

*file* *CB*  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

DDI-22-75

3 January 1975

NSA review completed

Major General Lincoln D. Faurer  
Deputy Director for Intelligence  
Defense Intelligence Agency  
Washington, D. C. 20301

Dear Linc:

Enclosed is the CIA study of the DIA military biographic operations I discussed with you in early December and which we agreed I would not transmit through channels.

The Central Reference Service (CRS) in CIA that conducted the study has received numerous requests for copies from DIA/DC who requested we undertake it in a letter to Bill Colby from Vince de Poix in August 1974. We have not satisfied these requests pending your reactions to the study. I am enclosing one copy, however, that you may wish to give to John Hughes. If additional copies are needed for internal DIA distribution, you may contact

25X1

Sincerely,

25X1

Paul V. Walsh

Associate Deputy Director  
for Intelligence

DIA Review Completed.

Enclosures

Distribution:

25X1

Orig & 1 - Addressee (w/enclosure--2 copies of the Report on the  
DIA Military Biographic Program)

1 - Director/CRS w/o encl

① - DDI w/encl

1 - DDI Chrono

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ADDRESS OF RECIPIENT Major General Lincoln D. Faurer Deputy Director for Intelligence/DIA Room 1E880, Pentagon			SIGNATURE (ACKNOWLEDGING RECEIPT OF ABOVE DOCUMENT(S))		
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(33)

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REPORT ON THE DIA  
MILITARY BIOGRAPHIC PROGRAM

Prepared by

CIA/CRS

19 December 1974

SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE  
OF E. O. 11652, AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT  
TWO YEAR INTERVALS AND DECLASSIFIED ON

31 December 1980

(Insert date or event)

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## INTRODUCTION

This report was prepared by the Central Reference Service, CIA, in response to a request from the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, for assistance in reviewing the DIA biographic operation and in examining the feasibility of transferring the responsibility for military biographic intelligence to CIA (Tab A contains copies of the exchange of correspondence on this subject between the D/DIA and the DCI). The report summarizes the findings of eight senior CIA biographic analysts (with a total of 66 years experience in the biographic field) who examined the DIA biographic holdings, procedures and services from 23 September through 18 October 1974.

### I. Methodology

The initial briefings by DIA/DI indicated that DIA/DI does not maintain statistics on most aspects of its biographic operation. A few statistics exist, particularly at the analyst or branch level, but they are not standardized and thus, with few exceptions, cannot be synthesized. It was necessary, therefore, for the study group to collect and compile statistics on all aspects of the operation, including file input, volume of requests, manpower, and production. The survey covered only 4 weeks, and in most cases the results could not be compared with data collected over a longer period. Thus, it is possible that information collected for an entire year might produce figures either higher or lower than those presented here. The task team (hereafter referred to in this report as "we") believes, however, that the survey period, coming as it did between the summer and Christmas vacations and lacking any unusually heavy workloads, probably was representative.

We attempted to do as much of the survey work as we could, but in two major data collection efforts we required assistance from the DIA/DI biographic analysts. We asked the DIA/DI biographic analysts to complete a request form on every biographic request handled during the survey period. The form, designed specifically for this survey, contained spaces for recording information on the requester, the specific request statement, the type of response, the sources of information used, and the time required to

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complete the request. We believe that we received completed forms on virtually all major requests serviced by DIA biographic analysts during the survey period. We probably did not receive forms for some requests that the analysts were able to answer in a few minutes. The statistics on the volume of requests, therefore, reflect a somewhat lower number of requests than were actually received in DIA/DI during the survey period. The difference would not be sufficient to seriously affect our overall findings.

We also asked the DIA/DI biographic analysts to give us a copy of every document they put into their military biographic files during the 4 weeks of the survey. These documents were reviewed, as available, both to understand DIA/DI file input and to compare it with what is being done at CIA. Most DIA/DI biographic analysts felt that compliance with our request would require too much of their time because they lacked sufficient clerical help to reproduce the documents. We agreed and therefore attempted to collect this information by examining in-process documents at the analysts' work stations. This methodology was not completely satisfactory and we did not see all documents processed during the survey. Fortunately, several DIA military biographic analysts had large filing backlogs, some containing documents received as far back as June, and by examining them we were able to reinforce the impressions gained from what we did see of the current material.

