S-0795/DI-2A

SECRET

[redacted]

A HANDBOOK OF WARNING INTELLIGENCE

VOLUME II

INCLUDES PARTS V-VI, CHAPTERS 19-29

NOVEMBER 1972

DO NOT DESTROY - RETURN TO SENDER

COPY 8 OF 424 COPIES

EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EO 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5B (2)
DECLASSIFICATION DATE CANNOT BE
DETERMINED

SECRET

A HANDBOOK OF WARNING INTELLIGENCE

VOLUME II

INCLUDES PARTS V - VI

CHAPTERS 19 - 29

BY: CYNTHIA M. GRABO

PRINTED BY THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOVEMBER 1972

TO RECIPIENTS

THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN PRINTED IN RELATIVELY FEW COPIES AND THE DEMAND IS EXPECTED TO EXCEED SUPPLY. ALL RECIPIENTS ARE REQUESTED TO CIRCULATE THIS HANDBOOK AND TO RETAIN THEIR COPIES FOR FUTURE USE. IF YOU HAVE NO NEED FOR IT, HOWEVER, PLEASE DO NOT DESTROY, BUT RETURN EITHER TO THE NATIONAL INDICATIONS CENTER OR TO THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, DI-2A.

(Reverse Blank)

AUTHOR'S NOTE

Recipients of this volume should also have received the earlier portions of this work, Chapters 1 through 18, which were published in a single volume in July 1972. An earlier printing of these first chapters also was issued to a few recipients, largely in the Defense Department, in draft form. Although the individual chapters and sections may be read singly or out of order, it is suggested that most readers would find it more useful to read them in sequence.

As was noted in the introduction to the first volume, this handbook is concerned with strategic warning as an analytical problem, rather than with such questions as improvement of collection, data processing, and crisis management which have received so much emphasis in recent years. This work is intended primarily for the use of intelligence personnel and in intelligence training courses, although it is hoped that others at the policy and command levels may also find it of value.

It should be emphasized again that this is not an official project and does not necessarily represent the views of any agency. The work has been prepared entirely on my own time and all opinions, except as otherwise noted, are my own. The text has not been officially reviewed prior to publication, although several chapters have been submitted to knowledgeable members of the intelligence community for comments. Once again, I express my thanks to all the individuals who have offered their comments and encouragement. In particular, I am indebted to the secretaries in the National Indications Center who have typed this manuscript, and to the members of the Defense Intelligence Agency (especially in DI-2A) who have arranged for its printing and distribution.

Comments would be appreciated and should be forwarded to the writer at: National Indications Center, 1E821, Pentagon, Washington, D. C.

Cynthia M. Grabo
National Indications Center
October 1972

(Reverse Blank)

A HANDBOOK OF WARNING INTELLIGENCE

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CONTENTS OF THIS VOLUME

TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont'd)

TO BE PUBLISHED LATER

CONTENTS OF VOLUME I

(PUBLISHED SEPARATELY IN JULY 1972)

PART V: SPECIFIC PROBLEMS OF POLITICAL, CIVIL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

CHAPTER 19: IMPORTANCE OF POLITICAL FACTORS FOR WARNING

CHAPTER 19: IMPORTANCE OF POLITICAL FACTORS FOR WARNING

It is easy to demonstrate the importance and relevance of military developments for warning. Anyone can recognize that the numerous military preparedness steps identified on indicator lists bear a direct relationship to a capability, and hence at least a possible intention, to commit military forces. Many military developments, including some of the most important, are physically measurable or quantifiable -- assuming, of course, that the collection capability exists. There are so many tanks deployed in this area, which represents such-and-such a percentage increase over the past two weeks, etc. Such information, factually speaking, is unambiguous; its interpretation is not dependent on subjective judgment.

Ambiguity of Political Indicators

In contrast, the relevance of political developments or political indicators to warning is often not so readily apparent, is not factually demonstrable, and interpretation of specific developments is likely to be highly subjective. The potential for concealment of intention in the political field, not to mention for deception, is much higher than for military preparations. At least in theory, it is possible for a closed society to conceal completely its decisions, to fail to take measures to prepare its own populace psychologically for war, and to handle its diplomacy and manipulate its propaganda so that there is virtually no discernible outward change in the political atmosphere which might alert the adversary. In practice, of course, this virtually never occurs. But, even when there are numerous political anomalies and significant changes in diplomacy and propaganda, the

interpretation of their significance may be difficult and elusive. Short of old-fashioned ultimatums and declarations of war, or the collection pipeline into the adversary's decision-making councils, nearly all political indications are subject to some degree of ambiguity and uncertainty. It follows, of course, that interpretations of political indications are likely to be much more variable and controversial than of military developments.

One manifestation of this is that there are usually fewer political and civil developments on indicator lists and that they tend to be much vaguer and imprecise in wording. An illustration or two will suffice to make this point. Indicator lists usually carry such political items as: "Protracted high-level leadership meetings," and "Marked intensification of internal police controls." Such developments are, of course, potentially significant indications that decisions on war are under consideration or have been taken, but they may also be attributable entirely to domestic developments, such as civil unrest. Even political indicators tied directly to foreign affairs, such as "A general hardening of foreign policy" or "Significant increases in propaganda broadcasts to or about a critical area," are not in themselves necessarily manifestations of any decision or intention to resort to conflict. Such developments are significant even as possible indications only in relation to what is sometimes called "the overall situation." Although not all political indicators are so unspecific, it has not been possible to define potential political indicators with anything like the precision which is possible for military developments; there is no political TO&E. Nor is it possible to forecast in advance whether an adversary will choose

to publicize his objectives and intentions, seek to conceal them almost totally, or -- as is most probable -- take some intermediate course. Thus the number of political indications versus military is almost impossible to anticipate for any hypothetical future situation. We can forecast with some degree of confidence that some specific military preparations will be undertaken, but we cannot forecast or at least cannot agree what manifestations of the political decision may be evident, or how such manifestations should be interpreted.

This ambiguity and non-specificity of political indicators also often means that our sense of "political warning" is likely to be much more subjective, and hence more difficult to define or explain to others, than is the military evidence. Sometimes, there is little more than an uneasy sense or intuitive "feeling" that the enemy is up to something, which of course is not provable or even necessarily communicable to others who are not thinking on the same wave length. The analyst or military commander who attempts to put this sense of unease into words may feel almost helpless to explain his "feelings," if not downright apprehensive that he is making a fool of himself. Yet, often these "feelings" have been generally accurate, if not specific, barometers of impending developments. Thus, General Lucius Clay, a few weeks before the start of the Berlin blockade, dispatched a cable to Army Intelligence in Washington, which said in part: "Within the last few weeks, I have felt a subtle change in Soviet attitude which I cannot define but which now gives me a feeling that it [war] may come with dramatic suddenness. I cannot support this change in my own thinking with any data or outward evidence in relationships other

than to describe it as a feeling of a new tenseness in every Soviet individual with whom we have official relations."[1] Or, as General Clay later recalled his feelings at the time: "Somehow I felt instinctively that a definite change in the attitude of the Russians in Berlin had occurred and that something was about to happen.. I pointed out that I had no confirming intelligence of a positive nature."[2]

Much the same sense of unease that something was about to happen has haunted perceptive intelligence analysts on other occasions -- such as the spring of 1950 prior to the North Korean attack in South Korea, and in the early months of 1962, even before the marked upsurge of Soviet shipments to Cuba was begun.

Even when political warning is less vague and subjective -- that is, when the political atmosphere is clearly deteriorating and tensions are rising over a specific situation which may lead to war -- the political indicators still may be imprecise and not measurable or quantifiable evidence of a specific course of enemy action. There are, of course, exceptions to this, in which the adversary may make no attempt to conceal his plans, or in which direct warnings are issued to the intended victim, both privately and publicly. Often, however, political indications can give us only generalized warning, such as a recognition that the dangers of war are increasing substantially, or that the enemy is clearly committed to some course of action which entails a grave risk of hostilities.

---

1 Walter Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries (New York, The Viking Press, 1951), p. 387.

2 Lucius D. Clay, Decision in Germany (New York, Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1950), p. 354.

Critical Role of Political Factors for Warning

In large part because of these uncertainties, there exists a fundamental mistrust and misunderstanding of the importance of political factors for warning. Particularly among military officers, although by no means confined to them, there has been a tendency to downplay the significance of "political warning." Because political indications are less precise, less measurable and less predictable than military indications, it is an easy step to conclude that they somehow matter less, and that we can give them only secondary or incidental attention in our assessment of the enemy's intentions. Warning papers and estimates, in some cases, have seemed to place undue emphasis on the detection of military preparations, with only passing reference to the political problem. The importance of the political assessment has rarely been so well defined as in the following perceptive comments written several years ago by one of the few real warning experts in the US intelligence community:

> We query whether the critical role of the political factors in warning may not warrant somewhat more emphasis or highlighting.
>
> We appreciate that, in the warning process, the political factor -- or "posture" --constitutes one of the most esoteric and elusive fields. The very term "political posture" remains essentially ambiguous. Nevertheless, elusive, ambiguous or no, its critical role in warning must be duly weighed. We discern the implication that the political factor somehow constitutes a separable category, distinct from that of physical preparations; that when joined with the latter at some point well along in the game, it may, mathematically, add to or subtract from the sum of our physical holdings. Actually, the political context is determinative of whether at any and every given point in the progress of the enemy's preparations, you indeed hold any sum at all in the "preparations" category. The political context to us is not merely another increment to the warning conveyed by a particular pattern or

patterns of observed physical "preparations." It is rather the essential, a priori, context which establishes that a particular physical activity may have any possible relevance to a real, live warning issue; it gives or denies to the physical "preparations" their presumed evidential value as indications. In any discussion of a hypothetical future warning problem, there is, of necessity, present an exquisitely subtle subjective assumption. Any discourse on what indications or evidence one expects to receive, how one will handle these, etc., assumes the very point at issue--that one is dealing with activities recognized as "preparations." Now, logically, there cannot be "preparations" for something that in fact the enemy has no conscious design of doing; there cannot be a valid "indication" of that which does not exist in reality (much less a whole compendium of such "indications" sampled from a cross-section of the attack-bound enemy national entity). Unless and until, and then only to the degree that, the intelligence community's intellectual assumptions and convictions as to the enemy's political posture can rationally accommodate at least the possibility that the enemy just might really be preparing to attack, there is not likely to be acceptance--even contingent and tentative--of any enemy activity whatever--specific or in pattern--as reflecting or indicating "preparations" to attack. So long as the prevailing political assessment of the enemy's foreign policy objectives, motivational factors, etc., confidently holds that the course of action for which alleged "preparations" are being made is inconceivable, or impossible (or even unlikely), there has not even been a beginning of the cumulative process [of indications intelligence]. Thus the political factor invariably stands athwart the warning exercise from the very outset, and represents a constant, vital ingredient in the warning process from beginning to end.

Our remarks above derive primarily from our cumulative experience in the warning process. The same conclusion, however, follows from the intrinsic logic of the problem itself. The very end to which warning generally addresses itself--enemy intent to attack--is fundamentally a political issue, involving a political decision of the highest order, made by the political leadership of the enemy state (we are excluding here, of course, the "Failsafe" issue of some military nut just arbitrarily pushing a button). The working rationale underlying the exercise discussed throughout this estimate is simply the presumed existence of:

(a) an enemy decision to attack;

(b) a plan of measures/preparations to be taken to insure success of the attack;

(c) implementation of the plan.

The intelligence processes involve basically our attempt to detect, identify, and place in order fragmentary manifestations of the process actually under way in (c), with a view toward reconstructing and authenticating the essential outlines of (b), from which we hope to derive and prove (a) which equals classic warning. We cannot hope to reason effectively from (c) to (a) without a correct, albeit hypothetical, appreciation from the outset of (a). Here again, then, we find that in theory as well as in practice the crucial, final link is entirely political. Whether viewed from Moscow or Washington, the political context is the capstone: for the enemy--the beginning of that fateful course; for US intelligence--the end!

Political Perception Fundamental to Warning

The perception of the enemy's fundamental goals and priorities is the sine qua non of warning. It constitutes the most significant difference between those who "have warning" and those who do not. No amount of military evidence will serve to convince those who do not have this political perception of the adversary's objectives and national priorities, or those who cannot perceive that military action may be the rational outcome of the adversary's course of action to date. The validity of this point can be demonstrated in instance after instance; it is the problem of "those who cannot see," and more "facts" will have little effect on their ability to see. Just as some could not see that Hitler was bent on conquest in Europe, others later could not see that China would or even might intervene in Korea, or that the USSR would or even might invade Czechoslovakia. All were fundamentally problems in political perception, rather than the evaluation of military evidence. An indications study on the Czechoslovak crisis (written after the event) described the analytic problem as it existed in mid-July (just prior to the start of Soviet mobilization and major troop deployments) as follows:

It is important to note that, while current intelligence reporting at this time clearly and explicitly recognized the gravity of the crisis and the nature of Soviet tactics, there was also a fundamental difference of opinion among analysts. The point at issue was the means which the Soviet Union could and would use to accomplish its objectives and whether it would, if faced by continuing Czechoslovak intransigence, ultimately resort to overt intervention in Czechoslovak affairs.

On the one hand, there was a group of analysts who questioned whether there was anything that the Soviet Union really could do, including employment of military force, to reverse the trends in Czechoslovakia. This group was also inclined to the view that the USSR, if unable to secure Czech compliance by political means, would not jeopardize its international image, its relations with western Communist Parties and its progress toward coexistence with the United States by direct military action. It believed that the USSR had changed or matured politically since the days of the Hungarian intervention and was unlikely to take such action again. For these reasons, direct Soviet action against Czechoslovakia was viewed as somewhat "irrational" and therefore unlikely. This group was thus predisposed, in varying degrees, to regard subsequent major Soviet military moves as more pressure on Czechoslovakia rather than as bona fide preparations for military action.

On the other hand was a group of analysts who inclined to the belief quite early in the summer that the USSR was deadly serious in its determination to maintain control of Czechoslovakia and would ultimately use any means, including military force, to insure this. They believed that the USSR, not just for political but also for strategic reasons, could not tolerate the loss of Czechoslovakia and that Soviet security interests were the paramount consideration. The USSR therefore would decide, if in fact it had not already decided, that military action against Czechoslovakia was the lesser of the evils which confronted it. These analysts thus did not regard such a course of action as irrational, and they were predisposed earlier rather than later to regard the Soviet military moves as preparations for direct intervention.

Such judgments or estimates by individuals are crucial to the warning process, and each person makes his own regardless of whether there is an agreed national estimate. Each analyst is influenced, perhaps unconsciously, by his preconceived views or his opinion of what is rational or logical behavior on the part of the enemy. His judgment on this will help to determine, sometimes more than he may realize, not only how he interprets a given piece of information but what he selects to report at all.

The foregoing discussion should help to explain why some critics object to the terms "military warning" and "political warning" as if they were separate processes. There are indications which are essentially military, and those which are primarily political, but there is only one kind of warning. It is the perception of the significance of all these developments in toto. Warning, like beauty, lies in the eye of the beholder.

It is highly erroneous to presume, as many do, that political analysts (or even political agencies, such as the Department of State) make political analyses, and that military analysts (and military agencies, such as the Department of Defense) make military analyses. The intelligence offices of the Department of State do a great deal of essentially military analysis and must constantly take military factors into account in making political assessments. Still more pertinent, perhaps, is the fact that military analysts are constantly making essentially political judgments about the likely military courses of actions of our potential enemies. They may not recognize that this is so; it may be entirely unconscious, but assessments of political factors underlie virtually all military estimates and other analyses of enemy courses of action.

It may be extremely important for warning that gratuitous political judgments of intent do not creep into military assessments of the enemy's capabilities, or at least that the political judgment be clearly separated from the statement of the military capability. This point was well illustrated in judgments made prior to the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950. By March, Army Intelligence was correctly

reporting that the steady buildup of North Korean forces gave them the capability to attack South Korea at any time -- but then undercut this significant military judgment (a warning in itself) with the judgment that it was not believed that North Korea would do it, at least for the time being. The same positive military but negative political judgments were being made by General MacArthur's intelligence in the Far East. Thus, the gratuitous political judgment (the basis and argumentation for which was never really set forth) tended in effect to dilute or even negate a highly important military estimate.

Warning has failed more often for lack of political perception than it has for lack of military evidence. When I have pointed this out to military officers, their reaction often is that you really cannot trust these political people, and if more heed had been paid to the military people, all would have gone well. In some cases this may be true (it is at least partly true for Czechoslovakia in 1968), but in other cases it has been the military themselves who have permitted their own political misperceptions to override the military evidence. And there are cases in which political officers have been well ahead of the military analysts in perception of the likely course of military action. In warning, where we have so often been wrong, there is blame to go around. The point is that the political judgment, no matter who makes it, will likely be even more important than the military analysis for the assessment of the enemy's intentions.

PART V: SPECIFIC PROBLEMS OF POLITICAL, CIVIL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

CHAPTER 20: BASIC POLITICAL WARNING -- A PROBLEM OF PERCEPTION

Approved For Release 2008/03/17 : CIA-RDP80B00829A000800050001-5

May 1972

CHAPTER 20: BASIC POLITICAL WARNING--A PROBLEM OF PERCEPTION

Presumably, few persons would take exception to the general thesis set forth in the preceding chapter -- that the perception of enemy intentions is essentially a political judgment of what he will likely do in given circumstances, and that this understanding of national priorities and objectives is fundamental to any warning judgment. In this chapter, this problem will be examined in more detail, with some specific illustrations of how it may affect our appreciation of the enemy's course of action.

Perceptions of the Likelihood of Conflict

In normal circumstances, the likelihood or unlikelihood of conflict between two or more nations is fairly well understood, not only in government circles but by the educated public, and these judgments are usually quite accurate. They are derived from our recognition that the basic conditions for war between two or more nations either do not exist at all, or are present in varying degrees of probability ranging from a very small chance that war would occur to the situation in which virtually all political signs of ultimate hostilities are positive.

We may cite two examples of these extremes. War between the United States and Canada, given the present international situation and particularly the political systems of the two nations and their long tradition of friendship, appears virtually inconceivable. For war to occur between them, there would have to be drastic and fundamental political changes, which would be clearly recognizable.

At the other extreme, the formation of the state of Israel, in the midst of Arab countries which are bitterly opposed to it and indeed deny its right to exist at all, has created a situation in which the fundamental conditions for war are present at all times -- and which have led to three wars in 20 years. Until or unless the political atmosphere is drastically changed, the probabilities are that war between Israel and the Arab states will erupt at some time again. There need be no fundamental worsening of the atmosphere for this to occur. Politically speaking, war is always a probability, and it is largely military restraints, particularly the superiority of Israeli military forces, that thus far have served to prevent its recurrence since the 1967 conflict.

Between these two extremes, there are all sorts of gradations of our assessments of the probabilities of conflict between nations, or of our perceptions of whether a given nation is or is not inclined to resort to hostilities, or of how aggressive or cautious it may be in pursuit of its aims. Our understandings of these questions are basic not only to our intelligence assessments (particularly our national intelligence estimates) but also to our national political and military policies. Our views concerning whether the USSR would or would not launch a surprise military attack on the US if it felt it could get away with it, or whether China would back another attack by North Korea if it felt the risks were tolerable, are absolutely fundamental. They determine in large part not only how we assess particular moves by these nations, but more importantly what risks we think that we can run and how much of the national budget is allocated to defense against the contingency of attack

by our potential enemies.

A brief examination of our changing attitudes toward the Soviet Union and China since World War II will amply illustrate how fundamental these attitudes are both to our national policies and to intelligence assessments of their likely courses of action.

Our military alliance with the USSR in World War II, together with the US desire to end the war as soon as possible and bring the boys home, was conducive to an atmosphere, or euphoria, in which suggestions that the USSR might have some aggressive post-war ambitions were initially most unpopular, and often completely rejected. The writer recalls how difficult it was to gain a hearing in Army Intelligence in 1944-45 for the idea that the USSR had subversive designs in Latin America. It took a series of unpleasant shocks -- the repression of Eastern Europe by Soviet forces, the Soviet invasion of Iran in 1946 and threat against Turkey in the same year, Communist guerrilla warfare in Greece, and the Communist subversive threat to Western Europe -- to bring about a major change in national attitudes, policies, and intelligence assessments of Soviet intentions. There followed, in 1948, the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia and the Berlin blockade, and in 1950 the Soviet-backed North Korean attack on South Korea. This series of cold war crises with the Soviets ultimately brought about an atmosphere in which many in this country, including some in the intelligence field, became convinced that the USSR was seeking world domination by force, and that it was deterred from further military ventures only by US strength and willingness to respond to the threat. Yet, in little more than

a decade (following the Soviet retreat in the Cuban missile crisis and the ensuing relaxation of US-Soviet tensions), attitudes had swung so far back the other way that many had come to view a detente with the US as the highest priority in Soviet policy. To these people, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia came as a rude surprise -- not for lack of warning, of which there was ample, but for lack of perception of Soviet objectives and priorities.

The China problem over the same period has presented a not dissimilar picture. A view, widely held in the 1950's because of the intervention in Korea and the threat of intervention in Southeast Asia, was that the Chinese Communists were highly aggressive and intent on conquest of much of Asia. Today, almost the opposite view has become accepted -- that they are highly preoccupied with building up their country and would enter into foreign military ventures only if they saw their own security to be directly threatened. Needless to say, these changing attitudes have tended materially to affect our assessments of possible indications of their military intentions.

Such attitudes are crucial to our views as to the nature, and amount, of "political warning" which we may receive. If the opinion prevails that the national leadership of any country is essentially aggressive and bent on expansion or conquest, then it follows that there need be no basic political changes in the attitudes or behavior of that country before it attacks. In this case, the casus belli already exists; it is not brought about by some change in circumstance which we will be able to perceive.

This problem of how much "political warning" we would receive of Soviet attack in Europe has been a bone of contention in NATO planning and estimates, with national positions often closely keyed to the proximity of the potential enemy. Thus, those nations of Western Europe most immediately in danger of being overwhelmed by a Soviet ground force attack have often placed less faith in "political warning time" than have those, such as ourselves, who are not in such immediate danger. Most US analysts today would agree that the outbreak of war in Europe is now almost inconceivable without a fundamental and discernible change in the political situation, which would generate a period of political tension in which the growing possibility of war would be evident. Nonetheless, there remain some who do not accept this even today, just as -- at the peak of the cold war in the late 1940's and 1950's -- many analysts would have questioned that any specific "political warning" of Soviet military intentions would have been received. There have been many military papers, some of quite recent vintage, which have maintained that the USSR not only could attack in Europe with little or no warning, but probably would do so. Such judgments are both military and political; they assume both that there would be no significant military buildup or other discernible preparedness measures prior to the attack, and also that there would be no major change in the political atmosphere which would raise the likelihood of conflict. Obviously, our assumptions and attitudes on this question are absolutely vital to our views on warning of attack in Europe, and the opposing views have proved virtually irreconcilable.

Long-Term Factors: Priorities and Traditional Behavior

How any nation may react in a particular situation will usually be predicated, at least in part, on its traditional national objectives and past performance. It is thus essential to understand what the national objectives or priorities of the potential enemy have been in the past. This, of course, assumes a rationality and consistency of national behavior which have not always been the case, but the premise nonetheless is usually valid. It is from such concepts of likely national behavior in certain circumstances that we derive our judgments of what a nation will fight for and what it will not. We know from experience that the Soviet Union has fought (or at least used its military forces) to preserve its hegemony over its empire in Eastern Europe, and we therefore tend to deem it likely that it would, if necessary, do so again. On the other hand, experience thus far has taught us that the USSR is not likely to run the risks of fighting to gain new territory.

It is virtually impossible for any country (or leader) to conceal for long what its basic philosophies and national objectives are. Deception and concealment cannot extend this far. All leaders need some popular support for their programs, particularly programs which may ultimately lead to war. History shows that most leaders, even those bent on a course of aggression, rarely have made much effort to conceal their intentions, and some leaders (e.g. Hitler in Mein Kampf) have provided us with virtual blueprints of what they planned to accomplish. If we do not, in such cases, correctly perceive the enemy's general course of action, it is often because we did not wish to believe what we were being told -- just as many

refused to accept the clear warnings from Hitler's own writings.

Unfortunately, however, political warning is not this simple. While it is essential to understand the potential enemy's fundamental objectives and priorities, this is not likely to provide us with specific warning of what he will do in some particular situation. It usually cannot tell us how great a risk he is prepared to run to achieve his objectives, how far he may seek them by political means before he will resort to military action or whether he will, in fact, ever finally take the military course. In short, even when our understanding of the adversary's philosophy and objectives is pretty good, we must still have some more specific understanding of his objectives and decisions in the specific situation in order to predict his likely course of action.

Strategic Importance of the Particular Issue

Except in instances of long-planned deliberate aggression, the possibility of conflict usually arises over some particular issue or development, and the potential aggressor may have had very little control of it (see discussion in Chapter 26). Or, if the situation is largely of his own making, development of the situation and the reactions of others may be different from what he had expected. There are potentially, and often actually, a vast number of complicating factors which may influence his political decisions. It will not be enough just to have a general estimate of how he should react in such circumstances, or how he has reacted in the past. It is important to understand how he views the situation now and to interpret how he will behave in this particular instance. We are confronted now with a

condition and not a theory. We thus move from the long-term estimative approach to the problem to the specific and more short-term indications approach.

How much weight are we going to give, in these circumstances, to our traditional concepts of this nation's objectives and likely courses of action, and how much to the specific indications of what he is going to do this time? In a fair number of cases, there is not apt to be a great deal of conflict here -- the traditional or seemingly logical course of action will in fact prove to be the right one. In this case, the current political indications will be generally consistent with how we expect this particular nation to perform. This will be particularly true if both past behavior and current indications call for an essentially negative assessment -- i.e., that the nation in question will not resort to military action in these circumstances.

The difficulties in warning are likely to arise when some of these factors are out of consonance with one another, and particularly when standing estimates or judgments would dictate that the adversary will not take military action in this situation, but the current indications, both military and political, suggest that he will. Which is right, and what validity should be given our current indications as against the going estimate?

Any answer without numerous caveats is likely to be an oversimplification and subject to rebuttal with examples which will tend to negate the general conclusion. History nonetheless suggests that the greater weight in these cases should be given to the current indications. In other words, it is usually more important to

understand the strategic importance of the particular issue to the nation than it is to place undue weight on traditional behavior and priorities. This is, after all, the fundamental cause of warning failures -- that the behavior of the aggressor appeared inconsistent with what he would normally have expected him to do, or with our estimate of what he would do. Thus, we were "surprised." He did not do what we thought he would do, or should do.

In some instances, the enemy's course of action truly does appear irrational. It is a misjudgment of the situation, in either the long or short term, or both, and in the end it is counterproductive to him. Two conspicuous examples which come to mind are Pearl Harbor -- which was a short-term triumph but long-term misjudgment on the part of Japan -- and the Cuban missile crisis, which was a gross miscalculation in the short term. In both, the indications of what the enemy was doing were more important to an assessment of his intentions than any going estimates, which in fact proved to be wrong. It was observed, in one of the numerous post-mortems on the Cuba crisis, that we had totally misjudged Khrushchev's sense of priorities (just as he had misjudged ours) and that there must have been an overriding requirement in his mind to achieve some degree of strategic parity with the US which would have led him to take such a risk.

In lesser degree, this may be said of many crises. The perception of what the enemy is thinking and how important the current issue is to him is fundamental to our ability to understand what he will do. It was a lack of such perception that lay behind much of our misjudgment of North Vietnamese intentions and persistence

in the Vietnam war. As has subsequently become obvious, both US intelligence and perhaps to a greater degree policy levels (there were individual exceptions, of course) vastly underestimated the determination and ability of the North Vietnamese leadership to sustain the war effort. No doubt this attitude contributed materially to the reluctance to believe in 1965-66 that Hanoi was mobilizing its armed forces for the conduct of a prolonged war in the South (see discussion in Chapter 15).

We should note here also that it may require no particular collection effort or sophisticated analytic talent to perceive how nations feel about particular issues. Even our security-conscious adversaries whom we characteristically suspect of all kinds of chicanery are not necessarily engaged in devious efforts to conceal how they feel on great problems and issues vital to their national security or objectives. It will often be quite obvious how they feel about something and how important it is to them -- if we will only take the time to examine what they are saying and try to see it from their viewpoint. In some cases -- such as China's intervention in the Korean war and North Vietnam's general program for the conduct of the war in South Vietnam -- they have virtually told us what they intended to do. In others -- such as the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia -- they have made no secret whatever of the criticality of the issue and of its overriding importance to them, and have strongly indicated that force would be used if needed.

Czechoslovakia as a Problem in Political Warning

The Czechoslovak problem is worth some elaboration here since it provides

an unusually clear and interesting example of the nature of political warning, the problems involved, and the lack of understanding of what political warning is. It is hoped that the reader will not tire in the coming chapters of the use of the invasion of Czechoslovakia as an example, but we have had few cases which have served to demonstrate so many valid principles of warning. It is indeed a classic, textbook case.

Some weeks after the invasion, this writer was asked to review a draft paper written in one of the military intelligence agencies (which shall go unnamed) concerning the invasion. Among other things, this paper stated that, as that agency had previously maintained would be the case in event of Soviet military aggression, "there was no political warning of the invasion" (sic!). No political warning! We had had political warning all summer long, in repeated and progressive manifestations, for at least five months before the invasion, of the Soviet Union's deep concern with the potential consequences of the liberalization trend. As the "Prague Spring" continued to flourish, the USSR's anxiety over the situation and political and military pressures on the Dubcek regime became ever more evident. At no time did the USSR attempt either publicly or privately to disguise its concern that political developments in Czechoslovakia posed an ultimate if not immediate threat to the political and military hegemony of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe. So evident was the USSR's preoccupation with this problem that there was some tendency to believe that it had exaggerated the threat and was "overreacting." The Soviet leadership clearly was obsessed with the problem of Czechoslovakia.

There were, moreover, specific warnings of the Soviet Union's intention to invade if political measures failed to achieve the desired goal. Both the French and Italian Communist Parties were so alarmed in mid-July (five weeks before the invasion) that their leaders hurried to Moscow to plead with the Soviets not to invade. Both returned empty-handed and with no assurances from Moscow that military force would not be used. Concurrent with this, the five invading powers convened in Warsaw and issued a virtual ultimatum to Czechoslovakia. Two weeks later, agreements reached at Cierna and Bratislava called on the Dubcek regime to take certain measures to redress the situation, with an implicit threat that failure to comply could lead to military action by the massive forces which now surrounded Czechoslovakia.

What can be meant then by "no political warning"? Presumably, only that the USSR never issued a direct public threat to use military force, and that there was no last-minute ultimatum or dramatic shift in propaganda which would have signalled that invasion finally was imminent. But rarely has basic political warning of intention been more evident. The USSR never attempted to conceal its intention to bring the Czechoslovak situation under control and in fact tried virtually every other device at its command before it finally resorted to military force. To maintain that political warning was lacking in this circumstance is to misunderstand political warning. While sometimes it may be explicit and specific, it often will be generalized. It usually will not provide us definite evidence that final decisions have been reached and particularly that military action is imminent, since most nations will seek

to withhold such information in the interests of achieving tactical surprise (see Chapter 28).

The NATO powers, which were largely surprised by the invasion of Czechoslovakia, in retrospect came to recognize that there had in fact been ample warning. A post-mortem read: "We -- and the Czechs -- had several months of quite visible political warning, plus a number of weeks of strategic warning, as Warsaw Pact forces got into position to threaten the Czech leaders with a military invasion."

Some Factors Influencing Political Perception

We have addressed in other chapters the human factor of perceiving and believing evidence which is in conflict with one's preconceptions, and we will be returning to this subject again in later chapters. Objective perception of the enemy's attitudes and the ability to look at things from his point of view are crucial to warning, and above all to political analysis, since this will necessarily be more subjective than the compiling and analysis of military data.

The "climate of opinion" also strongly influences political perception, as noted earlier in this chapter with regard to our changing national attitudes toward the USSR and China since World War II. It is not only very difficult for an individual to maintain an independent viewpoint against a widespread contrary view about another nation, it may prove almost impossible to gain acceptance for such a view, even when there may be considerable evidence to support it. Time is needed to change national attitudes.

A somewhat related factor may be the influence of our own national policies

and military plans on our judgments of what the adversary may do. Once a national decision has been made on a certain course of action -- such as whether a particular country is or is not vital to our defense and hence whether we will or will not defend it -- there will almost inevitably be some impact on our assessment of that nation's actions. It is not so obvious as simply saying what the policy level would like to hear (or not saying what it would like not to hear); there tends also to be a more subtle influence on our thinking and analyses. Various historical examples could probably be cited, Vietnam for one. Our concepts of North Vietnam as an aggressive nation bent on conquering the South almost certainly were influenced, or at least reinforced, by the US decisions in 1965 to commit forces to defend the South; it then became acceptable to talk of North Vietnam as an aggressor and hence to think in such terms.

