CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE

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Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
345 East 46th Street
New York, New York 10017

Cable: INTERPAX, NEW YORK

Telephone: (212) 557-0700

Telex: 62314

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
1717 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20036

Cable: INTERPEACE, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Telephone: (202) 332-6929

Telex: 64485

Dotation Carnegie pour la Paix Internationale
European Center
58, Rue de Moillebeau
1211 Geneva 19
Switzerland

Cable: INTERPAX, GENEVA

Telephone: 34 23 50 - 34 23 58

Telex: 28167

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The Carnegie Endowment in Transition

A Preface by the President

The pages which follow report on the Carnegie Endowment's continuing search for self-identity and public service in the decade of the seventies. That decade opened with the Endowment's status confirmed as an operating (not a grant giving) foundation under the new (1969) tax law. In that setting, as the Endowment's new president, I was charged with the tasks of rethinking priorities, restructuring programs, and, as appropriate, recruiting new personnel.

At decisive points in this process, the informed participation and active encouragement of the Endowment's board of trustees has been noteworthy. Their sustained collaboration and warm support have been invaluable, especially in the case of the chairman, Milton Katz.

This report uses primarily the unusual format of interviews with the Carnegie Endowment's program directors. We have chosen the interview device in order to capture some of the flavor of the evolution through which our programs and personnel are going. In the final analysis, programs are run by people, and their background, their thinking processes, their values and objectives—all will shape the programmatic consequences. Interviews allow people to think out loud about their work and their aspirations, and to give the observer a glimpse of the Endowment in transition.

As an aid in setting their discussions in perspective, these personal notes may be useful.

* * *

Right at the beginning, in 1911, Nicholas Murray Butler tried to take Peace out of the Endowment's title and call it the Carnegie International Endowment instead. Perhaps he had the clairvoyance to anticipate Alfred North Whitehead's later warning that "the deliberate aim at Peace very easily passes into its bastard substitute, Anaesthesia." Or perhaps he anticipated the inevitable corollary: that peace as an unexceptional goal would evoke an endless argument about means.

In any event, more than any other word in our language, peace does unleash emotional attachments to a multitude of differing and often inconsistent positions, each of them strongly felt by somebody to be the proper path to peace. For peace needs defining. Even Lincoln found it necessary to modify it by prefixing "just and lasting. . . ."

For over sixty years the Carnegie Endowment has had an unrivalled perspective on the disputatiousness among would-be peacemakers pressing their preferred projects — on, indeed, the frequent contrast between the Happy Warriors and the unhappy peacemakers. We have experienced the discord among the high-minded, heard the dialogues of the deaf, and watched the defeatism of the disillusioned. In the process we have discovered what should have been obvious to begin with: that there are more roads to peace than roads to Rome; that peace, like heaven, has many mansions; that peace, like man, has many seasons.

We knew all this long before two self-styled peace candidates contested the 1972 U.S. Presidential elections — long before that unlikely twosome of Kissinger and Tho won the 1973 Nobel Peace Prize. We suspected it even before we faced the special doubts and dilemmas of the Vietnam

trauma, when the Peace Endowment found itself seeing things less clearly than either a war-embarked government or thousands of militant peace protectors. That was a time, wrote Emmet Hughes, when

> "200 million American peace lovers divided into two armies distinguishable not by confidence in their own virtues but only by their choice of weapons: the older seekers of 'peace with honor' principally relying on incantations, helicopters, and a little napalm; the younger zealots of 'peace with love' usually favoring obscenities, bricks, and a little vandalism."

The Endowment is called to work for peace publicly, accountably, and with fairness, at a time when differing champions of peace are very clear that peace is enlisted cleanly on one side of an issue only—whether of bombing, mining, and invading in Southeast Asia; or of linking emigration to detente; or of emphasizing North/South relations over East/West or West/West; or of indiscriminately concentrating on international institution building; or of providing arms to African liberation movements; or of embargoing arms to the Middle East; or of "tilting toward Pakistan" against Indian "aggression" with votes in the Security Council or nuclear carriers in the Indian Ocean; or of quietly underwriting the multinational corporation as the *de facto* new internationalism.

People have regularly come into my office who have been clear on all these things. Often I have had to confess, for reasons which may be experiential or chemical, that it has not been vouchsafed to me with apocalyptic clarity which side peace is on. The slide rule, for instance, is not an infallible guide to the social reality of peace. Frequently the point at issue is inherently not subject to proof, although it is always subject to argument. Yet those to whom instant insights occur will inevitably be disappointed in those of us who lag behind. More often than not, they will want to write off our obtuseness as a lack of moral keenness, and attribute it to years of double vision or to a chronic inability to make up our minds.

On one thing the Carnegie Endowment long ago did make up its mind: it was unlikely that we, unaided, would prevent World War III. That much aside, the magnitude of our professed objective still looms so large as to appear presumptuous. The sheer implausibility of relating our goal to our means has, I suspect, always plagued us. It has frustrated our finding any fully satisfactory organizable framework. Programmatic coherence has been, and is, elusive, because the goal of peace itself is so grandiose, ambiguous, and overarching. It semantically spans and artificially bridges most of the gravest polar tensions in world politics: like defense and detente, development and equality, justice and stability, freedom and order.

Consequently over the years, in honest pursuit of our trust, we have had to rethink the Endowment's open-ended assignment. The decade of the seventies is once more a time for new perceptions.

Yet unleashing the hounds of redefinition is always treacherous business, for us especially. For the Endowment's assignment to work for peace guarantees that our frustration potential will inevitably be greater than—or at least different from—that of any other existing foundation. Moreover, differing and changing perceptions of peace will merge imperceptibly into the Endowment's own continuing search for plausible priorities. We know to start with that peace activity normally tends to exaggerate theory, that rhetoric regularly exceeds reality, and that at the end of the day there turns out to be a difference between the real world and the world of make believe. Indeed the Endowment itself, in its grant-giving days, was often the bearer of this bad news to activist peace groups resentful of our refusal to supply funds.

After all, the taxonomy of peace is a central issue which we confront as an institution every time choices are made. Our small scale decisions have to be taken against the background of what is going on in the large scale world. In positioning ourselves to deal with, and choose among, contemporary issues of war and peace, we have tried to keep the operational problem and the intellectual problem equally and concurrently in view. We have found that we had better reconcile ourselves to a certain elusiveness—that living with some imprecision about our secondary goals may be the better part of wisdom.

In the Endowment's new programs, we have sought to resist the caution that leads to inconsequentiality, as well as the idealism that leads to otherworldliness, and the zeal that leads to trouble. (We intend to be innovative and tax-exempt too.) We are trying to act within a frame of reference sufficiently broad to avoid overly identifying the Endowment with episodic concerns, sufficiently narrow so that no one will think we are presuming to do everything, and above all contemporary enough so that we will be seen to be probing close to the margins of serious, significant three-dimensional issues.

Taken seriously, peace, like politics, will always be an area where conscience and power meet, where the ethical and coercive factors of human life will interpenetrate and work out their many temporary, uneasy compromises. If we wish to pursue peace persistently enough to have any impact at all on decision making, it will help if we pursue central subjects in central places on a continuing basis. Even then, we will still have to engage in hard, utilizable thinking and communicating.

The alternative, almost effortlessly achievable, is to arrange for peripheral subjects to be pursued by peripheral people in peripheral places. There is always researching for peace: and we live in the most research-ridden era in history. There is always travelling for peace: and we are part of the most over-travelled generation ever. There is publishing for peace: and we are engulfed in the most publication-surfeited society of all, where reading, meanwhile, is rapidly becoming a lost art. There is conferring for peace: and hundreds of respectable devotees worldwide devote some of the best years of their lives repeating themselves to one another at one conference after another.

Researching, travelling, publishing, and conferring we still wish to do, especially since these are the activities least discouraged by the Tax Reform Act of 1969. In every case how peripheral they really are can almost be measured by the distance, physical and psychic, from those who actually decide or have a role in actually deciding. At a time when it is harder than ever to make a real difference, to be relevant is to be proximate—to bring, in a variety of ways, ideas of potential impact in combination with people of potential influence into the orbit of potential war-makers and peacemakers.

There are legally permissible inventions still to be made in the arena of public policy influence—new ways to organize for effective communication, new levers to be grasped for constructive perturbation. Here the Endowment is in a position to turn to contemporary advantage its conservative heritage in a new and pertinent context. Comparatively speaking, we have been the archetypal symbol over sixty years of the value-free approach to international peace. With minor lapses here and there, we have chosen to identify ourselves with symbolically dispassionate institutional-instrumental programs like international law, international organization, training diplomats, and examining "the changing role of force". Highly combustible subject matter may actually be lodged within these safe-sounding, grey-appearing, tranquil-seeming rubrics, but they have cushioned us from controversy. As it is, our neutral, public image of prestigious non-controversiality provides easy ground for enhancement via further institution building.

At the same time many of these traditional law-and-order subjects have a fateful ring of obsolescence about them in a world where there is increasing disagreement everywhere on the goals of societies, burgeoning challenges to legitimacy and authority, and next to irreconcilable arguments over the operational rules—especially over the merits of continuing to approach real world problems through the filter of traditional Western forms. Hence it has been clear to us that without jettisoning the past, we must experiment seriously with the future.

In charting that future course, we have wanted to avoid complacency, self-delusion, and cynicism, all three. We have recognized that, whatever we do, our leverage will be modest at most. Since, therefore, we are serious about being relevant, we are trying, as actively, inventively, and imaginatively as possible, to achieve the highest intensity of useful involvement, deliberately choosing, whenever possible, operational situations of pertinence, combining pertinent people with pertinent subjects in pertinent places.

The Endowment's three locations — New York, Geneva, and Washington—providentially have provided appropriate settings for the programmatic experiments upon which we are already engaged. Some of these will succeed, some may fail. Others will take their place. Some of our programs are better known abroad than in the United States, some better known in New York than in Washington. Operating in three such diverse locations has given us easy options and enhances our flexibility in selecting both new programs and new personnel.

The first years of the 1970's have been years of both continuity and change. Each new Endowment program has been devised with existing ones in mind. Often a new program has had multiple rationales. At minimum we have hoped for the cross fertilization of multiple relationships. Especially in the case of our joint ventures with other tax-exempt organizations in Washington, we have consciously sought the side benefits of linkages and synergism.

Moreover, redesigning our operating style has been, in part, mandatory as well as volitional. "One of the most basic decisions that must be made about the use of a foundation's funds", according to a Ford Foundation authority, "is that between making grants to other organizations or conducting operations itself." When the Carnegie Endowment decided to qualify legally as an operating foundation, long distance grants had to give way to direct expenditures, and arms-length relationships had to make way for the Endowment's own or integrated programs. As an operating foundation we have had to ask ourselves not only what subjects did we wish to stress, but with and through whom did we closely want to work. We have embarked on selective incentives.

Now, more than before, we have had to base our organizational activity on the most effective arrangements of human resources we could devise in our own centers of activity. In seeking enhancement of the Endowment's reach and augmentation of the Endowment's role, we also had to recognize that the necessary resources of human skill, commitment, and perseverance were scarce.

A frequent organizational retreat under such circumstances is nevertheless to sub-optimize: to locate what personnel can be found, put them directly on the payroll, and then go for broke. The costs of this method of operation can be found in the scattered debris of talent and purpose littering the landscape of contemporary American nongovernmental organizations. Multiple claims are made on dwindling funds, scarce resources are squandered or worn thin, psychological sustenance is strained all around, and the results are bound to be less than the sum of the parts.

That is why the Endowment has opted for the opposite course. We deliberately decided to orient our new Washington programs to take account of the rapidly changing international picture, the serious contemporary breakdown of the American dialogue on foreign policy, and the need for a new and realistic domestic consensus as a basis for international performance by the United States government. Husbanding our resources and judiciously looking for greater reach, we decided to build new institutional networks, linking other compatible tax-exempt groups, in integrated joint ventures satisfying our legal requirements. Choices of partners were made with a view to their compatible scale of operations, their young and energetic leadership, their economy of structure, the mutual benefits to be obtained by co-location, the potential coherence to be found in the complementary outlooks of those with daily working responsibilities, as well as the automatic augmentation of all the networks involved.

Links with the American Foreign Service Association, the Student Committee, the Arms Control Association, and *Foreign Policy* represented different models. But each also constituted a deliberate incremental advance toward a growing beneficial association happily combining different universes of discourse with scarce skills and capacities. When supplemented as necessary with the direct appointment of new Endowment program officers, as in the Humanitarian Studies program, the total complex was designed to represent most of the advantages of orchestration and many of the elements of central casting. Meanwhile, as catalyst, we believe we have widened the audience, enhanced the participation, expanded the readership, broadened the coverage, stimulated interactions and reciprocities, and given the whole cluster a collective significance beyond the reach

of their individual resources. In the process, we have also impressed the Endowment's developing personality on the whole set of interacting relationships.

This experimentation in extending the Endowment's reach through joint ventures has proved helpful not only for the intrinsic merits of the operations, but for what we can learn about future possibilities. There are obvious built-in resources for new program generation. We have increased our ability to seize targets of opportunity in a time of rapid social change and controversy. We have been venturesome and yet, by engaging strictly in term arrangements with program officers who themselves are young and mobile, have preserved our flexibility to launch other, quite different, programs from time to time.

The same purposes have inspired our looser facilitating relationships with young organizations like the German Marshall Fund of the United States, the Commission on the Middle East, and the Institute for Congress, where co-location and administrative support assist in the pursuit of goals compatible with the Endowment's programs.

Our new infrastructure promotes a broader base and greater freedom to experiment at the same time as it moves us away from tendencies toward permanent programs and personnel. In a sense, joint ventures must be exercises in creative ambiguity. They are both sustaining and innovative in purpose. Hence they do not necessarily lend themselves on either side to excessive clarification. When they work, they give promise of new forms of dynamic growth. Most important of all, they provide us with an operational definition of our mission—perhaps the most reliable kind—expressed in terms of actual programs and projects.

Hence it seemed to me that one good way for others to reperceive the Carnegie Endowment might be to provide a contemporary mosaic of the Endowment in transition and to do so by means of the unconventional layout and presentations which follow. With that in mind, I asked Richard Holbrooke, the Managing Editor of *Foreign Policy* and the Endowment's Special Assistant for Publications, to interview program directors about the range and dimensions of their work. He has been very ably assisted by Robert C. Richter. Together we thought that the interview format might produce more lively and readable insights than can customarily be found in foundation reports. We believe this objective has been achieved.

The resulting panorama is necessarily uneven and undoubtedly more personalized than usual. In view of the comparative newness and importance of the Humanitarian Studies program, for example, we have given it more space than the others. We hope, however, that in this way we are conveying more genuine information about the type of work actually being done, and the type of people doing it, than would normally be the case.

I like to think that in some of the following pages the reader will find a certain validation of what I had in mind for the Endowment when, one spring evening in New York in 1971, I used these words to conclude my first formal statement to the Carnegie trustees:

> "The service of peace in the 1970's lies, at least in part, in arresting the flight from foreign policy, in providing new agents for dialogue, and in striving to bring purposes and means into balance again. If we live 'in the street called Now and the house named Here,' we will not have to convince ourselves of the need for timely action, nor for the politics that rises above politics, nor for those indispensable catalytic factors that can constructively reengage the estranged elements of contemporary life inside and outside the United States. In the process, perhaps we shall find—who knows?—not only a renewal of character, and not only a new chapter in the life of this old Endowment, but a contemporary glimpse, as well, into the efficient secret of peace."

Thomas L. Hughes
January 15, 1974

HUMANITARIAN POLICY STUDIES

Roger Morris & Donald F. McHenry

Roger Morris: The Humanitarian Policy Studies program is designed to bring to the foreign affairs field some of the research techniques which have been so effective on the domestic scene in monitoring the behavior of government. I think Carnegie has recognized that public interest studies in the domestic field have been much more successful than similar work in foreign policy, that the past decade has brought to the domestic area a new rigor of analysis, a new depth and intensity of public interest research. As a result, government agencies have become somewhat more accountable and open.

However, the foreign policy community, the Defense Department, the Department of State, AID, other agencies, the Congress, are still largely immune from any kind of public scrutiny except for academic research, which tends to be either abstract, or quick draw journalism. The techniques that exposed the cyclamate offenses in the FDA, the misfunctioning of the FTC, the scandals in nursing homes in Maryland, all the public interest studies that have been done over the last decade in so many areas—health, education, human problems of the United States—have not been brought to bear on foreign policy. Yet as we learned in Vietnam, there were high human costs being paid all around the world, many of those costs paid by the American people.

So the Humanitarian Policy Studies program is an effort to apply a technique. But it is also an effort to revive within the U.S. government the legitimacy of the whole realm of the human factor. As people who had had experience in government, we were concerned with the inability of government — for a variety of bureaucratic and intellectual reasons—to come to grips with the human factor as distinct from the more traditional categories of foreign policy dealing with regimes, relations among states . . . .

Let me interrupt for a minute. What do you mean by the human factor? To what extent has it been missing in our policy? Surely almost every senior policymaker would resent the implication that they are not concerned with human lives. Yet clearly you are implying that . . . .

Morris: I don't think we're implying that they were unconcerned with human lives. What we're trying to find out in an empirical way is just how much they were concerned with human lives.

But aren't you starting from an assumption that they were insufficiently concerned?

Morris: Well, what we are suggesting is that a number of decisions over the last decade have had the result—whatever the intentions may have been—of subordinating human considerations to more traditional considerations of power, interstate relations, and all the rest.

Don McHenry: I think the questions which get attention in foreign policy tend to be those questions which revolve around U.S.-Soviet or Chinese relations or problems of the Middle East, or the like. What gets less attention in the newspapers, in the Administration and in the Congress

are things like crises in Bangladesh, the drought in West Africa, or some of the endemic human rights questions in Southern Africa. The focus tends to be on those things which are traditionally *major* issues. People in government and the public both pay much less attention to human rights or humanitarian questions. It's true that they pay a great deal of attention to human rights questions when they grow large—when drought threatens the lives of millions of people—but there is a possibility of paying more attention, and of influencing situations *before* they reach a crisis stage.

Does your work rest on the assumption—and I think if it does, it's worth stating specifically—that human considerations should be the starting point for foreign policy rather than strategic or balance-of-power considerations?

Morris: No, and this is a critical distinction to make about the program. We are really not that theoretically oriented. What we're trying to do is to describe a policy process in Washington, and describe it in terms of real life as distinct from traditional academic analysis. We're highly empirical. We work on the basis of intensive interviews of public officials. We bring in students from around the country who come to Washington and examine documents and then talk to all sorts of sources, both in and out of government. We're trying to tell a story which is intelligible to the general public, and which will describe what has happened. Now, inevitably out of that story will come judgments. All we're really starting with in terms of an assumption is that human considerations of the kind Don is talking about are a very legitimate factor in the making of foreign policy. We're trying to measure in a hard empirical way how that factor gets weighed. If it is subordinated to other interests, why and how is it subordinated? If it is ignored, why and how is it ignored?