In addition to the data collection activities mentioned above we:

1. Interviewed at length all DIA/DI biographic analysts, selected supervisors in DIA/DI, and selected customers of the DIA/DI biographic services.
2. Examined all biographic requests recorded by DIA/DI during the survey, attempted to answer them from the CIA biographic files, and compiled statistics on the results.
3. Compared selected DIA/DI biographic files with comparable files in CIA and analyzed the differences and similarities in content.
4. Measured the DIA/DI biographic files and estimated the number of personalities included in those files.

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5. Interviewed the supervisors of the employees of the Library of Congress, Federal Research Division (FRD), who provide support to the DIA military biographic program under a contractual operation.

In compiling the statistics by geographic area, we used the CIA/CRS rather than the DIA/DI area breakdowns. This allowed us to make direct comparisons with the biographic operation at CIA. These area divisions are:

USSR - Soviet Union		
EE - Eastern Europe		
WE - Western Europe		25X1
WH - North, Central and South America		
FE - Pacific Islands, Southeast Asia,		25X1
PRC & ROC - People's Republic of China, Republic of China, and Mongolia.		
NE/SA - Near East and South Asia		25X1
AF - Africa		25X1

## II. General Findings

A. Based upon our survey during the period 23 September - 18 October 1974, we estimate that DIA/DI is now devoting about 32 man-years to the military biographic effort. About 20 of these man-years come from staff employees, the rest from reservists, detailees and contractors. (See Tab B, Chart I.) Most of the statistics in this report, particularly those on service and file input, reflect work done mainly by staff employees.

B. We found that 4,381 items were selected for input into the DIA/DI military biographic files during the 4 weeks studied; on that basis we estimate that 57,000 items are added to the files annually. (See Tab B, Chart II.)

C. DIA/DI has biographic files on approximately 223,000 foreign military personalities. (See Tab B, Chart III.)

D. The request forms completed for us by the DIA/DI analysts indicate that DIA receives approximately 2,700 requests comprising approximately 8,000

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questions each year and that 4.4 man-years are required to service these requests. (See Tab B, Chart IV.) These request figures might have been 10 to 20 percent higher if we had received completed request forms for all the requests levied upon DIA/DI during the survey period. We also feel that in many cases the figures for the man-hours reported as spent in answering requests were low. In some cases DIA/DI analysts did not include in their reports time spent in such activities as calling military bases and schools for assistance, waiting for a xerox machine, and coordinating reports. The service man-hours reported by the unit handling Latin American biographics, a unit that routinely keeps detailed records of manpower expenditures, are much higher than those reported by the other units and in themselves tend to indicate that the total expenditure reported is too low. The charts kept by the Latin America unit over an entire year indicate that 75 percent of the working hours are devoted to service. Our observations lead us to believe that additional units probably have service manpower allocations in that range. Thus, the actual figures for manpower spent in servicing requests may be 50 to 100 percent higher than what is reported here. Further, we fear that potential requesters do not ask for service because of the current state of affairs, and we suspect that, with improved capability, and the resultant improved service, the volume of requests and manhours spent on requests would rise.

### III. Problem Areas

#### A. Organization

*The DIA biographic effort lacks central management and coordination. The biographic analysts are spread throughout DIA/DI and individual production components -- or sometimes individual analysts -- conduct their own biographic programs without guidance from any central authority that establishes priorities, sets standards, and develops publication schedules. Even worse, as far as the analysts themselves are concerned, there is no central authority to work on overall biographic problems such as* [redacted] *slow receipt of documents and unreasonable requirements.*

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*The DIA/DI biographic analysts often do not receive incoming documents containing biographic*



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*information; many of the documents they do receive arrive several weeks late. Upon being received in DIA/DI, documents clearly labeled as biographic reports usually are routed directly to the biographic analysts; but those containing biographic information mixed with other data usually go first to the political and/or order of battle analysts and may or may not eventually reach the biographic analysts. Multiple-area documents, that is those containing information on personalities from two or more geographic areas, often do not get routed beyond the first recipient. Because the DIA analysts are located in several different buildings, communication between analysts is curtailed and proper handling of multiple-area documents is difficult.*

Often, because he is uncertain, that he has all the available information, the biographic analyst must check with other DIA analysts before answering even simple requests. He is at times unaware of even the most important changes in positions held by high-level foreign military officers. We noticed several DIA-produced biographies that contained erroneous statements taken from inaccurate or outdated field reporting -- errors that the analyst undoubtedly would have noted and corrected if his files were complete and current.