Judgments concerning North Korean intentions in the period prior to the attack of June 1950 also were materially influenced by US policies in that area. For at least three years before that attack, it had been officially recognized that there was grave danger that North Korea would seek to take over the South if US forces were withdrawn. Nonetheless, it was decided to withdraw US forces, partly on the grounds that South Korea was not essential to the US military position in the Far East, and to hand the Korean problem to the United Nations. Once having decided to write off South Korea as a US military responsibility, the US made no military plans for the defense of South Korea against an attack from the North, and seemingly it became US policy not to defend South Korea. The effect

of this on intelligence assessments, and thus indirectly on warning, was two-fold: as a low priority area for US policy, Korea became a low priority collection target; and intelligence analysts, believing that the US would take no military action if North Korea attacked, tended to downplay both the importance and by implication the likelihood of the attack in their assessments. Even those who expected the attack and predicted that it was coming (not necessarily in June, of course), saw the possibility as a relatively unimportant development in comparison with other potential Communist military threats in Europe and the Far East, and hence gave it little attention in their assessments. They saw no urgency in warning the policy maker about Korea, since nothing was going to be done about it anyway. It was only one of many areas where the so-called Communist Bloc (meaning the Soviet Union and its obedient satellites) might strike, and apparently one of the least important.

A related factor influencing assessments on Korea in that period was the concept that only the Soviet Union was a real military threat against which US military forces should be prepared to act. The concept of limited "wars of liberation" or indirect aggression through third parties was vaguely perceived, if at all. North Korea, like Communist Europe, was seen only as a pawn of Moscow; war, if it came, would be on Soviet instigation and part of a much larger conflict. Intelligence assessments, as well as military planning, reflected this view of the Communist threat and scarcely hinted at the possibility of a Communist attack which would be confined to the Korean peninsula. General Ridgway has well

described the then prevailing concept as follows:

"By 1949, we were completely committed to the theory that the next war involving the United States would be a global war, in which Korea would be of relatively minor importance and, in any event indefensible. All our planning, all our official statements, all our military decisions derived essentially from this belief."[1]

Finally, we may note the effects on judgments of the likelihood of attack of the unwillingness to believe it or to accept it -- the tendency to push the problem aside as too unpleasant to think about, in the hope that it may just go away. We have noted this human tendency earlier, and we will be coming back to it in a later chapter, as one of the major factors affecting the warning judgment. This tendency, which all of us have in some degree, may be accentuated by a sense of hopelessness and inability to do anything about it, or by a desire not to rock the boat or stir the waters lest the potential aggressor be even more provoked. This last consideration possibly was a major factor in Stalin's apparent failure to have anticipated the German attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941, and his seeming dismissal of the numerous warnings of the coming attack. There is no doubt that the USSR had ample long-term strategic warning of the German offensive, and some observers have felt that Stalin was blind to this, suffering from a megalomania almost as great as Hitler's. But an alternate thesis holds that he did foresee the attack but,

[1] Matthew B. Ridgway, The Korean War (Garden City, N. Y., Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1967), p. 11.

believing that nothing further could be done to prevent it, he sought to delay it as long as possible by trying to appease Hitler and thus publicly refusing to concede that there was danger of attack. Whether true or not -- we shall probably never know what Stalin really thought -- the effect of his policies was to decrease the preparedness of the Soviet public and particularly the armed forces for the attack when it finally came.

PART V: SPECIFIC PROBLEMS OF POLITICAL, CIVIL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

CHAPTER 21: SOME SPECIFIC FACTORS IN POLITICAL WARNING

CHAPTER 21: SOME SPECIFIC FACTORS IN POLITICAL WARNING

In this chapter, we shall examine some of the types of political developments which may provide us warning and attempt some assessment of their value as indications. It is very difficult to be specific on these subjects, that is to predict what kinds of political developments are most likely to be of value in any warning situation which may arise in the future, or even whether they are likely to occur at all. Therefore, this discussion perforce is rather generalized and probably inadequate, but will include some specific illustrations from the past.

Diplomacy and Foreign Policy

Since war is a carrying out of political relations by other means and nations will usually resort to war only when they have failed to secure their objectives by political means, the conduct of foreign policy and diplomacy obviously are highly important indications of national objectives. It is difficult to conceive of hostilities breaking out between nations today without some prior crisis or at least deterioration in their diplomatic relations. Indeed, historically, the most obvious early warning of approaching hostilities has usually been in the field of foreign political relations. The outbreak of both world wars in Europe was preceded by marked deterioration in the international political climate, which made the threat of war apparent to all, if not "inevitable." Even Japan's surprise attack on Pearl Harbor was preceded by a crisis in US-Japanese political relations, which had greatly raised US fears of war, although specific Japanese intentions were not foreseen. Those who are confident

that the coming of future wars also will be foreshadowed by international political crises and developments in the conduct of foreign policy unquestionably have the lessons of history on their side.

Nonetheless, there is a substantial body of opinion which questions the likelihood that wars of the future will necessarily be preceded by such obvious changes in the political atmosphere. Moreover, it is our uncertainty that political indications of this nature will provide us warning that largely accounts for the existence of indications intelligence at all. If we could be confident of this type of political warning, not to mention old-fashioned ultimatums and declarations of war, then obviously there would be little need for much indications analysis. We could confine ourselves to assessments of the enemy's capabilities.

The circumstances surrounding the outbreak of some conflicts since World War II certainly justify this concern. The North Korean attack on South Korea, the most conspicuous example, was not preceded by any political crisis or diplomatic warning in the near term, although the political atmosphere had long been highly strained, and of course the two sections of the country had no diplomatic relations. The diplomatic warnings of Chinese intervention in Korea -- although they were issued -- fell short of what might have been expected if the Chinese objective was truly to deter the advance of US/UN forces toward the Yalu. The Middle East conflicts of 1956 and 1967 were both preceded by international political crises, but specific political indications that Israel had decided to attack were largely lacking.

There are perhaps three major reasons that we have less confidence that we will receive specific political warning through developments in foreign policy and diplomacy than has been true in the past:

- Modern weapons, even non-nuclear weapons, have given a greater advantage to the attacker, thus increasing the value of political surprise. The Israeli attack of 1967 is a prime example. Probably in part because of this, it is no longer considered desirable to break political relations or to declare war prior to attacking, and few nations today would probably do so.

- It is the doctrine of our major potential enemies in the Communist world to attack without diplomatic warning, and they almost certainly would do so, however much generalized political warning there might be beforehand of their intentions. In the short term, this is one of the easiest and most common means of deception (see Chapter 29).

- The pressures brought by other states, through the United Nations or otherwise, to forestall conflicts are such that nations today increasingly feel compelled to act without diplomatic warnings so that the international peacemaking machinery will not be brought to bear before they achieve their objectives.

Altogether, it is probable that specific warning of impending attack through diplomatic channels is largely a thing of the past. This does not necessarily mean, however, that more generalized indications of intention will not continue to be evident through the conduct of foreign policy and diplomacy. Indeed, as the dangers and costs of war increase, there is considerable reason to believe that there will

be ample evidence that international political relations are seriously deteriorating before wars break out. In other words, we should still expect generalized strategic warning, if not short-term warning of imminent attack, from such developments. This may, however, require increased sophistication of analysis to recognize that war is imminent.

Propaganda Analysis

The term "propaganda" here is used in its broadest sense, to cover all information put forth by any means under national control or direction, which is designed to influence the intended audience. Propaganda can be either true or false, or somewhere in between, and it can be intended for domestic or foreign consumption or both. It can be disseminated through private channels (i.e., to the party faithful or cadre in briefings, directives, or "resolutions") or through the mass media to the domestic population or the world at large.

The potential value, and difficulties, of propaganda analysis for assessment of intentions (that is, for warning) are well recognized. Propaganda analysis became recognized as an art, if not a science, during World War II, when specific efforts were made to analyze Nazi pronouncements for indications of possible forthcoming German military moves, as well as for other purposes. This apparently was only a partial success, in that propaganda proved not to be a very specific guide as to what the German Army might do next, or when, although it did provide some useful insight into how the Germans viewed the war in general -- and thus was of value in judging whether a new offensive effort might be brewing.

Propaganda analysis in the US government today is diffused throughout the community, and in fact most intelligence personnel probably feel themselves qualified to some degree to interpret what our adversaries are saying, which may be one of our problems. For there are in the intelligence system some offices and personnel with specific qualifications and experience in this field, whose views have not always been given as much attention as they deserve. Certain overseas diplomatic posts -- most notably Moscow for the USSR and Hong Kong for China -- have concentrated on this type of analysis and have generally excellent records in interpreting the significance of propaganda pronouncements of our two major adversaries.

On the home front, the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) has a propaganda analysis staff which is devoted almost entirely to examining and reporting trends and new developments in Communist propaganda and which concentrates on "identifying new elements or departures from the norm, defining the toughness or softness of public statements and propaganda themes, isolating indications of policy shifts, sensitivities, or projected actions." In addition to continuing analyses of trends in general, major propaganda statements (such as Chinese Foreign Ministry statements, or authorized TASS statements) are analyzed by FBIS in depth, with careful attention to the significance of particular phrases as well as the general thrust. In addition, FBIS maintains what are known as War Themes files. From a warning standpoint, this title may be slightly misleading, since these are not primarily a compilation of phraseology or statements which have preceded acts of aggression

or other crises but rather a collection of statements and data on attitudes toward war. Nonetheless, there is a wealth of material at FBIS to support the warning effort, both on a current basis and in depth.

The Value of Propaganda for Warning: A General Commentary

There are two prevalent misunderstandings about propaganda and its relationship to, and value for, warning.

First is the widespread tendency to mistrust or reject almost anything which our adversaries say as "mere propaganda" and hence to regard it as meaningless if not completely false. This tendency is particularly prevalent in the military services -- a tendency which may derive both from their concentration on the military hardware and from lack of experience with the subleties of political and propaganda analysis. This tendency to disparage the usefulness of propaganda is most unfortunate, for the record shows that propaganda trends, and specific pronouncements, are often very valuable indications of enemy intentions.

A second tendency, almost the opposite of the above, is to expect too much warning from propaganda, that is, to expect it to be highly specific or to provide virtually unequivocal evidence that military action is impending, perhaps even specific warning of the time and place. People who expect this kind of warning from propaganda are almost certain to be disappointed, and they may therefore conclude that the propaganda provided "no warning" when in fact the enemy's propaganda provided considerable indirect or less specific evidence of what he might do.

This writer is not an expert in propaganda analysis. The following general

comments on the usefulness of propaganda are, however, derived from experience in many crises. We are here discussing the propaganda put out by closed societies through controlled media, where both its quantity and content are carefully regulated and designed to achieve specific goals.

- Propaganda reflects concern: Propaganda is a very useful barometer of how concerned the nation's leadership is about particular issues. Marked upsurges in propaganda on a particular subject or area do generally reflect genuine preoccupation with it, particularly if sustained over any period of time. Similarly, a very low level of propaganda attention to an issue usually indicates very little concern with it. There are occasional exceptions to this under unusual circumstances. One might be when a particularly secretive issue was involved, such as delicate international negotiations. A second is when propaganda is "marking time" pending a decision by the national leadership on what to say, or do, about it; these lulls or drops in meaningful comment can signify that the issue is so important that all comment is being withheld pending guidance from the top. Finally, deliberate inattention to an area or an issue can be used for deception, generally in the relatively short term (see Chapter 29).

- Most propaganda is "true": We are here using "truth" in a relative, not absolute, sense. We mean that nations cannot continually distort their objectives and policies, and particularly not to their own people. A major function of propaganda in Communist states is to indoctrinate the populace, including the party cadre, in what they are supposed to think and what they are supposed to do. To put

out totally false statements or misleading guidance is self-defeating and will not evoke the desired response. It may be observed that this is particularly true of great national programs or objectives, when a greater than normal endeavor or enthusiasm is being sought. It is important, when hostilities may be impending, to instill the proper degree of hatred or fear of the enemy, to persuade the people to work longer hours, to justify cutbacks in consumer goods, to encouraged enlistments in the armed forces, and so forth. The leadership cannot afford to give a wholly false picture of the situation to the populace.

To illustrate the point further, there was a major argument in 1965-66 over the meaning and significance of a heavy barrage of North Vietnamese statements aimed at their own populace which called for large-scale enlistments in the armed forces, longer working hours, greater sacrifices, recruitment of more women so that men by the thousands could be sent "to the front" (i.e., South Vietnam), and so forth. There was a group in the US intelligence community which rejected all this as "mere propaganda" for our benefit and which would not credit it as evidence that North Vietnam was preparing to send large numbers of troops to South Vietnam. The contrary argument -- which of course proved to be the correct one -- maintained that just the reverse was true, that this intensive internal indoctrination was the true barometer of Hanoi's intentions, and that the official propaganda line (that there were no North Vietnamese troops in South Vietnam) was the false one put out for our benefit. The refusal to believe this internal propaganda campaign possibly was the single greatest obstacle to the recognition that Hanoi was mobilizing for a major

military effort in South Vietnam.

- Official, authorized statements are unusually significant: The Communist press operates under a set of prescribed rules which have proved very consistent over a period of years. Routine, day-to-day events are handled under established guidelines; more important developments call for articles by particular commentators (sometimes pseudonyms for top officials); major issues evoke authorized or official statements from the highest level. These latter statements are important not only for themselves, but because they set forth the "party line" for the rest of the propaganda machinery and thus will be carefully adhered to by the faithful. These statements always warrant the most careful study and analysis, and when they may bear on war or peace they are of particular significance for warning. This does not necessarily mean that they will be easy to interpret. Some of these statements are masterpieces of Communist dialectic which presumably (we are not certain of this) are understood by those initiated into what someone has called "the art form," but whose true significance often eludes the rest of us. Whether we can or cannot, in any given instance, comprehend the dialectic will sometimes depend in part on the amount of study and attention given some of the details. It became clear in retrospect that some of the fine points in one of these Communist classics -- the 11 September 1962 TASS statement which unknown to us really ushered in the Cuba crisis -- were not given sufficient attention in the community.

There are also certain time-honored phrases which have connoted varying

degrees of concern in the past, and hence may be general guidelines to what may happen again. History tells us that phrases such as the following have been associated with preparations for military moves or even with a firm decision to intervene with military forces:

> "cannot stand idly by"
>
> "will never allow [a given state] to be removed from the Socialist social system"
>
> "regards its security as directly threatened"

The above are illustrative, not a comprehensive list of such phrases. Of course, like other propaganda, such phrases cannot be interpreted in isolation but must be assessed in the light of all other evidence.

- Propaganda warning is usually indirect, rather than specific: As a general rule, phrases such as the foregoing are about as specific propaganda warning as we are likely to receive of military action. It will be observed that it would be difficult to be much more precise without describing specific military preparations (generally a no-no in Communist states) or directly threatening to intervene with military force, which is also usually avoided. I cannot recall an instance since World War II in which a Communist nation has publicly stated that it would intervene, invade or attack with its regular forces, even when such action was imminent. The closest any Communist country has come to such a direct statement was China's open calls for "volunteers" for Korea in the fall of 1950. In most cases, Communist nations like to maintain the pretense that their forces were either "invited in" or aren't there at all. China has never acknowledged that anything other than "volunteer"

units were sent to Korea; North Vietnam never acknowledged the presence of its forces in South Vietnam until the 1972 offensive, when this was tacitly although not explicitly admitted; and Soviet troops, of course, were "invited" to enter both Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968.

- The commitment to act is highly persuasive: In line with the above, Communist nations are not often given to bluff or idle threats that they are going to take aggressive actions when they do not intend to carry out. We must hasten to add that there are exceptions to this, such as the direct Soviet threats in the 1956 Suez crisis to wipe out the United Kingdom with missiles, and a number of similar statements made later by Khrushchev, including several quite threatening ones concerning Berlin. Nonetheless, it is generally true that these states like other nations do not wish to entail the stigma of failing to carry out their threats, or promises, particularly when a public commitment is involved.

Therefore, developments in propaganda which convey a high degree of commitment to do something or to achieve a particular end are particularly meaningful. The public warnings of the Warsaw Pact states in July 1968 that Czechoslovakia would never be permitted to pass to control of the imperialists were unusually significant; without saying what means might be used to prevent this happening, these statements implied that any and all means would be used as necessary. An even better example of the importance of such commitments for warning preceded the Chinese intervention in Korea. After a period of hesitancy and uncertainty, there was an abrupt shift in the international Communist propaganda line during the first

week of November 1950 to an all-out support of the North Korean cause, which now became identified as the responsibility of the world-wide Communist movement. So striking was the change in the propaganda line that the US warning committee concluded that the major new development that week in the Korean situation was the shift in Communist propaganda to open acceptance of responsibility for the fate of North Korea, and that the unreserved nature of the propaganda implied an intent to turn the tide in Korea through an unofficial war by the Chinese Communists. This judgment preceded the massive Chinese offensive by almost three weeks.

Political Warning Through Third Parties

No discussion of the type of developments which can give us political warning would be complete without some attention to the usefulness of intermediaries or third parties. This applies both when they are deliberately used as a channel to convey a message and when they serve as leaks, inadvertently or otherwise.

When deliberately used, it is often for the purpose of arranging discussions or negotiations, but it may also be to convey a direct warning. The Indian Ambassador in Peking was selected as the first channel to convey warning to the US that Chinese forces would intervene in Korea if US/UN forces crossed the 38th Parallel. Most people were inclined to dismiss this as bluff at the time.

Still more useful may be the unintended, or at least only semi-intended, leak through third parties. It is axiomatic that the more people, and particularly the more nations, brought in on a plan, the more difficult it is to keep it secret.

because of the very tight security, on the introduction of Soviet missiles into Cuba, the USSR is believed to have informed very few foreign Communist leaders, probably only the heads of the Warsaw Pact countries under rigid security admonitions. This adventure was solely a Soviet show. On the other hand, the preparations for the invasion of Czechoslovakia required a high degree of cooperation and planning among five nations, and numerous people were cognizant of the general nature of the plans if not the details. In addition, the USSR elected some four weeks before it finally invaded to forewarn the non-ruling Communist Parties, probably throughout the world, of its general intention -- i.e., to keep Czechoslovakia within the fold by any means required, including force. The result was that we learned far more about the Soviet decision-making process and plans than during the Cuban crisis (see discussion of this in Chapter 27).

Despite the rigid internal security of Communist states, their growing contacts with the West and the breakdown of the once monolithic system have served to improve our knowledge of what goes on within them. At the same time, many third world countries (such as the Arab states and India) have been courted by Moscow. China, as of this writing, is beginning to open up to foreigners. Over a period of time, our chances of obtaining warning information through various third parties will probably further improve. Although this is grounds for some optimism, the Communist nations almost certainly will remain capable of extraordinary secrecy, surprise and deception when they consider it essential to their security interests.

Internal Factors: Assessing the Views of the Leadership

Few subjects have proved more elusive to us than a true understanding of the character, attitudes and proclivities of the leaders of foreign nations. This can be true even in countries with which we have friendly relations and numerous cultural contacts (e.g., France). When the nations are essentially hostile, or at least not friendly, and their leaders have been educated in entirely different traditions or ideologies, the potential for misunderstanding them rises dramatically. Of the Communist leaders since World War II, Khrushchev almost certainly was the most outgoing, garrulous and willing to meet with foreigners. If we thereby felt we understood him, we were disabused by the Cuban missile episode. Brezhnev, on the other hand, had apparently never met with an American other than Gus Hall prior to preparations for his Summit meeting with President Nixon in May 1972. Where the leadership is essentially collective (as it has been in several Communist nations), we often have very little if any perception of the lineup on particular issues. Despite several reports on the subject, we really do not know how the Soviet leadership voted with respect to an invasion of Czechoslovakia. Nor do we know which of the leaders of North Vietnam at any time have favored various tactics -- e.g., prolonged guerrilla warfare versus large-scale conventional offensive operations. It is possible to get widely varying opinions from professed experts on where General Giap really has stood on this question at various times.

As a general rule, therefore, the attempt to second-guess our potential enemies based on any professed insight into their characters or attitudes is likely to be

a risky business. When sudden changes in leadership occur and relative unknowns move into positions of power, the difficulties are compounded. The death of Stalin brought about a period of great uncertainty, and there was a brief period of intelligence alert against the contingency that the new Soviet leaders might undertake some hostile act. Of course, the reverse proved to be true. Stalin's successors were somewhat less hostile and aggressive and probably were partly instrumental in bringing about the armistice in Korea shortly later.

Nonetheless, there are instances in which a change in leadership has been of warning significance, and has been indicative of a change toward a more aggressive policy or even of a clear intent to initiate hostilities. The change of government in Japan in October 1941 is universally recognized as one of the key developments which foreshadowed a more aggressive Japanese policy. The formation of a new government under the militarist General Tojo set in motion the chain of events which culminated in the attack on Pearl Harbor. A somewhat less dramatic change in Israel five days before the Six-Day War increased the likelihood that Israel would initiate an attack on the Arab states. On 1 June, General Moshe Dayan, a recognized hawk, became Minister of Defense. All indicator lists identify the appointment of individuals known to favor war as a development which may foreshadow hostilities.

Coups and Other Political Surprises

Intelligence personnel, particularly the chiefs of intelligence agencies, become used to being blamed for things for which they were not responsible and which they could not conceivably have predicted. (This is partly compensated by

the mistakes made by intelligence which are not recognized or brought to light.)

Nothing is more exasperating to members of the intelligence profession than to be charged with failing to predict coups and assassinations, which they rightly consider as "acts of God" somewhat less predictable than tornadoes, avalanches and plane hijackings. It is ridiculous and grossly unfair to expect the intelligence system to anticipate such acts, which are plotted in secrecy and sometimes by only one individual. Indeed, the likelihood that intelligence will learn in advance of a coup or assassination attempt is in inverse ratio of probability to the likelihood that it will come off, since the leak which reaches the intelligence agent will probably also reach the intended victim who will in turn take steps to forestall the attempt. Some veterans in the business are still irritated by the recollection of the investigation of intelligence reporting which followed the assassination of Jorge Gaitan in Bogota in February 1948, an unforeseen event which precipitated disastrous riots and unfortunately coincided with a Pan-American conference being attended by the US Secretary of State.

Forecasts of this type not only are not within the province of strategic warning, however serious the consequences of such acts may be. They are really not within the province of intelligence at all. The most that can reasonably be expected is that the intelligence system recognize that, in certain countries or situations, such acts if they should occur might precipitate riots, revolts or other crises inimical to our interests. But even this is expecting a good deal, as the police record in this country of attempting to anticipate urban riots should demonstrate.

PART V: SPECIFIC PROBLEMS OF POLITICAL, CIVIL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

CHAPTER 22: ECONOMIC INDICATORS

Approved For Release 2008/03/17 : CIA-RDP80B00829A000800050001-5

CHAPTER 22: ECONOMIC INDICATORS

This chapter is concerned with those aspects of war preparedness which affect the civilian economy and civilian populace, as opposed to military logistic preparations and mobilization, which were addressed in separate chapters in Part IV. In practice, of course, this distinction is somewhat artificial, since in wartime the military and civilian preparedness measures are closely integrated, in fact are opposite sides of the same coin. Moreover, our ability to recognize that certain military mobilization and logistic preparations are under way is often largely a result of the impact of these steps on the civilian economy, so that from the analytic standpoint the military and civilian developments must be considered as a whole.

Economic indicators are potentially a very important aspect of warning but nonetheless are usually given relatively little attention. Most indicator lists carry comparatively few economic items in comparison with the voluminous numbers of military items, and there is some tendency to regard economic developments as either too long-term or too unspecific to be of particular pertinence for warning.

This attitude probably is the result in part of the types of wars -- and the types of warning problems -- which we have had since World War II. The great majority of the crises in this period have been either of a short-term nature (sometimes only a few weeks) or they have been long simmering cold war problems (such as Berlin) which did not result in hostilities. There have been only two important extended conflicts -- Korea and Vietnam/Laos -- which might have required a major diversion or recommitment of economic resources, and the Asian nations involved in these conflicts have

relatively primitive economies in which the conversion to a wartime economy was both less drastic and less evident than in highly industrialized states. Both Korea and North Vietnam, moreover, were heavily dependent on their major Communist allies for the supply of much of the ordnance and other materiel needed to sustain the war, so that many of the classic economic indicators were not applicable. Finally, both these wars escalated somewhat unexpectedly to major and extended conflicts; neither North Korea nor North Vietnam initially believed that they would have to expend so much in manpower and resources. Particularly in the case of Vietnam, there was a rather gradual upping of the ante brought about in large degree by the change in the character of the war itself.

In short, there has not really been an instance since World War II which illustrates the type and scope of economic preparedness measures which might be undertaken by a highly industrialized state in expectation of major hostilities.

Long-Term, Fundamental Economic Indicators

The importance of major economic indicators derives primarily from the fact that they reflect the basic allocation of resources of the nation, toward war or toward peace. They are a tangible measure of national priorities, of the direction in which the country is headed. The shift from a peacetime to a wartime economy, particularly in industrialized societies, obviously entails an enormous and extremely expensive reallocation of national resources. Such basic changes in allocations and priorities will usually occur only if the nation's leaders are themselves preparing to initiate the conflict (e.g., Hitler's conversion of Germany to a war economy over a period of more

than six years), or if they become convinced that there is a grave danger that they will be victims of aggression. In the past, nations often have been extremely reluctant to convert to wartime production or to initiate other major economic reallocations and have deferred the undertaking of such steps until war was already under way. This, of course, can reduce their military capability to respond and may prolong the conflict (e.g., the years required in World War II to build up sufficient Allied capability to take the offensive against Hitler).

One useful measure of the importance and validity of an indicator is how expensive it is to implement or accomplish it, how large a portion of the national resources is involved, or how much it inconveniences or reduces the standard of living of the citizenry. Clearly, by this standard, major economic reallocations which reduce the availability of consumer goods, increase taxes, entail longer working hours or otherwise have a major adverse effect on the pocketbooks and pleasures of the populace should be rated as highly significant indicators. And they are. It is safe to say that no nation undertakes steps of this type as a bluff, and that a determination to carry through with such measures is a clear and reliable sign of a genuine belief that there is a growing danger of hostilities.

The threat of a devastating but short nuclear war has raised questions whether some of the traditional long-term economic indicators should still be considered applicable, particularly those which involve a major conversion of industry, production of large quantities of additional weapons, and so forth. The point of course is well taken, insofar as one is describing actions which would be undertaken either after the

war had started, or not until it appeared imminent. From an indications standpoint, however, the possibility of nuclear war may raise the importance of such developments -- in that the potential aggressor might decide to undertake such measures well prior to the start of the conflict, rather than delaying them until it might be impossible to carry them out. There seems little doubt that the nature of modern war has increased the importance of initial preparedness, both offensive and defensive, and therefore could increase the likelihood that the aggressor will feel compelled to take more steps prior to hostilities (and thereby hopefully give us more indications) than was the case in the past. One such key preparedness measure for modern war -- civil defense -- will be discussed in the next chapter.

Short-Term Economic Indicators

Apart from a major reallocation of economic resources, there are a variety of less drastic economic measures which may be undertaken in preparation for, or in expectation of, hostilities. Developments of this type have sometimes proved extremely valuable indications of impending hostilities. Two examples from the period since World War II will illustrate the point.

- In November 1950, as Chinese Communist troops were preparing for their offensive in Korea, a series of reports indicated considerable confusion and changes of plans in Communist commercial circles in Hong Kong. Purchasing agents apparently had been instructed by Peking to concentrate on items readily available in Hong Kong and to withhold further purchases from overseas. Chinese companies sought to cancel contracts with delivery dates later than 30 November, and they

inserted clauses in contracts providing that the buyers could change the port of delivery if hostilities were in progress. In several cases, funds were transferred from Hong Kong and the US to Swiss banks, and efforts were made to finance Chinese purchases through Switzerland. On at least two occasions, Chinese Communist officials indicated that if a full-scale war did not occur in December, the immediate threat would be over and buying might be resumed. In sum, the evidence strongly indicated that Peking expected that war in the near future would result in the elimination of Hong Kong as a trading center. These developments, which were most unusual and have never since occurred, were among the strong indications that Peking was preparing for an early and major military offensive in Korea.

- The second illustration -- the mobilization of Soviet reserve transportation units prior to the invasion of Czechoslovakia -- has been discussed elsewhere in this handbook (see Chapter 16). What made this effort unusually significant as an indication of Soviet intent was the season of the year, for normally during the harvest season this pattern would have been reversed -- i.e., military personnel and trucks would have been assigned to assist in the harvest. Thus, the development indicated an overriding military requirement for truck transport even at the cost of possible failure to bring in all the harvest on schedule.

Examples of Key Economic Indicators

From the multiplicity of possible economic developments, there are certain types of things which the indications system attempts to watch and which have been judged to be of potential value for warning. Some developments naturally will have

greater specific warning value than others, and therefore some assessment of their potential usefulness and of our ability to collect the information on a timely basis is also included in the following discussion. Since we have had so little experience with some of these indicators since World War II (particularly in the Soviet Union which has not been mobilized for war), it must be understood that forecasts in this field are perhaps even more hazardous than in some other aspects of the warning business.

- National budgets and defense allocations. These are long-term basic indices of national economic priorities which can give us a sense of what proportion of the GNP is being allocated to military matters and whether the trend is up or down. A marked change involving greatly increased appropriations for weaponry is likely to be discernible even in countries, such as the Soviet Union and its Eastern European allies, which conceal many of the details of the budget. Careful study by trained economic analysts also frequently provides other useful data on trends in allocations for specific military or military-related matters -- such as the total manpower in the armed forces or appropriations for research and development. The basic data and the accompanying analyses thus can be very useful barometers of general trends toward a wartime or peacetime economy, and even of more specific use in pinpointing particular economic allocations. Needless to say, this may be invaluable to us over the long term. Presumably, a full conversion to a wartime economy might be reflected in published budget figures. Some Communist states, however, have revealed so little about the national budget that it is of little indications value,

and any closed society may choose to withhold vital data (or possibly even falsify them, although this is less likely) if it considers it to be in the interests of national security.

At best, such developments are not likely to provide us much specific warning that hostilities are likely in any given time frame, or of where they may break out. There has been a tendency in recent years for the warning system to pay very little attention to this type of development, although formerly the Soviet budget was annually examined for any trends or items deemed to be of military indications significance. One reason perhaps is that so much of the Soviet military budget in recent years has been allocated to the long-term buildup of strategic capabilities, largely handled in detailed national estimates. Were Soviet military or military-related allocations to increase or otherwise change substantially at some time in the future, it is likely that more attention would again be paid to this type of development from a warning standpoint.

- Shifts in economic production. These are closely akin to the preceding item, and in fact a reflection of the allocations in the budget. Thus, they have much the same value as long-term indicators of military trends. Changes in economic production of the "butter to guns" type, however, may provide more specific information than the budget and can be useful indications of the nature of military preparations for possible impending hostilities. Substantial increases in the production of tanks, aircraft, small arms and ammunition, missiles, submarines and the like are not only measures of an increasing military capability; they may

also be indications that a nation is preparing to initiate war at some time in the future. Sudden and urgent changes may be even more useful as indications: the initiation of round-the-clock production in military plants, sharply increased employment of women in jobs usually held by men, or marked increases in production of specific items which might be critical for the military in the event of war but of little need otherwise.

Experience has taught us that we do not learn much about what goes on inside major production facilities of closed societies until we obtain evidence that they are turning out particular items of equipment. We are not likely to learn that an order has been issued to convert them from production of farm tractors to armored personnel carriers, and it will probably be quite some time after the conversion has been accomplished before we will learn that APCs are being produced there. In some cases it has been a very long time. In general, the larger and less readily hidden the item is, the sooner we will learn about it. We are much more likely to pinpoint the aircraft factories and have some estimate of their monthly production than of the ball bearing factories.

The Soviet Union, and to a lesser extent other Communist states but particularly those in Eastern Europe, are known to have detailed industrial mobilization plans. These include military mobilization departments in the various national ministries and specific mobilization plans for industries and individual plants. Obviously, evidence that any plant or group of plants was implementing its mobilization plan would be of critical importance for warning. It is very difficult to forecast what our

chances would be of obtaining such information on a timely basis, but experience suggests that there might be considerable delay in the receipt of such information from within the USSR, at least for specific individual plants. In Eastern Europe, the prospects for obtaining such information are considerably better.

- Stockpiling and strategic reserves. As a corollary of their mobilization systems, the Communist states (again, particularly the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies) have placed great emphasis on the stockpiling of large numbers of critical items which might be needed in the event of war. In the USSR, these stockpiles are known as State Reserves. Although we know little about the size of the reserves or how the system has operated in recent years, there is every reason to believe that the USSR and its allies have placed continuing and probably increased emphasis on the building up of strategic stockpiles for wartime use. Our evidence suggests that their concern with the "initial period of war" -- which they view as critical if not decisive to victory -- has resulted in the most careful buildup of stocks of innumerable items which would be available both for regional use and for supply of the military forces and specific plants or installations. Presumably the existence of such stockpiles will reduce the need for urgent accumulation of goods in the period preceding the outbreak of hostilities, including that interval which the Communist nations describe as the "period of threat." Nonetheless, no system operates perfectly, and it is logical to expect that there would be some intensive effort to improve and replenish reserves, and perhaps to relocate some of them, prior to the outbreak of major hostilities. It is also possible that some reserves would be

released in advance of hostilities to fulfill some urgent requirements. It was learned after the outbreak of the Korean war that the USSR had released some materiel from State Reserves to support the initial stage of that conflict. On rare occasions, some items from Soviet strategic stockpiles also have been released following natural disasters. Any seeming abnormal emphasis on the buildup of strategic reserves or evidence of unexplained releases thus might be an indication of impending hostilities.

