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94th Congress, 1st Session

House Document No. 94-64

ACDA

14TH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

MESSAGE

FROM

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

TRANSMITTING

THE 14TH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, PURSUANT TO SECTION 50 OF PUBLIC LAW 87-297



MARCH 3, 1975.—Message and accompanying papers referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and ordered to be printed

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1975

48-172 O

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LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

To the Congress of the United States:

America's traditional optimism about the manageability of human affairs is being challenged, as never before, by a host of problems. In the field of national security, arms control offers a potential solution to many of the problems we currently face. The genius of the American people may be said to lie in their ability to search for and find practical solutions, even to the most difficult of problems; and it is no accident that this country has helped lead the world in the quest for international arms control agreements.

Safeguarding our national security requires a dual effort. On the one hand, we must maintain an adequate defense against potential great-power adversaries; for although we are pursuing a positive policy of detente with the Communist world, ideological differences and conflicting interests can be expected to continue. On the other hand, we share with them as with the rest of the world, a common interest in a stable international community.

Over the past year, we have made considerable progress in our arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union. The Vladivostok accord which I reached with Chairman Brezhnev will enable our two countries to establish significant limits on the strategic arms race and will set the stage for negotiations on reductions at a later phase. The U.S. and U.S.S.R. have, over the past year, also reached agreement on the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and on a limitation on ABM deployments to one complex for each country.

The negotiations being held at Vienna on mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe (MBFR), while they have not yet produced conclusive results, are also an important endeavor to limit and reduce armaments safely through mutual agreement. For our part, we shall make every effort to achieve such an outcome.

Even as we see some encouraging progress in our relations with the Soviet Union, we still face a growing danger in the potential proliferation of nuclear weapons to more countries. The United States will continue to seek practical steps to avert this danger, while providing the benefits of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

The 14th annual report of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, which I herewith transmit to the Congress, sets forth the steps which have been taken over the past year to meet these and other national security problems through arms control.

GERALD R. FORD.

THE WHITE HOUSE, *March 3, 1975.*

UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
WASHINGTON

OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR

January 22, 1975

Mr. President:

I submit for your transmittal to the Congress, as required by the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, as amended, the fourteenth annual report of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. This report covers the work of the Agency during calendar year 1974.

Respectfully,

Fred C. Ikle

Fred C. Ikle

The President
The White House

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION.	1
NEGOTIATING FORUMS.	4
LIMITATIONS ON STRATEGIC ARMS	7
RESTRICTIONS ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTING	14
NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION	18
MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS.	27
CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, AND ENVIRONMENTAL WARFARE	31
MILITARY EXPENDITURES AND ARMS TRADE.	38
PUBLIC INFORMATION.	42
AGENCY OPERATIONS	45
GENERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE.	53
APPENDICES	
I - Organization Chart.	56
II - Officials of the Agency	57
III - Bilateral Agreements.	59
IV - Multilateral Agreements	60
V - Depository Libraries.	72

INTRODUCTION

The Act establishing the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency states that the Agency shall provide the Congress, as well as the President, the Secretary of State, and other executive branch officials, with recommendations concerning U.S. arms control policies.

The Director frequently meets with and briefs Members of Congress and their staffs, and frequently appears, as do other top Agency officials, before interested committees of the Congress to testify on arms control matters. In 1974 the Director made approximately 75 visits to Members' offices and also continued his practice of conducting periodic meetings at the Agency with small groups of Congressional staff of interested Members and committees of Congress. Agency officials testified before Congressional committees 18 times during the year.

During 1974 the Agency was the subject of a thorough Congressional review of its activities and role in the formulation of U.S. arms control policy. The Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, under the Chairmanship of Congressman Clement J. Zablocki, was charged with conducting hearings, and for recommending possible legislative changes.

The Agency welcomed this review. It cooperated in the committee staff preparations which preceded the hearings held in September and October. Director Fred C. Ikle appeared before the Subcommittee on October 3 to testify on the Agency's activities and objectives and to respond to the Subcommittee. During that testimony, Dr. Ikle described the Agency as performing three essential functions:

- To serve as a catalyst by bringing opportunities for arms limitations and reductions into the fore;

- To serve to calibrate the counterbalancing considerations between security through military force and security through arms restraints;
- To serve as a conscience to help ensure that short-term tactical considerations will neither obscure nor sidetrack the long-term national and international interests.

The work of the Agency during 1974 covered a broad spectrum of arms control issues and problems. Although staff time and attention were devoted to the control of "conventional" instruments and methods of warfare, clearly the most urgent task was to seek ways to stop the increase of nuclear weapons. The challenge must be met on two fronts: to limit and reduce the nuclear weapons systems of the two major nuclear powers, the Soviet Union and ourselves; and to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to countries which do not now possess them.

For the past two decades, the build-up of strategic forces by the Soviet Union has been the most dangerous threat to our security. Although that danger is by no means past, we are making progress with the Soviet Government toward arms control in the strategic area. The world's attention has now been drawn forcibly to the danger of nuclear proliferation to other nations. The eager pursuit of nuclear energy to fulfill the energy needs of developed and developing countries alike carries with it the export of nuclear technology and materials which could be subverted to military use.

Arms control achievements during the past year included:

- The Vladivostok accord between President Ford and Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev setting guidelines for a SALT agreement with a common aggregate ceiling on offensive strategic weapons and on the number of missiles which can be MIRVed.

- An agreed Protocol to the ABM Treaty which further restricts the anti-ballistic missile systems to one deployment area each for the United States and the

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Soviet Union in lieu of the two agreed upon in 1972.

-- An agreement with the Soviet Union on a Threshold Test Ban Treaty prohibiting underground nuclear weapons tests having a yield above 150 kilotons.

-- Senate consent to ratification of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention.

The following report describes the Agency's activities during 1974 in connection with the above events and with other development relating to arms control.

NEGOTIATING FORUMS

The Arms Control Agency participated in a number of negotiating forums in the past year -- a larger number than ever before.

Phase II of the bilateral SALT negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union, on the further limitation of strategic arms, continued in Geneva. The ACDA member of the U.S. Delegation is Ralph Earle II. During 1974, sessions were held from February 19 to March 19, and from September 18 to November 5.

The Agency is also directly concerned with the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) which was established under the SALT ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement. Mr. Sidney N. Graybeal of the Agency is the U.S. Commissioner. The Commission, which meets at least twice a year in Geneva, is responsible for considering questions concerning compliance with obligations under those agreements, for reconciling any misunderstandings or uncertainties that may arise in connection with those obligations, and for considering, as appropriate, proposals for increasing the viability of agreements already in force and for further strategic arms limitation measures.

Delegates from NATO and Warsaw Pact nations met in Vienna to continue discussions on mutual and balanced force reductions -- MBFR -- in Central Europe. The ACDA member of the U.S. Delegation in 1974 was, successively, Timothy Stanley, Thomas Hirschfeld, and John Lehman. The 1974 sessions ran from January 15 to April 10, from May 6 to July 25, and from September 12 to December 12.

The Agency has primary responsibility for U.S. participation in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD), the principal forum for the negotiation of multilateral arms control measures, which has met in Geneva each year since 1962. Its members

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represent a geographic and political cross-section of the world. Five new members were accepted during the last year -- the Federal Republic of Germany, the German Democratic Republic, Peru, Iran, and Zaire -- bringing the total to 31. The members of the U.S. Delegation to the CCD are drawn principally from the Agency's International Relations Bureau. The U.S. Representative to the Committee in 1974 was again Ambassador Joseph Martin, Jr. In addition to Agency political officers, the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Defense send advisers who are accredited as members of the delegation. The U.S. Representative, along with his Soviet counterpart, serves as Co-chairman of the Conference.

Ambassador Martin was a member of the U.S. Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly and, assisted by other ACDA staff, advised the Delegation on arms control issues. During the Twenty-ninth Session, held in the fall, 21 resolutions relating to arms control were adopted by the General Assembly.

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) provides for a review conference to be held in Geneva five years from date of entry into force, to see if the purposes of the Treaty are being realized. A Preparatory Committee of 29 nations met twice during the past year to lay the groundwork for the review conference, scheduled for May, 1975. The head of the U.S. Delegation to the Preparatory Committee was the Deputy Director of the Agency, J. Owen Zurhellen, Jr.

The Agency was represented in three separate talks held with representatives of the Soviet Union in Moscow -- technical talks and negotiations on a Threshold Test Ban, follow-on negotiations on peaceful nuclear explosions in the context of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, and technical talks on environmental warfare.

Lastly, the Agency sent representatives to the First Session of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts and to the Conference of Government Experts on the Use of Certain Conventional

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Weapons, which met in Geneva and Lucerne respectively,
under the auspices of the International Red Cross.

A more detailed discussion of the U.S. policy objectives pursued in these forums, and of how the Agency fulfills its statutory responsibility for "the preparation for and management of United States participation in international negotiations in the arms control field," is presented in subsequent chapters.

LIMITATIONS ON STRATEGIC ARMS

President Ford and General Secretary Brezhnev, meeting in Vladivostok in November, signed a statement setting guidelines for the further limitation of offensive strategic arms which, in the words of the President, "put a firm ceiling on the strategic arms race, which heretofore has eluded us since the nuclear age began." This agreement was the culmination of a two-year effort to replace the Interim Agreement of 1972, which had the effect of freezing levels of offensive strategic arms existing then, with firm limitations based on the principle of equivalence.

Negotiating History Prior to Vladivostok

The 5-year interim agreement on the limitation of certain offensive strategic arms, concluded between the United States and the Soviet Union on May 26, 1972, helped to stabilize the situation quantitatively and provide time to negotiate a more comprehensive agreement on offensive weapon systems. The most serious obstacle to reaching a permanent agreement lay in the asymmetries in the composition of the two opposing forces. The numbers and characteristics were so divergent that devising a formula for setting comprehensive limits based on equivalent forces proved very difficult. In the meantime, each side continued to modernize its forces.

Another obstacle was the Soviet position that nuclear systems of our Allies and U.S. nuclear systems directly committed to our Allies be taken into account without considering their substantial nuclear threat to our Allies. The United States consistently maintained that SALT, in which our Allies are not participating as negotiating partners, should only deal with nuclear arms that are central to the U.S./Soviet strategic relationship.

