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DOT-116-69

14 January 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Deputy Director for
Intelligence

SUBJECT : Discussion with ACDA on our Intelligence
Memorandum, "Prospects for the Non-
Proliferation Treaty" *

1. Mr. Culver Gleysteen, Deputy Assistant Director of the Bureau of International Affairs, of ACDA came over on 10 January to express his Agency's disquiet on several points in this memorandum. Since the subject covers a host of countries, we assembled six OCI officers to talk to him.

2. Gleysteen's chief concern was that this memorandum was damaging to ACDA in its own battle within the US government to get up steam behind US ratification of the NPT in general. He confessed to a fear that it would reach the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (we assured him vigorously that this would not happen through our fault). He also indicated that opponents of the NPT in State were drawing on the memorandum to argue against ACDA.

3. He had a number of specific points to make. Some of these concerned technical facts e.g., whether Mexico had completed the entire process of ratification; these were all regrettable but not significant. Others had to do with the positions that individual foot-draggers were taking. Here he thought we were exaggerating the force of opposition, and his method of argument was to say that various objections mentioned in the paper had not been formally made by the countries concerned to the US in government-to-government channels. We did not find these arguments very impressive.

* Dated 27 Nov. 1968 - No. 1582/68 - Prepared by OCI

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4. When we got down to country cases, he had no real objections to our presentations on West Germany, India, Israel, Italy and several others. He did think we greatly underrated the chances for Japanese accession in a reasonable time. He also thought we drew too tight and too negative a linkage among Brazil, Argentina and Chile.

5. Because ACDA has a fairly optimistic view of the treaty's prospects, Gleysteen objected strongly to our statement that delay had already rendered the treaty "moribund." My view is that this particular word is probably an exaggeration, but I was not persuaded that our general line of analysis was in error. In fact, ACDA papers on the subject, which he left with us, make most of the same points that we do.

6. Gleysteen hoped that we would rewrite the paper, that is publish a new analysis which would be closer to his own. I indicated that we had no present plans to return to the subject but that the meeting of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference in March and/or favorable action by the US Senate (which he expects before 1 April) would probably provide a normal occasion for us to write a new analysis. He confirmed that, the next time we write such a paper, the coordination channel which we used in preparing this paper would be the proper one to use again.

7. The discussion was amiable. Gleysteen at one point suggested that perhaps ACDA might feel compelled to produce a refutation of our memorandum, but he quickly backed off. I made it clear, and he accepted this, that we welcome discussion, wanted to get our facts straight, wanted to know their views, but after all consultation would still feel required to produce and publish independent analyses.



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DATE: 15 Jan 1969

TO: Jack

FROM: Ed

*File
ACDA*

SUBJECT: OCI Discussions with ACDA Man

REMARKS:

25X1 Last week [] called to say that several people in ACDA had serious problems with an OCI Memo on the NPT. The paper had been prepared in response to a request from the White House. [] wanted me to arrange a meeting between the OCI analyst and an ACDA man. I called OCI and arranged for the meeting, but said that either [] Hanrahan should also be present.

25X1 The attached memo from [] tells us what happened at the meeting. [] did well.

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