems to us egoistic and irresponsible. We do not want to play God with men's lives, or even with their reputations. Although we have great confidence in the author and in the book, we do not find it utterly inconceivable that someone else may know something we don't. This is simply a matter of intellectual honesty; to convert it into some form of political surrender is an exercise in knee-jerk paranoia.

As everyone knows by now, the CIA did submit their comments, which we and the author carefully considered and rejected as wholly unpersuasive. The book is being published this week without a word changed. And yet Hentoff bridles at calling this a victory. We gave away, he says, a full adversary proceeding in a court of law which would have protected the author's rights and the public's as well. Yet it was just such a proceeding that we sought to avoid or, failing that, win, by making the book available voluntarily.

We are in the business of publishing books, not litigating with the CIA. Whatever it may do for the ego, such litigation is enormously expensive for both author and publisher, and it can tie up publication for months and even years. The CIA could commence an action whether we let them see the book or not, and the moment the issue was joined the Court could, and probably would, have let them see the book anyway. One of the reasons for volunteering the book was in the hope of avoiding such expense and delay by convincing the CIA that they had no case for court action. Another was to put us in the strongest possible position should the CIA go to court anyway (in which case we would have fought them to the limit. It seems rather ungenerous to fault this strategy for having paid off, as it appears to have done.

But, says Hentoff, there is the "chilling effect" to consider. Just what got chilled in this case? What difference did it make that the CIA saw the book three weeks earlier than it otherwise would have? This is not a series of newspaper exposes where future sources might dry up. And the CIA can intimidate past sources just as well after publication as before, even assuming they need our copy of the manuscript to do it.

I am not saying there is no such thing as a "chilling effect." I am only saying that its importance must be judged on the circumstances of each individual case, and weighed in the balance against the danger of pursuing the opposite course. In this case I believe the danger of "chill" was much less than the danger of publishing serious allegations which might turn out to be unsupportable. I believe that the action of the Freedom to Read Committee, which Hentoff criticizes, was based on a recognition of the delicacy of this balance. Hentoff's simplistic analysis does not, of course, even admit the existence of the problem.

Finally, Hentoff scores Harper & Row for having successfully persuaded the author to go along with its point of view. It does not take much reading between the lines to perceive that what he really resents is the notion that a publisher should *have* a point of view on such a matter. Yet a publishing house is not a public utility like the telephone company, required by law to transmit messages for anyone who can pay the fare.

Many people associate the credibility of a work with the reputation of the publisher as well as with that of the author, and most are quick to hold the publisher to account when things go wrong. The Clifford Irving debacle is only one of several recent reminders of this fact of life. Surely the author has no more right to force the publisher to publish against his scruples than the publisher has to force the author to write against his.

In this case, the author had other equally attractive publishing options which did not involve showing the manuscript to the CIA. The fact that he chose to go along with us rather than publish elsewhere only reflects the fact that our commitment to the book was clearly more important to him than our difference of opinion about showing it to the CIA.

—B. Brooks Thomas
Vice President &
General Counsel
Harper & Row
East 53rd Street

Nat Hentoff will reply in next week's issue.

[redacted]

STATINTL

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NEW YORK TIMES
17 AUG 1972

STATINTL

NARCOTICS STUDY BY U.S. CONCEDES PROBLEM IS HUGE

Only 'Small Fraction' of the Illicit Flow Is Seized, Cabinet Panel Finds

WORLD TRAFFIC TRACED

International Crime Rings Said to Reap Big Profits —New York Key Point

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Aug. 16 — The Government, in an unusually candid report on worldwide drug traffic, said today that despite increased enforcement efforts the United States and other countries were able to seize only "a small fraction" of the total illegal flow of heroin.

The 111-page survey, under preparation for nine months by the Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control, which groups all the United States agencies involved in the problem, surveyed the world scene. The picture that emerged was anything but encouraging.

The report noted that New York was the main distribution point for heroin smuggled into the United States from Europe. [Details on Page 16.]

The report noted that on forcement efforts in the last two years had led to mounting seizures, but it concluded that "the rising level of seizures still represents only a small fraction of the illicit flow."

"The international heroin market almost certainly continues to have adequate supplies to meet the demand in consuming countries," it said.

High Profits are Noted

The report, "World Opium survey 1972," the most comprehensive of its kind, noted that international [illegible] "cartels" seemed to control the wholesale opium and heroin trade, and apparently reaped "high rates of return on their investment."

As an example of the illegal profits made in the heroin trade, the report said that on an investment of $120,000 to $300,000, French Corsicans, who it said run the European trade, normally receive about $1-million from dealers in New York for 100 kilograms of heroin. A kilogram is 2.2 pounds.

And then, on street sale in New York, a kilogram of pure heroin would sell for $200,000 — or $22-million for 100 kilograms, the report said.

The report was put together by the State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, the Customs Bureau, and the Treasury. It was completed in July and released by the State Department after a meeting at the White House, this morning of the Cabinet committee, which is headed by Secretary of State William P. Rogers.

Efforts Are Described

Perhaps to counter the discouraging tone of the report, the State Department also released a "fact sheet" discribing efforts by the Administration to counter what President Nixon has called "America's public enemy No. 1."

The report included comments, often caustic or uncomplimentary, about many nations with which the United States has friendly relations.

Success in developing international policing organizations has been slow, the report said, "largely because of widely varying national attirudes toward th drug problem."

These differences "are regularly and skillfully exploited by the illicit international trafficker," it said.

It noted that efforts were underway to curtail the growing of the opium poppy—the source of heroin—but that because of local conditions these programs "are unlikely to be successful unless accompanied by serious changes in a number of long-standing social and economic traditions."

The eport said that a minimum of 200 tons of illegal opiu[illegible] tional market in 1971 and, in addition, "there were undoubtedly substantial stocks and processed opium, morphine base, and heroin held by growers, processors, or traffickers."

In 1971, total seizures amounted to 21.6 tons of opium equivalent, and the seizures in the first quarter of this year reached 9 tons.

The report was released the day before Harper & Row is publishing a controversial book, "The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia," by Alfred W. McCoy. It charges that the C.I.A. and other United States agencies for political reasons supported Asians involved in drug trade.

When this was pointed out to a ranking State Department official later, he maintained that the dual publication was "purely coincidental." He said the Government report had been "in the works" for a long time, and had received its final approval this morning at the White House meeting.

The Government report described in some detail how illicit opium and its derivatives — mainly heroin — were marketed. It said "the primary complex," which leads to the largest deliveries to the United States, begins in Turkey, encompasses many countries in Western Europe and the Western Hemisphere and terminates in the United States.

A second complex is the Southeast Asian market — with the opium grown in the "golden triangle" of Burma, Thailand and Laos. This complex serves mostly addicts and users in the area. The report said that the withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam had hurt production.

A third complex , composed of India, Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan, also serves addicts in the area, mostly in Iran, but the report said the second and third complexes "are of interest also because of their potential for becoming important suppliers of opium for the international heroin market, in the future, particularly is the primary complex falters."

Describing how the illegal drugs move to markets, the report said the smuggler's methods "are limited only by the scope of his imagination."

It said that the most popular method of smuggling opium and morphine base from Turkey into Western Europe, for manufacture into heroin, is the use of "specially constructed compartments or 'traps' built into passenger cars, commercial trucks, and touring buses."

"Much of the morphine base is concealed in trucks carrying bonded consignments of legiti[illegible] sealed with a customs band, it said. "These sealed trucks, operating under international customs arrangments, will usually be allowed to travel across various national frontiers with little or no controls. The great number of such trucks traveling into Western Europe precludes any systematic inspection."

The smuggling by sea, less popular now than several years ago, "still accounts for a large amount of narcotics entering France," while smuggling by air is "the least favored smuggling method," the report said.

The route taken from Turkey overland passes through Bulgaria or Greece to Yugoslavia. From there, the drugs are taken either to West Germany through Austria or to France through Italy.

"The most common entry points for narcotics transported by ships are Marseilles, Barcelona, Venice, Trieste, Genoa, and Naples, and to a lesser extent, Bari, Brindist and Piraeus," it said.

The greatest change in smuggling patterns, the report said, is that West Germany has become "a major opium and morphine base storage depot and staging area."

Latin Route Developing

Once in France, the morphine base is refined into heroin by small, mobile laboratories.

"The French heroin traffic is believed to be dominated by a few large trafficking groups," the report said. "The most common factor in virtually every major trafficking group over the last 20 years is the prponderance of French Corsicans. It is this ethnic group above all others that has controlled the heroin traffic in France."

The heroin is then smuggled into the United States either directly from France, often concealed in cars or unaccompanied baggage, or through third countries.

"Since 1969, heroin smuggled via the Latin American route has accounted for about one-third of the seizures," the report said. "Although little is known about French-Latin American connections, it appears that well-organized smuggling rings in Latin America purchase large quantities of heroin from French traffickers and then arrange for its transport and sale to the United States. Many of the leaders of these Latin-American groups are ethnic French Corsicans

continued

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BATON ROUGE
ADVOCATE
AUG 1 6 1972
M - 54,562
S - 84,562

STATINTL

[redacted]

An Internal Attack To Slow Drug Traffic

Like some others, the British magazine, The Economist, takes a rather dim view of the $35 million that America is paying farmers in Turkey in return for a halt to the growing of opium.

"Trade in Turkey is bad but the narcotics dealers are doing well in Thailand," the magazine notes. "Just when the Americans are congratulating themselves that the opium traffic from Turkey is ending they discover that more heroin is coming into the United States from Southeast Asia than they realized."

Stemming the flow of heroin into the United States appears to be at the peak of controversy now, particularly in wake of the announcement of a forthcoming book, "The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia." The book charges that the Central Intelligence Agency is in collusion with those trafficking in drugs — an allegation heatedly denied by that agency.

The Economist says that the CIA protestations "ring rather hollow since the agency's own report appears to support much of the evidence used against the (Southeast Asia) governments in the region.

A high level report of the CIA claims that it will be virtually impossible to stem the flow of drugs from Southeast Asia because of the lack of cooperation from both the governments concerned and from Americans living in the area.

It is seeming folly to hand out some $35 million to farmers in Turkey to halt one source of opium, while more numerous sources openly proliferate.

The Economist made the assessment that the most effective part of the attack on heroin seems to be within the United States itself, judging from figures. It notes that the federal narcotics authorities claim to have seized an average of 71 pounds of heroin a month, or $1 million worth, on the East Coast alone in the past 12 months. This has sent the price of one gram of heroin from $418 to $785 — no comfort to those already addicted, but a deterrent to others becoming hooked on the drug.

The total number of heroin addicts in this nation is not known. But the problem is serious and President Nixon has now asked Congress to add another $135 million to the fight against drugs, for a total outlay of more than $300 million next year.

There are those who feel that the drug problem will not be settled until some way is found to eliminate the desire for the stuff. This may well be the case.

However, until this is accomplished, the obvious priority would be the next best thing — elimination of the flow of drugs across U.S. borders — by a concentrated attack from within.

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ORLANDO, FLA.
STAR
E - 35,983
AUG 1 6 1972

[redacted]

STATINTL

Book Linking CIA To Drugs Printed

NEW YORK (Reuter) A book alleging that the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency helps international heroin traffickers is published this week — despite objections from thegovernment agency which rarely breaks its silence.

The controversial manuscript by Alfred McCoy, a 27-year-old Yale graduate student in history, was made available to the CIA and — despite their challenges — went to press without a word being changed, according to the publishers, Harper and Row.

Entitled "The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia," the book claims that many of the governments and military men in Southeast Asia are profitably involved in the production and transportation of drugs.

McCOY SAYS they receive aid and support from the U.S. government and its agencies, including the CIA.

The U.S. government is involved in at least three ways, according to McKoy — ignoring the activity of known heroin traffickers, knowingly allowing American aircraft and crews to be subverted for the transport of heroin and opium, and allying with groups engaged in drug traffic.

Before publication, the CIA approached Harper and Row asking to read the manuscript. It said it could show that some of the claims about the agency's involvement were false or distorted and none was based on convincing evidence.

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Brooks Taylor, vice president of Harper and Row, said the CIA merely objected to the book and in no way tried to censor publication, set for Thursday.

"They tried to persuade us not to publish. On the basis of what they told us, they certainly hoped we would not publish," he said today.

IN WASHINGTON, a CIA spokesman declined to comment on the book.

CIA Director Richard Helms told a newspaper editors meeting last year, "There is this arrant nonsense, for example, that the central Intelligence Agency is involved in the world drug trade. We are not.

"We are heavily engaged in tracing the foreign route of the drug traffic for the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs. We hope we are helping with a solution. We know we are not contributing to the problem."

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STATINTL

NEW YORK, N.Y.
POST

EVENING - 623,245
WEEKEND - 354,797

AUG 16 1972

Harriet Van Horne

AN UNCLEAN FEELING

Recent revelations about the war in Southeast Asia are beginning to make Americans feel unclean. It is one thing to save a small nation from a Communist takeover, quite another to bomb, burn, torture and destroy that nation in the name of a militant "anti-communism" that is no longer valid.

When the world was simpler, our viable alternatives were plainer and their moral consequences were glaringly apparent. There was less need to mask evil, to dissemble facts and to betray the people who trusted us. There was a time when our involvement in Vietnam simply could not have happened. And there was a time when the hideous consequences of that war would not have been tolerated.

Now, because we have tolerated so much evil, the alternatives facing us are much more terrible today than they were ten years ago.

* * *

How painful our choices will be in the immediate future is driven home to us by every new and shaming disclosure out of Southeast Asia. But the alternative that will send the sharpest chill through America's bloodstream is this one:

To get heroin out of our high schools we must withdraw all aid and all political support from Southeast Asia.

That is the either/or conclusion reached by Alfred W. McCoy in the new book that is giving the CIA bad nights, "The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia."

"There is every reason to believe that 1972 is shaping up as the year of decision for the international narcotics traffic," writes McCoy. "If President Nixon is reelected he will probably continue his policy of giving unqualified support to President Thieu's administration in South Vietnam and to the right-wing governments in Thailand and Laos.

"As long as there is no serious threat of a cut-off in foreign aid or a withdrawal of political support, these governments cannot be subjected to any serious pressure and the narcotics traffic will continue unabated." Such is the considered judgment of Mr. McCoy, a specialist in Southeast Asian affairs, now at Yale University.

If we terminate all aid to South Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand and make money available through the United Nations for a strong opium suppression campaign, then, it is presumed, these governments will find the opium trade unprofitable and scarcely worth continuing.

Should we go on propping up Gen. Thieu and all the other corrupt little men who control Southeast Asia, the drug traffic will boom—"and America will have to endure the curse of heroin for another generation."