Moscow Summit Meeting

As the June summit meeting approached, ACDA and the other agencies involved in SALT studied various approaches to the problem of achieving an agreement.

The two heads of government and their advisers met in Moscow from June 27 to July 3. They discussed strategic arms limitations extensively and, as Secretary Kissinger said, "with a frankness that would have been considered inconceivable two years ago..." The Secretary emphasized that the thoroughness of these discussions removed the danger inherent in "misapprehensions about each other's general intentions and general perceptions of the nature of the strategic environment."

One benefit of the SALT negotiations to date which has perhaps not been sufficiently recognized is a clearer understanding within the U.S. government of strategic issues derived from interagency discussions leading up to U.S. negotiating positions and to negotiating exchanges with the Soviets. It seems likely that similar benefits accrued to the U.S.S.R. The result can only be a plus for prospects of improved strategic stability, as well as an improved overall U.S.-U.S.S.R. strategic relationship.

An important achievement in the summit explorations was the decision that the focus of further negotiations would not be on a brief extension of the 1972 Interim Agreement but on the negotiation of a ten-year agreement, i.e. to 1985. The longer time frame would permit modernization programs for systems which had been planned but not yet carried out to be included in the calculations, and would therefore permit a more stable negotiating basis.

The U.S. and Soviet Delegations to SALT resumed their work in Geneva on September 18, with instructions reflecting this new approach.

Agreement at Vladivostok

Arrangements were made for a meeting to be held between President Ford and General Secretary Brezhnev at Vladivostok in November. The President, Secretary Kissinger and their advisers, and General Secretary Brezhnev, Foreign Minister Gromyko and their advisers engaged in very intensive talks on the question of offensive strategic arms during their two-day working meeting. The result of their discussions was agreement on the guidelines for further negotiations leading to a ten-year agreement limiting

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offensive strategic arms under ceilings to be applicable
to both sides.

On the afternoon of the second day of their meeting, the President and the General Secretary reached agreement on guidelines for further negotiations, which are embodied in an aide-memoire which has been submitted to the appropriate congressional committees. The guidelines cover the following points:

- ** The new agreement will cover the period from October 1977 through December 31, 1985;
- ** Each side will be entitled to have an aggregate total of 2400 delivery vehicles of strategic arms;
- ** Both sides will be limited to no more than an aggregate total of 1320 ICBMs and SLBMs equipped with MIRVs;
- ** The new agreement will incorporate the relevant provisions of the Interim Agreement of May 26, 1972;
- ** The new agreement will include a provision for further negotiations no later than 1980-81 on the question of further limitations and possible reductions of strategic arms.

Each side has essential freedom to mix the composition of weapons systems making up the aggregate total. This means if either side should decide that some part of its present mix of offensive weapons has become vulnerable to attack, it may replace that part of its force with more survivable weapons, thereby enhancing strategic stability.

The significance of the Vladivostok accord lies in the fact that it provides for the first time an outline for an agreement establishing equal, clear ceilings on strategic offensive arms. Equality in aggregate numbers of strategic systems has been a primary U.S. goal in these negotiations.

Intelligence projections just prior to the

Vladivostok meeting forecast the probable total number of Soviet missiles and the number armed with MIRVs at higher levels than those agreed to, and the same projections placed Soviet capabilities with respect to total numbers and to MIRVs at substantially higher levels than those agreed to.

Agreed common ceilings will be conducive to future negotiations on reductions, since they provide equal levels as a point of departure. The Vladivostok accord provides for future negotiations to take place on reductions in the agreed ceilings.

Finally, the Vladivostok accord sets aside the question of third-country nuclear forces and of shorter-range nuclear delivery systems, thus removing what had been a major obstacle to progress in SALT.

ACDA Participation

Development of SALT policy within the US government is a process which engages the personal attention of the President, senior officials of several agencies, and a large number of staff members of those agencies. The factors to be addressed include US strategic arms programs, assessment of Soviet strategic programs, and the military and political considerations affecting not only US and Soviet interests, but also the interests of our Allies and the interests of the world community. Research, analysis, and policy recommendations in the area of strategic arms limitations are among the most important functions of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. In coordination with the Departments of State and Defense and the CIA, the Agency has thus been deeply involved in the SALT negotiating process.

The Director of the Agency has a statutory responsibility to act as the principal advisor to the President and the Secretary of State on arms control matters. He is a member of the Verification Panel, which is chaired by Dr. Henry A. Kissinger in his capacity as Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. This group reviews the verification aspects and strategic implications of possible SALT limitations, making recommendations to the full National Security Council (NSC) and to the President. Dr. Ikle attends NSC meetings where key arms

control issues are presented for the President's decision. In addition to his participation in the NSC, the Director makes direct recommendations to the Secretary of State.

Under the Special Assistant to the Director for SALT, ACDA contributes to the Verification Panel Working Group which prepares studies and analyses for the Verification Panel and coordinates the work of all agencies in support of SALT. Some 20 ACDA officers participate either on a full-time or part-time basis in this work.

ACDA also participates in the work of the Back-stopping Committee which is chaired by ACDA's Special Assistant for SALT or the Assistant Director for Nuclear Weapons and Advanced Technology. This committee supports the work of the US SALT Delegation in Geneva during negotiating sessions, in implementation of Presidential instructions and guidance for those negotiations.

The ABM Protocol

A concrete achievement of the June summit meeting was agreement on a protocol to the 1972 Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Systems, which further restricts the deployment of defensive missile launchers by the United States and the Soviet Union to a single ABM deployment area for each.

The 1972 ABM Treaty had allowed two sites for each country - one for the protection of the capital city and the other for an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) field, providing the latter was at least 1,300 kilometers from the capital city.

By last summer the Soviet Union had an ABM system deployed around Moscow and the United States was nearing completion of an installation at Grand Forks, N.D., the site of a Minuteman III missile complex. Funds had not been authorized to move ahead with a system around Washington, and the Soviets, for their part, had taken no action to build a second site near a missile field.

The new protocol is seen as important because it eliminates the possibility of a decision by either country to build the second site. As Dr. Ikle recalled, in a press conference of July 3:

There have been concerns that such a development towards two ABM areas would provide the takeoff basis for wider competition in ABM systems. Now this agreement helps lay to rest these fears.

Under the terms of the Protocol, the Soviet Union could decide in the future that it would prefer its one ABM system to protect an ICBM complex rather than Moscow. Similarly, the United States could exchange the Grand Forks installation for a system around Washington. This option can be exercised only once by each country, however, and the Protocol requires advance notification if this is to be done.

The Protocol is of unlimited duration, as is the ABM Treaty itself, and will enter into force as soon as both nations have exchanged instruments of ratification.

The Protocol was transmitted by the President to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification in September. It is pending in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Standing Consultative Commission (SCC)

In keeping with its basic charter and regulations, the Standing Consultative Commission held two sessions during 1974. The principal result of the first of these (April 2 - June 19) was the completion of work on the formulation of agreed procedures governing replacement, dismantling or destruction, and notification thereof, for strategic offensive arms limited under the Interim Agreement and for ABM systems and components in excess of the limitations established by the ABM Treaty. Two Protocols containing these agreed procedures were signed by Secretary of State Kissinger and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko during the Moscow Summit Meeting of June, 1974.

During the second 1974 session (September 24 - October 28), SCC activity was focused on discussion of procedures required for the replacement of ABM systems and components permitted by the ABM Treaty, as modified by the Protocol to that Treaty of July 3, 1974. Work on this and other current SCC agenda items, including

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U.S. proposals related to improved implementation and increased viability of the "Measures" Agreement of September 30, 1971, will continue at the next SCC session, in early 1975. Mr. Sidney N. Graybeal of ACDA is the U.S. Commissioner on the SCC, and Agency personnel contribute to the work of the Commission as advisors and technical experts, both during preparation for and conduct of the bilateral SCC sessions.

RESTRICTIONS ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTING

Since 1963, when the treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, underwater, and outer space entered into force, United States policy has called for an extension of the prohibition to underground tests, if such a ban could be adequately verified. Eleven years of efforts toward this end, in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) and elsewhere, have not been successful, primarily because of the verification problem.

During the Spring session of the CCD, the U.S. and Soviet delegations repeated their long-standing positions. The United States favors an adequately verified comprehensive test ban but does not believe, despite advances in seismic technology, that national means alone give sufficient confidence that low-yield underground nuclear weapons tests can be distinguished from earthquakes. The United States therefore maintains that effective monitoring of a comprehensive prohibition requires some on-site inspection. The Soviet Union has consistently refused to accept such inspection on its territory in order to verify a CTB, maintaining that national means of verification are adequate.

In view of the longstanding impasse, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed in the Spring of 1974 to pursue on a bilateral basis the possibility of further partial restrictions on nuclear weapons testing.

Review of U.S. Policy

An intense study was undertaken within the U.S. Government to determine what options were open and the implications of each. This interagency review was conducted under the chairmanship of ACDA's Deputy Assistant Director for Nuclear Weapons and Advanced Technology, Dr. Robert W. Buchheim. Once a decision was made by the President, a team of U.S. experts was sent to Moscow for technical talks. The U.S. delegation was led by the American Ambassador to the Soviet Union,

Ambassador Walter Stoessel. ACDA's Assistant Director in charge of the Nuclear Weapons and Advanced Technology Bureau, Thomas D. Davies, and two of his staff served as members of the delegation. The talks were held from May 30 to June 26, and developed the framework for the discussions on this subject at the Summit.

Threshold Test Ban Treaty

A few days later, during the July Summit meeting, President Nixon and General Secretary Brezhnev signed the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, which established a ban on underground nuclear weapons tests having a yield above 150 kilotons (equivalent to 150,000 tons of TNT).

The Treaty contains a commitment by the parties not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other, and provides for regular consultations to take care of any questions which might arise relating to the implementation of its provisions.

The Treaty is accompanied by a Protocol setting forth technical data to be exchanged to facilitate verification. It also limits testing to designated test sites; and the data to be exchanged includes information on the geology of these testing areas. Geological data -- including such factors as density of rock formation, water saturation, and depth of the water table -- are useful in verifying test yields because the seismic signal produced by a given underground nuclear explosion varies with these factors at the test location. After an actual test has taken place, the geographic coordinates of the test location are to be furnished to the other party, to aid in verification. Other information available to the United States will be used to cross check the data provided.