The stockpiling of strategic items also may be reflected in changes in imports and exports, particularly urgent efforts to acquire strategic materials from abroad and the cessation of exports of such items. Obviously, our chances of obtaining such information are much better than on internal developments. Although knowledge that a nation is making intensive efforts to acquire some specific item or items is not, of course, necessarily evidence of hostile intentions, it can in some cases contribute substantially to such a judgment. For example, heavy North Vietnamese purchases of drugs and other medical supplies in the 1965-67 period was one of the major indications of preparations for the large-scale commitment of forces in South Vietnam.

- Transportation. This subject was discussed in Chapter 16, where it was noted that the Communist nations have extensive plans for the requisitioning or takeover of civilian transport in the event of war, and that disruption of normal transportation is likely to be one of our best indications that military forces are being mobilized and deployed. Moreover, it is a development which we have a good chance of detecting, particularly in the forward areas such as Eastern Europe, but also in some degree in more remote areas. Most of the Communist world remains heavily

dependent on rail transport (far more than the US), so that traditionally our best indications of abnormal military requirements on the transportation system have been reflected in rail traffic. As trucks have come into greater use for military movements, the requisitioning of trucks from the civilian economy (as in the invasion of Czechoslovakia) has proved as useful an indication as disruptions of rail traffic. The steady rise in air transport has substantially increased the likelihood that the takeover of civilian aircraft for military use will be a significant indication of approaching hostilities, and that we shall have some evidence of this. Altogether, transportation has been and promises to remain one of our best indicators of hostilities -- and the more sophisticated and mechanized the military forces, the greater will be their needs and the greater the impact is likely to be on the civilian population.

To insure the rapid restoration of damaged transportation lines, the strategic reserves of both the national economy and the military forces almost certainly will include stocks of rail ties, bridging equipment and other items. The prepositioning of such reserves at bottlenecks in the transportation system would be another significant, and potentially observable, indication.

- Food and Agriculture. Time permitting -- that is, where preparations for war last for several months or more -- there may be some changes in agriculture. These might include various efforts to intensify production and increase yields, requisitioning of a greater portion of the crop for national stockpiles, and the greater encouragement of private gardens and self-sufficiency by the populace. A recent

article in the Soviet press entitled "The Problem of the Survival of the Economy in Modern War" emphasized that the survival of the economy in such a war would be "inconceivable without stable agricultural production."[1] Among the points emphasized was the need to protect animals from weapons of mass destruction, to include the preparation ahead of time of special shelters.

The likelihood that we would receive indications of this type -- and correctly interpret them -- is probably rather low, and moreover they would probably occur only in the event of pre-planned nuclear hostilities. A more meaningful indication -- which is both likely to occur in preparation for more limited hostilities and which we may detect -- is a shortage of food (particularly choicer items such as meat) for the civilian populace as such items are taken over in increasing quantities for the military. Actual food rationing is a measure which most nations are reluctant to impose even when significant shortages exist, and it might be that rationing would not be introduced prior to the outbreak of hostilities.

- New economic controls and bottlenecks. A changeover toward a wartime economy is almost certain to require the imposition of some new economic measures or controls which will likely have an early impact on the average civilian. It will also produce shortages of items, whether real or artificial as the result of hoarding, of which the ordinary housewife becomes immediately aware -- and which therefore cannot be concealed. Even minor international crises have produced waves of panic buying in the Communist countries of Europe. Shortages of some commodities

[1] This article appeared in Communist of the Armed Forces, February 1972, pp. 9-16.

and items have been so frequent that it may be difficult to tell whether some new military requirement has produced the shortage, or whether it is just another manifestation of a chronic problem. Although new economic regulations and bottlenecks are therefore potentially useful indications, it may not be possible to discern whether the indication is a real manifestation of a wartime measure. In the event of widespread and extensive economic preparedness measures, however, it would seem likely that their real cause would be apparent. Full economic mobilization, like full military mobilization, is a step which no nation could hope to conceal.

PART V: SPECIFIC PROBLEMS OF POLITICAL, CIVIL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

CHAPTER 23: CIVIL DEFENSE

Approved For Release 2008/03/17 : CIA-RDP80B00829A000800050001-5

CHAPTER 23: CIVIL DEFENSE

A separate chapter on civil defense is warranted because this aspect of preparedness has become so important to modern war, particularly nuclear war. There is probably no other aspect of preparation for war -- except possibly the changes in doctrine and tactics for the conduct of nuclear war -- which has changed so extensively in the period since World War II. Moreover, the changes in the nature of civil defense preparations -- at least in those countries with which we might conceivably become involved in nuclear war -- are such that they have dramatically increased the involvement of the population as a whole, and consequently have greatly increased the likelihood that there would be meaningful indications in the civil defense field prior to the outbreak of hostilities. In fact, some students of this subject believe that civil defense is the most likely field of Soviet preparedness to provide us strategic warning, assuming of course that the USSR actually carries out the measures which it has planned to implement for the defense of its population. The extent to which it would or would not do so -- and the arguments pro and con -- are discussed later in this chapter.

There is a great deal of literature available on the Soviet civil defense program, and a lesser amount on the programs of the other Warsaw Pact countries and the Communist nations of the Far East. Much of the information is unclassified, since the Soviet press is the single best source of information on the program. Although some aspects of the Soviet program are secret, most of the information

has been given extensive publicity inside the USSR. There are numerous intelligence studies of various classifications on the Soviet civil defense program, which the student of this subject may consult. Therefore, this discussion will attempt to outline only the highlights of the program, as background for some assessment of what we might expect to see in the event of actual preparations for a major conflict. We will also examine, much more briefly, the civil defense programs of other Communist states.

Highlights of the Soviet Civil Defense Program

The USSR has by far the most extensive, elaborate and well-organized civil defense program in the world today. In comparison with most of the West, where civil defense planning is still in its infancy and the merits of any program to protect the civil populace remain in dispute, the USSR has moved forward with a massive civil defense program. It is directed by an extensive staff which supervises an elaborate organization reaching throughout the governmental and economic system and which involves almost every citizen of the country. Following are some of the more important aspects of the program.

- Organization: For more than a decade, the Soviet civil defense has been directed by a joint military/civil organization (whose chief has been a Marshal of the Soviet Union) directly responsible to the Soviet Council of Ministers. Major responsibility for the implementation of the program lies with the military which provides most of the personnel for the "civil defense staffs" assigned at all levels of government and throughout the economic system. The civil administrative

chain of command is from Moscow down through the governmental (not party) structure to the lowest echelon. Each Soviet military district also has a deputy commander for civil defense and a staff which would assume direction of the civil defense program in event of war. Schools have been established at the national level for the training of civil defense officers, and civil defense units, both civilian and military, have been formed, trained and equipped. The scope of the program is illustrated by listing some of the functions which these units would perform: direction of nation-wide and local communications and alerting systems; supervision and control of evacuation; transport service for evacuees, for the injured and for essential supplies; medical services; firefighting; engineering services, including the construction of shelters; restoration of electric power and other utilities; maintenance of public order. The civil defense organizations in economic enterprises and agriculture have appropriate similar functions. The farm units have several special tasks, including protection of livestock, crops and water supplies, and the reception and accommodation of urban evacuees. These services, which require thousands of full-time personnel in peacetime, are expected to involve millions of people in time of war.

- Training: Civil defense training is compulsory for almost everyone in the USSR. It begins in the elementary grades of the schools and extends upward through the educational system. It is mandatory in factories and agricultural enterprises, and unemployed adults are not neglected. A series of nation-wide

civil defense training programs since 1955 probably have reached nearly all citizens. Increasing emphasis has been placed on the training of instructors and specialized personnel in recent years. Although the Soviet press has periodically complained of public apathy and inadequacies in the program, the quality and effectiveness of training is believed to have improved significantly in recent years. If it is possible to protect the civilian populace at all from nuclear war, there is little doubt that the USSR is the best prepared and organized of any major nation, probably of any nation in the world, to do so.

- Shelters: At one time, the USSR placed considerable emphasis on the construction of underground shelters, and the basements of many apartments constructed during the 1950's were specifically designed as such shelters. This program was abandoned in 1961, after studies determined that such shelters would provide scant protection against more powerful and accurate nuclear weapons, and a program of mass urban evacuation was substituted. It is expected, however, that shelters would still be used for some personnel. Elaborate shelters almost certainly exist for top party and government personnel -- quite likely both in and outside the Moscow area. Shelters also will be available for factory workers who are not scheduled for evacuation. The Moscow subway, long considered a likely bomb shelter, probably would be so used even if a major evacuation of Moscow were accomplished. In rural areas, there are almost certainly insufficient shelters to protect both the local populace and the urban evacuees, and a crash program to construct simple fallout shelters in rural areas is expected in event that a major

conflict is threatened.

- Evacuation and dispersal: The most ambitious, complicated and difficult aspect of the Soviet civil defense plan is the program to evacuate the majority of urban inhabitants to small towns and farms. Plans apparently call for the evacuation of about 70 percent of the residents of all cities over 100,000 population, with the remaining 30 percent to stay behind to man essential industries and services. Moreover, it is the Soviet expectation that these evacuations would occur for the most part prior to the outbreak of hostilities -- an expectation which obviously would entail a period of strategic warning. Elaborate plans have been drawn up for the evacuations. These include: the selection of the modes and routes of transport, with the railroads to provide the bulk of the transport; selection of the dispersal areas and embarkation and debarkation points; preparations for the issuance of evacuation cards to those who are to depart the cities; instruction of individuals in what they are to take with them (a three-day supply of food, plus a limited number of personal belongings); the study and planning for numerous details which would be involved in the carrying out of such a massive resettlement program; and the conduct of exercises by the civil defense staffs and selected units to train them in the implementation of the program.

The Soviet civil defense chief has stated that urban evacuation could reduce casualties from 80 or 90 percent of a given city's population to less than 10 percent. Even if this is a somewhat exaggerated assessment of what the USSR actually expects (and does not, of course, take account of rural casualties or other

factors), it appears clear that the Soviet leadership believes that the evacuation program could greatly reduce casualties from an initial nuclear strike and furthermore might be decisive in insuring the survivability of the economy, the country, and the socialist system.

The Soviets have not specified publicly just how much time they expect to require to evacuate a major city, although they have specified that about six hours of alert time would be needed before the first evacuees could depart. Some independent US studies have been made of the feasibility of evacuating a number of selected Soviet cities of more than 100,000. These have concluded that, under favorable conditions (which include no loss of available rail transport), 70 percent of the population of all of these particular cities could be evacuated in three to five days. Just how this might function if all Soviet cities over 100,000 were being evacuated simultaneously is, of course, another matter. Presumably, there might be considerable difficulty in areas of the western USSR, particularly in the general Moscow area, where there are large numbers of cities with more than 100,000 people. Nonetheless, these studies would indicate that the Soviet plans are not altogether impracticable, even though there would no doubt be numerous problems in actual implementation. From a warning standpoint, the most important point by far is that the USSR does really plan such a massive evacuation effort and moreover seemingly expects (or at least hopes) that it will have at least several days in which to carry out the program before war starts.

Civil Defense Programs in Eastern Europe

In other matters, the Eastern European members of the Warsaw Pact have generally followed Soviet direction and precepts, and to some extent, this is also true in matters of civil defense. Just as war plans are closely coordinated, we would expect civil defense plans and preparations to be similar, and the actual implementation of such programs to be more or less simultaneous. The Eastern European countries have, in fact, given a fair amount of public attention to civil defense programs and the training of civil defense personnel. Nonetheless, the conclusion seems inescapable that these programs generally have lagged well behind that of the USSR and have involved much less ambitious plans for the protection of the civilian populace. Apart from psychological and budgetary factors, one major reason for this probably is the smaller size and greater population density of these countries, which would seem to make massive evacuation programs a considerably less practicable means of protecting the populace than in the USSR. A Czechoslovak colonel who was engaged in various aspects of Czechoslovak defense planning has described an extensive evacuation of the civilian population and economy as a practical impossibility and of very questionable effectiveness. This may reflect actual Czechoslovak official attitudes, and possibly those of other Warsaw Pact nations. Nonetheless, the civil defense plans of these countries apparently call for some dispersal from the cities, as well as hardened shelters for key personnel and other protective measures. Several Eastern European countries are known to have conducted occasional civil defense exercises involving some evacuation measures.

A Hungarian announcement of an exercise conducted in June 1969 stated that over 80,000 persons would take part, including both civilian units and military formations, and that it would involve "tasks connected with evacuation, the provision of accommodation, and rescue, relief, and rudimentary restoration work."

How Would Civil Defense Actually Function?

The potential difference between theory or doctrine and actual practice is nowhere more evident than in the field of civil defense. Opinions as to what the USSR would actually do in the civil defense field, if major hostilities threatened, range all the way from those who believe that it would do almost nothing which would be obvious to us and certainly would not undertake massive evacuations of the cities, to those who maintain that a full implementation of civil defense plans is to be expected, time permitting. Many of those who hold to the "do-nothing" theory -- on the grounds primarily that it would provide us such clear-cut warning that the USSR would not tip its hand -- also maintain that the evacuation program would actually be impossible to implement and therefore really would not be attempted on any scale.

Obviously, there is no answer to this question which is going to satisfy everybody. It is the same problem as how much buildup there would be of Soviet forces in Europe prior to attack, how much political warning we would have, and so forth. How much would weight of attack be sacrificed to achieve surprise? Would protection of the civilian populace be more important to the Soviet leadership or would it be more important to them to avoid taking measures which we would

almost certainly view as very ominous, perhaps would interpret as evidence that the USSR was planning a preemptive nuclear strike?

The Soviet performance thus far has made it evident that massive live civil defense preparations, including evacuation of cities, are regarded by the USSR as extremely serious steps which therefore probably would not be undertaken unless the leadership was convinced of a grave danger of hostilities. Our relative confidence on this score derives from several considerations: such a program is tremendously expensive and disruptive economically; it would be certain to have a most serious and adverse psychological impact on the population, the consequences of which might be unpredictable; the USSR could not be sure what the US/NATO response would be to an "exercise" of such massive and realistic proportions; and, so far as we know, the USSR has yet to undertake a massive evacuation of any city, either for exercise purposes or as a genuine precautionary measure during a crisis. It is of interest that, even during the Cuban missile crisis when Soviet air defense forces were brought to a very high degree of alert and Khrushchev was genuinely apprehensive that war could occur, there were no major civil defense preparations taken in the USSR. Undoubtedly, the civil defense staffs were alerted and certain other preparedness measures were probably taken relatively unobtrusively, but there was no mass alerting of the population.

This means, of course, that we also have no basis on which to judge how effectively the evacuation program might function, even if undertaken as an exercise in a period of calm. It is possible that the USSR some day may test out the program

in a few selected cities, probably ones to which we would have little access. It is conceivable that it has already conducted a mass evacuation of some city, but we believe it unlikely that some news of this would not have trickled out in time. Such actions, however, probably could be effectively concealed in many cities of the USSR for at least a short time, provided the radio was not used to alert the populace. It is doubtful, however, that it could be done simultaneously in a number of cities without some knowledge of it reaching us. Obviously, it would be impossible to conceal a mass evacuation of Moscow, or probably of Leningrad.

In the event of a decision to conduct a mass evacuation because of a threatening international situation, it appears highly unlikely that it would not be announced to the Soviet public through radio, television and press. Reassurances from the leadership and repeated public instructions as to what to do would appear almost a necessity to prevent chaos, no matter how much advance planning and rehearsals by civil defense units there might have been. The maintenance of public morale could be critical to the military and economic effort, and indeed a prime objective of the civil defense program is to prevent a breakdown of public support so that the military effort can be sustained. Thus it appears most unlikely that some public explanations of the reasons for such drastic measures would not be forthcoming. It is probable, in fact, that the entire propaganda machinery would be called into action to explain or justify the civil defense effort.

In addition to uncertainty as to the mass psychological reaction, it appears highly questionable that the Soviet transportation system would function anywhere

nearly as effectively in practice as theoretical studies of the evacuation problem would suggest. This is not necessarily because Soviet transport is inefficient (actually the railroads function quite well), but rather because there would be such heavy competing demands from the military for the transportation. There would obviously be all sorts of other difficulties in the implementation of an evacuation program, particularly the feeding of the populace in the countryside for any length of time, which would pose enormous problems and would almost certainly impair the smooth functioning of the operation. No doubt, however, the USSR would not expect it to function exactly as planned, and presumably would regard the program as a success if only half the evacuees ultimately were saved from nuclear destruction.

All this, however, does not answer the question whether or not the USSR would in fact attempt to carry out such a program. If there can be no demonstrably correct answer, there can be certain general judgments as to what would appear to be the most likely course of action. As in other aspects of the warning problem, there will undoubtedly be those who will not agree.

The most careful students of the Soviet civil defense program are generally persuaded that the USSR would implement the program in the event of a grave threat of hostilities with another nuclear power, i.e., the US or China. Moreover, it would appear likely that the program would be implemented both in event the USSR planned to strike first or feared that the enemy was preparing to strike. The arguments in support of this view are as follows.

- The massive amount of effort which has been put into civil defense planning and preparation would not have been undertaken unless it was intended to implement the program in event of approaching hostilities. The subject must have been extensively debated already and the conclusion must have been reached that the program is both feasible and necessary to the Soviet war effort.

- The necessity for the program does not derive solely, or perhaps even primarily, from concern with saving the lives of more people. It derives from a conviction that the military effort will be dependent on the maintenance of a viable civilian economy, and that the Soviet Union could not survive a nuclear conflict in which masses of the urban populace were eradicated in the first hours or days of the conflict. Although Soviet leaders have wavered from time to time on whether any nation could survive a nuclear conflict and whether there could be any "victors," their planning indicates that they consider that their comprehensive civil defense program will provide them a better chance for survival than would otherwise be the case.

- The civil defense program is an integral part of the war plan. The military establishment is deeply involved in it, and the militarized units of civil defense have prescribed roles to perform under the war mobilization plan. Thus, to omit the civil defense portion of the plan would require the reversal of many standing military orders and the reassignment of many reservists to other functions. It would further require the issuance of entirely new instructions to innumerable party and government officials and plant managers who now have prescribed functions to perform

in the civil defense program and who have rehearsed what they are to do. In short, a decision not to implement the civil defense program could require a revision, at the last moment, of the war plan. As one writer on the subject has put it:

> It appears that a decision to omit civil defense would be administratively as complex as a decision to cancel participation of aircraft in an air defense effort and leave the job entirely to missiles.... With so many people involved, the planners of the strike have a problem: would the security of the surprise be well served by an attempt to leave out civil defense?
>
> Most important is the probability that the party leaders would not accept a military plan which excluded civil defense participation. One totally unacceptable result of such a plan might be the decimation or worse of the party while the military leadership remained relatively unimpaired. Another consideration of the Presidium ought to be the reaction of the surviving members of the populace, as well as of the party, if available civil defense facilities had not been put to use.

Civil Defense Programs in Asian Communist Nations

In comparison with the USSR, the Asian Communist countries have relatively unsophisticated civil defense programs, although they have not neglected the problem.

North Vietnam, which has been engaged in war more or less continuously since World War II, undertook a civil defense program only after the start of US bombing in 1965. Fears that Hanoi, and to a lesser extent other cities, might be bombed led to fairly extensive efforts to evacuate non-essential personnel. These efforts proved rather ineffective, however, since the populace showed a tendency to drift back to the cities, particularly when it appeared that the danger to civilians was not

very great. The resumption of US bombing in the spring of 1972 resulted in another partial evacuation of Hanoi, which also appears to have been a rather half-hearted effort. The North Vietnamese civil defense program also has included extensive use of improvised bomb shelters, many of them concrete pipes. North Vietnam's civil defense measures were of relatively little value to us as warning indicators, since a stepped-up effort usually followed the initiation of US bombing, rather than anticipating it.

In Communist China, civil defense efforts have been sporadic and usually can be directly associated with some immediate developments which have raised Peking's apprehensions that it might be subjected to attack. In the few weeks prior to the major intervention of Chinese forces in Korea in the fall of 1950, there was a rash of reports concerning preparations for evacuation of government offices or other facilities from Chinese cities and some increase in air raid precautions. So far as is known, however, few if any evacuations were actually carried out, and Chinese fears apparently abated when the US did not respond to the Chinese offensive in Korea by attacking Chinese territory. There is little indication that the recurring crises in the Taiwan Strait area or the brief Sino-Indian conflict of 1962 were accompanied by any serious civil defense planning.

The conflict in Southeast Asia -- particularly the Tonkin Gulf incident in August 1964, the initiation of US bombing of North Vietnam in early 1965, and the introduction of Chinese engineer and antiaircraft units into North Vietnam shortly later -- raised Chinese fears of a possible US attack and led to the first of

Peking's so-called "war preparations" campaigns. This ominous sounding phrase actually involved a variety of measures to persuade the populace to greater efforts and to instill support for the regime's programs -- not all of them directly related to increasing war preparedness. Among the real preparedness measures was a considerable increase in civil defense activity, concentrated not unnaturally in South China, although the program also extended to other areas of the country. These preparations included: a considerable propaganda campaign to alert the populace to the danger of war "at an early date, on a large scale, with nuclear or other weapons"; the digging of air raid shelters, particularly trenches; numerous reports of plans to evacuate personnel and government offices from cities, together with a limited amount of actual evacuation; instruction in civil defense measures; air raid drills; stocking of food supplies; and a step-up in militia training.

This effort abated after two or three years, but the "war preparations" campaign was revived in 1969 following the clashes on the Sino-Soviet border. This time the danger of war with the Soviet Union occasioned a step-up in civil defense preparations, including renewed preparations to evacuate personnel from the cities and construction of air raid shelters. The program appears to have involved less intensive propaganda and participation of the populace than in 1965-66, but there were indications of more effective and permanent shelter construction. This, together with a program to decentralize industry into the interior, suggested that China was embarked on a serious long-term effort to improve its defensive capacity.

The history of the Chinese effort would suggest that increased emphasis on

civil defense is a good indication of Peking's concern for national security from a defense standpoint. It is likely that civil defense preparations also would step up markedly in the event that China was planning for aggressive military action.

Little is known about civil defense in North Korea. There has, however, been an intensive effort for several years to put much military equipment into caves, tunnels and underground facilities. It would be surprising if some similar effort had not been devoted to shelters for civilians.

Conclusions

Our experience with civil defense indicators in several conflicts justifies a conclusion that the intensity of such preparations is generally an excellent barometer of whether a nation really believes it is in danger of attack. Large-scale and economically disruptive civil defense measures are unlikely to be initiated unless the threat is considered grave. Like other defensive preparations, a high level of civil defense activity may indicate either a fear of enemy attack or an intent to initiate the attack. The threat of nuclear war has greatly increased the importance of prior civil defense measures, particularly the removal of key officials to secure areas and at least a partial evacuation of civilians from urban areas. Nations which have extensive civil defense programs regard them as an integral part of their war plans, if not essential to survival, and it is therefore likely that these plans would be put into effect prior to the outbreak of a major conflict, if time permits.

PART V: SPECIFIC PROBLEMS OF POLITICAL, CIVIL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

CHAPTER 24: SECURITY, COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE AND AGENT PREPARATIONS

CHAPTER 24: SECURITY, COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE AND AGENT PREPARATIONS

In this final chapter on indications in the civilian area, we shall deal briefly with the value for warning of developments in the field of security and clandestine operations. Although usually less exotic in actuality than in the world of fiction, the cloak-and-dagger business nonetheless has the potential of providing us with considerable insight into the enemy's preparations for hostilities.

Security Measures

There is no question of the importance of security measures in Communist nations for purposes of concealment. It is the primary means by which we are denied information about what is going on in much of their society all the time. The need for security dominates virtually every aspect of life and conceals from us a vast amount of basic social, economic and military activity. The two major methods by which this continuous blackout of information is accomplished are the control of the press and all other public media, and intensive physical security around most military and economic installations and activities, which in practice often means that large areas of the country are off-limits to travel by potentially unfriendly foreigners, both official and unofficial.

As a general rule, virtually all military installations (barracks areas, compounds, training areas, military headquarters, missile and antiaircraft sites, airfields, naval installations, depots) in Communist nations are closed to the public, not only to foreigners but to the local citizenry. Moreover, they are not just closed but

intensively secured and guarded against unlawful entry. Equally drastic security measures surround important economic enterprises which are engaged in the production of military or military-related items. The rare occasions on which foreigners, such as attaches, are permitted visits to military units or to such factories are carefully controlled and usually are confined to selected show pieces.

In these nations, the "need to know" principle is really adhered to and indeed carried to fantastic lengths by our standards. A rigid compartmentalization of knowledge -- within the military establishment, and in such fields as weapons production and research and development -- denies details of the overall effort to all but a select few at the top. There is little doubt that these stringent measures impair efficiency and inhibit the free exchange of productive ideas in some degree.

The intended -- and, to some extent, actual -- effect of these measures is to deny us the basic data from which we can determine what is normal. If the system worked with total effectiveness, we would have little or no specific data about the strength and locations of military units, their weapons and capabilities, maneuvers and other training activities, except what was released to the press or otherwise made available officially. At the same time, however, most of these nations do not really want us to be totally ignorant of their military capabilities nor to close off foreign travel entirely, so in practice some limited access to their less important "secrets" is condoned most of the time. In actuality, there is considerable variation in the extent of territory which is normally closed to foreigners in the different Communist countries. While vast areas of the Soviet Union are permanently closed and periods of so-called

"detente" have had little effect on this policy, some Eastern European nations impose relatively little restriction on foreign travel except in or immediately around important military and industrial installations. The most denied area in the world to the West has been North Korea.

The extent of permanent security restriction and past practice in crisis situations are two factors which could affect how much additional restriction might be imposed to deny us information during a period of unusual military activity, including preparations for hostilities. This is a subject on which we have had a great deal of experience, and it is therefore fairly safe to make some generalizations.

It is Soviet practice always to deny travel by official foreigners, and often by other foreigners as well, to an area in which unusual military activity is under way, specifically troop deployments and maneuvers. It is most unusual for any Westerner to observe any significant troop deployment, and Western military attaches are virtually always denied access to areas of maneuvers or other military movements. On occasion, the USSR has imposed very widespread travel bans. In June 1969, the Trans-Siberian Railroad was closed to nearly all foreigners as well as to official travelers. One traveler who did make the trip, perhaps because of some Soviet oversight, reported very heavy eastward military movement, and we ascertained nearly three years later that there had been a mobilization exercise along the Chinese border during this period. Another very widespread travel ban had been imposed in the western USSR in June 1968 for reasons which have never been established, but it has been suspected that there might have been some type of mobilization test preparatory to

the subsequent invasion of Czechoslovakia. During the periods of known troop deployments for that invasion, the USSR repeatedly denied travel requests of Western attaches, although there were a few occasions on which they were able to observe a limited amount of troop movement. During the week of the Cuba crisis, the USSR also prohibited most official travel, possibly to cover a general alerting of its forces, since we do not believe that any units actually were redeployed.

The USSR also restricts travel by military observers in East Germany by imposing both permanent and temporary restricted areas. A temporary restricted area is nearly always declared for any important exercise activity, and sometimes for other purposes. A sizable area along the Czechoslovak border was continually closed by a series of "temporary" restrictions for more than three months prior to the invasion of Czechoslovakia.

Our experience in this field warrants a judgment that the USSR almost certainly would impose further restrictions, and probably quite drastic ones, to cover the redeployments or other preparations of its forces in the period prior to the initiation of war. Although such restrictions do serve to alert us to an abnormal military situation, the Soviets quite evidently consider that security is better served by the restrictions than by permitting some of the activity to be observed.

The Eastern European Communist states generally have much less restrictive travel policies than the USSR, and the chance of detecting any significant troop deployments is much better, although areas of actual maneuvers are usually off-limits. Various devices also are used to prevent travel of trained military observers at crucial

times. Nonetheless, major and widespread travel bans in these countries would be quite unusual and would probably not be imposed except in extraordinary circumstances. It is interesting to note that Poland did not even impose such restrictions in July-August 1968 when major Soviet forces were deployed into the country for the invasion of Czechoslovakia, although quite severe travel restrictions were in effect in the USSR and East Germany, and to a lesser extent in Hungary, to screen the deployments.

In the event of preparation for hostilities against the West, there is a good prospect that still more drastic and unusual security measures would be imposed. One such measure could well be tightened censorship on foreign correspondents, and measures to deny them access to their usual sources. A major and highly significant security measure, begun by North Korea three months before the attack on South Korea, was the evacuation of civilians from the 38th Parallel. Obviously, any similar step along that or any other border could be a very important indication.

The limited access of Westerners, particularly US personnel, to the Asian Communist nations to date precludes much generalization about what their security policies might be if diplomatic relations were established and these areas opened up to more Western travel in general. Their histories since World War II, however, justify a conclusion that they are all highly security conscious and would almost certainly impose severe restrictions to prohibit observation or other disclosure of any military activity which they wished to conceal.

How much warning value are abnormal security measures? The chief value

perhaps is to alert us to an unusual situation, probably involving some military activity, so that other collection resources can be brought into play. Security measures, no matter how drastic, are not in themselves evidence, let alone proof, that military deployments are under way. Some further collection is essential to establish what is going on. The more extensive and drastic the measures are, however, the greater reason we have to suspect that something covert and potentially hostile is under way, unless there is some plausible alternative explanation. It is likely that the period prior to the outbreak of hostilities would be marked by extraordinary security measures of a nature rarely observed in peacetime.

Counter-Intelligence: Domestic Aspects

The role of counter-intelligence and security is to protect the state from its enemies both foreign and domestic. In police or quasi-police states, the domestic enemy is nearly as important as the foreign and sometimes more so, and a substantial amount of the counter-intelligence effort is devoted to watching and when necessary restraining potential dissidents. (This is also true, one may note, of many states which do not lie behind the Iron Curtain. For example, it is not unusual in many countries for known troublemakers to be rounded up in advance of the visit of a foreign head of state.)

In the USSR, the power of the KGB (Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti - Committee of State Security) has been reduced since the days of Stalin when it served as an instrument of terror, but it remains a large, secretive and ubiquitous organization with authority to pry into the lives of all citizens and the personnel to accomplish

it. Occasional press items that some well-known dissident has been sentenced to prison or a labor camp are a reminder that the power of the secret police still permeates the Soviet state, barely concealed most of the time and sometimes blatantly evident. Less clandestine but also a major force for the preservation of order are the internal security forces, a branch of the armed forces. The pattern is repeated in all Communist states, with some differences in organization and functions of the various security forces.

These forces have major roles to play in the event of war, including the roundup and incarceration of dissidents and others suspected of disloyalty, as well as a variety of other security functions. It is highly likely that the authority and personnel strength of these organizations would be increased in preparation for war and that the leadership would rely heavily on them to insure their safety.[1] An increase in KGB activity, both obvious and covert, is to be expected. It would probably include tightened observation of and restrictions on foreign diplomats, attaches and newsmen, but more importantly widespread measures to insure against an outbreak of dissidence and sabotage once war had begun. A large-scale roundup of potential troublemakers, perhaps very quietly and very shortly prior to the outbreak of major hostilities, would be likely.

---

[1] Some understanding of the number of personnel which may be involved in a major security operation in the USSR may be derived from a report that 20,000 military and civilian personnel were involved in security arrangements in Leningrad alone for President Nixon's visit there in May 1972 -- a report which the US Embassy in Moscow found "easy to believe."

Foreign Espionage and Counter-Intelligence

Even more meaningful than internal security and counter-intelligence measures are some of the changes which might occur in operations abroad prior to the initiation of hostilities. We are speaking of the vast underworld of espionage, subversion, and other clandestine and covert operations on which our potential enemies spend enormous sums of money and employ thousands of trained operators. For most US intelligence personnel -- those who work on overt collection or analysis -- this part of the intelligence process is only dimly and very inadequately perceived. It is "the other side of the house," and a side vastly more secretive and compartmented than almost any other phase of the intelligence process. Nothing is more laughable than the popular concept set forth by some writers of mystery stories that most intelligence work consists in espionage and counter-espionage and that we are all "spies." For the fact is that most of us in the intelligence business have nothing to do with spies, our own or those of other nations, and we are likely to know precious little about the whole subject.

This writer is one of that generally uninformed majority. Such observations as follow, therefore, are not based on any special insight into the operation of foreign espionage systems and should not be so interpreted. In fact, much of what will be said is from unclassified sources.

