

The New Iron Curtain

By Tom Wicker

The Supreme Court ruled last week that despite the Government's wire-tapping of a member of the Daniel Ellsberg defense team, the trial of Mr. Ellsberg and his friend, Anthony Russo, could continue. But it does not seem to be widely recognized that the charges against these two men, if sustained, will provide the Government with far more sweeping powers of secrecy and censorship than it has ever had.

In that case, John Kincaid has written in the magazine of the War Resisters League, "The executive branch will have succeeded in using the judicial branch to produce a new, repressive information control law which the legislative branch has always refused to enact." The little-known truth is that there is now no statute—none—which gives the President the explicit right to establish a system of classifying information. The classification system ("top secret," etc.) rests instead on Executive orders, and those who have violated it in the past have suffered only administrative reprimands or the loss of their jobs—not criminal prosecution.

It is a crime, declared so by statute, to make public certain information dealing with codes and atomic energy;

neither Mr. Ellsberg nor Mr. Russo did that, nor are they so charged. It is also a crime, under the Internal Security Act, to hand classified information to a Communist country; neither defendant did that either, nor are they charged with it. Among other things, Mr. Ellsberg and Mr. Russo are charged with conspiring to "defraud" the Federal Government of its "lawful function" of withholding classified information from the public. But Congress has never by statute declared that to be a "lawful function" nor made releasing classified information a crime. In this case, the Government is contending that setting up a classification system is an inherent or implied power of the executive function—which it may be; but to prosecute Mr. Ellsberg and Mr. Russo for a crime in violating an Executive order rather than a statute, the Government also has to claim that it has inherent or implied power to declare certain behavior criminal, when Congress has never done so.

The Ellsberg-Russo indictments also charge them with violation of the Espionage Act. In every other case brought under that act, the Government has had to show that the defendants acted, as the statute requires, "with intent or reason to believe that the information to be obtained is to be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any

IN THE NATION

foreign nation." But the Government, despite this plain requirement, does not so charge Mr. Ellsberg and Mr. Russo; instead, the indictment charges them with communicating the Pentagon Papers "to persons not entitled to receive them," a very different thing.

The "theft" part of the indictment, moreover, charges Mr. Ellsberg with stealing, converting and communicating information and ideas—not documents (the actual documents were Xeroxed, and the Government retains possession of the originals). The Ellsberg defense maintains that the Government has never been construed by the courts or Congress to have proprietary rights over information; it has, for instance, no right to obtain a copyright, on the theory that no government should have the power to own or control information, and that a government's information is a collective possession of its people.

These are the remarkable issues that now must go to trial. If the Government gets a conviction on these issues, and the conviction is sustained all the way through the Supreme Court, it will mean that making public classified information will have been declared a crime, although no statute makes it a crime. It will mean, further, that the Government will not even have been required to show that such an act was intended to injure the country or to aid a foreign power—only that information was passed to persons "not entitled" to have it. And finally, the Government's proprietary right to control information—not just physical documents, plans, films, etc.—will have been established.

Honest men may debate the wisdom and motives of Daniel Ellsberg and Anthony Russo in releasing the Pentagon Papers; but the implications of the case the Government seeks to make against them transcend such questions. For if that case is sustained, the Government will be enabled to make it a crime to make public anything on which it chooses to place a classification stamp. Then, anyone who discloses such information—say, an Air Force colonel "leaking" information about a faulty weapon or a wasteful program—and anyone who receives it—for instance, Joseph Alsop or Rowland Evans being clued in by the C.I.A.—will be committing a crime for which he can be prosecuted.

There is almost no limit on the Government's capacity to act in secret—which is to say its capacity to do anything it chooses.

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U.S. ISSUES REPORT TO REBUT CHARGES ON DIKE BOMBINGS

Intelligence Document Says
Hits Were Unintentional
and Damage Was Minor

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 28—The Administration today released a Government intelligence report finding that American bombing had damaged North Vietnam's dike system at 12 points. But the report concluded that the hits were unintentional, their impact was minor "and no major dike has been breached."

The eight-page report, put together largely by the Central Intelligence Agency, was given

Text of State Department's
report is on Page 2.

newsmen by the State Department to buttress the Administration's contention that North Vietnam was falsely charging the United States with bombing the dikes systematically and deliberately.

"Photographic evidence shows conclusively that there has been no intentional bombing of the dikes," the report said. The photographs were taken on July 10 and 11, a State Department official said. Later photos were not available, the official said, because reconnaissance flights by the United States Air Force were hampered by cloud conditions over the Red River Delta area in which the extensive 2,700-mile network of dikes and dams is centered.

[In the dispute between President Nixon and Secretary General Waldheim over bombing of dikes, the Secretary General called in George Bush, the United States delegate. Their conversation, while not described publicly, dealt with Mr. Nixon's charge that Mr. Waldheim had been "taken in" by Hanoi's assertions. And in South Dakota,

Senator George McGovern asserted that Mr. Nixon had "stooped beneath the dignity of his office" in his news-conference comments on bombing. Pages 2 and 10.]

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reconnaissance flights by the United States Air Force were hampered by cloud conditions over the Red River Delta area, in which the extensive, 2,700-mile network of dikes and dams is centered.

The report also said that all the dike damage occurred within close range of "specific targets of military value."

"Of the 12 locations where damage has occurred, 10 are close to identified individual targets such as petroleum storage facilities, and the other two are adjacent to road and river transport lines," the report said.

It said that because a large number of the dikes serve as the bases for roadways, "the maze they create throughout the delta makes it almost inevitable that air attacks directed against transportation targets cause scattered damage to dikes."

The report said that the bomb craters identified by photographic reconnaissance at the 12 locations "can be repaired easily with a minimum of labor and equipment—a crew of less than 50 men with wheelbarrows and hand tools could repair in a day the largest crater observed."

"Repairs to all the dikes could be completed within a week," it said.

Although the report was based on photographer reconnaissance, the State Department refused to show newsmen any of the photographic evidence. A department official said that it was decided today not to issue the photograph because it was felt by the Administration that this would only provoke North Vietnam to issue its own photographs in rebuttal, some of which might be "fabricated."

This report, including the photographs, prepared earlier and presented on Monday to Kurt Waldheim, secretary general of the United Nations, by George Bush, the United States delegate. Mr. Waldheim had said he had unofficial information that the United States was bombing the dikes.

Yesterday, at his news conference, President Nixon forcefully denied Hanoi's charges about a systematic bombing campaign against the dikes and said that Mr. Waldheim and other well-intentioned and naive people had been "taken in" by Hanoi's propaganda.

Mr. Nixon conceded, as have other spokesmen, that there had been some damage to the dikes by accidental hits. Today, North Vietnam's radio repeated that "Nixon has intentionally attacked the dike network in North Vietnam in line with all his wicked and barbarous plans. Senator J. W. Fulbright, chair-

man of the Foreign Relations Committee, was briefed along with other Senators by the C. I. A., a few days ago. He said today that he had no quarrel with the conclusion of the report. He said that the photo evidence he was shown seemed to support the view that the dike damage was near military targets.

19 MAR 1972

Memoir of a Major, but Humorless, Journalist.

By BURT HOFFMAN

Star Staff Writer

One of the curses of newspapermen today is that too many of them too often take themselves too seriously.

And Herbert L. Matthews, in this often impersonal and generally humorless memoir of his 45 years with the New York Times, takes himself more seriously than most.

Yet it is hard for one newspaperman to fault another who says of his work: "To be where history is made: to survive danger; to get off a whacking good, first-hand story for one's newspaper and get it off in time — this is what makes journalism a great and attractive profession."

Matthews, whose chief claim to fame now rests with the interviews he had with Fidel Castro in his mountain hideaway in 1957, was an editorial writer for the 17 years preceding his retirement in 1967. His other 28 years with The Times were spent in a variety of assignments, mostly overseas, including stints in Paris, Rome, Madrid, New Delhi and London. He covered the Abyssinian campaign

BOOKS

of Mussolini, the Republican side of the Spanish Civil War, the Allied battle in Italy in World War II and the amphibious landing on the French Riviera.

HIS ACCOUNT OF those years, particularly the years in Spain and his visits to Cuba, is the account of a dedicated man who cares passionately about his profession, his newspaper, the events he saw and the stories he wrote. It is this passion, and his admitted bias for "truth" as he defined truth, that brought him into conflict with many others at The Times as well as with portions of the public, including some officialdom.

As a young reporter covering the Loyalist side of the war in Spain from 1936 to 1939 he proved indefatigable and courageous — Hemingway, who was close with him much of the time, described Matthews as "brave as a badger." Matthews was at or near the front lines of most major engagements and he has justifiable pride in what he wrote.

He does not, however, have pride in what The Times printed. "The truth suffered," says Matthews, "because editors handling his

A WORLD IN REVOLUTION. A Newspaperman's Memoir. By Herbert L. Matthews. Scribner's. 462 pages. \$12.50.

Times who was covering the forces of Franco suffered no such problems and was believed even though he wrote only what was handed to him at headquarters and rarely ventured forth to see what was going on.

Much of the antagonism toward his dispatches is attributed by Matthews to the Catholicism of the editors in The Times "bulpen" who were responsible for the handling of his stories. These editors, he writes, opposed the Republican government and the support it was getting from the Communists.

Similarly, Matthews expresses much bitterness at the antagonism toward him by some of his Times colleagues and the lack of understanding of Castro and Matthews' attempts to tell the true story.

His initial interviews in the Sierra Maestra created the legend of Castro. They gave the impression that Castro, who at the time had something like 18 followers, was in fact winning his revolt against Batista. The effect was to raise Castro's morale by making him an international figure and to rally supporters to his side.

While Matthews' stories exaggerated the extent of Castro's support, they did provide an accurate impression of his political aims — aims which could be accepted by anyone who believes, as Matthews does, in justice and equality. Much dispute arose in later years over whether Castro at the time he met Matthews was a Communist. Matthews' critics contend that Castro deceived him and thus Matthews deceived the world. Matthews himself and others have pretty convincingly demonstrated that Castro's communism followed his ascendancy to power.

AN INCIDENT IN October, 1962, during the Cuban missile crisis, tells much about Matthews' relationship with The Times and with Castro. Matthews was in Mexico City with a visa to Cuba and a seat reserved on what turned out to be the last plane that left for Havana after President Kennedy's quarantine speech. His plan to visit Cuba had been the subject of a conversation between Matthews and Kennedy at the White House the previous July. Kennedy had asked Matthews to report back to him after the visit.

While awaiting the flight, Matthews also discussed his trip with Thomas E. Mann, then U.S. ambassador to Mexico, and arrangements were made for him to talk to representatives of the Central Intelligence Agency to find out what the CIA wanted to learn in Cuba. But the day before the plane left, John Oakes, editor of The Times editorial page, contacted Matthews "with orders from me high that I was not, under any circum-

tion of being trusted by the White House and the State Department, but not by my own newspaper." The moral of the incident, writes Matthews, "is that journalism is sometimes too important to be left to editors and publishers. I presume that there was some element of concern for my safety . . . but I suspect it was much more a case of the embarrassment that would have been felt — and the criticisms from obvious quarters — at the New York Times having an editor in Havana — and me, of all people — during such a crisis."

In 1963, Matthews did return to Cuba as part of a trip he was taking for background information for his editorial writing. Barred from writing anything for the news department, Matthews attempted to write for The Times Sunday magazine. But, says Matthews, "the pervading American emotionalism about Castro . . . seemed to me to affect Lester Markel, the Sunday editor, more than anyone else on The Times. . . . Since he knew nothing about Cuba, but felt very strongly about it, a barrier was raised that I could not surmount" and an article written for the magazine was rejected.

While Matthews condemns many of the editors at The Times as antagonistic toward him — and thus toward truth — his relationship with Times publishers was more sanguine — at least until Arthur Ochs Sulzberger, the current publisher, took over.

Basic to an understanding of the case Matthews presents against his editors is the historical enmity that exists between reporters and editors on virtually all newspapers. Few reporters ever believe an editor is capable of sound judgment of any sort, and a similar attitude prevails among many editors toward reporters. A reporter is, as he should be, intimately involved in his own story and his own problems. An editor is faced with the problems of many reporters compounded by the limits of space and time. As an editor myself, who has listened to the same sort of complaints Matthews levels against his editors, I nevertheless tend to sympathize with Matthews. It is questionable, however, whether Matthews is fair in ascribing truth and the purest of motives to himself while criticizing the abilities and the motives of many of his colleagues.

Interestingly, perhaps, Matthews has praise for only one Times managing editor, Carr Van Anda, who had left the scene by the time Matthews arrived. Van Anda, writes Matthews, was "the first and thus far only great managing editor that (The) Times has had. . . . I did not work under Van Anda and knew him only by reputation and office gossip."

Matthews' book is about Spain and Cuba. Much of the rest is more a series of editorial

stories would not believe his reports and mangled them or did not print them. Mat-

VIETNAM

U.S. fears of an offensive by liberation forces in South Vietnam continue to mount. Tad Szulc of the New York Times reported in the Jan. 30 edition that, according to U.S. intelligence sources, political officers among liberation military units are saying that "decisive blows" must be dealt against U.S. and Saigon troops. The same sources, presumably the CIA, also told Szulc, that the flow of "troops down the Ho Chi Minh Trail" has been 30,000 higher from October to now than during the same period a year earlier. The release of this "information" and numerous similar reports from the U.S. and Saigon military commands in South Vietnam reflect a real fear of a damaging offensive in South Vietnam. At the same time, the predictions appear to be self-serving pretexts to justify heavy U.S. bombing.

On Jan 31-Feb. 1, the U.S. stepped-up the bombing of North Vietnam again, carrying out the heaviest raids since last December. Such attacks could not possibly have a significant effect on an imminent offensive in South Vietnam and they may have increased in intensity, in yet another effort to force Hanoi to meet U.S. terms for a settlement. There have also been heavy U.S. bombings in the demilitarized zone and South Vietnamese central highlands by U.S. B-52s and fighter-bombers, with American aircraft dropping an estimated 700-900 tons of bombs on these areas Jan. 30-31, according to an AP report.

Testifying in Washington, following a recent visit to South Vietnam, Dr. E. W. Pfeifer of the University of Montana, stated that there are an estimated 23 million craters left from bombs dropped by B-52s in South Vietnam. The deep craters make land unsuitable for rice cultivation and fill up with water and provide "a perfect breeding ground for disease-bearing mosquitoes." Noting that 5.5 million acres of South Vietnamese forests were destroyed by chemical defoliation until it was halted eight months ago, Pfeifer reported that the U.S. now is destroying forests by bulldozers. Five U.S. companies, he said, using 150 tractors working from dawn to dusk, destroy about 1000 acres per day.

In the second of two articles on the Mylai massacre, Seymour Hersh wrote in the New Yorker that members of Army's Americal Division destroyed documents about the incident to protect officers involved. Basing his report on transcripts of the Army inquiry panel headed by Lt. Gen. William R. Peers, Hersh states that the Peers commission was unable to find how the Mylai 4 files had disappeared, although 400 witnesses were questioned. Peers suspected, according to Hersh, that the implicated officers themselves were among those responsible for the disappearance of the records. Furthermore, Hersh wrote, "The truth was more damaging to the Army's system than Peers could imagine: that subsequent officers of the Americal Division, who had no direct involvement with Mylai 4...had destroyed evidence to protect the officers who preceded them." Hersh also stated that at least one Saigon officer wrote a report that Americans had killed more than 400 persons in the Mylai area, and at the time American intelligence officers dismissed the report as "Vietcong propaganda."