Agreement to exchange such detailed data represents a significant degree of direct cooperation by the United States and the Soviet Union in the effort to control nuclear armaments. For the first time, each will make available to the other specific data relating to its nuclear weapons program. Verification is an essential element of any arms control agreement. The Threshold Test Ban Treaty establishes important precedents for the exchange of data between the Soviet Union and ourselves

to facilitate the verification process.

The true significance of the Treaty is that it is a further step in the negotiating process to restrain the U.S.-Soviet arms competition. Its restriction puts an end to all megaton tests. It contains a commitment by the parties to continue negotiations with a view toward achieving cessation of all underground nuclear weapons tests, and therefore may be viewed as a step towards a comprehensive test ban, in keeping with our obligation under the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963 and the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Thus, the threshold ban helps balance the obligations undertaken by the nonnuclear weapon states in those two earlier treaties and furthers the cause of nonproliferation.

For the purposes of the Treaty, all underground nuclear explosions at specified test sites will be considered nuclear weapon tests. Peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs), which may be conducted at locations away from the specified test sites, are to be covered by a separate agreement -- called for by Article III of the Treaty -- to be negotiated between the United States and the Soviet Union. Negotiations to implement Article III began in Moscow on October 7. The talks were recessed on November 6, and are expected to resume in early 1975. A more detailed discussion of PNEs is contained in the following chapter.

The Treaty is to enter into force upon exchange of instruments of ratification by the two parties, with the threshold limitation taking effect on March 31, 1976. The Treaty is to remain in force for a period of 5 years, but each party has the right to withdraw upon 6 months' notice if it decides its "supreme interests" have been jeopardized. The Treaty may be extended for successive 5-year periods, unless it is replaced by a comprehensive test ban.

The Agency has supported seismic research in the development of mathematical techniques of pattern recognition to discriminate between earthquakes and nuclear explosions and the development of computerized models that permit an evaluation of proposed seismic networks to detect and identify underground nuclear explosions. Design studies have also been undertaken

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for an improved unmanned seismic observatory. The Agency
has also theoretical studies on the characterization of
multiple seismic events and evaluations of the seismic
data obtained at short ranges for establishing the loca-
tion, depth and nature of seismic events.

NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

One of the most pressing concerns of the Agency is the danger inherent in the rapidly increasing spread of nuclear technology and materials throughout the world.

The Agency was primarily responsible for the Geneva-based negotiations, lasting four years, that resulted in the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which entered into force in 1970. The Treaty commits the signatories possessing nuclear weapons not to share such weapons or the technology for making them with any country which does not have them, and commits the signatories who do not possess nuclear weapons not to acquire them in any way. The Treaty also obligates the parties to facilitate the "fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy."

A current and extremely important question to be addressed by both nuclear and non-nuclear nations is how nuclear technology may be made available for peaceful uses while insuring against the spread of nuclear weapons.

The root of the problem is the inherent dual nature of atomic energy. Like fire, it can be used beneficially or destructively. One answer seems to lie in further development and expansion of international procedures for safeguarding nuclear materials and facilities, to guard against diversion to military purposes.

In the process of nuclear fission of uranium -- the element used in reactors to generate electric power -- plutonium is produced as a byproduct. Plutonium is a man-made element; it is not found in nature. It is also a fissionable material and can be used to fuel a reactor, just as the original uranium was used. The danger lies in the fact that plutonium can also be used for bombs. It must be separated from

the uranium, but this can be done by a chemical process which is simpler and less expensive than producing highly enriched uranium, the principal alternative material for making nuclear explosives. There are now almost 100 reactors in non-nuclear weapon countries in the world which produce electricity -- and plutonium. In the next few years, as the world's energy requirements increase, this figure is expected to more than double.

Safeguards

The Nonproliferation Treaty stipulates that non-nuclear parties must conclude safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The IAEA, with headquarters in Vienna, was established under the auspices of the United Nations as an outgrowth of the Atoms-for-Peace proposal made by President Eisenhower in 1953. It is financed by its 106 member nations. The U.S. contribution for 1974 was \$7.4 million. The staff numbers about 1,000 including scientists and technicians who devise and implement safeguards techniques and inspections.

IAEA inspectors face problems far more difficult than those routinely encountered by domestic safeguards inspectors. IAEA safeguards must insure the highest degree of confidence that peaceful nuclear activities are in accordance with agreements, while at the same time taking into consideration sensitivities relating to national sovereignty. The United States, through the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the Atomic Energy Commission, has given substantial assistance to the IAEA in its efforts to work out procedures which are both effective and nonintrusive.

ACDA Research

During 1974, the Agency continued its work on research and development of safeguards and equipment. The work falls into four main categories:

1. The development of portable measuring instruments.

Portable instrumentation has been designed and

built by ACDA contractors which permits a safeguards inspector to measure the amounts of uranium and plutonium which he is required to inventory without destroying the container in which the fuel is sealed. These non-destructive techniques permit measurement of both the gamma rays from uranium and the neutrons emitted during the spontaneous fission of plutonium.

2. The development of tamper-resistant, unattended safeguards surveillance instrumentation.

ACDA has worked with the Canadian Government to sponsor design, building, installing, and testing of unattended tamper-resistant instrumentation to safeguard reactors which are continuously refuelled while operating -- a class of reactors which presents a number of challenging safeguards problems. Additional secure safeguards surveillance systems have been designed and built by ACDA for enrichment plants and for plants which recover uranium and plutonium from spent reactor fuel. This equipment includes secure cameras for optical surveillance, neutron power monitors for reactors, and instruments to count and monitor the movement of spent reactor fuel elements.

3. The development of safeguards seals.

Seals can be very useful in safeguards to assure inspectors that during their absence doors, vaults and containers of various types have not been opened. These include reactors, bottles of plutonium, cylinders of uranium, and the special containers used to protect tamper-resistant instruments. ACDA contractors have developed a seal using a glass or plastic fiber optic bundle. The random pattern of the ends of the many fibers in these bundles provide a unique and unreproducible means of identification.

4. The development of advanced techniques for verifying the plutonium production of reactors.

The relative amounts of the various plutonium and uranium isotopes present in reactor fuel are dependent on the nuclear processes occurring in the reactor. Measurement of these quantities can assist inspectors

in verifying the origin and history of the fuel and the amount of plutonium which was produced in a reactor and which thus must be accounted for.

In order to expand further the Agency's initiatives in the field of physical safeguards and to stimulate outside participation in research and development, the Agency published a notice in the Commerce Business Daily in mid-November inviting "new, creative, imaginative and innovative ideas and programs for the improvement of and/or the creation of safeguards instrumentation, devices and techniques that can be used by the IAEA." To date, 34 firms have expressed an interest and requested additional information.

Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes (PNEs)

The explosion, in May of 1974, of a nuclear device by India -- which is not a signatory to the Nonproliferation Treaty -- drew new attention to the relationship of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes and the problem of nuclear proliferation.

The Nonproliferation Treaty contains an article which obligates its parties "to take appropriate measures to ensure that, ...under appropriate international observation and through appropriate international procedures, potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available to non-Nuclear-Weapon States Party to the Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis and that the charge to such states for the explosive devices will be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development."

This article was based on a recognition that acquiring a nuclear explosive capability for peaceful purposes is equivalent to acquiring a nuclear weapons capability. At the same time it is intended to insure the non-discriminatory availability of any benefits that may accrue from the peaceful use of nuclear explosives.

The United States -- as a potential supplier of nuclear explosive devices for peaceful applications that might prove useful in the future -- has participated in efforts by the International Atomic Energy Agency to

prepare for assistance of this kind. The IAEA has taken steps to facilitate the exchange of information and to anticipate the needs for such services. The IAEA Board of Governors has approved initial procedures for IAEA response to requests from members for PNE services, has developed guidelines for international observation in connection with such services, and has authorized the Director General "to establish within the Secretariat, at a suitable time, a separate organizational unit for implementing an international service for nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes under appropriate international control."

Thus far, PNEs have not proved to be the ideal way -- as compared to conventional methods -- for carrying out engineering projects which many had hoped for. Research is continuing in this field, however -- including the examination of non-nuclear alternatives.

Dr. Dixy Lee Ray, (then) Chairman of the AEC, told the 18th General Conference of the IAEA at Vienna on September 17:

I would like to emphasize the need for in-depth studies to establish the feasibility and desirability of using peaceful nuclear explosions in any project under consideration. The United States stands ready to contribute to the planning and performance of such feasibility studies. Where these studies demonstrate the practicability of conducting a peaceful nuclear explosion project consistent with the provisions of pertinent treaties or agreements, we are prepared to meet our obligations under Article V of the NPT to provide PNE services at prices that will exclude any charges for research and development.

An example of ACDA external research in this field is a study of the rate at which the use of PNEs is likely to develop, since this question will have obvious significance for the relationship of PNEs with arms control agreements. The study will examine the technical, economic and regulatory variables affecting PNE activity in

the 1980s. It is being conducted by the Gulf Universities Research Consortium, a non-profit group with close ties with experts in the oil, gas, and minerals industry. They are approaching the problem essentially from the viewpoint of potential user industries, and are making extensive use of petroleum and chemical engineers to assess the potential for use of PNEs in a wide variety of underground engineering activities.

Worldwide concern over the nuclear proliferation danger was reflected in the debate in the UN General Assembly this fall. Among the Resolutions discussed was one calling for examination of the PNE question in the CCD, the IAEA, and the NPT Review Conference scheduled for 1975. The Resolution was adopted by a vote of 91 to 3, with 11 abstentions. In a statement to the Assembly advising that the United States would vote affirmatively, Ambassador Martin elaborated on the U.S. view of the relationship between nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes and those for testing weapons:

For countries in the early stage of developing a nuclear explosive capability, we cannot see how it would be possible to develop such a capability for peaceful purposes without in the process acquiring a device which could be used as a nuclear weapon. In the case of advanced nuclear-weapon States, however, it may be possible, under certain conditions, to develop criteria that would be adequate to ensure that nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes are not used to further nuclear-weapon development. But, I should add, if such criteria could be developed they would not be applicable to the problem posed by the development of a nuclear explosive capability by a nonnuclear-weapon State.