McHenry: Roger mentioned an aspect of the program which I think is probably the most exciting part. That is the involvement of the students. Through interviews, through contact with government officials, with the legislature, and with knowledgeable people in the foreign policy community, they get an appreciation of government, of the decision-making process, and of the complexity of these problems.

Morris: Yes, I think that our experience thus far suggests that three hours of interviewing government bureaucrats is worth 30 hours of credit in most political science faculties.

How did you pick your students?

Morris: Students were recruited with an emphasis on areas outside the northeastern United States. We looked at those areas which did not have the usual Washington intern programs. The recruitment process was very simple. We've worked through the Student Committee and through contacts in various universities. For example, the first group of students came from a wide variety of schools—the Universities of Houston and Cincinnati, Iowa State, Rockhurst College in Kansas City, UCLA, the Universities of Oregon and Nebraska. Others came from Reed College, USC, Texas, Iowa, and Minnesota—again areas primarily west of the Mississippi.

Undergraduate or graduate?

Morris: These are primarily graduate students. We have one or two undergraduates in their senior year.

Are they headed for careers in public service?

Morris: Not necessarily. Many of them are. I'm afraid in some cases they may have changed their minds after an experience in Washington. But most of them we tried to recruit from the point of view of interest, motivation, and originality. Some of them are in anthropology, others in psychology. We didn't look primarily at political science majors.

And they get credit for this in their universities?

Morris: Yes, all of those who have requested credit have received credit.

McHenry: We had a young law student from the University of Kansas last summer who got law school credit for her work.

You chose as your first two projects Biafra and Bangladesh. Why?

Morris: Yes, that's right. We thought that they were two classic recent cases of humanitarian crises and that the U.S. response to those problems would probably illustrate as vividly as any other recent examples how the United States weighs the human problem as against all the other factors in foreign policy.

Is it possible to accuse you of having deliberately chosen two projects in which you knew at the outset that American humanitarian efforts have been sorely delinquent?

Morris: No, I don't think that's quite true. I think that the surface publicity suggested some delinquency, but we selected two problems which involved massive human disasters of the last decade—Bangladesh in terms of ten million people driven from their homes into refugee camps, Biafra where the human toll was enormous. We try to measure it in terms of the intensity and scope of these disasters, and we also selected those cases because they involve very complex factors of civil strife and international involvement.

The foreign policy community in the United States seems to be endlessly studying things, forming task forces, doing special projects. Why are your projects and studies different from those that have been done elsewhere?

McHenry: I think that when you look at most of the studies under way in the think tanks around the country, you discover the difference. Many of the studies that we're doing are the kinds they don't do. You won't find Biafra-Bangladesh studies. I don't think you'll find Burundi. You won't find an inquiry into Rhodesian sanctions. They are studying those larger issues that we were discussing earlier.

Morris: And they're also studying the *issues* as distinct from the process itself. The Brookings Institution may study a decision on naval weapons procurement in terms of the pros and cons of a particular weapons system. They may study the issue of troop levels in Europe. They will not, as a general rule, tell you how the Department of the Navy weighs naval weapons decisions, or precisely how AID or State made its policy toward the Indian subcontinent. The distinction is critical—again getting back to my original comments about public interest research. What distinguished many other groups in public interest research in the domestic area was that they were describing institutions and processes of government, really for the first time. People had been talking for years about the issues of the environment, of drug control, and of automotive safety. But no one had really described how General Motors builds cars or safety features, no one had really described how the FDA polices the drug business, no one had really described how the FTC does or does not deal with industry. We're going to try to describe how the Department of State and AID and the Department of Defense and other foreign affairs agencies actually work on a day-to-day basis on human questions.

McHenry: I think it is the difference between traditional academic research and how decisions are really made.

Morris: I remember a prominent academic, leaving the government, saying, "I'll never again be able to draw those diagrams on the blackboard with a straight face." We've had the same reaction from students who, having studied political science, have now spent time with bureaucrats. After prowling the halls of the Department of State, they come back and say, "It isn't that way at all."

Do you think that you're open to the criticism that this is just another series of swipes at the United States government?

Morris: Yes, I think that could be a valid criticism, in the sense that we are looking at what may be failures of U.S. policy. But we're trying very hard to be objective. In the cases of Biafra and Bangladesh we're talking about a civil war, civil strife, international involvement in rather distant areas, areas of minimal strategic interest to the United States, where the factors influencing U.S. policy were extremely complicated and the pressures on policymakers intense from all sides. We're not trying to make value judgments on that total policy process. What we're going to try to do is describe the environment and the atmosphere in which policymakers had to operate, the pressures that were put upon them, the

decisions that they made, and then let the reality of the process speak for itself.

McHenry: Incidentally, what's wrong with another series of "swipes" at the U.S. government if they are deserved "swipes?" Particularly with the kinds of studies we're talking about—issues which ordinarily are handled very quietly. They are not front page news until they reach a crisis or disaster stage. The only way the public or the Congress can have any influence on them is as a result of someone trying to bring these issues out to the public in a reasonably objective and intelligent way. Now if that's described as a "swipe" at the U.S. government, in our system of government it's probably all to the good.

Morris: I think that's very important. We're dealing here with a bureaucracy largely immune from public accountability. The Department of State in particular, unlike most of the other agencies of government, has escaped public accountability to a large degree. If one goes to the Bureau of Indian Affairs, or to HEW, HUD, or Transportation, one can find there people who are responsible for policy who have gone out and actually faced their constituents in a very direct way. If you've gone to an Indian reservation in Minnesota and faced some very angry mothers and fathers on a school issue, if you've talked to welfare workers in New York or in Watts, if you've gone from the Department of Transportation to face the labor unions in a trucking dispute, then you've dealt with the American public in a way that the Department of State rarely experiences.

McHenry: What is more, there are people dealing with these issues in the government who actually appreciate attention because it strengthens their hand. They aren't able to get attention in the bureaucracy as long as the issue is quietly handled and no one cares.

So by drawing public attention to humanitarian issues you've strengthened those elements in the bureaucracy which are very often the weakest.

You both have made a very interesting point. The domestic branches of the government have to respond to a certain extent to domestic pressures because their constituents are in the United States. Those American officials who are dealing with foreign matters rarely feel constituency pressure, except in great national catastrophes like Vietnam . . .

This leads to the larger issue of American concern for humanitarian matters. We have always believed that our country is a great humanitarian source of strength in the world. But what will happen in an era of resource shortages if large areas of the world are short on food and face famine or drought, and the United States finds itself in control of the world markets, with inflation driving up the price of wheat and beef? How will Americans react? Are they going to be willing to make sacrifices to help people with different skins who are continents away?

Morris: I think one of the encouraging results of Vietnam is that there has really been no decline in public interest or in public contributions to humanitarian efforts in this country —perhaps an increase.

Now I think that's a striking paradox in the American character, that humanitarian concerns and feeding starving people, caring for children in disasters, are still seen as legitimate purposes and goals of American foreign policy. When the President of the United States announces that he's just given 10 million dollars to feed some refugees someplace, it's one of the few things he can still do which is truly, genuinely nonpartisan and gets bipartisan support in the Congress.

McHenry: It's one of the reasons I don't accept all the talk about isolationism. I think Americans are still very willing to play a part in world affairs if they believe we are there for legitimate purposes and if they have some belief in the cause.

I'm glad that you have a positive view of American humanitarian concerns. When confronted squarely with the issue — should we send food to people on the verge of starvation? — Americans respond yes, from Herbert Hoover's famous effort in the 1920's for a country which we opposed ideologically, Russia, right up to our 1973 efforts to airlift

supplies into the Sahel. On the other hand, when the issue becomes a little more indirect, and strategic considerations are raised, I have greater doubts. You said earlier, Roger, that there were minimal U.S. strategic interests in either Biafra or Bangledesh. From the way the United States government behaved in those crises, perhaps your view of American strategic interests would not have been shared at the White House.

Morris: That's true, and what we're trying to do is identify and get out in the open what rationales underlay these policies.

When strategic interests are perceived, the United States has been willing to subordinate humanitarian considerations?

McHenry: The best example of this is coming out in the Endowment's Rhodesian sanctions study.* Clearly, the humanitarian objectives which lay behind the whole sanctions effort became subordinate when the Congress thought the United States was being hurt strategically by observing the chrome sanctions. The Congress chose to violate international law. Now, I suspect that this is an example in which there was too little knowledge on the part of the public and the Congress of the real issues. Because there wasn't sufficient knowledge, it was possible for lobbyists to put across quite successfully the idea that the United States ought to violate international law because we had some strategic interest in continuing to buy chrome from Southern Rhodesia.

Now, let's go on to another type of cross-fire. In addition to the Rhodesia example which you cited, Don, there's another category of issue in which humanitarian considerations may run up against another principle often honored in the breach: that of non-intervention in the internal affairs of another country. Greece, the Soviet Union, Brazil, Indonesia, Czechoslovakia, and Chile, to choose countries across an ideological spectrum, all fall in the category today of having documented and notorious violations of human rights. When humanitarian issues intersect that principle of non-interference, how do you choose?

*See interview with Anthony Lake, pp. 55.

Morris: I don't think it's possible at this point for us to postulate any kind of theorem on what may be the most agonizing problem in American foreign policy in the remainder of the century—that is the whole question of intervention. And humanitarian intervention in particular in the cases that you suggest raises all sorts of practical problems of national security and propriety under international law. Our thinking is much more modest than a new postulate.

It would be wrong to assume that the purpose of this program is to draft some kind of guideline or to arrive at some kind of lesson for American policymakers in a humanitarian crisis. It's by no means clear that we're going to discover in the case of either Bangladesh or Biafra that it was necessarily easy, let alone that it was right, or clearly in the national interest, to have acted in a more humane or humanitarian way. All we really want to do is to describe the pressures and the complexities facing these policymakers, because humanitarian crises are going to recur again and again in a variety of different contexts involving a variety of conflicting national interests. We want to make the government better able to *deal* with those conflicts, more urgent and alive in its approach to humanitarian concerns, and to make the human factor a much more legitimate and closely considered factor in foreign policy.

McHenry: I think it's entirely possible—and I hope we'll succeed in this—to be extremely hard-nosed about recognizing that there are conflicting interests which have to be weighed in reaching a policy decision in all situations. But we want to assume that the humanitarian factor is weighed as heavily as it ought to be weighed, no more than that. I think from my own experience in government that it isn't weighed that much. It may be there in the backs of people's minds, but in discussions it certainly isn't articulated.

Morris: I prefer to think of measuring the government against its own claims. I don't think any President in the last 50 years, certainly no recent administration, has disavowed a humane stand in foreign policy. President Nixon tells us that the United States is most of all concerned with the lives of

children around the world and with the generation of peace, and with security only as it bears upon the ability of people to build a better life for themselves. President Johnson was concerned about wiping out poverty and despair and hopelessness around the world as well as in the United States. President Kennedy wanted to man the ramparts of freedom for the same purposes. Every administration articulates its foreign policy in humane, moral terms. We're simply trying to hold up to the government its own standards and measure its performance.

Let's turn from the general to the specific. You first gained attention through your Burundi study. Could you describe how that study got going? Your conclusions received a great deal of press attention, and more policy attention has probably focused on Burundi since your study than before.

Morris: When we began the program, we envisioned two kinds of studies. One was longer term analysis and description of a policy process of the kind we've been talking about (Biafra, Bangladesh, Micronesia, Rhodesia). We also envisioned a capability in the group to do from time to time certain shorter *ad hoc* studies on humanitarian problems of which Burundi was a prototype.

Burundi came to our attention when some young Africans came to our office and simply raised the issue that the U.S. government and the international community had been conspicuously negligent in dealing with the human rights problems there. Three of the student researchers who were working on Bangladesh volunteered to work extra hours in order to do interviews on Burundi. They were Michael Bowen, Gary Freeman, and Kay Miller. We began with no clear preconception at all of what had happened there. We knew that there had been massive murders of the Hutu tribe by the ruling Tutsi, but we had no idea of what American policy had been. We set out to find out as best we could by interviewing nearly every public official who had been associated with the policy.

The Burundi study is an illustration of what we've been talking about because the real faults that we found in the U.S. government were not faults of concept or of approach —they were faults of process. We discovered that the United States had *not* considered actively or seriously its alternatives by way of economic sanctions against the Burundian regime, though the United States purchases 80% of Burundi's coffee and has an economic stranglehold on the country. We found that the government had ignored legitimate and serious arguments made by the Department of State's own legal advisor for African affairs with regard to our obligations under international law to deal with abuses of human rights of the kind that went on in Burundi. We were describing the process by which the U.S. government had been confronted with this humanitarian crisis, and for bureaucratic and other reasons had simply ignored alternative approaches. We were much more distressed that the government had not done these things, than we were with the policy itself. I don't know how to draw the distinction very clearly, except to say that we would have been less distressed if we had found that the U.S. did the same thing after the most laborious and serious consideration of all the alternatives. What we found was that the U.S. government had dismissed policy alternatives without real debate and had done so for a variety of reasons.

The Burundi study also illustrates something else which is very important. It was personalized—we named names, we tried to identify which officials were responsible for policy, who had acted when and in what way and for what reasons. This occasioned some controversy even among our own colleagues in the sense that the foreign policy community is not accustomed to being named that way. Officials, particularly in the African bureau, had operated for a long time in relative obscurity. They did not appreciate publicity. So long as these men are as immune as they are from public accountability, so long as they're as obsessed as they are with their own client considerations, then whenever those policy considerations are consigned to them, they're going to behave in the same unfortunate way. If we have any single audience that we're trying to reach in addition to the American public and the Congress which ought to be more informed, it ought to be younger foreign service officers who are going to have responsibility in the future and who will have to weigh these factors carefully.

Well, perhaps it isn't institutional so much as attitudinal. It doesn't matter whether it's the White House or the State Department that made a certain policy. What matters more are the values that the mid-level officials bring to their job.

Morris: It's a seamless web — attitudes are obviously shaped in part by the institution and in part by a whole series of cultural and social factors. What it boils down to is personalities. Foreign policy in the end becomes a matter of temperament. Institutions are shaped by men, and *are* men, and we're trying to *reach* those men, and this emphasizes again the importance of the objectivity of the study. We're going to try to describe the factors that these men have to weigh. I hope we can get through to them.

Along those lines, what do you feel about the impact of your Burundi study on policy?

Morris: Well, we've had some encouraging reports. Exactly at the time the study came out, there was a resurgence of violence in Burundi. We understand that a new initiative was taken by the U.S. government to prod the African leadership into dealing with the situation, particularly the OAU. And we've been told privately that those initiatives would not have been taken without the Carnegie study. Now that's the most gratifying and direct kind of success you can have—to be told that human rights have been moved to the top of an official agenda because the Carnegie Endowment put it there. I wouldn't hope for that kind of direct success in other studies, but I think we have a very good chance in the case of Micronesia, which is the newest study of the Humanitarian Policy Studies program. Bangladesh and Biafra are *ex post facto*. Rhodesia tends to be *ex post facto*. Micronesia is an effort to study something more prospective, a crisis waiting to happen.

MICRONESIA

McHenry: Micronesia is one of those issues on which a great deal of attention is being focused within a small segment of the U.S. government. Eventually, the Congress is going to have to make major decisions on everything from the extension of American sovereignty to the role of the Micronesian islands in our foreign basing strategy. It's one of those classic cases where there is a potential conflict between the strategic interests of the United States and the traditional American view that we are for self-determination.

Would you elaborate on that, because most people don't know much about the issue.

McHenry: We took the Micronesian islands from the Japanese during World War II. At the time, the United States held the position that we did not want to take territory by conquering, that people ought to have the right of self-determination. At the same time the American military, remembering the bloody battles that had taken place in that area, and looking at the strategic location of the islands, wanted to maintain them under American control. So we compromised. The UN Charter had a specific category of Trust Territory under which Micronesia fell, the only so-called Strategic Trust which ever came under the UN. But 25 years have passed, and we have to decide whether we are going to fulfill our commitment to self-determination for those islands. The military says that there is still an American strategic interest in those islands, or at a minimum denying them to other powers. The United States is trying to fulfill this commitment to self-determination while not letting go of the islands. As a result, the Administration has been negotiating with the people of Micronesia, trying to work out some kind of arrangement whereby they would enter into a new and lasting association with the United States.

Is this a problem in which no other nation is involved? Is it between us and the Micronesians?

McHenry: Well, we can do nothing toward changing the status of those islands without the agreement of the United Nations, specifically the Security Council.

Morris: There is also intense concern about the Soviets and Japanese because of the strategic considerations.

McHenry: We're looking basically at four areas: the first is the international legal and political factors involved in

changing the current status of the islands from a Trust Territory to whatever it's going to become. Second, assuming for the moment that the islands will in some way become associated with the United States, what are the domestic legal and political factors involved in their association with the United States? And here you get into questions like: does American sovereignty extend to the islands? Do the islanders get citizenship? If they have self-government, does the U.S. Congress have the right to pass legislation to veto theirs? If the Congress makes appropriations, does the Congress have the right to oversee how those expenditures are made? If the islanders want their land protected, is it possible for them to become a part of the United States and have a situation where only Micronesians can own land in Micronesia and other American citizens cannot?

Third, there are strategic questions. Is it valid to assume that Micronesia is of strategic importance to the United States? Many people say it isn't, and that even if it is, you could fulfill our strategic interest in the area by other means, by neutralization, by coming up with some kind of international agreement which would deny the area to other powers — that we can indeed fulfill strategic commitments without necessarily using Micronesia. The whole strategic area is one we want to take a hard look at. Obviously in doing so you get into domestic issues of how much in military expenditures we want to make. Should we be opening new bases in Micronesia when we're closing bases in the United States and around the world?

The fourth area which we are taking a look at couldn't more clearly be labeled a humanitarian area. Are there steps which we ought to be taking in negotiations with the Micronesians which might assure a respect for Micronesian rights? Are we going to have a situation fifteen years from now where the Micronesians will have been had, where we'll have another trail of broken treaties along the lines of the American Indian experience?

How many students are working with you, Don?

McHenry: I think we will have had a total of 11 by the time the project's finished.

Morris: Let me add a final comment to that. Some people feel that these projects are new departures for the Carnegie Endowment. I think what Don has just said illustrates a rather more basic truth, and that is that all of these studies are really concerned with some very traditional interests of the Endowment — human rights, international law, international organization, the international role of the United States, how the United States adjusts and makes its way in the international community, the interaction of domestic and foreign policy considerations — I think these interests fall well within the charter that Andrew Carnegie set forth, and well within some of the traditional interests of the Endowment as practiced in programs for several decades. We may be adopting a somewhat different and unorthodox approach, and we may be enlisting students in a new manner and tackling problems of unusual controversy, but the traditional concerns of the Endowment are still very basic to what we're trying to do.

The involvement of the students is an interesting additional factor here — you really seem to have dual objectives. The education of students surely must rank as one of the highest returns of this whole project.

Morris: It may be the single highest return in the end. In personal terms, it's by far the most gratifying part of the program, because we're dealing with what tend to be very depressing subjects, and sometimes the most cheerful thing is the dawning awareness of young people about what's going on.