LAOS

Heavy U.S. bombing attacks are continuing, augmented by air strikes by U.S.-supplied aircraft of the Saigon air force. It was officially admitted on Feb. 1 that Saigon planes have been bombing in Laos since December. In the ground fighting, at latest reports, the siege was continuing at the former secret CIA base at Long Chieng, south of the Plain of Jars. Pathet Lao forces have reportedly cut the road between Vientiane and the royal capital at Luang Prabang. The area of the royal capital was also said to be under attack by liberation forces...The official revelations of CIA-activity in Laos is considered part of an administration effort to get more funds for U.S. operations in Laos. Meanwhile, the numbers of Thai mercenaries being hired by the CIA to fight in Laos is steadily rising.

Don't Quote Me.

But There's Progress

On Backgrounders

By Murrey Marder

Washington Post Staff Writer

AFTER A MONTH of controversy over news gathering rules, some portions of Washington's standard diet of "background" news have slipped into the foreground. True, no government official will concede that there has been any change in established patterns of disseminating information either on background (without attribution to officials by name) or on the record (with attribution and thus public accountability for what has been said). Moreover, the collective response of White House and State Department spokesmen to inquiries about their news practices admits no innovations. But by coincidence or design, more news has been put on the public record by the White House, State and Defense, than would normally be the case since the outbreak of public dispute over government information practices.

The day-to-day practice for invoking the background device in daily briefings varies, but there is now greater government and press consciousness of the need to have policy declarations stated on the record, by identifiable officials who will take responsibility for what they say. The problem is by no means peculiar to the Nixon administration. This administration happened to land in office when the accumulation of challenges to the credibility of government were extraordinarily acute, as President Nixon acknowledged before reaching the White House.

It is too early to determine if the current shift of emphasis is merely temporary, while the heat of controversy is high, or more durable. The dispute is by no means resolved, either between the government and the press or within the sharply divided press corps, where the argument is even more intense. The officers of the White House

tion, in fact, without consulting the group's 800 members, early this month endorsed every possible variation of backgrounder.

White House Response

THE WHITE HOUSE has held no large group background briefings since the controversy erupted in mid-December. Presidential Press Secretary Ronald L. Ziegler said then that President Nixon was quite ready to end the practice if that was what the press wanted. White House spokesmen went on the record for news briefings at the President's recent round of "little summit" conferences and in the 1971 year-end reports on administration accomplishments. However, White House officials, and all others in the executive branch, reserve the right to employ background rules. Herbert G. Klein, the administration's director of communications, speaking to the Arkansas Press Association, emphasized that backgrounders will continue to be used "when we feel that it provides the public with additional needed information."

At the State Department, there was an unusual departure in press practice recently, technical in nature, but illustrative of both the changes taking place and the reasons they are needed. A television network newsmen, in open press briefing, asked how the department reconciles sweeping Communist military successes in Laos and Cambodia with what he described as the "rather glowing" forecast by "U. Alexis Johnson (at) a background briefing" on Dec. 1.

There was a noticeable pause in the proceedings. Spokesman Charles W. Bray, rarely at a loss for a circuitous response, sidestepped the identification breach and the question, replying: "I do recall that a senior official of the Department of State held a back-

ground briefing here on that subject. Let me collect my thoughts and come back to it later." With that marking-time response, Bray conferred with Robert J. McCloskey, deputy assistant secretary of state, the longest surviving chief spokesman in any Western foreign office. McCloskey, at 49, is scarred by many information policy struggles, but he has survived the Johnson and Nixon administrations' zig-zag policies on the Indochina war—probably the supreme test for any spokesman—with his own credibility intact.

It was decided to reply to the question if it was pursued the next day, as it was. Fortunately for officialdom in this instance, Under Secretary of State Johnson is a cautious speaker who had attached enough qualifications to his background statements to sustain at least an argument that new Communist successes in Laos and Cambodia resulted from unpredictable developments. "I don't think it was possible," said spokesman Bray. "to know on Dec. 1 of the qualitative improvements which the North Vietnamese had, in retrospect, clearly made" in their armament, with the addition of 130-mm. artillery and numerous tanks. This reply and other responses to the same inquiry left some press questioners dissatisfied. But others counted it a gain that the attempt was made to seek public accountability for official statements.

Troubled Officials

JOHNSON AND MANY officials at the White House, State, the Pentagon and other news centers are sincerely troubled by the dispute about background briefings. They hold that officials—especially diplomats—will be less communicative if they are required to speak on the public record. This is a central issue in the dispute, and an unmeasured but large proper-

LAOS LOSSES SPUR CALL FOR MORE AID

Americans Are Concerned
About Enemy's Drive—
Some Secrecy Lifted

By CRAIG R. WHITNEY

Special to The New York Times

VIENTIANE, Laos, Jan. 20—Concern about the unusually powerful and early Communist offensive in Laos has grown so intense that the United States Government has lifted much of the secrecy it maintained over its efforts here and is saying that, far from doing too much, the Americans are doing too little and the Administration may ask for more money.

The American establishment in Vientiane — including the Ambassador, G. McMurtrie Godley, about 300 men of the Central Intelligence Agency and the more than 100 Army and Air Force attaches—does not normally speak for attribution. In recent private background interviews, however, and during a trip that the intelligence agency sponsored to the long-secret guerrilla base and airfield at Long Tieng, officials made their concern clear.

A senior American official said that the embassy would probably run out of military and economic aid money for Laos well before the end of the fiscal year this June unless Congress raised the \$350-million ceiling on it. The reason, he said, was the serious toll of the American-backed guerrilla and regular Laotian forces since the intense Communist attack began last month and the need for bullets, bombs and artillery shells. The Administration may have to ask for more, the official added.

The Laotian Premier, Prince Souvanna Phouma, is aware of the restrictions on American aid. A European diplomat who saw him recently said today that the Prince was growing discouraged and reported: "He says, 'What can we do? Maybe we'll have to give up.'"

The \$350-million limit was imposed by Congress as an amendment to the Administration's military procurement bill

last fall. It covers the costs of all forms of military assistance and weapons and about \$50-million in economic aid that the Administration said it planned to spend in Laos in the current fiscal year. But it does not cover the costs of American bombing here, the largest part of the continuing American air war in Indochina.

"Maybe one of the reasons the enemy is attacking so heavily here now is because of this amendment," a high-ranking official said in an interview in which he asked not to be identified. "It just shows the tragedy of trying to put a ceiling on any war."

Ambassador Godley said today: "The amendment may cause difficulties for this mission in maintaining its assistance to the Royal Laotian Government."

Since the North Vietnamese began attacking in unusually large force across the Plaine des Jarres in northern Laos and drove the C.I.A. group and its Laotian defenders out of the Long Tieng base, which is 80 miles north of Vientiane, much though not all of the reticence of the official establishment about its activities has fallen off.

Embassy Arranged Tour

This was dramatically apparent yesterday when, for the first time, the embassy, at the Ambassador's direction, arranged for reporters to charter airplanes and helicopters from the Government contractor, Air America, to fly to Long Tieng to see the scope and nature of the American-supported Laotian effort in defense of the base.

An American official accompanied the reporters and allowed them to go anywhere they wanted, but did not permit his name to be published. He said that one reason for finally granting access to the base—after all the C.I.A.'s sensitive radio and other communications equipment had been taken out before the high point of the Communist attack Jan. 12—was that, in his view, much nonsense had been written about Long Tieng "and we thought you should see it for yourselves."

What was there was nothing extraordinary — an airfield, probably used by Laotian T-28 propeller-driven bombers, since it was too short for American jets; a handful of American civilians with radios helping the Laotians on air strikes they could not handle with their own air force, and a large, almost completely abandoned, village where dependents of the guerrilla army of Meo tribesmen had lived before being swept down from the Plaine

des Jarres and began shelling the Long Tieng Valley on New Year's Eve.

The enemy attackers were still on a craggy limestone ridge at the southeast end of the base yesterday. Airplanes do not land on the airstrip now for fear of ground fire but drop supplies by parachute.

It was apparent at the command post overlooking the ruggedly beautiful valley that if the base was ever exclusively run for Maj. Gen. Vang Pao's Meo irregulars, it is no longer. The General whom the Americans in civilian clothes fondly called "V.P." was there, cheerful and natty in a dark brown safari suit with stars on each collar, but he was surrounded by other regular Laotian generals and by the Laotian Defense Minister, Sisouk na Champassak.

In fact, the Meos did bear a heavy burden of the fighting in northern Laos for many years during the so-called secret war of the nineteen-sixties. Long Tieng is in mountain country south of the Plaine des Jarres, which is their ancestral homeland, and may explain why they have been fighting so hard for so long.

But now, according to Americans here, they are weakened, and are believed to number only about 2,000 of the 6,000 or so troops that are fighting on the high ridges overlooking Long Tieng.

There were 400,000 Meos there before the war but over 200,000 are believed there now through combat losses and the traumas of annual forced migrations, as they lost ground militarily in the dry season and then took it back again when the rains came in summer.

The Coalition That Died

The clandestine army was set up largely for political reasons. Laos is in theory a neutral kingdom and has been since 1962 when, under international supervision, the indigenous Pathet Lao Communist, the rightist military faction and the neutralists formed a coalition under Prince Souvanna Phouma that collapsed in fighting that year.

Pathet Lao officials left the Government then and their positions have not been filled since. Fighting between the Government forces, quietly supported by the Americans, and the Pathet Lao, supported and now vastly outnumbered by the North Vietnamese Army, has been going on since 1963. American intelligence here, backed by independent diplomatic sources, says that there are 80,000 to 90,000 North Vietnamese troops in the country in the Pathet Lao forces, which

do not do the bulk of the fighting.

On March 6, 1970, President Nixon put on the record the previously known but officially unacknowledged facts that American Air Force and Navy planes had, with Prince Souvanna Phouma's consent, been bombing North Vietnamese supply trails in southern Laos for years and that they had been flying air support for the Royal Laotian forces in the north as well.

Now, with the latest North Vietnamese attack—6,000 to 9,000 superbly trained and equipped combat troops with again as much support are estimated to be in the van in the Long Tieng fighting — American officials have apparently concluded that they have nothing to lose by putting more information out in the open.

"It's a North Vietnamese invasion, the most serious attack they've ever made here," one official said at Long Tieng the other day. "They are more determined to knock these people out than they have ever been before."

So the Americans have now allowed reporters to see how they support General Vang Pao and the regular and irregular Laotian forces. Yesterday at Long Tieng, the roar of American Air Force F-105 and F-4 fighters often resounded through the valley as they flew combat-support missions, and the American civilians were planning more big strikes by B-52's. All the planes are from bases to the south, in Thailand.

That support does not come under the Congressional \$350-million limit, but the bombs dropped by the 40-plane Laotian Aid Force do come under it.

So did the \$1-million for ammunition that blew up at Long Tieng when it was struck by North Vietnamese shells and so did hundreds of thousands of dollars represented by about 20 guns of 105 and 155 millimeters that were captured by the enemy when the Plaine des Jarres was overrun last month.

So too does the money that pays the 3,000 to 4,000 Thai soldiers—the exact number is not known—who have been manning artillery positions here and are described by the American authorities as volunteers paid by the United States through the Laotian Government.

Of these men, 1,000 or 2,000 are still in Laos, in positions around Long Tieng, and others have suffered heavy casualties in fighting farther south on the Boloven Plateau. The feeling of futility among the Americans

18 JAN 1972

Marquis Childs

Furor on Secrecy Owes Lot to Nixon

THE CLAMOR over secrecy in government and the revelation of leaked documents owes a lot to the man in the White House. Except for carefully stage-managed television performances, communication with the media has fallen close to zero.

In 1971 the President had nine press conferences, and four of these were of the impromptu kind held on short notice where only the White House regulars are present. This is a measure of his distrust of a direct confrontation with reporters. He shies away from even the kind of East Room press conference that has increasingly become a television spectacular with the seats in the front row allotted to those who are familiars.

Suppose in the immediate issue of the India-Pakistan dispute that Mr. Nixon had held a press conference in the first week in December. He would have been asked about his attitude on the developing war.

How much better to have given a forthright answer deploring what the White House considered India's aggression than to have this leak out of a secret session of policy makers. The President could not in any event escape responsibility for the decision.

In 1970 the President had four full-scale press conferences and one impromptu. The total for 1969 was eight. Television interviews with network reporters have filled some gaps. But they are no substitute for the give-and-take of the press conference that not so long ago was both a principal source of news and a mirror of the man in the Chief Executive's chair.

COMPARISON with the past is instructive. Mr. Nixon's only Republican predecessor in recent history, Dwight D. Eisenhower, could never have been accused of loving the press and secret media. Pressed hard by his inquisitors, his flushed face would reflect his intense irritation.

Yet in his eight years in office he held 193 press conferences. An average of 24 per year is not bad for a President who took frequent vacations and in 1955 had a long enforced quiet with a heart attack.

In his nearly three years in the White House John F. Kennedy had 64 press conferences. In the State Department auditorium taking the questions as they came from every side, he developed a mastery of challenge and response. The complaint was that his was a virtuoso performance with the emphasis on theatrics. Yet it often produced important news with a Kennedy flair, as when the President in a somber mood, the negotiations over the nuclear test ban treaty faltering, spoke of the genie escaping forever from the bottle of control.

In his six years Lyndon B. Johnson held 126 press conferences. Many on the impromptu order. Suffering from comparison with the Kennedy virtuosity, he varied the rate from year to year.

THE VALUE of the White House press conference as an institution was exaggerated in the past. Comparison with the question hour in the British House of Commons will not stand up. In the Commons, the Prime Minister and his cabinet are subjected to a sharp give-and-take on the issues of the day.

At the White House press conference a reporter can rarely have a followup question when the first response has been evasive.

Even in the era of FDR, who tried to keep to a twice-a-week conference schedule, the followup was rare. Once a reporter pressed for a further response, the President replied with "Remember, no cross examination."

But for all its limitations, the press conference has lost its original confrontation with a Chief Executive increasingly hedged around with an apparatus of

power and secrecy. As a rare television show, a limit of half an hour in itself a serious handicap, it no longer has much value as a forum shedding enlightenment on the ways of government.

One handicap is the size of the press corps accredited to the White House. Some means can surely be found, however, to divide the corps at separate conferences. Both for public confidence and for the conscience of the President the right of public inquiry is a vital part of a democratic system.

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STATINTL

THE MEDIA**Voice of the Voiceless**

He is the most widely read syndicated columnist in America (600 newspapers), and perhaps the most controversial. To his countless critics, Jack Northman Anderson is a reckless, irresponsible and frequently inaccurate scandalmonger. To his equally numerous admirers, the Washington-based columnist is a muckraker in the noblest sense of the word, a relentless exposé of sham and hanky panky in high places. Both friend and foe, however, concede that Anderson has the largest and most varied network of sources in all of newspaperdom. And as his headline-grabbing leakage of classified White House documents on the India-Pakistan war once again made plain, some of those informants work within the top echelons of the U.S. Government.

What made the whole affair so puzzling was that Anderson, who usually camouflages such sources with the utmost care, was dropping hints to their identity in this case with almost gleeful abandon. "If the sources were identified," he told one reporter, "it would embarrass the Administration more than it would me. It would make a very funny story." At another point, Anderson revealed that the flow of top-secret documents to him was still continuing, and then added: "My sources—and they are plural—are some of [the Administration's] own boys. And if they want to finger them, they're going to end up with bubble gum all over their faces."