The Threshold Test Ban Treaty -- signed during the 1974 U.S.-Soviet summit meeting -- in addition to placing an upper limit of 150 kilotons yield on nuclear weapons tests, calls for the negotiation of a separate agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union governing PNEs, and in accordance with this agreement, negotiations

were begun in Moscow. The Agency chairs the inter-agency Backstopping Committee on the Test Ban. The basic purpose of these discussions is to seek agreement on criteria for assuring that nuclear explosions said to be "peaceful" will not be used for military purposes.

Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference

The Nonproliferation Treaty provides that 5 years after entry into force, i.e. in May 1975, a conference shall be held in Geneva to review the operations of the treaty to see if its purposes and provisions are being realized. By the end of 1974, the Treaty had been signed by 106 countries, 83 of which had completed the process of ratification and thus become parties.

During the 1973 session of the U.N. General Assembly, an agreement was reached among treaty parties to form a preparatory committee to lay the groundwork for the Review Conference. Under the formula devised for membership, participants -- in addition to being parties to the NPT -- are members of the Board of Governors of the IAEA or are members of the CCD.^{1/}

The U.S. Delegation was led by ACDA Deputy Director J. Owen Zurhellen, Jr.; he was assisted by Charles N. Van Doren, a senior staff member of the International Relations Bureau who has been a specialist on the NPT since the early 1960's.

The Preparatory Committee held two meetings in Geneva during 1974. The first, in April, was mainly concerned with procedural matters, such as working languages, records, decision making, and entitlement to attend and to address the sessions. An informal and open-ended working group was established to analyze and summarize the factors involved in financing the Review Conference.

^{1/}The nations now eligible under the formula are Australia, Bulgaria, Canada, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Hungary, Ireland, Iraq, Lebanon, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Nigeria, Peru, the Phillipines, Poland, Romania, Sudan, Sweden, the Soviet Union, Thailand, the United Kingdom, the United States, Uruguay, and Yugoslavia.

Following the April meeting, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the IAEA, and the Agency on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL) were asked to prepare background papers on questions bearing on the Review Conference. These documents were received and commented on during the second session, held from August 26 to September 6. In general, they were found to be of great value for the anticipated work of the Review Conference, and were placed on the agenda for the third and final meeting of the Preparatory Committee, to be held from February 3 to 14, 1975. The Review Conference itself, which is expected to last for up to four weeks, will be convened on May 5.

The Secretary-General of the U.N. submitted four working papers relating to fulfillment of the Treaty's purposes -- notably with regard to: The preambular paragraph in the NPT relating to a comprehensive nuclear test ban; Articles I and II, dealing with nontransfer and nonacquisition of nuclear weapons and technology; Articles IV and V, relating to the promotion of peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to peaceful nuclear explosions; and Article VI, the commitment to negotiate toward the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.

The working papers prepared by the IAEA incorporate analytical and technical reports on the IAEA's activities under Article III, the safeguards article; Article IV, peaceful uses of nuclear energy; and Article V, peaceful nuclear explosions.

OPANAL's paper is a report on the implementation of the Treaty of Tlatelolco (establishing a Latin American nuclear-free zone), and contains comments relating to Article VII of the NPT. (Article VII guarantees the right of groups to conclude regional treaties banning nuclear weapons.)

These documents reflect some of the principal questions to be addressed in assessing the effectiveness of the NPT.

Considering the nuclear proliferation problem to be a matter of paramount concern and importance, ACDA has devoted major efforts to dealing with it. The Agency

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chairs a Nonproliferation Backstopping Committee that coordinates inter-agency positions on negotiations and conferences, and is a member of a new Verification Panel Working Group on Nonproliferation, chaired by the NSC staff, which considers major policy issues in the field. Within ACDA, a new Nonproliferation Staff has been established in the International Relations Bureau. Devoting full time to the subject, it also draws on the expertise available in other bureaus and offices of the Agency, and works closely with those engaged in discussions at the UNGA and the CCD.

MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS

Negotiations continued in Vienna between NATO and Warsaw Pact nations on the "Mutual Reduction of Forces and Associated Measures in Central Europe." The NATO nations directly participating in the conference are Belgium, Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States. Warsaw Pact participants are Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Poland and the U.S.S.R. Seven other nations are participating with special status: Denmark, Greece, Italy, Norway, Turkey, Bulgaria and Romania. Although Hungary is participating with special status, the Allies have reserved the right to raise the issue of Hungary's participation in the negotiations or in any agreement at some future date.

During the preparatory talks in 1973, both sides agreed that the central objective of the negotiations should be to contribute to a more stable relationship and to the strengthening of peace and security in Europe without diminishing the security of any party to the negotiations. In the fall of 1973, both East and West put forward proposals as to how these objectives might be achieved. The three negotiating sessions held in 1974 (January-April; May-July; September-December) have permitted each side to explore thoroughly the other's views.

In the Western view, any agreement must take into account major disparities favoring the Warsaw Pact in geography, manpower and the character of opposing forces. Within the defined reductions area agreed to by both sides, NATO's ground forces at present total 777,000 men (193,000 of them US) with 6,000 tanks, as against 925,000 ground troops (460,000 Soviet) and 15,500 tanks for the Warsaw Pact. The West believes that it is the disparity in conventional forces that poses the principal military threat and hence becomes a source of tension in Central Europe and, consequently, that a more stable relationship should be achieved

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only by eliminating the imbalance. For this reason, the NATO participants believe that the negotiations should focus on ground forces (which in contrast to air forces, do not lend themselves to rapid redeployment) and aim at approximate parity between the forces of the two sides.

Accordingly, the Allies have proposed to the East that the final outcome of reductions should be a common ceiling on the overall ground manpower of each side. This would be achieved in two phases of reductions, the details of which would be agreed upon in two phases of negotiation. In the first phase, there would be significant reductions in U.S. and Soviet ground force manpower, as well as in Soviet tanks. During the second phase, there would be further reductions leading to the common ceiling. On the Western side, these second-phase reductions would focus on the forces of Western direct participants other than the United States.

The West believes it is essential that the US and USSR, as the leading military powers on each side, should make the first reductions in order to create the necessary climate of confidence which will permit other participants to make reductions of their own.

In contrast, Eastern negotiators have proposed that all direct participants should reduce their forces from the outset by equal numbers or equal percentages. All types of forces -- ground, air and nuclear -- would be included in the reductions. Such an agreement is unacceptable to the West since it takes no account of the existing disparity in ground forces and would not only enshrine the imbalance in an international treaty but increase the force ratio in Europe to the East's advantage.

U.S. Participation

Ambassador Stanley Resor has been head of the U.S. MBFR Delegation since the beginning of the talks. The Agency representative on the delegation has been, successively, Timothy Stanley, Thomas J. Hirschfeld and John Lehman. In addition, staff officers serve as advisers to the delegation.

Subject to coordination with our NATO allies, MBFR negotiating positions are determined by the President and the National Security Council on the basis of recommendations made by the Verification Panel. The Panel is chaired by Dr. Henry Kissinger in his capacity of Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

Day-to-day guidance and support to the U.S. Delegation in Vienna is provided by the Interagency MBFR Coordinating Committee, which is chaired by the Agency's Assistant Director for International Relations. The Director's Special Assistant for MBFR also represents the Agency on the Committee.

ACDA Research

The Agency's research programs in support of the MBFR negotiations have included in-house ACDA studies, ACDA participation in inter-agency studies, and contract research. While in 1973, the bulk of ACDA's MBFR related research was oriented toward development of the Western MBFR proposal, this year's research has concentrated on refinement of certain aspects of the Alliance proposal and examination of the proposals put forth by the Warsaw Pact nations.

Considerable attention was devoted to developing the specifics of "stabilizing measures" -- i.e., measures designed to reinforce stability in the area of reductions by regulating troop movements and exercises. Such military activities, after reductions, should be conducted so as to avoid practices that might be considered threatening or be misinterpreted by the other side. Detailed proposals applicable to the conduct of major military exercises and to troops introduced into the reductions area for exercise or rotation purposes were developed. Particular attention was given to how these measures would contribute to warning of an impending attack.

Studies relating to verification examined the contributions which both national means of verification and negotiated inspection measures might make to confidence in compliance with an MBFR agreement. Alternative ways

of using inspectors and inspection equipment in the reductions area were examined with a view towards making specific recommendations to the Alliance.

Warsaw Pact proposals embodied a number of features not contained in Alliance proposals. In order to provide the Alliance and the U.S. Delegation with considered responses, Warsaw Pact positions on a number of issues, such as coverage of forces, have been subjected to rigorous political and military analysis.

CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, AND ENVIRONMENTAL WARFARE

The Agency has pursued international agreements to prohibit certain specialized weapons systems from the arsenals of nations, or at least restrict their use in warfare, because of the excessive violence they do to man and his environment. These efforts, in coordination with other federal agencies, have resulted in positive steps being taken by the U.S. Government during the past year.

Geneva Protocol and the Biological Weapons Convention

On January 22, 1975, President Ford signed the instruments of ratification of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972. The Senate had voted unanimously to give its consent to ratification on December 16, 1974.

The Geneva Protocol of 1925, which prohibits the use in war of "asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and of bacteriological methods of warfare," was sent to the Senate by the Administration in 1970, for the second time in its long history. (Though originally an American initiative, the Protocol succumbed to a strong lobbying effort when submitted to the Senate in 1926, and Senate action on it was not completed.)

The Biological Weapons Convention is a commitment by the Parties "never in any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain" biological weapons. It will enter into force when it has been ratified by the three depositary governments -- the United States, the United Kingdom, and the U.S.S.R. -- and at least 19 other countries. Thirty-eight of the 110 nations that have signed the Convention have ratified, so that only ratification by depositaries is still required.

Ratification of both these measures had been held in abeyance because of the Committee's disagreement with the Administration's interpretation as to whether the Protocol banned the use of herbicides and chemical riot

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control agents.

In response to the Committee's request, the Executive Branch undertook a comprehensive review of this legal interpretation and analyzed possible alternatives for resolving differences of opinion on the scope of the Geneva Protocol. The Agency contributed to an evaluation of the military utility of riot control agents and herbicides by presenting alternative approaches that would accomplish arms control objectives.