Does this dawning awareness take the form of hope that if they work at it they can change things, or cynicism that it is all just too big to affect?

Morris: I think we have disabused several young people of a somewhat conspiratorial view of American politics, institutions in general, and foreign policy in particular. The result is to leave them with the awareness that these problems are intensely human, and therefore soluble, and that while they may be difficult and complex, they are not really overpowering. ■

The Commission on the Middle East

Judging the conflict in the Middle East as a critical threat to peace, in 1968 a number of private citizens from many countries constituted themselves a Commission on the Middle East to devise regional economic measures to enable those who had been uprooted by the conflict to re-establish themselves and become productive and self-supporting.

Initially with Ford Foundation funding, and subsequently with financing from the Carnegie Endowment, Near East Emergency Donations, and matching funds, the Commission sponsored two major study projects in the 1967-73 interwar period. Under the direction of former Ambassador Vladimir Velebit of Yugoslavia, with Professor Richard Gilbert as Economic Consultant, studies were prepared aimed at future development plans covering that portion of the Middle East in which most Palestinian Arabs live: Jordan, the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, Lebanon and, when political conditions should permit, Syria. The plans were oriented towards employment, but covered all aspects of development. They were to provide for both public and private financing. The purpose was to contribute toward the solution of the refugee problem by integrating the refugees into the general populations, not by direct aid to the refugees, but by providing economic opportunities for all. The intention was not only humanitarian: it was to promote peace. It was hoped that the plans would serve as an incentive in the peace negotiations under UN Resolution 242. It was also hoped that economic betterment itself would create a climate that would facilitate peace making.

Two research projects were undertaken: one for the administered areas—the West Bank and Gaza, the other for Jordan. The studies deal with the refugee problem in an economic context rather than with the Arab-Israeli military or political confrontation. Using somewhat different approaches, they make several recommendations concerning economic development that are currently under study by authorities in the Middle East and by international funding agencies. The Commission has not endorsed the specific analyses or recommendations in these preliminary studies. However, they serve to emphasize the contribution that development could make to peace in the area—the subject of the Commission's ongoing concern.

Members of the Commission: Herman J. Abs, Kurt Birrenbach, Eugene R. Black, Roberto Campos, Hollis B. Chenery, Kermit Gordon, Thomas L. Hughes, Jacob K. Javits, Joseph E. Johnson (Convenor), Edward M. Kennedy, James Linen, Edward Mason, Reginald Maudling, Gunnar Myrdal, Aurelio Peccei, David Rockefeller, Eric Roll, Pierre Uri, Eric Wyndham White. *Executive Director,* Larry L. Fabian. ■

THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION PROGRAM

Charles William Maynes Jr.



Bill, as you sit in your office here in New York, you can see the United Nations. Many people say that it is becoming irrelevant in the modern world. Yet the Carnegie Endowment has been deeply committed to programs concerning the United Nations. As the Endowment's new Secretary, what is your view on the future of the world organization, on the future of international organizations in general, and the relationship of the Endowment to such institutions?

Bill Maynes: The United Nations is in trouble, but it is not alone in its difficulty. I see the UN's difficulty as related to the difficulty faced by others. If we return to a period where more people have positive attitudes towards the UN, we probably will see many of the same people with more positive attitudes about the U.S. State Department. It's the turning away from foreign issues in general which is the most crippling development of all.

Why do you think people are turning away from institutions like the UN or the State Department?

Maynes: One reason is that they don't believe the institutions are effective in coping with the forces that are troubling the average citizen. And, of course, they're right.

Traditional institutions of foreign policy like the State Department or the UN operate on the assumption that nation-states are in control of, and can be held accountable for, the forces at work in the international community. The theory may have made sense in the past, but now it breaks down in the face of some of the newer international issues. What government controls the terrorist who hijacks a plane? What government controls the drug traffic? Or the pace of science and technology? Or sudden shifts in trade which bankrupt domestic industries?

In brief, the challenge to the UN probably is not an isolated challenge.

Maynes: It's a common challenge addressed to all of us in the field of foreign policy. That's why those hard "realists" who point to the UN's disarray are deceiving themselves. The disarray is everywhere.

Would you say then that the Carnegie Endowment, through its New York office, has a vested interest in the UN or in any other international organization?

Maynes: We don't have a vested interest in any particular organization, national or international. We do have a vested interest in the problems that require some form of international organization to be solved. I'd like to make another point on that issue. Today, there's a growing feeling that foreign policy institutions like the United Nations or the State Department aren't terribly relevant. But sharp swings in popular mood shouldn't be the *only* policy guide for foundations. It may make sense to set up programs like "Face-to-Face"—our joint venture with the American Foreign Service Association—or to continue our program in international organization precisely because it is at least possible that the popular mood may be wrong.

How can a private, American foundation with modest resources make a major contribution in the field of international organization?

Maynes: The truthful answer to that question is that any contribution will be extremely modest, although, heaven knows, on problems like this everyone's contribution, even that of many governments, is modest. But it's useful to look at the environment in which we find ourselves. It's completely different, I would think, from the environment in which the Carnegie Endowment found itself in, say, 1946. Then, in part because of the League experience, it was believed that there would be relatively few organizations interested in or sympathetic to the United Nations. Moreover, there were fewer private organizations or foundations then actively interested in promoting research on international issues. Look at the situation today. Now the United Nations has its own research institute, the United Nations Institute for Training and Research, or UNITAR. There has been an explosion of research institutes and university departments, all working on international questions, many of which are related to the UN's activities. Today the Carnegie Endowment is only one among many private and semi-public institutions trying to come to grips with pressing international issues. In such a changed environment, it would be especially arrogant to think that we had any monopoly on wisdom or resources.

Now that you have modestly and wisely set limits for yourself, what can the Carnegie Endowment do?

Maynes: To answer that question we probably have to ask what any operating foundation like the Endowment can do. Under current legislation, we can engage in educational activities, but even that has to be done only in certain ways. We can hire qualified people to do research on important issues, or provide them with fellowships on condition that we manage the program. We can form research teams. We can convene conferences. And operating foundations can set up training programs. Naturally, we hope to do any or all of these as imaginatively as possible. But in the last analysis, what we're trying to do is create opportunities that otherwise would not exist. That is not to say that these opportunities would *never* exist. If the problem is important enough, I think that some day it probably will be faced. But wouldn't it be better to face the problem earlier?

Could you describe some of the specifics that flesh out the generalities that you have been talking about?

Maynes: Let's take, as the best example, our new efforts to establish an international fact-finding center in New York. The Endowment is convinced that there could be a role of significance and usefulness for such a center to play. Some institutions are studying the problems of the year 2000. Some others have studied crises that have already broken out. There are very few, however, that tackle problems of the present plus the next six to 24 months, the so-called near-horizon issues. Yet in the very near future these are the issues that will lead to tension or violence.

There are, of course, good reasons why few organizations concentrate on such issues. For example, as long as one believes that the nation-state is the only significant actor on the international scene, then some will argue—I think falsely—that there isn't much for a nongovernmental organization to do. They contend that only the nation-state has the relevant information, and it may refuse to share that information. But particularly with the rise of so-called transnational issues among states—that is, issues where at least one of the actors is not a government—there may be a greater opportunity for international, privately-funded fact-finding. A private body may be able to bring to the attention of the international community in a timely and thoughtful fashion possible consequences of such transnational issues. Or to seize other opportunities.

How?

Maynes: We see the center as bringing together teams of first-class investigative reporters or others with relevant experience to work on issues like possible festering relations between a multinational corporation and a nation-state, arms flows into particular regions which seem to be assuming ominous proportions, certain aspects of the energy crisis,

internal issues that have external effects such as gross violations of human rights where evidence is available but where, for various reasons—primarily political in nature—neither the member-state nor the United Nations itself is in a position to speak out in time.

But every issue you have mentioned is an issue that many others have been studying and writing about. I take it you have something more in mind than just another research and study group effort?

Maynes: Perhaps the difference we have in mind can best be explained by looking at some of the projects which the Endowment has funded in the past.

Most have fallen into the area of policy-related research. But like most other organizations the Endowment often waited until an event actually took place before it decided to study what the consequences might be for the international community and what lessons might be drawn for similar situations in the future. Thus, while there were important exceptions, the Endowment funded a study of UN peacekeeping forces *after* the 1956 decision to send UN troops into the Middle East; it funded a study of the Congo *after* the UN had been involved there; it funded a study of what the UN could do in Berlin *after* the Berlin crisis had flared up again. Now I'm as conscious as anyone else of the difficulty of trying to begin studying such issues before they flare up. There are reasons why organizations study such issues as the energy crisis only after it has become a crisis. But to the degree that it is possible, we hope that an objective of the international fact-finding center will be an attempt at crisis anticipation. The role the Endowment played in the 1950's was an important role. But others are playing that role now. The needs have changed.

You study an issue, hopefully, before it flares up, and then what happens next?

Maynes: Much will depend upon the kind of report produced. In some cases, for example, gross violations of human rights, simply publishing information can serve a useful purpose by stimulating positive action. On other issues the need for action will not be so clear. In those cases, a report presumably would identify certain trends. The next step might be a study group with appropriate representation organized by the Endowment to consider what the policy consequences of these trends might be—what steps might be taken either to counter them or accelerate them. If we have a good draft report which is controversial, we may also consider sending it to the primary actors involved and asking them to comment. In that way, it would be clear that both sides had been given a chance to express their views prior to publication.

There seems to be some overlap with the Humanitarian Policy Studies program. Is this intentional?

Maynes: There may turn out to be similarities. But there are also differences. Take personnel. In the case of the Humanitarian Studies program, we have teams of students directed by Endowment staff. In the case of the international fact-finding center, we will have teams of professional journalists and other experts with professional experience. Or look at the focus. In the case of the Humanitarian Studies program, the focus is primarily on the actions of the U.S. government. In the case of the international fact-finding center, the focus will be more international. Even the audience of the two programs may be different. The international fact-finding center would hope to have a more international audience.

If the fact-finding center is a good idea, why should it be located in New York, rather than Geneva or Washington or elsewhere?

Maynes: I don't think there is a better place to locate it than New York where we hope to benefit from several advantages. One, the proximity to the United Nations. Two, New York remains the media communications hub of the world. Three, the city, despite its difficulties, remains the economic capital of the world. Finally, New York has unparalleled information resources, the universities, the various UN missions, the large number of important visitors—all in all, I really can't believe there is a better place for such a center.

There is no question about the value of gathering the kind of information you are talking about. But why should a private organization act, even in part, as a service and information resource for the world organization—the United Nations. Why can't the UN itself do this?

Maynes: We're not trying to replace anyone. We are trying to provide a service of interest to many audiences besides the UN which for various reasons existing organizations either won't or can't provide. Everyone recognizes that on many issues, for political and other reasons, the UN and member-states tend to be crisis prone and to deal with issues that are already on the front page rather than with issues that are still several months or a few years from being on the agenda. In this sense the UN mirrors the governments that make up its membership. Also, because of the rapid surfacing of new issues and the inability of established institutions to study them in time, there may be an opportunity for a small, private group to be of use.

Turning from the future to the past of the Carnegie Endowment, I wonder if you can trace for me how the Endowment reached its present level of involvement in international organization affairs?

Maynes: To answer that question, we have to go back to the immediate postwar period. In 1945 Dr. Nicholas Murray Butler decided to retire after serving as the Endowment's president for 20 years. Understandably there was a desire on the part of the trustees to look at the overall program of the Endowment. But there was another more important reason for an overall review. The postwar era clearly called for efforts to think of new ways the Endowment could undertake relevant work on international questions. The trustees therefore decided that the Endowment should increase its concentration on the "practical problems" of the day. And, as I said, they were traumatized by the experience of the 1920's. They didn't want the U.S. to make the same mistakes. So they decided to help the new United Nations establish itself.

Since that decision, the Endowment's international organization program has gone through three stages. There was the initial stage of trying to develop understanding and support for the world organization. As part of this stage, the Endowment supported a large number of studies on the UN from the standpoint of individual member-states. Some 28 national studies were launched and more than 24 of these were published.

The second stage of implementation took place in the late 50's. The Endowment turned its attention to more practical questions involving expert assistance to the UN. I could cite several studies as examples: the 1956 study of UN peacekeeping; the 1958 study of the Berlin crisis in the UN; the 1962 study on Portugal and the African territories; the various studies on procedures and practices of the UN.

In the middle 60's, the Endowment entered a third stage. In this stage, the Endowment trustees and staff began to focus on two important changes. There was a changed context first in terms of who was interested in the UN, and second in terms of the kinds of issues that were relevant to international organizations. In the past, UN officials had often informally asked the Endowment to undertake a particular study. Now UNITAR exists to do research on problems from the inside. There has also been a proliferation of research institutes all over the world which, some hope, will be linked with one another through the UN University which the Japanese government has taken the lead in trying to establish in Tokyo. These developments had and have clear implications for the Endowment's international organization program.

This was a different environment for the Endowment whose response was to begin to feel its way toward new program areas. Though the Endowment continued work on traditional questions like peacekeeping in the form of two simulation conferences, there were newer issues to take up like the law of the seas, space, accelerated impact of science and technology on foreign affairs. And the Endowment sponsored conferences on such topics as satellite communications. In another attempt to deal with some of the newer issues, in 1968 the Endowment launched the travel and maintenance assistance program to encourage young doctoral scholars to conduct field research on questions related

to international organization issues. This program promotes scholarship on such questions as transnational relations, particularly from the standpoint of possible influence on shifts in the locus of political authority in the international system. Carnegie Visiting Research Scholars like David Kay, now Editor of *International Organization,* turned to these new subjects. Another change that the Endowment made was in the subject areas covered by some of its publications. Thus the Endowment participated in the World Order Models Project, an attempt by scholarly teams from several continents to posit a desirable 1990 world order and concrete steps to achieve it. In the 1970's, the Endowment will continue work on many of these issues through the fact-finding center, if that turns out to be an appropriate vehicle.

Speaking of talking with other nations, what is the United Nations Study Group? I notice it has been an activity of the Endowment since 1964.

Maynes: Basically, it's a group of some of the more active UN ambassadors from all regions who are interested in meeting to talk about common problems. Obviously, as ambassadors, even in the informality of the Study Group, they represent their countries, but there is a personal camaraderie and a free flow of ideas which the participants have found extremely useful for a decade now.

How often do they meet?

Maynes: Maybe five or six times a year. And over time, they have discussed a large number of issues from reform of the General Assembly, issues before the Security Council, actual operations of the Security Council itself, and the impact on the operations of the UN of admission of certain key countries to membership. We have also introduced the group to outsiders who are interested in or relevant to the work of the United Nations. For example, the group had a useful meeting with ten editors of important U.S. newspapers to discuss the declining public interest in the activities of the UN.

Are all countries represented?

Maynes: The membership fluctuates but primarily represented in the group are countries that might be described as just below the big power level. These are the countries that actually do much of the work at the United Nations. They do not have the veto in the Security Council, but they carry tremendous weight among other delegations because of the size or wealth or geographic position of their countries. The future of the organization probably lies in their hands. They're the ones who can make the organization work.

Are meetings open?

Maynes: They're off the record, but some of the discussions have led ultimately to publication of reports. For example, in the early stages and for the first time ever, discussions in the Study Group led to a synopsis of UN cases in the field of peace and security from 1946 through 1967. The synopsis has since become a useful reference tool for delegations.

The Carnegie Endowment is one of the oldest foundations in the U.S. Are there some resources that have been developed in the past which will be useful for future programs?

Maynes: I think there are great resources, and I hope that every program we develop will exploit them. For example, the potential growth of a fact-finding center should benefit greatly from the enormous number of contacts the Endowment has built up around the world for so many years.

What about training?

Maynes: I think the Endowment has a proven capability to engage in training projects, and we are exploring the possibility of new projects which the Endowment might sponsor. One could be the identification of young people who might ultimately become employees of the UN Secretariat or of permanent missions in New York. If you look at some of the studies that have been made of the personnel structure in the United Nations, the statistics are startling. Less than four percent of the people in the Secretariat are under the age of 30. Thirty-seven percent of the people in the Secretariat are over

the age of 50. The last major study of Secretariat personnel concluded that these figures were likely to become even more unbalanced.

Isn't it often argued that UN jobs are uninteresting?

Maynes: Yes, but that can't be really true when you look at the excitement which some very distinguished people have found when they moved to the United Nations. Look at the cases of Rudolph Peterson who used to run the Bank of America and who now heads the UN Development Programme, or Maurice Strong in the environmental field, or Brad Morse who is now Under-Secretary General. I think an effort needs to be made to try to attract young people of that quality at an early age. They shouldn't have to make their careers outside of the UN and then go into it later on.

What appeal should you make to a young person today interested in public service and considering the United Nations?

Maynes: Let's put it this way. The UN is probably going to get first crack at some of the more exciting issues facing the international community. It's not at all clear, of course, that the UN, any more than the various governments, will rise to the challenge. And if the UN fails, the issues may be dealt with in other ways. But the first effort will be made in the UN. We see this with the environmental questions, the space issues, with the law of the sea, with international control of multinational corporations, with the drug question, etc. So the UN will be a place where much of the initial excitement of trying will take place.

It's good to see an optimist about the United Nations because, as you know, the UN is no longer an area in which many Americans in the foreign policy field retain much hope. What do you think of this loss of faith by Americans in the UN?

Maynes: I think it will be restored when Americans and others — others because around the world there is a general retreat inward — see that they cannot run away from international problems. I am *not* an optimist to the point that I am willing to say that the United Nations in its present form is going to succeed in coping with the newer international issues. I am optimistic in the sense that I think some way is going to have to be found to deal with these issues that will involve international organizations, perhaps international organizations that do not now exist.

Most of our discussions, including this one, have dealt with ideas and programs. The Carnegie Endowment also has a substantial asset in its eleven-story building on United Nations Plaza and East 46th Street, facing the United Nations. How does the Endowment plan to use this building to support its objectives?

Maynes: We shouldn't make the distinction between programs on the one hand and the building on the other. The building is a program. It was always intended as a program. The issue is what we can do to make the building a more effective program.

We are looking for new opportunities to locate in the building organizations whose objectives closely parallel the Endowment's and with which we can plausibly anticipate some fruitful interchange. We would like to move away from the more formal landlord-tenant relationships where they exist. We prefer the co-location of colleagues who have obvious mutual interests and potentially joint programs.

As a result of recent efforts, we have two new organizations moving into the building this year — the African-American Institute, which concentrates on African issues as its name implies, and the Trilateral Commission which will deal with the whole cluster of political and economic issues confronting the U.S., Western Europe, and Japan. They join such old and close friends of the Endowment as the Foreign Policy Association, the United Nations Association USA, and others. In the case of UNA, for example, the Endowment has recently worked successfully on a number of joint projects. We hope this will continue. ■

FACE-TO-FACE

David Biltchik



Dave, you say that your Washington program facilitates the exchange of information between the foreign affairs community inside the government and outside. What is this community you see outside the government? Whom are you trying to reach and how do you go about trying to reach them?