Some suspected that Anderson's puckish warning was simply an attempt to protect himself from prosecution—a step that the White House seems highly reluctant to take anyway. Indeed, last week the Justice Department appeared to be far more intent on shutting off the sources of the Anderson leaks than on launching legal measures against the columnist himself. In light of the government's tough stance in the Pentagon papers case, this milder approach prompted New York Times foreign editor James Greenfield to remark: "It would be very strange if they prosecuted Daniel Ellsberg and not Anderson."

Spot: Possibly to buttress its own legal position in the Ellsberg affair, the Times began front-paging the Anderson scoop well before any other paper—including The Washington Post which, unlike the Times, carries Anderson's "Washington Merry-Go-Round" column every day. "I suspect," said one newsmen, "that the Post was too engrossed with its own cam-

paign against the backgrounder [following page]. Perhaps it didn't notice the Anderson bombs in their usual spot on the comics page." But Post managing editor Howard Simons denied all this. "The one or two times we have put a columnist out on the front page, we have been burned," he said: "We just figure people will read the columns."

The Post, however, quickly recouped by carrying the full texts of the three secret documents that Anderson leaked to the paper exclusively after Presidential adviser Henry Kissinger complained that he had been quoted out of context. The Post also distributed the texts over its joint news wire with The Los Angeles Times, enabling them to appear in The



Jack Manning—New York Times

Anderson: 'I work at staying in trouble'

Boston Globe, San Francisco Chronicle, Chicago Sun-Times and New York Post. (The New York Times and some 30 other news organizations later obtained the texts from Anderson's office.)

The actual contents of the documents were not surprising to readers who had followed U.S. policy in India and Pakistan. But by baring the very words and moods of key Presidential advisers, Anderson scored a major coup. For the burly, 49-year-old Mormon who inherited the column from his senior partner Drew Pearson when Pearson died in 1969, the revelations capped a long series of blockbusters that have both infuriated and titillated the Washington Establishment. It was Anderson who researched and wrote most of the 100 Pearson-Anderson columns on the financial machinations of Thomas Dodd, the late Connecticut senator. It was also Anderson who charged

that Sen. Edward Kennedy at first persuaded his cousin Joseph Gargan to take the rap for the Chappaquiddick tragedy and who once had an aide dig for news in J. Edgar Hoover's garbage can. "I work at staying in trouble," Anderson explains.

Fairer: Despite his heavy-handed tactics, Anderson is generally regarded by Washington newsmen as more fair-minded than Drew Pearson was. "Jack has cultivated a broader range of sources," says Bill Lambert, former head of Life's investigative reporting team. "The column now has more reliability."

Anderson himself likes to think of his column as "the voice of the voiceless American—the common man." And that conception may explain why he has adamantly resisted attempts by The Washington Post to move his column from the comics page to a more prominent and prestigious niche. "We think," says one of Anderson's staffers, "that we are on the best-read page in the newspaper."

STATINTL

CARL T. ROWAN

Anderson Disclosures Serve Public Interest

A small but loud minority of my press colleagues, and a number of government officials, are trying to portray columnist Jack Anderson as some kind of traitor for making public those secret documents about the India-Pakistan war.

James J. Kilpatrick thinks Anderson should have put "good citizenship" first and run to the Justice Department with the documents, helping them to discover and punish the "disloyal" official who made the security breach.

What to think or do about the official who leaked the documents is a separate issue. But there ought to be no doubt in the public's mind that Anderson was a model of good citizenship when he remained faithful to his commitment to tell the public the truth.

It would have been easy enough to curry favor with the administration by suppressing the documents, but Anderson knows that the single greatest justification for a free press is that it serves to keep government honest.

It is a serious enough situation that no responsible newsman should be shackled by a "secret" stamp when he sees clear-cut evidence that the government is lying, and using the press to mislead the public.

Why shouldn't the American public know that while President Nixon's national security adviser, Henry Kissinger, was using a press "backgrounder" to flummox the public into believing the United States was following a fair, responsible policy, the White House in fact was acting with petulant childishness?

There was Kissinger secretly telling top government officials the President wanted them to adopt a "pro-Pakistan tilt," that he wanted them to be "cool" to the Indians, and that Mr. Nixon didn't want the Indian ambassador treated at too high a level.

Why shouldn't the American people know that Kenneth Keating, Nixon's envoy to India, had fired home a cable protesting that USIA reports and other versions of the conflict (based on Kissinger's briefing) did not square with the facts and could create a credibility problem?

As Lyndon B. Johnson discovered about Vietnam, no foreign policy succeeds for long without the support of the

American people; and public support quickly withers unless it is based on wide understanding of the truth.

After the damage was done, administration spokesman began to tell the press some of the things that should have been revealed when our government knew that war was imminent. They told how Nixon had made four important offers to the Indian Prime Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, when she was here.

These included a unilateral troop pullback by Pakistan if India would agree to reciprocate later, another \$250 million from the U.S. to help care for the 10 million refugees in India and talks between the government in West Pakistan and the Awami League in the East.

"The President felt that he had given the lady an alternative to war, and she choose war—that is why he was so peeved," one official told me.

Wouldn't it have been more statesmanlike, more enlightening to the American people, to confront the Indians pub-

licly with Nixon's "alternatives to war"—instead of issuing silly behind-the-scenes orders to be rude to the Indian ambassador?

As it is, even the Anderson documents give us no clear picture as to why Nixon was so fervently pro-Pakistan and anti-India.

The town remains full of whispers that it was because Mrs. Gandhi cut him up verbally in her toast at the White House dinner. Asian diplomats talk about the Indians snubbing Nixon and the Pakistanis treating him royally when he went to Asia after losing to Kennedy in 1960. Some speculate that siding with Pakistan, and thus with Red China, was part of some grand strategy the President had in connection with his trip to China.

We may know. But thanks to Anderson we are a lot closer to the truth about foreign policy bunglings which this government, like governments before it, was all too eager to cloak in secrecy labels.

10 JAN 1972

Kissinger — Nixon's shot caller

By Richard L. Strout

Staff correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

STATINTL

It is the light shed on the operation of the Nixon administration rather than any specific new revelations that is the arresting part to many of the so-called Anderson papers being revealed by syndicated columnist Jack Anderson from hush-hush official documents on the India-Pakistan crisis.

The whole issue of the so-called "Metternich role" of Dr. Henry A. Kissinger as adviser to the President on international affairs is brought up, by the exposure of how it works in practice. Dr. Kissinger is not secretary of state, and yet, in this instance, he was apparently calling the shots and delivering orders from the absent President to the prestigious top-level White House Security Action Group (WSAG), including the head of CIA and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Washington

Dr. Kissinger is liked by the press, and his frequent backgrounders are often illuminating and helpful, yet his credibility is now raised. In two backgrounders, for example, he said the administration had no advance inkling of the Indian attack on Pakistan, yet a confidential cable to Secretary of State William P. Rogers from U.S. Ambassador Kenneth B. Keating (Nov. 12) at New Delhi reportedly said that war was "imminent."

A wave of sympathy for Mr. Nixon is expected on the grounds that nobody can carry on foreign policy easily or perhaps successfully when confidential talks at highest levels are disclosed.

Almost everybody here seems to agree with this.

On the other hand there is a feeling that official secrecy has been carried to preposterous lengths. This is another aspect of the instability in the situation, like Dr. Kissinger's own role, that the Anderson papers affect. There are other aspects of the administration position.

For example, advisers to the President simply shrug their shoulders ironically over the alleged "slanting" of the American press in ways counter to administration foreign policy in this instance, condensing it inevitable.

Another theme is how President Nixon asserts authority over the prestigious WSAG through Dr. Kissinger. But in the Pakistan crisis WSAG did not meet directly at critical moments with the President who sent his directions through Dr. Kissinger.

FBI continues search

Meanwhile the FBI continues the search for the source of the leak, and two house committees are starting their own investigation.

G. Warren Nutter, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Security Affairs, in an exchange with Dr. Kissinger during a White House WSAG session Dec. 4, gave the administration's mood to the press.

"It goes without saying," according to Mr. Nutter, "that the entire press is slanting this war to place the entire blame on the Pakistanis and to show that they attacked India."

Mr. Nutter's comment was recorded in a "memorandum for record" by James H. Noyes, a deputy to Mr. Nutter, that was leaked to the columnist by sources unknown. It purportedly quotes participants directly instead of in paraphrase as in an earlier published memorandum prepared by Navy Capt. Howard N. Kay. And like the Johnson administration, the Nixon administration has had trouble with the press. In this instance administration officials at WSAG discussed procedures for "tilting" government response against the Indian Government, in a situation where the administration placed blame on New Delhi.

Nixon anger discussed

The WSAG was told of Mr. Nixon's anger at the version of affairs that was coming out from press backgrounders at the State Department.

"Both Yahya [West Pakistan President Yahya Khan] and Mrs. Gandhi are making billicose statements. If we refer to Mrs. Gandhi's in our statement, do we not also have to refer to Yahya's?" asked Samuel De Palma, assistant secretary of state for international organizations.

Dr. Kissinger replied, "The President says either the bureaucracy should put out the right statement on this or the White House will do it. Can the UN object to Yahya's statements about defending his country?" Mr. De Palma replied, "We will have difficulty in the UN because most of the countries who might go with us do not want to tilt toward Pakistan to the extent we do."

"Whoever is doing the backgrounding at State," Dr. Kissinger reportedly answered, "is invoking the President's wrath. Please try to follow the President's wishes."

The Washington Merry-Go-Round**Nixon's One Man State Department****By Jack Anderson**

Owlsh, offish Henry Kissinger, the foreign policy wizard, is simply over his head in paperwork.

He is trying to serve President Nixon as a one-man State Department. But the paperwork is too voluminous, the problems too overwhelming even for the brilliant Kissinger to master.

Still he tries to manage every foreign crisis, to absorb every new detail, to advise the President on every development. During the three hectic weeks before Christmas, the secret White House Papers show Kissinger had his fingers in the following pies:

- He directed the top-level strategy sessions on the Indian-Pakistani conflict. He submitted the option papers, for example, that persuaded President Nixon to dispatch a naval task force into the Bay of Bengal.

- Kissinger compiled a grim situation report showing a dangerous intensification of North Vietnamese military pressure in Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam. Not only were our Laotian allies in possible peril, but the government we support in Cambodia appeared to be in danger of collapse. He recommended air strikes against North Vietnam.

- He orchestrated the delicate U.S. strategy in the Middle East. Under his direction,

Ambassador George Bush probed and pressed in the backrooms of the United Nations for a diplomatic solution while Egypt and Syria deployed their forces for a military showdown. To keep a military balance, Kissinger urged the shipment of Phantom jets to Israel.

Calling Kissinger

- He became deeply involved in preparing the new international monetary agreement. President Nixon's unilateral economic moves last August caused a diplomatic backfire around the world. He did not consult with America's trading partners. He offered no explanation to the International Monetary Fund. He ignored the diplomatic niceties. In all this, he was advised chiefly by Treasury Secretary John Connally. Kissinger was called in, finally to unravel the international disorder.

- He stage-managed the President's globe-trotting to placate ruffled allied leaders. Not only were the briefing papers prepared under Kissinger's supervision, but he traveled with the President. Kissinger seemed to be everywhere—conferring with British Prime Minister Edward Heath, breakfasting with French President Georges Pompidou and, after hours, hitting the night spots with beautiful young ladies.

- All the while Kissinger

continued to prepare for the presidential pilgrimages to Peking and Moscow. He not only handled the arrangements but plotted the big-power chess that the President will play with our two chief adversaries.

- More than anyone else, Kissinger served as ring master for the three-ring Paris peace talks, Vienna SALT and Brussels NATO conference that were going on simultaneously behind closed doors. He called the signals from the White House.

He also kept close watch through horn-rimmed glasses upon such far-flung trouble spots as Cuba, Chile and Korea. He monitored the diplomatic cables, intelligence digests and situation reports that poured into Washington from around the globe. His interpretations and recommendations, largely, guided the President in setting policy everywhere.

Paper Clip War

Day after day, Kissinger processed dozens of option papers, security memoranda and briefing papers for the President. Kissinger also worked on several major national security studies on such subjects as "Prisoners of War" and "Laos Peace Initiatives."

In short, Henry Kissinger has been running U.S. foreign policy out of his basement of-

fice in the White House. The final decisions, to be sure, have been made by the President. But Kissinger has guided the President's thinking and directed the implementation of his policies.

- The State Department, with its worldwide foreign service network, has been relegated largely to a messenger service. Kissinger accepts briefing papers from the State Department, and the department's specialists participate in White House strategy sessions.

But the final formulation of policy is handled by Kissinger. In preparation for the President's Peking visit, for example, veteran strategists at the State Department submitted briefing papers but weren't invited to join the advance party now in Peking. This mission is completely controlled by Kissinger.

Yet Kissinger has been able to operate in almost total secrecy. Congress has sought in vain to find out what he's doing, but he has refused to testify as Secretary of State Bill Rogers is required to do. The State Department, which is charged with the conduct of foreign affairs, can't even keep up with Kissinger.

Not until we got hold of the White House Papers has the public been given a glimpse into Kissinger's secret operations.

Bell-McClure Syndicate

6 JAN 1972

STATINTL

Read this, please, but don't tell anyone what it says or who wrote it. If you must tell, attribute it to a former Government aide writing in a large metropolitan daily.

By BILL MOYERS

Following my address at the University of Maine commencement last June, a student said to me: "Mr. Moyers, you've been in both journalism and Government; that makes everything you say doubly hard to believe." The skepticism which she expressed toward two of our major institutions is widespread, one reason being, I am convinced, the indiscriminate use of backgrounders as the source of "hard" news stories.

The backgrounder permits the press and the Government to sleep together, even to procreate, without getting married or having to accept responsibility for any offspring. It's the public on whose doorstep orphans of deceptive information and misleading allegations are left, while the press and the Government roll their eyes innocently and exclaim: "No mea culpa!"

I know. I used to do a little official seducing myself. The objects of the chase—members of the Washington press corps — were all consenting adults. Having been around much longer than I and being more experienced, they came to each tryst more eagerly than I had expected. As when the noted correspondent of a major network implored me, "If I can't use what you have just told me, can I use what you haven't just told me?" Assuming the classic posture of the incorruptible but ingenuous press secretary — eyebrow arched casually, condescendingly, in the manner of Clark Gable, and a smile like Whistler's Mother—I merely looked him in the eye and he was had. That night his gravelly voice carried to millions of homes across the nation the word we wanted out in the first place but were unwilling to announce explicitly.

Every major newspaper picked up the story the next day, quoting the network reporter quoting "high Administration officials." Never mind that two months later the trial balloon burst. Except for a few crusty veterans in the White House press corps, no one knew who was responsible for the story. And my accomplice? He was back for more. Score one for the Official Version of Reality.

The backgrounder has its defense most ably put forward, ironically, by the victims themselves, the reporters,

Three years ago, in one of those periodic fits of repentance which befalls an ex-press secretary when he has been away from Washington too long, I confessed to misgivings about the practice and suggested some changes. My proposals were modest. Always identify a source by his specific agency, I suggested; this would replace the loose anonymity of "high U. S. officials" with more accountable terms like "a Defense Department spokesman," "a White House source," or "an official of the Interior Department." Embargo the contents of a group background session for at least one hour, I went on, permitting hastily summoned reporters time to cross-check what they have been told. A few other suggestions followed, equally sensible, of course.

You would have thought I had proposed abolishing the First Amendment, so wrathfully did the press corps rise up to proclaim the absolute indispensability of the backgrounder. Perjury, naiveté, and hypocrisy were but the lesser sins of which I stood condemned, perhaps accurately if somewhat excessively. For two weeks one could travel the length of the National Press Club bar by the light of my effigies, no mean distance.