*There is no effective backup system. When the regular analyst is out, the supervisor or some other analyst will attempt to handle requests from VIPs, but in general, when the analyst is absent, all work stops.*

**B. Manpower**

*We estimate that the current allocation of manpower to the military biographic program in DIA/DI is about one-half of what it should be. Moreover, about one-third of the current allocation is composed of reservists and temporary detailees who are not as productive as staff employees and FRD contract personnel who cannot be used in all phases of the operation. We believe that most of the problems in the program stem from the insufficient manning.*

*A severe clerical shortage plagues all phases of the military biographic effort. Staff analysts do most of their own reproduction and filing and much of their own typing; we even noted supervisors typing reports. Judging from our own experience, we believe that, an effective biographic operation needs about one clerical*

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or intelligence assistant for each analyst. As Chart I in Tab B indicates, the clerical/professional ratio in the DIA biographic program does not approach this.

### C. Morale

*Morale among the DIA biographic analysts is poor. Much of the morale problem is directly related to the manning level. The analysts do not have the time to do a satisfactory job; they realize this and some thus take little pride in what they are doing. The need for professionals to do filing, reproduction and typing further contributes to the loss of pride.*

### D. Production

*The DIA/DI biographic analysts take time to write biographic reports for important requests but do not have time enough to prepare any significant number of self-initiated reports. Without a sufficiently large data base of finished intelligence reports to work from, requests tend to take longer to handle than they should and, because of the pressure to get the answer out, are not answered as well as they might be. The failure to prepare and distribute more self-initiated, finished intelligence reports probably creates more requests from customers, which, in turn further reduces the time available for writing such reports.*

*The military Biographic Handbook program appears to be nearly dead. Some military Biographic Handbooks are being published, but most appear to be mere compilations of reports previously prepared for specific requests or reports prepared by contractors and reservists. There does not seem to be any major attempt to identify the most important foreign military leaders and publish reports on them in anticipation of future needs, even when these needs can be predicted fairly accurately.*

*DIA/DI is attempting to meet some of the need for anticipatory report preparation through its contract with the Federal Research Division (FRD) of the Library of Congress. Self-initiated reports on personalities in the Near East, South Asia, Latin America and Africa are done almost entirely by FRD. Unfortunately, much of the report preparation at FRD is being wasted because many of these reports are not being printed and distributed. (See Section E below.)*

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### E. The FRD Contract

*The FRD contract is a useful device for getting around the manpower ceiling, but we do not feel that DIA/DI currently is getting a satisfactory return from its investment. DIA/DI uses FRD to write reports based upon the DIA/DI file holdings and to screen foreign publications for information on military personalities. During the period of February 1973 through October 1974, FRD prepared 500 biographic reports, mostly on African, Near Eastern and Latin American personalities. A large percentage of these reports, however, have not been published, partly because of editing and publishing problems and partly because most DIA biographic analysts consider them to be too wordy and "flowery" to use. One DIA/DI unit is using a reservist to reduce lengthy FRD reports to one page.*

The academic qualifications and talents of the FRD analysts appear to be good. FRD believes its products are satisfactory and seems to have no idea that DIA/DI reworks most of the reports before using them. Feedback to FRD on what DIA/DI wants in its reports probably would go a long way toward correcting this situation.

Increased reliance upon FRD may provide a partial solution to the manpower shortages in the DIA military biographic program; it does not, however, appear to offer the possibility of a satisfactory answer to most of the problems: First, improving the military biographic file holdings through more complete screening of incoming documents and through detailed guidance to field collectors are two major needs that do not lend themselves to handling by a contractor. Second, there is always a certain percentage of the documentation that cannot be released to contractors; these documents are few in terms of volume but often highly valuable in terms of content. Third, the practice of sending intelligence files across town to a contractor means that files frequently may not be available at headquarters to handle crash requests.