The Director of the Agency testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, on December 10, in support of ratification of both the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and the Biological Weapons Convention. Dr. Ikle advised the Committee that the President was prepared to renounce as a matter of national policy:

- (1) first use of herbicides in war except use, under regulations applicable to their domestic use, for control of vegetation within U.S. bases and installations or around their immediate defensive perimeters,
- (2) first use of riot control agents in war except in defensive military modes to save lives such as:
 - (a) Use of riot control agents in riot control circumstances to include controlling rioting prisoners of war. This exception would permit use of riot control agents in riot situations in areas under direct and distinct U.S. military control;
 - (b) Use of riot control agents in situations where civilian casualties can be reduced or avoided. This use would be restricted to situations in which civilians are used to mask or screen attacks;
 - (c) Use of riot control agents in rescue missions. The use of riot control agents would be permissible in the recovery of remotely isolated personnel such as downed aircrews (and passengers).

- (d) Use of riot control agents in rear echelon areas outside the combat zone to protect convoys from civil disturbances, terrorists and paramilitary organizations.

Dr. Ikle further advised that Presidential approval in advance would be required even for those uses of riot control agents or chemical herbicides in war as listed above.

In his testimony, Dr. Ikle pointed out that verification of compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention in countries with relatively closed societies is difficult, particularly the prohibition on development of these weapons. Nevertheless, he argued that it is in the net interest of the United States to become a Party to this Convention for three reasons: the military utility of these weapons is dubious at best; biological weapons are regarded internationally with particular repugnance from a moral point of view; and widespread adherence to the Convention can help discourage misguided competition in biological weapons.

In urging ratification Dr. Ikle emphasized, however, that the limited verification of this Convention should not be construed as a precedent for other arms limitation agreements where these special conditions would not obtain.

Chemical Warfare

The United States is committed to the objective of effective prohibition of chemical weapons and is continuing negotiations at the CCD with a view to reaching early agreement on effective measures.

During the summer session of the CCD an informal meeting with technical experts was held from July 17-22 in an effort to clarify some of the technical issues involved in establishing effective restraints. Twenty-two experts from 13 countries attended the four-day meeting. The United States was represented by two experts from ACDA and one from DOD.

The principal topics discussed were (a) definition

of chemical warfare agents, (b) scope of CW limitations, (c) criteria for defining the scope of the prohibitions, and (d) verification. An encouraging degree of similarity was apparent in the views put forward by the experts on some topics, such as criteria for expressing the scope of limitations.

The problems involved in verification were given particular attention at the meeting, especially those problems related to destruction of stockpiles. The US experts pointed out that certain technical methods of inspection could provide a high degree of assurance that destruction was being carried out. However, they also noted the difficulty in verifying that no stocks had been hidden.

Nonetheless, ACDA and the other agencies within the Executive Branch involved in disarmament questions are attempting to overcome the difficulties involved in achieving effective restraints. The question of possible limits on chemical weapons was subjected to intensive study in 1974 by an interagency panel which included an ACDA representative.

In response to Congressional invitations, ACDA officials testified before several Committees on the arms control implications of a US Army proposal to establish a production facility for a binary nerve gas artillery munition. This new type of chemical munition utilizes two chemical components, neither of which is supertoxic. The two components are placed in compartments in the artillery shell, separated by a membrane. As the artillery shell is fired, the membrane is broken and the two chemicals are mixed together, becoming a lethal agent. The Agency expressed its concern that moving ahead with binary production at this time could make it more difficult to achieve international restraints on chemical weapons. Both the House and Senate later decided to deny approval of the Army request for FY 1975 funds for binary poison gas production facilities.

Environmental Warfare

The Congress and the Executive Branch pursued parallel objectives in 1974 towards the control of

environmental modification techniques that might be used for military purposes. House Resolutions 116 and 329, of the 1st session of the 93rd Congress, express the sense of the House of Representatives that the U.S. Government should seek agreement with other governments on the prohibition of research, experimentation, or use of weather modification activity as a weapon of war.

During the Summit meeting in July, the President and General Secretary Brezhnev signed a joint statement "advocating the most effective measures possible to overcome the dangers of the use of environmental modification techniques for military purposes," and agreeing to hold a meeting of U.S. and Soviet representatives for the purpose of exploring the problem. The joint statement recognizes that the scientific and technical advances in this area may open possibilities for military use and that "such use could have wide-spread long-lasting, and severe effects harmful to human welfare."

ACDA Assistant Director Thomas D. Davies testified on this subject before the House Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements of the Committee on Foreign Affairs during its September hearings on House Resolutions 116 and 329. He advised the Subcommittee that the objectives of the House Resolutions were essentially consistent with the aims of the Summit joint statement.

A meeting was held in Moscow during the first week in November, in implementation of the Summit agreement. Assistant Director Davies headed the American group of experts; Academician E. K. Fedorov, together with Soviet experts, represented the USSR.

In a joint communique issued at the conclusion of the November meeting, the delegations expressed satisfaction with the exchange of opinions and agreed to meet again in Washington after a working interval. The next meeting is expected to begin in early 1975.

In a related but separate move, the USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs, Andrei Gromyko, proposed that an item be placed on the agenda of the fall session of the UN General Assembly on the "Prohibition of action to

influence the environment and climate for military and other purposes incompatible with the maintenance of international security, human wellbeing and health."

There was almost unanimous support in the UN General Assembly that the question of environmental modification should be referred to the CCD for consideration. The US, however, believed that the reference in the Soviet resolution to the need to conclude "an appropriate international convention" prejudged the question of whether "the most effective measures possible to overcome the dangers of the use of environmental modification techniques for military purposes"--the formulation employed in the joint US-Soviet statement on this subject at the July 1973 summit--would most appropriately take the form of a single international treaty.

In a statement to the First Committee, Amb. Martin presented the viewpoint of the United States as follows:

"We believe that at this stage of our exploration of the problem what is needed is serious study of the issues involved in possible restrictions. In our view, we must define the problem and formulate the measures which will effectively deal with it before we can consider the advisability of adopting an international instrument on the subject."

Amb. Martin pledged active U.S. participation in the CCD and elsewhere "not only [to] bring about new understanding but also to develop effective measures to deal with the serious problem of environmental warfare."

The Agency will be primarily responsible for preparing the U.S. Delegation position papers and statements on this question for the 1975 session of the CCD.

The Agency's interest in the problem of environmental changes for military purposes goes back a number of years. Nuclear Weapons and Advanced Technology Bureau staff monitor scientific advances in this field in journals and by attending conferences and seminars. ACDA is represented on the Interdepartmental Committee for Atmospheric Sciences, which is under the parent Federal Council for Science and Technology.

International humanitarian law consists for the most part of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 for the Protection of War Victims, to which the United States is a party. International attention has focused for several years on the need to draft new rules to supplement the existing conventions. The first session of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts was held in Geneva from February 20 to March 29, under the auspices of the International Red Cross. Its purpose was to review two Protocols drafted by the International Conference of the Red Cross, one on International Armed Conflicts and the other on Non-International Armed Conflicts.

Representatives of 125 nations participated in the Conference. The U.S. Delegation was headed by Mr. George H. Aldrich, Deputy Legal Adviser, Department of State. A representative from the Agency's Office of General Counsel was a member of the delegation.

The issue of wars of national liberation overshadowed all other issues, and accounted for the fact that little progress was made. A second session of the diplomatic conference will be convened in 1975.

A related conference, convened by the I.C.R.C., was held in Lucerne from September 24 to October 18. Experts from the United States and 48 other countries, as well as representatives of some national liberation movements, the U.N. Secretary General, and the World Health Organization attended. Two technical experts from ACDA were members of the U.S. delegation. The discussions, which were primarily of a technical nature, and intended to define the scope of the problems, centered on developing data for subsequent consideration of possible prohibitions or restrictions on the use of conventional weapons which may cause unnecessary suffering or have indiscriminate effects. The agenda included discussions of such specialized weapons as incendiary, blast and fragmentation, delayed action, and new weapons which may be developed. It is expected that another such conference of government experts will be held late in 1975.

MILITARY EXPENDITURES AND THE ARMS TRADE

ACDA has continued to concern itself with the issues of military expenditures and the international arms trade. One of the products of research and analysis in the subject areas was the publication, World Military Expenditures and Arms Trade 1963-1973, prepared for distribution during the year. This publication provides estimates of the military expenditures, gross national product (GNP), population, armed forces, and arms trade of 136 countries over an eleven year time span. These data, which must be regarded as approximate, indicate that world military expenditures, measured in constant 1972 dollars, rose from about \$197 billion in 1963 to about \$241 billion in 1973. During this same period the value of international arms exports in constant 1972 dollars increased from about \$4.4 billion to an estimated \$8.7 billion in 1973.

Military Expenditures

The Agency also examined the economic implications of certain arms control agreements as well as the potential economic impact of possible arms control arrangements. A contract study completed for the Agency as a follow-on to an earlier study indicated that the "savings" in U.S. military outlays resulting from the SALT I ABM treaty were on the order of \$6.5 billion, or \$700 million higher than originally estimated. This figure represents the difference between ABM costs calculated with the SALT ABM treaty and without it -- assuming that without it the U.S. would have gone on to a four-site deployment. The new study found that the three localities most adversely affected by the ABM treaty subsequently made a significant recovery, owing in large measure to energetic local efforts and to programs of assistance by the Federal Government. Actions proposed by the interagency Economic Adjustment Committee, of which ACDA is a member, helped to mitigate the effects of contract cancellations.

The Agency also sponsored contract research on U.S. mobilization problems in an arms control environment.

Effort was devoted during the year to a consideration of certain technical aspects of international military expenditure limitations. The most important problems addressed dealt with definition of the scope and content of military budgets, valuation of resources employed in the military sector, techniques for international comparisons of military expenditures, and alternative approaches to the verification of agreements. In support of this work the Agency continued contract research on the measurement of price changes of military expenditures and technical aspects of military expenditure limitations.

Of specific concern with respect to military expenditure limitations was the UNGA request at its 2194th plenary meeting on December 7, 1973, that all Governments extend cooperation in the development of a technical study on the "reduction of the military budgets of the States permanent members of the Security Council, which should also cover other States with a major economic and military potential, and on the utilization of a part of the funds thus saved to provide international assistance to developing countries."

ACDA provided technical assistance to the United States private expert who worked with experts from ten other countries at meetings in Geneva during the summer of 1974 in response to the UNGA request. Such technical issues as the nature of military expenditures to be reduced, the effect of military expenditure reductions on military force posture and international security, and the procedures for ensuring confidence in the equitable implementation of an agreement were developed for the technical study, which was submitted to the UNGA in the fall of 1974.