To withdraw from Southeast Asia would inevitably weaken our military influence in that part of the globe. But, one may fairly ask, haven't we been imperialists long enough? Must we wage war with all the moral fervor of Genghis Khan to demonstrate how much we loathe communism? [illegible] be without conscience or honor.

* * *

None of the horror stories now coming out of Vietnam should surprise us. We are so far steeped in blood that we've all but lost our capacity for shock. The European press has been reporting the damage to North Vietnamese civilians—and their dikes, schools, churches and hospitals—for months.

The hideous conditions of torture and degradation in Saigon's civilian prisons were first revealed in 1969 by a committee of clergymen, the Study Team on Religious and Political Freedom in Vietnam. Alfred Hassler summarized their findings in a book, "Saigon, USA" (whose foreward, I now notice, was written in 1969 by Sen. George McGovern).

Brutalization by the police and the army, detention of 200,000 civilians without arrest or trial, the torture of women and children before the eyes of their families, all these atrocities were documented and described. The beastly business of confinement in "tiger cages" was exposed back in 1969. And our government, because we are a moral nation (and because our tax dollars are supporting Thieu) promised that such inhuman practices would be stopped.

Now it is 1972. The tiger cages are still there, holding captives whose only crime is opposition to Thieu. The torture —to terrible to describe, in some cases—continues without letup or hindrance. So does the opium trade.

Were this not an election year, one doubts that Henry Kissinger would now be in Vietnam, desperately making one more try for a Nixon Peace. And oh, what an orgy of self-congratulation we'll be seeing in Miami next week if Dr. Kissinger brings home even one small concession from the North Vietnamese!

In the name of humanity, neither the Johnson nor the Nixon administrations could stop the war. But with an avowed peace candidate running against the President, just watch the negotiations get down to business!

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STATINTL [redacted]

RADIO TV REPORTS, INC.

4435 WISCONSIN AVE. N.W., WASHINGTON, D. C. 20016, 244-3540

[redacted]

STATINTL

FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF

PROGRAM Today Show

STATION WRC TV
NBC Network

DATE August 15, 1972 7:00 AM

CITY Washington, D.C.

AN INTERVIEW WITH ALFRED W. McCOY

FRANK McGEE: In this portion of the program we're going to talk with Alfred McCoy, the young man who's been in the news lately because of a conflict with the Central Intelligence Agency, the CIA. It's his assertion that the CIA as well as other government agencies are involved in the illegal narcotics traffic in Southeast Asia -- a claim the CIA says is totally without foundation. He has a lot of other things to say about the politics of the narcotics trade in Southeast Asia. I think you'll find him interesting.

* * *

McGEE: A writer claims the United States government is actually participating in drug traffic in Southeast Asia. In just a moment we'll meet him and ask him to substantiate that charge.

* * *

McGEE: In the triangle where Laos, Thailand, and Burma meet, opium has been produced as a cash crop for more than a hundred years. Some narcotics investigators, as well as members of Congress, believe this area provides 70 percent of the world's illicit supply of heroin and that much of it makes its way into the United States.

A new book called "The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia" traces the increase in opium production in this area since the end of World War II, and it also makes the claim that various governments in Southeast Asia, including South Vietnam, are involved in the production and transport of illegal narcotics. Perhaps more significantly, it asserts that the United States government and its agencies have actually supported the opium trade.

The book was written by Alfred W. McCoy, who spent 18 months researching in Asia, Europe, and the United States, and [redacted]

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NEW YORK TIMES
15 AUG 1972
Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R00

Harper & Row announces publication of "THE POLITICS OF HEROIN IN SOUTHEAST ASIA"

STATINTL

STATINTL



HARPER & ROW is publishing this week a brilliant and controversial study of the international narcotics traffic and the role played in it by agencies of the U.S. Government, including the CIA. The book is THE POLITICS OF HEROIN IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. The principal author is Alfred W. McCoy,* a twenty-seven year old graduate student in history at Yale University.

In early June 1972 Mr. McCoy testified on the general subject matter of his book before the Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee (better known as the Proxmire Committee). Shortly thereafter, the CIA asked Harper & Row for an opportunity to read Mr. McCoy's manuscript prior to publication. The CIA stated that:

"In the light of the pernicious nature of the drug traffic, allegations concerning involvement of the U.S. Government therein or the participation of American citizens should be made only if based on hard evidence. It is our belief that no reputable publishing house would wish to publish such allegations without being assured that the supporting evidence was valid.*** We believe we could demonstrate to you that a considerable number of Mr. McCoy's claims about this Agency's alleged involvement are totally false and without foundation, a number are distorted beyond recognition, and none is based on convincing evidence."

*with Cathleen B. Read and Leonard P. Adams II

continued

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Part 1 HANOI, SOUTH VIETNAM IN STRUGGLE
14 Aug 1972 STATINTL
Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-0160

In the shadow of the american embassy in Saigon

STATINTL

Editor's note. — The Nixon administration has been striving to foster the Nguyen Van Thieu regime as a tool for the "Vietnamization" of the war. But no glossy veneer can hide the latter's nature as a traitorous clique, a gang of robbers trading in prostitutes, drugs and war means, a band of political speculators, black-marketeers and embezzlers who have been plundering "aid" funds and the salaries and wages of their own civil servants and soldiers — all this under American protection. The following inquiry by Thanh Nam exposes part of this corrupt and rotten US-puppet regime.

SAIGON, in early 1972.

Tens of thousands of Honda and Suzuki motorbikes and Mercedes and Datsun sedans of every colour and hue rush along, belching clouds of exhaust fumes which ruin the foliage and flowers of the trees lining the streets.

The 3.6 million people of Saigon live crowded in eleven districts. High-rise US-style buildings of nine, ten, eleven storeys tower insolently in Dong Khanh and Nguyen Hue avenues while along muddy and refuse-strewn alleys in workers' quarters at Chuong Duong, Binh Dong and Cholon whole families are crammed into shanties of thatch, tin and card-board.

The number of Americans in military uniform has decreased a great deal. More and more snack-bars, Turkish-bath establishments and massage parlors catering to the American soldiery are closing down. American military police continue to stalk about, but in dwindling numbers.

And yet, while the war is being "Vietnamized," the American presence remains intact, overwhelming, in this city. It seems to have grown even heavier, more stifling. The scream of American jets keeps coming from the Tan Son Nhut airfield. Crowds of American civilians and air force officers continue to throng Tu Do boulevard. The American hand, the tricks of old Banker, the desperate moves of President Nixon to avoid checkmate, as well as the histrionics of Thieu, Huong, Khiêm and Co. are still daily topics of discussion for the Saigonese. People talk about the fiasco staring Nixon in the face, the inevitable departure of Nguyen Van Thieu, the collapse of "Vietnamization." For the last seven or eight years, the Saigonese people have had their ears full of the "lofty mission of the Americans" in this country and the "stability" of the "Second Republic." More and more clearly, the truth is appearing to them.

The fortress in the city

Everyone in Saigon knows about the new American fortress embassy, Bunker's residence. The old embassy at the corner of Ham Nghi and Vo Di Nguy streets now serves only for the reception of ordinary visitors and the delivery of passports and visas. The new embassy is white-painted and six storeys high, with a helicopter landing strip on its terrace roof; where a chopper and its pilot are standing by at all hours of the day and night. The box-shaped building is set back some distance from the street, surrounded by a solid ferro-concrete wall, equipped with air-conditioners, electronic computers and a hot telephone line linking it to the White House in Washington, and defended by machinegun nests. It is served by a power-house in the backyard. Military police stand guard day and night. The Americans boast that all building materials came from the United States and that plans were drawn and construction supervised by a renowned American military engineer, at the cost of 2.25 million dollars. In early 1971, in an interview with a French journalist, Bunker bragged about the solidity of this "White House" on the eastern shore of the Pacific. The unimpressed Frenchman replied with a wry smile: "Mr Ambassador, in my opinion, the fortress style of the embassy building suits your name rather than ambassadorial functions." Bunker's face showed that he was not amused by the play on word. In fact, Bunker was no ordinary ambassador and the unusual style of his residence indeed fits his unusual assignment.

Bunker has been in Saigon for six consecutive years. His is the most difficult and dangerous job ever held by an American diplomat in any period of American history. Political circles in Saigon are rife with stories and rumours about the man and the policies he has been pursuing. In spite of his 78 years, Bunker is very fastidious about his clothes, and the expensive *eaux de Cologne* he uses vary according to the season and the occasion. He has been, before his appointment to Saigon, ambassador to Argentina, Italy, India and Nepal.

The American press considers him as a skilful trouble-shooter who shows cold toughness not only to his adversaries but also to his allies. Saigon politicians nickname him The Old Fridge, while the Saigon press has dubbed him the Proconsul. His business is to pull the strings on which Nguyen Van Thieu dances, and he seems to perform it well. Even when the going is hard, he knows how to smooth away the obstacles. For instance he would lower his voice and call Thieu by his name (instead of Mr President) and tell him: "The United States is a great country, but one of her foibles is to lack patience. So you should realize that there are limits to American forbearance." Or he would say bluntly: "This has been decided in Washington. Once our President has taken a decision, there is no turning back." Then the only thing Thieu can do is to shut his mouth and stay quiet. If he doesn't, Bunker will have this clincher: "You know, Mr Thieu, Congress has become rather restive. They might reduce or even cancel some of the aid appropriations..." And that settles it.

The above are part of what the world press calls the tactics of pressure and blackmail, the mainspring of American diplomacy.

In fact, "Fridge" Bunker still has one more trick reserved for when Thieu is really intractable. He would smile and give the latter a gentle tap on the shoulder and say softly: "Mr Thieu, we happen to know that you and Mrs Thieu have some personal financial affairs to settle. We should be glad to

continued

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WASHINGTON POST
1 JAN 1973

STATINTL [redacted]

Halting Smugglers Almost Hopeless

By Jack Anderson

Stopping the drug smugglers is almost a hopeless task in the opinion of the man in charge of the drug crackdown.

John Ingersoll, the nation's narcotics chief, gave congressmen a gloomy report the other day behind closed doors.

"I guess," he said, "we are going to have to resign ourselves to the fact that we are going to live with a drug problem in this country, and we are going to have to cope with it the best we can."

Summarizing the problem, the lawman pointed out: "Each year some 210 million people come across our borders or through our ports of entry. The number of ships that call at our ports are numbered in the hundreds of thousands, and we also have this number of aircraft flights that come in through international ports of entry, let alone the number of automobiles that come across borders. . . .

"Unless we are going to call out the Army and the Marine Corps and the Navy, even then I doubt that we would be able to totally exclude the smuggling of drugs into the country.

"But we can do it if there is no demand. Where there is no demand, there is no drug problem."

"That is a little unrealistic for there not to be a demand," suggested Rep. Ralph Metcalfe (D-Ill.), "since we have so many thousands presently addicted to (heroin), and since it is habit forming."

"It probably is unrealistic, Mr. Metcalfe," agreed Ingersoll.

Anti-Drug Forces

He told how he had started in 1968 to cope with the drug epidemic with "hardly more than 600 agents."

"Our manpower has (now) increased to nearly 1,500 agents, plus another 1,300 support and professional personnel," he reported. "Our foreign offices have increased from 13 to 31. U.S. Customs manpower devoted to this area has at least doubled. The Departments of State, Defense and the CIA have become involved in one aspect or another.

"A Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention has been established in the White House. An Office of Drug Abuse Law Enforcement has been created to attack street level pushers by using the device of grand jury inquiry, and a cabinet-level committee has been formed to coordinate the government's total activities.

"Obviously, the United States government is totally committed now to a successful battle against drug abuse in all of its ugly dimensions."

Yet all of this, he acknowledged, won't lick the drug problem. "The final answer," he said, "will come from reducing the demand. And the demand will be reduced only when the people of this country develop an intolerance for addiction and drug abuse . . . and for those who traffic in the drugs."

Deceptive Advertising—The nation's tenth largest bank, the First National Bank of Chicago, spent $80,000 last month on an advertisement attacking environmental lawsuits. These have caused delays in building nuclear power plants, offshore oil rigs and the Alaskan pipeline, which could bring about "a disastrous power shortage," warned the bank. It even fantasized an exact time for the disaster: January 22, 1973, at 6:42 p.m. The bank published the warning, claimed the ad, "in the public interest." However, the bank neglected to mention its own interest in power utilities; it holds at least four million shares of stock in seven utilities.

Refund Delay—Fred Hickman, an acting Assistant Treasury Secretary, denied our report that the big auto manufacturers have been in no hurry to refund excise taxes to new car buyers. The Treasury helped rush back the refunds, he said, "in a short period." This will dumbfound the hundreds of letter writers who have complained to us and to Ralph Nader about delays up to seven months. If taxpayers waited the same "short period" before they paid their income taxes to Hickman, the IRS would be slapping them with summons. Hickman went on to say that "it is the auto manufacturers who paid the tax" to the Treasury. The truth, of course, is that the car buyers paid the tax to the manufacturers.

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[redacted]

E.ST.LOUIS, ILL.
JOURNAL

E - 38,406
S - 40,150

AUG 13 1972

Book on narcotics traffic survives CIA's complaints

STATINTL

WE ARE pleased that Harper & Row, the New York publishing firm, has, in spite of strong objections from the Central Intelligence Agency, (CIA), decided to publish without change a book on narcotics traffic in Southeast Asia.

The book, by Alfred W. McCoy, is entitled, "The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia." It is highly critical of the CIA's efforts to suppress opium production and smuggling in South Vietnam and surrounding countries.

In fact, Mr. McCoy argues, according to a Washington Post report on the manuscript, that "American diplomats and secret agents have been involved in the narcotics traffic at three levels" — coincidental complicity by allying with groups engaged in drug trafficking; abetting trafficking by covering up for Southeast Asian traffickers; and active engagement "in the transport of opium and heroin."

It is unfortunate, however, that Harper & Row officials complied with a CIA demand that it be allowed to review the manuscript before publication.

The CIA verdict on the book was that it would do a "disservice" to the fight against narcotics traffic in Southeast Asia. A Harper & Row spokesman said the CIA had contended that it would "prove beyond doubt" that Mr. McCoy's facts were wrong. The spokesman added, "They (the CIA) just didn't do it."

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[redacted]

ST. LOUIS, MO.
POST-DISPATCH

E - 326,376
S - 541,868
AUG 1 2 1972

STATINTL

Dope And The CIA

The publishing firm of Harper & Row is to be commended for its rejection of Central Intelligence Agency criticism of a book on the heroin traffic in Southeast Asia which it plans to release this month. The author, Alfred W. McCoy, alleges that some American officials and CIA agents have allied themselves with groups engaged in the drug traffic, have abetted the traffic by covering up for drug runners and have been involved "in the transport of opium and heroin."