A variety of historical factors contribute to the USSR's obsession for security, distrust of foreigners and conviction that it is encircled by enemies which are seeking to destroy it. They include the tradition of political repression inherited from

imperial Russia, the hardships of the revolution and the difficulties of establishing the Soviet state, the armed intervention by Western states which sought to overthrow the Bolsheviks, the invasion by Nazi Germany, and the post-war suspicion of the West engendered by the years of the cold war and the limited contacts of the Soviet leaders with Westerners. Above all, of course, the suspicion of the West derives from the secretive and conspiratorial nature of the Communist system itself and its own dependence on force or the threat of force to remain in power. The mere existence of democracies is a threat to it.

The result of these attitudes is that the USSR, and to a lesser but nonetheless important degree other Communist states, devote an enormous amount of effort and money to foreign espionage and subversion. Indeed, in many areas of the world -- particularly the underdeveloped nations -- such activities are probably the primary function of Soviet embassies and other official representation. Moreover, the centralized control of all foreign activities and the ability to maintain secrecy permit the KGB to place its officers anywhere within the official and unofficial establishment abroad, and in almost unlimited numbers -- subject only to how many personnel the host nation is willing to accept. There is little question that the expansion of Soviet missions abroad in recent years is in large degree attributable to an increase in espionage and other covert activities. A celebrated case -- the defection of a KGB officer in London in September 1971 -- provided dramatic evidence of the scope of such Soviet activities. As the result of his reports, the British expelled 105 members of the official Soviet establishment in London for espionage activities. They

comprised nearly 20 percent of the total, and included nine of the Soviet Embassy's eleven counselors and five of its twelve first secretaries. The agents were established in every type of mission, including the trade delegation, the Moscow Narodny Bank and Aeroflot. The British action was reported attributable in part to the fact that the defector and some of his colleagues were engaged not in normally accepted espionage activities but in preparations for sabotage in the United Kingdom in the event of war. Numerous less dramatic examples of the all-pervasive nature of the USSR's foreign espionage program could be cited, and many of course have become common knowledge as the result of defections and arrests in recent years.

To those in the Western world, the extensive effort and resources which the Communist nations put into espionage and counter-intelligence is something of a mystery. We can understand the payoff in the recruitment of men who years later reach the positions of a Philby or a Burgess. But we are at a loss to understand a system which puts so much effort into the covert collection of relatively routine data, the great portion of which is often freely available by open means. For the fact is that a considerable part of the Communist espionage effort probably is superfluous from our viewpoint and is concerned with checking through covert means the veracity and completeness of information which is obtainable openly. This practice probably is a consequence both of the secretive nature of the Communist state and of a distrust of open sources as inherently subject to manipulation by the state or vested interests -- as they are in fact in dictatorial states. What is important for our purposes is to observe that, because this is so, there is probably some inclination in these nations

to give greater weight to information obtained clandestinely than to information obtained openly, even when the latter would seem to be of greater authenticity. This is not to say that the report of the KGB operative will necessarily carry more weight in Moscow than an authoritative article in the New York Times, but only that there will be a predilection in favor of the covert report, other things being equal. In any event, the Communist system beyond any question is engaged in a continual, relentless, expensive and complex effort to ferret out our every secret, however minor, which might affect their national security.

And what does this have to do with warning? Its relevance to warning derives from the fact that the espionage and security services are a mirror which reflect the objectives and requirements of the national leadership on major foreign issues. The standing collection requirements for the espionage services, if we can be fortunate enough to obtain them, will provide us a blueprint of what our enemies most wish to know about us, which can often be very revealing. Moreover, a crisis almost invariably will result in some emergency collection requirements which can help us to perceive, at least in some degree, whether the enemy is primarily concerned that we may be preparing some action against him or whether he is preparing to initiate something. And, over the longer term, changes in the types of information sought may provide quite clear insight into enemy planning.

This point may be better illustrated by citing some specific examples from the fascinating accounts of the British penetration of the German espionage operations in the United Kingdom during World War II, which have recently been

declassified and published. We will draw particularly on Sir John Masterman's discussion of what could be inferred concerning German war plans from the types of questions which were sent to their agents in Great Britain -- all of whom were actually operating under British control. He says:

> The most interesting point with regard to the traffic up to the beginning of 1942 is the evidence which it gives of enemy intentions.... In retrospect it is perfectly clear, even if it was not quite clear at the time, that enemy intentions could be gauged from the traffic of our agents with very fair accuracy. In R.A.F. matters, for example, the majority of questions with regard to aerodromes was concerned all through the Battle of Britain with the position and defences of fighter aerodromes. Conversely, in 1941, when the British air offensive on the Continent started, interest swung over to bomber aerodromes and the landing grounds from which bombers operated. The extent of the danger to this country of invasion from Germany is naturally clearly mirrored in the messages.[1]

The queries to German agents on other topics also enabled the British to reach a judgment by late 1941 that the Germans had, at least for the time being, abandoned plans for any large-scale offensive operations against the United Kingdom. By 1944, when the strategic picture had materially changed and it was the Allies who were on the offensive, the nature of the Nazi questions again provided insight into German military planning. Masterman concludes:

> We should restate a conviction which established itself more and more firmly in our minds -- viz., that a careful and intelligent study of all the traffic could and would

[1] J. C. Masterman, The Double-Cross System in the War of 1939 to 1945 (New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1972), p. 76.

> have given an accurate picture of all the more important German interests and intentions throughout the war. In retrospect it is clear that more use could have been made of this product of double-cross agents' work.[1]

Possibly the most dramatic evidence cited by Masterman of the potential value of such agent queries for warning concerns a questionnaire given to a key German agent operating in Britain who was detailed on a special mission to establish an espionage network in the United States. On 19 August 1941, the British read and transmitted to the FBI a three-page German questionnaire of desired information on the United States, of which one-third was concerned with Pearl Harbor. It was further noted that, whereas most of the questions about the US were fairly general, those about Hawaii and Pearl Harbor were highly specific and called for details and sketches of airfields, hangers, bomb depots, POL installations, and so forth. The logical inference, as Masterman points out, was that, if the US were to be at war, Pearl Harbor "would be the first point to be attacked, and that plans for this attack had reached an advanced state by August 1941."[2]

Although the nature of warfare may have changed since Pearl Harbor, the objectives of foreign espionage services have not changed greatly. All are concerned with the preparedness measures and vulnerabilities of the enemy. Moreover, there remains a high probability that there would be some modifications in the types of information desired if the threat of war appeared to be rising, and in the urgency

1 Ibid, p. 177.
2 Ibid, pp. 79-80.

of collecting and reporting this information. Changes in the structure and operations of the espionage services themselves also probably would be undertaken -- such as a much greater reliance on undercover agents in expectation of a break in diplomatic relations, preparations for a change in means of reporting when diplomatic pouches and embassy radios cease to be available, and so forth. We should also expect an increase in those types of subversive activities which would directly further the war effort -- such as the infiltration or surfacing of saboteurs and of experts in partisan warfare and the dissemination of false rumors. Obviously, no one could predict in advance exactly what changes in the espionage services and their means of operation would be undertaken, still less how much we might be able to learn of it. It also cannot be predicted whether acts of sabotage or political assassinations might actually be undertaken before hostilities began. There is no doubt, however, that the Communist espionage services all have their war plans and that some changes in operation would be undertaken before war broke out if time permitted. Thus, these activities are a potentially highly valuable, and perhaps unique, source of indications intelligence.

Problems of Compartmentalization

The tight security on espionage and counter-intelligence operations and the compartmentalization of those portions of the intelligence process which are concerned with these activities poses a potentially grave bureaucratic problem. The relative freedom of exchange of information among those engaged in the production of positive intelligence breaks down almost completely -- at least at the analytic level -- when

counter-intelligence operations become involved. Even valuable positive intelligence derived from these operations may be bottled up or delayed in dissemination, often not for arbitrary reasons but on valid security grounds. And those aspects which are operational -- such as surveillance of foreign agents and the nature of their contacts -- are virtually never made available to the other side of the house at the working level, and rarely even at the highest levels of intelligence and within policy councils.

Thus the dangers that all relevant information may not be brought together in a meaningful pattern, and that indications will be "lost," are particularly acute in this field. Even greater than the separation of intelligence and policy and the compartmentalization of operational plans is the secrecy which surrounds counter-intelligence. This statement is not to criticize this policy -- which is clearly essential in many cases, and sometimes a matter of life and death -- but merely to note the potential seriousness of this situation for warning. Thus it could be highly important, before hostilities begin, that steps be taken to insure that valuable warning information derived from counter-intelligence operations is integrated with other positive intelligence. Any procedures devised almost certainly would involve only a limited number of people but hopefully would attempt to see that some analytic group, however small, was coping with all (or at least nearly all) the pieces of the puzzle.

If it is any consolation to us, we might observe that our potential enemies might have much the same types of problems, in that their counter-intelligence operations also are highly compartmented, and that there is a much more restricted exchange

of information in general. The involvement of the Communist leadership in the planning of major espionage, counter-intelligence and deception operations, however, does tend to insure that the highest authorities will be cognizant of major developments as they occur. The chief of the KGB reports directly to the Politburo, and the present chief is a candidate member of that supreme decision-making body. The idea which sometimes prevails in Western democracies -- that the chief of state and the foreign office should not become involved in or perhaps even be cognizant of "dirty tricks" -- is not a problem which troubles the Communist world.

PART VI: SOME MAJOR ANALYTICAL PROBLEMS

CHAPTER 25: WARNING FROM THE TOTALITY OF EVIDENCE

CHAPTER 25: WARNING FROM THE TOTALITY OF EVIDENCE

In the two preceding sections (Chapters 13 through 24) we have examined various types of military and civil preparations for hostilities, largely in isolation from one another. Obviously, in real life these various developments will not be occurring separately but in conjunction or simultaneously. Moreover, they should relate to each other in some more or less logical fashion if in fact a nation is preparing for hostilities. For example: there will not be urgent and massive civil defense preparations without various military preparations to bring the armed forces to higher readiness; there will not be political indications that the leadership has directed the implementation of certain wartime legislation without other evidence of mobilization. There will not be just military or just political indications, but a variety of developments in both fields which at least to some extent will be consistent or mutually supporting.

At the same time, however, there will likely be some inconsistencies in our evidence or at least gaps in our knowledge which will make us uncertain as to the significance of some of the developments, or of their relation to each other. We will not be sure what weight we should accord to any particular indication, or even to a large number of them collectively. No two situations will be just alike, and we cannot rely solely on precedent or history (although they may assist us) in coming to our judgments.

The Relative Weight of Political and Military Factors

At the risk of an oversimplification of this problem, we may note certain

generally valid precepts.

First, political indications alone -- in the absence of any significant military preparations or without the capability to act -- are not credible and we will virtually always be correct in dismissing them as so much bombast or propaganda. For years, Communist China had a propensity for reserving some of its most violent propaganda for situations half way across the globe in which it had absolutely no capability to act -- e.g., Lebanon in 1958. In the years following its decisive defeat by Israel in 1967, Egypt's repeated calls for the recovery of its former territory carried little weight in the clear absence of a capability to defeat the Israelis in the Sinai. Similarly, the anti-American propaganda put out by North Korea over a period of years has been so intense and vitriolic that it has been meaningless as an indication of an intention to take military action within any foreseeable time period. We must always remember, however, that the national attitudes reflected in such propaganda are significant, and that such bitter hostility will make the military preparations (if or when they occur) potentially more meaningful and dangerous than might otherwise be the case.

At the other extreme, military indications alone -- in the absence of any signs of political crisis or a deterioration in the international situation -- also will tend to lose credibility. In such circumstances, we will be inclined to regard even quite extensive unusual military activity as an exercise or test of some kind, rather than a bona fide preparation for early military action. For

example, a partial mobilization, which in time of political crisis would cause grave concern, would probably be dismissed as only an exercise in a period of political calm. In the absence of any crisis, even a highly unusual and potentially very ominous development may not cause much alarm; it will rather be regarded as a mistake of some kind, or an error in reporting, as in fact it often is. Whereas in a crisis such a development would likely be assessed as even more ominous than the fact alone might warrant, it will probably require quite a number of unusual military developments to disturb our complacency if we see no positive political indications. Although this is in part a psychological phenomenon, it is also historically valid. Very few wars have started without some deterioration in the political situation, or some development which would increase the possibilities that a nation might decide to launch military operations.

There is, however, some limit to the number of major military preparations which may be undertaken in a period of political calm without arousing concern. Obviously, this would be particularly true if one of our most powerful potential enemies were to begin extensive and unusual military preparations, even though the political atmosphere was relatively "friendly." The idea, advanced by some, that the USSR could mobilize and redeploy its forces against NATO in a period of calm and convince us that it was just "an exercise" begins to strain credibility. There would be some point in that process, however complacent we might be at its start, that the sheer buildup of capability would cause grave concern and almost certainly some type of military preparations on our part. This does not necessarily

mean that we would reach a positive judgment that Soviet attack was likely, but we would come to appreciate that we could no longer say with confidence that it was very unlikely.

In real life, we rarely see the situation in which political and military indications are totally out of phase or contradictory. Each will be contributing, in varying measure perhaps, to our assessment of the enemy's likely course of action. It has been observed that, in normal times, we will usually give somewhat greater weight to political indications than to military developments -- this reflects our general sense of the attitudes and intentions of our adversaries, usually borne out by many years of experience. It is also essentially our national estimate -- that they are not going to go to war without some reason, and that we will have some indication that the situation has changed before they would take such a decision. On the other hand, once the situation has changed and the political atmosphere is deteriorating, we will probably give greater weight in the crisis situation to the military indications as our best guideline to the enemy's intentions. This in turn reflects two historically valid principles: political indications can be ambiguous or even misleading, particularly if the adversary is seeking to confuse or deceive us; and the extraordinary buildup of military capability is likely to be the best single indication of the enemy's course of action, a point made several times previously in this work.

Isolating the Critical Facts and Indications

Individuals lacking experience with real warning situations nearly always have considerable misconception about the nature and quantities of information

which are likely to be received, and the problem of interpreting it. Whereas the inexperienced tend to believe that warning "failures" arise from totally inadequate information ("we didn't have warning"), experienced analysts have learned that the reverse may be the case -- there is almost too much information, too many reports, too many military preparations, too much "warning." It must be conceded that this is not always the case, and that there have certainly been areas and circumstances in which our information was very inadequate. A review of the evidence available prior to the outbreak of most recent conflicts, however, will show that a great deal of information was usually available. What was lacking was probably the evidence of the final decision to go and the evidence of the final military preparations which would have given a clue to the timing of the attack -- problems which we will discuss in coming chapters.

In any large volume of political and military reports or indications, some obviously will be of far greater importance than others for the judgment of the enemy's intentions. In the preceding chapters, a number of such critical facts and indications have been discussed, particularly highly unusual military developments which can be expected to occur only in preparation for combat. As we also have noted, many political and civil indications may be much more ambiguous, but some will be much more meaningful than others for warning, and hence should be accorded much more weight in the assessment of the enemy's intent. It will therefore be important that these particular meaningful preparations be singled out and accorded the attention they deserve. The question should not be simply, is this a

likely preparation for war? There will probably be a great many developments in this category. The crucial question may be, how rare is it? How often has it occurred at all in peacetime, including crises which did not lead to conflict? How likely would it be to occur except in preparation for war? If the answers show that even a few critical or nearly unique indications are showing up, the odds of course are materially increased that the nation in question is preparing for and will probably initiate hostilities. The more advanced and sophisticated the military forces and the economy of a country are, the more such distinctive preparations will be required for war. Preparations for nuclear war would involve an unprecedented range of activities, some of which would probably never be seen except in preparation for that contingency. It follows, therefore, that:

All Indicators Are Not Ambiguous

A great disservice has been done the community and the warning system by some rather casual statements that "all indicators are ambiguous." Such comments are not dissimilar in lack of perception to the claim that "We can judge the enemy's capabilities but we cannot judge his intentions" (see Chapter 5).

Those who make such off-hand judgments are probably familiar neither with the examples which can be drawn from history nor with the specificity of some items on indicator lists. Or -- which may be equally likely -- they are using the word "ambiguous" in a highly ambiguous sense.

It is probably true that there is only one totally reliable, unequivocal indication of an intention to attack -- and that is instantaneous access to the enemy's decision to do so and/or the order to implement it. Even where total preparation

for war has been accomplished, where all military indications are "positive," and even when the political decision has already been made in principle to attack, there is always the possibility that the leaders will change their minds or that some last minute event will cause them to postpone or to call off the operation entirely. In this sense, it may be said that all indications but the one are subject to some measure of doubt or uncertainty and can never be viewed as absolutely conclusive evidence of the enemy's intent.

But there are, as emphasized in the preceding discussion, a number of military indications which are not in themselves ambiguous. That is, they are the steps which are undertaken only in preparation for hostilities, which virtually never occur in peacetime, which are not just "more of the same" but different from what goes on from day to day. They do not occur for exercises, they do not occur (or only to a very limited extent) in practice mobilizations or other drills. They are the developments which truly distinguish war from peace and which, in the Soviet Union, we have never seen, at least since World War II. They are the manifestations of the implementation of the war plan, and they include such developments as: full national mobilization; the institution of full combat readiness in all military forces; the formation of wartime commands; the release of nuclear weapons to the authority of the commander; and a number of other similar although less dramatic measures.

There are further a number of lesser military developments which, although not necessarily indicative of imminent hostilities, are positive indications that the

combat readiness and capabilities of forces are being raised, or that they are being deployed into positions for attack. To call these measures "ambiguous" is highly misleading, for the military measures themselves are not. They are not exercises but bona fide measures to raise the combat capabilities and readiness of forces for a particular action. Even if that action is not finally implemented, the preparedness measures themselves should not be dismissed as of doubtful or ambiguous significance. Many of the measures taken by Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces prior to the invasion of Czechoslovakia were in this category -- they materially and obviously raised the capabilities of these forces for such an operation and bore no resemblance to normal "exercises." They brought these forces to a very high degree of readiness to invade -- a fact which the intelligence community recognized and stated. If the situation was "ambiguous," it was only because firm evidence was lacking (or many chose not to accept as likely) that the Soviet Union finally would go through with the invasion. But this did not negate the validity and non-ambiguity of the military developments themselves.

Negative Indications and Problems of Concealment

In assessing the enemy's intentions, it is necessary not only to take note of what he has done, but also of what he has not done. If we can determine for sure that he has not taken certain essential preparations for conflict, or even has taken some which might reduce his readiness for combat (such as releasing seasoned troops), this will materially influence our conclusions. In some cases, knowing what has not occurred can be the most important factor of all.

Unfortunately, it is often very difficult to find out that something has not happened. This is particularly true of the whole range of preparations, both military and civil, which are not readily discernible or which involve relatively little overt activity. There are other preparations, particularly those involving major deployments or changes in the normal patterns of military activity, on which we often can make a judgment with some degree of confidence that certain things either have or have not occurred.

In compiling a list of what is often called "positive" and "negative" indications, therefore, great care should be taken to distinguish true negative indications (things that we expect to happen prior to hostilities but which have not) from just plain lack of information. In some cases, a large portion of the seeming negative indications will turn out to be in the no information category. On some of these, we may be able with sufficient collection to make a determination one way or the other. On many others, however, our chances of finding out anything are poor, and sometimes very poor. We must be careful not to mislead our consumers into believing that we know more than we do, and it may be necessary to point this out quite explicitly. The indications or current analyst should avoid phrases such as "we have no evidence that" when the chances of getting the evidence are poor, and he should not otherwise imply in any way that the information he is presenting represents the sum total of what the enemy is up to. It may be helpful just to compile a list of the things that logically could or might have happened which

we cannot tell about one way or the other. The consumer of intelligence in his turn must have a realistic understanding of indications intelligence and our collection capabilities lest he equate a lack of reporting with lack of occurrence.

Reporting from field collectors also should be geared to insure in a crisis situation that those at headquarters know what the collector has covered or even can cover, when he files his "negative" report or fails to send a report at all. A true "negative indication" from the attache is not the absence of a cable, from which we assume that all is well, or even the report which reads: "Troop movements, negative; mobilization, negative." We may need to know what parts of the country he and his colleagues have covered, and whether any troop induction stations or reserve depots have been reconnoitered to be sure what "negative" means.

Subject to these provisions, the careful compiling and reporting of true negative indications can be a most important portion of the totality of evidence and hence of the final judgment of the enemy's intentions.

Urgency

A distinguishing feature of most crises which result in hostilities and of the preparedness measures which accompany them is urgency. There is an atmosphere which surrounds the bona fide pre-war situation which differentiates it from exercises, shows of force, or even political pressure tactics. Although it is somewhat difficult to define this atmosphere, or to explain exactly what makes it seem "real," an important ingredient nearly always is urgency. This sense that there is a race against time, that things are being done on an accelerated schedule, that the pressure

is on is likely to be conveyed to us in a variety of ways. It usually will affect both military and political activities and be evident in a number of anomalies or indications that plans have been changed, trips cut short, exercises cancelled, propaganda changed abruptly, and so forth. Only in rare instances -- and those usually where our collection is poorest -- do we fail to obtain some evidence of this urgency. Where the pace is leisurely and there appears to be no deadline for completion of the activity, we will usually be correct in judging that it represents a long-term or gradual buildup of capabilities rather than preparation for early hostilities. The general absence of urgency or hurried preparation has been one of the major differences, for example, between the Soviet military buildup along the Chinese border over a period of years, and the precipitate movement of forces prior to the invasion of Czechoslovakia.

One note of caution is in order, however. There are instances of long pre-planned and deliberate attack -- the North Korean attack on South Korea in June 1950 is a prime example -- in which evidence of urgency or even any particular sign of crisis at all may be lacking. Where a nation has more or less unlimited time to prepare and is practicing a deliberate political deception campaign designed to lull the adversary, it may under favorable circumstances be successful in concealing or suppressing any signs of urgency. (See further discussion in the next chapter.) In the case of the North Korean attack, our very limited collection capabilities undoubtedly also contributed heavily to the surprise -- we were not even alerted to the possibility of the attack when it occurred.

It must also be said that urgency of activity alone, of course, is not a firm indication of intent to undertake offensive operations, since obviously there may be circumstances calling for speedy military preparations and hurried political decisions when there is no hostile intent. Even in this case, however, the urgency of the activity will usually indicate that the nation is genuinely concerned, that it regards the threat seriously, and/or that it is not bluffing.

Some Guidelines for Assessing the Meaning of the Evidence

Crises are marked by confusion, by too much raw information and too little time to deal with it, by too many demands on the analyst and so forth. It would be nice to have lots of time for the interested and knowledgeable analysts to assemble and review their evidence, make their arguments, reexamine the facts, and revise their judgments and conclusions, much in the laborious fashion that national estimates are prepared. In warning, unfortunately, time often does not permit this and it frequently does not even permit some of the less time-consuming means of getting analysts together to discuss the material and exchange views on what it all means.

In these circumstances, analysts and consumers alike may profit from some relatively simple guidelines designed to assist in evaluating the evidence and the intention of the enemy.

We begin by assuming that the enemy is behaving rationally and that he is following some logical and relatively consistent pattern of action in achieving his objectives. Although this may not always be the case (nations as well as

individuals have sometimes acted irrationally and inconsistently), it is well to start with the logical analysis of the enemy's behavior before assuming that he may act irrationally. As a result, we also assume that war is not an end in itself for him and that he will not resort to hostilities so long as there is some reasonable chance of achieving his objectives by means short of war. We therefore start with the five following questions designed to clarify our own thinking about what the adversary is up to. The questions are:

1. Is the national leadership committed to the achievement of the objective in question, whatever it may be? Is it a matter of national priority, something the leadership appears determined to accomplish?

2. Is the objective potentially attainable, or the situation potentially soluble, by military means, at least to some degree?

3. Does the military capability already exist, or is it being built up to a point that military action is now feasible and victory likely to be attainable? Or, more explicitly, does the scale of the military buildup meet doctrinal criteria for offensive action?

4. Have all reasonable options, other than military, apparently been exhausted or appear unlikely to have any success in achieving the objective? Or, more simply, have the political options run out?

5. Is the risk factor low, or at least tolerable?

If the answer to all the questions is a firm yes, logic would dictate that the chances of military action are high. If the answer to any one of them is no,

then it would appear less likely, or even unlikely, that the nation will resort to military action now, although of course circumstances might change so that it would decide to do so in the future. If two or three answers are no, the chances of military action would logically appear to drop drastically to the point of highly improbable if four or all answers are negative.

Applied to some recent indications problems, this technique yields some interesting results. For the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, the answer to all five questions is yes -- although some persons might maintain that Soviet political options were not entirely exhausted by 20 August 1968, a series of political measures had failed to bring the situation under control, and there was little reason to believe that more such pressures would succeed. For the Arab-Israeli conflict of June 1967, the answers from Israel's standpoint also are yes to all five, although slightly less clearly or categorically perhaps than for the USSR in 1968, i.e., the risk factor was seemingly a little higher and the exhaustion of political solutions perhaps a little less certain. For Egypt in 1971, the answers to questions one and two are emphatically yes, to four also yes (from a realistic standpoint), but the likelihood of military action drops drastically because Egypt lacked the capability for successful military action and the risk factor was high. For India in the India-Pakistan war of December 1971, the answer to all five questions again is yes.

In the Sino-Soviet border controversy (which reached its most critical point in 1969), we can come to a firm yes only on question one -- the Soviet leadership did appear committed to "doing something" about the China problem, particularly

after the Damanskiy Island incident in March. To all other questions on this thorny problem, however, the answer is either no or at least uncertain. It was highly doubtful that a Soviet military attack would have "solved" or even lessened the China problem. The Soviet Union could not build up sufficient military force actually to conquer the Chinese people in war -- except possibly by the use of nuclear weapons. The employment of these, in turn, would make the risk factor very high -- both militarily and politically. And finally, difficult as the Chinese might be to negotiate with, the political options had run out. And in due course talks -- not very fruitful but still talks -- were begun, and the crisis atmosphere which had prevailed began to abate.

Because of the different nature of the Soviet actions in Cuba in 1962 (obviously, the Soviet Union never intended to go to war over Cuba), the foregoing questions cannot all be literally applied to the Cuban missile crisis. Insofar as they are applicable, however, the answers do not yield a positive yes which would have made the Soviet action logically predictable or consistent with previous Soviet behavior. In particular, the risk factor -- from our standpoint and in fact -- was extremely high, and the Soviet action is explainable only as a gross miscalculation of what the US reaction was likely to be.

Thus these questions, although useful as a logical starting basis for the examination of the meaning of our evidence, are not a foolproof guide to an assessment of the enemy's intentions. For there will also be the cases in which the adversary's action will not necessarily be logical -- where he may resort to military

action, even though the answer to one or even more of the five questions is no. For a variety of reasons -- miscalculation of the opponent's strength or reaction, overestimation of one's own strength, frustration, internal domestic pressures, patriotic hysteria, revenge, a fit of pique, or just plain desperation -- a nation's leadership may decide on imprudent or even disastrous courses of military action which are clearly not in its national interest.

Nearly all conflicts are final acts of desperation when other means of solution have failed. In many cases, the instigator of the military action nonetheless has followed a rational and consistent course of action, and -- after due deliberation and after all other options have failed to yield results -- has decided on military action as the only method which will achieve the desired result. Military solutions are not inherently irrational acts, particularly if they are likely to succeed. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, for example, was a carefully deliberated, meticulously planned, coldly rational, and entirely logical course of action; although there were political (but not military) risks, they were far less from the Soviet standpoint than permitting Czechoslovakia to pass from control of the Communists.

Before we conclude that some other nation is acting "irrationally" in going to war, we should carefully examine our own attitudes and make sure we are not rejecting such action as illogical because we either do not fully appreciate how strongly the other country feels about it, or because we are just opposed to war on principle as an instrument of national policy.

I believe that the systematic application of the method described above will far more often than not yield positive and correct results. At a minimum, it is a method of helping ourselves to think objectively about the evidence as a whole and to avoid, insofar as possible, substituting our own views for those of the other guy.

But there will remain those cases, like Cuba in 1962, which are not logical and do not meet objective criteria for rational action. It is this imponderable, of course, which so vastly complicates warning. We must allow for those cases where the risk factor is high or where military action is not likely to solve the problem and may even be potentially suicidal. When there is good reason to suspect that the leadership of the nation in question may be acting irrationally, the two most important questions are slightly modified versions of one and three:

- Is the national leadership so committed to the achievement of the objective, or so obsessed with the problem, that it may even act illogically in an effort to achieve its goals? and

- Is the military capability being built up to the maximum possible for this action, even though the chance of success is doubtful?

PART VI: SOME MAJOR ANALYTICAL PROBLEMS

CHAPTER 26: THE IMPACT ON WARNING OF CIRCUMSTANCES LEADING TO WAR

CORRECTION SHEET

to

A HANDBOOK OF WARNING INTELLIGENCE VOLUME II
(PARTS V-VI, CHAPTERS 19-29)

NOVEMBER 1972

In Chapter 26, two pages are interchanged:

The page numbered 26-9 should be 26-12

The page numbered 26-12 should be 26-9

CHAPTER 26: THE IMPACT ON WARNING OF CIRCUMSTANCES LEADING TO WAR

The varying circumstances under which wars may start, and the differing motivations or objectives of the nations which begin them, inevitably will have considerable effect on the indications of the coming of war and our assessment of them. The causes of war and the reasons why nations resort to conflict are, of course, enormously complex, and it would be absurd in a single chapter to attempt even to outline the scope of this problem. Our purpose here is not to analyze the causes of wars, but only to describe how warning is affected by some of the various circumstances surrounding the outbreak of conflicts. In particular, we are concerned with such things as deliberately planned aggression versus wars which come about because of some change in circumstances, or by miscalculation or escalation.

The Deliberately Planned Aggression

Historically, many and possibly most wars have started from territorial ambition or a simple desire to gain power, conquer other peoples, or even to rule the world. In these circumstances, the quest for power is the cause of conflict, and war is not brought about by any circumstance other than the ambitions of rulers, such as Genghis Khan, Napoleon, or Hitler. Although such stark militaristic expansionism has not in the past quarter century been a cause of many conflicts, it was the basic cause of World War II both in Europe and the Pacific. Thus, those who correctly perceived the coming of World War II were those who recognized that both Hitler and the Japanese militarists were bent on conquest and that war was an instrument

of their national policies rather than something to be avoided. In the broadest sense, the warning of the coming of the war was the recognition of this. Beyond this, warning became a question of when and where conflict would break out, rather than whether.

The militarist who is determined on conquest and has the requisite power to initiate the conflict obviously has many advantages in the planning of his operations. Most important is that he controls the coming of the war, which will be initiated by and large at the time and place of his choosing. He need not be pushed into war until he is ready or make his military preparations in haste. He can try military blackmail to secure his ends and if successful obtain some of his objectives without resort to war, if he chooses to operate this way. Or he can, at least theoretically, avoid any kind of ultimatum or demand on his intended victim and attempt to launch a surprise attack without any "political warning" or seeming deterioration in their relationship.

These options open to the military aggressor also affect the type and number of indications which may become apparent to the adversary or be concealed from him. As is most evident, the political indications can conceivably range from virtually nil (no hostile propaganda, no diplomatic moves or threats, wholly successful concealment of the decision to attack, etc.) to the most obvious kinds of political blackmail, ultimatums or overt declarations of intent to attack. In practice, there have been very few instances in recent times of attempted total political concealment or absence of crisis, although, as noted in the preceding chapter, the North

Korean attack on South Korea in June 1950 comes close to it. The point is that, in closed societies and with the practice of maximum security, the potential aggressor at least has a presumed capability of achieving political "surprise" of this type. At the least, there is always the chance that he might try it.

The long-planned, deliberate aggression also permits considerably greater concealment of many military preparations, primarily because security and deception measures can be most carefully planned and implemented. Many steps also can be undertaken more gradually, so that there is less discernible disruption of normal military and civilian activity. In contrast, sudden, unexpected crises requiring precipitate and unplanned moves of military forces in response to the emergency nearly always are apparent in some degree in nations where we have any significant collection capability. They often are accompanied by breakdowns in military security which would be almost unheard of in normal circumstances.

On the other hand, the instigator of deliberate aggression normally will initiate his military preparations much earlier and usually more extensively than in the unexpected situation in which war comes about because of some external change in the situation. Thus, although the preparations individually will be less obvious (or not obvious at all), the collection services may have much more time in which to detect them, and there will be more readiness measures to detect, than in the crises. The analytic elements of the intelligence services in turn will have more time in which to make their evaluations, recheck their sources, and so forth. In general, given the serious problem of delay in the acquisition of confirmatory data from within most closed

societies, time is likely to be on the side of the victim in the long-term buildup. That is, by and large his chances of detecting the military preparations will be better the longer he has to do so, even though the security measures to conceal them are also better. At the same time, however, the preparations may seem to lack an urgency which can be deceiving, and the intended victim of the aggression may be more inclined to view the preparations of his enemy as a long-term buildup of capabilities or contingency preparations rather than as indications of an intention to attack. Obviously, each case will be different in some degree, and it would be misleading to attempt any generalizations on this subject.