Dave Biltchik: It's one community, but divided into a lot of parts. There's academia, the nongovernment organizations, the business community, and the media people, to cite four obvious groups. Although we do pay attention to the more general public outside the government and outside the traditional areas of special foreign affairs expertise, we are not equipped to deal with citizen education in world affairs in a thorough way.

Why do you think "communication" is important? Why is this kind of program necessary at all?

Biltchik: Well, various people have described a breakdown in communications between the government and the people —

And you feel that this breakdown has, in fact, taken place?

Biltchik: Yes, even in more usual channels, let's say between academia and the State Department, I've sensed, for example, a lack of dialogue, a lack of real utilization, a lack of real interest on both sides. Take, for example, the use of advisory committees in the Department of State, or rather the non-use of advisory committees — people don't pay any attention to them.

I start from the premise that no institution can be self-sufficient, particularly in a field as involved and complex as foreign policy. You should want to reach out no matter who you are—academia or government—you should reach out, trying to draw on the best ideas available. If some people in the government are reluctant or hesitant to reach out, then let's try to help them. The Carnegie Endowment and the American Foreign Service Association (AFSA) are well placed to help.

Obviously AFSA backs your program heavily and so does the Endowment. Has the United States government in general and the State Department in particular shown any interest in the program—any willingness to open its doors more widely because of the things you've done?

Biltchik: Certainly the State Department has given us all the rhetorical support one could hope for. Ambassador Macomber was very supportive of us when we first started out, and he was Undersecretary of State for Management. In terms of my own detachment from the Department, there were no problems; they encouraged me to do it. Whether or not our efforts have had any impact on the Department or on other parts of the government community —that's obviously more difficult to answer.

Let's take a specific example: the luncheon honoring the "Old China Hands" that we organized in January, 1973. One of the comments we heard from a man whose judgment I respect was that this particular event had done more to con-

vince people in the Department of State that McCarthyism was really dead than anything he could remember. So that luncheon had some impact.

I heard that it was controversial.

Biltchik: Well, there was some controversy but not very much. Some people were worried about a negative impact on the President and some people around him. I think that those fears were exaggerated. In fact, the Secretary of State complimented AFSA on the luncheon. He said he was sorry he couldn't be there and thought it was an excellent affair. We also got a letter of endorsement from the Secretary of Defense.

Was the "China luncheon" your most successful single effort to date?

Biltchik: Just in terms of newspaper, radio, television coverage — the word getting around inside and outside the government — there's no question.

I see your program as having two kinds of targets. You're aiming at the community outside the government to show them that the government is theirs and accessible. You're also aiming at people inside the government to show them that the government doesn't have to be a closed corporation. How are you doing on the latter target? Do you feel that the Face-to-Face program has, in fact, shown officers — particularly younger officers, many of whom are thinking of leaving the government — that the Foreign Service is a more open place for them to work?

Biltchik: In terms of getting the government to realize that it should be more open to the outside, we've brought 200-300 government people over the course of the last year together with outsiders to talk seriously about things—to talk about the U.S. budget with people at The Brookings Institution over a period of seven weeks (once a week); to talk about development with the Overseas Development Council experts; to participate in evening meetings with people as different as David Halberstam, Stanley Hoffmann, and Dean Rusk. These are all excellent examples of the kind of open exchange we are stimulating. To give you an example, on the evening David Halberstam talked about his book, "The Best and the Brightest," some people described it as a somber evening, almost a wake. Halberstam faced senior level civil servants, people who had lived through the '60's, who were intelligent enough to be questioning, and who are somewhat apprehensive about the '70's. He didn't have any answers. I won't say it was a confrontation, but it was a difficult evening for a lot of people, for a lot of us. It was a very unusual session. This sort of thing just doesn't happen very often in Washington. This is the purpose of the program—to try to get all of us to think more about the hard questions. That's the benefit of bringing in an outsider. He can make you think about some things that you don't ordinarily think about.

Am I correct in assuming that your program avoids advocacy? In other words, you do not have specific policy objectives that you try to advocate as U.S. foreign policy.

Biltchik: Correct. We deal with topics that seem important, and we try to bring in people to talk from different points of view on that particular topic. Let's take Japan—we're going to have a series of sessions on Japan and U.S. policy towards Japan. We are going to have Japanese and American industrialists, academics and journalists meeting officials, but we won't support any specific policy.

Why can't this be done under the normal auspices of the State Department?

Biltchik: Some of it can be done and is being done by the government and by other groups. We are trying to supplement what's being done, to fill gaps where they exist. We have more flexibility and more freedom of action—we can move faster. We can invite just about anybody we want because we go under the somewhat unique dual colors of an Endowment for peace and also a private professional organization whose members are all in government—but both are completely independent of the government. We are trying to reach deeper into the government, get beyond the dozen or so token government people who regularly attend outside meetings, and get to the permanent, nonpolitical

level to try to share with them the thoughts of people on the outside who are working on the same problems.

You have referred to your consultant's role. What kind of work have you done as a consultant under this program?

Biltchik: Consultant may be too fancy a title. From the very beginning the idea was that we would serve as a broker, as a middleman. This means not only organizing discussions, or organizing an occasional workshop, but also helping groups who call us and ask for advice on some specific problem. Some specific examples: when Amherst College was organizing its Copeland Lecture Series, they wanted to bring to Amherst interesting younger people from many walks of life, including the government, to talk about their own careers. I was able to give some suggestions to the organizer of that program. Various World Affairs Councils have called in the course of the year. They know me and our program from my visits around the country and from our 1972 conference on "Citizen Education in World Affairs." They've called and sought advice about speakers. Or I've called them and told them about matters of interest to them. Then there is the Foreign Policy Association—I've met with them a number of times over the past year. They've asked for suggestions. The American Association of University Women has a yearly mailing to 1700 local chapters, and they've asked for suggestions as to what they should put into it on foreign policy. I get calls from television programs asking for names of expert participants for television shows that deal with foreign policy. And people in the government call up and ask for ideas on programs and people—how they might best utilize outside resources. This includes the Planning Staff and External Research of State. I don't want to make this seem too grandiose, but it adds up.

Summing up your program, is it worth it? Is it worth it to the Carnegie Endowment and AFSA? Is it worth it to you personally? Is it worth it to the State Department? Is it worth it to the larger foreign affairs community which you describe?

Biltchik: Let's take it in sections. For me personally, this has been a creative and positive experience, and I've enjoyed



it immensely. The range of subjects and people has been wide. For the financial contributors to the program, the Endowment and the Association, a considerable amount of money is involved. How does one judge whether a program is relevant? From the Association's point of view, it is worth it because of the Association's professional dimension. Its members want it, they feel the need for it. This is the first time in the history of the Association that it has organized active and widespread contacts between the professionals inside the State Department and professionals outside the State Department, all talking about their common interests, on relatively neutral ground. And from the Endowment's perspective, I believe we have strengthened foreign affairs dialogue between the policy operators and the public.

Where do you think this program is going to lead?

Biltchik: As you know, I intend to leave the program in the near future. It's important that I do so because a new man with a fresh approach should come in and decide what to do next, what to throw out and what to change or keep. But I think that some kind of program with this mixing of people has got to continue. That's the essential element;

you've got to bring people, as we say, face to face. But there may be better ways of doing it, more efficient and more productive ways. There may be other things we could do which would have greater impact. It's important that in something as experimental as this program there be changes from time to time.

To get back to your question of whether it was worth it, the reactions I've had from people in the Department indicate that this kind of activity was previously almost unknown to 99 out of 100 people in the Department. Any time that we can reach a substantial number of responsible government officials with thoughts expressed in new ways—anytime we can do this consistently, then we have a program that's worth doing.

Perhaps, then, the most important impact of the Face-to-Face program is on the government and people within the government rather than on the foreign affairs community outside the government. Is that a fair conclusion to draw from what you've said?

Biltchik: Certainly, in terms of relative numbers, yes. On the other hand, rarely does anybody from the outside turn me down when I ask them to participate in this program.

I assume this is because they are pleased at the rare opportunity to talk directly to mid-level government officials.

Biltchik: Exactly. This indicates to me that we haven't yet begun to tap potential interest on the outside. If nearly everyone I invite accepts, it indicates that there's a lack of other opportunities with the same impact. And as time goes by, the impact will spread within these outside communities. ■

THE JAMES THOMSON SHOTWELL LIBRARY

The James Thomson Shotwell Library serves as a major reference resource for the Carnegie Endowment staff, for other organizations in the Carnegie International Center, and for the United Nations community at large.

There are more than 8,000 books, over 250 periodical titles, 35 drawers of vertical file pamphlets, 1,100 archives of Endowment publications as well as an extensive United Nations documents collection, all easily accessible.

The Library has borrowing arrangements with other libraries in New York and belongs to the New York Consortium of Foundation Librarians. The Library has been designed to support the program interests of the Endowment.

Two professional librarians, Vivian D. Hewitt and Jane E. Lowenthal, supported by two clerical assistants, are in charge of the Library.

ARMS CONTROL

Herbert Scoville Jr. & Thomas A. Halsted



How long has the Carnegie Endowment had an interest in arms control?

Tom Halsted: Arms control always has been central to the Endowment's concerns for promoting international peace. I was looking the other day at the 1913 annual report of the Endowment and found that one of the major projects then was planning for the celebration of the 100th anniversary of the Treaty of Ghent, which ended the War of 1812. It was going to be a celebration of 100 years of peace; the birthday party was to take place in December, 1914!

More seriously, in recent years the arms control program has been concerned a great deal with strategic arms questions related to SALT, both from a technical and a political standpoint. Perhaps Pete Scoville, who was in charge of these programs from 1969 until 1971, could fill in a little better than I on the recent background of Endowment programs in this area.

Pete Scoville: Actually, the first study to be carried on in the strategic weapons area was done before I was involved with the Endowment. It was a study for the Endowment in which George Rathjens looked at our strategic arms policies and the future of the strategic arms race. This particular pamphlet ("Future of the Strategic Arms Race: Options for the 1970's") was prepared in the summer of 1968 and published in 1969. It was really the first in the public literature in this general area. It turned out to be extraordinarily useful because of the public debate, which began in the spring of 1969, over whether or not we should go ahead with the deployment of ABM's and what should be the U.S. policy vis-à-vis SALT. Carnegie made a very important contribution since there was really nothing else in the public literature useful in supplying background information for these discussions.

And since the Rathjens pamphlet?

Scoville: Well, there have been a number of studies in this area. There was one which was done specifically on SALT, analyzing various options for the SALT negotiations. I personally was involved in that study. Another particularly useful thing, done in the year prior to the signing of the SALT agreements, was a joint study carried out at Talloires, France, with the International Institute for Strategic Studies. This was an attempt to bring European and American thinking together on the whole subject of limitations of strategic arms.

Can you explain more clearly what you mean by the impact on policy of pamphlets like George Rathjens' and the Talloires conference?

Scoville: Well, it is probably easier to detect a real impact on policy from the Rathjens pamphlet. This was a key document which was used not only by the public and newspapers, but also by the Senators engaged in the debate, to develop an understanding of strategic policy issues. This enabled them to comprehend what up to that time had been con-

sidered such an esoteric subject that the public couldn't address itself to the problem.

Of all the areas of foreign policy which the Carnegie Endowment deals with, I think arms control and disarmament questions are the most technical and those with the lowest level of American public understanding. How do you see the role of the Endowment together with the Arms Control Association in increasing public understanding and awareness of these problems?

Scoville: Some of these pamphlets are particularly useful as a means of getting the facts out in the open. Of course, they point out various policy options rather than becoming an advocate for a specific line of policy. I think this is the way Carnegie can best serve the public, not by being an advocate, but by being an educator, so that what appear to the public to be very complicated issues are simplified to the point where they can understand them and make their own judgments.

Well, let me try to be more specific. What is the role of the outsider? In that sense I am referring to the Arms Control Association and the Endowment as informed outsiders in technical matters such as SALT, Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions, and general disarmament discussions. Are you trying to educate the informed and interested American lay public, or are you chiefly trying to talk with considerable expertise but from outside the government to those people in the government who are responsible for the formulation of policy?

Halsted: We're trying to be effective on both levels. The Endowment can team up with other groups with an objective of exchanging information of a technical nature among informed people who have different geographic or institutional bases. It can also communicate through the Arms Control Association (of which I am the Executive Director) on a less specialized level to make developments in the arms control area more comprehensible to the general public.

So you make a distinction between the activities of the Arms Control Association and the arms control studies that are directly sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment.

Halsted: I would say they complement one another. The studies of the Endowment are generally by specialists for specialists. The educational and informational work of the Arms Control Association makes extensive use of those studies. However, it isn't principally concerned with the specialists but rather with the more generally interested public.

Let's stick to the former for a minute, the Carnegie Endowment's plans and programs. Can you give some more examples of the kind of work that you've done and what your plans are for the future over the next two or three years?

Halsted: Well, we're into a range of subjects, mostly in the strategic arms area, often having to do with the efforts to work toward a SALT II Treaty. Occasionally we have participated in joint undertakings with other organizations. For example, we've been engaged in a study for several years with The Brookings Institution to produce a fairly extensive overview of strategic arms and arms control policy, how they have evolved, and how they might develop in the future.

Who is working on that project?

Halsted: The principal researcher is Jerome Kahan, but this is the product of an extensive study program involving a good many more people who have been involved in meetings, discussions and conferences over the last several years. A second study of almost the same magnitude is one whose principal researchers have been Abram Chayes, George Rathjens and Jack Ruina. This project, originally intended to look into the verification of arms limitation, has now been broadened in scope to focus more on the actual operations of arms agreements with a particular emphasis on SALT. They're looking into how the agreements are working, what some of the pitfalls are, and what some of the political implications of SALT may turn out to be.

What is the reaction of the U.S. government to this kind of work by former officials? Do you think that senior American officials now involved in the formulation of policy regard this

kind of work as gratuitous or an additional valuable input into their thinking?

Halsted: One bit of evidence suggests that this is not a major problem. Senior government officials have participated, in an individual capacity, in many of the conferences and study groups that we've organized over the years in New York, Washington, Talloires and Geneva.

Scoville: I might mention a study on a slightly different subject that dealt with the control of chemical and biological weapons. This looked at the Geneva protocol and particularly at the use of such chemicals as herbicides and riot control agents in military operations and whether these should be included in any bans on chemical weapons.

With what impact?

Scoville: I feel that the study was very useful. One of the participants was Major General Stone, who was then the senior official in the Army's chemical warfare program. Somebody from the White House/NSC staff also was an informal member. These people participated in a nonofficial way and provided valuable inputs of information. They in turn had an opportunity for freewheeling discussion with outside experts in legal, scientific and academic disciplines.

Halsted: The process you've been describing is something very important, where an outside group is heavily involved in a technical field which almost all other Americans have been willing to leave in the hands of a handful of American officials who formulate policy under heavy security constraints. Here we have a very serious effort to develop communications between informed private citizens and responsible officials who can have a real impact on policy.

What is the role of an informed public in the field of arms control? Why do you feel that anyone other than technical experts should know much about it?

Halsted: Well, first of all, the public has an enormous stake in the outcome of arms control thinking, arms control discussion, arms control negotiation . . . .

But the traditional counter to that is that while they have a stake, it is too complicated an issue for them to understand their own best interests.

Scoville: I strongly disagree that that is the case. I think that people on the inside claim these issues are too complicated because they don't want any criticism of what they think is best. I think these issues can be reduced to terms which are understandable at least to the educated public. I think this is a function which the Carnegie program and the Arms Control Association have performed very well. They have taken these issues, which very often were described in technical jargon and where high security was invoked, and stripped them down to terms that can be understood. One can evaluate these subjects without access to classified information because there is enough unclassified information available to make an informed judgment. The important thing is to avoid burying these issues in technical details which are not fundamentally important to making the right decisions.

Why can't the government itself do the informing of the American public?

Scoville: Well, I think the government can. On the other hand, one of the great advantages of an outside group or foundation is that it has flexibility. It is divorced from having to make the policy, therefore it can draw on people from all walks of life. It can call in foreigners in an unofficial capacity, while if the government calls in a foreigner it becomes an official action. So there are all kinds of opportunities for a foundation to focus a wide spectrum of opinions on a problem. At the same time they can cut away a lot of the underbrush and make the issues understandable to the public.

If I understand you correctly, it is not a primary objective of either Carnegie or ACA to press specific positions on the U.S. government.

Halsted: That certainly is true of Carnegie. It is perhaps a little less true of ACA in that ACA starts from the position of advocating arms control as a method of maintaining na-

tional security. Therefore it would tend to promote those arms control measures which it felt promoted national security. On the other hand, even the Arms Control Association does not promote specific solutions. Instead it provides a look at alternative arms control options which might be useful and ventilates various sides of issues even when reaching a conclusion or judgment.

Is arms control basically a technical or political issue?

Scoville: I feel it is basically a political issue, and the only reason for bringing technicians into it is that one has to make technical points more understandable so that the political decisions can be made more clearly and easily.

Some weapons programs can be quite destabilizing and can increase the risk of war. These are the kinds of weapons which we would look at and try to bring to the public's attention. For example, MIRVs (Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicles) can increase the risk of war because they make a first strike advantageous. Therefore, we urge serious attempts to try to control them.

Could you give us some background on the formation of the Arms Control Association? What has it done up to now, and where would you like it to go?

Halsted: The Arms Control Association was set up in 1971 with the objective of providing better information on arms control to the public than existing organizations were able to produce. It proposed to inform the public of the results of on-going projects in the arms control area, including those produced under the Carnegie arms control program. In addition, it wanted to educate the public, often through the news media, on issues in the arms control area such as SALT, the test ban, chemical and biological warfare issues, and so forth.

ACA produces a newsletter, conducts seminars, organizes conferences and, upon request, provides testimony to Congressional Committees and individual members of Congress and the Executive on arms control issues. The Arms Control Association has undertaken a number of these projects on its own, and others in conjunction with Carnegie and other organizations. An example of a program where both organizations might work together very closely, and one that we hope can be implemented in the near future, is a summer school training project which would focus on improving the size and quality of the body of experts professionally interested in arms control and in providing new and better ways of informing the public generally about arms control problems. This would be a continuing project that would train young university professors in the history of development of arms control issues. In turn, we would hope they would go back to their institutions around the country and incorporate arms control thinking into their curricula.

What about the risk that you are just preaching to the converted? Perhaps the only people you actually reach are those predisposed towards arms control. Maybe you never really reach vast numbers of people who have a vested interest in large defense budgets and large weapons procurement programs.

Scoville: I think that is a very serious problem. It is hard to get information out to those who are not interested in the first place. On the other hand, we do make headway at reaching a mixed audience by our contacts with the press. Very often the reporters at our educational seminars are not necessarily biased towards arms control; in fact, in some cases they can be quite hostile. But they attend these meetings and listen to all the freewheeling discussion in which a variety of points of view are expressed. These ideas are later reflected in articles which are published around the country. In this way you reach a much wider audience. But it is certainly true that it's very hard to get the military-industrial complex representatives to attend a meeting on arms control. They don't seem to want to open their eyes and ears to this particular subject.