The CIA, which has undertaken an unusual publicity campaign to throw down the charges (some of which have been published previously), asked Harper's for permission to examine the advance text. The firm complied, and received a long CIA criticism of the book. Harper & Row editors went over the comments with Mr. McCoy, examined his substantiating documents, and then informed the agency it saw no reason to make any changes in the book.

B. Brook Thomas, Harper & Row vice president and general counsel, said the publishers were "underwhelmed" by the CIA critique. He added that the CIA had been very courteous and correct—"We haven't got any pressure."

We would consider the very request by the CIA to be a form of pressure, however, and Harper & Row was well-advised to resist it.

Mr. McCoy makes a strong case for the charge that CIA policies have in fact aided the heroin traffic in Southeast Asia. This has come about through the agency's free-wheeling clandestine efforts to control events in remote areas of Indochina. If the CIA would stick to intelligence gathering it would not be subject to such charges as Mr. McCoy has leveled, and would not have to defend itself.

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DAILY WORLD
12 AUG 1972

Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-0160

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

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CHAMPAIGN, ILL.
COURIER

E - 30,013
S - 30,611
AUG 11 1972

CIA tries book reviewing

WE ARE pleased that Harper & Row, the New York publishing firm, has, in spite of strong objections from the Central Intelligence Agency, (CIA), decided to publish without change a book on narcotics traffic in Southeast Asia.

The book, by Alfred W. McCoy, is entitled, "The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia." It is highly critical of the CIA's efforts to suppress opium production and smuggling in South Vietnam and surrounding countries.

In fact, Mr. McCoy argues, according to a Washington Post report on the manuscript, that "American diplomats and secret agents have been involved in the narcotics traffic at three levels" — coincidental complicity by allying with groups engaged in drug trafficking; abetting trafficking by covering up for Southeast Asian traffickers; and active engagement "in the transport of opium and heroin."

Ie is unfortunate, however, that Harper & Row officials complied with a CIA demand that it be allowed to review the manuscript before publication.

The CIA verdict on the book was that it would do a "disservice" to the fight against narcotics traffic in Southeast Asia. A Harper & Row spokesman said the CIA had contended that it would "prove beyond doubt" that Mr. McCoy's facts were wrong. The spokesman added, "They (the CIA) just didn't do it."

It is understandable that, as the Harper & Row official put it, 'the industry has been very cautious on things like this ever since the Clifford Irving story broke." But there were other ways the publisher could have verified the McCoy research; it could have, for example, put one of its own staff members on a spot-check verification of some of McCoy's primary sources.

The book, to be published Aug. 17, will be important and much-debated.

Also in need of debate and public clarification are the implications for free and responsible speech raised when publishers allow governmental agencies — particularly when those agencies are criticized in the publications — to review and comment on a manuscript before it reaches the public.

STATINTL

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VILLAGE VOICE
10 August 1972

STATINTL [redacted]
Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R001000050001-8

The CIA: Book Editing Division

Writers working on projects that might offend the government have been warned to be wary of having Harper & Row as a publisher. The warning has been given by the present management of that very publishing house.

Alfred W. McCoy, a Ph.D. candidate in Southeast Asian history at Yale, spent 18 months investigating narcotics operations in Southest Asia. The resultant book, commissioned by Harper & Row, had been thoroughly examined by attorneys for the publishing house. But then, the CIA asked Harper & Row for permission to review McCoy's book, "The Politics of Heroin in Southest Asia," *prior* to publication.

Despite the lessons of the battle to publish the Pentagon Papers, despite the continuing travail of Beacón Press (publishers of the Gravel edition of the Pentagon Papers), despite the First Amendment, Harper & Row acceded to the CIA's request!

Seymour Hersh, the most valuable addition to the Times-Washington bureau in my memory, dug out the story as part of a continuing investigative account of the increasing quantity of heroin coming into this country from Southeast Asia. As Hersh points out (Times, July 22), the CIA's interest in Alfred McCoy's book is due to McCoy's allegations that "both CIA and State Department officials have provided political and military support for America's Indochinese allies actively engaged in the drug traffic; have consciously covered up evidence of such involvement, and have been actively involved themselves in the narcotics trade."

The CIA, understandably exacerbated—all the more so because Mr. McCoy has been testifying before Congressional committees—put pressure on Harper & Row. The CIA did not try seriously to claim that national security is involved. The agency impugns the accuracy of the book and wanted to see it before publication in ar attempt to persuade the publisher to make "corrections" so the CIA and other American agencies won't look so bad. (The First Amendment stands even if the CIA had insisted that national security might have been breached, but Harper & Row yielded on a much softer point. That's what is so appallingly surprising after all we have learned from the Nixon administration concerning its intentions with regard to the First Amendment.)

Seymour Hersh quotes B. Brooks Thomas, vice-president and general counsel of Harper & Row, as having no doubts about the book. ("We've had it reviewed by others and we're persuaded that the work is amply documented and scholarly.") *Nonetheless*, Mr. Thomas adds: "We're taking a responsible middle position. I just believe that the CIA should have the chance to review it."

According to Hersh, the book's author, Alfred McCoy, was given the choice of agreeing with Mr. Thomas's "responsible middle position" or not having his book published by Harper & Row.

Brooks Thomas tells me that's not accurate. An either/or situation, he says, did not develop.

"If McCoy had refused to allow the page proofs to be seen by the CIA," prior to publication I asked Thomas, "*would* you have published the book?"

"I don't know what we would have done," Thomas answered. "In any case, we persuaded McCoy to let the CIA see it." (My information is that Harper & Row would not have published the book if McCoy had resisted prior viewing by the CIA.)

I am sorry that Mr. McCoy allowed himself to be persuaded. At first, Hersh writes, McCoy refused to go along, but "changed his mind during protracted negotiations."

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STATINTL

[redacted]

Headquarters
EMPLOYEE BU

#321

10 August 1972

"The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia"

1. Mr. Alfred W. McCoy, a graduate student at Yale, has written a book entitled "The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia." Prior to its publication, Mr. McCoy has been involved in rather extensive publicity in the newspapers, on television, in an appearance before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and an excerpt of the book was published in the July 1972 issue of Harper's. Many of these allege in effect that CIA is somehow implicated in the drug trade in Southeast Asia. His theme can be summarized in his words as "American diplomats and secret agents have been involved in the narcotics traffic at three levels: (1) coincidental complicity by allying with groups actively engaged in the drug traffic; (2) abetting the traffic by covering up for known heroin traffickers and condoning their involvement; (3) and active engagement in the transport of opium and heroin. It is ironic, to say the least, that America's heroin plague is of its own making."

2. CIA has altered its traditional practice of remaining silent with respect to allegations against it in view of the serious nature of the charge in this case. In several public statements, the Agency has taken issue with these allegations and extensions of them by editorial writers and journalists. CIA also approached the publishers of Mr. McCoy's book with the request that we be allowed to review the book before publication and advise the degree to which we felt it was erroneous, on the theory that a reputable publisher would want to know the facts before being associated with such serious charges. In our letter we pointed out clearly that the decision as to publication would remain with the publishers and that our sole purpose was to offer to point out factual inaccuracies. After reviewing the book, we advised the publishers that the large number of allegations, assertions, and interpretations contained in the book were limited to ones supporting Mr. McCoy's thesis and that he appears to have ignored available information which might contradict his thesis. We submitted a few specific comments illustrating our point. The publishers have reaffirmed their earlier confidence in Mr. McCoy's scholarship and plan to publish the book unchanged as soon as possible.

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STAT

BAKERSFIELD, CAL.
CALIFORNIAN
AUG 10 1972
E - 49,055

A Drug Nerve Center

It is heartening to learn that the government will again make good use of William C. Sullivan, a leading intelligence analyst who for many years was a top official in the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Sullivan was ousted from the FBI about a year ago for differing with the then director, the late J. Edgar Hoover. Now he is to be coordinator of all narcotics intelligence drawn from the FBI, the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, and several other sources.

There appears to be a genuine need for such a clearing house on data about drug abuse. At present, information is obtained at home and abroad by a number of agencies, including the armed forces and the Central Intelligence Agency. Sometimes, the right hand is at very least not fully informed about what the left hand is doing.

Sullivan's role will be to keep tabs on everything, and to give out information to authorized agencies as required. His admirable 30-year record in the FBI gives reason to believe that he will do an excellent job. If he gets the cooperation that the new setup will demand for maximum effectiveness, it should become a major weapon against the drug traffic.

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trust that this message will be heard and acted upon by the Thais, and that the President will soon be able to resume the aid programs based on positive action by the nation.

Mr. MURPHY of Illinois. Mr. Chairman, I rise to voice my support for the provision of the Foreign Assistance Act to cut off foreign aid to the Government of Thailand until it is ready to cooperate with us in ending the illegal growing and shipping of heroin to the United States.

We have heard that it is not in our best interest to stop sending money to Thailand. We have heard that they are an ally and that it would cause a chasm in our friendship. If they were truly our friends, they would do all within their power to stop those who are trading in narcotics. Instead, we receive token gestures such as the burning of 25 tons of opium recently and it remains to be proven that the entire substance destroyed was opium.

Let us not fool ourselves. When our allies are in need of money, food or other assistance, the United States is always there with an open pocketbook. I believe the American people are tired of footing the bill for other countries and not getting any cooperation in return. Foreign aid is a two-way street and we should expect better results from other governments when it is necessary.

Call it foreign assistance, foreign aid, or whatever, the American taxpayers bear the expense. They are tired of their children becoming dope addicts while other countries let the drug trade flourish when it is within their power to stop it. I am totally against other countries becoming rich using the needle-marked arms of our young Americans.

Let me clarify one point: I favor most foreign aid. I believe it is our responsibility to help developing nations as best we can, but I also believe we should expect some cooperation when our country is faced with a problem of this magnitude. And we are not receiving that cooperation from Thailand.

I believe the American people are tired of reading day after day how we are in the midst of a drug crisis, a drug menace or whatever you want to call it, and we are seemingly powerless to do anything to stop it.

It is time we act. We know that opium is grown and refined in Thailand, we know it is shipped from there and we know the Thai Government has done little to prevent it whether intentionally or not. We must demonstrate that America and its citizens are bewildered over the lack of cooperation we are receiving. We must not allow a generation of misery to grow up while others profit from financial aid. The American people will not stand for that kind of action from the Congress.

It should be noted that this amendment gives the President the discretion to give or withhold the funds as he sees fit. But it is, in fact, an expression that the Congress won't sit idly by as long as narcotics represent a major business in other countries.

Let us therefore pass this amendment unanimously and initiate what could become the first of many serious efforts to urge other countries to cease drug trafficking before it is too late.

Mr. FRENZEL. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1972. I should like to pay special tribute to the committee for putting into the bill a prohibition against giving aid to Thailand until that country makes substantial, effective action to prevent its opium products from reaching foreign shores, including ours.

The fact that Thai opium products are produced on a large scale and find their way into our country is no secret. On Friday, July 28, on NBC, the television public of this country viewed one of many heavy-guarded mule caravans of opium moving through the Thai countryside. On July 24, the New York Times cited a February 1972 confidential report of the Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control concerning air and sea smuggling. The report was prepared in cooperation with the State Department and CIA. It is stated that there is apparently no way to stop opium traffic due to "corruption, collusion, and difference" of many government officials involved, notably the Thais.

Therefore, Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to support strongly this provision in the committee bill. In addition to other members of the committee, I would personally applaud the efforts of Congressmen STEELE of Connecticut and WOLFF of New York. These men have led the fight to keep drug poisons out of our country.

Mr. SIKES. Mr. Chairman, I am certain everyone in the House wants an end to the war in Vietnam. The supporters of the end-the-war section of the bill are not alone in their desire for peace. They are not alone in the desire to have our prisoners released and a full accounting made for those missing in action. But those who seek approval of the language in the bill are unable to show the slightest evidence that their procedure will accomplish an end to the war and a return of American POW-MIA's. The Communists have never agreed to anything. They hope to achieve an American surrender. The things that have been said on Capitol Hill have kept that hope alive.

The Communists have not said they will return our POW-MIA's if we stop the fighting. They have not promised to return them even if we withdraw all American forces at a date certain. If past experience is an indication of things to come, we must assume that, once they gain the objectives proposed in this bill, they will simply raise the price for a return of POW-MIA's. I don't know what the new price would be. They have learned that their American prisoners possess a very high value as hostages. They are sufficiently inhuman to try to extract the very last measure of tribute—the last possible ounce of flesh for their return. The language of the bill will serve only to give new hope to the North Vietnamese and to encourage them to continue the fight.

Now let us look at the other side of the picture. Those who oppose end-the-war resolutions at a date certain—and American surrender in Indochina—see a shaping of events which can mean an end to the war within the months ahead.

The North Vietnamese have made it clear that they want to talk. Secret talks, the only kind that offer hope or progress, are again underway. For the first time, the North Vietnamese homeland is being made to feel in some measure the pressures they have brought to bear on the South Vietnamese. There has been no brutal invasion, but there has been a throttling of supply lines which make effective fighting possible. The North Vietnamese are now being told through leaflets and radio exactly what is happening to their sons and fathers at the fighting fronts and they are being told about the objectives of their own leaders. They are uncertain and uneasy. They see the destruction of military installations and munitions plants. They hear the bombs bursting. They know now it is a two-sided war, even though we have not warred on civilians.

Their ports are bottled up, their railways are cut, 50,000 and more of their young men will never come home again as result of the latest onslaught into South Vietnam. At least as many more will come home crippled if they get there at all. North Vietnam is feeling the pinch of war. At long last they have learned that America is not a paper tiger.

Through all of this there has been an open and generous invitation to end the war on terms that are highly advantageous to North Vietnam. All they have to do is to stop the fighting, agree to meaningful negotiations and return our POW-MIA's. They will be left holding a very substantial part of Indochina and Laos and Thailand and even South Vietnam while the negotiations are in progress. You and I know they probably will never agree to give up an inch of this captured territory, but the fighting would be stopped and South Vietnam would have its opportunity to continue to gain strength under its own chosen government. Anything further than that is outright surrender. You cannot change this with fancy language or pious hopes. Anything further means turning South Vietnam over to North Vietnam for butchery and persecution. That is what the war is all about. That is what the Communists have been fighting for. Do not make a mockery out of the services and sacrifices of every American who served in Vietnam. The language of this section is a cruel hoax on the American people.

Mr. COLLINS of Texas. Mr. Chairman, as my distinguished colleagues may recall, I introduced the original bill from which section 503 of the Military Procurement Act ultimately followed. It enabled us to restore our trade in chrome with Rhodesia and end the Russian monopoly on this critical material.