The War Brought on by Changes in Circumstances

Within recent years, the deliberately planned aggression has been much less frequent than the war which comes about because of some external development which alters, or threatens to alter, the balance of power, or because of some other change which worsens a long smoldering situation. The variety of such developments is considerable. They include sudden spontaneous disturbances or outbursts (such as the Hungarian revolt in 1956), nationalist or chauvinistic actions which threaten the interests of another power (such as the Egyptian seizure of the Suez Canal in 1956 and the Egyptian closure of the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping in 1967), an escalation resulting from border incidents (such as the Sino-Indian conflict in 1962), to name a few. Potential causes of conflict also include provocative actions or threats of actions designed primarily to test out the opponent and see how much he will put up with, such as the Chinese Communist shelling of the Nationalist-held offshore

islands in 1958, or the series of Soviet threats to Berlin from 1958 to 1961. Other examples could be cited.

The point is that situations of this type, whatever precipitates them, are obvious occurrences which demonstrably raise the international temperature and in which the threat of possible conflict is nearly always immediately apparent. And where hostilities do follow, it may not be by choice of the instigator but because he feels compelled by circumstances to resort to force or the situation simply gets out of control. Some nations, of course, will be less unwilling than others to resort to force, but nonetheless the situation is not entirely of their choosing. The conflict, if it comes, arises at least in part from circumstances or miscalculations rather than machiavellian design.

The developments which precede such conflicts, or potential conflicts, are likely to vary to some extent and sometimes considerably from those which precede the deliberately planned aggression. This difference will not be primarily in the actual preparations which precede the outbreak of the conflict; in fact, the military steps may be virtually identical, and some of the same types of civil preparation will likely be taking place as well. The differences arise rather from such factors as: the motivations of each of the participants to the dispute; their willingness or reluctance to resort to conflict; their readiness to negotiate or to seek a genuine compromise solution; the actual status of negotiations if they are begun; the effectiveness of the intelligence services in ascertaining the level of preparedness of the antagonist; perceptions of the intentions of the other party regardless of the

effectiveness of intelligence; assessments of whether time is or is not on their side; respective estimates of relative military capabilities (not always accurate); military doctrine on preemption and surprise; pressures from other nations to hold off operations or to limit their scope, and so forth. The foregoing are only some of the complex factors which can influence whether the leadership of a nation will resort to conflict -- which it may not wish, would not have chosen in other circumstances, and might have avoided had it better understood the adversary or not misinterpreted his preparations.

It is obvious that the forecasting of hostilities in such complex circumstances can be a highly hazardous occupation and potentially fraught with difficulties which do not arise in the case of the nation which is firmly committed to conquest and has the clear military capability to achieve its ends by force. It is impossible to obtain conclusive evidence of the intentions of a nation which has not yet made up its own mind what to do. In these circumstances, the finest penetration of the highest councils of government will not provide definitive answers but only information that the decision has not yet been made. Such access, however, and even intelligence of lesser quality, may provide us understanding of the options as the leadership sees them and a perception of the circumstances which might in the future result in the firm decision to go to war. It thus may permit us to make quite a good judgment of the probabilities of conflict even though the decision has not yet been made. But in the best of circumstances there will likely be a considerable element of uncertainty as to whether the conflict will or will not be avoidable and, if not, when it may

finally be precipitated.

Given all these uncertainties, it must be said that our record in perceiving the coming of hostilities in these complex situations is perhaps better than might be expected and would seem to compare favorably with our record in predicting the deliberately planned aggression. Thus our recognition of the likelihood of conflict between Israel and Egypt in May-June 1967 was considerably better than our perception that North Korea would attack South Korea in 1950, and forecasts of the Indian-Pakistani conflict in December 1971 were more forthright and accurate than forecasts that India would move against the little enclave of Goa in December 1961.

It would no doubt be highly misleading to attempt to generalize why this is so. But a primary reason unquestionably is that a crisis generates a recognition that a conflict may ensue and an understanding of why it may occur. Both sides usually will take pains to make their concern evident, and many if not most military preparations may be poorly concealed. Collection is stepped up, and developments which would pass virtually unnoticed in a period of calm are promptly reported and disseminated; they may, in fact, be given more weight than is warranted because of the charged atmosphere. The press and other public media are filled with material on the crisis. The French have a word for it -- intoxication. Thus the coming of the conflict, even when the intelligence services fail to predict it with certainty or expect it too soon, cannot really be said to be a surprise.

The One-Sided Versus the Two-Sided Buildup

Regardless of the reasons for conflict and the motivations of the attacking nation, our interpretation of the military moves and issuance of warning will be considerably complicated if both sides are preparing for war and reacting to the preparedness measures of the other. Where the two powers are relatively equal in military capabilities, and both are building up their forces, the interaction of their preparations may make it difficult to tell which nation, if either, is the potential aggressor and which is only preparing to defend itself. Obviously, the chances for miscalculation and misjudgment are compounded, and an inadvertent border violation or minor incident potentially may trigger an outbreak of major hostilities in which neither side appears as the clear-cut aggressor. The problems of war by miscalculation rather than design have increasingly concerned both the intelligence community and policy makers in recent years. Some aspects of these problems from the standpoint of warning will be considered in the remainder of this chapter.

First, it should be noted that the one-sided buildup of military force -- or the instance in which one nation to the controversy has such overwhelming power at its disposal that it would be ridiculous to assume that its adversary could possibly initiate the conflict -- are by no means infrequent. In a number of conflicts since World War II, one side has had a great preponderance of power and has been able to employ force -- or to threaten to employ it -- with relative impunity. Indeed, it is the clear preponderance of force which encourages the military solution rather than extended and possibly fruitless negotiation, while, conversely, the threat of

neither side was "inevitably" forced into the conflict, which might have been avoided by a genuine desire to negotiate or compromise in the interests of avoiding war.

A conspicuous example in which gross miscalculation threatened to lead to war, but in which conflict was avoided, was the Cuban missile crisis. Khrushchev's shipment of strategic missiles to Cuba -- which must rate as one of the most astonishing and dangerous misjudgments ever made, certainly by the usually cautious Soviet leaders -- is a prime example of the type of miscalculation which could precipitate a conflict between major powers. Since both nations, in this instance, were above all anxious to avoid war, and the potential for escalation to nuclear conflict was both real and terrifying, the danger was averted. For analyst and policy maker alike, however, the missile crisis must serve as a constant reminder that miscalculation of the effects of military actions is a greater danger in the age of nuclear weapons than it ever has been before.

It will be apparent that such miscalculations present extraordinarily difficult problems for warning analysis. The prediction of seemingly irrational behavior, particularly in the absence of strong supporting evidence, is a virtual impossibility for the intelligence system -- except as a contingency warning to the policy maker of a possibility which might be developing, or a threat which might be in the making. As is well known, a special national estimate on Cuba, issued on 19 September 1962, reached the conclusion that the introduction of Soviet strategic missiles into Cuba was unlikely -- a judgment which correctly has been called both logical and wrong.

into account a variety of political and military factors. Obviously, some access to the nature of policy decisions may be even more valuable in such instances than in the simpler situation. Lacking this, there are perhaps some questions which may help to clarify analysis, in addition to the five general guidelines in Chapter 25. To suggest a few:

- Are the parties really seeking a political solution or willing to compromise, or is either or both determined to solve the problem on its terms once and for all?

- Closely related, are great issues of national prestige involved, or even national survival of one of the parties?

- Has one or the other made public commitments, or taken other steps, which would be very difficult to reverse or revoke?

- Has either or both taken steps to justify military action, e.g. to its own people, its allies or the world at large?

- Does one of the countries have sufficient military advantage that it can reasonably expect victory if it attacks?

- Are the military preparations placing a heavy drain on the national resources of either or both sides, and hence unlikely to be sustained indefinitely without some action to resolve the crisis?

- Are the military preparations and deployments of either side essentially of an offensive nature, and are the defensive preparations consistent with an expectation of retaliation for a coming attack?

On this latter point, the reader is referred to Chapter 17 for a discussion of offensive versus defensive preparations. It must always be remembered that the most intensive and complete defensive preparations may be taken by the nation which is preparing to attack and expects early retaliatory action. The analyst must be careful not to write off such preparations as indicative of nothing more than fear that the other side may initiate the attack.

Problems of Miscalculation and Preemption

Much has been written on these subjects in recent years, and it may be well to attempt to define what is usually meant by the terms.

"War by miscalculation" usually defines the situation in which a provocation or relatively limited action by one party causes an unexpectedly strong response from the other, and in which a series of escalatory steps follows, resulting finally in the war which, in some instances, neither side presumably wanted. Although there are few live instances in recent years, the Arab-Israeli Six-Day War of June 1967 is probably one. In this case, war followed Egyptian miscalculation of the Israeli reaction, particularly to the closure of the Gulf of Aqaba, this misguided action on Cairo's part constituting the primary immediate cause of war. (It may be added that there is good reason to believe that the USSR, or elements of the Soviet intelligence services, also contributed to Cairo's miscalculation by misinforming Egypt concerning Israeli intentions, this error in turn having been a serious miscalculation somewhere in the Soviet apparatus.) On the other hand, there was no miscalculation by Israel in its attack, which was a carefully considered and superbly executed action. But

protracted war or escalation of the conflict will tend to encourage negotiated solutions or the deferment of any solution. These elementary facts require no elaboration; they are the foundation of "balance of power" politics. Thus, the USSR can employ force against Hungary and Czechoslovakia with no fear of military retaliation, but it cannot do so against West Berlin. It is in fact constrained even from major military threats against Berlin, or the initiation of even minor military incidents on the autobahns, because of the grave dangers of escalation. Ultimately, when political threats, bluff, military maneuvers, and other measures short of direct military action had failed to achieve results, the USSR simply put Berlin on the back burner.

The situation marked by a unilateral buildup of force is the least complicated and should be the least difficult of warning problems, in that the military activity usually cannot be written off as "defensive," a reaction to preparations by the other side, or otherwise ambiguous. Normally, the only reasonable grounds for regarding such buildups as inconclusive indications of hostile intent are that: the military buildup is intended as pressure to force surrender or capitulation without having actually to employ it; or it is a contingency preparation for possible action at a later date, meaning the leadership has not yet firmly made up its mind and is "keeping its options open." (See discussion of this in the next chapter on the decision-making process.)

But what guidelines are there to help us when the situation is not so clear cut, when both sides are mobilizing and neither enjoys an overwhelming preponderance of power? It would be nice to have some pat answers, but of course there are none. Each situation will be unique and judgments of intentions will necessarily have to take

The evidence which might have supported a contrary conclusion was circumstantial and, while it clearly indicated that the Soviets were "up to something" extraordinary in Cuba which could include the introduction of strategic missiles, such a judgment was not then susceptible to proof. Thus, even those who believed such action likely -- foremost of whom was the Director of Central Intelligence, John McCone -- could do no more than to urge its consideration as a possibility or probability. For, without proof, the President could not act -- he could perhaps have issued even stronger warnings to Moscow, but he could not have imposed a "quarantine" on Soviet ship movements to Cuba nor produced convincing evidence for his action to present to the US public, the United Nations, or to Moscow. The Cuban case is a good example of the limitations of warning intelligence and a demonstration that there are times when only more collection can provide the answer -- and that the first duty of intelligence in such circumstance is to be sure that its collection systems are geared for a maximum effort (see discussion in Chapter 4).

Preemption or preemptive attack is defined in the JCS Dictionary as "An attack initiated on the basis of incontrovertible evidence that an enemy attack is imminent." It is to be distinguished from the longer term preventive war or preventive attack, which follows from a belief that war, although not imminent, is inevitable or at least highly probable, and that delay will entail greater dangers or risks than attacking now. It is difficult to find an example of true preemption. The Israeli attack of June 1967 lies somewhere between preventive and preemptive attack, since there was no clear indication that an Egyptian attack was imminent,

let alone under way, initial Israeli claims to the contrary notwithstanding.

The appearance of nuclear weapons of course has vastly increased the dangers of preemption -- and some believe also its likelihood, although this is arguable. The problem clearly is closely tied to that of miscalculation, for he who goes so far as to tempt preemption and he who in turn preempts may be guilty of the greatest miscalculations of all.

"Defusing" the Crisis: Hot Lines and Other Devices

It is these acute problems -- miscalculations resulting from inadequate communications, the danger of preemption based on false intelligence or misinterpretation, and other possibilities for gross misunderstandings between nations -- which have led to the establishment of "hot lines" and other devices to facilitate communications between the heads of state or other high-ranking officials. No one could deny the merits of such systems for rapid and secure communications or their potential value for avoiding dangerous confrontations when both sides in fact are seeking to prevent misunderstandings and to avoid war. At the same time, it is doubtful that hot lines will serve to avert conflicts if one side is determined to continue on a collision course, and there is nothing that can be said by such means that cannot be equally well conveyed through more conventional channels, perhaps a little more slowly. There is also a grave danger that such links would serve as top-level deception channels in the event of a premeditated attack.

From the standpoint of the indications analyst, and indeed the intelligence system as a whole, the use of high-level direct communications between heads of

state introduces still another method by which intelligence will likely be denied both pertinent facts and knowledge of policy decisions and moves by its own side. The gulf which today so often separates intelligence on the one hand and the policy and operational levels on the other is particularly dangerous in time of crisis (see discussion in Chapter 6). Without questioning the other advantages for the policy maker, the denial to intelligence of information from high-level private communications can only compound the ever-present dangers that intelligence will be issuing judgments which are less complete or accurate than they might be, or failing to report some information altogether because its importance or relevance was not apparent.

PART VI: SOME MAJOR ANALYTICAL PROBLEMS

CHAPTER 27: RECONSTRUCTING THE ENEMY'S DECISION-MAKING PROCESS

CHAPTER 27: RECONSTRUCTING THE ENEMY'S DECISION-MAKING PROCESS

If the final objective of warning analysis is the understanding of what the adversary is going to do, then the knowledge or recognition that he has decided to do something is the ultimate achievement. The highest goal of every espionage service is the penetration of the enemy's decision-making machinery -- the hidden microphone in the conference room, or the agent with access to minutes of the conference, etc. To have this type of access is to be sure, or nearly sure, of the enemy's intentions, and will make superfluous a vast amount of information, however valuable in itself, from lesser or secondary sources.

Since we are most unlikely to have such access to the highest councils of our enemies -- or if it could be obtained, it would be a highly vulnerable and perishable asset -- we must try to do the next best thing. We seek sources and information which will best permit us to deduce what may have been decided or to infer what the adversary's objectives and plans may be. In practice, in a crisis or warning situation, this will mean that we must examine virtually all the available evidence in an attempt to perceive what the pieces both individually and collectively may tell us about the enemy's decisions.

Obviously, this is both a highly sophisticated and very difficult analytic problem. It is also one of the most controversial aspects of the warning problem, on which there is apt to be the widest divergence of opinion in a live situation. Moreover, very few guidelines appear to have been devised to assist the analyst or

the policy maker to follow some logical process in reconstructing the enemy's decision-making process. In the pressures of a crisis situation, and lacking any body of experience or agreed "rules" which might be of assistance, there has been some tendency in the intelligence community to ignore this problem. What should be of highest priority in the analytic process -- the attempt to decide what the enemy has decided -- is often shunted aside in favor of mere factual reporting of what is going on, which is obviously much easier and less controversial. Too often, the reconstruction of the enemy's decisions and planning is attempted only after the crisis has been resolved, and thus becomes one more piece of retrospective or historical analysis, rather than something which might have helped us to foresee what was going to happen. Some brilliant post mortems have been produced, which have revealed that there is considerable talent for analyzing the decision-making process by inferential means. Such studies almost invariably also dig up pieces of information which were not considered at the time. But they nearly always are produced too late to help analysis in the current crisis and hence to be of any assistance to our own decision makers.

Clearly, it would be very useful to have some type of methodology which would help us to deal on a current basis with this elusive, but highly critical and sometimes decisive, factor in warning. It would be presumptuous to suggest that the remainder of this chapter is going to provide the answers, or some kind of simple and foolproof methodology. Its purpose rather is to assist the analyst to ask the right questions and to point out some of the more obvious aspects of this

problem which have often been overlooked. After a brief discussion of these points, we will examine what we know about Soviet decision-making in two major crises.

Some Elementary Guidelines for Decision Analysis

a. Actions flow from decisions, not decisions from actions. On the surface, this appears to be a truism, and almost an insult to the intelligence of the reader. Yet experience shows that this elementary principle is often not understood in crisis situations. In case after case, there has been a tendency to project into the future enemy decisions which must in fact already have been taken. The impression is left that the adversary is highly confused, hasn't decided anything yet, and is just doing things with no plan behind them. Thus, even major deployments of military forces may be downplayed or written off in such commonly used phrases as: "The deployment of these units significantly increases the enemy capability to attack, if he should decide to do so." The last phrase is not just gratuitous, it can be downright misleading. It suggests that the forces are being moved without any plans in mind, that the adversary does not know yet what he is going to do with them, that major actions have been taken without any reason for them and that the enemy is going to make decisions later. Whether the writer of such phrases consciously realizes it, he is probably using this device to avoid thinking about the problem or coming to any decisions himself. This phrase will help him to "be right" no matter what happens later. Whether it will help our own decision maker to "be right" is another matter, since the effect of this soothing language will probably be to reassure him that he has lots of time still and there is nothing to be alarmed about yet. He may

even infer that when the enemy "makes his decision," the intelligence system will know it and tell him.

All non-routine or unusual actions emanating from the national level result from some kind of decisions. They don't just happen. This is true of both military and political actions. In highly monolithic or centrally controlled states (which includes Communist nations), this is even more true than in democracies; i.e. a US governor may call out the National Guard or make some extravagant statement on national policy without its reflecting any decision in Washington, but in the Soviet Union things don't happen this way. Nor, even at the height of the Cultural Revolution in China, would it have been accurate to assume that some independent warlord would have been able to mobilize forces opposite the Taiwan Strait or take some other such action without national authority.

When something unusual occurs, particularly something which increases the adversary's capability to take military action or is otherwise potentially ominous, the analyst should ask such questions as: What does this suggest of enemy plans? What prompted him to do this? What kind of decision has been taken which would account for this action? He should avoid suggesting that the enemy does not know why he did it or that we are waiting for him to make his decision. It will often be helpful at this point to try and look backward and see what may have gone before which could account for the current development or which may indicate that there is a connection between a number of developments. And this in turn may help us in -

b. <u>Isolating or estimating decision times.</u> Major national decisions, and

sometimes even minor ones, are likely to result in actions in various fields, all of which flow from the same source or cause and are thus related to one another. They are designed to achieve the same ends or to be complementary. Where the decision is concerned with hostilities or preparations for possible hostilities, it will nearly always be followed by a series of both military and political actions which differ markedly from the norm. In some cases, it will require only a minor amount of backtracking or retrospective analysis to perceive that the actions were probably initiated at a recent publicized meeting of the national leadership, Politburo, Warsaw Pact leaders, or whatever. This will be particularly true if there is some sudden, unexpected development which precipitates a crisis, and ensuing developments clearly follow from that event. No one should have much trouble in these circumstances in perceiving that decisions of some sort are being taken and when.

Where there is no sudden and obvious emergency, however, both the nature and timing of major decisions are often concealed in closed societies, and sometimes in free societies as well. Thus, it may be some time before there will be indications that any new decisions have been taken at all, let alone when they were taken, or what they might have been. The analyst may often have to work from very fragmentary data in his effort to reconstruct what has been happening up to now and to attempt to determine when the adversary decided to initiate the action. Why bother?

The reason to bother is that the recapitulation of the events or developments

in time sequence from the date when the first anomalies became apparent will not only help to fix the decision time but also the nature of the decision. The interrelationship of events as part of a plan may begin to become apparent; they may cease to be isolated, unexplained anomalies when they can be traced back to a common date. Thus we may begin to perceive a scenario in which, for example, the following things began to happen at approximately the same time: reservists were secretly called up; the propaganda line for domestic consumption began stressing the need for greater vigilance against foreign spies; certain key officials were quietly called home from abroad for consultations; a previously scheduled military exercise failed to take place; the leaders of some allied countries went on "vacations" to unannounced destinations; meat became unavailable to civilians in some provinces; large-scale exercises were announced in a border area; a shortage of boxcars began to develop for normal economic needs; a prominent military leader disappeared from public view; the ambassadors of the nation became markedly more friendly in many countries; the number of submarines on patrol began to rise; and so forth. It must be stressed that, in real life, this information will likely be reported in fragments over a period of weeks, never all at once, and some of the developments at the time will seem to have been so insignificant as not to be worth noting, let alone reporting in intelligence publications. Only as they are assembled by the date they were first observed to have occurred (not date they were reported) will the analyst begin to perceive their possible relationships and suspect that some common prior decision may lie behind all or many of them.

Once again, the value of keeping chronologies of bits of seeming incidental intelligence is evident. It is only by doing this that the probable times of secret decisions are likely to be suspected at all, or that the analyst can begin to fit the pieces together. Once it becomes apparent (as it probably will only after meticulous research) that a shift in the propaganda line actually coincided with the first secret mobilization of reservists and a variety of other preparations for possible conflict will the possible scope and significance of the enemy's decisions begin to emerge.

c. Judging that crucial decisions are being made. One of the most important things to know about what the enemy is up to is whether he is making major new decisions at all. That is, even if we have no evidence as yet as to the nature of the decisions, we may gain considerable understanding of the intentions of the adversary if we have some insight into what he is concerned about and whether some particular subject is of overwhelming priority to him at the moment. This is often not so difficult to ascertain as it might appear, although clearly it will be dependent either on what the adversary chooses to publicize about his concerns, or on our ability to collect some information on political developments and the activities and attitudes of the leadership.

Contrary to what many may think, the preoccupation of the leadership with particular problems and decisions may often be no secret at all. To pick a conspicuous example, noted earlier in Chapter 20 and discussed in more detail in this chapter, it was abundantly evident in the summer of 1968 that the Soviet leadership was obsessed with the problem of what to do about Czechoslovakia, and that it had overriding

importance to them. It was evident that the Soviet leadership was making decisions of some kind about Czechoslovakia, even if analysts could not agree what those decisions were. The perception of the crisis thus derived in part from our knowledge that Czechoslovakia, from the Soviet standpoint, was what the whole summer was about.

In contrast, we may note that the Sino-Soviet border crisis of the spring-summer of 1969 was not accompanied by similar evidence or suggestions that the Soviet leadership was engaged in decisions of such a crucial and immediate nature concerning what to do about the China problem. This difference should probably not be stressed too much, given the Soviet capability for concealment and deception in this field. Nonetheless, our perception that the crisis in 1969 was not of the same magnitude as that of 1968 derived in large measure from the sense that the Soviet leaders were not taking the same kind of critical decisions. This perception of the degree of criticality of the problem was the result of a variety of information, some of it of a negative nature, that is, we were just not getting the same volume and type of reporting reflecting critical positive decisions that was received in 1968. If this analytic approach sounds highly subjective, it is; but it is of stuff like this that warning judgments are made.

d. Contingency, intermediate and final decisions. All analysts should beware the pitfall of oversimplification of the decision-making process, which is one of the most common of errors. Crucial national decisions usually involve a series of steps, which may range from preliminary decisions to take certain measures

on a contingency basis, subsequent decisions to take further preparations and to "up the ante" in case military action becomes necessary, up to near-final and final decisions to proceed with the action. Or, alternatively, actions may be initiated only for pressure purposes or in an attempt to dissuade by threat of force, with no intention of following through.

It may be noted that a nation may make a final or near-final decision as to an objective which it firmly intends to obtain, but will make a series of decisions on the various means which may be tried to obtain that objective. Often, these will involve both political and military pressure tactics, since presumably all-out force is the means to be employed only if all other measures have failed. In this case, a nation may seem to be indecisive (because a series of measures is tried) when in fact it has the objective clearly in mind and always intends to reach it.

In recent years, we have heard much about options, and to "keep his options open" has become a popular phrase to describe various preliminary steps or contingency preparations which the nation may take, presumably when it has not yet decided which course of action it will finally adopt. Indeed the phrase strongly implies "decision deferred," and the more options a nation has, the better off it presumably is and the longer it can defer the crucial decisions.

It is well to avoid over-dependence on this idea, which can lead the analyst into cliche-type reasoning where all preparations for military action, no matter how ominous, are written off as inconclusive and indicative of no decisions on the part

of the enemy. The important questions are: "What options are left?" and "Does this action indicate that the adversary himself now believes that the options are dwindling and that the chances for a political solution are running out?" It is surprising how many people seem unable, or unwilling, to carry out this type of analysis, and will fall back time and again on the argument that it was impossible to come to any judgment of the enemy's intentions or decisions since he was "only keeping his options open."

The reader may wish to refer back to the five questions suggested in Chapter 25 as basic guidelines to the interpretation of a nation's course of action. They are also the crucial factors in the decision-making process. If the first question, or premise, is judged to be positive -- that the national leadership is committed to the achievement of the objective in question -- then this is the operative factor behind the decision, or series of decisions. Only if some other factor effectively prevents or precludes obtaining that objective, will the nation presumably be deterred from a course of action which will fulfill its objective. Some of the means it may use (which we describe as options) may indeed be contingency or preparatory steps initially, in case other more desirable options fail or do not prove viable, but they are means to an end, not just steps taken to have "more options" and hence to postpone coming to any decisions. Indeed, the number of options which the nation devises, or tries out, to secure its objective may be something of a rough measure of how serious it is about obtaining it. As applied to Czechoslovakia in 1968, the mere fact that the USSR tried so many means of bringing the situation under control before

it invaded was in itself indicative of the seriousness of its intent and raised the probability that the military option ultimately would be exercised if all else failed.

e. Inter-play of political and military decisions. Another simplistic approach to the decision-making question, which also occurs surprisingly frequently, is to assume that political and military decisions are taken by different groups and are somehow not really related to one another. On the one hand are political leaders making political decisions and on the other are military leaders undertaking military exercises, carrying out mobilization, deploying troops, etc., almost on their own without relationship to the political situation. This is highly erroneous, at least in countries where the national leadership exerts effective command and control over the military forces, and it is particularly erroneous in Communist nations in which the political leadership maintains a monopoly on the decision-making process and the military undertakes virtually nothing on its own. The Party runs the Soviet Union, and the Politburo makes the decisions.

Thus, military and political decisions are inter-related and part of the same process, and the military steps are undertaken and insofar as possible timed to achieve specific political objectives. They must not be considered in isolation or as unrelated to the political objective. To do so is not only to misunderstand the cause of the military actions, but more importantly to fail to perceive the strategic objective and the interrelationship of the various means which may be used to obtain it.

Soviet Decision-Making in the Cuban Missile Crisis

Among the many unresolved mysteries of the Cuban missile crisis are why the

USSR undertook the action at all, how and when the Soviet decisions to undertake it were made, and what the outcome of this highly dangerous adventure was expected to be. I have often asked analysts who profess to understand this crisis what they think Moscow was going to do after it succeeded in establishing an operational missile force 90 miles from the continental US. The fact is that no one knows, and we can only speculate. The Soviet plan may be compared to a drama in which we missed the first act altogether, came in for the second act and forced the author to bring down the curtain because we did not like the plot, and never did learn what denouement was planned for the third act.

Nor are we likely ever to know. The most exhaustive research after the event and numerous retrospective analyses have failed to shed much light on the crucial questions of Soviet motivations, planning, decisions, and expectations. The post mortems have taught us more about what happened that summer and fall (although even here there are still many gaps), but virtually nothing more about how it was decided and why. (It may be added parenthetically that Khrushchev's so-called memoirs, whether or not he wrote them, are almost no help and very misleading.)

It is often possible, after a crisis is over, to come to some fair understanding of when certain decisions were taken, even though it was not apparent at the time. In the case of the Cuban missile crisis, we cannot even establish this. There is no evidence when or even that high-level discussions were held with the Cubans, since there is no record of an exchange of VIP visits during the period when the crucial

decisions must have been made. The only thing that appears reasonably clear is that the Soviet decision would have been made some time between the autumn of 1961 (when the USSR's efforts to obtain a Berlin settlement had failed) and the early spring of 1962. Based on the magnitude of the subsequent logistic effort and the extensive planning that must have gone into coordinating the various shipments of materiel and troops to Cuba, it has generally been considered that the decision was probably made no later than April, or some three months before the first ship movements were detected in July. During the entire period from the fall of 1961 to July, we had almost no indication that the USSR was particularly preoccupied with Cuba, or that any important decisions with regard to that island were being made. The seeming focus of Soviet concern and the area of greatest danger of confrontation continued to be Berlin. Thus Soviet security effectively concealed that any highly dangerous and crucial decisions were being taken concerning a confrontation with the US and also that anything unusual was under way with regard to Cuba.[1]

It may also be observed that, even in retrospect, we do not know who thought up the plan (although we presume it was Khrushchev himself, it could be

[1]It is true that there were a very few and seemingly unrelated clues from clandestine sources which indicated this possibility, but it would have required almost clairvoyant perception to have anticipated the Soviet move before the shipments to Cuba began -- and no one would have believed it. There were some other indications that summer that something potentially big might be brewing in the minds of the Soviets, but its nature and any connection with Cuba could hardly have been foreseen.

that he adopted the ideas of someone else), which members of the Soviet leadership favored or disapproved the idea, or what the attitude of the military was. It can be argued, with almost equal plausibility, that Soviet military leaders would have opposed so risky a venture which could have led to hostilities, or that they would have favored a measure designed to alter the strategic balance of power prior to undertaking certain other dangerous ventures, for example, in Berlin.

Intelligence, both at the time and in retrospect, also has shed very little light on the Soviet decision-making process from the time that the US detected the shipments to Cuba and began to become concerned about them up to the discovery of the strategic missiles in mid-October. It is quite evident that the various US warnings to the USSR of the dangers of introducing offensive weapons into Cuba did not serve to deter Khrushchev and presumably also had no effect on the nature or timing of the shipments to Cuba. We do not know, however, whether these warnings prompted new debates in the Kremlin on the whole question and whether they were partially responsible for some of the military readiness measures which the USSR initiated about 11 September (the day it announced that its forces were being brought to "highest combat readiness").

President Kennedy's speech of 22 October announcing the discovery of the strategic missiles and the imposition of the US "quarantine" of course precipitated a week of overt crisis in which it was quite evident that the USSR was taking some very important decisions indeed. The first of these which became evident to us was the order to halt the movement toward Cuba of ships carrying military

equipment, a highly important indication that the USSR desired to avoid a direct confrontation with US forces, at least at sea. In subsequent days, however, work continued on the missile sites in Cuba. As everyone knows, the final and crucial evidence of the Soviet decision to back down was conveyed in the messages sent to President Kennedy by Khrushchev, first privately on 26 October and again, when it was made publicly, on 28 October, in which the USSR agreed to withdraw the missiles in return for US assurances that there would be no invasion of Cuba. On the intervening day (27 October), there appeared to be real indecision in the Kremlin, since on that day Moscow radio carried a statement by Khrushchev which said that the USSR would remove its missiles from Cuba if the US did the same from Turkey.

There are a number of indications that Khrushchev became convinced on 27 October that the US had decided to invade Cuba and that the attack was imminent. This was the date when Soviet forces apparently were brought to their highest readiness, and the crisis was further heightened by the shootdown of a U-2 over Cuba (an act, incidentally, which almost certainly was not ordered by Moscow). Khrushchev, speaking to the Supreme Soviet on 12 December 1962, stated that, "In the morning of 27 October, we received information...which directly stated that this attack [on Cuba] would be carried out within the next two or three days." There appears little doubt that it was this threat of imminent attack on Cuba, or actually on Soviet missile installations and forces in Cuba, which led to the final and publicly announced Soviet decision to withdraw the

missiles. We also have little reason to doubt that the decision was Khrushchev's own, although again we have no insight into what role the rest of the leadership may have played in that decision. There were subsequent hints in the Soviet press that elements of the military were dissatisfied with the decision, but in the USSR the military is not represented in the highest decision-making body or Politburo.

As a footnote to the inter-play of decisions by both sides, it is interesting to note that Robert Kennedy's book on the missile crisis, published several years later, revealed that President Kennedy had not reached a final decision on 27 October to proceed with an attack on Cuba. "We won't attack tomorrow, the President said. We shall try again."[1] Nonetheless, the President was apparently ready to order the attack if necessary. That evening, Robert Kennedy informed Ambassador Dobrynin that the US must have a commitment by the next day that the missiles would be removed, or otherwise the US would remove them.[2] Further, there were leaks to the press quoting US leaders as indicating that such action would be taken soon, and these, together with the major US military steps, appear to have been convincing to the USSR.

The Cuban missile crisis, which to many analysts is both the most fascinating and most elusive problem we have ever had, is an example of an almost total failure

1 Robert F. Kennedy, Thirteen Days, a Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York, W. W. Norton & Co., 1969), p. 101.

2 Ibid, pp. 108-109.

to have perceived the nature of the adversary's strategic decisions, up to the moment when conclusive evidence was finally obtained. Not only would it have been impossible, on the basis of the information available at the time, to have reconstructed the decision-making process; it is almost impossible to do so even in retrospect. We must rely on hindsight even to perceive that decisions were being taken, let alone what they were.

If the Cuba crisis represents the nadir of our collection and perception of an adversary's decision-making process, the Czechoslovak crisis six years later provides an altogether different problem, one in which we had ample evidence that Soviet decisions were being taken on Czechoslovakia, but in which there is still considerable controversy and misunderstanding concerning what decisions were taken and when. Thus, the Czechoslovak instance provides an excellent example of the process of reconstructing decision-making for warning purposes, which would never have been possible in the Cuban crisis.