Looking to the future of the Arms Control Association, Tom, what do you see?

Halsted: The main focus for the immediate future will be to expand considerably the public information programs. We have a periodic newsletter that comes out approximately quarterly. We also have had several seminars and informa-

tion discussion sessions with the Washington press corps. We'd like to do more of both, perhaps holding more debates and discussions for the benefit of the media at locations other than Washington — perhaps one in the Middle West, one on the West Coast, one elsewhere. We'd like to put out our newsletter more frequently and perhaps supplement it with an information packet which might be useful to editors and editorial writers, as well as to scholars and libraries. In the months ahead we will be looking for ways to best implement these ideas and related notions in the public education area.

I mentioned the arms control summer school idea. There are other substantive areas as well. For example, there's a growing public interest in conventional arms transfer questions. It seems to me that this is one area where the Arms Control Association can educate the public a good deal about both the mechanisms and the implications of the process of selling arms to other countries. Secondly, useful studies in this area might be undertaken on the implications of arms transfer policies, perhaps prescribing ways of dealing with them. Maybe there are ways of reaching agreement with other governments that have not yet been adequately pursued to see if some kind of suppliers agreement could be reached.

As with all the activities of tax-exempt, nongovernmental, educational organizations like the Carnegie Endowment, there seem to be four general categories: holding conferences and seminars, facilitating and brokering the activities of others, training new experts and fostering the publication and dissemination of information. You are obviously doing all of these. But which do you feel is the most valuable, the most productive?

Halsted: I think they're all valuable; what appear to be the most immediately productive ones are perhaps the conferences and seminars. Publications are going to have a long-range impact, but they may be aimed at a narrower audience.

Scoville: Not all the studies are for that narrow an audience. For example, the Rathjens pamphlet had 20,000 copies distributed and was used as sort of a basic textbook for students and all kinds of groups all over the country. It had a very broad impact lasting over several years. The problem with the pamphlets is that the time between when you write one and the time you get any results is considerable. That's the advantage of face-to-face conferences and seminars. There you get your point of view across in a relatively short period, while the subject is still hot.

Pete, how many years have you been involved in arms control?

Scoville: I was first involved in arms control in 1954 when I was working at the Pentagon and the problem of a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing came up. Although I was testing nuclear weapons at the time, I got involved in trying to see what could be done to stop it.

Can you describe your own perception of how the public awareness of these issues has changed over the last 18-20 years?

Scoville: Well, I would say that unfortunately all too often the public attitude has been conditioned by some extraneous

aspect of the problem, not necessarily the arms control aspect. For example, probably the basic reason why a test ban was agreed to in 1963 was not because it was an arms control measure but because people were worried about the hazards of fallout from atmospheric tests. Now just because an arms control measure is approved for the wrong reasons doesn't mean that it failed. But the public tends to focus on one or two items which are particularly catchy or which politicians tend to emphasize. I think it is therefore very important for a group of people like the Arms Control Association to try to bring out the really important issues and develop a broad base of understanding on these.

After all these years, are you optimistic or pessimistic about the future and the field of arms control?

Scoville: Well, I guess you wouldn't be in the field of arms control if you weren't a perennial optimist. On the other hand, there are very discouraging aspects of arms control. One of the most discouraging has been that in recent years arms control has all too often been used as an excuse for buying new weapons rather than for restricting weapons procurement. Unfortunately, one saw this very graphically after the SALT agreements in Moscow in 1972. Here was a very good agreement which was signed, the ABM Treaty, which really did put a brake on the arms race and cut down on the risks of nuclear war. But what happened? Instead of cutting back on our weapons program, we went full blast ahead on spending more money on weapons than we ever had before. The bargaining chip theory that you have to buy weapons to have bargaining chips in arms control negotiations is a very discouraging development and one which we are very interested in exposing. ■

PROJECT DIALOGUE

Michael Krepon, Wendy Witherspoon & J. Griffin Lesher



What led you to create Project Dialogue?

Grif Lesher: Project Dialogue began in the summer of 1971 as a result of discussions between the Carnegie Endowment and our own particular group, The Student Committee on International Affairs. We had established ourselves in 1970 just after the Cambodian invasion, and we decided that an important enterprise for our Committee with the Endowment's assistance was to try to develop programs that would foster rational communication between student groups and the general public. Our feeling was that dialogue had broken down. With the Endowment's backing, we began a series of student-public conferences. Our staff has been administering the program with the Endowment's professional cooperation and financial support in this enterprise.

From what I gather, then, your original stimulus was the Cambodian invasion.

Mike Krepon: That's right. Back in May of 1970, there were thousands of students swarming into Washington engaged in various kinds of opposition to the Cambodian invasion. Among them were approximately 150-200 graduate students from seven schools of international affairs, the Woodrow Wilson School, the Columbia School of International Affairs, Johns Hopkins/SAIS and others, and we were involved in organizing this particular group of students to go up on the Hill and speak to their congressional representatives about the war.

What made you give up lobbying in favor of a longer term, tax-exempt approach in association with the Endowment in Washington?

Lesher: The mood, the climate at that 1970 crisis point had been very tense—almost ruling out any kind of interaction between students and communities. Our perception of the situation was, for a number of reasons, most of them tactical, that we were better off trying to communicate with, rather than conflict with, communities, and that is where the notion of dialogue came in. It was only by setting up some system, some form of communication, that we were really going to be successful in conveying our concerns.

By now you have been in the business for several years. You've sponsored or cosponsored scores of conferences involving students and the general public. You've had nationwide activities. Have you found the dialogue concept appropriate to fulfilling your objectives?

Wendy Witherspoon: The dialogue concept meets some expectations that we had for it and doesn't meet others. It certainly is a means of breaking down stereotypes on both sides. Those stereotypes often are as damaging as the kind of rhetoric that both sides indulge in. Dialogue is not a vehicle for radical social change; it is a way within the American construct of values to explore different perspectives among people who don't trade views very often.

Krepon: Just to add something to that—dialogue also

serves a useful purpose in building working relationships with various constituencies.

Can you give me an example of a particularly constructive dialogue, one that really worked?

Witherspoon: When I joined the staff, my first task was to organize a dialogue in Denver on the general subject of racism in foreign policy. The primary resource there was the Center for International Race Relations at the University of Denver. I went there and started working on it a couple of months ahead of time. The plan was to bring students from various universities around Denver and from the Air Force Academy together with businessmen in the Denver area whose businesses had substantial investments overseas, particularly in Southern Africa. A representative group of minority leaders from the Denver area would also participate. The theme was to be the implications of race in American foreign policy with the specific case study of South Africa.

In preparation for the dialogue, I met with the people who eventually came and with a lot of people who finally didn't come. Stereotypes were very strong there. Some of the students were African. Most of them were American. All of them had very strong suspicions about what the business people would be like, and how awkward the communication would be. The business people did not want to come. Racism was not a subject that they particularly cared to confront. They had strong questions for me about how I saw racism as a factor in foreign policy, and they also held strong suspicions about what communications with students would be like. They were doubtful as to the value of even sitting down to talk to students about a fairly controversial subject. There are two minority groups in the city, Chicano and Black, both of which were just beginning to become politicized. Some minority group leaders were genuinely interested in dialogue, while others were interested in confrontation with the prominent businessmen.

And what eventually happened?

Witherspoon: Well, January came and there wasn't a blizzard. The first thing that happened was that there weren't enough rooms in the inn. People had to double up and triple up in rooms, with some very strange mixtures of business people, African students and minority group people stuck in rooms together. My first fear was that there would be racial conflict right there and that the dialogue would never happen. But that worked out, and generally, as the dialogue developed, we began with personal perspectives on racism, moved into the United States as a society that experiences racial tension, and then turned to foreign policy subjects. Communication between businessmen and students did develop. But the most interesting thing about this group of businessmen was that they really provoked each other and this brought about not only a good exchange of opinion but a valuable revelation about some of the basic value structures that influenced their own feelings about racism as a factor in foreign policy. Gradually, then, some students began to realize the diversity within the group of businessmen which tended to make discussion easier.

Out of this dialogue came the formation, by a group of students based at Colorado College and the University of Denver, of a research-watchdog group to look into corporations in Denver and the Colorado area that have investments in South Africa. The group wished to begin trying to communicate with the businessmen involved, exploring their own thoughts on the value of investments there, and to begin to try to raise the issue in the state of Colorado. One interesting thing that happened as a result of that dialogue was that a couple of months later I got a call from one of the businessmen, a young guy who at that time worked for a large corporation in Denver. He called me up to tell me what an impact the dialogue had had on his life. He actually had quit his job with the first corporation and taken a job with another corporation strictly on the grounds that he would not have to move to an urban center in the East, and would be allowed to start a minority relations board within the corporation and start some technical training programs for inner city children.

Your organization was founded in the days of student turmoil in 1970. The general opinion today is that the campuses

THE STUDENT COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

1717 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 667-1874

A nonmembership educational organization established in 1970 to promote, through issue-oriented projects, greater student and community involvement in the formulation of American foreign policy.

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are quiet and the students are apathetic. Do you agree with that assessment of the change in the campus situation, and if you do, how has it affected your own work?

Krepon: I think we generally agree with that assessment. In our own travels to campuses to set up projects, we have found a great deal of student apathy. We have found it difficult to draw the numbers of students that we had wanted, but then we realized that you don't need large numbers of students to do a successful project. This forced us to modify our original program design and to work on foreign policy issues that had very clear connections to local community problems. We found that it was difficult to build interest in academic or remote foreign policy subjects, either on or off campus, but it could be done if we could show direct relationships between domestic concerns and foreign policy issues.

Lesher: I would agree with Mike's assessment. I think there is less broad student interest in foreign affairs than there was, but I also think that those students who were in the field and who, for one reason or another, decided to leave have already left, and what you've got now, I think, is a nucleus of very good people who, in fact, have stayed in the foreign affairs field and are clustered on certain campuses in the country. Those are the people we try to locate, people who were formerly, for example, in the Peace Corps, who have since come back, who have an interest and orientation towards working in their own communities. We can't draw large groups of people as we could have done in the mass politics of the late 60's. What you do find now is deeper commitment for community education in foreign affairs, but not involving as many people. It took us a while to realize this, we had to do a lot of ground work in our recruiting, but good people are out there. We've also discovered strong interests in areas of the country where we really didn't expect it. We consciously tried to go all over, not simply to the East Coast and the West Coast, and were able to organize good projects in areas like Madison and St. Louis.

Which foreign policy issues have you been most concerned with and why did you choose them?

Krepon: After experimenting with a variety of issues, we're going to concentrate on two, both in Washington and in the field. They are the need for economic conversion in defense industries and the international environmental crisis. For the period just ahead, we have narrowed our interests to these two issues because we feel they help clarify the relationship between foreign policy and localized concerns. If a community is concerned about unemployment and lack of social services, we can often relate those concerns to local defense production. We can also relate all this to foreign policy, by associating the microcosm of local defense production and lack of social services to national problems — what this means in terms of health care, what it means in terms of

transportation. It becomes the kind of issue that people can get involved in on the community level.

Do you take a particular position on any of these issues?

Witherspoon: We play two roles as members of the committee. We are interested in fostering dialogue and communication, and in that sense our approach to constituencies is the neutral one of providing an educational experience for all of those involved. But having worked on an issue fairly intensively, I think it's also important that we do voice our opinions about current policy and, within the limits set by our tax-exempt status, we point out areas where we think policy can be improved.

You must have frequent frustrations. How do you keep them from overwhelming you?

Krepon: It *is* frustrating work. There are a number of different problems that we face. One is just working on the issue of public involvement in foreign policy making. That's an enormously difficult problem; it takes a lot of stamina to keep working on that. There is the frustration that both Wendy and Grif mentioned earlier between the advocacy role and the brokerage role between constituencies. There is the frustration of trying to get work done and then trying to keep the organization going. We find far too much of our time is spent doing administrative paper work. The frustrations are there, but they are certainly not overwhelming.

We're here, and we will be here in the future. We have a pretty good idea of what the problems are and what needs to be done. We come in contact with really good people all of the time. All of this keeps us going, plus the certain knowledge on our part that students who become involved in our projects gain a greater knowledge of what the problems are, what can be done, and how to be successful in working for change.

You talked about the students involved in your projects. Recently, haven't you begun to place more emphasis on programming outside Washington — on selecting students from various campuses to work on projects in their own communities? Why did you make this shift?

Lesher: That shift was really based on two observations. One was that our spending lots of time trying to work with Washington groups inside and outside of government was really not going to get us very far, simply because this is a town full of influence peddlers and we're small fish in a big pond. Secondly, when we were programming outside of Washington during the first year our work was hit or miss. So we decided to locate and work with students on the campus and offer them follow-through resources. Our regional representatives would be there for a full ten month period organizing dialogues, following through on ideas that had been generated from the forums, and beginning to work on broader public education. We've had one student in New York working with cable TV as a means for broader dialogue. We've had another organize a high school speakers bureau in New York. A project in California on arms control and economic conversion promoted the formation of an independent Citizen's Conversion Committee that's going to study the question of transforming the midpeninsular area around San Francisco to more of a peacetime economy. Our regional concept was that we had to have local leadership for projects, and that this really couldn't be supplied by the administrative staff in Washington.

Witherspoon: The lesson that we have learned is that the old model of student confrontation politics was a good way for students to run around, to get rid of their inhibitions, and to have a great time in the spring, but not to achieve any kind of lasting constructive action. The model of regional staff people that we have now is one in which a member of a community who happens to be a student works with the resources of the campus, adds those to the human resources of a community, and attacks a larger foreign policy question that has definite local manifestations. There are a few instances of immediate gratification in a model like that, but it's a slow process. However, in many ways it makes the student a more effective agent for social change. It teaches the student who

is involved where the power centers are, how they interact with each other, and where change is possible.

I understand what you're trying to accomplish in the short run, but I'm not sure where you think it might lead. What are your long range objectives?

Krepon: Certainly one long range objective is to build up a probing relationship between the people who make foreign policy decisions and the people in whose names those decisions are made. We're really talking about participatory politics, an informed public, in the true sense of a democracy. As Wendy said, we're not talking about confrontation politics *per se*. We build in notions of civility and being able to work towards change, but we realize where the power lies now, and we realize what the problems are. The goal in the long run is to build up public participation.

What are your plans for the future?

Witherspoon: As Mike said earlier, we'll be working in two issue areas, the international environment and arms control and economic conversion. We will have two staff people in Washington working on each issue. At the regional level we are establishing up to ten projects on conversion and environment issues. We also feel we have developed a certain amount of expertise in linking local concerns to international affairs problems, that this kind of communication can be a healthy input into the media reaching the American public, and we intend to explore more avenues to increase that input. Among those avenues are things varying from cable television to the use of more readable pamphlets.

Lesher: We'd like to try to set up as many of these regional projects as we possibly can. The arrangement between the Endowment and Project Dialogue enables us to keep the basic nucleus of our staff going while we get resources for additional regional staff projects outside.

Could you describe a specific regional program?

Witherspoon: One of the projects that we're undertaking is a good example of the shift from confrontation politics to a more systematic exploration of political problems. It will be at what used to be called San Francisco State College, which was one of the centers of student dissent back in the late 60's and early 70's. It's a project on an issue that, superficially at least, is one of those issues that will have very little public impact — the law of the seas. A student who is working on her master's degree will orient her research toward an exploration of how the San Francisco Bay area will be affected by future oceans policy and what the long-term interest of the Bay area is in regulating ocean use and ocean management. The general theme of a project like this is to make a seemingly remote and uninteresting issue into something that local people can understand and relate to their own region.

Are there advantages in your relationship with the Carnegie Endowment?

Krepon: Well, the positive outweighs the negative. The advantages of working with the Endowment are having a physical plant in which to conduct our work, having the confidence and financial support of the Endowment, and having relationships with other joint ventures under the Carnegie umbrella. All of these things are helpful.

Witherspoon: I think one really positive thing has been the ability to interact with people who have been in government for a while, here or abroad, and who have a vast storehouse of contacts that we don't have as newcomers to the field.

Lesher: Our program is mostly outside of Washington in terms of our programming emphasis. The Endowment, on the other hand, is very much involved in Washington, New York and abroad. This difference in approach obviously contributes to expanding the Endowment's reach. The relationship is advantageous to both, I feel. ■

PROGRAMS IN DIPLOMACY

Ruth Jett

Ruth, as someone who has been involved with Programs in Diplomacy from the beginning, how would you define the goals of this activity? And to what degree would you say that they have been met?

Ruth Jett: The original aim of the program was to provide diplomatic training for selected young foreign service officers from newly independent countries in Africa, Asia, the Caribbean and the Mediterranean. From the beginning, in 1960, we had the active encouragement and financial support of the Rockefeller Foundation for what we all considered to be an experimental program geared to the first years of independence. At that time the governments concerned agreed that these young foreign service officers needed to know more than they did about international law, international economics, current world politics and the functions of international organizations, and they asked the Endowment to help. Some 350 fellows (including 21 women) from 60 countries have participated in the programs.

Prior to the recent shift to Africa, year-long courses were arranged for English-speaking fellows at Columbia University in New York and French-speaking fellows at the Institut Universitaire de Hautes Etudes Internationales in Geneva. In addition, about 500 others have participated in the regional institutes and seminars which the Endowment arranged in various parts of the world. A sizeable portion of the international diplomatic community has had some involvement in the Carnegie Endowment's diplomatic training programs.

In helping people from so many countries, how did the Endowment take into account all the different backgrounds, needs and aspirations? Do you feel that Programs in Diplomacy was sufficiently flexible?

Jett: It was indeed difficult in the beginning. We were working with people who had experienced different colonial administrations and lived according to different traditional patterns. Fortunately, we were able to make special arrangements with the faculties of the School of International Affairs at Columbia and the Graduate Institute in Geneva who often gave individual attention to the needs of the Carnegie fellows. At both institutions an academic counsellor was employed to advise fellows on their courses. The Endowment organized special lecture programs outside the universities. In addition, we provided a program of summer travel at the end of each academic year to give the fellows some exposure to a number of international organizations, specialized agencies of the United Nations, and government operations in a number of major foreign capitals, including Eastern Europe.

Apart from the fact that the Endowment's headquarters are in New York and its European Center in Geneva, was there any other reason that these two universities were chosen?

Jett: The fact that both institutions had strong ties with the United Nations made for a happy coincidence. As you will recall, the early 60's was the period of rapid decolonization in which the United Nations was often dramatically involved.

There was the Congo crisis, for example, and a host of related problems of immediate importance to the people in our diplomatic training programs. Since the United Nations was the most important forum for newly independent states, it was necessary for the younger foreign service officers to understand the United Nations as well as the problems and opportunities for solution provided by international organizations. With the development of international organizations came the diplomatic innovation of the permanent mission. Many of our former fellows have returned to New York and Geneva to assume important posts in their missions.

Were there any particular problems for the Endowment, which, after all, is an American foundation, in developing and implementing such a program with its possible political implications? For example, was it ever perceived as promoting American interests or views?