The vote at that time was 250 to 100. The House felt that continuation of the sanctions against Rhodesia as far as chrome ore was concerned amounted to an intolerable compromise of our national security, Mr. Chairman, our national security is still the issue. As long as we spend billions on maintaining defense parity with the Russians we cannot possibly afford to put ourselves in a posi-

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DAILY WORLD
10 AUG 1972

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

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RADIO TV REPORTS, INC.

41 EAST 42ND STREET, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10017, 697-5100

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FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF STATINTL

PROGRAM News STATION WHN

DATE August 9, 1972 - 8:32 AM CITY New York

NEW BOOK LINKS CIA WITH HEROIN FLOW IN SEA

NEWSCASTER: Alfred McCoy's book THE POLITICS OF HEROIN IN SOUTHEAST ASIA will be published by Harper & Row. McCoy accuses the Central Intelligence Agency in permitting and in some cases abiding the flow of heroin out of Southeast Asia. Brooks Thomas of Harper explained why the book is coming out despite CIA protests.

BROOKS THOMAS: They said it would be a disservice to people who were interested in suppressing this traffic. We think that the book is a accurate work of scholarship and that it states the truth and the public has a right to know the truth.

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BALTIMORE NEWS AMERICAN
9 August 1972

STATINTL

HENRY J. TAYLOR

Fulbright Is 'Color-Blind'

Along with others, mixed-up Sen. J. William Fulbright — who so frequently goes off into the wild blue yonder — is demanding that we banish Thailand from U.S. foreign aid on the claim of Thailand's dope-traffic participation.

Again this bewildering egotist is as confused as the gypsies who cry at weddings and dance at funerals.

Sen. Fulbright is persistently color-blind where Reds are concerned. Instead of condemning pro-American Thailand he should have condemned Red China and Burma.

ABLE NELSON GROSS, the State Department's international anti-narcotics coordinator, and our Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs experts could put the critics straight in a jiffy.

Thailand has a long common border with Burma on Burma's Shan states. Burma in turn, has a wild, mountainous 1,200-mile frontier — a third as long as our Canadian border — with Red China.

Burma's chief of state is flamboyant playboy Marxist Gen. Ne Win, his lidded eyes rich as jade in a face as pale as bread — a thoroughly rotten thug. And when you are there it is obvious that Peking feeds Burma through a cage, feels Red China can wait until Ne Win dies or is booted out — as he booted out predecessor U Nu — and then Red China will be sucked into Burma as into a vacuum.

IN THE WORLD'S ghastly narcotics problem there are two main types of dangerous drugs. The first—cocaine, from the coca bush, is difficult to prepare and the reasonably good control makes cocaine what Mr. Gross calls "the subordinate problem." The real scourge — the ghastly trade's basic narcotic element — is opium.

Opium is the product of a sick weed. It is the sap—the tears—of a ripened poppy seed. The common poppy that we know is useless. Only the P.S.L. (Papaver somniferum Linnaeus) poppy gives opium. The capsules are green. Small incisions are cut in the seeds before they ripen. A white latex appears. This hardens and turns brown. In that process you can smell the aroma for miles. The latex is refined into the morphine base and then into diacetyl-morphine, which we call heroin.

Mr. Gross could have told Fulbright and others that Red China's Yunnan-Kwang-si area and the Burma territory that Red China controls are the dominant sources of today's narcotics traffic.

Mr. Gross knows that the true kingpin of Southeast Asia's heroin traffic is a detestable Red China puppet named Lo Hsing Han.

THAILAND IS about the size of France. With her long border on Burma's Shan states and Burma's 1,200-mile border with Red China, Thailand stands astride the Red dope routes. Thailand is potentially either a funnel or a barrier. But Mr. Gross and our Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs experts agree that it is all but impossible for Thailand to intercept shipments with such frontiers.

They also state unequivocally that U.S. relations with Thai enforcement officials are excellent. Moreover, these enforcement efforts are implemented by a highly unique memorandum Secretary of State William P. Rogers signed with Thailand's Foreign Minister on Sept. 28, 1971.

I cannot find a single authority who does not praise Thailand for its strong and effective work.

Our Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs has 10 American officials and a 25-man strike team in Northern Thailand.

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DAILY WORLD
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[redacted]

STATINTL

CIA seeks to suppress book

NEW YORK—Harper and Row has refused to hold up publication of a book titled The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia, by Alfred W. McCoy, despite CIA requests. The secret intelligence organization claims the book would be a "disservice." The book is highly critical of the CIA's role in relation to drug production and trade in Southeast Asia.

McCoy said he gave a copy of the manuscript to the CIA under protest and only because the publisher said it would not publish the study if the CIA was not given a chance to read it in manuscript.

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NEW YORK DAILY NEWS

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STATINTL

Man J. Edgar Bounced Gets Top U.S. Post

Washington, Aug. 8 (NEWS Bureau)—William C. Sullivan, who was forced out of a top position in the FBI by the late J. Edgar Hoover last fall, was named today to head the Justice Department's new national Narcotics Intelligence Center.

William C. Sullivan

Sullivan, 60, will be a special assistant to Attorney General Kleindienst, gathering, and distributing narcotics data for several agencies, including the FBI, the CIA and the armed forces. He will have a staff of about 70.

Sullivan was thought to be in line to succeed Hoover until he angered the director, reportedly by urging reforms in the bureau and maintaining close relations with the attorney general, nominally Hoover's boss.

Differed on Red Peril

At the time, Sullivan was in charge of all investigations. His chief difference with Hoover was over Sullivan's view that the domestic threat of communism had faded.

While Sullivan was on sick leave, Hoover put him in for retirement; had his name taken off his office door and changed the locks.

Sullivan had once been as close to Hoover as Clyde Tolson, the bureau's former No. 2 man, and reportedly was one of the few FBI men that Hoover addressed by his first name. It was an open secret in the bureau that Sullivan "ghosted" Hoover's books on communism.

But relations between the two men began to sour in the 1960s when Sullivan became convinced that the FBI should spend less time on communism and more on enforcing civil rights laws. He believed that the Ku Klux Klan must be opposed and the rights of Blacks and other minorities protected or radical groups like the Black Panthers and the Students for a Democratic Society would find fertile ground for expansion.

A native of Bolton, Mass., Sullivan joined the FBI in 1941 as a special agent after four years with the Internal Revenue Service in its Boston office. Since January, he has been operations chief of the Insurance Crime Prevention Institute in Westport, Conn.

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NEW YORK TIMES
9 AUG 1972

[redacted]

Harper Proceeding On Drug-Trade Book Despite C.I.A. View

After receiving a brief critique from the Central Intelligence Agency, Harper & Row, Inc., has decided to proceed with the publication of a book by a 26-year-old Yale graduate student that charges that the agency is involved in heroin trafficking in south east Asia.

Harper & Row submitted galleys of the book, "The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia" by Alfred W. McCoy, to the C.I.A. after the agency's general counsel, Lawrence R. Houston, wrote the publishing house on July 5, asking "to see the text."

B. Brooks Thomas, vice president and general counsel of Harper & Row, said yesterday in an interview that the C.I.A.'s criticisms, delivered by hand on July 28, "were pretty general and we found ourselves rather underwhelmed by them."

In the book, Mr. McCloy states: "American diplomats and secret agents have been involved in the narcotics traffic at three levels: (1) coincidental complicity by allying with groups actively engaged in the drug traffic; (2) abetting the traffic by covering up for known heroin traffickers and condoning their involvement; (3) and active engagement in the transport of opium and heroin."

In a covering letter to the eight-page, 1,500-word critique, Mr. Houston stated that "it is plain that Mr. McCloy has limited his citations to those supporting his thesis, and he appears to have ignored available information which might contradict it."

"The truth is that the C.I.A. has never been involved in the drug traffic and is actively engaged in fighting against it," the letter added.

In a telephone interview from New Haven, Mr. McCloy said he was "struck" by the "incredible disparity" between the "confident, strident, militant tone" of initial C.I.A. criticisms of the book and "the final letter, which was very very weak—pathetic almost."

The book is scheduled for release on Aug. 17.

C.I.A. Plans No Further Action

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Aug. 8—The C.I.A. plans no further attempts to block publication of the McCoy book, a spokesman for the agency said today.

Referring to the announced decision of Harper & Row to proceed with early publication of the book, the spokesman said:

"We sent them a letter and that's it. I haven't heard any talk here of seeking an injunction or taking any other legal steps to halt publication."

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WASHINGTON POST
8 AUG 1972

STATINTL

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Publisher Bars Changes in Book On SE Asia Drugs Hit by CIA

By Tim O'Brien
Washington Post Staff Writer

The Central Intelligence Agency has sent Harper and Row, Inc., a detailed critique of a book the firm is about to release, saying the work will do a "disservice" to the fight against narcotics traffic in Southeast Asia.

The New York publishing house, however, has decided to go ahead with publication of "The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia" by Alfred W. McCoy. The firm informed the CIA that "it is our sincere opinion that Mr. McCoy's scholarship remains unshaken and we do not see any reason for making changes in the text."

The book is highly critical of the CIA's efforts to suppress opium production and smuggling in Southeast Asia.

On July 5, CIA General Counsel Lawrence R. Houston wrote to Harper and Row, asking "to see the text" of the book. "In the light of the pernicious nature of the drug traffic, allegations concerning involvement of the U.S. government therein or the participation of American citizens should be made only if based on hard evidence," Houston wrote. "It is our belief that no reputable publishing house would wish to publish such allegations without being assured that the support evidence was valid."

"This, of course, in no way affects the right of a publisher to decide what to publish. I find it difficult to believe, however, that a responsible publisher would wish to be associated with an attack on our government involving the vicious international drug traffic without at least trying to ascertain the facts," he wrote.

Author McCoy, when told that Harper and Row planned to release galley proofs to the CIA, protested. He argued in a letter to B. Brook Thomas, the firm's vice president and general counsel, that "submitting the manuscript to the CIA for prior review is to agree to take the first step toward abandoning the First Amendment protection against prior censorship."

McCoy cited "extralegal actions" taken by the CIA to obstruct the book's publications. He said, "Visits by the CIA to Harper and Row, the telephone calls, and the letters are extralegal attempts by the CIA to harass and intimidate me and my publisher."

Thomas replied in a July 18 letter, however: "We want very much to publish (the book). But we want even more to live up to the traditions and responsibilities of a great publishing house as we see them. If we are forced to make a choice between the two, there can be no doubt what that choice must be."

McCoy, under "strong protest," agreed to give the CIA an advance copy of his book. He did so, he said yesterday, "for pragmatic reasons," partly because of the firm's decision not to publish the work if it were not first reviewed by the CIA.

Acknowledging receipt of the manuscript, CIA counsel Houston wrote Harper and Row on July 21: "It is not our intention to ask you to make changes in Mr. McCoy's book even if we believe some of the statements might be harmful to the government. It is possible that we might find some statement which is currently and properly classified in the interest of national security. If so, we will consult with you, but we believe this is highly unlikely. Our primary interest is in the validity of the evidence with which Mr. McCoy supports his allegations."

A CIA agent hand-delivered the agency's formal critique of the book in a letter dated July 28.

"Mr. McCoy supports his theme by citing a large number of allegations, assertions and interpretations," the 11-page criticism said. "From an examination of these, it is plain that Mr. McCoy has limited his citations to those supportive [illegible] and appears to have ignored available information which might contradict it."

"Mr. McCoy's charges against the CIA, both directly and by innuendo, have been repeated by editorial writers throughout the nation and could create an accepted myth that the CIA has been involved in the drug traffic. The truth is that CIA has never been involved in the drug traffic and is actively engaged in fighting against it. We believe that the effect of Mr. McCoy's book is to do a disservice to this fight and to dishearten the many sincere people in CIA who are at least as concerned about this menace as Mr. McCoy."

In his book, McCoy argues that "American diplomats and secret agents have been involved in the narcotics traffic at three levels"—coincidental complicity by allying with groups engaged in drug trafficking; abetting trafficking by covering up for Southeast Asian traffickers; and active engagement "in the transport of opium and heroin."

The CIA critique covered several, although not all, of the illustrations used by McCoy to substantiate his three charges. For example, McCoy said that Air America —"which is really a CIA charter airline"—has been actively involved in the transport of opium products out of Laos. His sources, he said, include former Laotian chief of staff Ouane Rattikone (himself a suspected drug smuggler), Laotian air force commander Gen. Thao Ma, a USAID officer in Laos, and McCoy's own interviews with officials in Laotian villages.

The CIA critique said: "We believe the statement Mr. Paul Velte, Managing Director of Air America, made on 2 June 1972 in response to these allegations, labeling them as 'utterly and absolutely false,' clearly expresses the company and CIA views on this matter."

"General Ouane categorically denied that Air America was in any way involved in [illegible] traffic."

McCoy said yesterday that "there are over 200 pages of material on American operations in the Golden Triangle area. Out of all that, this is all they (the CIA) could come up with. They're only criticizing about 2 per cent of my total information."

"The most remarkable thing about the CIA's critique is that the agency actually admitted that one of its own mercenary army commanders, Laotian Gen. Chao La, was running a heroin lab in northwestern Thailand. Although the CIA said it destroyed his laboratory in mid-1971, it had been optrating since 1965 [illegible] the agency's full knowledg[illegible] he said.

Elisabeth Jakab, the editor handling the manuscript, said yesterday that "the industry has been very cautious on things like this ever since the Clifford Irving story broke."

A source at Harper and Row said the CIA wrote the publishing firm that it could "prove beyond doubt" that McCoy's facts were wrong. "They just didn't do it," the source said.

On Friday, the firm wrote the CIA, responding to each of the agency's criticisms. The "best service we can render the author, the CIA and the general public is to publish the book as expeditiously as possible, and that is what we intend to do." The book is scheduled for release on Aug. 17.

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St. Louis Post-Dispatch
7 August 1972

STATINTL

A Need For Candor

Now that a Cabinet-level report has concluded that the governments of Southeast Asia are either unwilling or unable to effectively shut off the narcotics traffic in the area, it would behoove the Administration to assume a more realistic public position on the problem. Hitherto Administration officials, particularly those representing the State Department, have maintained that the United States is "quite satisfied" with the co-operation of authorities in Thailand, South Vietnam and Laos and that real progress has been made in stopping smuggling.

Some observers in Congress and outside of government have long contended that such claims are absurd, a fact now confirmed by a document prepared by officials of the Central Intelligence Agency and the State and Defense Departments. That report states that there is no prospect of stopping smuggling by sea and air and that "corruption, collusion and indifference," especially in the countries of Thailand and South Vietnam, preclude a more effective suppression of the traffic.