Some of the arguments in support of the backgrounder I appreciate. As Jules Frandsen, veteran head of the Washington bureau of United Press International, wrote: "A lot of skulduggery in Government and in Congress would never come to light if everything had to be attributed." True, but I am not protesting this form of backgrounding. A single reporter digging for a more detailed story can usually check with other sources the information he gets privately from one official, unless he is lazy or on the take. And the good reporters, of which there are many in Washington, learn to throw away self-serving propaganda offered by a disgruntled or ambitious official.

Background sessions which are held to provide reporters with understanding of complicated issues are also useful. Explaining the President's new budget or the ramifications of legislative proposals requires giving reporters access to experts whose names would be meaningless to the public.

But these are not the practices that cause harm and create an unbelieving and untrusting public. It is when the press becomes a transmission belt for official opinions and predictions, indictments and speculation, coming from a host of unidentified spokesmen —when the press permits anonymous officials to announce policy without accountability—that the public throws up its hands in confusion and disgust.

Mr. Kissinger's *sotto voce* threat to the Soviets, which in true Orwellian fashion had to be denied when its source was identified, is only the latest revelation of the ease with which public officials have come to use the backgrounder as a primary instrument of policy, propaganda, and manipulation. "The interests of national security dictate that the lie I am about to tell you not be attributed to me." There are plenty of other examples.

In 1966 an official in Saigon gave a backgrounder in which he led reporters to believe that certain Pentagon studies had forecast a long war in Vietnam—that it would take 750,000 troops in Vietnam to end the war in five years (at the time we had 290,000 men there). The President then told a news conference that Secretary McNamara could find no evidence of any such studies having been made. Later, sources identified only as "U. S. officials" said no such studies had been made, except perhaps as one man's opinion. The source of the original backgrounder turned out to be no less an authority than the Commandant of the Marine Corps, Gen. Wallace M. Greene. Whom was the public to believe: the "high official" in Saigon or "U. S. officials" in Washington? There had been such studies, but the Government, by manipulating the press, obscured the fact.

In 1967 Gen. William C. Westmoreland, the U. S. commander in South Vietnam, told a group of reporters in Washington that he was "deeply concerned" that the Cambodian port of Sihanoukville was about to become an important source of arms for Vietcong troops in South Vietnam. Furthermore, he said, the military was considering contingency plans to quarantine the port. Reporters agreed to hold their stories until the general had left town, and then they quoted "some U. S. offi-

White House Newsmen's Group Affirms 'Backgrounder' Rules

WASHINGTON, Jan. 3 (AP)—In an implied rebuke to The Washington Post, the White House Correspondents Association today called upon its members to abide by the rules of anonymous briefings.

The statement of principles was put out by the executive committee, speaking for the association.

Without mentioning The Post, the statement said, "There is absolutely no question but that any news organization which accepts information on a 'background' basis, either directly or from a report from a group of reporters . . . must abide by the rules under which the information was obtained."

A controversy over such "backgrounders" erupted last month after Henry A. Kissinger, President Nixon's adviser on national security affairs, talked with reporters on the Presidential jet returning from the Azores, where Mr. Nixon met with President Pompidou of France.

Expressing White House displeasure with the Soviet role in the India-Pakistan war, Mr.

Kissinger raised the possibility that the President's pending visit to Russia might be reconsidered.

The session with Mr. Kissinger was a briefing in which newsmen could report what they were told but were not permitted to identify the source either by name or even as "a White House official."

In accordance with established procedure, reporters on the Presidential jet gave a detailed report of the Kissinger briefing to the rest of the White House press corps.

But The Post, which did not have a reporter on the Presidential jet, identified the source as Mr. Kissinger. Benjamin Bralee, executive editor of The Post, said the newspaper did not feel bound by the rules for such briefings because it obtained identity of the briefer independently.

Mr. Bradlee, who contends that "by accepting unattributed information we are allowing ourselves to be used by the Government," declined to comment on the association statement.

White House Reporter Unit for Backgrounders

By Carroll Kilpatrick

Washington Post Staff Writer

The officers of the White House Correspondents' Association approved a set of principles yesterday accepting the "background" briefing as an essential newsgathering device that should be respected.

The statement said that whenever information is obtainable in no other way "it is in a reporter's professional interest to accept it on that (background) basis, but with the understanding between reporter and news source that the goal is to inform the public, and not to promote the interest of any arm of the government."

The officers issued the statement without consulting with the association's membership of 800.

The issue of the "background" has been hotly debated among Washington newsmen since The Washington Post disclosed last month that Henry A. Kissinger, assistant to the President for national security affairs, was the source of a "background" warning to the Soviet Union.

Kissinger told five "pool" reporters aboard President Nixon's plane that the President might cancel his planned visit to the Soviet Union if the Soviets did not discourage India from attacking Pakistan.

Commenting on the statement by the officers of the correspondents' association, Benjamin C. Bradlee, executive editor of The Washington Post, said he continued to think the "background" has been "perverted from whatever purposes it once had. We think it is a deception."

The statement by the association officers said, "the goal of the WHCA must be and is to promote the greatest possible flow of information from government officials in ways that such information can be attributed, in quotation marks, to the news source by name.

"However, the WHCA recognizes it is available to all those on a particular assignment.

most world capitals, that on occasions officials will speak more frankly and provide more information on a 'background' basis than when they know they are to be identified.

"But the WHCA feels strongly that the government has an obligation not to misuse the 'background' device in an effort to 'use' reporters to the government's own advantage and evade its responsibility to stand behind what it says."

Bradlee said he "flatly disagreed" that it is in the reporter's interest to accept information on a background basis.

"It is not compatible with the goal of informing the public," Bradlee said. "By relying on the backgrounder, reporters become a party to a conspiracy with the government to deny information to the reader."

In what was apparently a rebuke to The Post for breaking the rules regarding the Kissinger background, the WHCA statement said:

"There is absolutely no question but that any news organization which accepts information on a 'background' basis, either directly or from a report by a group of reporters, or 'pool,' or other 'fill-in,' must abide by the rules under which the information was obtained."

Bradlee said that the issue of a pool report "is a separate problem, and we chose not to honor the last pool when it became independently known on the record that Kissinger gave it."

A pool of four to six reporters usually flies on the President's plane as representatives of the other traveling reporters.

The pool's chief purpose is to report to other reporters on any changes in the President's schedule or to accept any announcement he might wish to make in flight.

The correspondents' association said that pool reports should not be used until made available to all those on a particular assignment.

It also said that, contrary to past practice, pool reports should not be made available to the Washington press generally but "only to those newsmen on the particular trip or assignment on which the 'pool' originates."

Officers of the WHCA are John P. Sutherland of U.S. News and World Report, president; Edgar A. Poe of the New Orleans Times-Picayune, vice president; Garnett D. Horner of the Washington Evening Star, secretary.

The following are members of the executive committee: Ted Knap of the Scripps-Howard Newspaper Alliance, James Deakin of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Helen Thomas of United Press International and Lawrence M. O'Rourke of the Philadelphia Bulletin.

The statement was agreed to unanimously by the officers and members of the executive committee, the association said.

Letters to the Editor

Abuse of the 'Backgrounder'

To the Editor:

The Nixon Administration and the Washington press corps are beginning to look foolish in the "backgrounder" controversy. While the stories add an amusing touch to the otherwise dreary news of the day, to put the argument on a high moral plane, as some have done, is ridiculous.

The Administration is annoyed because newsmen have blown the cover on a long-accepted Washington conceit. The press is angry because it is being used in an obvious deceit. If anybody should be outraged, it is the general public, which depends on the media for straight-forward reporting.

When it comes to morality, neither side is entitled to public plaudit. The deception has been nurtured in mutual interest. Government officials get their party line in the news without, as has been noted, public accountability. At the other end of the stick, where would those columns and columns of Washington news analysis come from if these sources dried up?

The solution is not hard to find, if anyone is looking for it seriously.

The Times uses "News Analysis" to warn the public that it is reading opinion, not news. Reporters or the desk (sometimes) insert "at a press conference" to tell the reader that the news comes on the bias rather than through the efforts of an independent reporter.

There is no reason why all "backgrounder" stories could not insert a similar caveat: "This dispatch is based upon an off-the-record interview with a Government official who wants to make known his department's views on the issue." For "deep-backgrounders" substitute "White House official" and "the Administration's views."

Admittedly, such handout labeling would take a great deal of mystique out of the Washington news game and disemploy a piffle of pundits. But it would be honest, and if nothing else is accomplished by removal of a ludicrous mask, the media's image would be improved when it goes to the forum to defend the public's right to know.

CHARLES B. CRISMAN
New York, Dec. 21, 1971

26 DEC 1971

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Blowing the cover on backgrounders

By PETER J. KUMPA

Washington.

Twelve days ago, flying back aboard Air Force One from President Nixon's meeting in the Azores with French President Georges Pompidou were five members of a press "pool." The composition was a customary one, including wire service members and among them a "special," picked by rotation from single news organizations assigned to report on the President. The practice is for "pool" men to provide a collective report to other White House newsmen, in this case 88 of them, coming in later on other aircraft. Normally, the report is a routine one made quickly available to the others.

Also aboard Air Force One that day was the President's adviser in national security affairs, Dr. Henry Kissinger. After some coaxing, he talked to the five, who said they elicited remarks on the Indo-Pakistan conflict after "four questioning."

On two typewritten pages, the pool report was summarized. It was left at the White House for inspection or reproduction for all other correspondents. Some of Dr. Kissinger's remarks were on "background" and under normal rules had to be identified only as coming from "White House officials." Some others were on "deep background," or placed under the "Lindley Rule," named after Ernest K. Lindley, a former *Newsweek* bureau chief and State Department official in the previous two Democratic administrations. Under this journalistic practice, what a source said could be reported but without reference to his personal identity or department. In other words, the reporter had to write the information on his own as if it were plucked out of the air.

Bulletins went out

What Dr. Kissinger said on "deep background" was indeed news. Replying to a hypothetical question, he asserted that if the Soviet Union did not exercise restraint in the next few days on the Indo-Pakistan War, then plans for the President's May trip to Moscow might have to be changed and the entire United States-Soviet relationship re-examined.

Shortly after Air Force One arrived in Washington, "urgent" bulletins were sent over news service lines. The Associated Press, for example, wrote that "Presi-

dent Nixon may reassess his plans for a historic journey to Moscow, it is understood, unless the Soviet Union. . . ." United Press International, the television networks and all other newspapers—except two—reported the same story without attribution following the "deep background" injunction. The *New York Times* attributed the source as the "White House" while the *Washington Post* went much further. Claiming that it discovered independently the identity of Dr. Kissinger for the statement, it attributed the remark to him in its following morning editions. The pool report, as available and distributed in the White House, of course, contained the identification.

The story became more muddled because the White House news secretary, Ronald L. Ziegler, denied for the record

Mr. Kumpa is State Department correspondent in The Sun's Washington Bureau.

that the President was "actively" considering canceling his Moscow journey. Mr. Nixon appeared as if he wanted it both ways, warning but not really warning the Russians.

The storm was raised the next day because the *Post* had clearly and intentionally violated a journalistic precept, disclosing a "deep background" source when it was apparently bound by the same rules as all other organizations.

One "pool" member—the *Los Angeles Times* bureau chief, David J. Kraslow—charged publicly that the *Post* was guilty of "unprofessional, unethical, cheap journalism."

The *Post* took refuge in defending itself in its higher duty to its readers. "Increasingly over the years the government has taken to exploiting them [backgrounders] for anonymous dissemination of news itself—threats or charges or views on this or that for which the government or a particular official does not wish to acknowledge responsibility," the *Post* declared editorially. "It is a bad habit," the editorial added in joining the paper's executive editor, Benjamin C. Bradlee, in promising not to engage in this sort of "deception" any further.

on backgrounders and "background

statements in general. The *Post's* State Department correspondent walked out of a department briefing when the spokesman invoked "background" to describe the legalistic interpretation of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization and why it was inapplicable to the Indo-Pakistan War.

What troubled

The controversy split the Washington press corps and particularly diplomatic correspondents, who through the State Department Correspondents Association, tussled with the issue but later dropped it. There was unanimity that the *Post* was right in condemning the use of a "deep background" to issue a warning to the Russians and then take some of it back in an "on the record" statement. Some thought, however, this could have been done without violating an accepted rule. Nothing prevents a correspondent from warning a reader that a statement made without attribution from a source might be a "trial balloon" or a testing of public opinion or whatever and that it need not be given the weight of an attributed statement.

What troubled some of the press corps more was not the attack on "deep backgrounders," but Mr. Bradlee's policy statement in which he failed to differentiate these from normal "background" statements that are attributed to the source, say the White House or the State Department or any other agency. These do provide explanation and amplification of normally sterile policy announcements.

After retreating from the "walkout" policy, the Bradlee pronouncement said the *Post* would leave it to "editors' judgment" whether it would attribute "background" statements after trying to get as full attribution as possible.

Such a policy, it seemed to many, would inhibit official spokesmen and restrict the flow of information, not a real service to any reader.

Moreover, the *Post* went further by announcing that it would abide by "background" rules when its reporters, but no others, initiated a meeting. It was saying, in other words, that what it was given privately it would accept and abide by in a meeting, such as a State Department

continued

Breach of briefing 'code' stirs hassle; no solution

STATINTL

By Luther A. Huston

When Dr. Henry A. Kissinger the President's national security advisor, held a background briefing with five pool reporters aboard a plane returning from the Nixon-Pompidou conference in the Azores, he revived a controversy over the use of off-the-record conferences to leak information.

The controversy has flared intermittently over the years and no one in Washington expects that it will never flare up again after the current press-government hassle dies down. No solution acceptable to the press or to government officials appears to be in sight.

Whether the Kissinger briefing disclosed information vital to the public's right to know or not, the ensuing controversy caused the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* to publish statements of policy to be followed in dealing with the problem of unattributed news matter. It also produced a few highly seasoned comments by some newsmen upon the ethics of breaking faith with a news source by disclosing the identity of the source.

The story that caused the fuss dealt with a remark by Kissinger that was interpreted as indicating that President Nixon might re-examine his proposed trip to Moscow in the light of Soviet support given to India in the war with Pakistan.

Kissinger had come back to the compartment occupied by the reporters and whatever he said was in response to questions. After he left the reporters, they prepared a report of the conference which they sent to Kissinger for his approval. The portion concerning U.S.-Soviet relations was marked on the pool report to "be written on our own without attribution to any administration official."

Ground rules broken

When the plane landed, the Associated Press and United Press International filed "it is understood" stories to the effect that the President might reassess his plans for the Moscow Journey if Russia did not restrain India's military drive against Pakistan. These stories did not attribute the information to Kissinger.

The *Washington Post*, however, said that it learned from an independent source that Kissinger was the official who had talked and attributed it to him. No *Post* reporter was a member of the pool. The *New York Times* did likewise, notifying the White House that it intended to do so.

Ronald L. Ziegler, White House press secretary, promptly denied "on the record" that any U.S. official was suggesting that the President was considering canceling his trip to Moscow. Ziegler said that Nixon was considering a change in plans, only that he might.

inger, the newspapers had broken the ground rules governing off-the-record conferences and that the action "is unacceptable to the White House."

David J. Kraslow, Washington bureau chief of the *Los Angeles Times* who was a member of the press pool, charged the *Post* with "unprofessional, unethical, cheap journalism" in citing Kissinger as the source.

Benjamin C. Bradlee, executive editor of the *Post*, defended his newspaper's handling of the story and maintained that the "ground rules" for such off-the-record, not-for-attribution conferences, kept information from readers that they were entitled to know.