Jett: In the beginning there were questions raised by some governments about the suitability of such a program being developed by an American foundation. On the other hand, many governments were familiar with the Endowment's half century of activity in international fields, its worldwide reputation for impartiality, its research and publications related to the work of the UN and its agencies. Whatever suspicions and sensitivities existed were overcome by the experience of the programs. Columbia University, of course, had its own international reputation and the same was true of the Graduate Institute in Geneva.

How were the fellows recruited?

Jett: From the beginning fellows were nominated by their governments on the basis of a commitment to serve those governments after the training period. In some cases they were already in service; in others, they were newly recruited from universities. They were interviewed by an Endowment staff member or a UN official in their area. The interview gave the candidate some idea of what the program was all about and how he or she might fit into it, and, as well, gave the Endowment some idea of the personality of the candidate who in most cases would be living and studying in a strange environment. The principle was to help governments as much as possible with their training needs. Returning fellows have often assisted with in-service training programs in their ministries.

Has the Endowment made any attempt to maintain contact with the fellows once they return to their foreign service?

Jett: Yes, we are in almost regular contact by mail, and we get to see a large number of the "Carnegie alumni" when they return to their missions in New York and Geneva. Many show up every year in New York for the General Assembly. In addition to the personal contacts with Endowment staff members who travel on business to various areas of the world, the fellows themselves have taken some initiatives to maintain contact as a result of their common experience. While I would not want to exaggerate the strength of these ties, I do know of instances where two or three former fellows have participated in international conferences in which their respective governments have had differing positions. On more than one occasion, their previous association has helped to resolve difficult problems.

You said that there had been a shift of training programs to Africa. Can you discuss the reasons for this move and give some information about what is taking place in Africa where the programs are now located?

Jett: The year-long training program we have just talked about was first envisioned as a five year experiment. It quickly became apparent that the program was of great value to the governments concerned and, largely on their recommendation, the period was extended to ten years so that for many the critical first decade of independence was covered. During this period, as more and more people were attracted to the program, the transportation and living costs mounted. It also became evident that the year-long courses in western universities could not fully respond to the immediate needs of some of the countries, particularly in Africa, where the largest number of fellows were coming from. We were impressed with the successful experiences of the regional Institutes in Diplomacy which the Endowment organized at Makerere University

College in Uganda, at University College in Tanzania (Dar es Salaam), and at the Kenya Institute of Public Administration where problems of the East African community were treated in a much different way from universities thousands of miles from the scene. We concluded that it might be more appropriate to shift the program to one or more African sites, and by so doing to continue to help meet the over-all educational needs of that continent.

One of the seminars that had taken place annually over a period of years was the Consular and Chancery course held at the University of Cameroon, in Yaoundé, so that in considering the transfer of the training to Africa, the University of Cameroon was a likely place for the establishment of a full year's diplomatic training program. We were aware that in the beginning Yaoundé would cater primarily to French-speaking countries, but French and English are official languages of Cameroon and, in the future, it will be possible to offer courses in both languages. Since we were concerned about the most recently independent countries in Southern Africa and for English-speaking Africa as well, the Endowment also decided to provide limited support for a diplomatic training course now being organized at the University of Nairobi.

How have these new programs been progressing? Is there any special role that they are playing to meet more specific regional needs for the present and immediate future?

Jett: Well, after the usual start up period, the program in Cameroon is now in full swing. There were some initial problems, especially since the International Relations Institute of Cameroon (IRIC) was a relatively new institution. It needed personnel, library resources and buildings. But for the most part, these problems have been overcome. One of the exciting innovations of the program last year was the seminar sponsored by IRIC on the law of the sea in relation to African concerns — the first such seminar held on the African continent and one which produced a policy statement that has found its way into the continuing international debate. IRIC has also collaborated with the Hague Academy's External Program (with which the Endowment has worked for many years) on a series of seminars examining African perspectives on international law, and on the regional harmonization of technical cooperation between African and other countries and institutions. Another seminar at IRIC has focused on African universities and the teaching of international relations. All the universities and organizations in Africa concerned with international relations were invited to send representatives. We also anticipate that the diplomatic training course at the University of Nairobi will devote its attention to environmental problems, particularly since the Environment Secretariat has now been set up in Nairobi.

Can you give some of the highlights of the program that you remember particularly well, some personal reactions to the experience of being associated with such an unusual program?

Jett: Your question contains a part of the difficult answer. It has been such an unusual program that it is difficult to speak in terms of highlights. Enjoying the successes of fellows who make straight "A" records at Columbia, travelling with them to Europe and North Africa, seeing their countries become independent, watching former fellows go about their duties at the United Nations where some are now full ambassadors, participating in high-level meetings on the seabed or at UNCTAD with the problems of trade and development uppermost in their minds — these are all highlights. I have found the whole experience especially rewarding personally. Quite apart from the wonderful people I have met from all over the world, I have learned a lot each year about the conduct (or misconduct) of international affairs, about the needs of the developing world, about the limitations of diplomacy and the contraints imposed on those international organizations which we once thought could solve all the problems. Also, it has been interesting to watch the development of other institutions concerned with these problems — the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, the Eastern Regional Organization for Public Administration, the Institute of International Relations at the University of the West Indies, St. Augustine — and others — with which the Endowment has cooperated. There are naturally problems and frustrations but our faith has been strengthened by the cooperation and

mutual respect which the programs have engendered.

All you have said, thus far, would seem to indicate that close relationships have developed between the Endowment and the governments who have sent candidates to the program. Has this been a particularly difficult task? Have there been any special problems?

Jett: To answer the second part of the question first, the only problem we have had is in trying to accommodate the many requests that come from a number of the more recently independent countries. As I have said, the program became widely known, and for many, especially in the 1960's, the Endowment stood as the single nongovernmental organization that was in this respect responding to their needs. The problem today is one common to so many organizations — limited resources.

It is certainly true that we have enjoyed close relationships with many governments from the very beginning. Before the program was put into operation, the Endowment conducted a worldwide survey of the needs of newly independent and about-to-become independent governments. We tried to tailor the programs to meet these needs. But the close relationships with governments was due, in my opinion, to the personality and dedication of the first director of Programs in Diplomacy, Reginald Barrett. Prior to coming to the Endowment to start the program, Barrett had worked as Liaison Officer for Nigeria in the British Embassy in Washington, and had worked with the Race Relations Institute at Fisk University in Nashville, Tennessee, while on leave from Cambridge University. He had a deep knowledge and interest in the third world coupled with boundless energy and charm. An important part of his success came from his ability to understand the psychological as well as the material needs of the countries with which we were dealing. And, of course, the same must be said for my predecessor in this job, J. R. P. Dumas, who was, in fact, a graduate of the first program we ran in Geneva in 1961. At that time, Dumas was a young foreign service officer from the Federation of the West Indies. When the Federation was dissolved and Trinidad and Tobago became independent, he was sent to help establish his government's first embassy in Washington, and subsequently to Addis Ababa to open the embassy there. So you see, by the time he became director of the program (on leave from his government) he had an unusual accumulation of experience and knowledge to bring to the job. He left the Endowment in 1971 to take up the post of Minister-Counsellor of Trinidad and Tobago's Embassy in Washington and in late 1973 returned to Ethiopia as Ambassador with accreditation to several East African countries.

The whole subject of diplomacy in a transnational world has lately become something of a favorite academic subject. And it's clear that traditional methods of approaching interstate relations are undergoing revision. Have you observed any changes over the 1960's in the way African participants in the programs in Yaoundé and Nairobi are approaching their diplomatic careers in the 1970's?

Jett: It is too early to say whether there have been any different approaches to careers based on the Yaoundé and Nairobi experience. In general, there is a tendency toward specialization in diplomacy because world problems have become inextricably tied up with science and technology, whether they be problems of disarmament, communication satellites, the seabed or the environment — all of these are of much deeper concern to third world diplomats who have less expertise to draw upon than developed countries have. The questions of development and trade and the elimination of racism are, of course, continuing preoccupations.

I would say that African countries are more and more approaching their problems from the standpoint of the African continent's interest rather than their specific national interests.

Of course, the Yaoundé and Nairobi projects are new and will have to be evaluated. Meanwhile we are keeping in touch with Programs in Diplomacy alumni through such devices as a recent meeting with them, along with academics and Endowment trustees, on the subject of the future of African diplomacy. ■

The German Marshall Fund of the United States

The German Marshall Fund of the United States shares the Washington and New York offices of the Carnegie Endowment. Under an arrangement between the Fund and the Endowment, the Fund will use Carnegie facilities and administrative support for as long as it is deemed mutually desirable and programmatically advantageous for both parties.

The Fund, a private, nonprofit American foundation, is a memorial to the Marshall Plan, created by a generous gift from the Federal Republic of Germany. The arrangement made between the German government and the American Board of Trustees stipulates that ". . . the German Marshall Fund will administer its proceeds without any influence by German authorities, and will use them to promote American and European study and research projects."

The Fund will concentrate its activities in three main areas: (1) the comparative study of problems confronting advanced industrial societies; (2) the study of problems of international relations that pertain to the common interests of Europe and the United States; and (3) support for the field of European studies. The Fund's stated purpose is:

> To contribute to the better understanding and resolution of significant contemporary or emerging common problems of industrial societies—internally and in their relationships with each other and with developing societies—by facilitating new and sustained contacts and cooperation between persons with shared interests and responsibilities in the United States, Europe and elsewhere.

FOREIGN POLICY

Samuel P. Huntington, Warren Demian Manshel & Richard Holbrooke



FOREIGN POLICY began in the Fall of 1970. Could you tell us what led you to found it?

Sam Huntington: We had the idea of the magazine in 1968 or 1969. Warren and I had had somewhat different views on the question of Vietnam, after having been close friends for 20 years, dating from our graduate school days. But we shared a mutual concern about what was happening to the discussion of American foreign policy in the professional community and felt that it was desirable and necessary to do something to restore communication between people who had been shouting at each other. . . .

Did you feel that the existing magazines at that time did not fulfill that need?

Huntington: We felt there was a need for a new magazine. I think if one looks at the history of magazines concerned with foreign policy and international affairs, you can see that at each major turn in U.S. foreign policy, each shift in the U.S. role in the world, a new magazine has come into existence — after World War I and again after World War II, for example — and we felt this was the time for a new journal lacking an institutional memory or too strong an identification or image from the past.

When the magazine was founded, did you envisage presenting any particular point of view?

Warren Manshel: No, on the contrary, we had no particular point of view. We had divergent points of view, which we wanted to present in the pages of the magazine. One of the main purposes of the magazine was to bring together people who, under the impact of the disagreement on Vietnam, had not communicated with one another—to bring them together in the pages of one magazine to discuss the direction of American foreign policy after the war. These points of view were too divergent to be considered pleading for a special cause.

This was not your first venture in publishing, Warren. To what extent was FOREIGN POLICY related to your earlier founding of THE PUBLIC INTEREST magazine?

Manshel: Well, the only thing it reflects is an ability to learn quickly. I started *THE PUBLIC INTEREST* about five years prior to *FOREIGN POLICY.* It was edited by Irving Kristol together with Daniel Bell — now Nathan Glazer — and had gotten a great deal of attention and serious interest. I enjoy my association with that magazine, but my own training and primary interest are in foreign policy, and that field was in particular need of a new publication.

Now that the magazine has outlasted the Vietnam war, how do you look back on its success? Has it moved towards the objectives which you set over three years ago?

Huntington: Yes, I certainly think it has. As a matter of fact, I just went back and reread a memo which I sent to Warren in the summer of 1969 about what the purposes of

the magazine we hoped to found might be, and in looking over that memo it seems to me we have done very well in terms of promoting the goals which we had in mind then.

Can you be more specific about those goals and how you feel you've achieved them?

Huntington: One goal was to have a variety of viewpoints expressed in the magazine. A second goal was to serve as a vehicle for the expression of new viewpoints on policy issues, iconoclastic viewpoints, and to promote a reconsideration of the role of the U.S. in world affairs. I think that both in general terms and in terms of specific articles we've done that.

Manshel: I think if *FOREIGN POLICY* hadn't existed for the last three years it would have to be started today. What Henry Kissinger is talking about today, an end to civil war on the issue of foreign policy, is the kind of motivation which underlay the founding of our magazine. In the pages of *FOREIGN POLICY* we bring together people of divergent views . . .

Can you give some examples of the divergent authors that you've published?

Manshel: Our authors range from Senators Goldwater and Stennis to Richard Falk. . . .

Huntington: . . . and Richard Barnet . . . .

Manshel: . . . and our Editorial Board brings together people like Zbigniew Brzezinski and Stanley Hoffmann. But I don't want to play up the differences. The purpose of the magazine is not to create or cash in on controversy, but, on the contrary, to stimulate a discussion of topics by people who disagree but have important things to say. One good debate on an important issue was the one between Ronald Steel and Pierre Hassner on spheres of influence, and another was the varying views we've published on the virtues and vices of multinational corporations.

Huntington: Let me cite some other examples of what I would consider important articles. We ran an interview with George Kennan on the 25th anniversary of his "X" article. This was reported all over the country, and reprinted in several places. We ran the most controversial article ever written on the oil crisis, "Is the Oil Shortage Real?" by Professor Adelman of MIT. It was reprinted in the *Wall Street Journal* and provoked what amounted to a quasi-official reply by a senior State Department official.

Manshel: We have also run personality analyses of leading personalities, such as Dean Rusk and John Foster Dulles. I am also pleased with our efforts to pair contrasting viewpoints, such as the debate on the War Powers Bill between Goldwater and Eagleton.

Huntington: I would add that, from my vantage point as a professor at Harvard, *FOREIGN POLICY* has become an essential forum for the exchange of ideas on the front edge of the debate over our future. We print major articles by such men as John Kenneth Galbraith, Albert Wohlstetter, Paul Warnke, Leslie Gelb, Philip Windsor, all used extensively in the field of political science.

Manshel: In economics, Richard Cooper, Fred Bergsten, Harry Johnson, Harald Malmgren, Raymond Vernon, Dwight Perkins, and others, have made us the leading general circulation magazine in the field of international economics.

Looking back on the first three years of the publication, it seems clear FOREIGN POLICY has been a success editorially. You've received a great deal of attention in the press and have been quoted extensively. How does the magazine look to you from a business point of view? Is it losing money?

Manshel: The magazine is not making money, but then it was not established for that purpose. The circulation of *FOREIGN POLICY* has gone up substantially. We started with 3,700 subscribers three years ago. We now sell more than three times that number. When the Carnegie Endowment entered into its agreement with us in April 1972, we had approximately 5,000 subscribers; today we have about 11,000. This is a substantial increase, achieved with a relatively small input of money. I couldn't claim to be totally happy with it; I would prefer the magazine at this time to have at least 50% more subscribers than it does. But I am confident that we are

establishing ourselves and are attracting the right audience.

You talk about the audience of the magazine. Who are the people you are trying to reach in America today?

Huntington: We're trying to reach the people who have a serious concern with foreign policy. This includes people in the government, in the Washington community, in the press, academic people, and citizens who are concerned with foreign policy issues. We have subscribers in every state and in at least 83 foreign countries.

Manshel: One of the major differences between this magazine and any other magazine dealing with American foreign policy is that we interpret foreign policy in a very broad manner. We do not deal with government-to-government relations, but concern ourselves with economic issues, bureaucratic issues, relations with other countries. We have carried many articles on trade; from trading with different areas to the possibility of trade wars. We have dealt with the problem of international balances of payments, the dollar crisis, SDR's, to a far greater extent, I believe, than any other journal in the field.

We began, by the way, with a brilliant young Managing Editor, John Franklin Campbell, who died at the age of 31. He did an enormous amount to create a viable magazine, and we miss him greatly.

What is the nature of the arrangement with Carnegie?

Manshel: The agreement with the Carnegie Endowment was for a preliminary two-year period, with the expectation that it would become a renewable association after this initial two year arrangement. The Carnegie Endowment is helping National Affairs, Inc., which publishes *FOREIGN POLICY,* with the expenses of publishing the magazine, and provides, in addition to that, office space both in Washington and New York. The initial agreement also made provision for *FOREIGN POLICY* to take over the unexpired subscriptions of *International Conciliation* magazine, which the Endowment published until 1972.

Is the arrangement an essential part of the magazine's present character?

Manshel: It is certainly a very enjoyable aspect of it and one that we value greatly. The association with the Carnegie Endowment has given us additional prestige and has helped us in many ways, not least of which, by any means, is the presence of Tom Hughes as Chairman of our Editorial Board. I should emphasize that the Endowment as an organization plays no role in our editorial policy. We are not a publication of the Endowment. The editors of the magazine are completely free to make decisions about what to include and what to eliminate from consideration in the magazine.

You wrote in 1970 that "The two editors of this magazine are old friends who have, during the past six years, disagreed sharply over Vietnam. Now, however, we have decided to join together in an effort to stimulate rational discussion of the new directions required in American foreign policy. We both feel that the basic purposes of American foreign policy demand reexamination and redefinition. We at FOREIGN POLICY will probably continue to differ in our individual thinking as to the course which American foreign policy should take in the next phase. But we all want FOREIGN POLICY to be revisionist, in the most catholic sense of this word. We think this is a good time for new and, we hope, more constructive controversies." When you wrote that three years ago, the United States was still at war in Vietnam. Looking back on the magazine and the three years, how do you feel about your own efforts, the personal commitment of time and money, that you've made to the creation of this magazine?

Manshel: I feel very positive about it. I think that we have succeeded in large measure in doing precisely what we set out to do. I think our purposes were modest, and our achievements within the modest framework of our purposes have been substantial. We have not changed American foreign policy, but then we did not set out to change American foreign policy. We wanted to bring together those people we thought had the most to contribute, regardless of their points of view, in discussion of where the main problems of Ameri-

can foreign policy lay and where the main initiatives were required and what these initiatives should be. Our editorial disagreements continue, and we work them out in the pages of the magazine. We continue to feel — I'm sure Sam Huntington as well as I — that American foreign policy demands reexamination and redefinition because this is a process and not a one-time occurrence. We think that our magazine has contributed towards that function in a small but effective way.

Huntington: I think, Warren, you may have been overly modest in saying what sort of an impact we have had. We obviously aren't solving any foreign policy problems, but it seems to me that the extent to which we are read and quoted is some indication of the extent to which our articles have had an impact on the way in which people think about foreign policy issues, and in several cases — some of the articles have been very important for policymakers.

And yet it has been said of both FOREIGN POLICY and other magazines in the field that they have not come up with the kinds of far-ranging prescriptions for future policy which some people are looking for and which some people believe existed in George Kennan's "X" article.

Manshel: I think it is not the function of a magazine nor even of a foreign policy to provide a lasting solution to problems. Foreign policy, like any other policy, is a pragmatic process which requires constant redefinition, reexamination and reevaluation of means and ends. A foreign policy which has only one objective is either a foreign policy of necessity, like a wartime foreign policy, or a policy of neurosis, like the policy which we pursued for two decades after the second World War. Normally, a foreign policy is a flow in which the problems constantly change, in which the solutions are tactical, not strategic, and in which no final solution is ever achieved. Here I reflect a personal philosophy because I don't believe that there is such a thing as a "solution" to a foreign policy problem. I think all you can ever hope for is to modify your problems, or to divide them into smaller problems, some or which you can then ignore because they're so small, while others develop a whole life of their own and grow into bigger problems again.