Other research interests centered on the arms control implications of intensified global economic and financial problems caused by critical resource imbalances and oil price increases.

Arms Trade

With respect to the international arms trade, ACDA has continued to examine the feasibility of possible international arrangements among arms supplier and/or recipient states to control transfers of conventional arms and

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production technology.

At the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva the U.S. Delegation again urged consideration of restraints on conventional arms. In April 1974, Ambassador Martin stated:

My delegation therefore believes it is timely to begin to study seriously the question of restraints on conventional weapons in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. In the past my delegation has submitted for the consideration of the Committee a number of principles and guidelines related to restraints on conventional weapons. We would welcome the comments and views of others on this subject. Further consideration by the Committee could eventually result in effective controls over these weapons to the general benefit.

In order to obtain the views of experts outside the Agency on possible approaches to international controls over arms transfers, the Agency, in early 1974, sponsored a seminar on conventional arms control, a large portion of which was devoted to the arms transfer problem. The seminar included experts from the executive and legislative branches of the government as well as from outside of government.

ACDA has continued to participate with other departments and agencies in the formulation and implementation of U.S. arms supply policy. Through its participation the Agency seeks to insure that arms control considerations are fully taken into account. In setting forth its views ACDA focuses its attention on the degree to which proposed transfers might (1) contribute to an arms race, (2) increase the possibility of outbreak or escalation of conflict, (3) prejudice the development of bilateral or multilateral arms control arrangements, or (4) result in an unnecessary diversion of resources from economic and social development.

The Agency is represented on the interagency Security Assistance Program Review Committee, which advises and

assists the Secretary of State in the development of security assistance annual programs and multi-year plans. ACDA is also a participant in the interagency study of U.S. arms transfer policy initiated by the Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance in late 1974.

On a day-to-day basis the Agency has participated with other agencies in studies of U.S. arms supply policy toward particular areas, and has given advisory opinions on issues involving the transfer of conventional arms and production technology as they have arisen.

Along with other agencies of the executive branch, ACDA provided information on arms sales policies and programs for use in a Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff study.

PUBLIC INFORMATION

In August, after careful examination of the requirements for an active public affairs program, the Director ordered that the staff and operations of the Office of Public Affairs be expanded. One organizational change was the transfer of the Agency's historical unit. This move will make it possible to broaden the use of the historical staff's product, not only in the field of scholarship but in public affairs generally.

This upgrading of the public affairs function was consonant with the recommendations received from Congress that a greater percentage of the Agency's resources be devoted to the dissemination of information on arms control matters to the general public.

The Office of Public Affairs prepares guidance on arms control questions for the White House, the Secretary of State, and the State Department press spokesman. In addition, the Office maintains day-to-day contact with the Washington press corps, domestic and foreign. During the year the Director of ACDA has many times been interviewed by both the written press and radio and television, in addition to delivering four major addresses.

While its staff is small, it has been the policy of the Agency in the past to honor all requests for speakers when possible. The Agency also conducts briefings for visiting groups at its offices in the Department of State building.

An initiative taken to strengthen the Agency's role in keeping the public informed is a new program of liaison with the academic community. Staff members visit on campuses and assist departments and faculties in organizing arms control course studies, seminars, simulations, lectures, and research projects.

The Agency provides scholars, students, the press and the general public with information through its publications program. In addition to its annual reports to the Congress, ACDA publications include the following

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items in print or under preparation:

Current Negotiations on Arms Limitations
(status -- as of Spring 1974 -- of negotiations
in progress)

Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements
(a history of negotiations of all modern
arms control agreements, together with
texts)

Arms Control and National Security
(a basic guide outlining contemporary arms con-
trol concepts and issues)

World Military Expenditures and Arms Trade
1963-1973
(a statistical summary)

SALT Lexicon
(a glossary of strategic arms terms)

The Danger of Nuclear Proliferation
(a discussion of various aspects of the rela-
tionship of nuclear energy for peaceful
purposes and military use)

Perspectives on Nuclear War
(an updated analysis of blast, heat, radiation,
electromagnetic and other effects of nuclear
explosions)

Documents on Disarmament
(an annual series of selected statements,
proposals, and documents of both U.S. and
foreign origin)

Publications and research reports are sent to ACDA
depository libraries, which number 189 university and
public libraries. See Appendix V.

The Agency has a statutory responsibility for pro-
viding public affairs guidance to USIA. This is done
on a continuing basis, parallel to the guidance given
to the Department of State spokesman for his daily

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briefings. It also takes the form of articles prepared
for the USIA's overnight wireless file, and materials
prepared for the Voice of America. Recently, ACDA con-
vened a special panel to draw up a series of recommenda-
tions for USIA policy on arms control.

AGENCY OPERATIONS

The Agency is one of the smallest in the U.S. Government. Its personnel, totalling 214, are essentially specialized, representing expertise in the military, diplomatic, legal, scientific, and technical fields. The Agency is organized along functional lines, with major responsibilities divided between support of on-going negotiations and long-range planning.

The Agency's program responsibilities are carried out primarily through four bureaus, each of which is headed by an Assistant Director of the Agency appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. These are the Plans and Analysis Bureau, the International Relations Bureau, the Military and Economic Affairs Bureau, and the Nuclear Weapons and Advanced Technology Bureau. Within the range of its program responsibility, each Bureau is responsible for generating policy proposals. Other organizational units are the Office of the General Counsel, the Office of Administration, and the Office of Public Affairs. In addition, the Special Assistant to the Director and Executive Secretary of ACDA, the Special Assistants for SALT and MBFR, the Counselor, and other officers within the Office of the Director furnish staff assistance to the Director and Deputy Director, or policy guidance within their specialized area of competence.

Structure

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR (ACDA/D)

The Director (D) of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency is the principal adviser to the President and the Secretary of State on arms control matters. Under the direction of the Secretary of State, he has primary responsibility within the Government for formulation of policy recommendations and for operations in such matters. He is responsible for the executive direction and coordination of all activities of the Agency and the Agency's relations with the Congress.

The Deputy Director (DD) assists the Director in carrying out his responsibilities and acts for and exercises the powers of the Director during his absence.

The Special Assistant to the Director and Executive Secretary, ACDA (D/ES) directs and coordinates staff work for the Director and Deputy Director; conducts interagency and National Security Council liaison, as well as liaison with the General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament; serves as the link between the top Agency decision makers and principal staff; and assists the Director in keeping policy and management aspects of arms control matters in phase.

The Special Assistant for SALT (D/SALT) is responsible for formulating ACDA positions and policies on the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) in coordination with and with support from the concerned Bureaus. He also serves as Chairman of the SALT Backstopping Committee -- an interagency committee for backstopping the U.S. SALT Delegation. The incumbent also serves as U.S. Commissioner on the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC).

The Special Assistant for MBFR (D/MBFR) is responsible for formulating ACDA positions and policies on the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) talks in cooperation with and with support from ACDA Bureaus, the Department of State, and other concerned Government agencies.

The Counselor (D/C) is responsible for such special projects essential to the formulation of arms control policy as may be assigned by the Director.

OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL (ACDA/GC)

The Office of the General Counsel is responsible for all matters of domestic and international law and for treaty affairs, and provides advice and assistance in the preparation of all drafts of proposed treaties and agreements relating to arms control, questions relating to the implementation, interpretation and revision of treaties, and other subjects relating to the form and content of international agreements and their implementation.

The Office has primary responsibility for Congressional matters, including all legislation, and for Agency

liaison with the White House. It also is responsible for the legal aspects of Agency policies and operations in the areas of personnel, security, patents, contracts, procurement, fiscal, and administrative matters. The Office is responsible for the Agency's contracting, reimbursable agreements and grants program, and participates in the preparation of Agency regulations.

PLANS AND ANALYSIS BUREAU (ACDA/PAB)

The Plans and Analysis Bureau is responsible for long range planning and studies concerning existing arms control agreements, possible new agreements, and policy recommendations with respect to their interaction and effect on strategy, posture and national security. In these activities, the Bureau works closely with other Agency bureaus and government agencies.

The Evaluation and Policy Division (PAB/EP) performs long range studies and evaluations of the impact of existing and possible new agreements on strategy, postures and national security. It also studies strategic doctrine and defense policy and participates in community-wide studies. It analyzes the interaction of on-going negotiations, and innovates ideas for new arms control efforts.

The Verification Division (PAB/VN) conducts internal studies and initiates external research on the verification process and its relation to arms control proposals, negotiations and agreements. Evaluation of verification procedures and systems is done to identify limitations, opportunities and new requirements. The Division works closely with all government agencies and activities interested in the verification process. It also serves as the Agency's central point of contact with the intelligence community.

The Operations Analysis Division (PAB/OA) studies the quantitative aspects of arms control policies and operations. Its work includes analysis of present and future relative force capabilities; analysis of operational and technical constraints and the effect of uncertainties on force structures; and the evaluation of verification systems. The Division supports policy formulation in the

strategic arms limitations area, the mutual and balanced force reductions area, the comprehensive test ban area and other areas as assigned.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS BUREAU (ACDA/IR)

The International Relations Bureau is responsible for the diplomatic aspects of U.S. multilateral arms control and disarmament efforts. It is primarily responsible for the Agency's participation in mutual and balanced force reduction talks, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), and in the multilateral disarmament negotiations at Geneva and in the United Nations. The head of the Bureau also serves as Chairman of the MBFR Interagency Backstopping Committee, which provides day-to-day substantive support to the U.S. delegation to the MBFR negotiations. In addition, the Bureau provides the Director with advice on other regional arms control matters and on some diplomatic aspects of SALT.

The CCD and UN Division (IR/CU) has the major responsibility for U.S. participation in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) and takes a leading role in the annual United Nations disarmament debates. The Division also oversees many matters that relate to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the implementation of it and other arms control treaties.

The Regional Division (IR/REG), in addition to the major responsibility of providing the support staff for ACDA's interagency responsibilities for MBFR, is responsible for providing advice on the diplomatic aspects of SALT and for pursuing arms control possibilities in other regions. It also provides guidance on CSCE, particularly with respect to Confidence Building Measures that relate to European security.