To be sure, some headway in combating the Asian heroin trade has been made. The problem is that as Turkey becomes less important as a supplier of opium, as a result of measures taken against production of the crop, more and more narcotics reaching the U.S. are originating in Southeast Asia. So in overall terms, the problem is growing despite efforts of the Administration to contain it.

A little more candor, therefore, by the Administration is necessary. It would put the Asian governments on notice that their casual attitude toward the narcotics trade is not a thing the U.S. will wink at. And further, a realistic appraisal by the Administration would do much to encourage Congress to cut off assistance to those nations which are content to receive American economic and military aid but refuse to take firm steps to eliminate the vicious narcotics business which flows outward from their borders.

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TRAINS STILL RUN ON TIME

Even the trains that used to run on time in Mussolini's Fascist Italy are now running on time in Peking with the now familiar sophistries that its dictators are in charge and representative of the ever abused "people." Such moral garbage that comes from the Left today used to come from the Right. Which proves, at least, that human rights carries no other label, but an ideological one.

A potential freedom fighter in Athens or Havana waits hopelessly for someone divorced from the ideological struggles that forge new chains as they break the old ones to say no to unfolding history and yes to Thomas Jefferson's "eternal hostility to all tyrannies over the minds of man." The above is a true liberal banner that now lies crushed and silent as the boot-loving current banner waivers shriek their admiration for diverse dictators.

We Americans will not say yet, and yet we can. What we have become is a tragedy of retreat and default.

Whoever wins the Presidential election, at least with McGovern and Nixon running, it is definitely not a beauty contest. What did he say? Who's listening [sigh]?

The roster of some of the names around the McGovern in the background reads like a Quixotic platoon of the New Frontier warriors who were fractured on the shores of Viet Nam. Some who were mesmerized by his charisma would have crossed the River Styx for J.F.K., but not L.B.J. And others saw blood dripping from the robes of Camelot.

It is difficult to guess just who thought that Harvard [with a Boston accent] could do no wrong and "My fellow Americans" [L.B.J.] could do no right.

HARVARD AND L. B. J.

One hates to even imagine that the destiny of America might have—and still could—hinged on a slipped syntax or a Hollywood profile.

And there McGovern gets a plus. The man is plain looking to the horror of the Beautiful People who never tire of running a John Barrymore for President. "When McGovern crossed his legs, a vast expanse of white shin was exposed to the cameras. Gloria Steinem solved that problem and set McGovern on the road to recovery by dashing to a local mens' store and bringing back a pair of over-the-calf socks." From "McGovern."

Gloria, please get your cosmetician hands off our Populist, he's got enough problems with "friends" trying to help him.

ASIAN DRUG INFLOW FOUND "GREATER THAN REALIZED"

HON. PHILIP M. CRANE

OF ILLINOIS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, August 7, 1972

Mr. CRANE. Mr. Speaker, recently the New York Times printed an article under the headline, "Asian Drug Inflow Found 'Greater Than Realized'." In the course of the article, which was a lengthy one—about 42 inches of copy—it developed that the Bureau of Narcotics had concluded that the amount of high-quality heroin being smuggled into this country from Southeast Asia is "greater than previously realized."

I must say, Mr. Speaker, this announcement comes as no revelation to a thinking person, except, perhaps, to the Bureau of Narcotics. I, for one, have always maintained that the drug flow from Red China, euphemistically referred to nowadays as "mainland China," was greater than publicly acknowledged.

I also have a very brief, one-paragraph news note from the Washington Post of August 2, mentioning a $1 million haul of heroin in New York. Origin of the heroin? "Mainland China." The investigation leading to these arrests had been in progress for 3 months; no doubt there are similar ones still going on. I will not be surprized to hear in the next few months of similar drug traffic exposés, with a similar point of origin for the contraband.

It is unrealistic to place most of the blame on Turkey and France for the tremendous influx of drugs into our country. After all, what interest has Turkey in undermining the character of America's citizens? Surely not the same interest that Red China, given her ideological convictions, has in weakening America. Red China is trying very hard, and so far, with great success, to utilize this most recent weapon in the "continuous revolution" between the Communist world and the non-Communist world.

It is no accident that the young men who go at their country's calling to fight a war in Southeast Asia are the ones most vulnerable to the drug-plague and the ones hardest hit by it. It is no accident, either, that our Government policy has low-keyed the Chinese role in the drug traffic—political and diplomatic expediencies play their parts in the attempt to cast the blame on France and Turkey.

I am encouraged that my first point has been acknowledged; how long will it be until the second one is recognized?

Mr. Speaker, I insert two newspaper articles in the RECORD at this point:

[From the New York Times, July 28, 1972]

ASIAN DRUG INFLOW FOUND "GREATER THAN REALIZED"

(By Seymour M. Hersh)

WASHINGTON, July 27.—A secret analysis by the Government's top narcotics enforcement agency has concluded that the amount of high-quality heroin being smuggled into the United States from Southeast Asia "is greater than previously realized."

The new Government report, compiled last month by the Strategic Intelligence Office of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, further showed that narcotics-control personnel was beginning to accumulate evidence linking organized crime to the Southeast Asian drug market.

Another Government study, reported on in The New York Times on Monday, concluded that there was "no prospect" of halting the drug flow from Southeast Asia into the United States. This Cabinet-level study was later discounted by the man who commissioned it—Egil M. Krogh Jr., a special White House aide for narcotics matters.

Mr. Krogh said "there has been substantial progress" in reducing the influx of drugs from Southeast Asia.

The Narcotics Bureau report stated that "the traffic at present relatively unorganized, but has definite potential for expansion as a replacement for Turkish-French heroin."

Officials from the Central Intelligence Agency, State Department, Narcotics Bureau and Defense Department "are presently reviewing the international trade," the report added, "with particular focus on Southeast Asia as an alternate to the Middle East as a source of supply."

WHITE HOUSE THINKS OTHERWISE

Nixon Administration spokesmen have repeatedly maintained publicly, in opposition to statements of critics, that heroin smuggled from Southeast Asia makes up only a small fraction of the total United States annual supply.

Last month Nelson G. Gross, the State Department's senior adviser for international narcotics matters, told a Congressional hearing that "the overwhelming majority of the heroin coming to the United States originates in the Middle East and is processed in European laboratories before being smuggled into our country. We estimate that probably 5 per cent and certainly no more than 10 per cent of the heroin presently flowing into the United States originates in Southeast Asia."

The Cabinet-level study, while completed last February, was at odds with Administration thinking in its conclusions that there was "no prospect under any conditions that can realistically be projected, of stopping the drug flow from Southeast Asia. It was immediately assailed by Mr. Krogh.

Asked in an interview today about the Narcotics Bureau's analysis, Mr. Krogh acknowledged that "from what I've learned so far, there has to be a strong likelihood" that organized crime is involved in the flow of heroin from Southeast Asia, but he added that the evidence was not yet conclusive.

"STATISTICS ARE FLUID"

He emphasized that the Administration set up its international narcotics program only 18 months ago. Because of this, he said, it would be "impossible" to estimate accurately which area in the world was responsible for which percentage of the heroin reaching the United States. "Statistics at this time are so fluid," he said.

Other officials said that content of the bureau's analysis had been approved by that agency's over-all intelligence board before its dissemination inside the Government.

The Narcotics Bureau, a Justice Department agency, indicated in its study, made available today, that much of the growing amount of heroin from Southeast Asia was being smuggled into the United States by "essentially political Chinese entrepreneurs operating out of Laos, Thailand and Hong Kong. The heroin is sold to ethnic Chinese seamen, many of whom may be organized, who jump ship once their vessels dock in the United States.

Further intelligence may "reveal more precisely the role of Far East heroin in the United States," the document said, "and may reveal the substance of long-standing hitherto unverifiable reports of a 'Chinese-Corsican' connection between morphine base from the Orient and the chemical expertise of the Marseille area. Perhaps this preliminary report will stimulate interest in acquiring more data on the 'Chinese connection'." Morphine is another product of opium, which is extracted from poppy seeds.

Intelligence reports "over the past year indicate an increase in the number of ethnic Chinese who illegally enter the United States and Canada," the document said, adding that the volume and the pattern of techniques used in the delivery of narcotics were not sufficiently known.

"However," the report said, the bureau "views the amount as a serious and increasing threat."

EIGHT CHINESE ARRESTED

Government intelligence agencies recently set up a joint effort, known as Project Sea Wall, to stem the growing smuggling through United States and Canadian dock areas. Within a month of the program's initiation on April 7, the report said, eight ethnic Chinese were arrested, most of them carrying one to four pounds of high-quality heroin strapped to their bodies.

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NEW YORK TIMES
6 AUG 1972

[redacted]

STATINTL

U.S. AIDES OPPOSE CURB ON THAILAND

Say Cooperation Is Way to Stem Narcotics Flow

By DANA ADAMS SCHMIDT

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Aug. 5—Officials of the State Department and Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs are telling all who will listen that the way to persuade the Government of Thailand to help stem the flow of narcotics from Southeast Asia is by cooperating with the Thais—not by imposing penalties.

The officials are alarmed by a move sponsored by Representative Robert F. Steele, Republican of Connecticut, to cut off $100-million in aid to Thailand on the ground that the Thais are turning their backs on the transit through their country of huge quantities of Burmese-grown opiates, along with smaller quantities grown in Thailand.

Mr. Steele and other critics maintain that Thai officials and their friends are beginning to fill the gap that will be left if Turkey keeps her promise to stop growing opium poppies this year.

Curb Tied to Aid Bills

The aid cutoff was attached as an amendment in committee to this year's foreign aid bill.

Basing their position on State Department and Bureau of Narcotics intelligence, officials of the two departments asserted this week that the allegations were untrue and that the measures proposed were dangerous.

A State Department official said: "Slapping them in the face is bound to be counterproductive. These people are sensitive. They have been independent for centuries. We are in danger of destroying our influence completely and reproducing the situation already existing in Burma, where we got no cooperation at all."

The United States, the officials said, is interfering with an ancient pattern. They said that the 500 tons of opium grown annually in Burma and Thailand had for more than a century been consumed mainly in Asia. The traffic was largely in the hands of ethnic Chinese, they said, and the Thais rarely interfered.

Thais Starting to Help

The officials said that while many Thais remain indifferent, others were beginning to cooperate with the United States. The new vogue for opium in the form of heroin has caught on among young Thais, they said, and this has upset the military regime, which has a puritanical streak. In addition, some Meo tribesmen in the north who grow opium are also Communist insurgents whom the Government wants to suppress.

Since Ambassador Leonard Unger exchanged "letters of understanding" on the narcotics problem with the Thai Government last September, the officials said, the following achievements have been reported:

¶The Bureau of Narcotics has helped the Thai narcotics office set up a 50-man mobile team in the north and is preparing to set up another in the Bangkok area.

¶The first team, backed by provincial police and two helicopters, has been responsible for gathering most of the $347,455,000 worth of opium, morphine base and heroin seized since mid-March.

¶Half a dozen young American veterans from Vietnam and four teen-age girls who tried to organize a heroin courier service to New York have been arrested.

¶American technological aid will soon supplement Thai intelligence in an effort to move in on the trawler traffic out of Bangkok. The trawlers unload opiates in Malaysia, Borneo, the Philippines and Hong Kong. The opiates are exported from these ports to the United States and Europe.

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NEW YORK TIMES
6 AUG 1972

Drug Traffic:

Furor Over the Asian Pipeline

WASHINGTON—A bill to cut off $100-million in military and economic aid to Thailand as a penalty for failing to halt the flow of narcotics to the United States will come before the House on Tuesday. It is unlikely that the measure will ever become law—it has already been defeated in the Senate—but it does reflect a furor in Washington over official handling of the Southeast Asian drug traffic problem.

Behind the furor is the fear that a new wave of opiates, especially heroin, is on its way to the United States, particularly from Thailand, which in turn gets the narcotics from Burma.

Until now, the bulk of the illicit heroin supply entering the United States was siphoned off from the 200 tons of opium produced in Turkey. Turkey has promised to stop growing opium poppies by the end of this year. But a number of members of Congress are troubled by the knowledge that some of the 500 tons of opium produced each year by the hill tribes of Burma and neighboring countries could profitably be diverted to the United States.

Moreover, there is suspicion that certain corrupt Thais are pulling the wool over the eyes of officials in the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, the State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency who are supposed to block the flow of opiates. Or worse, that Americans have also been corrupted.

But many of the legislators who have been digging out "secret documents" and hurling accusations are ill-informed about the realities of the situation.

For a century or more, opium has been grown by the hill tribes in Southeast Asia. It was bought up by the Chinese traders and distributed to the addicts of Asia. Hardly anyone in America cared.

In recent years this pattern has been changed slightly as the main source of the Burmese opium has fallen into the hands of a Chinese named Lo Hsing-han, whose militia of about 1,500 men controls the mule train route to the refineries at Tajilik in southern Burma where the raw opium is processed into morphine base or heroin. The Burmese Government does not interfere with Lo because he also helps them control Communists and other insurgents in the area. Nelson Gross, the State Department's senior senior adviser on narcotics, met Premier Ne Win of Burma last January and has had follow-up conferences at lower levels, but the Burmese have declined outside help and have done little or nothing on their own.

The shipments continue to reach Thailand, which, according to some American officials, faces a situation comparable to that which would confront the United States if Canada made no effort to control narcotics.

Nonetheless, Mr. Gross and William T. Wanzeck, who headed the Southeast Asia regional office of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs for the past four years, feel that something can be done and is being done to stem the flow.

Mr. Gross and his colleagues argue that their critics have relied heavily on testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee by Alfred W. McCoy, a Yale graduate who in four years in Southeast Asia made it his business to find out about the narcotics traffic.

Mr. McCoy makes much of the fact that the opium is carried out of Burma by Chinese Nationalist paramilitary units that at one time were in the pay of the C.I.A. The American officials contend that this is no longer true. They say the two main Kuomintang units operating in Thailand left the narcotics trade last March when they were given land in return for a pledge to give up dope-running and for turning over 26 tons of opium, which was burned.

The Narcotics Bureau claims other achievements:

- They have helped the Thai Narcotics Office to set up special anti-narcotics teams, one of which in the northern area of the country has been responsible for seizing $347-million worth of morphine and heroin since March.
- New technological aid is being given the Thais to help curb the flow of narcotics on trawlers that carry the drugs from Thailand to Malaysia, Borneo, the Philippines and Hong Kong.
- The Thai Government is the first nation to enter into an agreement with the United Nations whereby farmers who give up growing opium will be recompensed. The Thais are contributing $5-million towards the program, the United States $2-million.