### F. Collection

*Most DIA analysts complained strongly about poor collection of military biographic information, but there appears to be little effort to improve it.*

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[redacted] DIA/DI analysts can write informal letters [redacted] asking for feedback on their own written reports and providing feedback on [redacted] reporting, but they use this channel infrequently. Formal requirements must be levied through ICRs and CIRs, a process that most analysts tend to avoid because they believe it to be cumbersome and time consuming. We saw little evidence of analysts attempting to fill gaps in their files by preparing specific requirements for the field, unless the information was needed to answer a request already in hand. [redacted]

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DIA

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The military biographic program needs both a higher priority for biographic reporting from the field and more effort in guiding and directing this reporting. [redacted]

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#### G. Security and Classification

*Generally, the handling of COMINT documents is poor and causes both a security danger and the loss of some information. In each of the DIA/DI units we found a different COMINT handling problem, including: failure to file any COMINT at all, failure to file any COMINT documents other than those at the lowest security level, cutting off security controls and filing COMINT documents as unclassified, and poor understanding of the procedures used in obtaining permission to downgrade COMINT for use in biographic reports.*

*The physical security arrangements contribute to lessened efficiency. In one unit the need to unlock 17 safes to answer a question took nearly as much time as the research on the request. Some units in noncodeword areas must go to a different building to review new COMINT documents and, because of the time involved, tend to omit this task. In one unit, supervisors and analysts do much of their own reproduction work because the clerk does not have clearances to the codeword area where the reproduction machine is located.*

#### IV. Possibility of Merger With CIA

*If DIA could agree to certain conditions (specified below), the military biographic operation could be merged*

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*with the existing CIA biographic operation and operated at less cost. Combining the 20 staff man-years now in the DIA effort with the existing CIA biographic effort would produce an improved military biographic program. CIA could accomplish more with the same amount of manpower because of the economies of scale: CIA/CRS already screens nearly all of the documents containing military biographic information for other purposes, manages a large biographic collection operation; and has a large biographic production operation.*

*Adding military biographics as currently handled by DIA/DI to the current CIA biographic responsibilities would produce only a 1-percent increase in the number of documents screened and a 2- to 3- percent increase in the number of copies of documents put in the biographic files at CIA/CRS. The CIA biographic analysts have responsibility for maintaining other large computerized and manual reference files in addition to their biographic files and already screen nearly all intelligence reporting. The only documents containing information on foreign military personalities not now reviewed by CIA/CRS are some biographic reports prepared [redacted] some NMCC cables, Legion of Merit nominations on foreign officers, some JPRS military biographic cards, and a few miscellaneous items. During the survey period, 68 percent of the items put into the DIA/DI biographic files also went into CIA/CRS biographic files. (This was about 5 percent of the total CIA/CRS biographic file input.)*

*Based upon the statistics collected during the survey, CIA/CRS already has information available to answer 63 percent of the biographic questions DIA/DI now receives. The DIA completion rate for the same period (not counting requests answered with CIA assistance) was 70 percent.*

*By moving the military biographic operation and the associated staff manpower to CIA, the man-hours saved in file maintenance could be used to stimulate field reporting and to prepare additional self-initiated reports.*

*A potential problem in moving the military biographic operation to CIA is the danger that [redacted] will not respond adequately to requirements [redacted]*

*Several DIA biographic analysts, supervisors and customers of the service who were interviewed during the survey indicated this was one of their main reasons for opposing transfer of the program to CIA. We believe, however, that with cooperation from DIA/DC and increased effort in preparing requirements for and providing feedback*

DIA

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to collectors, military biographic reporting can be improved substantially -- even with the requirements coming from a civilian organization. If we did not believe that this could be done, we would not be willing to attempt to handle the program; we view improved collection as one of the most serious needs of the military biographic program.

*Several DIA biographic analysts and supervisors stated that they believed military biographics should be colocated with order of battle analysis and record keeping. We found that, except for the Eastern European naval analysts who handle both responsibilities, the biographic and order of battle analysts operate nearly independently of one another. We did not see any coordination between the two groups that could not be handled through the mail or over the telephone, nor did we note any significant improvement in efficiency in the one instance in which the same analysts handle both biographic and order of battle data.*

*Adjustments could be made in the CIA report formats to meet specific DoD requirements. Customers and operators of the DIA biographic program frequently mentioned that the CIA narrative report format is not as well suited to the needs of military users as the DIA outline, telegraphic format. On the other hand, we found some DoD customers who prefer the CIA narrative format. CIA does not see any potential problem in adjusting formats to meet DIA requester needs. We already publish some reports, [redacted] in a format similar to that used by DIA.*

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*Finding space in CIA/CRS to house the additional files and the additional analysts, IAs and clericals would be a serious problem for CIA. After screening the DIA files we probably would select between 250 and 500 cubic feet of material for integration into our existing holdings. Finding space for additional employees would be extremely difficult.*

*CIA/CRS would be able to take on the military biographic operation provided that DIA would:*

(a) Provide manpower equal to the amount of new work caused by the transfer. The amount of manpower would depend primarily upon the amount of file input, amount of collection guidance, amount of service and quality of service DIA would want.