Soviet Decision-Making in the Czechoslovak Crisis

From the time that Novotny was replaced as head of the Czechoslovak Communist Party in January up to the Soviet-Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia on the night of 20-21 August 1968, there was abundant and continually mounting evidence of Soviet concern with the problem of Czechoslovakia and what could be done to reverse the course of liberalization undertaken by the Dubcek regime. The controversy, and there was much controversy, over Soviet intentions never arose from lack of evidence of Soviet preoccupation with Czechoslovakia. Since the

Chronology of Major Developments Prior to the Invasion of Czechoslovakia

23 Mar:	Trends in Czechoslovakia criticized at Dresden conference, attended by leaders of Czechoslovakia, the USSR, East Germany, Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria.
9-10 Apr:	Soviet Central Committee Plenum heard unpublished speech by Brezhnev, reportedly dealing particularly with Czechoslovakia, after which Soviet leadership toured the country to explain situation to local party meetings.
24-25 Apr:	Marshal Yakubovskiy, CinC of Warsaw Pact, visited Prague and reportedly asked to have Soviet or other Pact forces stationed in Czechoslovakia. Request refused.
4-8 May:	Czechoslovak leaders in Moscow for unsatisfactory talks, followed by separate and unexpected visit of leaders of East Germany, Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria.
6-12 May:	Several Soviet divisions deployed to positions near Czech border in East Germany, Poland and USSR.
17-24 May:	Soviet Defense Minister Grechko and other Soviet military leaders in Prague, with concurrent visit by Premier Kosygin; followed by announcement that Warsaw Pact exercises would take place in Czechoslovakia and Poland in June.
1-23 Jun: (approx)	Soviet troops which had deployed to borders moved into Czechoslovakia in undetermined strength, but apparently substantially more than token forces publicly announced.
20-30 Jun:	Warsaw Pact exercise "Sumava" conducted in Czechoslovakia, after which Prague and Moscow announced conclusion of exercises, but Moscow retracted its announcement.
1-10 Jul:	Soviet forces lingered in Czechoslovakia, amid mounting signs they might not leave.
10-15 Jul:	Czechoslovak leaders refused to go to Warsaw for talks. The other five met there without them and issued very tough letter calling on Prague to take steps to reverse trend toward liberalization. Prague announced Soviet troop withdrawal begun.
17-19 Jul:	CPSU Central Committee Plenum convened suddenly to endorse actions taken at Warsaw. Moscow again demanded talks with Czech leadership. Marshal Grechko returned to Moscow from Algeria ahead of schedule.

20-23 Jul:	USSR spreading word it might have to use force in Czechoslovakia. Letters dispatched to friendly Communist Parties warning that USSR would use any necessary means, including force, to bring situation under control. Ranking Polish Party member reportedly said decision made by USSR to break Czech will by force if necessary.
23-30 Jul:	USSR announced that large-scale Rear Services exercises would be held over the entire western USSR lasting until 10 Aug and would involve callup of reservists, requisitioning of transport and demothballing of equipment. Extension of these exercises into East Germany and Poland, and involvement of forces of those countries, announced on 30 July.
24-31 Jul:	USSR moved major forces to the border of Czechoslovakia, bringing total divisions to an estimated 15-19, with major movements being observed in East Germany and Hungary. Ground force movements accompanied by major deployments of tactical air units. There were indications that some East German and Polish units also deploying to border.
28-30 Jul:	Western travelers sighted large movements of Soviet troops and supply columns into Poland at several crossing points from the USSR, ranging from southern Poland to the Baltic coast. Large holding areas for Soviet forces in central Poland found by Western attaches in early Aug.
15 Jul - 3 Aug	Very slow withdrawal of Soviet forces from Czechoslovakia under way. Attache sighting on 29-31 July finally confirmed presence of division-size Soviet unit in Czechoslovakia.
29 Jul - 3 Aug	Meeting of Soviet and Czech leaders at Cierna and of Warsaw Five leaders with Czechs at Bratislava resulted in ill-defined Czech commitment to take steps to strengthen Party control and to strengthen ties with Warsaw Pact. Public polemics to cease. USSR also reported to have again demanded at Cierna that Soviet troops be stationed in country.
3-16 Aug:	Crisis appeared eased, but Soviet-Pact forces remained deployed and military preparations were continuing. Czechoslovakia was failing to take effective measures to carry out agreement and was again warned by Soviet press of need to comply.
11-16 Aug:	USSR announced that combined communications exercise being conducted in USSR, Poland, and East Germany, and that top military commanders meeting in East Germany and Poland.
16-20 Aug:	Soviet press attacks on Czechoslovakia increased, but contained no explicit warning of imminent military action. Press reports, 20 Aug, indicated Soviet leaders again meeting in Moscow.
20-21 Aug:	Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces conducted massive invasion of Czechoslovakia.

Soviets made no secret of their concern, and since most of the various meetings with their allies (the so-called "Warsaw Five") were public knowledge, as was much of the pressure which they brought against Czechoslovakia, analysis of their decision-making becomes one of interpreting from the available evidence what the decisions were, not whether decisions were being taken at all.

To simplify the subsequent discussion, the preceding two pages recapitulate in capsule form a chronology of the major events leading up to the invasion of Czechoslovakia, beginning with March. It is emphasized that this presents only highlights and should not be considered anything approaching a complete indications roundup.

Working from the facts presented in the chronology (which has excluded any information obtained only after the invasion), when were the major Soviet decisions taken and when did the USSR "decide" to invade Czechoslovakia? The student of this problem should be advised that there has never been agreement on this subject among analysts. Post mortems revealed the widest variations in opinion, even among those fairly knowledgeable on the facts, and those who did know many details of the available evidence not surprisingly were still hazier on what might have happened, and when.

Most of the argument concerning Soviet decisions has centered around the period of mid-July and the period 16-20 August, and in essence the question is: Did the USSR "decide" to invade at the time of the Warsaw meeting with its allies, or did it only initiate the contingency military preparations at that time, thus

"keeping its options open" for military invasion if it should later decide to take that course of action? Were the massive military preparations which became evident to us in the last week of July taken "just in case" or even taken by the military more or less on their own, or do they indicate a prior political decision that force would be required to bring the situation under control? Anyone who has not participated in debates on this subject might be amazed at the extent and even bitterness of controversy on this point, not only at the time but long after the event. Some proponents of the view that the USSR did not "decide" to invade until about 17 August have even seemed to suggest that the presence of all those military forces in the field for "exercises" was almost fortuitous, and that the leadership belatedly recognized Marshal Grechko's foresight in deploying those troops and decided suddenly to make use of them to invade. It has been suggested that the leaders were making the invasion plans, or at least working out the details, as late as two or three days before it occurred.

A less extreme, and much more prevalent, view concedes that this is ridiculous and that the military operations obviously had been carefully planned well in advance, but nonetheless holds that it was "impossible" to make a judgment of Soviet intentions from the evidence at hand prior to the invasion and that the USSR itself did not know what it was going to do until three or four days before. This view was reflected in conclusions put forth in intelligence publications for three weeks prior to the invasion -- that Soviet forces were in a high state of readiness to invade "if it was deemed necessary" or if the USSR "decided to do so," thus

conveying to the reader the sense that not only we but the Soviets themselves did not yet know what might occur, and that the crucial decisions were yet to be taken. Thus the intelligence judgment went as far as it could, and certainly was not wrong, even though the Soviets did finally "decide" to invade.

This controversy over the timing and nature of Soviet decisions well illustrates many of the points set forth in the opening portion of this chapter. Most comment, and thinking, on the Soviet decision-making process on Czechoslovakia has been highly simplistic, sometimes even naive. For the most part, analysts have failed to examine the known developments in sequence in an attempt to understand what decisions should logically have been taken before something happened, or to ask whether a series of observable actions are related to one another and may be logically traced to a common prior decision. Analysis has been overly concerned with what happened rather than with what caused it to happen. In the process -- and this is a most serious error -- it has often failed to distinguish between the Soviet objective and the means employed to achieve that objective, and thus has failed to perceive that fundamental and important decisions were probably taken much earlier than is usually believed.

Seldom in these discussions has it been suggested that major Soviet decisions might have been made earlier than mid-July, or that it is pertinent to examine what the USSR was trying to accomplish before that time. Many observers have maintained that Soviet policy was vacillating or inconsistent and that the leadership seemingly was unable to make up its mind what to do about Czechoslovakia, right up until the

time (unspecified) when the Politburo finally voted to invade. There are a number of reports, authenticity largely unknown and frequently contradictory, which purport to set forth how the Politburo voted on the invasion and which members were for or against the decision.

To which the perceptive analyst of the decision-making process must ask: What vote are you talking about? The Politburo did not vote just once, or make just one decision, on Czechoslovakia. It is clear from the chronology of the evidence that there must have been a series of decisions -- and, moreover, that these decisions were not logically inconsistent with one another and did not reflect vacillation on the part of the Soviet leadership. By this we do not mean to say that there was no controversy over what to do, or that the final outcome followed inevitably from the first crucial decision, but only that the scenario does have a logical plot, and that the timing and probable nature of the decisions can be reconstructed with considerable accuracy from the events which ensued.

The Soviet objective was the restoration of orthodox Party control in Czechoslovakia which would insure that the country would remain a faithful Soviet political ally and a full military participant in the Warsaw Pact. To the USSR, given Czechoslovakia's geographic location, such control was essential to the Soviet security position in Eastern Europe, and the defection of Czechoslovakia could have had incalculable consequences in adjoining countries as well. As the "Prague spring" flourished and the liberalization program increasingly permitted a freer atmosphere which the USSR perceived as a threat to the alliance, the Soviets were concerned

with finding a means of restoring orthodox Party control. Politically, this might have been accomplished in one of two ways: by persuasion or pressure on Dubcek to see the light and himself undertake the necessary steps to reverse the trend toward liberalization; or by the replacement of Dubcek and the "liberals" with an orthodox conservative leadership. In fact, the USSR tried both these means, the "persuasion" and pressure continuing virtually up to the invasion. Although little is known of Soviet attempts to overthrow Dubcek by a coup within the Party, there is reason to believe that the USSR hoped, at least initially, and perhaps even tried to do this, but that the conservative element was entirely too weak to accomplish it without more support than the USSR could bring to bear.

Another means which could be used to help secure the political objective was military power. It is important to understand that force, either present or readily available, is an essential ingredient of dictatorial control, that the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe have remained in power only because of the proximity of Soviet forces, and that this is a major reason why Soviet troops are deployed in Eastern Europe. The normal Soviet response to any serious threat of political dissidence is to deploy more military force to the area. Thus, in Moscow's eyes, the introduction of Soviet forces into Czechoslovakia was a means by which its political objectives would be furthered. The objective was not to carry out a massive invasion of Czechoslovakia -- this was undertaken only when all other measures had failed to achieve the desired result -- but rather to get Soviet forces into the country by one means or another, so that their presence would serve to keep the lid

on the political situation. The evidence indicates that the USSR was attempting from April onward to introduce Soviet forces into Czechoslovakia -- not because it sought a "military solution" but because the troops were to be a means of obtaining the desired political solution. In this sense, the USSR intended from April onward to "invade" and in fact it conducted not one, but two, invasions of Czechoslovakia.

Let us now go back to what happened that spring and summer, insofar as we have outlined it in the chronology on pp. 18-19, and try to reconstruct the Soviet decision-making process. In all, we can isolate five different occasions -- in fact almost the precise dates -- on which the Soviet leadership, either alone or in concert with its allies, must have decided on some action concerning Czechoslovakia. Further, we can from the events which followed come to logical and probably quite accurate judgments as to what the essence of the decisions must have been. The chart on page 26 summarizes this information on the decisions, including a little information on the period from 16 August onward which did not become available to us until after the invasion.

If this reconstruction of events is essentially accurate, as I believe it to be, it will be seen that the basic political decision -- to restore effective control in Czechoslovakia and to keep it within the Warsaw Pact -- had probably been taken in principle by early April. This does not, of course, necessarily mean that all subsequent measures undertaken were then discussed, or that a final requirement for full-scale invasion was then foreseen, although the military almost certainly would have been directed to begin contingency planning for this possibility, once the

DATE	EVENT	PROBABLE NATURE OF DECISIONS	RESULTING ACTIONS
9-10 Apr	Soviet Central Committee Plenum	Endorsed Politburo decision that control of Czechoslovakia must be maintained and that Soviet troops should be placed in country.	Party membership informed. Yakubovskiy dispatched to ask, unsuccessfully, that Soviet troops be stationed in Czechoslovakia.
4-8 May	Meetings in Moscow of Soviet and Czech leaders, and of Soviets with other four countries	Four Eastern European countries and USSR agreed on further steps, including deployments of Soviet troops to Czech border, and possibly to try to oust Dubcek by internal Party coup.	Soviet troops deployed to Czech border. Czechs persuaded to permit Soviet troops to enter country for Warsaw Pact "exercise." Deployed forces conducted "silent invasion" of Czechoslovakia.
14-15 Jul	Meeting of Warsaw Five, following Czech refusal to talk with Soviets	Agreement of the Five that political solution unlikely, and that full-scale invasion would probably be required to force Czech compliance. All military preparations for invasion to be carried out, but another effort also to be made at political solution.	Mobilization and deployment of Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces. Heavy pressure brought on Czechs to meet. Soviet Central Committee Plenum endorsed any action leadership considered necessary, giving it free hand thereafter. Friendly parties informed force would be used if needed.
29 Jul - 3 Aug	Cierna and Bratislava conferences	Soviet leaders probably decided and their allies agreed to give Czechoslovakia one more chance to comply. Final decision to invade probably deferred.	USSR toned down polemics against Czechs but continued military preparations for invasion, announcing a series of "exercises" as cover. Czechs failed to tighten controls as promised.
16-17 Aug	Meetings of Soviet leaders (but not Central Committee) in Moscow	Took final decision to proceed with invasion on night of 20-21 Aug; considered last-minute measures -- including agreement to begin SALT with the US and invitation to President Johnson to visit USSR.	Final military preparations for the invasion completed. Propaganda against Dubcek increased but without direct warning of imminent invasion. US informed of Soviet agreement to begin SALT talks.

SECRET

27-26

SECRET

political decision had been reached. Within a month, deployments were undertaken with the intention of "invading" under cover of a Warsaw Pact exercise, the scope and purpose of which had been grossly misrepresented to the Czechoslovak leaders. Whatever doubts we may have had about the purpose of all this were, or at least should have been, dispelled when the Soviet troops failed to leave the country after the exercise despite mounting Czechoslovak concern and demands. Finally, controversy over the nature and size of the Soviet forces which had entered for the "exercise" was largely resolved by attache sightings the end of July which confirmed the presence of at least one full division, fully combat prepared, and not the usual token forces used in Warsaw Pact exercises.

So what did the Pact allies discuss in Warsaw in mid-July, following which the mobilization and deployments of the invasion forces occurred? What is meant by those who maintain that no decisions were then taken on future actions, but only "contingency" preparations in case it was later decided to use force, and that the Soviets themselves never made up their minds until three or four days before the invasion? I personally find this reasoning extremely shallow and non-perceptive, and illustrative of a fundamental error in the warning process -- to wit, a reluctance to come to judgments on the grounds that the enemy has yet to make his decision, so how can we tell what he will do? I will try to explain why this type of reasoning does not hold water, at least in this instance, recognizing, however, that this will not be convincing to all readers, perhaps not even to most. But it is the heart of the warning problem, and the difference between those who "had warning" of the invasion

of those who did not.

First, the course of events up to mid-July, as well as a great deal of information received in the following two to three weeks, provided a convincing amount of evidence that the Soviet leadership was desperately seeking to bring the Czechoslovak situation under control, and that nothing held higher priority to them than this. There was a true crisis atmosphere, which belied any judgment that the Soviets were exaggerating their concern or bluffing. Moreover, we received virtually unequivocal warning by the end of July that foreign non-ruling Communist Parties had been informed that the USSR would take whatever means were necessary, including force, to bring the situation under control and, even more explicitly, a reliably sourced report that the decision had been taken to break the Czechoslovak will by force if necessary.

The scale of the military buildup also was consistent only with a decision to carry out preparations for full-scale invasion, and could not reasonably be dismissed as "exercises," an attempt to bring "more pressure," or preliminary contingency measures. This fact was recognized and reported, at least to the extent that the forces were held to be in a "high degree of readiness" to invade. Moreover, in addition to the forces deployed along the Czechoslovak border, the movement of substantial additional Soviet forces into northern Poland (apparently as backup or reserve forces) provided further evidence of a bona fide buildup of combat forces rather than mere "pressure" on the borders of Czechoslovakia.

What, then, was the most probable nature of the decisions taken in mid-July,

and again a few days before the invasion, and which was the most important? Which was "the" decision, or "the" Politburo vote sometimes referred to as if there had been only one? It appears to me that the crucial decisions with respect to the invasion must have been taken in mid-July, and that the massive military buildup was initiated because the USSR and its allies became convinced that a solution by political means was unlikely, and that a military invasion would therefore probably be required to bring the situation under control. Or, to put it another way, the Soviet leadership reached the basic decision in mid-July to carry out an invasion unless a political solution could be reached. At the same time, it was apparently also decided to make one more effort toward a political solution before proceeding with invasion, and thus probably to defer a final decision on whether military action would inevitably be required -- and hence also the decision on its timing.

And what was "decided" on 16-17 August that required the meetings of the leadership (but not, we may note, the reconvening of the full Central Committee which had already given its endorsement of the mid-July decisions)? So far as we can tell, these meetings were concerned with two things: a final decision to proceed with the invasion on the night of 20-21 August, and the last-minute details of the plans -- including the message to President Johnson agreeing on SALT talks. We remain uncertain why this date was chosen, although it is likely that both political considerations (the final acceptance that Dubcek was either unwilling or unable, or both, to implement the Cierna and Bratislava agreements in the sense in which

the USSR intended) and military considerations (the forces were fully ready and probably had been so for at least several days) prompted the final decision to go ahead. Although this decision was not, of course, "inevitable" -- the basic decisions of mid-July could always have been reversed and the invasion called off -- the most crucial decisions and votes were nonetheless those of July. From then on, invasion was always a probability barring some political miracle, which the Soviet leadership really did not expect. Moreover, the action followed logically from the earlier decisions, almost certainly dating back to April, that by one means or another Czechoslovakia must be kept within the Warsaw Pact.

The analysis above, while convincing to me, will not necessarily be so to others, particularly those who have long maintained that the USSR did not "decide" to invade until 16-17 August. We cannot answer the question definitely; the evidence does not permit an absolutely firm conclusion and will continue to be interpreted differently by different individuals. The case does illustrate the difference in reasoning, however, between the individual who says that the Soviets were "just keeping their options open" and then stops analyzing, and the individual who asks "what options did they have left?" To understand this difference is truly to perceive the warning problem on Czechoslovakia.

PART VI: SOME MAJOR ANALYTICAL PROBLEMS

CHAPTER 28: ASSESSING THE TIMING OF ATTACK

CHAPTER 28: ASSESSING THE TIMING OF ATTACK

One of the most widespread misconceptions about warning is the belief that, as the hour of the enemy attack draws near, there will be more and better evidence that enemy action is both probable and imminent. From this, the idea follows naturally that intelligence will be better able to provide warning in the short term and will, in the few hours or at most days prior to the attack, issue its most definitive and positive warning judgments. Moreover -- since there is presumed to be accumulating evidence that the enemy is engaged in his last-minute preparations for the attack -- this concept holds that intelligence will likely be able to estimate the approximate if not the exact time of the attack. Therefore, if we can judge at all that the attack is probable, we can also tell when it is coming.

This concept of warning -- as a judgment of imminence of attack -- has adversely affected US thinking on the subject for years. As of this writing, the official definition of strategic warning in the JCS Dictionary is, "A notification that enemy-initiated hostilities may be imminent." (See discussion of this question in Chapter 2). More explicitly, the US national warning estimate of 1966 concluded: "Intelligence is not likely to give warning of probable Soviet intent to attack until a few hours before the attack, if at all. Warning of increased Soviet readiness, implying a possible intent to attack, might be given somewhat earlier."

However logical these suppositions may appear in theory, they are not supported either by the history of warfare nor the experience of warning analysts, and in recent years more realistic assessments of this problem have begun to appear in warning papers and estimates.

For the fact is that warning judgments are not necessarily more accurate or positive in the short term and that assessing the timing of attack is often the most elusive, difficult and uncertain problem which we have to face. It is simply not true that the last few days or hours prior to the initiation of hostilities are likely to bring more and more specific indications of impending attack which will permit a better or more confident judgment that attack is likely or imminent. In many cases experience shows that the reverse will be true, and that there will be fewer indications that the attack is coming and even an apparent lull in enemy preparations. This can be quite deceptive, even for those who know from experience not to relax their vigilance in such circumstances. Those who do not understand this principle are likely to be totally surprised by the timing -- or even the occurrence -- of the enemy action. They will probably feel aggrieved that their collection has failed them and they will tend to believe that the remedy for the intelligence "failure" is to speed up the collection and reporting process, not appreciating that the earlier collection and analysis were more important and that a judgment of probability of attack could have been reached much earlier and should not have been dependent on highly uncertain and last-minute collection breakthroughs.

Principal Factors in the Timing of Attacks and the Attainment of Surprise

Nearly all nations, except in unfavorable or unusual circumstances, have shown themselves able to achieve tactical surprise in warfare. History is replete with instances in which the adversary was caught unawares by the timing, strength or location of the attack -- even when the attack itself had been expected or considered a likelihood. Even democracies, with their notoriously inept security in comparison with closed societies, have often had striking success in concealing the details (including the timing) of their operations. To cite the most conspicuous example, the greatest military operation in history achieved tactical surprise even though it was fully expected by an enemy who potentially had hours of tactical warning that the massive invasion force was approaching. It was the Normandy invasion. In Chapter 29 we will discuss the role which deception played in this operation.

It is not only by deception, however, that tactical surprise is so often achieved and that last-minute preparations for the attack can be concealed. A more important and more usual reason is that the indications of attack which are most obvious and discernible to us are the major deployments of forces and large-scale logistic preparations which are often begun weeks or even months before the attack itself. Once these are completed, or nearly so, the enemy will have attained a capability for attack more or less at the time of his choosing, and the additional preparations which must be accomplished shortly prior to the attack are much less likely to be discernible to us or may be ambiguous in nature.

Staff conferences, inspections, the issuance of basic loads of ammunition and other supplies, and the final orders for the attack all are measures which require little overt activity and are not likely to be detected in time except by extraordinarily fine collection and rapid reporting -- such as a well-placed agent in the enemy's headquarters with access to some rapid means of communications, or the fortuitous arrival of a knowledgeable defector. Even the final deployments of major ground force units to jumpoff positions for the assault may be successfully concealed by the measures which most nations take to insure tactical surprise -- including rigid communications security and night movements. Thus, unlike the major deployments of troops and equipment which almost never can be entirely concealed, the short-term preparations have a good chance of being concealed, and quite often are. And, even if detected, there will often be minimal time in which to alert or redeploy forces for the now imminent attack, still less to issue warning judgments at the national level. Such tactical warning usually is an operational problem for the commander in the field. Ten minutes or even three hours warning does not allow much time for the political leadership to come to new decisions and implement them.

Another facet of the problem of assessing the timing of attack is the difficulty of determining when the enemy's preparations are in fact completed, and when he himself will judge that his military forces are ready. As we have noted elsewhere, it is particularly difficult to make this judgment with regard to logistic preparations. In fact, I can recall no instance in my experience in which it could

be clearly determined that the logistic preparations for attack were complete, particularly since heavy supply movements usually continue uninterrupted even after the attack is launched. There has often been a tendency for intelligence to believe that all military preparations are completed earlier than in fact is the case -- the discrepancy usually being attributable to the fact that the major and most obvious troop deployments had apparently been completed. Thus, even when intelligence has come to the right judgment on enemy intentions, it has sometimes been too early in its assessment of the possible timing of the attack.

In addition, the enemy command for various reasons may not go through with an attack as soon as the forces are fully prepared, or may change the date of the attack even after it has been set. A recent study has compiled some data concerning the frequency with which D-Days are not met, and the effects of this on the adversary's judgments. Of 162 cases analyzed where D-Days applied, almost half (about 44 per cent) were delayed, about five per cent went ahead of schedule, and only slightly more than half (about 51 per cent) remained on schedule. The most common reasons for delay were weather and administrative problems, presumably in completing or synchronizing all preparations. Some attacks have had to be postponed repeatedly. For example, the Germans' Verdun offensive of 21 February 1916 was postponed no less than nine times by unfavorable weather.[1]

---

[1] Barton Whaley, Stratagem: Deception and Surprise in War (Cambridge, Mass., MIT Center for International Studies, April 1969), pp. 177-78, and A-69. See Chapter 29 for a more detailed discussion of this work.

Such changes in plans have sometimes had notable effects on the opponent's assessments, particularly when he has gone through one or more alerts of impending attack which failed to materialize. Whaley notes that the finding that procrastination can help to generate surprise is explainable by the "cry-wolf" syndrome -- whereby the false alert, and particularly a series of them, breeds skepticism or downright disbelief of the authentic warning when it is in fact received. "Moreover, the trend is that the greater the number of false alerts, the greater the chance of their being associated with surprise.... [The] Aesopian moral seemingly holds..., the false alarms serving mainly to undermine the credibility of the source and dull the effect of subsequent warnings.... It is ironic that...some of the D-Day warnings were quite authentic, the enemy having merely unexpectedly deferred the operation. The consequence was, of course, that several superb intelligence sources including Colonel Oster, Sorge and Rossler received undeserved black marks on the eve of their subsequent definitive alerts."[1]

Of all aspects of operational planning, the easiest to change and most flexible is probably timing. Once troops are in position to go, orders to attack usually need be issued no more than a few hours ahead, and the postponement of even major operations rarely presents great difficulties to the commander. Attacks have been postponed -- or advanced -- simply because there was reason to believe that the enemy had learned of the scheduled date. Obviously, among

---

[1] Ibid, pp. 187-188.

the simplest of deception ruses is the planting of false information concerning the date of operations with the enemy's intelligence services.

In addition to general preparedness, tactical factors and surprise, operations may be delayed for doctrinal reasons or to induce enemy forces to extend their lines of communication or to walk into entrapments in which they can be surrounded and annihilated. The delayed counteroffensive, designed to suck enemy forces into untenable advanced positions, is a tactic which the Communists have employed with devastating effect. Obviously, misjudgments of the enemy's intentions in such cases have been heavily influenced by the seeming delay in his response, which induces a false sense of security that he will not respond at all.

Political factors also may weigh heavily or even decisively in the timing of operations. This, of course, will be particularly true when (as is often the case) the nation in question intends to resort to military operations only as a last resort and hopes that the threat of such action will induce the opponent to capitulate. Obviously, in such cases, the decision of the national leadership that the political options have run out and that only force will succeed will be the determining factor in when the military operation is launched (see Chapter 27). In this event, operations may be deferred for weeks beyond the date when military preparations are completed, and the assessment of the timing of the attack may be almost exclusively dependent on knowledge of the political situation and insight into the enemy's decision-making process.

Still another political variant which may affect the timing of attack is when one nation is attempting to induce the other to strike the first major blow and thus appear as the aggressor. In this case, a series of harassments, border violations and various clandestine tactics may be employed as the conflict gradually escalates until one or the other power decides to make an overt attack. Clearly, the point at which this may happen will be very difficult to predict.

Apart from the various reasons noted above, there may be other largely tactical considerations which will affect the timing of attack. Weather, as already mentioned, is one of these -- not only visibility, but in some cases winds, tides, moonlight or lack of it. Conditions of roads and terrain of course have been a major determining factor in when some operations will be launched. Military operations and logistic movements of Communist forces in Southeast Asia have traditionally been greatly slowed, if not halted altogether, at the height of the rainy season, and spring thaws on the plains of central Europe have delayed many operations. In cases where weather effectively precludes overland movement, it is of course highly probable that attacks will not occur. Nonetheless, there is always a chance that an enemy may choose to attack even in highly adverse conditions in the interests of achieving surprise.

As is well known, many attacks are initiated near dawn, for two reasons: the nighttime cloaks the final deployments of the attacking units,

and the hours of daylight are desirable to pursue the operation. Several Communist nations, however, have shown a marked favoritism for attacks in the dead of night. This has been particularly true of North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces, which have shown themselves highly adept in night penetration operations and assaults. The USSR also has often launched attacks or other operations hours before dawn: the operation to crush the Hungarian revolt began between about midnight and 0330; the Berlin sector borders were sealed about 0300; the invasion of Czechoslovakia began shortly before midnight.

The USSR also has shown some favoritism for Sunday, both the Hungarian and Berlin operations having occurred in the early hours of a Sunday morning. It would be dangerous, however, to assume that this would be the case. The invasion of Czechoslovakia occurred, for instance, on a Tuesday night, slightly to the surprise of some who had come to expect Soviet operations to begin on Sundays. Whaley has found some preference for Sunday operations among Communist states but not in a majority of cases; it was true in only about one-fourth of the operations which he studied.[1] Among other nations, there does not appear to be any evident preference for particular days of the week. In cases where Sunday is chosen, it is not for any anti-religious reason, but because the alert status of most Western nations is then usually lowest. The Japanese selected Sunday for the Pearl Harbor attack because their observations had shown that most US ships would then normally be in port.

---

[1] Whaley, op cit, pp. 180-181.

Some Examples of Problems in Assessing Timing

Because of space limitations, discussion of more than a few examples is precluded, and even these must be covered briefly. There is considerable military historical writing, particularly on World War II, which may be consulted by those who wish to study this aspect in more detail, as well as the many examples in Whaley's previously cited work. Since much of this material is readily available and the timing of the Normandy invasion also is addressed in Chapter 29 of this book, the examples below include only two from World War II with the remainder drawn from more recent intelligence experience.

- The German attack on Holland, Belgium and France, May 1940: World War II had been under way for eight months before Hitler finally launched his offensive against Western Europe in May 1940, the long delay in the opening of the western front having generated the phrase "phony war." All three victims of the final assault had ample and repeated warnings, and indeed it was the redundancy of warnings which in large part induced the reluctance to accept the final warnings when they were received. The "cry-wolf" phenomenon has rarely been more clearly demonstrated -- Hitler is said to have postponed the attack on the West 29 times, often at the last minute.

Owing to their access to one of the best-placed intelligence sources of modern times, the Dutch had been correctly informed of nearly every one of these plans to attack them, from the first date selected by Hitler, 12 November

1939, to the last, 10 May 1940. Their source was Colonel Hans Oster, the Deputy Chief of German Counterintelligence, who regularly apprised the Dutch Military Attache in Berlin of Hitler's plans -- and of their postponements. Although in the end Oster provided one week's warning of the 10 May date, and there was much other evidence as well that the German attack was probably imminent, the Dutch ignored the warnings and failed even to alert their forces prior to the German attack. The Belgians, more heedful of the numerous warnings received, did place their forces on a general alert. The French, having also experienced several false alarms of a German attack, seem to have ignored the repeated warnings of their own intelligence in early May, including a firm advisory on 9 May that the attack would occur the following day. These instances also clearly demonstrate two fundamental precepts of warning made in Chapter 3 of this work: "more facts" and first-rate sources do not necessarily produce "more warning," and intelligence warnings are useless unless some action is taken on them.

- The Soviet attack on Japanese forces, August 1945: This is one of the lesser studied World War II examples, but clearly demonstrates the difference between strategic and tactical warning. The Japanese, who were able to follow the Soviet buildup in the Far East from December 1944 through July 1945, correctly judged that the USSR would attack the Japanese Kwantung Army in Manchuria. As noted in a preceding discussion (Chapter 16), they had also concluded by July that the Soviet troop and logistic buildup had reached the stage that the USSR would be ready to attack any time after 1 August. Despite this expectation which almost certainly must have resulted in a high degree of alert of the Japanese forces in

Manchuria, the Kwantung Army had no immediate warning of the timing of the attack, which occurred about midnight on the night of 8-9 August.

- The North Korean attack on South Korea, June 1950: This was a notable example of both strategic and tactical surprise, and indeed one of the few operations of this century which truly may be described as a surprise attack. Neither US intelligence, at least in its official publications, nor policy and command levels had expected the attack to occur, as a result of which there had been no military preparations for it. The South Koreans, despite many previously expressed fears of such an attack, also were not prepared and had not alerted their forces. Since strategic warning had been lacking, the short-term final preparations of the North Korean forces (insofar as they were detected) were misinterpreted as "exercises" rather than bona fide combat deployments. In considerable part, the warning failure was attributable to inadequate collection on North Korea -- but the failure to have allocated more collection effort in turn was due primarily to the disbelief that the attack would occur. In addition, the "cry-wolf" phenomenon had in part inured the community -- for at least a year, there had been about one report per month alleging that North Korea would attack on such-and-such a date. When another was received for June, it was given no more credence than the previous ones -- nor, in view of the uncertain reliability and sourcing of all these reports, was there any reason that it should have been given greater weight. Although we can never know, most and perhaps all of these reports may have been planted by the North Korean or Soviet

intelligence services in the first place. The attack is a notable example of the importance of correct prior assessments of the likelihood of attack if the short-term tactical intelligence is to be correctly interpreted.