As Mr. Gross said last week, "Basically we are trying to anticipate what the narcotics operators are going to do to exploit Southeast Asian supplies. We have agents out. We have some chance of success."

—DANA ADAMS SCHMIDT

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THE ECONOMIST
21 AUG 1971

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STATINTL

Heroin run

Trade in Turkey is bad but the narcotics dealers are doing well in Thailand. Just when the Americans are congratulating themselves that the opium traffic from Turkey is ending they discover that more heroin is coming into the United States from south-east Asia than they realised.

Stopping the flow of heroin at its source is a mammoth task. The Administration is already giving the Turkish government money to help the peasants who will not be allowed to grow another crop of opium after this year. In south-east Asia the problem is even more difficult. A high level report prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency claims that it will be virtually impossible to stem the flow of drugs from this area because of the lack of co-operation from both the governments concerned and from Americans living in the area. A book called "The Politics of Heroin in South-east Asia," which is due to be published in September, comes to virtually the same conclusion. But the author, Mr McCoy, goes further and accuses the agency itself of collusion with those trafficking in drugs.

Generally the CIA prefers not to respond to criticism but this book, which some officials were allowed to see before publication, has triggered heated denials and allegations that the evidence used is out of date. But these protestations seem to ring rather hollow since the agency's own report appears to support much of the evidence used in the book against the governments in the region. It is obviously a sensitive subject. The CIA has its own reason for wanting to protect its agents who are involved in highly dangerous operations. But it also seems that the Administration wants to protect the reputation of the governments in south-east Asia. Its spokesmen are now saying that the evidence used in the CIA report which was completed last February is out of date and that the governments concerned are co-operating enthusiastically in the fight against narcotics.

The most effective part of the attack on heroin seems to be within the United States itself, judging from the figures. The federal narcotics authorities claim to have seized an average of 71 lb of heroin a month, or $31m worth, on the east coast alone in the past 12 months. This is nearly nine times more than in the same period of the previous year. These successes have led to both an increase in the price of a gramme of heroin from $418 to $785 and to a lowering of the quality of the heroin on sale. This may not have helped those who are already addicted but it may have stopped others from getting hooked. The real effects of the programme are unlikely to be felt for a few years. At present no one is even sure how many heroin addicts there are in the United States. President Nixon has now asked Congress to add another $135m to bring the total for the fight against narcotics next year to over £300m.

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NEW HAVEN, CONN.
REGISTER
AUG 4 1972
E - 104,849
S - 122,459

Book Coming Out Despite CIA

A Yale student's book linking the Central Intelligence Agency to Southeast Asian heroin traffic will be published this month despite the CIA's objections to it.

Harper & Row will publish "The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia" by Alfred W. McCoy, a Yale graduate student, on Aug. 17, according to the author.

The book charges that the CIA was aware of, and at times a participant in, heroin business conducted by government officials in Laos, South Vietnam and Thailand.

The CIA asked to review the book prior to publication, saying that it could disprove a number of McCoy's claims. The publishing company told McCoy it would not print the book if he refused this review.

The CIA sent Harper & Row a letter listing its objections Thursday, but McCoy said most of them were simply "flat denials."

McCoy said this morning he felt the agency was trying to squash the book but that extensive coverage of the CIA review in the news media caused it to pull back.

McCoy said many of his charges — substantiated in the book — were supported by news stories as well following the CIA request to review the book.

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NEW YORK TIMES
4 AUG 1972

A Long War on Drugs

U.S. Drive on Smuggling May Prove As Protracted as the Vietnam Conflict

By JAMES M. MARKHAM

The worldwide American war on opium-growing and heroin-smuggling promises to be at least as protracted, and perhaps as inconclusive, as the conflict in Vietnam.

As an awareness of the dimensions of the effort spreads, officials are beginning to scale down their expectations. There is less talk of burning the world's poppy fields. The emphasis now is on disrupting supply routes, pinching the flow of heroin into this country and, by reducing availability on the street, perhaps reducing heroin experimentation by young Americans.

News Analysis

It was not always so. A year ago, after announcing that Turkey had agreed to suppress opium cultivation, President Nixon spoke of a "significant breakthrough." Since Turkish opium was thought to account for 80 per cent of the heroin injected by American addicts, some Administration officials appeared to think that the rest of the struggle would be downhill.

More recently, however, "we began to see that we were dealing with a worldwide proposition, not a regional one," Egil M. Krogh, Jr., the White House coordinator of narcotics matters, said in an interview.

Smugglers Moved East

While the Turkish connection is being phased out, some smugglers appear to have moved farther east, to Afghanistan and Pakistan, whose opium crops appear to be meeting the new demand, according to some intelligence estimates.

At the same time, others have moved into the lucrative Far Eastern production area, which is reported to be in a state of oversupply. New routes and new heroin refinery sites are being opened. A heroin laboratory is reported to be operating in the Philippines for the first time, for example.

And so, having put pressure on the Turks to close down the opium business, Washington now finds itself chasing after a panoply of producers and smugglers in less manageable parts of the world. Fifty-seven nations have been selected for diplomatic attention—either as producing or transshipment areas—

The combination of furious United States diplomatic activity abroad and the continuing ravages of addiction at home often gives the impression that American addicts have a corner on the world opium market.

Yet, in fact, they are marginal consumers. The Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs estimates the annual illicit world production of opium at 1,200 to 1,500 tons and the illicit American consumption at 60 to 100 tons—that is, 6 to 10 tons of heroin.

And the American market, it is reckoned, can be supplied through the cultivation of 5 to 10 square miles of arable, upcountry land.

Already Narcotics Bureau agents in South America have been alerted to watch for the inauguration of poppy cultivation in the Andes, where small Chinese communities now cultivate tracts to supply their own habits.

"But there is such an oversupply still around the world," one well-placed narcotics official said, "that there is no need for anybody to start planting poppies in Kenya."

Border Seizures Increased

As for seizures at the borders of the United States, even Administration officials are not especially sanguine about stopping the inflow.

"For heroin alone, 1,541 pounds were seized last year, compared with 488 pounds in 1970 and 360 pounds in 1969," says an internal State Department memorandum. "While the increase is significant, it should be pointed out, 1,541 pounds of heroin represented only a small part of the estimated 6 to 10 tons of heroin consumed by the half-million addicts in the United States."

Is the whole effort at stopping poppy cultivation and chasing cosmopolitan smugglers bankrupt?

"It's nonsense to me to keep reading these stories about how we're going to stop it from growing," observed Myles Ambrose, the special assistant attorney general designated by President Nixon to attack the heroin-distribution system at the level of the street pusher.

Mr. Ambrose also acknowledged the difficulties involved in trying to stop heroin from coming into this country.

Big Dealers a Main Target

But, sounding a theme heard elsewhere, he insisted that the harassment and prosecution of smugglers and big-time dealers might upset supply systems and persuade some to get out of the business altogether.

"We're going to make it hard for the professionals," he said. "If the amateurs get in the business, we've got a better opportunity to catch them."

And, as a foreseeable short-term goal, Mr. Ambrose said that the over-all law-enforcement effort, by reducing the availability of heroin on the street, might make it less likely that youngsters would experiment with the drug—and become addicts. The current shortage of heroin on the East Coast—laid to the seizure of heroin laboratories in France—is a case in point, he added.

"The fact of the matter is that we're not thinking so much about the addicts as the 10 million other people they might infect," he said.

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DECATUR, ALA.
DAILY

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E - 19,407
S - 18,845

AUG 3 1972

STATINTL

Traffic In Narcotics Shifting To China

One problem for which this country doesn't have an answer is what to do about narcotics, and the largest of that problem comes directly in stopping the supply.

Keeping someone from harming themselves by its use is also a fact we don't have an answer for, but unless the movement is stopped there is little that can be done about using it.

To us there seems to be a simple answer to ending the traffic, but like so many other things it is easier said than done. Narcotic traffic won't cease until there is no profit in dealing with it. At present the profits must be higher than the average man can possibly envision, and thus the traffic grows faster.

Efforts to stop the traffic have been made with varying measures of success, now it is becoming apparent another source of supply is being uncovered. Read Seymour Hersh's story that follows:

A secret analysis by the government's top narcotics enforcement agency has concluded that the amount of high-quality heroin being smuggled into the United States from Southeast Asia "is greater than previously realized."

The government report, compiled last month by the Strategic Intelligence Office of the Bureau Of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs further revealed that narcotics personnel are beginning to accumulate evidence linking organized crime to the Southeast Asian drug market.

Officials from the Central Intelligence Agency, The State Department Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs and the Defense Department "are presently reviewing the international trade," the report added, "with particular focus on Southeast Asia as an alternate to the Middle East as a source of supply."

"The traffic at present is relatively unorganized," the Narcotics Bureau document said," but has definite potential for expansion as a replacement for Turkish-French heroin."

Spokesmen for the Nixon Administration have repeatedly maintained in opposition to statements of critics, that the amount of heroin smuggled from Southeast Asia makes up only a small fraction of the total United States annual supply.

Last month Nelson Gross, the State Department's senior adviser for international narcotics matters, told a congressional hearing that "the overwhelming majority of the heroin coming to the United States originates in the Middle East and is processed in European labs before being smuggled into our country. We estimate that probably only 5 per cent and certainly no more than 10 per cent of the heroin presently flowing to the United States originates in Southeast Asia."

A cabinet level study has concluded that "there is no prospect" of reducing the smuggling of narcotics from Southeast Asia "under any conditions that can realistically be projected." The report was debunked later that day by Egil M. Krogh, a special White House aide for narcotics, who told a news briefing that he disagreed with its conclusion. Krogh also said that "there has been substantial progress" in cutting off the flow of narcotics from Southeast Asia.

Asked in an interview about the drug bureau's analysis Krogh acknowledged that "from what I've learned so far, there has to be a strong likelihood" that organized crime is involved in the flow of heroin from Southeast Asia, but he added [illegible] conclusive.

The White House aide emphasized that the administration had set up its international narcotics program only 18 months ago. Because of this, he said, it would be "impossible" to accurately estimate which area in the world is responsible for what percentage of the heroin is reaching the United States.

Other officials said the content of the drug bureau analysis had been approved by that agency's over-all intelligence board and its high officials prior to its dissemination inside the government.

The narcotics bureau study indicated that much of the growing amount of heroin from Southeast Asia is being smuggled into the operating out of Laos, Thailand and Hong Kong. The heroin is sold to ethnic Chinese seamen — many of whom may be organized — who jump ship when their vessels dock in the United States.

Further intelligence may "reveal more precisely the role of Far East heroin in the United States," the document said, "and may reveal the substance of long-standing, hitherto unverifiable, reports of a Chinese-Corsican' connection between the morphine base from the orient and the chemical expertise of the Marseilles area. . . perhaps this preliminary report will stimulate interest in acquiring more data on the 'Chinese connection.' " Morphine is another product of opium, which is the material extracted from the dried juice of the opium poppy.

The report listed docks in San Francisco, New York, Miami and Vancouver (British Columbia), as areas with some degree of organized smuggling, but also said that high-quality Southeast Asian heroin had entered the United States through other ports, among them Seattle, [illegible] Baltimore and Philadelphia.

continued

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The analysis contained a number of clues indicating that the amount of organized smuggling could be far higher than even now suspected.

It cited the arrest of a Philippine diplomat late last year in New York City with 17 kilograms of a brand of highly refined heroin known as "double uoglobe." It was the diplomat's third trip to the United States, the analysis said. "at least one previous time he was accompanied by a known Chinese heroin dealer in Bangkok."

The Narcotics Bureau analysis tended to support the position of the leading critics of the administration's narcotics drive — Rep. Robert H. Steele, R-Conn., and Alvin W. McCoy, a Yale graduate student who has written an expose of the heroin traffic in Southeast Asia.

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WASHINGTON STAR

3 AUG 1972

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STATINTL

Ex-FBI Official to Be Named U.S. Aide Heading Drug Data

William C. Sullivan, the top FBI administrator who was forced to retire after the late J. Edgar Hoover locked him out of his office, will be appointed special assistant Attorney General in charge of a new National Narcotics Intelligence Center.

Sullivan, 60, was forced out of the FBI last October after 30 years with the bureau reportedly because his attempts to modernize the bureau and his close relationship with former Attorney General John N. Mitchell and other high Justice Department officials made Hoover furious.

While Sullivan was on sick leave, Hoover had his name taken off his office door and the locks changed. Sullivan was assistant director of the bureau at the time of his forced retirement and was once thought to be a likely successor to Hoover.

Since January, Sullivan has been chief of operations of the Insurance Crime Prevention Institute in Westport, Conn.

The Justice Department would neither confirm nor deny Sullivan's appointment but high administration sources said he would head the new narcotics intelligence office.

President Nixon asked Congress last week for $2.5 million for the intelligence center. It came as part of his request for $135.2 million in supplemental funds for his campaign against drug abuse. The extra funds sought by Mr. Nixon are mainly for research and rehabilitation programs.

As head of the new center, Sullivan would be charged with "developing and maintaining a national narcotics intelligence system and analyzing information related to illicit traffic."

Other agencies, including the Central Intelligence Agency, the FBI, the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs and the Defense and State Departments would be required to feed information to the new office.

As assistant director of the FBI, Sullivan was in charge of the bureau's domestic intelligence division. He also served as an FBI intelligence agent outside the country during World War II.

The center would be the third agency in the Justice Department dealing with drug abuse. The other two are the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs and the Office of Drug Abuse Law Enforcement.

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WASHINGTON STAR
3 AUG 1972

STATINTL

Sullivan to Rejoin Justice

By JEREMIAH O'LEARY
Star-News Staff Writer

William C. Sullivan, who was forced to retire last October as a top official of the FBI after a feud with the late J. Edgar Hoover, will soon be named to a new Justice Department post as coordinator of all narcotics intelligence.

He will be appointed by Att. Gen. Richard Kleindienst as a special assistant with wide-ranging authority to act as the clearing house for all narcotics intelligence assembled by all agencies of the U. S. government, officials said in confirming published reports.

Sullivan, 60, will create a focal point for drug intelligence that has never existed before and which some officials said has long been needed.

He will set up a national narcotics system with information drawn from the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, the armed forces, the State Department and the Office of Drug Abuse Enforcement in the Justice Department.

His mandate, according to government sources, will be to coordinate all foreign and domestic intelligence on the narcotics traffic and to disseminate information from his files to agencies that require it.

Nixon administration sources said the position will not make Sullivan a "czar" over Myles J. Ambrose, the attorney general's special assistant for enforcement of drug laws or John E. Ingersoll, who heads BNDD.