Guidelines for reporters

Issuing new instructions to *Post* reporters, Bradlee said it was the newspaper's policy to insist on public accountability for the public business, and told his staff to insist "through every means available, that government news briefings be 'on the record' and statements made by officials be attributable to them.

If officials refuse to be quoted directly, Bradlee said, *Post* reporters will seek attribution "specific enough that no readers can reasonably be confused."

In a positive application of the *Post*'s guidelines, Stanley Karnow, a reporter for the newspaper, walked out of the State Department's daily news briefing when Robert J. McCloskey, official spokesman, put some information on a "background" basis. Karnow had notified McCloskey that he would leave if any information was put on a not-for-attribution basis. James H. McCartney of the *Knight Newspapers* walked out with Karnow.

The guidelines for the *New York Times* staff issued by A. M. Rosenthal, managing editor, left reporters more leeway than the *Post* in deciding whether to accept background information not attributable to the source. Rosenthal called on *Times* reporters and editors to be "a lot more selective" about attending official backgrounders, suggesting that such briefings be attended "only when the reporters and editors themselves believe there is an important reason beyond the source's convenience for not making the information attributable to the person or government department involved."

Rosenthal said it was quite proper for reporters to seek information on a confidential basis and to protect confidentiality of sources but when officials or politicians call reporters together "simply to float trial balloons or to present an attitude or a policy without standing behind them by permitting the source to be identified, concealment of public information to suit the convenience of officials resulted and was not acceptable.

Efforts of the Washington press corps to grapple with the problem produced a split between reporters who were satisfied with the status quo and those who want to pin down public officials who communicate with the press.

At a meeting of the State Department Correspondents Association, several reporters were critical of the *Post*'s guidelines and were fearful that State Department officials might be deterred from providing information they wished to volunteer. James Anderson, Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., president of the association, reported that department officials had told him it would now start to restrict access to the transcript of regular briefings to those reporters who agree to abide by the ground rules.

Frank Starr, *Chicago Tribune*, proposed a resolution calling upon the *Post* to abide by the generally recognized rules after it had endeavored to change the ground rule upon the particular point of information involved. Stan Carter, *The New York Daily News*, proposed that the resolution refer only to members and not to the *Post*.

The meeting took no decision.

Ziegler, at Key Biscayne with the President, said that he had discussed the situation with the President. He quoted the President as saying that the practice of putting out information that cannot be attributed to any source is "a problem for the journalistic community to solve."

Ziegler said there would be no change in administration policy with regard to background briefings. He again challenged the contention of the *Post* that it had learned independently that Kissinger was the source of the Moscow story. He said, however, that "we have in this administration, more to do than get involved in the machinations of the *Washington Post* Company. He declined comment of the *Post* and *New York Times* "guidelines."

The Backgrounder for Propaganda

By WILLIAM H. LAWRENCE

WASHINGTON—The Nixon Administration has perfected the backgrounder news conference as both an offensive and defensive weapon. From the privileged sanctuary where sources may not be named, anonymous officials have been threatening on some occasions and explanatory on others.

President Nixon and his top aides certainly didn't invent the backgrounder—it is an ancient Washington propaganda technique utilized by both Democratic and Republican Administrations and politicians. It also is a rather cowardly technique since those seeking to influence or publicize public policy are unwilling themselves to take responsibility for their words. It was used widely during the Administration of President Lyndon Johnson, but has perhaps been used even more since Mr. Nixon took office.

The current controversy over whether sources of backgrounders should be named, with or without their consent, is far more than a struggle between the press and the President. It concerns the public's right to know who

briefing was placed in the published Congressional Record by Arizona Senator Barry Goldwater, a Republican, who thought he was doing the White House a favor.

A much more serious incident occurred in May, 1970. Then Mr. Kissinger threatened at a backgrounder that the United States might have to expel the Soviet presence in Egypt if it were not withdrawn voluntarily. The Presidential adviser referred primarily to Soviet aircraft and missile technicians who had come to help the Egyptians in increasing numbers at that time.

To expel, according to all dictionaries, means to drive out or force out—and such an action by the United States certainly would have involved us in war in the Mideast.

Yet under the rules of the backgrounder, neither Congress, which is supposed to declare war, nor the American people, who have to fight such wars, would have known immediately that it was Mr. Kissinger who was threatening to plunge the

in recent controversies because President John F. Kennedy, in 1962, had given the Pakistan Government a top-secret pledge that the United States would come to the aid of Pakistan to avert Indian aggression. Nixon Administration officials said they were fearful that Pakistan might insist we now keep the Kennedy pledge in full. All this came from an anonymous source at a time when the Nixon Administration was being criticized heavily for its pro-Pakistan stand in a losing cause.

If Kennedy made such a pledge—and that remains an "if" so long as no responsible official will take responsibility for making it public—his letter presumably bore a high security classification, perhaps "top secret," which would explain why we have not heard of it before. One wonders if anonymous Government officials are authorized to declassify such documents and make their contents known, or whether they should now be indicted as some nonofficials have been on a similar charge.



It would seem that, if Mr. Kennedy made such a pledge, he went far beyond his authority to commit the nation to war without the consent of Congress. Surely no succeeding Administration need be bound by secret and illegal commitments.

One interesting fact is that many backgrounders are given by White House officials who claim "executive privilege" and who decline to testify when summoned by Congressional committees.

President Nixon recently threatened through the press secretary, Ronald Ziegler, to ban the backgrounders unless the news media guarantee anonymity for his briefers.

My own feeling, after nearly thirty-four years in Washington, is that the politicians need the backgrounder more than the reporters do. It might be just as well if the news media did not allow faceless Democrats or Republicans to make propaganda from this privileged sanctuary.

William H. Lawrence is a Washington political observer and author of the forthcoming "Six Presidents and Too Many Wars."



Drawings by Stan Mack

said what, particularly on issues that might mean peace or war.


Henry Kissinger set off the current row with a backgrounder last week in which he threatened that President Nixon might reconsider his planned trip to Moscow next spring unless the Russians used their restraining influence on India in her war on Pakistan. The Washington Post named Mr. Kissinger as the source, and this triggered the controversy.

This was not the first time that one of Mr. Kissinger's frequent backgrounders got him into trouble. Recently he anonymously blamed India for pressing the war against Pakistan despite U.S. efforts to mediate. Mr. Kissinger's cover in that instance was blown when the press reported his

country into a Middle Eastern war.

Happily, President Nixon did not take Mr. Kissinger's advice, and the Russians did not take the Kissinger threat seriously. Nor are the Russians likely to take seriously the Kissinger threat that Mr. Nixon might reconsider his trip to Moscow.

There was a brilliant example last week of the backgrounder being used for defensive purposes. Bill Gill, a White House correspondent for the American Broadcasting Company, was told by high Administration officials that the Nixon Administration had little choice except to be pro-Pakistan



Richard Wilson

Nixon has bigger stakes to think of than who-said-what-to-whom

Washington.

A journalistic flap over "background" information supplied by Henry A. Kissinger has obscured what President Nixon is trying to do to recoup from some adverse international developments.

The President is sending out the word that the United States will not stand idly or helplessly by while the Soviet Union has its way in Asia. Dr. Kissinger has used a background briefing to convey this thought by suggesting that President Nixon's visit to Moscow in May might be affected by the Soviet Union's support of India's successful aggression against Pakistan.

Dr. Kissinger had his cover blown by eager advocates of the people's right to know.

It is pointless, and of no real importance, to go into the intramural bickering about publicly identifying the source of such background information. Certainly the President and Dr. Kissinger were trying to convey through the press their concern about what Russia is doing without calling in the Soviet ambassador and verbally slapping him in the face.

The press was "used" for this purpose, and clearly with the idea of causing the Kremlin to think about how its actions in Asia and the Indian Ocean might affect some of its own interests such as trade with the U.S. and an agreement on nuclear weapons, which would relieve the Soviet economy.

There were reasons for finessing Mr. Nixon's roundabout warning. The game he has to play is a little too complicated to be explained every morning on-the-record, off-the-record or for background.

The President's problem is excruciating because he is attempting to maintain the prestige and authority of the United States at the same time he reduces its commitments

But, as the commitments are reduced, the current begins to run adversely and it is not so easy to maintain the prestige and authority of America in world affairs.

The widely applauded opening of discussions with the People's Republic of China is followed by the exclusion of Nationalist China from the United Nations. The opening of new discussions with Russia is followed by India's Soviet-supported aggression.

The net result of both is a visible and perhaps irreparable reduction of American influence in Asia as two friends, Nationalist China, and Pakistan, have been humbled. Taken together with the irreversible withdrawal of United States forces from Vietnam, the pretensions of a few years ago on America's stake in the future of Asia appears forlornly outdated.

In this context it does not make much difference whether Dr. Kissinger speaks for background or for attribution. The problem is how to balance the complex and adverse factors which now threaten a complete rout in Asia.

Mr. Nixon's way has been to blame India and warn Russia indirectly through spokesmen without himself uttering the fateful words which could bring his worldwide peace efforts shattering down. Maybe this is not the right way and maybe the press should not permit itself to be so "used" but journalistic ethics tend to fade in the glaring light of what actually is at stake.

In this "era of negotiation" Mr. Nixon initiated, the Soviet Union has steadily advanced its position in Asia and the Mideast. Communist China has gained such advantages as it might never have dreamed

and with little doubt left that Peking eventually will get its way with Taiwan.

By backing India Russia has swung into a key strategic position in South Asia with access to bases on the Indian Ocean at the same time it is moving into a powerful position in the Mediterranean.

Neither in the Middle East nor in South Asia has the United States been able to influence a settlement. The bitter resentment of India has been harvested along with the shattered confidence of Pakistan, Nationalist China, or any other nation in Asia looking to the U.S. for support.

These are the problems Mr. Nixon has to deal with and it is little wonder that he resorts to indirection, plays for time, tries to create an atmosphere and gives reconsideration to what he can accomplish in Peking and Moscow.

He will go to both capital with lessened prestige because India has humbled Pakistan. America's ability to influence the shape of Asia's future has been seriously impaired.

RICHARD WILSON

The Background Flap and Our Stake in Asia

A journalistic flap over "background" information supplied by Dr. Henry A. Kissinger has obscured what President Nixon is trying to do to recoup from some adverse international developments.

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
'Backgrounding' Opens News Credibility Gap

A storm has arisen in Washington over the handling of "background" information provided by government officials who don't want to be identified. Robert S. Boyd, chief of the Washington Bureau for The Herald and other Knight newspapers, explains what the fight is about, and what the position of the Knight Washington staff is.

By ROBERT S. BOYD

Herald Washington Bureau Chief

WASHINGTON — On April 16, 1954, Richard M. Nixon, then vice president of the United States, stood before several hundred newspaper editors and correspondents here and said the United States would have to send American troops to Indochina if there were no other way to prevent its fall to the Communists.



BOYD

Nixon's remarks to the American Society of Newspaper Editors were supposed to be "off the record." But they promptly were reported all over the world.

At first, the statement was attributed to an anonymous "high administration spokesman." But The London Times implied that the source was Nixon, and the next day, a French newspaper openly fingered the vice president.

THE THREAT caused a loud and negative reaction. Nixon's boss, President Eisenhower, declined to send troops, and soon afterward the Communist forces of the northern half of Vietnam.

Once again last week, a high administration official, attempting to act out a bit of history under the mask of anonymity, lost his disguise. Henry A. Kissinger, the Svengali of the White House, was exposed as the source of a hint that Nixon might reconsider his trip to Moscow next spring if the Russians didn't restrain their Indian allies in the Indo-Pakistan war.

The clunk of Kissinger's mask falling re-awakened an old controversy about some of the cozy relationships that have grown up between the government and its watchers in the press.

SOMETIMES for the convenience of the government, sometimes for the convenience of the press, a great deal of information is transmitted without clear identification of the source.

This game, which stretches back over many years, is played in various ways. But there are four main sets of rules:

⊙ On-the-record, in which the specific source is named. Sample: "White House national security adviser Henry Kissinger said. . ."

⊙ Background, in which the individual source is not named, but his agency or organization is identified. Sample: "A high White House official said. . ."

⊙ Deep background, in which information may not be attributed to any person or institution. Sample: "It was learned today that. . ." or, "It can be stated on excellent authority that. . ." or simply, "The White House will do such and such." This technique is sometimes known as the "Lindley rule" after its inventor, Ernest Lindley, former Washington bureau chief for Newsweek magazine.

⊙ Off-the-record, in which nothing is supposed to be reported.

The first and fourth situations are no problem. The second, usually also causes little difficulty. A reader is not going to be seriously misled if he is told that certain information comes from the State Department or Democratic headquarters or French officials, even though he is not given the name of the specific individual who did the talking.

The real trouble comes from the "deep background" or Lindley rule, under which Kissinger made his Moscow remarks to reporters on President Nixon's plane over the Atlantic last Tuesday afternoon.

This is the device by which officials sometimes float "trial balloons," promote pol-



Henry Kissinger . . . lost disguise

icies or attack opponents without taking public responsibility for their words.

It is by no means new to the Nixon Administration. Lyndon Johnson and John Kennedy were masters of the art. Probably most of their predecessors used it in one form or another.

DURING HIS Christmas vacation at the LBJ ranch in Texas in 1964, for example, Johnson told reporters on a not-for-attribution basis that it would be impossible to keep the new federal budget under \$100 billion.

The story made headlines in all the newspapers. A month later Johnson, as he

know all along unveiled a budget of less than \$100 billion and claimed credit as a great economizer.

From time to time, when the technique is overused, the press stirs itself to protest in order to protect its readers from being deceived.

This happened last week, as both The Washington Post and The New York Times issued new rules for their reporters and editors to handle background information.

AND KNIGHT Newspapers correspondent James H. McCartney and a Washington Post reporter walked out of a State Department press briefing when the briefer, Robert McCloskey, decided to put some information "on background."

The reaction of the press is not likely to end the use of "background" technique. Editors and reporters recognize that sometimes there is no way to get certain information except by protecting the confidentiality of its source.

In diplomatic matters, for example, the U.S. government may make an official statement that is carefully worked out with another country. Officials may provide additional explanatory information without attribution in order to avoid upsetting the foreign nation.

IN OTHER cases, an official may be willing to disclose wrongdoing or disagreement with his superiors only if his identity is concealed.

The purpose of the protests is to end or at least minimize the excessive and unnecessary abuse of the background technique, particularly the deep backgrounder.

The position of the Knight Newspapers Washington correspondents is to get as much information "on the record" as possible.

When this cannot be done, we will identify the source as clearly as possible, so that the reader will understand, at least in general, where the information is coming from and will not be victimized by propaganda.

In the rare case where important information can only be obtained without attribution, it will be used only if there is good reason to believe that it is reliable.

'Backgrounders' Abused, Says UPI

United Press International said yesterday that its newsmen are under instructions to make it clear to officials that the news agency believes in the greatest possible identification of the sources of news.

"We think the backgrounder has sometimes been abused," said Julius Frandsen, UPI Washington vice president and general manager. But he added that the agency had to "cover all the news, however it may develop."

Background briefings—at which high government officials talk to newsmen on the understanding that they will not be identified—came under critical scrutiny during the past week.

Washington Post reporters have been told to insist that material offered at briefings be on the record and fully attributable. The New York Times has told its newsmen to "be a lot more selective" about attending backgrounders.

UPI's Frandsen said in a statement: "UPI believes in the greatest possible identification of the sources of news. Our reporters are under instructions to make this clear to the officials with whom they deal. We think the backgrounder has sometimes been abused. But we also recognize an obligation to our subscribers in this country and abroad to cover all the news, however it may develop. Each problem involving attribution has to be considered in light of these sometimes conflicting goals."