Huntington: I think another major difference with our foreign policy in the past, brought out by your reference to George Kennan's containment article, is that quite clearly the whole foreign policy world is far more complex now than it was before. One used to be able to sum up American foreign policy for two decades in a single phrase like containment, whereas now there are so many arenas and so many issues and new actors in the foreign policy field that you can't have any sort of simple formulation like that. That's one of the reasons why things seem confused—they are. ■

THE EUROPEAN CENTER

John Goormaghtigh

John, you are now the senior person among the key program staff at the Carnegie Endowment. Could you start by reflecting on the development the Endowment has taken over the years, particularly its European Center in Geneva which you direct?

John Goormaghtigh: The European Center has had its ups and downs. When I joined the Endowment in 1950, the European office was a small concern in a large building on the Boulevard St. Germain in Paris. The war years had upset the traditional operations of the Carnegie Endowment outside the United States, and we were looking for ways in which we could again fulfill the role of contact in Europe for an American foundation, and also how we could bring the voice of Europe to the United States.

In the early years of my involvement with the Endowment this was, I suppose, my main role: to inform headquarters in New York of some of the thinking of scholars and others in Western Europe about international affairs in general, and about international organizations in particular. Very soon the operation became more complex, when we attempted to bring about a real dialogue between specialists in the field of international affairs on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean and to initiate projects in international law and relations.

As you know, international affairs were not integrated into the academic programs on the continent. One of the first missions of the Endowment in the postwar years was to help diversify the range of studies in academic centers and in institutes. Until then, the studies we sponsored had been mainly legal.

We were instrumental in getting the focus shifted from a rather formal approach towards political science, and I think one can see in the development of the various institutes of international affairs in Europe the input of the Endowment. An important catalyst in this process has been the Endowment's Visiting Research Scholarship which brought well known American scholars to the European Center for a year's research. The most recent scholar, Leon Lindberg of the University of Wisconsin, has been particularly successful in stimulating some new thinking among our colleagues on post-industrial problems.

Why did you move from Paris to Geneva? Do you see advantages in Geneva over any other city in Europe?

Goormaghtigh: The Endowment chose Paris because it was the main political center of Europe in the period after the Treaty of Versailles. After 1945, with the United Nations becoming the key focus of the programs of the Endowment in New York, the trustees felt that the European office should move close to the main center of the international organizations in Europe: Geneva.

I think there are real advantages in being in Geneva. It is a small place with a large international community, where things are actually going on. They're not spectacular things because the political life of the world is not determined in Geneva. But most of the technical aspects of international cooperation are centered there.

Could you give an example or two?

Goormaghtigh: First, the main specialized agencies of the United Nations are located in Geneva. The big Nixon Round of trade negotiations has brought to Geneva hundreds of people connected with international trade who are shaping the face of the world to a greater extent than the Kennedy Round did several years ago.

Also, there is the United Nations Commission for Trade and Development, the major organization dealing with economic relations between the third world and the developed countries; the World Health Organization; the International Telecommunications Union; the UN Economic Commission for Europe, which maintained precious contacts between East and West during the whole of the Cold War; the International Labor Organization, which our former colleague James T. Shotwell helped to set up; and many other important intergovernmental and nongovernmental agencies.

How does this location of activities in the same city as the European Center of the Endowment affect the work of the Endowment? More importantly, how does the Endowment affect these organizations?

Goormaghtigh: We would be very presumptuous indeed if we thought that a small private organization like our own could really change the face of these organizations. But I do think that in the course of time we have had a certain impact. Since we have seen them operate from day to day, we have become very familiar with their problems. We have, I think, contributed to a better understanding of their tasks and of the limits to their possible action. Officials from these organizations are brought into our meetings and discussion groups; resulting publications are widely distributed.

But your role is not always limited to studies. In some cases, don't you also help solve a specific problem?

Goormaghtigh: Yes. The convention setting up the High Commission for Refugees was quite restrictive. It limited the High Commissioner's operations to the European scene, mainly to refugees leaving Communist countries. By the 1960's, however, the refugees were not only located in Europe. The major problems were posed in Africa, in the Middle East, and in the Far East.

We brought together a small group of lawyers to prepare the text of a draft protocol to the 1951 Convention, broadening the terms of reference of the High Commissioner's office. Although this was a purely private initiative of the Endowment, the instrument is now operative and has made possible large operations throughout the world — in southern Sudan recently, for instance, and in Bangladesh where hundreds of thousands of refugees have been helped by the High Commissioner's office.

This was a case in which the international organization was blocked because of its structure. The Endowment managed to play a positive role in changing that structure. There are other examples.

What about your efforts in the field of territorial asylum?

Goormaghtigh: This follows very logically from what I was saying about our work with the High Commissioner's office. There is no agreement which obliges a country to grant asylum to a citizen of another country, and although there is a declaration of the United Nations, it is not binding. We wanted to contribute to giving greater protection to the individual in the international community by a convention which would make it illegal to return a political refugee to the country from which he is escaping. So we brought together a small group of legal experts from East and West, North and South. We actually had the participation of the legal advisor of one of the Eastern European countries. We wanted to draft a text which had a real chance of being accepted by the majority of states, so we had to be modest.

It is quite a conservative document, but at least it creates an obligation for states to respect the *non refoulement* principle, meaning that one does not push someone back across the border from which he came. It is on the agenda of the General Assembly.

Could you give more examples of the kind of work you're

doing — particularly those which show the practical outcome of your projects?

Goormaghtigh: In a completely different area, we have had an interest in the International Telecommunications Union. Everybody is aware of the importance of satellites in the contemporary world and particularly of communication satellites.

Now, partly because of the very complex decision making process within this specialized agency, the question of regulating the use of communication satellites could not be solved by the organization itself. What resulted was two main regional groupings, one based on the American Intelsat, and one based on the Soviet Union's Intersputnik. This was an unfortunate development in which political divisions reinforced technical differences.

So, together with the Twentieth Century Fund, we decided to bring together competent experts in the field of control of telecommunications, both from the Soviet Union, the major Socialist countries, and the Western world. We held a series of conferences and consultations designed to have some impact on the diplomatic conference of the International Telecommunications Union.

Considering the new direction which the Endowment is taking under its new leadership, how do you see the past merging with the future?

Goormaghtigh: The Endowment has established over the years a reputation for itself throughout the world which is an asset difficult to evaluate in dollars. For example, during the last fifteen years we have established a kind of working relationship with the Socialist countries which I think is unique among American foundations. There was no time during the whole of the Cold War when we did not have some contact with scholars in Eastern Europe. This is an important asset.

Now, we have also developed a network of good relations with the third world through our Programs in Diplomacy which you are covering in another interview. Recently we have assisted the Cameroon government in establishing in Yaoundé a graduate institution for the study of international affairs and a diplomatic training center.

I think the goodwill generated by past programs, including the one devoted to international law, can still serve us well in the new programs toward which the Endowment is moving.

What about your efforts to discuss the postwar reconstruction of North and South Vietnam? How did that come about and what do you think the chances are for some constructive role in Indochina?

Goormaghtigh: This brings me back to something I was mentioning earlier, namely, our very close association with international organizations, and our desire to make them more effective.

In 1971, a group of us in Geneva felt that there was not sufficient thought being devoted inside the United Nations to the complex problem of relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction in Indochina after the end of hostilities.

We were quite aware of the immensity of the task and the difficult political context in which this problem would be posed. However, we felt that we could gather information about what initiatives had been taken by individual governments and by nongovernmental organizations.

It was the feeling of our working group that funds would be readily available, possibly not sufficient funds, but many millions of dollars, if governments were sure that there was a coordinating mechanism to enable the funds to be put to the most effective use. The United Nations for well known reasons was not able to solve the problem. So, we attempted to indicate some of the paths which might be followed and some of the ways in which the obstacles could be lifted.

I notice that you make frequent trips to Eastern Europe and that you work with Eastern Europeans. Could you talk a little more about that? To what extent, if any, has this contributed to a dialogue between East and West?

Goormaghtigh: We have become involved in dialogues in cooperation with colleagues in Eastern Europe on many topics. Initially, our contacts were mainly with scholars in

the study group on international organization which we have been running in Geneva for the last several years. This group has regular members who come from universities in Poland and other Socialist countries. With them we have developed a sort of common language: there's no longer any problem of communication.

In addition to this activity of the study group, we run conferences on subjects ranging from international trade to conflict management. We organized in Hungary in 1967 one of the first of the major dialogues on the obstacles to international trade between Western and Socialist countries. We were at the beginning of the end of the Cold War and the beginning of serious trade negotiations between the two parts of Europe and the United States. The Endowment's initiative came at a propitious time.

One last question, John. How did you come to be associated with the Endowment in the first place?

Goormaghtigh: It was, of course, an accident, like most things in life. I had been running the Belgian Institute of International Affairs for a number of years when the Rockefeller Foundation gave me a fellowship to travel in the United States. While I was in America, the Carnegie Endowment asked me to attend one of their meetings, a discussion group in Ann Arbor, Michigan. Later, while I was still in the United States, I got a message from the Carnegie Endowment asking me if I'd be interested in running their European office.

In New York I was interviewed by Joe Johnson shortly after he, himself, had been appointed President. For a time I ran the European office of the Carnegie Endowment on a half-time basis. I was spending one week in Paris and one week in Brussels where I was still running the Belgian Institute of International Affairs.

After a few years of commuting, I decided to opt for the Carnegie Endowment and have never regretted it. ■

THE INTERNATIONAL LAW PROGRAM

Ralph Zacklin & Thomas M. Franck



Ralph, why has the Carnegie Endowment been so identified with programs in international law over its long history?

Ralph Zacklin: I think the history of the Endowment has been in large part the history of international law in the 20th century. The creation of the Endowment was related directly to the hope of increasing the role of law in establishing and maintaining international peace. It was a somewhat naive assumption, looking back on 60 years of history of both the Endowment and the international community. But in the 1920's and 1930's the Endowment's activities in international law were quite pragmatic and filled a function which was not at that time filled by any other international organization. We have to remember that the creation of the Endowment preceded both World War I and the creation of the League of Nations, and until that time there were no intergovernmental institutions which were active in the international field. So in its early period the Endowment performed pragmatic functions which no one else was performing, and this legacy has come down over the years. In the 1960's and 1970's we have tried to renew the Endowment's role in a very different institutional environment.

What is the audience for international law work today? Are you aiming at governments, or international organizations, or the general informed public?

Zacklin: All three.

What do you hope to accomplish?

Zacklin: Well, I think we start from a basic assumption that an international legal order is a necessary thing, and therefore we're working towards improving it. The international law activities of the Endowment today are designed to enhance the overall functioning of the international legal system. They are designed to play some role in the progressive development of international law, to act as a channel of communication between international legal theory and different cultures, and to act as a quasi-diplomatic sounding board for the examination of international legal problems which may be on the horizon.

When you talk about international law, I take it that you're talking about codification of legal relationships between nations, particularly in new fields such as the law of the sea, in which new problems caused by modern technology require new adjustments between nations. But how much emphasis do you place on solutions to major political problems through international law?

Zacklin: International law functions at different levels. There is international law as an instrumentality for achieving a stable world order. In that sense I think it would be naive to expect a great deal, given the political realities and the absence in the international legal system of any central sanctioning authority. But international law is also a system which provides a framework for states in which they can conduct relations with one another. It provides a method of regulation for certain intergovernmental activities which are ab-

solutely essential in fields like the environment or the sea or civil aviation. The functional approach is the approach that the Endowment has recently stressed.

Tom Franck: Nations and states are constantly in a bargaining position. The role of international law in any dispute is, first of all, to help the parties spell out the exchange which is to take place in order to resolve the particular dispute in hand. And secondly, to remind the parties that there is a negotiable future addressed as well, which is implicit in any legal solution. The legal solution defines the relationship not only in the immediate case but also in any possible future disputes.

Is the emphasis of the Carnegie Endowment on the substance of international law—the formulation and codification of new international legal understandings or relationships—or is it on the training of international lawyers throughout the world?

Zacklin: Really both. Both are important functions the Endowment can fulfill. From the point of view of the international law program, I think that certain assumptions were made in the 1960's. It was perceived that there were qualitative changes taking place in international law which were of great importance, and many of these. . . .

What qualitative changes?

Zacklin: The substantive content of the law was changing as the makeup of the international community changed. There was rapid expansion of the community of states in the 1950's and 1960's—largely newly independent African states —and this brought about a shift in the balance of the international community which in turn is now bringing about a change in the substance of international law. If you look at it from a historical point of view, until the 1940's or 1950's international law was largely regarded as basically European law to govern the relations between a relatively homogeneous group of states. Now we have a different situation. We have many new states for whom the existing legal structure and content of the law is inadequate. As a result the law is being changed. It's happening very slowly, but it is happening. If you look at the law of the sea, for example, you see that the new law which is being discussed will reflect much more of a balance between the needs of new developing countries and the interests of the older maritime nations.

What have you emphasized in the Carnegie Endowment's training efforts?

Zacklin: Developing international legal capability in the third world. We have attempted to use the Endowment's facilities to train legal advisors who are working in governments. The most important program of this kind has been the Hague Academy External Program, which has conducted a number of seminars in developing countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America. We have trained more than 200 legal advisors and other persons in government service in those countries, as well as teachers for universities.

What is the Endowment's role in the Hague Academy's External Program?

Zacklin: We have a role both in the administration of the program and in the technical side, deciding what subjects should be discussed, selecting the professors, and choosing the participants. There has been a related effort, of course, in the Endowment's Programs in Diplomacy, because many of the fellows who have participated in that program at Columbia or in Geneva have also taken international law courses.

To turn from training to research, what is the main focus of your research efforts?

Zacklin: The guiding principle for research has been to try to identify some of the issues which we think are going to receive most attention, issues where the substance of the law will change or is changing. We have tried to devote our resources to gaining an understanding of the interests of developing countries in these areas.

Why the continued emphasis on developing countries?

Zacklin: Well, because the existence of these new states is one of the primary factors affecting the international legal

system today. Any improvement in the effectiveness of the international legal system must take into account the interests of developing states, otherwise it's not going to be an effective system. For example, among the research projects which have been sponsored by the Endowment, the most ambitious is the Inter-American Study Group. This group of about a dozen persons has worked on problems of democracy and international economic law. The results are being published. One book on the law of the sea sets out the law and its practice by Western Hemisphere states. Another book deals with such questions as state trading, commodity agreements, the role of multinational corporations, and so forth.

A separate study is an examination of the role of international institutions like the World Bank in developing the legal systems of third world countries. This study seeks to describe what the role and impact of these institutions has been on their legal and political systems.

Who is doing that study?

Zacklin: It is a joint project between the Endowment and the International Legal Center. Reputable scholars are doing case studies of particular developing countries such as Pakistan, Turkey, Ghana and Colombia.

You have written that the real issue is not change in legal systems per se, *but the mechanisms employed to produce change and the intricate interaction between governments and international lending and regulatory agencies. What do you mean?*

Zacklin: I think we started out with a fairly healthy skepticism about the actual role of lending agencies in developing countries. Although in popular mythology such agencies by definition almost always do good, the evidence is beginning to accumulate that they too can make mistakes.

Which lending agencies do you have in mind?

Zacklin: The World Bank is a good example. For many years the World Bank did not lend for educational projects. This is now changing. But the Bank and similar agencies operated on certain assumptions which they are now beginning to see were not always accurate and in some cases were actually dysfunctional. This particular research project has shown that not only has the leverage of these institutions in certain countries been quite extensive, but the interaction between the institution and national institutions and even individuals has had a great impact on the way in which certain countries have developed.

But why is this a part of an international law study, and not just another study of the economic, political and social impact of international lending organizations on third world countries?

Zacklin: I think what makes a difference is that we have accumulated a good deal more evidence than was available heretofore, mainly because much of the research was carried on in the borrowing countries, as distinct from the usual research carried out at the headquarters of institutions. So we have been able to accumulate evidence, and from it we've been able to draw certain deductive and inductive conclusions.

Are you in a position to discuss some of your conclusions and their potential political impact?

Zacklin: Yes. I think one example would be the role of the World Bank in Colombia, a very interesting case. On the basis of our study we have been able to determine that the World Bank was in fact responsible for certain policies which were translated into Colombian realities. It has distorted Colombian development because of its insistence on industrial projects such as hydroelectric plants. And it has played a significant role in internal politics through the creation of autonomous agencies in certain public sectors such as energy.

Let me pursue this, Ralph. I accept the importance of this subject, but what does it have to do with international law?

Zacklin: Well, the answer to that depends upon your perception of international law. What we're trying to do is examine the interaction between international agencies and a particular country. We feel that the result could and should

lead to a set of well defined international legal relations between a country and an organization. This is an input into the changing international legal system. In other words, there is an impact on the actual substantive content of international law through this relationship.

Is international law a potential avenue for control over multinational corporations?

Zacklin: It is a potential avenue. The role of multinational corporations is presently being discussed in a number of international arenas, and I think that both governments and international institutions are having difficulties dealing with it. The regulation of the activities of such corporations is going to be a major issue in the near future.

What about international law as a means of communication with the Soviet Union?

Zacklin: The Carnegie Endowment played a significant role in the 1960's in the area of communication between the Socialist world and the Western world. About 1963, the Endowment organized the first international law conference attended by representatives of Socialist countries. The Endowment has a reputation in many of these countries over half a century, and its activities are well regarded. There have been several other conferences with substantial Eastern European participation, including a major one in 1969 on the law of conflicts.

Do you and Tom Franck see the field of international law as one in which the Western European nations and the U.S. on the one hand and the Soviet Union and perhaps the Chinese on the other can work out arrangements which will reduce tension?

Franck: Let me try a generalized response to that question. There is a distinction between international law as a procedure and as a substantive issue. As a procedure for adjusting differences between states, international law has to do with getting people around a table to talk in structured fashion about a specific problem and to do so not in isolation but in the context of an on-going relationship. This reciprocity which is at the heart of the legal process has to do not only with how you solve today's problems, but how you place the search for a solution in the broader context of negotiations that aim to create a continuing relationship. As a process, international law is always asking politicians to think about the consequences of today's initiatives for the on-going systemic relationships among states. They are always telling policymakers: "If you do such-and-such, that will be a sign that other states can count on having the right to do similar things. Are you sure that might not be to our disadvantage in the long run?"

Perhaps some problems may be solved without a thought for tomorrow. Other problems are better solved by bringing in trade-offs that have to do with future relationships and predicting the long-run system. The only way to solve a here-and-now problem may be by placing it in a broader context of contingent futures. Whenever policymakers decide that they want to have an on-going relationship — what lawyers call a "regime" — usually somebody presses a button to summon an international lawyer to help conceive such a regime. If he is any good at all, he himself will have some ideas as to what the future problems may be. He will not only be talking, for example, about the problems of this year's herrings off the coast of Peru, but also talking about a continuing relationship. Hopefully, that relationship will govern not only our herring catch off Peru during the next 50 years, but will also be able to adjust to changes in technology, take into account changes in the pattern of herring movements, be able to deal with disputes that will arise as to whether a particular fish is a herring or a sardine, and perhaps set up some kind of low level way of resolving such problems before they become the source of more profound hostilities.