- Chinese intervention in the Korean war, October-November 1950: Among the several problems in judging Chinese intentions in the late summer and fall of 1950 was the question of the timing of their intervention. Based on the premise that the less territory one gives up to the enemy, the less one's own forces will have to recover, the Chinese can be said to have intervened much "too late" in the conflict. And this conception of the optimum time for Chinese intervention strongly influenced US judgments of their intentions. From the time the first direct political warning of the Chinese intention to intervene was issued on 3 October (to the Indian Ambassador in Peking) until the first contact with Chinese forces in Korea on 26 October, all Communist resistance in Korea was rapidly collapsing as the US/UN forces were driving toward the Yalu. As the Chinese failed to react and the Communist prospects for recouping their losses appeared increasingly unfavorable, the Washington intelligence community (and probably the Far East Command as well) became increasingly convinced that the time for effective Communist intervention had passed. In the week prior to the first contact with Chinese forces, the US national warning committee (then known as the Joint Intelligence Indications Committee, the predecessor of the Watch Committee) actually went on record as stating that there was an increasing probability that a decision against overt intervention had been taken.

Once the Chinese forces had actually been engaged, there was an interval of a month before they became militarily effective and launched their massive attacks in late November. Thus in this period the intelligence process again was confronted with the problem of assessing the timing of any future Chinese operations, as well of course as their scope. The four-week period produced many hard indications, both military and political, that the Chinese in fact were preparing for major military action. But there was virtually no available evidence when such action might be launched, and even those who believed that the coming offensive was a high probability were somewhat perplexed by the delay and were unable to adduce any conclusive indications of when the attack would occur. As is well known, tactical surprise was indeed achieved.

Even in retrospect, we cannot be sure whether the Chinese delayed their intervention and their subsequent offensive because of political indecision, the need for more time to complete their military preparations, or as a tactical device to entrap as many UN forces as possible near the Yalu. I believe that military rather than political factors probably delayed the initial intervention and that both preparedness and tactical considerations accounted for the delay in the offensive, but I cannot prove it. Others may argue -- and they cannot be proved wrong -- that the Chinese may not have decided inevitably on intervention by 3 October, and/or that negotiations with the USSR and North Korea may have delayed the intervention as much as military factors.

- The Arab-Israeli Six-Day War, June 1967: There were many indications of the coming of this conflict. From 22 May, when Nasser closed the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping, tensions had been mounting, and the possibility of war was universally recognized. Both sides had mobilized and taken numerous other military preparedness measures. Before 1 June US intelligence was on record that Israel was capable and ready to launch a preemptive and successful attack with little or no warning, and that there was no indication that the UAR was planning to take the military initiative.

Inasmuch as the Israeli attacks on the morning of 5 June, and particularly the decisively effective air strikes, have often been heralded as one of the most brilliant examples of tactical surprise in this century, one may reasonably ask who was surprised, and why and in what way? The answer to the who is that the Arabs were surprised, although we were not. US intelligence predictions of the likelihood and probable success of an Israeli assault were highly accurate, although the precise timing and tactics of the operation, of course, were not known to us.

The Israelis screened their plans from the Arabs by a combination of rigid security (there was no leak of their decisions or final military preparations) and an exceptionally well-planned and effective deception campaign. There were several facets of the deception plan, one of which was to lead Egypt to believe that the attack, if it occurred, would be in the southern Sinai rather than the north. In addition, numerous measures were taken in the several days

prior to the attack to create the impression that attack was not imminent. These included public statements by newly appointed Defense Minister Moshe Dayan that Israel would rely on diplomacy for the present, the issuance of leave to several thousand Israeli soldiers over the weekend of 3-4 June, public announcements that concurrent Israeli cabinet meetings were concerned only with routine matters, and so forth. In addition, the attack was planned for an hour of the morning when most Egyptian officials would be on their way to work and when the chief of the Egyptian Air Force usually took his daily morning flight.[1]

The greatest surprise in the Israeli operations was not their occurrence, however, or even their timing, but their devastating effectiveness in virtually wiping out the Egyptian Air Force on the ground. And this success in turn was due on the one hand to the excellent planning of the operation and its meticulous execution by the Israeli pilots, and on the other to the ineptitude of the Egyptian military leadership in having failed to prepare for the possibility of such a strike or to have dispersed or otherwise protected at least a portion of the air force. (It is of interest to note that the USSR, which was providing at least some intelligence assistance to Nasser, was seemingly as surprised as Egypt. One result of this was that the USSR soon began to adopt measures to reduce the vulnerability of its own air forces to surprise attack, including the widespread construction of individual hangarettes to protect aircraft.)

[1] A great deal of material on the Israeli planning has been brought to light, much of it unclassified. An excellent, unclassified summary of the techniques of deception and tactical surprise has been prepared by the Syracuse University Research Corporation, Syracuse, New York.

- The invasion of Czechoslovakia, 20-21 August 1968: In the previous chapter we examined the series of Soviet decisions leading up to the invasion and the problems of determining just what decisions were taken, and when. Obviously, our perception of the USSR's decision-making process in this case has major bearing on our understanding of why the attack occurred when it did, rather than sooner or later. And, since our knowledge of the decisions of the Soviet leadership although considerable is still incomplete, we must also remain somewhat uncertain as to why the invasion occurred on 20 August rather than some time earlier that month, or alternatively why the USSR did not wait to see the outcome of the Czechoslovak party congress scheduled for early September, as many people believed that it would.

Regardless of one's views on this point, however, the invasion of Czechoslovakia illustrates some of the pitfalls of trying to assess the timing of military operations. First, we are not sure in retrospect whether the USSR was fully ready to invade on about 1 August when the deployments appeared largely completed and US intelligence concluded that Soviet forces were in a high state of readiness to invade. We do know that logistic activity continued at a high level thereafter (see Chapter 16) and that the conclusion of the so-called rear services "exercise" was not announced until 10 August. Thereafter, other military preparations were continuing, including inspections of forces in the forward area by the high command, which the meticulous Soviet military planners may well have desired to complete before any invasion. Indeed it is possible, on military

evidence alone (the political evidence is less persuasive), to argue that the invasion was always scheduled by the military for 20 August, and that it was we who were wrong in our assessment that the military forces were in high readiness to go on 1 August.

It can also be argued that military factors may have prompted the invasion somewhat earlier than the political leadership might have chosen and that it was this which occasioned the leadership meetings and final decisions on 16-17 August. If so, the approaching autumn and the problem of housing Soviet forces in Czechoslovakia into the winter might have been a major factor in determining the timing of invasion.

More important, however, are the lessons to be drawn for our judgments in the future concerning the timing of operations. The Czechoslovak case well demonstrates the psychological effects on intelligence assessments when an operation does not occur as soon as we think it might, and when the community is most ready for such action. When the Soviet Union did not invade in early August but instead reached a tenuous political agreement with Czechoslovakia, a letdown occurred and intelligence assessments almost immediately began placing less stress on the Soviet capability to invade. In fact, of course, that capability was being maintained and actually was increasing. So long as this was so, the possibility was in no way reduced that the USSR sooner or later would exercise its military capability.

Above all, the Czechoslovak case provides an outstanding illustration of the critical importance for warning of the judgment of probability of attack and of the lesser likelihood that intelligence will be able to assess the timing or imminence of attack. US intelligence in this instance, as in others, placed too great weight on short-term or tactical warning, and too little on the excellent strategic intelligence which it already had. Moreover, many persons (including some at the policy level who were aggrieved that they had not been more specifically warned) tended to place the blame on the collection system which in fact had performed outstandingly in reporting a truly impressive amount of military and political evidence, much of it of high quality and validity, bearing on the Soviet intention. The intelligence community, while clearly reporting the USSR's capability to invade, deferred a judgment of whether or not it would invade in seeming expectation that some more specific or unequivocal evidence would be received if invasion was imminent. On the basis of historical precedent and the experience derived from numerous warning problems, this was a doubtful expectation; an invasion remained a grave danger, if not probable, so long as the military deployments were maintained, while the timing was far less predictable. The history of warfare, and of warning, demonstrates that tactical evidence of impending attack is dubious at best, that we cannot have confidence that we will receive such evidence, and that judgments of the probable course of enemy action must be made prior to this or it may be too late to make them at all.

- North Vietnamese attacks in Laos and South Vietnam, 1969-70, 1971-72: As a final example of problems in timing, three instances of North Vietnamese attacks in Laos and South Vietnam provide quite striking evidence of the problems of assessing timing of attacks even when the preparatory steps are quite evident.

Traditionally, in the seesaw war in northern Laos, the Laotian government forces made gains in the Plaine des Jarres area during the rainy season, and the Communist forces (almost entirely North Vietnamese invaders) launched offensives during the dry season (November to May) to regain most of the lost territory and sometimes more. In the fall of 1969, evidence began to be received unusually early of North Vietnamese troop movements toward the Plaine des Jarres, including major elements of a division which had not previously been committed in the area. As a result, intelligence assessments beginning the first week of October unequivocally forecast a major Communist counteroffensive. After eight consecutive weeks of this conclusion (qualified in later weeks by the proviso "when the Communists have solved their logistic problems"), it was decided to drop it -- not because it was considered wrong, but because consumers were beginning to question repeated forecasts of an enemy offensive which had not materialized yet, and the impact of the warning was beginning to fade. In mid-January, evidence began to become available that preparations for an attack were being intensified, and a forecast of an impending major offensive was renewed. The long-expected offensive finally came off in mid-February, or four months after the troop buildup

and the initial prediction of the attacks. The delay was not a surprise to experienced students of the area, who had learned that the North Vietnamese meticulously plan and rehearse in detail each offensive operation and that their attacks almost always were slow in coming.

Two years later in the fall of 1971, a very similar repetition of the North Vietnamese buildup in northern Laos began, again in October and again involving the same division, although this time there were indications (such as the introduction of heavy artillery) that an even stronger military effort would be made. Intelligence assessments again forecast major North Vietnamese attacks in the Plaine des Jarres but for the most part avoided any firm judgment that they were necessarily imminent. There was almost no tactical warning of the attacks which this time were launched in mid-December in unprecedented strength and intensity. Within a few days, all Laotian government forces were driven from the Plaine, and within three weeks thereafter, the North Vietnamese launched an offensive against government bases southwest of the Plaine.

Concurrently, the North Vietnamese were preparing for their major offensive against South Vietnam which finally kicked off on 30 March 1972 after months of buildup and intelligence predictions that an offensive was coming. Initial expectations, however, had been that the attacks most likely would come some time after mid-February, possibly to coincide with President Nixon's visit to China later that month. Once again, timing proved one of the most uncertain aspects of the offensive, and we remain uncertain whether Hanoi originally intended to launch the attacks

earlier and was unable to meet its schedule, or never intended the operation to come off until the end of March. In retrospect, it appears that the forecasts of another "Tet offensive" in mid-February probably were somewhat premature, since the deployments of main force units and other preparations continued through March. Nonetheless, the intelligence forecasts were essentially right, and it could have been dangerous in February to suggest that the attacks would not come off for another six weeks.

Growing Recognition that Warning is Not a Forecast of Imminence

It is from experiences like these (which are truly representative and not selected as unusual cases) that veteran warning analysts have become extremely chary of forecasting the timing of attacks. They have learned from repeated instances, in some of which the timing of operations appeared quite a simple or obvious problem, that this was not the case. In most instances, attacks have come later and sometimes much later than one might have expected, but even this cannot be depended on -- sometimes they have come sooner. But except in rare cases any forecast of the precise timing of attack carries a high probability of being wrong. There are just too many unpredictable factors -- military and political -- which may influence the enemy's decision on the timing and a multitude of ways in which he may deceive you when he has decided.

This experience has finally borne fruit at the national estimative level. The last estimate to address possible warning of Soviet attack in Europe reversed the previous estimate (cited on the first page of this chapter) that warning of probable attack could not be given until a few hours before. It concluded instead

that, once deployments and other military preparations had been largely completed, the chance of obtaining evidence of further military preparations would be greatly reduced, and that final warning that attack was imminent could likely be dependent largely on chance or other unpredictable factors.

The lesson is clear. Both the analyst and his supervisor should keep their attention focused on the key problem of whether the enemy is in fact preparing to attack at all -- a judgment which they have a good and sometimes excellent chance of making with accuracy. Judgments often can be made, with less confidence in most cases, that all necessary preparations have probably been completed. A little less confidence still should be placed in forecasts as to when in the future all necessary preparations may be completed. At the bottom, and least reliable of all, will be the prediction of when the adversary may plan to strike. As a general rule, analysts will do well to avoid predictions of when precisely an attack may occur, particularly when some preparedness measures have not yet been completed. If pressed, it will normally be best to offer some time range within which the attack appears most likely, rather than attempt too specific a guess (for that is what it is). And some explanation of the uncertainties and perils of forecasting dates, backed up by historical evidence, may be helpful from time to time for the benefit of the policy maker as well.

Some official papers notwithstanding, strategic warning is not a forecast of imminent attack. Strategic warning is a forecast of probable attack and it is

this above all which the policy official and commander need to know. If we recognize the uncertainties of timing, we will also be less likely to relax our vigilance or alerts because the enemy has not yet attacked even though he is seemingly ready.

PART VI: SOME MAJOR ANALYTICAL PROBLEMS

CHAPTER 29: DECEPTION: CAN WE COPE WITH IT?

CHAPTER 29: DECEPTION: CAN WE COPE WITH IT?

> Stratagematic security is absolute, if the deception operation succeeds in anticipating the preconceptions of the victim and playing upon them. In that case the victim becomes the unwitting agent of his own surprise, and no amount of warning (i.e. security leaks) will suffice to reverse his fatally false expectations.[1]

Confidence that a study of history and of techniques and principles of indications analysis will enable us to come to the right judgment of the enemy's intentions fades as one contemplates the chilling prospect of deception. There is no single facet of the warning problem so unpredictable, and yet so potentially damaging in its effect, as deception. Nor is confidence in our ability to penetrate the sophisticated deception effort in any way restored by a diligent study of examples. On the contrary, such a study will only reinforce a conclusion that the most brilliant analysis may founder in the face of deception and that the most expert and experienced among us on occasion may be as vulnerable as the novice.

The Infrequency -- and Neglect -- of Deception

There can be no question that deception is one of the least understood, least researched and least studied aspects of the warning problem. It has, in

---

[1] Barton Whaley, Stratagem: Deception and Surprise in War (MIT Center for International Studies, April 1969), p. 225. This work will be published by Praeger in 1973. I wish to express my indebtedness to Mr. Whaley for many of the principles and examples cited in this chapter. This work is one of the few existing analytic studies on the nature of deception, and also contains a wealth of examples and case studies which will be a real eye-opener to any student of indications and of warfare. It is essential reading for all warning analysts.

fact, been almost totally neglected in the training of US intelligence analysts and, even in its tactical applications, receives only scant attention in US military schools, or so I am told by those who have attended them. It is a measure of the inattention to the subject that so much of Whaley's research on the topic really broke new ground, and that some military historians have never even perceived the role which deception has played in the outcome of some major military operations.[1] When one considers the potential effects of deception on the conduct of warfare, intelligence analysis and the national decision-making process, this neglect of so important a problem becomes almost unbelievable.

One reason for the scant attention to deception almost certainly is its rarity. If true warning problems are seldom encountered, useful examples of deception are rarer still, and indeed a number of major crises of recent years seemingly have involved relatively little if any deception. A second, and related, factor is that the deception effort is likely to be the most secret and tightly held aspect of any operation and that nations often have been reluctant, even after the fact, to relax security on the deception plan, even when other aspects of the operation are fairly well known. Not surprisingly, this has been particularly true of our security-conscious enemies. The exceptions, in which the deception operation has been recorded for our benefit and study, usually have been the result of the publication of articles or memoirs by participants in the plan,

[1] Whaley claims, for example, that even analysts of that most studied of surprise attacks, Pearl Harbor, in nearly all cases have failed to give adequate attention to the Japanese deception effort as a contributing cause to the US failure to have recognized the likelihood of the attack.

or the declassification of operational war records, usually well after the event. Thus Whaley's examples from World Wars I and II appear quite complete and reliable. In more recent cases, his unclassified data not surprisingly are quite incomplete and may even be misleading.

Deception tends to be forgotten and neglected between wars because it is not an instrument of peace. Few if any nations have made a practice of extensive or elaborate deception in time of peace, and this includes even Communist nations which we have characteristically considered to be highly devious by nature and masters of deceit and surprise. One reason that active deception is reserved for the exceptional situation -- usually one in which national security interests are at stake -- is that success in deception is heavily dependent on its rarity and on the prior establishment of credibility. Any nation which constantly or even frequently disseminates falsehoods would rapidly lose credibility and acceptance with other nations, and with its own populace. It is one thing to be highly security conscious and not to reveal much, and quite another to engage in an active deception effort to mislead. The most effective deceptions are by those whom we have come to trust, or at least who have been relatively truthful in their dealings with us over a period of years. Thus the true deception operation, at least a major and sophisticated one, usually is reserved only for that critical situation in the life of the nation when it is most essential to conceal one's intent. And this will usually be in preparation for or in time of war.

Deception versus Self-Deception

Still another reason for our limited understanding of deception is the interrelation of, and even confusion between, deception and self-deception. Anyone

who thinks that the distinction between the two is, or ought to be, clear doesn't, as they say, understand the problem. The writer participated in a post-mortem study of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in which the analysts, drawn from the intelligence shops of several agencies, were utterly unable to agree among themselves on whether the Soviet Union had or had not engaged in deception, on whether it expected us to be deceived or not, and whether we had been the victims of self-deception. And this, of course, was in retrospect. Still less was the problem analyzed or even perceived to be a problem before the invasion. Did a majority of analysts fail to perceive the likelihood of invasion because the USSR took positive steps to deceive or mislead us, or was it only our own misconceptions of Soviet national priorities and unwillingness to accept that the Soviet Union would do such a thing, despite the evidence at hand? Space will not permit a discussion here of this fascinating and still unresolved problem. It is my own opinion that both contributed, but that we were probably more the victims of self-deception than of active Soviet deception.

The fact is that the most successful of all deception plans and operations are those which capitalize on and actively encourage the enemy to believe his own preconceptions -- as Whaley notes in the quotation which opens this chapter. A similar point has also been made in an earlier section of this handbook (Chapter 10). There, it was noted that studies have shown that people do not perceive all new information objectively and that their preconceptions will sometimes lead them to ignore or reject entirely information which is inconsistent with their already formed opinions. Thus a relatively simple and unsophisticated -- even obvious -- deception

effort may be highly effective in these circumstances in deluding the victim. And, even in retrospect, he may be unable to perceive that he was deceived by his own preconceptions as much as, or even more than, by the enemy's deception plan. With this cautionary reminder, we will proceed to examine some of the principles and techniques of active deception plans -- again drawing heavily on Whaley.

Principles, Techniques and Effectiveness of Deception

The principle of deception, most simply stated, is to induce the enemy to make the wrong choice; or, as General Sherman put it, the trick is to place the victim on the horns of a dilemma and then to impale him on the one of your choosing. If this is left entirely to chance, the probability of the enemy's making the right or wrong choice will be in direct ratio to the number of alternatives which he perceives as equally viable. While surprise can result from sheer misunderstanding, "the possibility of surprise through misunderstanding diminishes nearly to the vanishing point as one considers the more elaborate strategic operations."[1] Therefore, the planner must develop one or more plausible alternatives as bait for his victim and then employ a range of stratagems to mislead him. "The ultimate goal of stratagem is to make the enemy quite certain, very decisive and wrong."[2] If this ideal cannot be achieved (and this writer believes that it would be a rare situation in which such total deception could be achieved), the mere presenting of alternative solutions nonetheless will serve to confuse the enemy and lead him to disperse his effort or to make at least a partially wrong response:

1 Whaley, op.cit, pp. 131-33.
2 Ibid, p. 135.

> "In other words, the best stratagem is the one that generates a set of warning signals susceptible to alternative, or better yet, optional interpretations, where the intended solution is implausible in terms of the victim's prior experience and knowledge while the false solution (or solutions) is plausible. If the victim does not suspect the possibility that deception may be operating he will inevitably be gulled. If he suspects deception, he has only four courses open to him:"

These are, in summary:

1. To act as if no deception is being used.
2. To give equal weight to all perceived solutions (in violation of the principle of economy of force).
3. To engage in random behavior, risking success or failure on blind guesswork.
4. To panic, which paradoxically may offer as good a chance of success as the "rational" course in 3.[1]

Thus, even a primitive deception effort will, by threatening various alternatives, create enough uncertainty to distract the most wily opponent and force him either to disperse his effort or gamble on being right. Further, concludes Whaley in a judgment of greatest importance for warning, even the most masterful deceivers have proved to be easy dupes for more primitive efforts. "Indeed, this is a general finding of my study--that is, the deceiver is almost always successful regardless of the sophistication of his victim in the same art. On the face of it, this seems an intolerable conclusion, one offending common sense. Yet it is the irrefutable conclusion of the historical evidence."[2]

A related, and also unexpected, finding of Whaley's study is that only a small repertoire of stratagems is necessary "to insure surprise after surprise." The

1 Ibid, pp. 142-43.
2 Ibid, p. 146.

fact that the victim may be familiar with specific ruses "does not necessarily reduce much less destroy their efficacy. This can be predicted from the theory, which postulates that it is the misdirection supplied by selective planting of false signals that yields surprise and not the specific communications channels (i.e., ruses) used."[1] In other words, the same tricks can be used over and over again, and stratagem can be effective with only a small number of basic ruses or scenarios.

Whaley goes on to note that, as between security and deception, deception is by far the more effective in achieving surprise, although both may contribute and usually do. Security will also be greatly served by a deception operation since the only important security in this case will be the protection of the deception plan itself, which usually needs to be revealed only to a very small number of individuals. If the security on the deception plan is tight enough, security on the rest of the operation can be outright sloven, and "the most efficient stratagems calculatedly utilize known inefficiencies in general operational security."[2]

Whaley cites some examples of the extreme security maintained on deception plans, which the warning analyst should well heed, since it will upset all accepted theory that enemy plans may be learned from full confessions of high-ranking prisoners or defectors, or from interception of valid communications, authentic war plans, etc. Thus, in preparation for the Pearl Harbor attack, the Japanese Navy issued a war plan on 5 November which gave full and accurate details of the planned

1 Ibid, p. 228.
2 Ibid, p. 244.

attacks on the Philippines and Southeast Asia but which omitted any reference to the Pearl Harbor missions of the Navy, this portion of the order having been communicated only verbally. In the Suez attack in 1956, the entire British military staff from the Allied CinC on down were not informed on the collusion of the UK and France with Israel, so tightly was this held. In the Korean war, the US planned an amphibious feint (the so-called Kojo feint) which only the most senior commanders knew to be a bluff; even the planners and commanders of the naval bombardment and carrier strike forces thought the operation was real and behaved accordingly. Thus, the misleading of one's own people has been an important feature in many deceptions, with the unwitting participants in the plan convincingly carrying out their roles in good faith and thus contributing materially to the success of the operation. So effective has security been on deception operations, that Whaley concludes that there have been almost no cases in which the deception plan itself was prematurely disclosed to the victim.

Types of Deception

This subject may be approached in a number of ways. Whaley identifies five specific varieties of military deception as follows:

Intention (i.e., whether an attack or operation will occur at all)

Time

Place

Strength

Style (i.e., the form the operation takes, weapons used, etc.)[1]

[1] Ibid, pp. 210-12.

For strategic warning, the subject of this book, it will be obvious that the first of these (intention) is the most important. Indeed, some might say that this is the only variety of deception which should properly be defined as strategic, the other types above being essentially tactical problems. In fact, however, strategic warning or the perception of the enemy's intention often does fall victim to one or more of the other foregoing varieties of deception as well. Thus, in the Tet offensive of 1968, we were less the victims of misperception of the enemy's intention as such (it was obvious that attacks of some type and scope were in preparation) than of the other factors. We greatly underestimated the strength of the attacks; we were astounded at some of the places (particularly cities) in which the attacks occurred; we misperceived the style of the offensive in some degree (i.e., the extent of covert infiltration of saboteurs and troop units, again particularly into the major cities); and there was something of a misestimate of the timing of the attacks in that it was generally assumed that they would be launched before or after the holidays rather than during them (a factor which accounted for so many South Vietnamese troops being on leave and for the lax security). Thus, it was all these misperceptions of the enemy's planning and intentions which contributed to the surprise -- and initial success -- of the Tet offensive. We were the victims of a combination of effective security, enemy deception and self-deception.

The history of warfare is filled with examples of the achievement of surprise in time, place or strength, or a combination of them. Whaley finds

that, of the examples which he studied in which surprise was achieved, the most common mode was place (72%), followed by time (66%), and strength (57%). The least frequent type of surprise which Whaley found was style, which prevailed in 25% of the cases he analyzed.[1] There are nonetheless some very famous examples, including the dropping of the first atomic weapon on Hiroshima, and the introduction of Soviet strategic missiles into Cuba.

We may close this very inadequate discussion of this approach to types of surprise and deception by observing that one of the greatest and most successful military surprises in history, the Pearl Harbor attack, involved at least four of these modes. The United States had not correctly perceived the Japanese intention to attack US territory at all and thus to bring the US into the war -- a step which logically appeared to be a gross strategic miscalculation, as indeed it was. The place of attack was not perceived, since the great bulk of the evidence pointed to Japanese attacks in Southeast Asia (which were in fact initiated almost simultaneously). The time of the attack contributed greatly to its success, Sunday morning having been deliberately chosen because the bulk of the US warships would then normally be in port. The strength of the attack of course was not anticipated (since it was not expected at all where it occurred), security and deception having effectively screened the movements of the Japanese task force.

A second approach to types of surprise and deception, which is somewhat broader and perhaps more pertinent to strategic warning, is to examine the various methods or measures which may be used to achieve one or more of the foregoing types

[1] Ibid, p. 214.

of surprise. We may identify roughly five of these:

Security

Political deception

Cover

Active military deception

Confusion and disinformation

a. Security in itself is not strictly speaking a type of deception, in that it involves no active measures to mislead the adversary to a false conclusion, but is designed only to conceal preparations for attack. Thus the sophisticated analyst should take care to distinguish normal or routine security measures from true deception. Nonetheless, the line between deception and security is narrow, and the two are very often confused. Moreover, an effective security program often can do much to mislead or deceive the intended victim of attack even if no more sophisticated measures are undertaken. Although security alone will not normally lead the adversary to undertake the wrong preparations or to misdeploy his forces, it may lead him to undertake very inadequate countermeasures or even to fail to alert his forces at all, if security is totally effective.

The Communist nations which have been our principal adversaries since World War II are, of course, proponents of the most rigid military and political security. Even the most minor and seemingly unimportant military facts are routinely considered state secrets, and all sorts of data which are revealed in the press of democratic nations are never published in Communist states -- for example, the

true unit designations of military units, along with their locations, strengths, equipment, and usually their commanders as well. This routine security, which may seem ridiculous in peacetime, insures that similar security will also prevail when units are mobilizing or deploying for war and makes it unnecessary to impose many new security measures which in themselves might serve to alert the adversary to an unusual situation.

Political security in closed or dictatorial societies may be even more effective. The number of persons privy to high-level decisions in Communist states is very small indeed, and we have remained in ignorance for months of major political developments or decisions in such countries. Needless to say, political decisions on the initiation of hostilities or other major military preparations are among the most rigidly restricted. We have earlier (in Chapter 10) cited the introduction of Soviet missiles into Cuba and the closure of the Berlin sector borders as two examples of the effectiveness of Soviet military security. More generally, it may be said that apparently there has never, at least since World War II, been an inadvertent leak of the specific military plans or intentions of a Communist nation. They have sometimes told us, or virtually so, what they planned to do, but there has never been a breach of security concerning such a decision, unless it was communicated to third parties. It follows that it will be most unlikely that we will be able to learn directly of such plans in the future.

Effective as such measures may be, however, there is a limit to what can be concealed by security alone, and our potential enemies know this as well.

In general, the greater the number of military measures which must be undertaken for the operation, the larger the mobilization and deployment of forces required, the less likely it is that security alone can mislead. Whaley cites the views of Clausewitz that the high visibility of large-scale operations makes their concealment unlikely, and that true surprise is therefore more likely to be achieved in the realm of tactics than in strategy. This in fact has been borne out in recent examples. Although it was possible in large measure to conceal the military deployments required for the closure of the Berlin sector borders, it was not possible to conceal those for the invasion of Czechoslovakia, and in fact the USSR made no particularly great effort to do so. Some writers have argued that modern collection systems and communications will make security measures even less effective in the future -- and this would appear likely to be the case. Thus, the prospects are that various forms of active or deliberate deception will assume even more importance if surprise is to be achieved.

b. Preeminent among such methods is political deception -- probably the easiest of all deception measures and possibly the most common. While political means may be used to promote tactical surprise, this method is of particular value as a strategic measure to conceal intent. Moreover, it is one of the most economical means of deception and one in which the likelihood of disclosure is remote, since so few people need be involved in the plan. There are a variety of political deception tactics, of which we will note a few:

The direct or indirect falsehood may be put forth through diplomatic channels, official statements, the press or other media. In its simplest and most crude form,

the nation simply denies that it has any intent whatever of doing what it is preparing to do and asserts that all such charges are false -- a method sometimes used, particularly if the stakes are very high. The more subtle method of the indirect falsehood is often preferred, however, and permits the leadership to maintain some degree of credibility after the event, or at least to deny charges of outright prevarication. This tactic was used by the USSR in a number of its public statements prior to the Cuban missile crisis -- for example in the celebrated TASS statement of 11 September 1962 in which the USSR stated that all weapons being sent to Cuba were "designed exclusively for defensive purposes," and that there was "no need" for the USSR to deploy its missiles to any other country.

Another method of political deception which has often been used, particularly to lull suspicions in the relatively short term as final preparations for the attack are being made, is to offer to enter into "negotiations" to discuss the matter at issue when in fact there is no intention of reaching any sort of agreement. This tactic was used by the USSR on the eve of the counterattack to suppress the Hungarian revolt in November 1956, when Soviet officers opened negotiations with the Hungarians on Soviet "troop withdrawal." A form of this ruse was also used by the North Koreans for about two weeks before the attack on South Korea in June 1950 when they issued "peace proposals" calling for a single national election.

Whaley has identified a slightly different form of this deception tactic, which is to lead the enemy to believe that the firm decision to attack is actually bluff. "This is a fairly common type of ruse, one intended to restore the initiative and insure

surprise by implying that options other than war are still open, thereby concealing the full urgency of a crisis and encouraging the intended victim in the belief that he has more time and more options than is, in fact, the case."[1] He notes that this ruse was used at Port Arthur in 1904, at Pearl Harbor, in the German attack on the USSR in 1941, by the British in the attack at Alamein in 1942, and in the Israeli attack on Egypt in 1967.

A somewhat similar and relatively subtle form of political deception is to downplay the seriousness of the situation in diplomacy and in public statements in an effort to create the impression that the nation does not consider its vital interests at stake, or that its relations with the intended victim are pretty good or even improving. This may result in a quite sudden shift in propaganda to a more conciliatory tone, and friendly gestures to the adversary, after the decision or at least contingency decision to attack has already been reached. This is a quite common tactic, and one in which dictatorships, including the Soviet Union, are usually masters, particularly since their complete control of the press makes a shift in the propaganda line so easy. The USSR employed this tactic for weeks and even months prior to its attack on Japanese forces in Manchuria in August 1945, when it undertook an ostensible easing of tensions with Japan and began to be "almost cordial" to the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow, while the buildup of forces for the attack was under way in the Far East.

The effort to deceive by political means will often entail not only the deception of many of one's own people, but may extend on occasion even to the leadership

[1] Whaley, op.cit, p. A-548.

of allied nations, if the issue is of sufficient importance. And true practitioners of the art of deception even have been known to deceive their superiors (by failing to inform them of their plans) -- although clearly this is a risky business undertaken only in the interests of tactical surprise for a specific military operation when war already is in progress.

c. Cover (here meaning the "cover plan" or "cover story") is a form of military deception which should be distinguished from active military deception, although it may often be used in conjunction with it. Cover will be used when it may be presumed that the military buildup itself cannot be concealed from the enemy, and its purpose therefore is to offer some seemingly plausible explanation (other than planned aggression) for the observable military activity. It may involve simply the putting out of false statements about the scale or purpose of the military buildup in order to conceal the real intention by attributing the military preparations to something else. Throughout history, the most usual explanation offered has been that the troops are "on maneuvers," although it is possible to think of other pretexts which might sometimes be used to explain troop movements, such as an alleged civil disturbance or disaster in a border area. The likelihood that the pretext of maneuvers would be used by the USSR to mask preparations for aggression has long been recognized by Western intelligence, and the USSR and its Warsaw Pact allies have also professed to believe that NATO exercises could serve as a cover for attack.