Nixon Is Brought Into Dispute on Background

STATINTL

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 16—

President Nixon was brought today into the controversy over whether newsmen should report information and points of view supplied by officials on other than an on-the-record basis.

Ronald L. Ziegler, the White House press secretary, was asked at Key Biscayne, Fla., where Mr. Nixon is spending a few days, for the President's view of the dispute on the practice of officials offering and newsmen accepting material on a so-called "background" or "deep background" basis.

The controversy, which has been a subject of discussion here for many years, arose again yesterday when The Washington Post and The New York Times refused to abide by the ground rules of a "deep background" held by Henry A. Kissinger, the White House national security affairs adviser.

Mr. Nixon, according to Mr. Ziegler, said that if news organizations did not like the practice of "backgrounders," then "fine, let's not have any more backgrounders."

For many years, newsmen and officials have adhered to a practice by which information and points of view have been disseminated in different guises.

Categories Listed

Generally, these break down in the following way:

On the record — when the source is attributable, such as, "President Nixon said."

On background — when the official is not named, but his agency may be, such as "A White House official said."

On deep background — when the material may not be attributed to any person or institution, such as "It was learned today," or "informed sources said."

Off the record — when the material may not be published in any form.

The Kissinger "deep background," which raised the possibility of Mr. Nixon's canceling his trip to Moscow, was attributed to the White House by The Times in the first edition and later to Mr. Kissinger after the Post identified him as the source. Yesterday, Mr. Ziegler said that the White House would soon seek a meeting with press representatives to set ground rules.

Benjamin C. Bradlee, execu-

tive editor of The Post, last night issued a statement defending the violation of the ground rules and promising that guidelines would soon be issued "to get this newspaper once and for all out of the business of distributing the party line of any official of any government without identifying that official and that Government."

This evening, Mr. Bradlee issued his guidelines, which aimed at explaining to The Post staff how to act in background situations.

He said that Post reporters would always seek to get all information put on the record, but if that request was refused to get attribution "specific enough so that no readers can reasonably be confused."

This would seem to indicate that The Post would accept material "on background" but not "on deep background."

Statement by Rosenthal

A. M. Rosenthal, managing editor of The New York Times, issued a statement this afternoon in New York, explaining The Times's views on use of other than on-the-record information. He attacked what he called abuses in the system but said that sometimes backgrounders were "journalistically and ethically justifiable."

TURN RULE FOR INSERT A

Mr. Ziegler, asked about Mr. Bradlee's comments, said, "The Administration has more to do and think about than the machinations of The Washington Post."

"We believe in full and complete communications with the press," he said. "The question is misuse of backgrounders. We recognize that over the years to some degree government has misused backgrounders."

But he said that in the process, the press had accepted certain established procedures.

"The Post can proceed in any way that they wish," he said, "but if all the other organizations accept the procedures, then we and the journalistic community cannot accept one organization breaking those procedures."

At the State Department's regular noon briefing for newsmen today—a session in which announcements and comments on international developments are made known—Stanley Karnow, a diplomatic correspondent for The Post, said that he would walk out of the session if Robert J. McCloskey put "background"—that is, attributable to a State Department source

Briefings of Press

but not to himself personally as the department's spokesman. When Mr. McCloskey started a "backgrounder," Mr. Karnow left.

Mr. Karnow, who said that he was leaving the briefing in conformity with The Post's "anti-background" policy, was joined by James H. McCartney of Knight Newspapers. The other newsmen present remained for the rest of the session. The State Department Correspondents Association called a meeting for tomorrow morning to discuss ground rules for future briefings.

Mr. Ziegler, in talking to a handful of newsmen, did not seem very agitated over the controversy. He said that he thought backgrounders were misused when they announced a new position or policy without attribution but were useful when they provided explanations of policies.

He said that he thought Mr. Kissinger had made a mistake in going on "deep background" instead of allowing his remarks to be attributed on background to "a White House official."

Over the years, officials have spoken to newsmen on a basis other than on-the-record for a variety of reasons. Sometimes, it has been to inform the American public without causing diplomatic problems with a foreign country.

Other Reasons Given

Thus, at the State Department, from time to time, information is provided on the record as part of a joint agreement with another country, but supplementary information is added on background basis.

Sometimes, officials want to make their views known without drawing excessive attention to them. Sometimes, officials speak on "deep background" to conceal the identity of the informant from their superiors, who may not want the news made known.

Often, officials have asked to speak on "a background basis" when they have not carefully gone over their remarks and are worried about how they will look in print.

In many cases, officials have spoken on background when their remarks could just as well have been on the record, but the officials chose to avoid being mentioned for personal reasons. "Backgrounders" gives backgrounders "when important Presidential mes-

sages and speeches are released, often to draw attention to the points that the Administration wants to underscore and to supply additional information.

The most controversial use of backgrounders has been the attempt by various Administrations to defend or promote their policies in such a way that the news media serve as the mouthpiece for the Government. This has occurred when Administrations issued documents or other information on a "deep background" basis with no attribution allowed.

In past Administrations particularly, the President himself has been known to speak about his record with no attribution made of his remarks.

Opposition Explained

Mr. Rosenthal, in The Times's statement indicated that the newspaper was principally opposed to nonattributable information, known as "deep backgrounders," in which neither the individual nor his agency could be named.

The full text of Mr. Rosenthal's statement follows:

"The purpose of this newspaper is to provide as much meaningful information as it can to its readers.

"The use of information from confidential or unnamed sources is essential to the press. Otherwise, facts vital to an informed public might never become known.

"It is quite proper for reporters to seek out information or have information given to them privately and then decide that confidentiality must be protected.

"But the problem arises when Government officials or politicians call reporters together and in advance lay down conditions of nonattribution. Often the real purpose is simply to float trial balloons or to present an attitude or a policy without taking the responsibility for standing behind them by permitting the source to be revealed.

"In effect, the press attends a press conference and reports on it without saying who gave it. The result often is concealment of sources not on the basis of real need for confidentiality but to suit the political or diplomatic convenience of the government or political

STATINTL

Washington Post's Policy: Fullest Possible Attribution

Benjamin C. Bradlee, executive editor of The Washington Post, issued the following statement yesterday on background briefings:

Over the last five years, the reporters and editors of this newspaper have become increasingly concerned about the use and abuse of unattributed information by the government at background briefings.

In theory, unattributed information given to the press by the government at background briefings enables the press to do a better job of reporting.

In practice, this is less and less true. Background briefings have become vehicles for the government to give its versions of the news, to use the press as a vehicle for its policy announcements and its political advantage without taking responsibility for what it is saying.

This practice has been true of every administration. This newspaper has long been a party to this practice. The public has suffered from this collusion between the government and the press.

We now are convinced that we have engaged in this deception and done this dis-

service to the reader long enough.

Therefore, it is now the policy of The Washington Post, in its coverage on government news briefings, to insist on public accountability for the public business.

We instructed our reporters to insist through every means available to them that material offered at these briefings should be on the record and fully attributable.

If ground rules are imposed providing for anything less than full attribution on the record, Washington Post reporters will immediately ask that attribution be made direct on the record.

If that request is refused, the reporter will seek attribution specific enough so that no readers can reasonably be confused.

If this request is refused, the Washington Post has instructed its reporters to inform the agency or official that the newspaper's handling of the material will be determined by the editors' judgment of their responsibility to inform the public. We believe that responsibility cannot be transferred by us to any public official or circumscribed by government edict. The Washington

Post believes that while certain circumstances may make full, on-the-record attribution impractical, the public interest is not served by permitting statements of policy to be made by government officials who are unwilling to be held accountable for their own words.

The decision whether to remain voluntarily in the briefing is one for the reporter's discretion. Under normal conditions he would remain and report under these guidelines.

Nothing in this policy concerns contacts with government officials and other new sources initiated by reporters of The Washington Post. In these instances, the contacts will continue on an independent, individual basis, under terms understood and accepted by the reporter and the news source.

Post, N.Y. Times Set Briefing Policy

By Don Oberdorfer.

Washington Post Staff Writer

In a developing controversy over government information practices, editors of The Washington Post and The New York Times issued new instructions to their staffs yesterday regarding official "background briefings."

Declaring that it is the newspaper's policy to insist on public accountability for the public business, Executive Editor Benjamin C. Bradlee of The Washington Post instructed his staff to insist "through every means available" that government news briefings be "on the record," with statements by officials fully attributable to those who utter them.

If the officials refuse to be quoted directly, Bradlee said, Post reporters will seek attribution "specific enough that no readers can reasonably be confused."

If the problem still cannot be resolved, Bradlee said, Post reporters have been instructed to inform the agency or official that the newspaper's handling of the material will be determined by the editors' judgment of their responsibility to inform the public.

"We believe that responsibility cannot be transferred by us to any public official or circumscribed by government edict," Bradlee said. He added that while certain circumstances may make full attribution impractical, the public interest is not served by policy statements of faceless officials.

The new Post policy is limited to briefings initiated by officials and does not apply to contacts with officials or other

news sources when these contacts are initiated by Post reporters, Bradlee added.

Managing Editor A. M. Rosenthal of The New York Times, in a policy statement to the paper's Washington bureau, declared that the press "backgrounder" has been abused to the point that it is "a way of life" and often an obstacle rather than an aid to the full flow of information.

While it is quite proper for reporters to seek information on a confidential basis and to protect the confidentiality of sources, Rosenthal said, the problem arises when officials or politicians call journalists together "simply to float trial balloons or to present an attitude or a policy without taking the responsibility for standing behind them by permitting the source to be revealed."

"In effect the press attends a press conference and reports on it without saying who gave it. The result often is concealment of sources not on the basis of real need for confidentiality, but to suit the political or diplomatic convenience of the government or political sources," he said.

Rosenthal said The Times had laid down no flat rules covering all situations, but called on Times reporters and editors to be "a lot more selective" about attending official backgrounders.

The Times managing editor said the movement should be toward attending background briefings "only when the reporters and editors themselves believe there is an important reason beyond the source's convenience for not making the information attributable to the person or government department involved."

Stanley Karnow, a diplomatic reporter for The Post, and Washington correspondent James H. McCartney of Knight Newspapers walked out of the State Department's daily news briefing yesterday when the government spokesman put some information on a "background" basis.

Karnow had served notice at the start of the briefing that he would leave if the spokesman, Robert J. McCloskey, put anything on a not-for-attribution basis.

McCloskey outlined his position by saying, "I am entitled in a briefing to go on traditional background or not answer a question."

The State Department Correspondents Association, made up of journalists who normally cover diplomatic news, has called a meeting for 11 a.m. today at the State department to consider the problem of "background" briefings.

Derick Daniels, news director of the 11 Knight newspapers, declared in a statement last night that "our Washington staff is committed to the clearest possible identification of sources of information." While recognizing that certain circumstances may require printing of unattributed information, Daniels said, "we intend to resist abuses."

Government by backgrounder

'News ooze' confuses Washington

By Richard L. Strout
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

The American public wants to know about presidents, and when presidents don't have press conferences a system of news leaks develops or, if not news "leaks," then news ooze. That is what is happening now in Washington.

Under the parliamentary system the opposition could rise and ask Mr. Nixon about his trip to see President Pompidou, the devaluation of the dollar, his intentions on the Pakistan-India crisis, why the aircraft carrier Enterprise and a task force have gone to the Bay of Bengal, whether the chances of a summit meeting in Moscow have diminished.

With one of the most active presidential adventures in personal diplomacy in history going on, Washington is a city of confusion, and this seems to some extent to the country as well.

"I have given up reading about America and Pakistan and India," is a statement frequently heard at social gatherings, "I just can't understand it."

Unusual circumstances

Probably only one man could set the record straight: President Nixon. But, up to the present, he has allowed information to slip out through a series of off-the-record briefings by his subordinates, generally associated with presidential adviser Henry A. Kissinger. It is hard to remember anything quite like the present circumstances in modern times.

The serious question is asked here whether "government by backgrounder" is adequate, or will work. At times it approaches the theater of the absurd.

• A commentator from Columbia Broadcasting System devoted an electrifying five minutes this week to the expression of President Nixon's face as he left his discussion with President Pompidou at Angra do Heroismo, Azores: President Pompidou looked happy, like the cat that had swallowed the canary, while Mr. Nixon—well, he looked drawn and wan. Maybe it didn't mean anything, we are told, but the United States had just agreed to devalue the dollar.

• Or, to take another illustration, Mr. Kissinger gives a hush-hush briefing on the Indian-Pakistan war, Dec. 7, with security so strict that copies of the White House questions and answers are carefully guarded and... Ziegler explains to the press, "What he

[Dr. Kissinger] says to you will be background; you can attribute it to White House officials, but no direct quotations."

'It is all there'

The interested reader can go back to the newspapers next day and see how the information was treated — the thesis of the briefing being that India, not Pakistan, is somehow at fault. Then hey, presto, Sen. Barry Goldwater puts the entire Kissinger briefing into the Congressional Record, Page S 21012, Dec. 9, about as hot as the Pentagon papers. Now anyone can read Dr. Kissinger where he says, "Let me go off the record here for a minute . . . This part I consider off the record," and so on. It is all there.

And what is America's role in the Indian-Pakistan dispute?

Here is a case where the balance of power of the subcontinent has shifted, and where superpower politics from now on seems likely to come into play, China for West Pakistan, Russia for India, and Maoist opposition (the Naxalite terrorists) operating in the new country of Bangla Desh and perhaps by their savage rival magnetic attractions ultimately pulling apart the whole unstable Indian democracy.

The cool London Economist observed (Dec. 11):

"The second most curious thing in the behavior of the superpowers during this crisis was the briefing given by a carefully anonymous State Department official in Washington on Saturday afternoon, which switched the American attitude toward the crisis from studied impartiality to an angry attack on the Indians — and switched it just when it was starting to become clear that the Indians were going to win. . . . It is a mystery why the Americans should have chosen to climb so ostentatiously on board the sinking Pakistani ship when the water could be heard pouring in down below."

Ominous development

Doubtless Mr. Nixon has reasons, but it is doubtful if most Americans have followed the scenario so far any better than the British.

The press is often criticized for lack of respect toward the President. Like the controversy over the Pentagon papers, the issue turns again on what is the legitimate right of the public to know, and the right of the President to conceal.

In sievelike Washington, backgrounders are institutionalized. But in the final analysis, question-and-answer, many feel. Mr. Nixon has had only 14 formal press conferences since taking office, the last March 4.

16 DEC 1971

Nixon puts Moscow on notice

By Courtney R. Sheldon
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

The White House is definitely looking to the Soviet Union to become a restraining influence on India in the next few days.

But if the Soviets, in the President's judgment, deliberately encourage military actions, a new look might be taken at the Moscow summit plans.

Also, the entire U.S.-Soviet relationship might be reexamined.

Henry A. Kissinger, the President's adviser on national security affairs, conveyed this information to a pool of newsmen traveling with the President on the way back from the Azores on Dec. 14.

Source rule broken

It was the understanding of newsmen that Mr. Kissinger would not be mentioned as the source.

Portions of the information were under the so-called "Lindley-rule," which means even the ambiguous attribution of "according to a government official" could not be used.

The Washington Post broke these rules and has caused one of the hottest debates over newspaper ethics.

Subsequently, the entire matter was put on the record at a regular briefing by Ronald L. Ziegler, the President's press secretary, on Dec. 15.

Whatever the outcome of the newspaper controversy—and many newsmen are severely critical of the Post tactics—the foreign-policy elephant is out of the tent.