The Non-Proliferation Staff (IR/NP), a new unit established in November 1974, is the focus for the diplomatic aspects of the Agency's activities in the nuclear non-proliferation field. One of its principal concerns is the improvement and expansion of international safeguards surrounding the export of nuclear materials and technology. In addition, this staff is concerned with preparations for the Non-Proliferation

MILITARY AND ECONOMIC AFFAIRS BUREAU (ACDA/MEA)

The Military and Economic Affairs Bureau is responsible for the evaluation of the military and economic implications of arms control agreements and potential arms control measures. The Bureau works in close cooperation with other agencies, such as the Departments of Defense, State, and Commerce; the Atomic Energy Commission; and the intelligence community.

The Military Affairs Division (MEA/MA) participates directly in the formulation of specific arms control negotiating proposals and develops background and position papers bearing on the military aspects of current U.S. national security policies, and on the current and potential weapons systems and military postures of the U.S. and other countries, as they relate to arms control policy formulation. This Division is particularly concerned with evaluation of the impact on U.S. and allied national security interests of potential arms control measures affecting the roles and capabilities of theater/general purpose/conventional and nuclear armed forces. This Division also provides support for such inspection and control systems (e.g., inspection of Antarctica under the Antarctic Treaty) as may become part of U.S. arms control activities.

The Economic and Arms Transfer Division (MEA/ET) assesses the fiscal and economic effects of military spending and of arms control agreements; compiles and disseminates data on national military budgets; develops policy recommendations and negotiating proposals related to the limitation of military expenditures as an arms control measure; develops data on worldwide conventional arms transfers and indigenous arms production; ensures that arms control factors are taken into account in policy decisions relating to U.S. arms transfers; and serves as the focal point for developing Agency recommendations on regional arms control. This Division also develops economic techniques for use as verification procedures for specific arms control measures and cost analyses for arms control scenarios.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY BUREAU
(ACDA/NWT)

The Nuclear Weapons and Advanced Technology Bureau has technical and policy responsibilities in such arms control areas as strategic arms limitations, curbing proliferation of nuclear weapons, banning nuclear weapon tests, limiting chemical and biological weapons, and controlling other kinds of advanced weapon technology.

The Strategic Arms Division (NWT/SA) focuses on the U.S.-Soviet bilateral SALT negotiations. It generates proposals and evaluates options for quantitative and qualitative limitations on strategic missiles and bombers. The Division also sends personnel overseas to support the U.S. SALT delegation when negotiations are underway.

The Advanced Technology and Test Ban Division (NWT/AT) devotes most of its resources to multilateral arms control measures that might come under negotiation in CCD or elsewhere. These include nuclear weapon test bans, chemical weapons control, nuclear non-proliferation, and other technical developments having potential importance for arms control.

OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION (ACDA/A)

The Office of Administration, under the direction of the Executive Officer, is responsible for administrative management of the Agency and for providing support to all of its components. This includes all personnel, budget, fiscal, supply, security, communications and general administrative activities. The Office advises the Director and other senior officials of the Agency on these and other matters relating to the management of the Agency, and maintains regular liaison with the State Department, the General Services Administration, and other organizations providing services for the Agency.

OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS (ACDA/PA)

The Office of Public Affairs, under the direction of the Public Affairs Adviser, carries out the Agency's responsibility for the dissemination and coordination of

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public information concerning arms control matters. It also advises the Director, Deputy Director and other Agency officers on the public information aspects of such matters. Within the Office, the ACDA Historian is responsible for the preparation of historical analyses on arms control topics and previous negotiations.

Resources

In recent years about half the Agency's total budget has been devoted to salaries for a highly trained professional staff, most of which is either recruited from the physical and social sciences or assigned on a reimbursable basis from the Departments of State and Defense. The remaining budget has been divided into three roughly equal parts: (1) the conduct of international arms control negotiations -- predominately SALT, plus certain expenses of U.S. participation in other negotiating forums; (2) research activities, designed to backstop negotiations; and (3) administration, public affairs and other supporting activities.

The following annual appropriations levels are pertinent to this report:

	<u>Program Operation</u>	<u>External Research</u>	<u>Total Funds</u>	<u>Total Positions</u> ^{1/}
FY 1974	\$ 6,965,000	\$ 1,100,000	\$ 8,065,000	204
FY 1975	8,130,000	1,280,000	9,410,000	214
FY 1976 ^{2/}	8,990,000	1,700,000	10,690,000	216

^{1/} Includes personnel who are assigned on a reimbursable basis from other agencies.

^{2/} Presidential request to Congress.

Research

The Agency's external research program not only focuses largely on arms control issues under active or imminent negotiation but also explores new opportunities for arms control and provides a sound basis for policy planning. The FY 1975 external research program supported the negotiation or implementation of major agreements in the areas of SALT, MBFR, Nuclear Test Limitations and

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Nuclear Non-Proliferation, as summarized by the following
table:

<u>Category</u>	<u>Amount</u>
1. SALT	505,000
2. MBFR/Conventional Arms	205,000
3. Nuclear Test Limitations	80,000
4. Nuclear Non-Proliferation	460,000
5. Other	30,000
	<u>1,280,000</u>

In all ACDA research efforts, extensive liaison is maintained with Government agencies (particularly the Department of Defense and the intelligence community) for coordination and to prevent duplication of effort.

GENERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE

The General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament was established by Section 26 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act of 1961 to "advise the President, the Secretary of State, and the Disarmament Director respecting matters affecting arms control, disarmament, and world peace." The law provides that the President shall appoint the Committee by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.

The Committee was reconstituted in 1974 with the selection of Harold M. Agnew as Chairman and the appointment of additional members to bring the total to fourteen. The Committee held its first meeting at the end of August 1974, with subsequent meetings in October and December, during which discussions were held with senior officials of the Government and with both governmental and nongovernmental experts regarding the major arms control issues. The Committee has examined the key problems involved in the SALT negotiations and the November 24, 1974 Vladivostok Agreement, developments in the discussions on mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe, the range of inter-related problems affecting limitations on the proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities on the part of other states than the existing nuclear powers, and the arms control issues considered in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) and in the United Nations General Assembly. The Committee has been advised of major technical developments bearing on the strategic arms relationships, and has conveyed its views with respect to strategic arms negotiations and its concerns regarding nuclear weapons proliferation.

In its meetings, the Committee benefited particularly from discussions with Secretary of State Kissinger, Secretary of Defense Schlesinger, ACDA Director Ikle, CIA Director Colby, Ambassador-at-Large U. A. Johnson, senior officials of the National Security Council Staff, Department of State, ACDA, and CIA, as well as such nongovernmental experts as Dr. Thomas Wolfe of the Rand Corporation, Rear Admiral LaRocque (Ret.) of the Center for Defense Information, and Mr. Paul H. Nitze.

While the Committee draws on the resources of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency for its support, as provided by the Federal Advisory Committee Act of 1972 and relevant Executive Orders, it also has a small staff located in the Committee's offices in the State Department Building. As presently constituted, the members of the Committee are:

- Dr. Harold M. Agnew, Chairman
Director, University of California Los Alamos
Scientific Laboratory;
- I. W. Abel,
President, United Steelworkers of America;
- Gordon Allott,
lawyer and former Senator;
- Dr. Harold Brown,
physicist and President of the California Institute
of Technology, member of the SALT Delegation, and
former Secretary of the Air Force;
- Edward Clark
banker and lawyer, former Ambassador to Australia;
- William C. Foster,
businessman and engineer, former Director of the
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and former
Deputy Secretary of Defense;
- Lane Kirkland,
Secretary-Treasurer of the AFL-CIO;
- John A. McCone,
businessman, former Under Secretary of the Air Force,
former Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission,
and former Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency;
- Carl Marcy,
former Staff Director of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee;

Joseph Martin, Jr.,
lawyer, Ambassador and U.S. Representative to the
Conference of the Committee on Disarmament;


Dean Rusk,
Professor of International Law, University of Georgia,
former Secretary of State, former President of the
Rockefeller Foundation;

William W. Scranton,
lawyer and banker, former Governor of Pennsylvania,
and former member of Congress;

Gerard C. Smith,
lawyer, former Director of the Arms Control and Dis-
armament Agency, former Assistant Secretary of
State and Director of the Policy Planning Staff;

Dr. John A. Wheeler,
scientist, Joseph Henry Professor of Physics at
Princeton.

UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY



56

OFFICIALS OF THE AGENCY
1974

DIRECTOR	Fred C. Ikle
DEPUTY DIRECTOR	J. Owen Zurhellen, Jr.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY	A. M. Christopher
SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR SALT	Sidney N. Graybeal
SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR MBFR	J. David Linebaugh
COUNSELOR	John Newhouse
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, PLANS AND ANALYSIS BUREAU	Amrom H. Katz
DEPUTY	BGen. Kermit C. Kaericher
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS BUREAU	Robert H. Miller
DEPUTY	J. David Linebaugh
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, MILITARY AND ECONOMIC AFFAIRS	Robert M. Behr
DEPUTY	Robert H. Kupperman
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY	Thomas D. Davies
DEPUTY	Robert W. Buchheim
GENERAL COUNSEL	James L. Malone
DEPUTY	Thomas Graham, Jr.
PUBLIC AFFAIRS ADVISER	Ralph Stuart Smith
DEPUTY	Adalyn Davis
EXECUTIVE OFFICER	James T. Hackett
DEPUTY	Sidney D. Anderson

ACDA REPRESENTATIVE TO THE
STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS

Ralph Earle II

ACDA REPRESENTATIVE TO THE
CONFERENCE ON MUTUAL AND BALANCED
FORCE REDUCTIONS

John F. Lehman

U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE
CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT

Joseph Martin, Jr.