Despite the presumed acceptance of this principle, however, the USSR achieved at least partial success with its several announcements during July and

August of 1968 that its troops were engaged in various "exercises" in the western USSR and Eastern Europe. In fact, there were no bona fide exercises and the sole activity under way was the mobilization and deployment of Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces for the invasion of Czechoslovakia. The gullibility of many analysts in swallowing, at least partially, these transparently obvious "explanations" may be attributed to various factors -- among them a lack of education or experience in deception and a failure to recognize the true objective of the buildup. The USSR, in turn, had probably laid the groundwork for this gullibility by its practice, during previous years, of issuing valid public announcements concerning a series of Warsaw Pact and Soviet exercises. Thus analysts had become accustomed to accepting such announcements -- which had never proved false in their experience -- and were conditioned to do so even when the circumstances should have alerted them to the likelihood of deception. This conditioning, interestingly enough, even extended to some studies written after the invasion which persisted in referring to the "exercises" as if they had really occurred.

d. Active military deception is at once the most difficult form of deception to carry out, at least on any large scale, and also one of the most effective and successful. If security and political deception measures are most effective in lulling suspicions as to intent, active military deception is the primary means whereby the adversary is led to misdeploy his forces and to prepare for an attack at the wrong place and the wrong time. Even when strategic deception has failed, or was never possible in the first place, positive military deception has proved enormously

effective in achieving tactical surprise, and hence in gaining victory and/or greatly reducing the attacker's casualties in the operation. Whaley in his treatise has compiled some impressive statistics on the effectiveness and rewards of positive deception operations, some of which have been so valuable and successful as literally to affect the course of history (e.g., the Normandy invasion which is discussed in greater detail later in this chapter).

The successful military deception operation may range from a relatively simple hoax or feint to a highly complex series of interrelated and mutually consistent measures all designed to create the wrong impression in the mind of the enemy (or to support his original but false conceptions) as to timing, nature, strength and place of the attack. Among the recognized techniques of active military deception are:

- Camouflage of military movements and of new military installations
- Maintenance of dummy equipment at vacated installations or in areas of the front where the attack is not to occur
- The simulation of a great deal of activity using only a few pieces of military equipment moving about
- The use of noisemakers or recordings to simulate a lot of activity
- The planting of seemingly valid, but actually false, military orders in the hands of the enemy
- The sending out of "defectors" with seemingly plausible but false stories
- The use of doubled agents for the same purpose
- The sending of invalid military messages by radio in the clear or in ciphers which the enemy is known to be reading

- The maintenance of normal garrison communications while the units themselves deploy under radio silence

- The establishment of entirely spurious radio nets to simulate the presence of forces which do not exist at all or to convey an impression of a buildup of forces in some area other than the planned attack

- A concentration of reconnaissance, bombing or artillery fire in an area other than the area of attack, or at least the equalization of such activity over a wide area so that the actual area of attack is not discernible from such preparatory measures

- False announcements or other deception as to the whereabouts of leading commanders

- Obvious training exercises for a type of attack (such as amphibious) which is not planned

- False designations for military units

- Actual deployments or feints by ground or naval units to simulate attack in the wrong area

- The use of enemy uniforms and other insignia

- Announcements that leaves are being granted on the eve of attack, or even the actual issuance of numerous passes for a day or so just prior to attack

The above list does not exhaust the tricks and ruses which have been devised and successfully used in military operations. Such active deception measures of course are often supplemented by political and propaganda deception measures, cover stories and extremely tight security on the real military operation. Thus the effect of the measures collectively can be the total misleading of the enemy as to the coming attack -- even sometimes when he has accepted its likelihood and indeed may be well prepared for it in other respects. The reader is referred to some of the

fascinating examples cited by Whaley and to other studies of specific deception operations.

It is obvious that a number of ruses cited above would be of limited use, and indeed could be counterproductive, in a strategic deception designed to conceal that an attack is planned at all, or in any area. In such cases, one does not wish to stir up a lot of military activity, or plant false documents about impending attacks, which will only arouse suspicions and stir the enemy's intelligence services into greater collection efforts. Some measures, such as bombing and artillery fire or even highly obvious and unusual reconnaissance, cannot be undertaken at all before hostilities have begun. For these reasons, some of the time-honored devices of military deception would not be used prior to an initial surprise attack which opens a war, the attack with which strategic warning is particularly concerned. At the same time, the reader can easily see that a substantial number of the tactics cited above could be most effectively applied to deceive us in a period prior to the initial attack. Among the ruses which should particularly concern us are: communications deception, especially the maintenance of normal communications accompanied by radio silence on deployments; planted military orders and other documents; the use of false defectors and doubled agents; and any of the other measures which might be used effectively to distract us from concentrating on the preparations for the real attack. For we may be reasonably certain that the greater and more important the operation, the greater and more sophisticated will be the positive deception effort. The fact that we have

encountered relatively few cases of active military deception since World War II should not reassure us -- in fact, it only increases our vulnerability.

e. Confusion and disinformation probably rank second only to political deception in the ease with which they can be used to mislead and distract the opposition. Indeed, of all types of deception with which this writer has any personal experience, this tactic has proved the most effective -- although this is not to say that this would necessarily be true in the future. Confusion and disinformation tactics do not have to be highly sophisticated to be successful, although of course they may be. Even an elementary program to flood the market with a mass of conflicting stories and reports can be highly effective in distracting the time and attention of analysts -- and their superiors -- from the reliable, hard intelligence on which they should be concentrating their efforts. Particularly if a crisis atmosphere already exists, as is highly likely, and some of the reports are sensational but have some degree of plausibility, they can prove to be a tremendous distraction. If the volume of such planted information is large enough, the analytical system can literally be overwhelmed to a degree that some important and valid facts become lost in the mill, and others are not accorded their proper weight. There is almost no end to the damage which this type of deception can do in a crisis situation. Moreover, such a mass of material compounds immeasurably the problem of analyst fatigue, always a factor in crisis situations, and may tend to generate a series of "cry wolf" alarms which will reduce the credibility of the authentic warning when or if it is received.

The most conspicuous example in recent years of the damage that can be done by a large volume of false or unevaluated information was in the Chinese Communist intervention in Korea in October-November 1950. This is not to say that the Chinese themselves necessarily had devised a sophisticated or extensive disinformation program. It is probable that a high percentage of the mass of spurious and contradictory reports which so confused the situation and distracted the analysts that summer and fall was never planted by the Communists at all but was rather the product of the several highly productive paper mills in the Far East. The result was much the same, however, and in fact the confusion may have been compounded by our inability to tell with certainty whether a report might have been a Communist plant rather than a spurious report manufactured by some information network which had no contacts whatever in mainland China. Most of those who have examined the intelligence failure that year have given altogether too little, if indeed any, attention to the adverse effects of the volume of this spurious material on the analytical process. Regardless of the origins of the material in this case, something of the same problem could surely arise again in another crisis should our adversaries choose to exercise their full capabilities to employ such tactics.

Deception in the Normandy Invasion

"In wartime," said Winston Churchill, "truth is so precious that she should always be attended by a bodyguard of lies." The remark was made at the Teheran conference in November 1943 where the Allies began the planning for the international deception operation which was to confound the Germans in the greatest

single military operation in history, the Normandy invasion (6 June 1944). Appropriately, the codename for the international deception plan was BODYGUARD. The complex series of stratagems specifically designed to mislead the Germans concerning the invasion of France carried a half dozen or more codenames. Of these the most important was FORTITUDE, the deception plan for the Normandy landings, which in turn carried the operational codename of OVERLORD.

Since the space limitations for this handbook will not permit an examination in detail of the specific tactics of various deception operations, we have selected the Normandy invasion and its accompanying and follow-on deception operations to give the reader some insight into how deception is planned and implemented and how effective it can be.[1]

[1] When the initial draft of this chapter was prepared, information on the deception operations was available only in fragmentary and incomplete form from a number of general works on the invasion. Since that time, two books have appeared dealing exclusively with the deception plans, particularly with the British use of doubled Nazi agents to plant false information with the Germans. These two fascinating books are:

- J. C. Masterman, The Double-Cross System in the War of 1939 to 1945 (New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1972). This is the authoritative account of the British doubling of the German agents, which was written immediately after the war and declassified by the British (with a few omissions and changes) more than 25 years later.
- Sefton Delmer, The Counterfeit Spy (New York, Harper & Row, 1971). This work, which also appears to be reliable, covers essentially the same material as the Masterman book, concentrating on the work of the outstanding doubled agent but also providing information on other aspects of the deception operations.

Earlier works which discuss the deception operations in less detail include:

- Cornelius Ryan, The Longest Day (New York, Simon and Schuster, 1959).
- Charles B. MacDonald, The Mighty Endeavor (Oxford University Press, 1969).
- Forrest C. Pogue, The Supreme Command (Washington, D.C., Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Military History, 1954).
- Whaley, op. cit.

It was patently impossible to conceal from the Germans that an invasion of the continent was in preparation, and more specifically to conceal the enormous buildup of troops and equipment in the United Kingdom which permitted the Nazis correctly to conclude that the main invasion thrust would be made from the British Isles. The deception operations, therefore, were designed to mislead as to the time, place and strength of the invasion, rather than the intent. The plans succeeded, almost beyond the dreams of their instigators, despite the fact that the operation involved a massive movement of ships and amphibious equipment across up to 100 miles of open water, against an enemy which fully expected the invasion, had made formidable defensive preparations for it, and had an extensive and seemingly effective espionage and intelligence service. How was this surprise achieved?

- Security: Knowledge of the deception plan was restricted to as few persons as possible, with all planning papers under stringent safeguards. From mid-April onward (for approximately two months before the invasion) security measures were tightened to deny the entry of civilians into coastal areas, to prohibit military leaves outside the United Kingdom, to censor mail and news dispatches leaving the UK, and even (over diplomatic protests) to prohibit foreign diplomats from sending or receiving uncensored communications or dispatching couriers. Although there were some famous security slips, apparently the only important leak to the Germans was in Ankara, where the agent known as "Cicero" (the valet to the British Ambassador) learned the codename OVERLORD but not the date or specific area of the invasion.

- Feints and Diversions: Although the Germans were unlikely to conclude

that the main invasion would be made elsewhere than in France, positive deception measures were taken to encourage them to believe that secondary but major thrusts might be made against the continent in other areas -- specifically in Norway and/or the Mediterranean. A variety of means was used to accomplish this, including communications deception and the planting of false information through the doubled Abwehr agents in the United Kingdom and the United States. By these means, the Germans were led to accept a false order of battle in Scotland, largely composed of what the British call "notional" (that is, non-existent) divisions, which seemingly posed an ominous and imminent threat to Norway. To divert attention to the Mediterranean, the British also carried out a celebrated ruse; they sent a British actor to Gibraltar and Algiers shortly prior to D-Day disguised as Marshal Montgomery.

- Confusion and Disinformation: To confuse the enemy, the Allied intelligence services planted a vast amount of false or otherwise misleading information in German hands. Deliberate use was made of the doubled German intelligence agents, and of rumors, in order to spread all kinds of erroneous or confusing information about the date and place of the invasion. Whaley notes that, of over 250 agent reports received by German intelligence prior to D-Day concerning the invasion, only one disclosed the correct time and place -- and even this one had been deliberately planted by Allied intelligence on an Abwehr agent.[1] The officer in charge of radio intercept operations for the German Fifteenth Army on the French

[1] Whaley, op. cit, p. A-373. See discussion below on timing.

coast had, by D-Day, become thoroughly skeptical of German intelligence: "he knew from past experience that Berlin's sources of information were inaccurate ninety per cent of the time. He had a whole file of false reports to prove his point; the Allies seemed to have fed every German agent from Stockholm to Ankara with the 'exact' place and date of the invasion -- and no two of the reports agreed."[1]

In this connection, mention must be made particularly of the tremendously successful British handling of the doubled German agents. The recently published Masterman and Delmer accounts have done much to explain the success of the entire deception effort. These works confirm that the British actually controlled and ran the entire German espionage system in Great Britain throughout the war; that is, the Germans received no information from their "spies" in the United Kingdom other than what the British wished them to receive. The British accomplished this extraordinary feat -- which incidentally could probably only have been done in a small country lacking a land border with the enemy -- by capturing apparently all of the German agents who were introduced into the country, doubling those who could be persuaded actively to cooperate or assigning radio operators of their own to maintain communications with the Germans in other cases. These operations, begun early in the war, were planned from the beginning with a view to using the agents ultimately to participate in the grand deception for the invasion of the continent, and when that time came their contribution clearly was indispensable. Masterman throughout his book constantly reminds us that the doubled agents served

[1] Ryan, op. cit, p. 32.

only as the channel to convey the false information, and that all credit for the deception itself belongs to the deception planners. Nonetheless, the foresight of the British intelligence service in perceiving the future use of these agents and their masterful handling of the individual agents must be rated one of the great intelligence accomplishments of that or any war. So successful was the British effort that those agents who did the most to put over the deception effort were, until the end, the most trusted by the Nazis.

- Timing: It is not altogether clear why the Germans failed so badly to perceive the time of the invasion -- particularly since there is some evidence that the time was compromised, as we shall discuss below. The most important reason, however, seems to have been that they did not believe that the Allies would invade in such poor weather -- which, in fact, did postpone the invasion for 24 hours and almost caused a further delay. It was only because the consequences of a delay could be so disastrous and that the tides and moon (if it broke through) were favorable that Eisenhower reluctantly decided to go through with the invasion as planned. The Germans, however, could not conceive that the Allies would invade in such treacherous conditions. According to Ryan, "All along the chain of German command the continuing bad weather acted like a tranquilizer." German confidence was based in large part on studies of earlier Allied landing operations which showed that they had never been attempted unless the weather was very favorable. "To the methodical German mind there was no deviation from this rule..."[1] -- an interesting manifestation of the principles of

[1] Ibid, pp. 79-80.

preconception and self-deception. A contributing factor also was the fact that the Germans had now been expecting an invasion for months, and as it failed to materialize, a certain degree of skepticism as to the validity of indications of its possible imminence had set in.

These factors, however, cannot fully account for the failure to have paid greater heed to the reported interception of the messages to the French underground that the invasion was imminent. For the Abwehr had obtained information in January that two lines from a Verlaine poem were to be broadcast in the clear on separate nights by the BBC, intermixed with other open code messages to the underground and a large number of meaningless messages. The first line, to be broadcast on the 1st or 15th of the month, would be a general warning that the invasion was coming soon; the second line would mean that the invasion would begin within 48 hours. The first line was picked up on the night of 1 June by monitors of the German Fifteenth Army who immediately understood its significance and promptly informed the German command in the West; this resulted in the alerting of the Fifteenth Army near the Belgian border but not of any other German forces along the coast. The second line, monitored by the Fifteenth Army a few hours before the invasion and again promptly passed on to Field Marshal von Rundstedt's headquarters, also failed to result in the alerting of German forces on the Normandy coast. As Ryan notes, it is a mystery why the intercept of this most crucial message did not lead von Rundstedt's headquarters to alert the whole invasion front from Holland to the Spanish border -- the more so since the Germans claimed after the war that

they had monitored and correctly interpreted no less than 15 BBC messages pertaining to D-Day.[1]

Both Allied deception and good luck apparently accounted for the extraordinary absence of so many German commanders from their headquarters at the time of the invasion. On the morning of 4 June, Marshal ("Desert Fox") Rommel, commander of Army Group B which included the forces in Normandy, left for Berlin to see Hitler and to celebrate his wife's birthday (he almost certainly had learned prior to his departure of the intercept of the first of the Verlaine lines). On the day of the invasion, all senior German commanders in Normandy had assembled, as previously planned, for war games exercises in the city of Rennes in Brittany, and they were thus some time getting back to their units. For various reasons, some other German commanders in France also were away. On the eve of the invasion, the German High Command even "decided to transfer the Luftwaffe's last remaining fighter squadrons in France far out of range of the Normandy beaches. The fliers

[1] Ibid, pp. 31-34 and 96-97. Essentially the same account is also given by Delmer, op. cit., pp. 198-99; both accounts are apparently derived from official German military records. One preeminent intelligence authority who has read this chapter, however, is skeptical that the Allies would ever have permitted the timing of the invasion to have been conveyed in advance to the French underground, given the very high risks of compromise. It is thus possible that there is some flaw in this story, perhaps even that some deception was used to lead higher German authorities to disbelieve the validity of the Verlaine lines. There is no indication that the Allied deception planners themselves believed that the time of the invasion was compromised. In order to maintain the credibility of their star double agent, they carefully arranged for him to convey the time of the invasion to the Germans just prior to the actual landings but too late for them to react to the news.

were aghast."[1]

- Deception of Place and Strength: The most elaborate, and successful, aspect of the FORTITUDE ruses was the stratagem to convince the Germans that the main invasion would be at the Pas de Calais, the narrowest point of the Channel some 150 miles to the northeast of the actual invasion sites. A largely fictitious army group was "created" for this purpose. Known as the First US Army Group (FUSAG), its headquarters was genuine but most of its formations were imaginary. In due course, the very real Lt. Gen. George S. Patton was appointed its commander. Leaks to the press and information planted through German espionage agents concerning the order of battle of FUSAG were reinforced by various positive military deception measures to create the appearance of the buildup of a massive force along the Dover coast. They included huge tent encampments and other fake installations, as well as dummy landing craft in the Thames estuary, which the Luftwaffe of course was permitted if not encouraged to photograph. This delusion was strengthened by the creation of a fictitious radio network which convincingly simulated the existence of the dummy headquarters and its units, and which, by landline routings, further created the impression that Montgomery's headquarters near Portsmouth was actually in Kent. This elaborated stratagem was reinforced by a plan of aerial bombardment which concentrated on the Pas de Calais and maintained this bombardment even on D-Day itself. On that day, an Allied invasion force of eight divisions (five moved by sea and three airlifted) was opposed

[1] Ryan, op. cit, pp. 16-21, 35-36, and 80-82.

in Normandy by only three understrength German divisions, so successful had the deception been. "In combination with the logical German mind, it was strikingly successful. None among Hitler's military high command in France and the Low Countries doubted that the invasion would strike the Pas de Calais."[1] Still more important, the Fuehrer himself believed it.

But this was not all.

Deception in the strength of one's forces most usually is intended to lead the enemy to underestimate the buildup, so that he may be overwhelmed with forces he did not suspect were present. In the Normandy invasion, the deception was calculated to give the opposite picture -- that the Allies really had much larger forces in the UK than were actually there. And the objective of this was not only to mislead the Germans as to the place of the initial landings. The deception plan was further designed to convince the Germans that the Normandy invasion, even after it had occurred, was not the main assault but would be followed by another and still larger invasion in the Pas de Calais area using the massive and as yet uncommitted forces of FUSAG. In addition to the skillful Allied subterfuge in creating this non-existent order of battle, at least one key German intelligence officer reportedly was so disturbed by Hitler's unwarranted optimism that he began deliberately inflating the Allied threat by uncritical acceptance of many agent reports.[2] In any event, on D-Day, when the Allies

---

[1] MacDonald, op. cit, p. 257.

[2] See Delmer, op. cit, pp. 144-147.

had about 39 operational divisions in Britain, the German estimate was somewhere between 70 and 93.[1] Hence, with the continuation of the Allied grand deception plan (now known as FORTITUDE II) and even though the Germans had captured two valid invasion orders on D-Day, they were successfully duped not just for days but for weeks after D-Day into believing that the main invasion was still to come in the Calais area. The hoax was successful until at least early August -- primarily because the fiction of FUSAG and security on Patton's real command were effectively maintained. The result, not surprisingly, was a major misdeployment of German reserves and the immobilization in the Calais area of some 19 German divisions during this most crucial phase of the consolidation of the Allied landings in France.

- The Soviet Participation in BODYGUARD in the Belorussian Offensive: The great international deception plan extended still further -- to the planning for and timing of the USSR's offensive in Belorussia which was launched on 22 June 1944, or 16 days after OVERLORD. The plans for this, which had been worked out with the US and the UK, were intended to make the Germans believe that the offensive would be launched in the Ukraine rather than in Belorussia and that it would not start

[1] MacDonald, an authoritative historian for the US Army, gives 93. Whaley gives about 80, based on a variety of reports from other historians ranging from 70 to 85. According to Delmer, an official German OB estimate one month before the invasion was 75 to 80 "large formations," and one week before D-Day, Allied strength in Britain was assessed as the equivalent of 87 combat divisions. Hitler's own estimate, conveyed to the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin in late May, was that about 80 Allied divisions were in readiness to invade. It would appear that there were various German order of battle estimates--all calamitously wrong. OB analysts take note!

until July. The deception effort got under way about mid-April. Among the propaganda and public statements intended to mislead the Germans as to the nature of the summer offensive was a deceptive May Day slogan. Elaborate camouflage and security concealed the buildup in Belorussia while active deception (including dummy equipment and simulated radio networks) created the appearance of a major troop buildup in the Ukraine. Reconnaissance was carried out along the entire Western front, rather than concentrated. Only six Soviets were witting of the whole plan, and all orders were hand-delivered in a single copy.

As a result of the successful deception, the Soviet commanders in the Belorussian sector (Marshals Zhukov and Vasilevskiy) achieved a buildup of forces there one-third greater than was estimated by the Germans; it included overwhelming armored forces and permitted the Russians to obtain a superiority of up to 10-to-1 at the initial assault points. Like Rommel on D-Day, the local German commander had left for Germany for an interview with Hitler. Surprise was complete and all Belorussia was cleared in 36 days.

Soviet operations in support of the overall Allied offensive also included the attack on Finland, launched on 10 June. This was both in the nature of a feint for the later Belorussian offensive and a move to tie down German forces that might otherwise have deployed to France by misleading the Germans to believe that a major invasion of Scandinavia might be forthcoming. Of course, the attack on Finland also served other Soviet national objectives.[1]

---

[1] For discussion of this phase of BODYGUARD, see Whaley, op. cit., pp. A-391 - A-393h, and A-387 - A-389.

Deception in National Doctrine and Practice

The student of warning may be only slightly encouraged, after reading the foregoing, to learn that Whaley considers that the Soviet Union is comparatively unsophisticated in the techniques and practice of deception. He attributes this in part to the stifling effect of Stalin on advances in Soviet military doctrine, and he considers that the USSR places too great weight on security and too little on active deception.

The most sophisticated practitioners of the arts of deception in World War II were the British -- from whom both the US and the USSR learned some of the tricks of the trade. Not only were the British very largely responsible for such masterpieces of deception as the Normandy invasion, they also probably were responsible for much of the sophistication of the Soviet deception in the Belorussian offensive of 22 June 1944.

Whaley's treatise deals at length with German, and to a lesser extent Japanese, deception operations in World War II. Space will not permit their summary here, but any student of warning and indications will find them both fascinating and instructive.

In the period since World War II, the Israelis as well as the British emerge as the foremost and most sophisticated practitioners of deception, at least in the Western world. In this time, the Israelis have had at once the greatest need to use deception, several opportunities to practice it, and their operations (particularly in the six-day war of June 1967) have been a

spectacular success. The US, which relearned the art of deception from the UK in World War II, has achieved some notable successes in deception, but, according to Whaley, lags behind both the Israelis and the British in both understanding of the art and recognition of its importance in warfare.

Based on experience with a number of operations since World War II -- including several which Whaley does not treat -- I am inclined to agree that the USSR and its Warsaw Pact allies have not, in these instances, displayed any great sophistication in deception, particularly in positive military deception. This could be dangerously misleading, however, since there have been few if any instances in this time which would have required an elaborate military deception effort to insure military success -- for example, it was unnecessary for either the suppression of the Hungarian revolt or the invasion of Czechoslovakia, and in the first instance there was not time to devise one. As we have noted, nations do not normally devise elaborate military deception plans except when national security interests are at stake. Moreover, the USSR has demonstrated a mastery of military security which is probably unmatched by any power in the world today -- as the Cuban missile crisis should constantly remind us.

Still more pertinent may be our evidence that Soviet military doctrine places high value not only on security but also on positive deception. The USSR in 1968 released an account of the deception operation for the Belorussian offensive, discussed above, in a context which clearly indicated that its purpose

was to teach the lessons of military deception to a new generation of officers. An article published in the September 1970 issue of PVO Herald was entitled "Ruses in Modern Battle," and it stated in part:

> In working out tasks of combat training, officers of National PVO are called upon at the same time to take into account the skillful use of ruses in modern battle.
>
> Military ruses mean the ability of the commander to hide from the enemy one's real intentions and to lead the enemy into delusion and to use this for the achievement of one's own successes....
>
> In spite of the great saturation of National PVO troops with modern equipment, the role of stratagems in modern war has not decreased, on the contrary, it has grown. Stratagems help the commander hide from the enemy one's own plans and intentions, make the enemy give away his plans, tactical methods of the formation of his groupings ahead of time, and assure surprise of strike which with the dynamic, swift and decisive character of actions in modern battle plays a very important role. This is why the Minister of Defense USSR demands from the command staff that they give fundamental attention to tactical preparation, persistently teach troops to use tactical methods unexpected by the enemy, military ruses, false actions...

It would be foolish to assume that Soviet strategists have not studied the lessons to be learned from successful deception operations (including in recent years, those of the Israelis). We must presume that they would be capable of much more sophisticated deception than they have been willing to tell, or to show, us.

There is one type of deception which the USSR will unquestionably employ in any circumstance where it suits its interests, and that is political deception and its military hand maiden, cover stories. This is probably as

near a certainty as almost any statement which can be made in the field of indications intelligence. The Soviet leadership since Lenin has shown a predilection for secrecy, security and surprise which virtually guarantees some form of political deception in any military operation. In such instances the Soviets are confirmed, if not always consummate, liars.

As for the Asian Communist nations, the combination of traditional Oriental inscrutability with Marxist doctrine and an obsession for security has for a generation left us considerably more confounded and uncertain as to their intentions, both political and military, than of those of the USSR. Indeed, in comparison, the USSR often appears downright above-board and scrutable. Few Westerners can make any pretense of understanding the Chinese. One is reminded of the diplomat in Peking (himself an Oriental) who observed, at the peak of the Sino-Indian crisis in October 1962, that one might as well use astrology as political analysis to attempt to fathom the intentions of the Chinese. Our advantages, if any, in these circumstances may be that at least we are prepared to expect deception and deviousness from the Orientals, and that we have now had some experience in two recent wars with their tactics of military deception.

What Can We Do About It?

As should now be evident even from this brief discussion, all nations are vulnerable to deception, including even those who are sophisticated practitioners of the art themselves. Logic also suggests that, in some respects

at least, democracies are likely to be more vulnerable to deception than are dictatorships and closed societies -- and it is undeniably more difficult for open societies to practice it. Moreover, the history of recent years supports the judgment of experienced warning analysts that the US, at both its intelligence and policy levels, is highly vulnerable to deception.

What, if anything, can we do to make ourselves less vulnerable? Is it hopeless? The suggestions which are offered below would, I believe, be of help in real situations -- although one must once again add the caution that the most sophisticated and perceptive of us also are vulnerable, and that there can be no guarantee that we will see through the enemy's deception plan. Nonetheless, despite our generally poor record, I am somewhat less pessimistic than Whaley on this score.

The first thing that is necessary, if we are to have any hope of coping with deception, is for people to learn something about it -- and to study some case histories. Our neglect of this problem has been noted earlier in this chapter. It is symptomatic of this neglect that, despite over 20 years continuous experience in indications and warning, this writer knew practically nothing about the history of deception until the research for this chapter was begun. It is imperative that this subject -- along with warning problems in general -- be given more time and attention in both the intelligence and military schools of this nation. While we may all be vulnerable in some measure to old ruses, as Whaley maintains, we need to know what some of these ruses are if we are to have much chance of recognizing them.

Secondly, both the intelligence services and perhaps even more the policy and command levels need to understand that deception is likely to be practiced in certain situations -- not only by our enemies but sometimes even by our friends. It is essential to the recognition of deception that the probability or at least the possibility of its occurrence be anticipated -- or else we will almost inevitably be gullible victims of even a simple deception plan. And how can we recognize such situations? It is when great national objectives are at stake, when military forces are mobilizing and deploying, when it is clear that the adversary is "up to something." In such situations, it is the height of folly to presume that he will not also employ deception. We must be continually alert in such situations for the possibility of deception and assume its likelihood -- rather than unlikelihood. Rather than wax indignant over the enemy's "perfidy," as is our usual wont, we should be indignant at ourselves for failing to perceive in advance such a possibility. Bluntly, we need to be less trusting and more suspicious and realistic.

To recognize that deception is being practiced at all may be half the battle. For the recognition of this in turn will alert us: (1) that the adversary is very likely preparing for some unpleasant surprises -- else why bother to deceive us? -- and (2) to start attempting to figure out what his real plans or intentions may be behind the smokescreen of the deception effort.

The easiest (or more accurately least difficult) of smokescreens to see through should usually be the political deception effort, and its accompanying

military "cover story," during a period of massive military buildup. When the political conduct of the enemy is out of consonance with his military preparations, when he is talking softly but carrying a bigger and bigger stick, beware. This is the simplest and least sophisticated of deception methods. No nation should be so gullible as to fall for such tactics, without at least asking some searching questions. While the recognition that such deception is being practiced, or possibly is, will not in itself necessarily lead to a clear understanding of what the enemy is going to do, it will at least alert us that what he is going to do is probably not the same as what he says. And for strategic as opposed to tactical warning this recognition may be the most important judgment of all.

For, as Whaley notes and modern history confirms, it is virtually impossible to conceal the preparations for great military operations. The enemy, despite the most elaborate security precautions, is not going to be able to build up his forces for a major attack in total secrecy. If we are deceived or surprised in such circumstances, it will be because we either fell for his cover story or offers to enter into peaceful negotiations, allowed our preconceptions to override our analysis of the evidence, or because we were grossly misled as to the time, place or strength of the attack and thus failed to take the right military countermeasures at the right time.

As opposed to strategic warning or the recognition that the enemy is preparing to attack at all, tactical warning may be highly dependent on our ability to see through the enemy's active military deception plan. And on this

score -- which is largely the type of stratagem and deception which Whaley addresses in his book -- experience teaches us that the chances of successful enemy deception are indeed high. Even when it is recognized that deception is being practiced -- for example, if camouflaged equipment is detected -- this will not necessarily lead to the right conclusions as to the strength, place or date of attack. The military commander, in other words, will still have the problem of penetrating the specifics of the enemy's deception plan and preparing his defenses against it, even though the likelihood of attack itself has been generally accepted. Thus the tactical warning problem will remain even though the strategic warning problem may in large part have been resolved.

For both strategic and tactical warning, confusion and disinformation tactics present an enormous problem. The prospect that we could, in time of great national emergency, be confronted by such tactics should be a cause for grave concern. The releasing of the full disinformation capabilities of the KGB or the comparable counterintelligence systems of other nations, together with the use of other deception techniques, could place an unprecedented requirement for sophisticated analysis and reporting on the collection mechanism, on which the substantive analyst would be heavily dependent for evaluation of the accuracy and potential motivation for deception of the informant. It is critically important in such circumstances, as we have noted elsewhere, that the collector provide as much information as possible on the origins of the report and the channels by which it was received, since the analyst who receives it will be almost completely dependent on such evaluations and comments in

making his assessment. At best, it will be extremely difficult in time of emergency to distinguish even a portion of the reports which have originated with the enemy's intelligence services from those which have other origins. The tracing of the origins of rumors, for example, is often virtually impossible, yet in many cases rumors are valuable indications of authentic developments which the analyst cannot afford entirely to ignore.

In addition to the points above, there are two general guidelines which will usually assist the analyst in perceiving the enemy's most likely course of action through a fog of deception. They are:

- Separate the wheat from the chaff. Weed out from the mass of incoming material all information of doubtful reliability or origin and assemble that information which is either known to be true (the "facts") or which has come from reliable sources which would have no personal axes to grind or reasons to deceive. This will allow you to establish your reliable data base which, limited though it may be, will serve as the yardstick against which the reliability or consistency of other data and sources may be judged. It sounds simple and obvious; it is usually not done.

- Keep your eyes on the hardware. In the end, the enemy must launch operations with his military forces and what they do will be the ultimate determinant of his intent. Warning has failed in some cases primarily for lack of this concentration on the hardware. There are all kinds of ruses and red herrings, both political and military, which the enemy may devise,

and they have often been highly successful in distracting attention from the all-important factor of the military capability. So long as that capability is being maintained, or is increasing, the analyst and military commander who concentrate on it are usually likely to have a much more accurate perception of the enemy's intention than are those who have permitted their judgments to waver with each new piece of propaganda or rumor of the enemy's plans.

Finally -- more for policy makers and commanders -- the best defense of all against the enemy's deception plan may be the alerting and preparedness of one's own forces. If these are ready for the possibility of attack, no matter how unlikely that may seem, the enemy's efforts may be largely foiled even though his operation itself is really not anticipated. In other words, it is possible to be politically or psychologically surprised, and at the same time militarily prepared. The dispersal of the US fleet from Pearl Harbor as a routine readiness measure against the possibility of attack, however remote that might have appeared, would have saved the fleet even though all other assessments of Japanese intentions were wrong.