World-opinion rouser

What is starkly disclosed is a President and foreign-policy adviser who are determined to rouse world opinion to head off a large-scale Indian attack on West Pakistan now that East Pakistan seems almost subdued.

It is true, according to reporters on the plan pool, that Mr. Kissinger was sought out and badgered with questions. The brief-

ings at the close of the Nixon-Pompidou conference earlier were considered inadequate by correspondents.

But it is also certain that Mr. Kissinger, if he so wished, did not have to respond at all.

And, critically important to the understanding of the affair, it is a fact that a copy of the pool report was shown Mr. Kissinger before it was issued to other reporters.

Kissinger action

Instead of toning it down, Mr. Kissinger stiffened it up. He wrote in the phrase, "U.S.-Soviet relationship," to replace the general term, "matter," in the part where the reporters said the U.S. would consider reexamining the entire matter if the Soviets didn't restrain the Indians.

Mr. Kissinger was asked what the Soviet motive was. He said it was apparently to humiliate China, to show the world that China cannot prevent what is happening to Pakistan.

Mr. Ziegler was asked on Dec. 15 if he wished to disavow this. He declined to get into that aspect of the matter further.

Almost immediately after the pool report on Mr. Kissinger was released on Dec. 14, Mr. Ziegler summoned reporters at Andrews Air Force Base — after talking with the White House by phone — and emphasized that the governing phrases in the official's (later to be identified as Mr. Kissinger) remarks were "could" and "might."

Ways to ease tensions

On Dec. 15, Mr. Ziegler stuck to his appraisal.

But he went a bit further than Mr. Kissinger in hinting what the Soviets could do first to ease tensions.

He pointed out that since the India-Pakistan war in 1965, the Soviet Union has supplied India with some \$500 million in tanks, artillery, missile systems, and other equipment.

In the last year and recent months, he said, the deliveries "have markedly increased."


Mr. Ziegler declined to discuss in any way the reported movements of U.S. naval forces.

The carrier USS Enterprise is said to be poised at the Strait of Malacca, near Singapore. The presumption is that it is standing by to evacuate U.S. nationals. The Indian ambassador here suspects that Pakistani soldiers could be rescued, as well.

Meanwhile, Soviet naval units are reportedly being increased 800 miles off the coast of West Pakistan. India's Ambassador to the U.S., Lakshmi Kant Jha, says he doesn't expect them to get involved and that India would object if they did.

STATINTL

Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-016



By JERRY GREENE

Washington, Dec. 15—President Nixon's prime worry of the moment is that India, flushed with success in Bengal, may throw major military forces against West Pakistan in a conflict that might directly involve both Communist China and Russia.

This is a concern that persists despite the hope and belief held by Nixon and his advisers that a sudden dramatic expansion of the war in the West won't happen.

Nixon Fears Expansion of Pakistani War

But the possibility definitely exists. The unease over the situation can be found all around the White House and it even surfaced publicly, and on the record, today in a comment by Presidential Press Secretary Ronald Ziegler. He said at his morning press briefing that such an event was not expected, of course, but if it did expand "our concern would be amplified substantially".

Ziegler went further to add the obvious: any such expansion would be bound to have an effect on world peace and upon U.S.-Soviet relations.

It requires no expertise in foreign policy to guess that the itchy worry making the rounds had something to do with the dispatch of the aircraft carrier Enterprise to Indian waters.

But beyond the use of the Enterprise for display purposes, the U.S. is pushing in many directions to try to bring the war to a complete close, we are told, and Nixon still clings to ideas that Russia may lend a hand in obtaining a total ceasefire, and a permanent settlement between India and Pakistan.

The White House has run afoul of considerable trouble these recent days in trying to get across to the public just what it has and has not been doing about the India-Pakistan war, and it must bear a good part of the blame for the resultant confusion.

Henry Kissinger's cover as a background spokesman for the administration has been blown twice in a week as he sought to spell out the official views and lay down the party line. Sen. Barry Goldwater (R-Ariz.) last week put into the Congressional Record the transcript of an extensive Kissinger backgrounder on the whole U.S.-India relationship in the last 10 months. Kissinger, the President's foreign affairs adviser, thinks this was a White House leak.

It Happened on the Piano

Then last night, on his way home from the Austin conference aboard the President's plane, Kissinger responded to a flock of questions tossed up by a press pool, all background and off-the-record, and the paper hung some exciting statements directly on him, by name.

That action led to some feathery backpedaling by Ziegler, who a few hours later and again today said that Kissinger had "no intention of canceling his projected May 1972 visit to India. It is a matter of timing with us at this time."

Out of the whole flap comes a hint of the White House opinions and estimates:

India and Pakistan have been at odds since a border dispute and miniwar in 1962 when the Chinese baniliated their Indian neighbors.

Russia took advantage of the tiff to expand friendship with India and has shipped the Indian government a total of \$500 million in arms, including tanks, artillery, jet planes and missiles.

Red China has become a warm and cozy neighbor with Pakistan—and can be expected to become an open ally if India blows open the war in the West.

Russia, seen here as having encouraged the Indians in the move against East Pakistan, trying to show the world that Red China was unwilling or unable to help the Pakistanis, would not hesitate to jump if the Chinese made a threatening move.

'Firm Support' From Chou

Chinese Premier Chou En-lai has expressed "firm support" for Pakistan against "India's subversive and aggressive activities." And in an interview only days before the war broke out, Chou said: "India would in the end taste the bitter fruit of its own making. And from then on there would be no tranquility on the subcontinent."

This, then, is the framework of Nixon's worry. His grand design for the first steps toward normal relations with China, followed perhaps by an arms limitation pact with Russia, is vastly complicated by the fact that China and Russia hate each other.

It is a delicate situation, and potentially dangerous. Nixon has been trying to walk the high wire between India and Pakistan since last March, and even before, trying to find a political settlement of the Bangla Desh issue. In his backgrounder last week, the one Goldwater put in the public record, Kissinger recounted that the secretary of state had seen the Indian ambassador 18 times and he, Kissinger, had seen the ambassador eight times since August.

"We all said that political autonomy for East Bengal was the inevitable outcome of a political evolution and that we favored it," Kissinger said.

Nobody around the capital we could find has had the slightest doubt that the Indian armed forces would crush the Pakistanis in East Bengal in short order, as has been the case. A settlement of some sort in that area should be forthcoming soon.

What will happen in West Pakistan is yet to be determined, and therein lies crisis. Only one thing appears certain: the White House is looking for some faster, less confusing means of getting its own message across to the American people. Backgrounders have lost their bloom.



Ronald Ziegler
Puts it on the record

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U.S. Says Possibility of Canceling Moscow Trip Is Not 'Live Issue'

STATINTL

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 15 —

The White House, seeking to clear up confusion caused by two senior aides yesterday, affirmed its unhappiness today with the Soviet Union's strong support for India but said that the possibility of canceling President Nixon's trip to Moscow was not "a live issue."

Statements by Ronald L. Ziegler, the White House press secretary, at his regular morning news briefing indicated that Mr. Nixon was irked over the refusal of the Soviet Union to join in Security Council action against India and was worried about any further Indian attacks on West Pakistan, now that East Pakistan seems lost to the Pakistani Government.

'Restraining Influence' Sought

But Mr. Ziegler, as he did last night, tried to soften the impact of remarks made yesterday afternoon by his White House colleague, Henry A. Kissinger, to a five-man delegation of correspondents aboard the President's plane, *The Spirit of '76*.

Mr. Kissinger, the adviser on national security, said that unless the Russians in the next few days persuaded the Indians to show restraint, "a new look might have to be taken at the President's summitry plans." The correspondents, acting as "pool" representatives for the rest of the White House press corps, were given the briefing on condition that the information be published without attribution.

According to the pool report, which was approved by Mr. Kissinger, he said that "the United States is definitely looking to the Soviets to become a restraining influence in the next few days."

Mr. Ziegler, who was aboard a chartered plane carrying the press corps back from the Azores, arrived at Andrews Air Force Base outside Washington several hours after the President and was stunned when he read news agency dispatches based on Mr. Kissinger's remarks. The reports all stressed the possibility that Mr. Nixon's trip to Moscow might be cancelled.

After consulting with the White House, Mr. Ziegler said that "the United States is not considering canceling the United States-Soviet summit and no United States Government official intended to announce this

He said that Mr. Kissinger's remarks had been interpreted in a "highly speculative way" and had been "taken out of context."

Mr. Kissinger had labeled those parts of his remarks "deep background," meaning that newsmen were not to identify the source in any way. This ground rule was violated by both *The Washington Post* and *The New York Times*.

The Times decided that because of the importance of importance of the material it would attribute the remarks to the White House without naming Mr. Kissinger. It did so after informing Mr. Ziegler. The *Post*, asserting that it had learned through independent sources, that Mr. Kissinger had given the briefing, named him in all its editions. In late editions, after the appearance of the early edition of *The Post*, *The Times* and other news media identified Mr. Kissinger also.

The sum of the Kissinger and Ziegler statements produced some confusion and drew more correspondents than usual to Mr. Ziegler's news conference this morning.

The statements also caused great discomfiture at the State Department. Officials who have been quietly working on plans for Mr. Nixon's visit to the Soviet Union were especially surprised by Mr. Kissinger's remarks. As reported, they seemed to them to go further than the situation in South Asia warranted.

One official, who asked not to be identified, said the Kissinger and Ziegler statements yesterday were "far from mature statesmanship."

Mr. Ziegler, explaining his statement last night, said that after consultation with the White House he had tried to "put into perspective" the Government's actual position.

"The fact of the matter is that if the situation in South Asia expands into West Pakistan or continues elsewhere in the area, this will very definitely affect the world peace," he said.

Mr. Ziegler said that Mr. Kissinger had been saying that such a development could "very well affect future Soviet-United States relations." But he asserted that the United States did not expect the fighting to spread to West Pakistan and

Thus, he added, the question of canceling Mr. Nixon's trip was "not a live issue."

The White House was unhappy that Mr. Kissinger's name had been mentioned as the source of the comments, in violation of long-standing ground rules. Mr. Ziegler said that *The Post's* breaking of the rules was "unacceptable to the White House," and called for a meeting with press representatives to draft a new voluntary code of regulations.

At the news conference, David J. Kraslow of *The Los Angeles Times*, who was one of the pool reporters who met with Mr. Kissinger, said that Mr. Kissinger's remarks had not been volunteered but had been elicited under sharp questioning.

He said that he had phoned Benjamin C. Bradlee, executive editor of *The Post*, to protest the paper's violation of the ground rules. Noting that *The New York Times* had also not adhered exactly to the rules, Mr. Kraslow said that "the good name of *The Washington Post*, and that of *The New York Times* to a certain extent, was sullied."

Other newsmen, however, told Mr. Ziegler that they thought the pool had been wrong to accept Mr. Kissinger's views as "deep background" when they touched such sensitive issues.

Editor Defends Stand

Mr. Bradlee, in a statement tonight, defended the violation of the ground rules. He said that in practice, background briefings "have been abused and become vehicles for the Government to give the press its version of the news, its interpretation of the news, and its policy, without accountability."

"We are convinced that we have engaged in this deception and done this disservice to the reader long enough," he went on.

"Therefore it shall be the policy of this newspaper to make every reasonable effort to attribute information to its source."

Specific guidelines would be issued to *The Post* staff shortly, he said, "to get this newspaper once and for all out of the business of distributing the party line of any official of any government, including that official and that government."

When not wanting to be

directly quoted, Washington officials usually resort to one of two devices. The remarks are labeled either "on background," in which the official's agency can be mentioned, such as "a State Department official," or "on deep background," in which information cannot be attributed in any way.

Post Criticized for Identifying Kissinger

STATINTL

By Don Oberdorfer
Washington Post Staff Writer

Presidential press secretary Ronald L. Ziegler and a Los Angeles Times correspondent criticized The Washington Post yesterday for revealing the source of official "background" statements regarding relations with the Soviet Union.

The article in question, in Wednesday's Post, identified presidential adviser Henry A. Kissinger as the source of a statement that the President may reconsider his forthcoming trip to Moscow unless the Russians exercise a restraining influence in the India-Pakistan conflict.

The Kissinger statement was made to five reporters in a "press pool" aboard the presidential plane returning from the Nixon-Pompidou talks in the Azores. Kissinger made his comments with the understanding that they could only be used by reporters without attribution to him or any administration official.

Ziegler said the Post story citing Kissinger as the source broke the ground rules of the encounter and "is unacceptable to the White House." He said he would begin consultations with the White House Correspondents Association wire services and broadcast networks to establish clear "ground rules" for future situations, including interviews aboard the presidential plane.

David J. Kraslow, Washington bureau chief of the Los Angeles Times and a member of the Tuesday press pool, charged The Post with "unprofessional, unethical, cheap journalism" in citing Kissinger as the source. Kraslow said Kissinger's remarks were not "dumped in our lap" but were elicited by the reporters on the aircraft "under the most intensive kind of questioning" and only after they gave assurance to Kissinger that he would not be identified as the source.

Benjamin C. Bradlee, executive editor of the Post, defended the newspaper's handling of the

"background briefings." Bradlee said it was common knowledge that Kissinger was the source of the statements — which were reported in various ways by major newspapers, wire services and networks yesterday — but that the "ground rules" kept this information from the reader.

Referring to unattributed information from officials at background briefings, Bradlee said, "We are convinced that we have engaged in this deception and done this disservice to the reader long enough." He said the policy of The Post shall be "to make every reasonable effort to attribute information to its source" and to view unattributed information with "skepticism and suspicion."

In presidential travel and in some other situations, a small group of journalists known as the press "pool" customarily accompanies the Chief Executive. Their job is make sure that some reporters are with the President in all public situations, and to pass along anything they learn to the entire press corps.

The five-member press pool for Tuesday—chosen by the White House—left the Azores on Mr. Nixon's jet. The 33 other members of the traveling White House press corps—including British, Canadian, Danish, French, German, Italian, Japanese, Swedish and Swiss journalists—remained behind for three hours to file their stories on Mr. Nixon's meeting with Pompidou.

In flight over the Atlantic in the presidential plane, Kissinger came back to the aft compartment occupied by the press pool. There under questioning he made the statements about the United States' attitude regarding the Soviet position in the South Asia conflict. A summary of his remarks was then composed by members of the press pool and sent forward to Kissinger's compartment for his approval. The President travels in another compartment of the plane, but

Bradlee said yesterday that he was aware of Kissinger's meeting with the press

The portion of Kissinger's remarks concerning U.S.-Soviet relations was marked on the pool report to "be written on our own without attribution to any administration official." Shortly after the presidential jet landed, major wire services distributed "urgent" stories on the matter.

The Associated Press reported that "President Nixon may reassess his plans for a historic journey to Moscow, it is understood, unless the Soviet Union begins to exercise a restraining influence in the India-Pakistan war." United Press International said "President Nixon will re-examine the Washington-Moscow thaw and his planned spring trip to Moscow if Russia continues to encourage India's military drive against Pakistan, it was understood Tuesday." The AP and UPI reporters were members of the pool.

The CBS Evening News reported that Mr. Nixon "let it be known tonight" that he might re-examine Soviet-American relations if Russia does not restrain India. The NBC Nightly News attributed the warning to "the Nixon administration." The ABC News said "it's reported" that the President may take a new look at his plan to visit Moscow.

By the time press secretary Ziegler and the bulk of the press corps landed here in two charter jets about 7:30 p.m., the stories mentioned above had been widely disseminated. The pool report had not been given to the traveling press corps in flight, as is often the case, because of communications difficulties.