Whenever politicians want to confront an immediate problem with a solution that embraces not only that immediate problem but an on-going predictable series of future contingencies, you're really talking about law. Incidentally, I see no inherent reason why the designing of procedural adjust-

ment mechanisms should have to be a monopoly of lawyers. It could be done by psychiatrists or sociologists. . . .

Or even politicians?

. . . . or conceivably even politicians. But lawyers tend to play that role in the international community, particularly in the United States. In part this is because politicians tend to be tied, to a considerable extent, to solutions for today's problems. They're responsible for bringing home today's bacon to today's constituents, and so they tend to want to do that, regardless of tomorrow's costs. It's a job for someone else to think about tomorrow and the day after tomorrow and try to resolve a particular problem by placing it in a larger systemic context.

That's the procedural aspect of international law. The substantive aspect has to do with actual rule-making and that can be done outside the context of a specific dispute: often only outside that context. The hard way to write a treaty on terrorism is by fixing on the Arab-Israeli dispute.

It's been part of the tradition of the Carnegie Endowment and the Harvard Law School and others to try to propose substantive rules for resolving problems before they become too hot to handle as legal issues, before they become politicized. So there is another aspect of the role of the creative lawyer as a predicter of future problems. The United Nations lawyers prod states to predict and deal with problems not yet arisen but likely to arise in the future — with, for example, the retrieval of outer space vehicles or territorial and other kinds of proprietary interests in outer space territory — things of that sort. They advocate resolving these "far out" problems by creating a code or system of law applicable to disputes before they arise. This they do on the lawyers' theory that men are more likely to reach an agreement before they have begun to disagree, before they are at each other's throats. On the other hand, sometimes it requires a specific controversy to get people thinking about the larger legal context, to sit down to try to work out some procedure, some regime to solve problems.

Tom, do you see a new set of priorities for international law as a program within the Endowment as you take over from Ralph Zacklin and assess the future course?

Franck: The priorities are inherent in the job. The Endowment wants to look at where international law fits in the new directions of the Endowment; to have a look at on-going programs, to consider a series of possible future models. If the overall direction of the Endowment is to be more activist, more directly relevant—and I agreed to work with the Endowment because it's my feeling that this is happening — then the task is to determine whether international legal projects can also be more activist. Are there things that can be done with legal tools that directly and measurably improve the capacity of the international system to promote peace with justice? Or is international law largely irrelevant? Or, worse, is it hopelessly geared to the *status quo?* Those are the questions I want to look at.

Are you doing this while continuing your duties at N.Y.U.?

Franck: I have resigned as Director of the Center for International Studies there, although I will continue to be Professor of Law at N.Y.U. and at York University in Canada.

How many years have you been working in the field of international law?

Franck: Well, I started to specialize in international law at the Havard Law School in 1953, primarily, I think, because international law seminars were given in the afternoons. I found I worked better in the afternoons and nights than in the mornings. International law placed me, at least briefly, in equilibrium with my nature.

So twenty years later, you're still working on this problem. Can we focus on the basic question of whether international law itself is related to international peace? Or are we talking about a fairly technical field which has intrinsic value but will not affect directly the great issues of war and peace?

Franck: I think that's very much like asking whether economics is a subject which has only broad hortatory and educational functions or whether it is capable of making a differ-

ence in the condition of men. The Endowment has a reputation for tackling the role of international law primarily in the context of research, training and the related drafting of model instruments for international law. It has built up a great deal of credit in the international community by focusing on those issues. I think one of the things the Endowment will be asking itself now, and that I will be asking, will be whether some of that credit can be drawn on to actually involve people at the Endowment in the inter-governmental processes.

Now, it's difficult to make the connection between research and training on one hand, and an actual on-going crisis and its solution on the other. But perhaps there are ways of doing it. The mixed training/research/litigation function of the public interest law firm is one approach that is attractive to law students today. It has made some impact both on the academic and research community and on the government, often in an adversary role to both. There are possible variations of that model that could be applied in international law.

But here's an even further out suggestion. We all know that one of the reasons that international law is popularly and wrongly thought to be a dormant field is because the two instruments of lawmaking that are most familiar to you and me, that is, the legislature and the court, have no real equivalent in the international community. The international conference and the United Nations, through its quasi-legislative processing, both play a role vaguely analogous to that of the U.S. Congress. But the World Court as an equivalent of our domestic traditional institution is still a very pale shadow. One of the reasons that the World Court gets so little business is because countries have to agree, either in a specific case or in general, to accept the Court's compulsory jurisdiction. More than half the countries of the international community, including in effect the U.S., have refused to do that. Even if they did, even if countries were willing to go to Court, there's the additional question of enforcing judgments against them. Even before coming to that second hurdle, the failure to accept compulsory jurisdiction on the part of so many countries has been a tremendous barrier to the development of law through the Court.

Could something be built that could become an instrument for placing before distinguished jurors actual disputes or issues which the parties were unwilling to take to the World Court? Could a nongovernmental organization make determinations in a judicial manner that would make a contribution both to world order and to the development of international jurisprudence?

This could be a way of getting more issues into international law and placing international law itself in a framework in which it could grow.

To conclude, then, one can say that both of you are optimists about the potential value of international law in the modern world. In various ways, you both have been able to identify mechanisms and subject areas in which influence can be brought against governments, international organizations, and private multinational organizations to create an atmosphere of cooperation in at least limited spheres — and perhaps, if I understand your final comments correctly, even in larger political issues at some future date. Is that a reasonable summation of why each of you has spent 20 years of your life working in a field which many people would say was never going to produce a fundamental change because the elements of power always lie elsewhere in international relations?

Franck: Well, I don't know where the power does lie in the field of international relations. It certainly hasn't lain with the armed forces or with the State Department over the last six or seven years. I'm not about to claim that it lies with international law. It's a recurring but fundamental decision for each state to make in its relations with other states. Does it want to try to resolve its problems in case by case negotiation, or in the use of systems and regimes that are established by legal instruments? I suppose the answer is still that they will probably continue to do it from a mixture of both. But I am, and will remain, an optimist about the role of international law.

THE RHODESIA PROJECT

Anthony Lake

Now that the Endowment's Project on Rhodesia has been under way for over a year, how would you describe its overall purposes?

Tony Lake: The Rhodesia Project consists of two parts. The first is a study by Ralph Zacklin on Rhodesian sanctions generally, looked at from an international perspective with particular attention to the international legal implications of the sanctions and the actual performance of the United Nations and member states in observing them.

The second part is the study we have been working on here in Washington. It concentrates on the response of the United States to the Rhodesian problem. For example, we are looking into the origins of American policy towards Rhodesia, the American response to the choices that we have faced at the United Nations on the issue, how the United States has observed the sanctions program, and American attitudes toward the Smith regime itself.

Why do you think this issue was significant enough to have two parallel studies, one in New York and one in Washington?

Lake: Because the Rhodesian issue is really a very special one. It represents the only effort by the United Nations actually to impose comprehensive mandatory sanctions against any territory. You recall that the League of Nations foundered in part because of the failure of its sanctions against Italy. Many believe that the future of the United Nations itself is very closely tied to the future of the sanctions program against Southern Rhodesia. The Rhodesian problem provides a strong test of how the American government and the American foreign policy community operate on an issue which involves a basic choice between short-term economic advantage and an international legal obligation on an issue that involves human rights. To the extent the United States chooses the former over the latter, it is undercutting both the future of the United Nations and international law itself.

There is widespread cynicism concerning the United Nations these days. It suggests that few governments, and few members of the so-called "attentive" public, really take the UN seriously as an organization which can enforce something like sanctions. You seem to be suggesting that the UN still has potential teeth in an area such as this. Why do you feel that at all?

Lake: My general view is that the people who criticize the United Nations for being weak tend to make their criticism self-fulfilling. If the organization is weak in the political area why not try to strengthen it rather than write it off?

And, more specifically, Rhodesia is a special case. Kissinger and others have argued correctly that the reason the United Nations is not an effective instrument on major political issues is that it is automatically blocked when there is a difference among major powers. That is not the case on Rhodesia. The sanctions would not have been voted if the major powers had not been in general agreement on the question. In addition, sanctions represent the most powerful instrument the United Nations has at its disposal, short of

force. This is why the Rhodesian issue is so important. If the United Nations fails when the major powers agree that such an instrument should be used, it would be a real blow to the UN's political role in the future.

So the United Nations voted sanctions. What has happened since then? What has the United States done to carry out its affirmative vote on the issue in the United Nations?

Lake: Let me begin by saying that that affirmative vote in the Security Council represented the acceptance by the United States of a legal obligation under Article 25 of the Charter. So private American compliance with and implementation of sanctions is not a voluntary action. It is legally required.

In fact, until recently the American performance on sanctions was probably as good or better than the performance of any other major nation in the world. The British perhaps have been more meticulous, but I think otherwise the American performance would compare very favorably with any others. At the same time there have been lapses. The most serious was the passage by the Congress in 1971 of the so-called Byrd Amendment, which prohibited the President from embargoing any strategic and critical materials from any non-Communist nation if those materials were imported from any Communist nation. The sponsors of this amendment designed it to allow the importation into the United States of Rhodesian chrome. The amendment was passed, in fact, after a major lobbying effort by American ferrochrome and stainless steel interests. Its passage made the United States one of only three members of the UN which, as a matter of official policy, allow the import into their countries of any materials from Rhodesia. The others are Portugal and South Africa. This has been a strong blow to the American position at the United Nations and in Africa. Assistant Secretary of State Newsom called it the worst problem we have had in our relationship with Africa over the last few years.

Beyond this official breach in sanctions—a breach which was forced by the Congress despite the State Department's objections—there has been some slippage in observation of sanctions by a number of American companies. For example, we learned that a number of airlines registered in the United States have apparently been violating the Executive Orders and Federal Aviation Administration's regulations implementing the sanctions. They have been selling tickets on Air Rhodesia, and cooperating with it in other ways.

Why, if the United States has been one of the better countries in implementing this UN decision, have you chosen to study the U.S. instead of France or Portugal, or South Africa, countries that have been more flagrant in violation?

Lake: Well, the short answer is that I am an American, and as an American citizen I am more concerned with how the American government maintains its international legal obligations than how any other government does.

At the same time, Ralph Zacklin in his project considers the performance of other nations. I also think it would be helpful if private monitoring procedures were established to check out the compliance of such nations as West Germany, France, Switzerland and Japan. There is a private group that does this kind of work in London.

You talked about the influence that your reports might have upon the U.S. government. This leads us to a discussion of the form in which you are going to make your findings public. You have already published two interim reports and, as I understand it, a book length study is now in process. Why did you choose this particular approach to making your findings public?

Lake: Initially, we had thought we would simply do one study at the end of the project. But during the summer of 1973 we discovered that there were two areas in which interim reports would be valuable.

The first concerned apparent violations of sanctions by American air carriers, by the *New York Journal of Commerce,* which has been publishing advertising for Rhodesian firms, by American tourist companies that are transmitting funds to Rhodesian tourist enterprises, and by a number of others. We thought we should do an interim report on this simply because these were apparent violations of American law.

We felt they should quickly be brought to the attention of the American government and others who could investigate the matter. We also thought that some questions of interpretation of the Executive Orders deserved public debate. So we issued our report in August 1973. It received rather widespread attention in newspapers, radio and TV. It is reprinted in a journal of African affairs and in a report on hearings by the House Subcommittee on Africa. More importantly, it led to a request by the State Department to the Treasury Department and FAA to investigate the matter.

The second interim report, "Irony in Chrome," concerned the consequences of the Byrd Amendment since its passage in 1971. Certain American ferrochrome producers who lobbied strongly for the amendment did so largely because they needed cheap Rhodesian chrome in order to be more competitive with foreign ferrochrome producers. Ironically the Byrd Amendment was couched in such very broad terms, in order to help its passage, that it not only allowed the import of Rhodesian chrome, but also a flood of cheap Rhodesian ferrochrome. This has in fact worsened the competitive position of some of the sponsoring companies, and has helped create a situation in which it appears likely that most or all of the American ferrochrome industry will have been driven abroad within the next few years.

Are you or your team in effect lobbying for repeal of the Byrd Amendment?

Lake: No. The Carnegie Endowment is not, of course, a lobbying organization. Under the tax laws it cannot be. And whatever the laws, I do not think it should be such an organization, since that would damage its credibility and international reputation for objectivity. In working on "Irony in Chrome," we were fully conscious of this question, so we concentrated on trying to help inform the public debate by laying out the issue as clearly and fairly as we could. I have, of course, a point of view on the issue. But I do not think it prejudiced our analysis. Nor did we focus the report on a future debate. We included all the arguments that had been made in 1971 on both sides of the debate about the amendment, and then in a factual way simply checked off which arguments had held water in the light of experience and which had not. We noted that some of the arguments on both sides had not held up as well as their supporters had predicted, while other arguments on both sides were indeed prophetic. At the end of the report, having stripped away the 1971 arguments that didn't, in retrospect, hold up, we laid out the choice that the United States now faces: a choice between recognizing and maintaining our obligations under international law on the one hand, and on the other a possible effect that repeal of the Byrd Amendment could have on prices in the stainless steel industry. I think the reaction to the report has been all we could have hoped it would be. At hearings held by the Senate's Africa Subcommittee, witnesses on both sides of the argument, as well as the Chairman, Senator Humphrey, quoted the report. Representatives of the stainless steel industry have said that they felt that the report was accurate in its description of the issues, although they did not agree with some of the conclusions we reached on specific points. The report was included in its entirety in the record of the Subcommittee hearings. So I hope the report will be considered a kind of model of how we can provide analytical work on issues that are before Congress without running afoul of the letter or spirit of the tax laws. The laws do not rule out dissemination of information on contentious legislative issues. They prohibit lobbying efforts as well as materials that consider only one side of an issue.

Some of the large private companies mentioned in your other report must have been concerned. How did they react to the extraordinary passage in your report where you and members of your team made reservations for round trips to Rhodesia through their ticket offices in Washington, in apparent violation of U.S. law?

Lake: Well, they hardly greeted the report with joy. The possible violations that we suggested be investigated could lead to severe penalties. Under the United Nations Participation Act, violations of the Executive Orders carry with them, upon conviction, a fine of not more than $10,000, imprisonment for not more than 10 years, or both. So we hardly

expected that those involved would have applauded our bringing these facts to the government's and public attention.

Did they accept these as facts or did they dispute them?

Lake: To answer that I should discuss very briefly the different kinds of apparent violations that we examined. In some cases, for example the American air carriers I mentioned earlier, the facts seem to indicate reasonably clear violations. In other cases, it depends on interpretations of various sections of the Executive Orders. For example, the latter do not allow the supply of any commodity to any Rhodesian business by any American individual or business. Now, if you look at a trade name as a commodity, then when Avis and Hertz sell their names to Rhodesian subsidiaries, they are supplying a commodity to those subsidiaries and are violating the Executive Orders. I don't know yet whether the government accepts this interpretation of the word commodity or not. In another case, when the *Journal of Commerce* sells advertising to Rhodesian firms, we argue that it is apparently violating the Executive Orders' prohibition against investment in Rhodesia or any act which promotes or is calculated to promote trade with Rhodesia.

Would it be against the law for the Rhodesian government to take an ad in the New York Times explaining their political position?

Lake: No, I don't think so, because that's not promoting trade. But advertising investment opportunities, or running advertisements for Rhodesian businesses and project handlers who can arrange shipment of goods outside of Rhodesia, would seem to be—especially when coupled with an article, as they were, that suggests that there are many, many opportunities in Rhodesia and that "where there's a will, there's a way." Advertising, by definition, "promotes." But the American government's position is that for the purposes of the Executive Order, the word promote means actually helping to write a contract, doing something that is related to an actual transaction, not simply putting out information. So here the government does not agree with our interpretation and apparently does not agree that there has been any violation of the Executive Orders. Another difference in interpretation has involved the airlines. At least one disagrees with us on what constitutes even an "indirect transfer" of funds to Air Rhodesia. With regard to the facts themselves, nobody has shown that any of the facts we put out were inaccurate. We had, of course, checked them carefully.

Since you feel that you uncovered violations of U.S. law, do you intend to pursue action through the courts?

Lake: No. Our purpose was to stimulate the American government into an investigation of these matters, and we have succeeded in doing that.

What is the relationship between the study and the Humanitarian Policy Studies project?

Lake: We share both purposes and offices. We too are trying to bring more public attention to bear on the kind of international human rights issue that tends to get lost in Washington. In addition, just as the Humanitarian Policy Studies program is beginning to give officials in the government a sense that there is an organization which is monitoring their performance on humanitarian policy issues, I think we have succeeded in making a similar impression on those concerned with Rhodesia, both in the government and in certain American companies. We have had a number of requests for copies of the report from American businesses who apparently have some sort of real or potential ties to Rhodesia.

Turning from the specific study to the general approach to American policy which this Rhodesian study represents, you said at the beginning of this interview that Rhodesia was perhaps a unique situation in the world today because it was subject to sanctions agreed upon by the United Nations Security Council. At the same time you said that this kind of study has general applicability. What are the general lessons that you have derived?

Lake: The general conclusions we reach in our final study will cover two areas. The first will involve the substance of

the American approach to Rhodesia: what it tells us about the American approach to Africa, to the United Nations, to international law. The second set of conclusions in some ways should be just as interesting, because they will concern how the foreign policy machinery in the United States reacts to the kinds of choices that Rhodesia presents, how it performs on complicated issues involving human rights. An examination of how the Byrd Amendment got through the Congress, how special interests were able to be as effective as they were against the voices of concern for international law, tells you a lot about how the process could work on similar issues in the future. It also suggests how those supporting international law could be more effective.

You came to this job from the Foreign Service, the White House and the Congress. You're going on from it to something quite different. Could you put this experience in personal terms? What it has meant to you and to the evolution of your own thinking on foreign policy?

Lake: I found frustrating the way in which foreign policy is now treated by the government in highly abstract terms, without strong concern for the human consequences of the decisions that are reached. So I was very glad to get a chance to work at Carnegie on a question that involves human rights. In the process, my view of international law has changed. I had always looked on it as a dry, arcane matter to be discussed among the experts. But I have discovered in the process of working on Rhodesia that in fact international law is much more; it does directly involve human lives, it does provide, in fact, hope for those who are without political and other rights now in Southern Rhodesia.

I am about to become the Director of the International Voluntary Services, a kind of private Peace Corps that operates in a number of countries. Like Carnegie, it allows one to combine an interest in foreign policy with an involvement in human issues. I am leaving Carnegie with a much better appreciation of those issues, and am grateful for the opportunity to have worked here. ■

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Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

345 East 46th Street
New York, New York 10017

1717 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20036

Centre Européen, 58, rue de Moillebeau
1211 Genève 19

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