(b) Hold the workload to that agreed upon at the time of the transfer or provide additional manpower to

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handle possible future increases in requirements on the program.

(c) Give CIA/CRS direct access through military communications channels to DoD human source intelligence collectors.

(d) Allow CIA/CRS to evaluate the overall military biographic reporting [redacted] 25X1 DIA

(e) Assist CIA/CRS in upgrading military biographic reporting by increasing the priority given to collection efforts in this area.

(f) Not cut back any existing military biographic collection programs without agreement from CIA.

(g) Provide promptly to CIA/CRS [redacted] reports, NMCC cables and other military biographic information it does not now receive.

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TAB A



DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

RE

74-2483

DDI-2354-74

15 AUG 1974

31 AUG 1974

C-41319/DC-4A

Mr. William Colby  
Director  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear Bill:

As a follow-on to our conversation of 2 April 1974, my staff is reexamining the entire question of how best to resolve problems relevant to the collection and production of military biographics. I am pleased that, based on conversations between [redacted] of your Information Services Group and my representatives from the Directorate of Collection and Surveillance, a first step has been taken to determine how we can best satisfy biographic requirements on a mutually beneficial basis.

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In this regard, I would welcome your support in providing some personnel to gauge the scope and parameter of DIA's current biographic holdings -- quantitative/qualitative volume of requests for information which are now received and serviced, with a view to determining the feasibility of your previous proposal.

Once this survey is completed, we will be postured to weigh the feasibility and relative advisability of pursuing options for the best possible community-wide biographic program in this period of reduced resources to assure adequate responsiveness to our consumers.

Sincerely,

*V. P. de Poix*


V. P. de POIX  
Vice Admiral, USN  
Director

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SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652  
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO  
YEAR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFIED ON 31 DECEMBER 1980

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TAB A

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

14 AUG 1974

Vice Admiral Vincent P. de Poix  
Director  
Defense Intelligence Agency  
Washington, D. C. 20301

Dear Vince:

I welcome your decision to look at the options for the best possible Community-wide biographic program in this period of reduced resources. I am consequently pleased to assist in your review.

I suggest using the terms of reference outlined in the feasibility study plan developed by CIA's Central Reference Service in 1972. This plan follows the methodology of a similar study that we did with NSA about six years ago which resulted in some mutually satisfactory decisions. I understand that your Directorate of Collection and Surveillance already has a copy of this document. Our people will be ready to begin by 3 September, and your representative may contact [redacted] of our Central Reference Service [redacted] for additional details.

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Again, I fully support your efforts to improve the military biographic program and conserve resources and I hope that this effort proves fruitful.

Sincerely,

/s/ Bill

W. E. Colby  
Director

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TAB B

## CHART I

ESTIMATED MAN-YEARS DEVOTED TO THE DIA  
BIOGRAPHIC PROGRAM BY GEOGRAPHIC AREA

<u>Geographic Area</u>	<u>Staff Analysts</u>	<u>ALL OT</u>	<u>Reservists and Detailees</u>	<u>Clerical and IA Support</u>	<u>Editing and Supervision</u>	<u>FRD Contract Employees</u>
USSR	1.50	.01	1.00	.75	.05	1.50
EE	1.10	.10	.50	.25	.05	.20
WE	1.75	.10	.20	1.00	.05	0
WH	2.00	.12	0	1.00	.12	3.00
FE	3.00	.03	0	.75	1.20	.50
PRC & ROC	1.00	.00	0	.25	.25	1.50
NE/SA	1.25	.08	.17	.75	.05	1.80
AF	<u>.75</u>	<u>.08</u>	<u>.25</u>	<u>.75</u>	<u>.25</u>	<u>1.00</u>
TOTAL	12.35	.52	2.12	5.50	2.02	9.50
OVERALL TOTAL						32.01

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TAB B

## CHART II

DIA/DI BIOGRAPHIC FILE  
 INPUT STATISTICS BY GEOGRAPHIC  
 AREA AND DOCUMENT SOURCES (1)  
 (23 September - 18 October 1974)