Bilateral Arms Control Agreements
Between the United States and the Soviet Union
December 31, 1974

	<u>Signed</u>	<u>Entered Into Force</u>
"Hot Line" Agreement	6/20/63	6/20/63
Improved "Hot Line" Agreement	9/30/71	9/30/71
Nuclear Accidents Agreement	9/30/71	9/30/71
ABM Treaty	5/26/72	10/ 3/72
Interim Agreement on Offensive Strategic Arms	5/26/72	10/ 3/72
Standing Consultative Commission for SALT	12/21/72	12/21/72
Basic Principles of Negotiations on the Further Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms	6/21/73	6/21/73
Threshold Test Ban Treaty with Protocol	7/ 3/74	
Protocol to the ABM Treaty	7/ 3/74	

P - Party
S - Signatory

Status of Multilateral
Arms Control Agreements
December 31, 1973

	Antarctic Treaty	Limited Test Ban Treaty	Outer Space Treaty	Treaty Prohibiting Nuclear Weapons in Latin America	Nuclear Nonpro- liferation Treaty	Seabeds Arms Control Treaty	Geneva Protocol	Bio- logical Weapons Con- vention
Agreement Opened For Signature	12/1/59	8/5/63	1/27/67	2/14/67	7/1/68	2/11/71	6/17/25	4/10/72
Agreement Entered Into Force	6/23/61	10/10/63	10/10/67	4/22/68	3/5/70	5/18/72	5/10/26	*
Country								
US	P	P	P	P (1)	P	P	S (2)	S (2)
USSR	P	P	P		P	P	P	S
UK	P	P	P	P (1) (3)	P	P	P	S
Afghanistan		P	S		P	P		S
Algeria		S						
Argentina	P	S	P	S		S	P	S
Australia	P	P	P		P	S	P	S
Austria		P	P		P	P	P	P
Barbados			P	P	S		P	P

09

Belgium	P	P	P	P	S	P	P	P	S
Bolivia	P	P	S	P	P	S	S	S	S
Botswana	P	P	S	S	P	P	P	P	S
Brazil	P	P	P	S (4)	S	S	P	P	P
Bulgaria	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P
Burma	P	P	P	P	S	S	P	P	S
Burundi	S	S	S	P	P	S	P	P	S
Cameroon	S	S	S	P	P	S	S	S	S
Canada	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P
Central African Republic	P	P	S	P	P	S	S	P	S
Chad	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P
Chile	P	P	S	P	P	P	P	P	S
China (Republic of)	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P
China, People's Republic of				P (1)	P	P	P	P	P
Colombia	S	S	S	P	S	S	S	S	S
Costa Rica	P	P	P	P	P	S	S	S	P

P - Party
S - Signatory

Status of Multilateral
Arms Control Agreements
December 31, 1973

Country	Antaractic Treaty	Limited Test Ban Treaty	Outer Space Treaty	Treaty Prohibiting Nuclear Weapons in Latin America	Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty	Seabeds Arms Control Treaty	Geneva Protocol	Bio-logical Weapons Convention
Agreement Opened For Signature	12/1/59	8/5/63	1/27/67	2/14/67	7/1/68	2/11/71	6/17/25	4/10/72
Agreement Entered Into Force	6/23/61	10/10/63	10/10/67	4/22/68	3/5/70	5/18/72	5/10/26	*
Cuba							P	S
Cyprus		P	P		P	P	P	P
Czechoslovakia	P	P	P		P	P	P	P
Dahomey		P			P	S		S
Denmark	P	P	P		P	P	P	P
Dominican Republic		P	P	P	P	P	P	P
Ecuador		P	P	P	P		P	S
Egypt		P	P		S		P	S
El Salvador		P	P	P	P		S	S

Equatorial Guinea									S
Ethiopia	S	S	P	S	S	P	S	P	S
Fiji	P	P	P			P		P	P
Finland	P	P	P			P	P	P	P
France	P	P	P	P (1)				P	
Gabon	P					P			S
Gambia	P	S	S		S	S	P	P	S
German Democratic Republic	P	P	P		P	P	P	P	P
Germany (Federal Republic of)	P	P	P		S	S	S	P	S
Ghana	P	S	P			P	P	P	S
Greece	P	P	P			P	S	P	P
Guatemala	P		P			P	S		S
Guinea							S		
Guyana		S						P	S
Haiti	S	S	P			P			S
Holy See		S				P		P	
Honduras	P	S	P			P	S	P	S

P - Party
S - Signatory

Status of Multilateral
Arms Control Agreements
December 31, 1973

	Antaractic Treaty	Limited Test Ban Treaty	Outer Space Treaty	Treaty Prohibiting Nuclear Weapons in Latin America	Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty	Seabeds Arms Control Treaty	Geneva Protocol	Bio-logical Weapons Convention
Agreement Opened For Signature	12/1/59	8/5/63	1/27/67	2/14/67	7/1/68	2/11/71	6/17/25	4/10/72
Agreement Entered Into Force	6/23/61	10/10/63	10/10/67	4/22/68	3/5/70	5/18/72	5/10/26	*
Country								
Hungary		P	P		P	P	P	P
Iceland		P	P		P	P	P	P
India		P	S			P	P	P
Indonesia		P	S		S		P	S
Iran		P	S		P	P	P	P
Iraq		P	P		P	P	P	S
Ireland		P	P		P	P	P	P
Israel		P	S				P	
Italy		P	P		S	P	P	S

Ivory Coast	P	P	P	P	P	P	S
Jamaica	S	P	P	P	S	P	
Japan	P	P	P	S	P	P	S
Jordan	P	S		P	P		S
Kenya	P			P		P	
Khmer Republic (Cambodia)			P		S	S	S
Korea (Republic of)	P	P	P	S	S	S	S
Kuwait	P	P	P	S		P	P
Laos	P	P	P	P	P		P
Lebanon	P	P	P	P	S	P	S
Lesotho		S		P	P	P	S
Liberia	P			P	S	P	S
Libya	P	P	P	S		P	
Luxembourg	P	S		S	S	P	S
Malagasy Republic	P	P	P	P	S	P	S
Malawi	P					P	S
Malaysia	P	P	S	P	P	P	S
Maldiv Islands				P		P	
Mali	S	P		P	S	S	S

P - Party
S - Signatory

Status of Multilateral
Arms Control Agreements
December 31, 1973

Agreement Opened For Signature	12/1/59	8/5/63	1/27/67	2/14/67	7/1/68	2/11/71	6/17/75	4/10/72
Agreement Entered Into Force	6/23/61	10/10/63	10/10/67	4/22/68	3/5/70	5/18/72	5/10/76	*
Country								
Antarctic Treaty								
Limited Test Ban Treaty								
Outer Space Treaty								
Treaty Prohibiting Nuclear Weapons in Latin America								
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty								
Seabeds Arms Control Treaty								
Geneva Protocol								
Bio-logical Weapons Convention								
Malta		P			P	P	P	S
Mauritania		P						
Mauritius		P	P		P	P	P	P
Mexico		P	P	P	P		P	P
Monaco							P	
Mongolia		P	P		P	P	P	P
Morocco		P	P		P	P	P	S
Nepal		P	P		P	P	P	S
Netherlands	P	P	P	P (3)	S	S	P	S

New Zealand	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P
Nicaragua	P	S	P	P	P	P	P	S	S	S
Niger	P	P	P					P	P	P
Nigeria	P	P	P	P				P	P	P
Norway	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P
Pakistan	S	P						P	P	P
Panama	P	S	P	S	P	P	P	P	P	P
Paraguay	S		P	P	S	S	P			
Peru	P	S	P	P						S
Philippines	P	S						P	P	P
Poland	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P
Portugal	S							P	S	S
Qatar										S
Romania	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	S
Rwanda	P	S						S	P	S
San Marino	P	P						P		S
Saudia Arabia								P	P	P
Senegal	P							P	S	S
Sierra Leone	P	P						S	P	S

P - Party
S - Signatory

Status of Multilateral
Arms Control Agreements
December 31, 1973

Agreement Opened For Signature	12/1/59	8/5/63	1/27/67	2/14/67	7/1/68	2/11/71	6/17/75	4/10/72
Agreement Entered Into Force	6/23/61	10/10/63	10/10/67	4/22/68	3/5/70	5/18/72	5/10/76	*
Country								
Singapore		P			S	S	P	S
Somalia		S	S		P			S
South Africa	P	P	P			P	P	S
Spain		P	P				P	S
Sri Lanka (Ceylon)		P	S		S		P	S
Sudan		P			P	S		
Swaziland		P			P	P	P	
Sweden		P	P		P	P	P	
Switzerland		P-	P		S	S	P	S

Syrian Arab Republic	P	P	P	P	P	P	S
Tanzania	P			S	P	P	S
Thailand	P	P	P	P	P	P	S
Togo	P	S	P	P	P	P	S
Tonga	P	P	P	P	P	P	
Trinidad & Tobago	P	S	S	S(4)	S	P	
Tunisia	P	P	P	P	P	P	P
Turkey	P	P	P	S	P	P	P
Uganda	P	P	P			P	
United Arab Emirates							S
Upper Volta	S	P	P	P	P	P	
Uruguay	P	P	P	P	P	S	S
Venezuela	P	P	P	P	S	P	S
Vietnam (Republic of)	S	S	S	P	P	S	S
Western Samoa	P						
Yemen (Aden)			S	S	S	S	S

P - Party
S - Signatory

Status of Multilateral
Arms Control Agreements
December 31, 1973

Agreement Opened For Signature	12/1/59	8/5/63	1/27/67	2/14/67	7/1/68	2/11/71	6/17/75	4/10/72
Agreement Entered Into Force	6/23/61	10/10/63	10/10/67	4/22/68	3/5/70	5/18/72	5/10/26	*
Country								
Antarctic Treaty								
Limited Test Ban Treaty								
Outer Space Treaty								
Treaty Prohibiting Nuclear Weapons in Latin America								
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty								
Seabeds Arms Control Treaty								
Geneva Protocol								
Bio-logical Weapons Convention								
Yemen (San'a)		S			S	S	P	S
Yugoslavia		P	S		P	P	P	P
Zaire		P	S		P			S
Zambia		P	P			P	P	
Total (S)	18P 16S	103P 16S	68P 35S	21P 3S	83P 23S	50P 40S	101P ⁽⁶⁾ 4S	38P 72S

* 22 parties, including U.S., U.S.S.R., and U.K., required for entry into force.
(1) Additional Protocol II.

- (2) U.S. Senate gave its advise & Consent to ratification on Dec. 16, 1974.
- (3) Additional Protocol I.
- (4) Also ratified subject to preconditions not yet met.
- (5) Byelorussian S.S.R., and Ukrainian S.S.R., are excluded from totals and the actions in note (7).
- (6) Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania have also ratified.

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Atlanta, Georgia

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Honolulu, Hawaii

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Boise, Idaho

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