Sullivan has a reputation as both a scholar and an intelligence analyst. For many years, he was the FBI's acknowledged expert on subversion. It was this expertise that led to his collision of wills with Hoover that led to his abrupt departure from the FBI after 30 years of services.

Basically, Sullivan disagreed with Hoover about the threat of domestic communism. Hoover until his death regarded the communists as the foremost enemy of the nation while Sullivan believed the newer and more radical groups such as the SDS and the Black Panthers were the primary enemy.

Insiders said Sullivan and Hoover began exchanging sarcastic and sometimes fiery memoranda. Sullivan also wanted to modernize FBI investigative techniques and collided head-on with Hoover's implacable will on that front, too.

The clash came in late September and resulted in Hoover taking action on a weekend, when Sullivan was on leave, to change the locks on his office door and also to have Sullivan's name removed from the entranceway.

Sullivan had been moved up to the Number Three spot in the FBI in July, 1971, replacing Assistant to the Director Cartha D. DeLoach.

But Sullivan had many friends in the Justice Department, including Kleindienst and former Atty. Gen. John M. Mitchell. Hoover's death last May removed the last obstacle to his return to high government position.

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STATINTL [redacted]
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friend's father, there were the boys, both 13, and then the explosion, the silence, the ambulance to Prince William Hospital without hope.

His father, Thomas Mullendore, said of his son's death last night that it was "purely accidental." He said Roy had taken a National Rifle Association hunter safety course in June, while the family was visiting Ethiopia.

Roy knew how to handle automatics. He was familiar with other types of revolvers, the father said. "He was familiar with all types of firearms; he has fired a .22 caliber pistol and rifle on ranges."

But perhaps because of the safety training, Mullendore, a communications specialist, would allow no guns in his home.

"I don't own a firearm and I have not let my children own even a BB gun," the father said yesterday. "Anyone that has a firearm in his house is . . . well, I just don't know."

"It was an accident," the father of the other boy said.

"I don't want to talk about it. The kids were just fooling around like kids do."

Police placed no charges against the youth; the neighbors were understanding yesterday, talking of the dead boy's popularity.

A little girl remembered Roy Mullendore lent her a face mask at the neighborhood pool; a classmate at Marsteller Junior High wept to tell of the two going fishing. "Roy was a pretty good guy," the fishing companion said.

Roy was born in San Jose, Costa Rica. He was a Boy Scout and high school student of distinction, a swimmer and competitor at track.

He collected poems, and his favorite poet was the Canadian balladeer Robert W. Service. The boy's favorite work, his father said, was Service's best known, "The Shooting of Dan McGrew."

Yesterday he came home from summer school at Stonewall Jackson High School where he had been taking a typing course.

His father, taking his day off at home, saw him briefly. Roy ate a light lunch and left.

It was the police who come to the house after the accident who told Mullendore he would never see Roy alive.

MANDATORY JAIL SENTENCES FOR NONADDICT DRUG PUSHERS

HON. BARBER B. CONABLE, JR.

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, August 2, 1972

Mr. CONABLE. Mr. Speaker, during the past 4 months a number of individuals and organizations in the Rochester area have endorsed a proposal I cosponsored providing for mandatory jail sentences for nonaddict drug pushers and providing Federal judges with additional discretion in deciding whether or not to release these nonaddict pushers on bail.

My constituents feel, as I do, that there is a different degree of culpability involved between a professional pusher and his addict counterpart and that the law should reflect this difference between the two. Professional pushers are often involved with organized crime and, according to the Department of Justice, may have jumped bond and continue to supply American addicts from foreign bases.

This course of action has been endorsed by the Monroe County legislature; the Council of the City of Rochester; Monroe County District Attorney Jack B. Lazarus; five Rotary Clubs; the Girl Scouts of Rochester and Genessee County; the Church of the Holy Spirit, Penfield, N.Y.; and over 1,300 interested individuals. These endorsements indicate the strong desire at the grassroots for tougher action against drug pushers. I hope every Member of Congress will review this proposal and aid the effort to secure its favorable consideration by Congress.

HEROIN ADDICTION: THE WAR BROUGHT HOME

HON. DON EDWARDS

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, August 2, 1972

Mr. EDWARDS of California. Mr. Speaker, there are many reasons why the United States must end the war in Vietnam and many unanswered questions regarding why the war continues. Increasingly our attention is drawn to a reason, and a question, that have become paramount—the infection of our society through the Southeast Asian heroin traffic and the failure of the U.S. Government to use its power over Asian allies to stop their complicity in the drug traffic. An editorial which recently appeared in the Washington Post describes a report by Government agencies, including the CIA, which have recently investigated the involvement of officials of the governments of Thailand and South Vietnam in the narcotics traffic. This connection between heroin smuggling and the very highest governmental levels of our Asian allies has been well documented and long known. The destruction of the lives of young soldiers who became addicted in Vietnam is, unfortunately, becoming a human tragedy equally well documented and known. The question is, when are we going to stop the war and end this source of heroin addiction?

The article follows:

HEROIN AND THE WAR

Alfred McCoy, a Yale graduate student who interviewed 250 people, charges that the Central Intelligence Agency has known of Thai and South Vietnamese official involvement in heroin traffic, has covered up their involvement and has participated in aspects of the traffic itself. The CIA has publicly denied these charges, in the process even persuading Mr. McCoy's publisher, Harper & Row, to let it review his book manuscript before publication. But now there comes an internal government report—done by the CIA and other agencies—on the difficulties of controlling the narcotics trade in Southeast Asia. The report states:

"The most basic problem, and the one that unfortunately appears least likely of any early solution, is the corruption, collusion, and indifference at some places in some governments, particularly Thailand and South Vietnam, that precludes more effective suppression of traffic by the governments on whose territory it takes place."

That is to say, a private report by agencies including the CIA confirms the thrust of charges which the CIA publicly denies. The White House contends the report, completed in February, is "out of date."

Now, we are aware that the Nixon administration has worked with great vigor and much effectiveness to curb the international narcotics trade. The fact remains that the largest supplies of the filthiest prison of them all apparently come from or through Thailand and South Vietnam, if one is to take the CIA's private word—as against its public word—on the matter. Nor should it stretch any reasonable man's credulity to understand that the United States has had to accept certain limitations on its efforts to get those governments to stop drug dealing because it has wanted to ensure their cooperation in the war against North Vietnam. In the final human analysis there is simply no place in the pursuit of honor and a just peace in Southeast Asia for an all-out honest effort to control traffic in heroin. This is the infinitely tragic fact flowing from continued American involvement in the war.

Would heroin addiction among Americans have swollen to its current dimensions and would the amount of heroin reaching the United States from South Vietnam and Thailand have reached its current levels if the war—and power politics—had not gotten in the way of effective American pressure upon the governments in Saigon and Bangkok? If President Nixon needs any further reason to make good his pledge to end the war, this is almost reason enough by itself for what it says about the character of regimes this country has gotten into the habit of supporting—lavishly and indiscriminately—in the name of our "national security" and world peace."

DEDICATES NEW CHURCH BUILDING

HON. JOSEPH M. GAYDOS

OF PENNSYLVANIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, August 2, 1972

Mr. GAYDOS. Mr. Speaker, recently the Free Magyar Reformed Church of McKeesport, Pa., dedicated a new building which stands as a testimonial to the deep and abiding religious faith of its congregation and its pastor, the Reverend Barnabas Roczey.

I was privileged to participate in the dedication which climaxed a 12-year building program on the part of these faithful members of the church and their many friends. It was an occasion which attracted ranking officials of the Reformed Church and other dignitaries. Among them were: the Reverend Dr. Laszlo Berzeviczy; Mr. Paul St. Miklossy of the Hungarian Reformed Federation of America; the Reverend Louis Nagy; the Right Reverend Dezso Abraham, who is a Bishop of the Hungarian Reformed Church in America; Mr. Elmer Charles, national president of the William Penn Fraternal Association; Judge Albert Fiok and the Reverend Zoltan Kovacs, principal speakers for the evening; and Pastor Roczey.

The decision of the Free Magyar Reformed Church to build a new house of worship was made back in 1960. The step was the purchase of property on the outskirts of the city of McKeesport, where it was decided to construct a new sanctuary, Sunday school classrooms, a fellowship hall and a parsonage. Ten years later, the congregation authorized the church council to proceed with the drawing of preliminary plans. Within 6

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material with respect to [redacted] chute from high or low altitudes. Because of its dependability and adaptability, it is the backbone of our tactical airlift force. Because of the aircraft's versatility, attrition losses, and diversion to other priority programs, there is now and there is predicted to be a significant shortage of total C–130 resources.

As to the absence of the request for additional C–130 aircraft in the Fiscal Year 1973 Budget submission, this resulted from budget constraints and should not be construed as any indication of a lack of requirement for the aircraft. During testimony before the Department of Defense Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations earlier this year, Secretary Seamans responded to questions by the Committee concerning what programs the Air Force would include if additional funds were made available in the coming fiscal year. He listed the procurement of 12 C–130 aircraft to compensate for projected inventory deficiencies.

In April 1972, Chairman Hébert was requested to favorably consider the inclusion of 12 C–130's in his report on the FY 1973 authorization bill. His report does contain these aircraft. Subsequent to our April request projections of C–130 shortages have been aggravated by the increased aircraft losses resulting from the current invasion of South Vietnam. Accordingly, the President has included a request for 30 C–130 aircraft in the FY 1973 SEA Amendment. This request is presently being considered by the Senate. Should the Congress approve an FY 1973 procurement of additional C–130 aircraft, we are confident that a fair and reasonable price can and will be negotiated for the approved quantity.

I trust the above information will be helpful to you.

Sincerely,

BARRY J. SHILLITO,
Assistant Secretary of Defense,
Installations and Logistics.

LAIRD ASKS FUND SHIFT FOR PLANES

(By Michael Getler)

A day after the Senate Armed Services Committee cut $226.8 million from a supposedly high-priority Air Force national defense project, Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird wrote to the Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee and told him those cuts were "acceptable" to the Pentagon.

In that same letter, Laird recommended that the House committee allow the Pentagon to transfer $152 million of the money saved by the Senate cut back to buy other aircraft whose production lines might otherwise close soon and which had not been scheduled to receive any more funds in the current $83.4 billion military budget request for fiscal 1973.

Laird's recommendation would allow the Air Force to buy 24 more A–7 attack planes from Ling-Temco-Vought in Texas at a cost of $90 million, 12 more C–130 transports from Lockheed in Georgia at a cost of $50 million and seven of the small F–5B export fighters built by Northrop in California for $12 million.

The Defense Secretary's letter, written April 27 and made available to The Washington Post yesterday has drawn a sharp response from Rep. Les Aspin (D-Wis.). Aspin is a freshman congressman, former Pentagon civilian analyst and House Armed Services Committee member who now regularly bombards the Pentagon with charges of waste and wrongdoing.

Aspin charges that the 12 extra C–130 transports constitute "a new $50 million ballout" for Lockheed.

He also cites a letter from Henry Durham, a former Lockheed aircraft production manager who has testified before Congress on the C5A transport cost overruns, that says "political pressure, even at the White House, [redacted] million bailout."

Aspin in a statement to The Post yesterday, said he would ask Laird to respond to Durhams charges and also to explain why the Pentagon gave up so easily on the Senate's cutback of the Air Forces Airborne Warning and Control System (AWAC) project.

In testimony earlier this year, Aspin noted, "Department of Defense officials described AWACS as vital to the national security."

AWACS involves an Air Force plan to develop and build a fleet of radar and computer-packed airplanes that would provide early warning against a possible Soviet bomber attack on the United States. The Air Force wants a fleet of 42 of these planes at a total cost estimated at about $2.7 billion over the next several years.

Despite inclusion of $474 million in the Air Force fiscal 1973 budget request for AWACS and Laird's overt support, there is known to be considerable high-ranking opposition within the Nixon administration to the United States making any major new investment in defense against a very limited Soviet bomber threat when there is no defense against the much greater threat of Russian missilesm.

In January, administration officials hinted that AWACS might wind up being limited to a much smaller number of planes that could be used to plug air defense gaps or in localized air control situations. There is also a group forming in the Senate to oppose AWACS.

In his letter to House Armed Services Committee Chairman F. Edward Hébert (D-La.), Laird noted the Senate committee cuts and said, "This action is acceptable to us."

When Laird volunteered this opinion, the House committee had not voted on the military authorization bill that includes AWACS. The committee still has not passed on the measure and Aspin—who as a Pentagon critic is in a distinct minority on the committee—now says he will ask his colleagues to review the bill again because of the Lockheed situation.

The Senate committee had actually cut out $309.9 million in AWACS procurement, but added $83 million to allow research-and-development work to continue on the project, causing a net reduction of $226.9 million.

Laird went on to explain to Hébert that "during the course of my testimony before your (committee, a concern was expressed by some committee members, Defense officials say) that production for the A–7, C–130 and F–5B aircraft would be terminated after the FY 1972 purchases.

"It was emphasized," the letter continues, "that in the event of additional requirements, for these aircraft, it would be extremely difficult to restart the lines and that as a matter of prudence small quantities of these aircraft could be procured to sustain a production base at reasonable costs.

"Additionally, Laird wrote, "It was pointed out that there is a current requirement for the aircraft, but as a consequence of priority considerations they could not be included within the budget totals."

Citing "the current invasion of South Vietnam," and "increased aircraft losses," Laird said this "emphasized the need for continued production, particularly in the case of the C–130 and the F–5B." The latter, he said is used for training the South Vietnamese Air Force. Following the Senate Comimttee action in cutting AWACS, Laird said "It is now recommended that a portion of the authorization which would otherwise have been required for the FY 1973 AWACS program be applied to the procurement of 24 A–7s, 12 C–130s and 7 R–5Bs."

While this would cost $152 million, Laird said there was still $60 million saved from [redacted] $92 million would have to be authorized.

The four-engine C–130 is the workhorse of the U.S. tactical airlift forces in South Vietnam and is also an excellent gunship. It has been widely hailed as a rugged and versatile plane. Four have been lost since the Communist offensive began March 30.

The Air Force, however, has 350 of these planes already operating, 12 more on order from last year which will be delivered in 1974, and 175 in the reserve fleet, according to Air Force figures.

Durham, the former Lockheed official, wrote to Aspin on May 9 and included a short news article from the May 5 edition of the Marietta (Ga.) Daily Journal.

The article reported that the head of Lockheed's C–130 program had told a local Kiwanis meeting that the company had enough C–130 orders to keep the production line running through 1973 "and is working on 1974 now. He didn't mention," the article states, "the hoped-for Air Force order of an additional 12 planes in the 1972–73 budget which the company has said are needed to fill a future gap in the line."