Shortly after landing, Ziegler began issuing statements on-the-record denying that any U.S. official was suggesting that Mr. Nixon was considering cancellation of his trip to Russia. (Kissinger had said the President might consider a change in summit plans; he did not say the President was already considering it.)

The Washington Post established a source of the stories which were being reported on all

news wires and networks, and identified him as such. Executive Editor Bradlee said he made the decision at 8 p.m. Tuesday.

The New York Times informed the White House in early evening that it would attribute the Kissinger statements to "a high White House official." The Times did so in its early editions and in later editions quoted Kissinger by name on the basis of public attribution by The Post.

Seymour Topping, assistant managing editor of The Times, said that paper's policy is to seek the greatest possible attribution but make its judgment on every story on an "ad hoc" basis. Topping said the non-attribution rule in the case of Tuesday's Kissinger story was "unacceptable" in view of the importance and nature of the material.

The question of "background briefings" — in which information is given the press on the condition that the source not be identified—has been controversial among Washington journalists for many years. Bradlee said yesterday that Post reporters and editors had become increasingly concerned about use and abuse of unattributed information over the last five years.

When Kissinger began his "background" talk aboard Air Force One on Tuesday afternoon, he was reminded that another of his recent backgrounders had become public when it was inserted into the Congressional Record by Sen. Barry Goldwater. Kissinger appeared to be irritated about that incident, and remarked—ironically as it turned out—that the purpose of doing the briefing "on background" was to prevent inflaming of the issue.

STATINTL

Some U.S. Government briefings assailed by news chiefs

Third of three articles on a survey made by the Washington news committee of the Associated Press Managing Editors committee.

By Courtney B. Sheldon
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

Washington bureau chiefs generally go along with a wide variety of types of government news briefings, but reservations abound. Seven types of interviews and briefings rules were listed for the 24 bureau chiefs participating:

o Completely on the record, everything fully quotable.

o On the record, but check quotes with interview before using.

o On the record, but paraphrase or indirect discourse only.

o Background with direct quotes attributable to a source such as a White House official.

o Background with indirect quotes attributable to source such as a White House official.

o Deep background, no quotes, use with attribution such as it is understood, or without attribution and "on your own."

o Off the record, information not publishable.

Those surveyed were asked if they would permit their correspondents to participate in interviews or briefings under all these rules and, if not, what were the objections. Fourteen said yes and 10 no.

The explanation responses included:

"I can remember No. 2 used only in formal, tape-recorded interviews and No. 3 only for the President of the United States. No. 6 causes the most trouble, and we use it only for essential information that we believe to be absolutely reliable, not for mere argument of a point of view.

"Although 'backgrounding' is often abused, it is extremely difficult to write blanket rules for all occasions. In the end our objective must be to get as much information as openly as we can and to make our own judgments on what we can responsibly print."—Max Frankel, New York Times.

"I would propose narrowing them to the following: on the record; on the record, but

paraphrase or indirect discourse only; background with indirect quotes attributable to generic source; and off the record, information not publishable." — John F. Lunch, ABC News.

"Our reporters are under instructions to strive always for completely on-record news conferences, and to protest against anything short of that. We object generally to off-record sessions which seem likely in advance to produce substantive major news, particularly in case of the President and Vice-President. In those cases our reporters have discretion to participate or not, depending on potential for our being seriously disadvantaged—for example, in event the substance leaks to reporters not present, or there is a violation of ground rules." — Unsigned.

"Deep background and off the record are to be handled like H-bombs, taking great care not be exploited by the source and remembering our purpose is to inform our readers about the truth as best we possibly can. A flat ban on such interviews seems unnecessary; good judgment and common sense should guide." — Robert S. Boyd, Knight Newspapers.

"We urge reporters to try to avoid totally 'off-the-record' situations and to use their individual judgment on whether to remain. At times reporters have decided to leave." — Dean Reed, Newhouse News Service.

"In principle, I object to all but the first two types. Important information is being denied the public. We are being used by the person or organization that invokes the rule." — Frank J. Jordan, NBC News.

"I object to 'on-the-record but checking quotes with interviewee before using' and 'off-the-record with information not publishable.' It is all too easy for an official to revise and extend his remarks if he sees his words in print before they are actually published. A reporter is placed in a compromising position if he knows something and cannot publish it. He is bound by a rule that another reporter may be unaware of." — Unsigned.

"No. 2 allows the interviewee to literally edit. No. 3 violates the meaning of 'on-the-record.' The reader has a right to the interviewees' exact language so he can judge nuance and connotation and emphasis." — Unsigned.

"Checking quotes with interviewee — we view this as abandoning our editorial function and inhibiting to proper reporting. I

can't see cases where a right of review would be helpful except to an interviewee regretting his remarks. All interviews taking on a hostile flavor would, of course, be erased by the news source. In the long run we are honest to our audience only when we retain editorial control fully." — William J. Small, CBS News.

"I object to all the background and off-the-record material — but competitive pressures prevent me from carrying out my objections to the point of telling the reporters to boycott these." — Unsigned.

"Permitting correspondents to participate does not indicate approval, but rather a recognition of the competitive nature of Washington journalism and the traditions we've allowed to develop. I personally never agree to check quotes and rarely print deep background material.

"Permission to check quotes is permission to revise quotes if they appear in written form different than they sounded when delivered orally.

"On deep background, I believe that elected public officials have an obligation to take the responsibility of their office, and that includes a public assessment of their work. If they want sympathy or pity or even understanding, they should do it on the record. Furthermore, backgrounders are frequently contradicted on the record, a contribution to the undermining of the public faith in the press." — Lawrence M. O'Rourke, Philadelphia Bulletin.

"We object to being used as a shield by the source, and in most cases believe that if he must bear responsibility for identification with what he says, he will be more accurate in what he tells us. We may not get as much information that way, but we can be certain or nearly certain that what we get is accurate." — Unsigned.



'Unidentified' Sources Blow Their Cover

BY HELEN THOMAS
UPI Staff Writer

WASHINGTON — The so-called "backgrounder" for newsmen is taking a beating in Saigon these days—much to the amusement of White House reporters who must maintain the myth of an unidentified "spokesman" or "a White House official" in many news stories on top policy.

More and more the cover is being blown off the background source, and soon it may become a thing of the past as a mode of transmitting important, but unattributable information.

Three weeks ago, U.S. Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker summoned a select group of reporters to the American Embassy to answer questions "on background" on his "neutral" involvement in seeing that there would be a contested election in South Vietnam Oct. 3. The statements he made, ascribed to an "informed source," were easily identifiable and quickly blasted by President Nguyen Van Thieu's opponents, Gen. Duong Van (Big) Minh and Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky.

Flat Attribution

In follow-up stories, American newspaper correspondents flatly attributed the statements to Bunker.

The same was true on a "backgrounder" Ky gave to a group of reporters during which he threatened to "destroy" Thieu and raised the possibility of a coup. Soon after Ky was identified as the source of the threats.

Despite the precariousness of the "background" briefing these days, it is still used at the White House. But few of the world's chancelleries are fooled when a "high Administration" spokesman speaks out on China, Cuba, the Soviet Union or touchy relations elsewhere in the world. They assume, quite rightly, that it is the President's national security affairs adviser, Henry A. Kissinger.

Reporters would prefer to have the information straight — and attributable. But they settle for less when the White House is willing to give a candid assessment of its policy.

Also interesting to note is the number of times flat denials of news stories are put in the realm of "off-the-record" by the White House.

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Newsman given classified data at high levels in Washington

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Two affidavits filed by the *Washington Post* in its Pentagon Papers case described to the court how the "leaking" of classified information is a common practice in the Government.

The executive branch of the government "normally, regularly, routinely and purposefully" makes classified information available to reporters and editors, according to Benjamin C. Bradlee, executive editor of the *Post* since 1968 and a journalist for 20 years.

He related that the information is made available in two ways—in private conversations originated by the reporter or by the government official, and in the "infamous backgrounders" normally, but not exclusively, originated by the government.

Volunteered leaks

In a second affidavit, Murrey Marder, a *Post* reporter, cited several examples of "volunteered leaks" which provided him with information for stories on critical government activities and policies.

He told the court: "If the press should no longer be able to secure classified information from the American Government, the press will still secure it—but from foreign sources."

"It is a prime function of the press in a non-totalitarian society to cross-check and try to balance this volunteered classified information with other classified information not volunteered by the government," Marder stated. "This is the process through which the widest possible spectrum of information is brought into the market place of public knowledge

to compete in the struggle for truth."

Bradlee's affidavit detailed some conversations with the late President Kennedy and with former President Johnson in which classified information was made available to him.

He recited the following:

"I have received classified information from officials of the executive branch of the Government on literally hundreds of occasions. On virtually all of these occasions the information was made available to me in the knowledge that I would cause the information to be published and it was published. On rare occasions the information was made available to me with the proviso that it not be published and it was not published. On virtually all these occasions the information was made available with some proviso that made identification of the source forbidden—then and now.

JFK read secret memo

"I can testify that President John F. Kennedy once read to me portions of a highly classified memorandum of conversation between him and Nikita Khrushchev in Vienna in 1961. I received his permission to use this material, which is still highly classified, and it appeared in *Newsweek*. His stated purpose was to convince the American public that the Soviet Union was taking an extremely hard, belligerent line on Berlin.

"I can attest that I attended a background briefing in the White House theater in April, 1965, in which classified information on the status of American negotiations with Hanoi was disclosed by two high-level Gov-

ernment officials with the purpose of having it printed—without attribution to the briefers. The stated purpose of that briefing was to create a climate of public opinion to better understand a major policy speech by President Johnson later that day.

"I can attest that I was present at a session with President Johnson in May, 1968, in which classified information on the war in Vietnam was made available on the proviso that this information could not be made available without his specific permission. That permission has subsequently been sought and denied. It has not been published."

How lawmakers kill bills

Bradlee mentioned how the legislative branch also makes classified information available to reporters—often to defeat legislation they don't like.

"For example," he stated, "I was present in the office of a Congressman in 1958 or 1959 when he gave me a 'secret' State Department document about foreign aid. Before he handed the document over he took a pair of scissors from his desk and carefully removed the 'secret' label from each page. His stated purpose for giving me this document was to kill the foreign aid bill."

Bradlee concluded by saying:

"If there is one fundamental in the principle of freedom of the press, it is that the press cannot be limited to reporting only what is advantageous to the government. The press must be free also to report what may embarrass, displease, or annoy the government."

The Not-Very-Secret Secrecy Game

STATINTL

By William Greider

Washington Post Staff Writer

Trafficking in government secrets, despite the recent uproar, is an old and established enterprise in Washington, conducted largely as a 9-to-5 affair, no cloaks, no daggers.

During the recent unpleasantness in the federal courts over this subject, some of the regular players of the game came forward to describe how they operate, asserting in sworn affidavits that the practice of transmitting "top secret" information to the public (and the enemy) is old stuff, well, as old as yesterday's newspaper.

Chalmers M. Roberts, who retired the other day after a long and active career as a newsman, remembers a time when the operation approached a formal routine.

Roberts would drop by the Secretary of State's office regularly and a young special assistant would read him selected excerpts from the daily flow of classified diplomatic cables. The young man was William Scranton, later a congressman, then governor of Pennsylvania and a presidential aspirant in 1964. He was, of course, purveying the state secrets with the full approval of his boss, John Foster Dulles.

"What he was doing was getting out the stuff," said Roberts, who saw to it that the information was printed in *The Washington Post*. "I think it was a good system but, of course, it was incomplete. Generally, the people don't tell all the bad news in that kind of a system."

New York Times bureau chief Max Frankel, another one of the town's prominent dealers in classified material, recalls how he obtained an authoritative account of the U.S.-Soviet summit talks in 1967 simply by standing beside a swimming pool in Texas and taking notes. The talkative swimmer was President Johnson.

Still another operative, Washington Post Executive Editor Benjamin Bradlee, has attested to securing portions of a confidential government memorandum on private talks in 1961 between President Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev.

Bradlee got it upstairs at the White House from the President. Although the material is still highly classified, it appeared in *Newsweek Magazine* 10 years ago. **Protection of Sources**

These men, of course, are journalists who, under normal circumstances, are sworn to protect the identity of their sources—especially when they obtain and print classified information, even if it came from the President himself. However, one by-product of the recent court confrontation between the Justice Department and the newspapers over the top-secret Pentagon papers was the spectacle of new reporters coming forward with affidavits to assert that they traffic in secrets all the time, so why make a federal case out of it?

That claim apparently still shocks people, even some Supreme Court justices and some newspaper columnists (who surely know better). The reality in Washington, as described by the practitioners, is a continual process of breach-and-leak which is as grand and petty, as vast and varied in purpose, as the bloated files which are supposedly guarded by the government's system of security classifications.

George C. Wilson, who covers the Pentagon for *The Post*, once did a careful job of prying-and-piecing information from a variety of sources—a standard tactic for all reporters—and came up with a story that the United States was developing a new and ominous nuclear weapon, a multi-headed rocket which could launch a shower of separate

warheads. That was in early and the secret weapon, now 1967 and the secret weapon, now known as MIRV in the jargon of the arms race, was probably news to the Russians as well as the American public. How could Wilson justify such a serious breach?

"I'm sorry I didn't have that story three years earlier," Wilson replied. "The development was so far along that it was beyond the point of no return. The only way you can control the arms race is to know what's going on. If weapons developments cannot stand up under Congressional and public examination, then they ought not to be pursued. What we're talking about is the life or death of the planet. That should not be left to weapons experts alone."

Cynicism Develops

From the petty to the sublime, reporters who cover these areas develop a certain cynicism about security labels. No self-respecting reporter, for instance, bothers to mention that he is revealing Pentagon data merely classified "confidential" because that designation is so commonplace.

Likewise, the old hands remember that no one complained much when the Eisenhower administration provided *The New York Times* with the Yalta papers or in 1957 when Roberts revealed in *The Post* the contents of the top-secret Gaither Report on U.S. preparedness. The eight-column headline said: "Secret Report Sees U.S. in Grave Peril" and, indeed, that document helped foster heavy arms spending by Democratic presidents in the 1960s.

Re-Leaked Documents

The absurdities were especially clear in the current flap over the Pentagon study on Vietnam. Some of the contested documents were actually re-leaks. For instance, Joseph Alsop, the syndicated columnist, de-

scribed and paraphrased in 1964 some of the same contingency plans and memoranda which *The New York Times* revealed in 1971—and which the government went to court to keep from the public.

Frankel described the process in his 18-page affidavit as "a cooperative, competitive, antagonistic and arcane relationship."

In large part, the reporters who get the secrets are the ones who dig hardest, who cover their fields with enough expertise that officials either trust them or cannot prudently ignore their questions. Often, the process requires asking a lot of speculative questions aimed at a lot of people in government. Sometimes, the answers are provided by officials with no motive other than seeing an accurate report of what is going on.

Frankel noted:

"Without the use of secrets . . . there could be no adequate diplomatic, military or political reporting of the kind our people take for granted, either abroad or in Washington, and there could be no mature system of communication between the government and the people. That is one reason why the sudden complaint by one party to these regular dealings strikes us as monstrous and hypocritical—unless it is essentially perfunctory, for the purpose of retaining some discipline over the federal bureaucracy."

Mutual Hypocrisy

Hypocrisy, however, may reside on both sides of the strange relationship between press and government. Both *The Post* and *The Times* have sometimes found occasion to defend the sanctity of the security system, without a hint that their own reporters ignore it routinely.

The Post waxed indignant in 1963 when Otto Otepka, a State Department security officer, was leaking classi-

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