AREA	NO. OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED	COPIES (2) OF DOCUMENTS SELECTED FOR FILES					TOTAL NO. OF DOCUMENTS FILED
		DoD	CIA	NSA	STATE	OTHER	
USSR	370	80	880	5	0	30	995
EE	800	310	110	30	0	50	500
WE	400	720	180	0	60	10	970
WH	150	190	23	0	7	25	245
FE	600	900	100	1	7	12	1,020
PRC & ROC	37	111	13	1	22	13	160
NE/SA	146	200	2	0	5	4	211
AF	<u>240</u>	<u>200</u>	<u>60</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>20</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>280</u>
TOTAL	2,743	2,711	1,368	37	121	144	4,381

Estimated annual file input  $4,381 \times 13 = 56,953$

(1) Figures do not include file input at FRD.

(2) Documents frequently contain information on more than one personality; thus, more than one copy of a document may be filed.

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## CHART III

## DIA/DI BIOGRAPHIC FILE HOLDING (1)

	<u>ESTIMATED NO. OF CUBIC FEET</u>	<u>ESTIMATED NO. OF DOCUMENTS IN FILE (2)</u>	<u>ESTIMATED NO. OF PERSONALITIES ON WHOM DIA/DI MAINTAINS FILES</u>
USSR	100	367,040	65,664
EE	57	218,880	43,500
WE	105	85,000	17,000
WH	113.2	122,400	12,000 (3)
FE (LESS PRC & ROC)	200	225,000	40,150
PRC & ROC	55	66,100	18,000
NE/SA	65.3	82,450	15,050
AF	<u>38.6</u>	<u>27,800</u>	<u>12,500</u>
TOTAL	734.1	1,194,670	223,864

(1) Figures do not include files maintained at FRD.

(2) There is no fixed ratio between size of files and number of documents; some files contain 5"x8" cards and some contain letter and legal size documents.

(3) The figure here is for dossiers. Latin American analysts have information on approximately 18,000 more personalities in junior officer and group files.

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## CHART IV

DIA/DI BIOGRAPHIC REQUEST TRAFFIC  
(23 September - 18 October)

	<u>No. of Requests Received</u>	<u>No. of (1) Questions Received</u>	<u>No. of (2) Questions Answered by DIA</u>	<u>% of Ques- tions Answered</u>	<u>Manhours (3) Required to Handle Questions</u>
USSR	46	67	43	64	45.8
EE	11	98	30	30	42.1
WE	32	148	131	89	89.1
WH	33	102	83	81	235.2 (4)
FE	45	77	54	70	40.0
PRC & ROC	3	5	4	80	2.7
NE/SA	31	76	52	68	34.5
AF	<u>12</u>	<u>51</u>	<u>42</u>	<u>82</u>	<u>36.9</u>
TOTAL	213	624	439	70	526.4 (5)

Converted into annual figures, these data indicate DIA/DI receives 7,995 questions each year and spends 4.387 man-years in answering these questions.

- (1) A single request may, and often does, contain questions on several different foreign personalities.
- (2) Does not include those answered with assistance from CIA.
- (3) Manhours reported include only work done by staff employees.
- (4) This unit routinely maintains detailed statistics on manpower usage. The higher figures for this unit are probably more accurate than the others in this column because of greater experience in keeping such records.
- (5) Conversion to man-years: 52 weeks a year x 5 days a week x 6 productive hours a day = 1,560 working hours a year.  
526.4 x 13 = 68,432 divided by 1,560 = 4.387 man-years.

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TAB B

## CHART V

STATISTICAL COMPARISON OF  
DIA/DI AND CIA/CRS  
BIOGRAPHIC PROGRAMS  
(ANNUAL ESTIMATES)

	<u>MAN-YEARS DEVOTED TO PROGRAM</u>	<u>NUMBER OF DOCUMENTS SCREENED</u>	<u>COPIES OF DOCUMENTS ADDED TO BIOGRAPHIC FILES</u>	
DIA/DI				25X1
CIA/CRS				

	<u>NO. OF PERSONALITIES IN BIOGRAPHIC FILES</u>	<u>NO. OF QUESTIONS RECEIVED</u>	<u>NUMBER OF REPORTS PREPARED AND DISTRIBUTED</u>	
DIA/DI				25X1
CIA/CRS				25X1