Durham said he was writing to Aspin to prevent another "giveaway" of public money to Lockheed. "If the Pentagon," he wrote, "has 55 to 60 extra million dollars to blow for unneeded C–130s, it could more profitably be used to start paying back the $400 million C–5 overpayment revealed by Senator William Proxmire in the March 27 hearing."

Durham's charges of Lockheed mismanagement on the C–5A program were attacked as "highly inaccurate" by Lockheed, but the former manager's charge of overpayments made to the firm by the government were substantially validated by the General Accounting Office during hearings last March.

THE BROOKE AMENDMENT

Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, once again, we in the Senate are faced with the decision to set a specific date for cutting off funds for Southeast Asia. Over the past 10 years the history of the war has been all too consistent: announcements of deescalation, increased bombing under various guides and definitions, more death, and more destruction. Over the past 3½ years, to the credit of the Nixon administration, American ground troop involvement has been significantly reduced, but the war continues even more odiously in the air over North Vietnam and off her shores. These policies, tried under the Johnson administration, have consistently proved counterproductive and have most likely enhanced North Vietnamese resolve.

I am just as firmly convinced today as when I first spoke out against our involvement in 1964, that our policies are wrong. Since coauthoring the first amendment to end the war in 1970, many votes have taken place on this most critical issue. Today we are to vote on the Brooke amendment to halt funding for Southeast Asia 4 months after enactment of the Military Procurement Act and the simultaneous return of the prisoners of war.

Recently, a new dangerously related matter has become known with respect to our involvement in that troubled part of the world. Evidence seems to be mounting that the Golden Triangle, centered in Southeast Asia, is now a major supplier of heroin to the United States. Not only does this bring into question our support of the already dictatorial corrupt regimes of the area, but it also means that a consequence of our involve-

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NEW YORK DAILY NEWS
2 AUG 1972

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IS THE CIA A PUSHER?
Vietnam Veterans testify on
Heroin and the Military
Today and Tomorrow
12 Noon and 7 P.M.
LIVE on WRVR
(106.7 FM)

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WASHINGTON POST
2 AUG 1972

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STATINTL

Report Pessimistic On Screening Out Indochina Drugs

By Tim O'Brien
Washington Post Staff Writer

A White House report circulated among congressmen early last month gives a gloomy forecast for U.S. efforts to stem illicit narcotics trafficking in Southeast Asia, particularly Burma and South Vietnam.

The little noticed report shows that a total of only 29 tons of illegal opium or its derivatives were seized in Southeast Asia between August 1971 and June 1972. This represents about four per cent of the annual illicit production in the region, which according to the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs is approximately 700 tons.

The report—a chronology of "narcotics action" in Thailand, Laos, Burma and South Vietnam—shows that 26 of 29 tons were destroyed at Chiang Mai, Thailand, last March.

The action has frequently been cited as an indication of a crackdown in Thailand.

But columnist Jack Anderson says that "the CIA and other federal agencies have quietly informed Washington that something besides opium went up in that bonfire." He said that all but five of the 26 tons was nothing but fodder, plant material and chemicals.

The Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs refuted those charges, claiming that on-the-spot U.S. inspectors examined the material under microscopes and found it to be "genuine opium."

Andrew C. Tartaglino, Deputy Director for Operations in the BNDD, said "our chemist tested it before it was burned. There is no question—it was opium."

Anderson's colleague, reporter Les Whitten, was present at a BNDD press conference, challenging Tartaglino to make available a weekly intelligence summary compiled by the bureau from CIA and State Department reports. The summary, Whitten said, contained evidence [illegible] effect that extraneous matter was mixed with only five tons of opium."

Tartaglino said the summary was based on "raw intelligence" and had been "discounted as unreliable." He said the summary is classified and cannot be released without going through "established procedures."

The United States paid $1 million for the 26 tons of material that was voluntarily turned over by bands of Nationalist Chinese living in northern Thailand according to Tartaglino.

The White House study, signed by Richard Harkness, information director for the President's Narcotics Control Program, said there would be difficulties in any long-term effort to stem the flow of illegal drugs in South Vietnam.

"Smuggling is endemic in the country and real control is unlikely," the report said.

According to the study, South Vietnam President Thieu was handed a memorandum on May 3, 1971, "which notes relationship between narcotics problems and future U.S. role in Vietnam." The memo urged him to greatly improve "intelligence and enforcement activities to identify and arrest narcotics ringleaders and pushers."

The following day, the head of the Vietnamese national police's narcotics bureau was replaced, and its personnel expanded from 26 to 52.

But the unpublicized White House report summarized: "Encouraging as Vietnam's recognition of the problem and (its) dynamic response may be, real progress of a long-term nature is questionable."

This conclusion stands in contrast to the administration's public optimism, reiterated only a week ago by presidential assistant, Egil Krogh Jr.

The study was compiled for the White House by those State Department desks responsible for the four countries covered in the narcotics action chronology.

The report listed no specific seizures or arrests in Burma, the largest opium producing country in Southeast Asia.

The Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs estimates that Burma's illicit opium production is about 400 tons a year.

According to the report, "the Burmese government's policy of non-alignment and sensitivity to foreign influence is a limiting factor in its involvement with the U.S. or the United Nations in the narcotics field."

"There are no BNDD (Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs) or U.S. Customs programs in Burma such as exist in neighboring countries with which the U.S. is allied or has common security interests and programs," the study said.

The White House said "very little opium is now grown in Laos; less than 30 tons a year." However, the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs estimated last Tuesday that Laos produces more than three times that amount — about 100 tons a year.

"Nearly all of (the Laotian opium) still being grown is consumed by the growers," the report said. "There is no evidence that significant amounts of Lao-grown opium are entering the international traffic. Laos is a conduit for Burmese opium and opium derivatives, including heroin, however."

Of the 30 or 100 tons of opium products grown each year in Laos, less than one ton was confiscated between August 1971 and June 1972, according to the report's chronology of narcotics actions.

Although the report said that Laos is a "conduit" for Burmese opium and although only one ton was confiscated there in the 10-month period, the report concludes that "the flow of opium and heroin through Laos has been seriously disrupted."

Alfred W. McCoy, author of a soon to be published book on "The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia," testified before a Senate subcommittee early last month that "all U.S. officials in Indochina know that the vast majority of the high grade heroin sold to GIs fighting in South Vietnam is manufactured in Laotian laboratories."

"In northern Laos," he said, "Air America aircraft and helicopters chartered by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency and USAID have been transporting opium harvested by the agency's tribal mercenaries on a regular basis."

Publication of the book by Harper and Row, Inc., has been held up by a CIA request to review it. McCoy, under "strong protest," agreed to give the CIA an advance copy.

Last Friday, a CIA agent delivered "written comments and criticisms" to the New York publisher, but the company has not yet announced whether the CIA asked for revisions or a halt to publication. It is believed the firm will not agree to alter the manuscript, a source close to McCoy said.

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WASHINGTON STAR
2 AUG 1972

Drug Row Clues Went Up in Smoke

STATINTL

By MICHAEL SATCHELL
Star-News Staff Writer

The question of whether United States and Thai officials were duped by Asian drug traffickers — a charge leveled Monday by columnist Jack Anderson and denied yesterday by the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs — may never be satisfactorily answered.

The evidence, 26 tons of a substance that may or may not have been pure opium and which cost the U.S. taxpayer $1 million to purchase, has literally gone up in smoke.

It was burned, with much fanfare, on March 7 at a Thai army artillery range at Chiang Mai. The opium, worth about $1 million on the illicit Thai market, was bought by Bangkok officials from drug traffickers in the Golden Triangle area of Burma-Thailand-Laos.

The suppliers, according to the BNDD, were the remnants of the old Nationalist Chinese Army — the Kuomintang or KMT — who have operated in the region for 20 years. Their price was not cash but land for resettlement under the State Department's AID program.

Monday, Anderson charged that the wily KMT peddlers had taken five tons of opium, mixed it with 21 tons of other material and passed it off as 26 tons of pure opium.

At a press conference yesterday, Andrew Tartaglino, BNDD deputy director of operations, called the allegation "totally inaccurate" and produced two BNDD officials who had tested the opium and watched it burn. He also showed a color film tracing the opium from its pickup points, its transportation by the Royal Thai Army to Chiang Mai, and its testing by the officials.

William T. Wanzeck, BNDD regional director in Southeast Asia said he took samples from each of 319 bags which contained the opium. The samples were field-tested by Joseph E. Koles, a BNND senior forensic chemist who said yesterday he verified that the substance was opium. Wanzeck said that although the opium was handled from its purchase to its destruction by Thai officials, he was satisfied that security was tight and there was no duplicity.

Questioned yesterday, Koles said there was no more extraneous material in the substance he tested than he had encountered before in raw opium. But he acknowlelged that his tests did not determine the purity of quantity of the opium examined, only that it showed morphine present.

Les Whitten, an Anderson associate told Tartaglino yesterday he had read and copied notes from blue foldered BNDD intelligence summaries upon which Monday's column was based.

Whitten also produced a sheaf of documents marked as secret BNDD intelligence reports and which—among other things—questioned the reliability of Thai officials when it came to curbing drug traffic.

An obviously irritated Tartiglino refused newsmen's requests to see a copy of the intelligence report Whitten said he saw and also discounted the information contained in the documents Whitten produced at the press conference.

The BNDD official would say only that the agency had received some intelligence information that the opium had been strongly diluted. But he would not name the source of the report, saying only that it was raw intelligence and had been discounted.

Wanzeck was shown in the film examining the opium by taking a small sample from each of 319 sacks weighing 100 pounds apiece. Each of the sacks contained 20 opium balls called "chois."

Asked why officials didn't rip open the large sacks to see their inside contents rather than taking out small samples by slitting the side of each sack, Wanzeck said it wasn't necessary.

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ST. LOUIS POST DISPATCH

[redacted]

A Protest By The CI

Intelligence Agency Denies Links With Drug Trade In Laos

STATINTL

(The following letter to the editor of the Post-Dispatch *takes issue with statements made in an editorial printed on this page. The statements, although reflecting charges publicized over a period of several years, were based in this instance mainly on an article in the July 1972 issue of* Harper's Magazine, *titled "Flowers Of Evil, The CIA and the Heroin Trade," by Alfred W. McCoy. The article was adapted from a chapter in* The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia, *a book by Mr. McCoy, a PhD student in Southeast Asian history at Yale University, to be published in September by Harper & Row, Inc.)*

In your editorial of June 27, you state: "The connection of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency with the dope traffic in Laos has long been notorious." I write you to state that this allegation is false and unfounded. It is disappointing to see a journal of the Post-Dispatch's reputation repeating such an unfounded assertion without a check of its accuracy, any reference to the public record to the contrary, or any apparent effort to specify its sources.

Normally CIA does not respond publicly to allegations made against it. Because of the serious nature of the drug problem in this country, I am writing to you to make the record clear, although the sweeping phraseology of your comment is difficult to counter in detail.

CIA's real "connection" with the "dope traffic in Laos" has been to work against it. John E. Ingersoll, director of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, in a letter to Representative Charles S. Gubser of California on May 27, 1971 (reproduced in the Congressional Record of June 2, 1971), stated:

"Actually, CIA has for sometime been this bureau's strongest partner in identifying foreign sources and routes of illegal trade in narcotics. Their help has included both direct support in intelligence collection, as well as in intelligence analysis and production. Liaison between our two agencies is close and constant in matters of mutual interest. Much of the progress we are now making in identifying overseas narcotics traffic can, in fact, be attributed to CIA co-operation."

Roland Paul, investigator for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, reported in the April 1971 issue of Foreign Affairs "that due to the long association with the CIA, the Meo tribesmen in Laos were shifting from opium to rice and other crops."

You also allege that "The big shot of the Laotian trade is Gen. Vang Pao, an unsavory character who for the last decade has been commander of the CIA's secret army in northeastern Laos. American diplomatic officials in Laos seem to look the other way; they have confined their recent efforts to promoting Laotian laws against opium addicts."

In truth, Gen. Vang Pao is not engaged in the drug trade in Laos. On the contrary, he has, as a leader of the Meo, conducted an energetic program over the years to bring this tribal group to abandon their traditional growth of the opium poppy and develop substitute crops and new forms of livestock to provide daily sustenance and income. He has done this in the course of fighting off a North Vietnamese invasion of the Meo territories in Laos. He has received American asssistance in both of these efforts.

While vague assertions such as your editorial have been made about him in the past, the U.S. Government personnel in constant contact with him for many years have never found evidence connecting him with trafficking in narcotics.

More than one year ago, in an address before the American Society of Newspaper Editors, Richard Helms, director of Central Intelligence, stated the following:

"There is the arrant nonsense, for example, that the Central Intelligence Agency is somehow involved in the world drug traffic. We are not. As fathers, we are as concerned about the lives of our children and grandchildren as are all of you. As an agency, in fact, we are heavily engaged in tracing the foreign roots of the drug traffic for the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs. We hope we are helping with a solution; we know we are not contributing to the problem."

This statement remains valid today.

W. E. Colby
Executive Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C.



—Post-Dispatch, July 25, 1971

". . . And I Thought It Was An Escape!"

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RAMPARTS
AUG 1972

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U.S. Electronic Espionage: A Memoir

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STATINTL

ABOUT THIRTY MILES NORTHEAST of CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia, right off the Baltimore-Washington expressway overlooking the flat Maryland countryside, stands a large three story building known informally as the "cookie factory." It's officially known as Ft. George G. Meade, headquarters of the National Security Agency.

Three fences surround the headquarters. The inner and outer barriers are topped with barbed wire, the middle one is a five-strand electrified wire. Four gatehouses spanning the complex at regular intervals house specially-trained marine guards. Those allowed access all wear irridescent I.D. badges – green for "top secret crypto," red for "secret crypto." Even the janitors are cleared for secret codeword material. Once inside, you enter the world's longest "corridor"–980 feet long by 560 feet wide. And all along the corridor are more marine guards, protecting the doors of key NSA offices. At 1,400,000 square feet, it is larger than CIA headquarters, 1,135,000 square feet. Only the State Department and the Pentagon and the new headquarters planned for the FBI are more spacious. But the DIRNSA building (Director, National Security Agency) can be further distinguished from the headquarters buildings of these other giant bureaucracies –it has no windows. Another palace of paranoia? No. For DIRNSA is the command center for the largest, most sensitive and far-flung intelligence gathering apparatus in the world's history. Here, and in the nine-story Operations Building Annex, upwards of 15,000 employees work to break the military, diplomatic and commercial codes of every nation in the world, analyze the de-crypted messages, and send on the results to the rest of the U.S. intelligence community.

Far less widely known than the CIA, whose Director

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