

MEMORANDUM FOR: Paul

Lehman handed me the attached memo on how to restructure OCI and the Dailies. He said that he would modify it somewhat. The general thrust looks good to me; it is in the right direction.

The recommendations begin on page 13.

What do you think?

Ed

9 March 1975  
(DATE)

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101  
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

DIA review(s) completed.

14 February 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Current Intelligence  
SUBJECT : The NIB, Production Staffing, and the  
[redacted] Report

In looking for answers to the three inter-related questions, I have talked with numerous people who deal with almost all aspects of the issues. What follows is an attempt to come up with solutions that will be acceptable--though far from perfect--to all concerned, including Mr. Colby, the IC staff, DIA, and our own people. I have not worked out the exact details of staffing in all cases, and I am assuming that some of these recommendations, if adopted, will have to be implemented on a trial-and-error basis. Some may prove unworkable, perhaps in part because of my unfamiliarity with the complicated details of night staffing, machines, and newspaper requirements. In any event, I hope it will be possible to make changes without too much disruption but changes which nonetheless will make the system work a little better.

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Problems with the NIB

Some of the key goals in the April 4, 1974 memorandum for USIB outlining production procedures for the new National Intelligence Bulletin (NIB) have not been met. The aim was to enlist the <sup>1</sup>participation of key intelligence producing components in the community. Although DIA and NSA are in fact regular contributors, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research in the Department of State has declined to participate. There is little reason to believe that INR will change that policy. A second goal was to encourage the <sup>2</sup>presentation of alternative and contrasting assessments as a regular feature of the NIB and incorporated within the body of a given article or in a separate piece published subsequently. In point of fact, the tendency has been to compromise, water down or withdraw an article altogether rather than deal directly with dissenting opinion. The situation, then, is little different from that which prevailed in the old Central Intelligence Bulletin (CIB), when dissents were expressed--but rarely--as footnotes to a published article.

Another aim was to <sup>3</sup>focus primarily on key intelligence developments and publish, on the average, ten articles a day. The average has been much higher than that and the book sometimes runs as high as 15-20 pages.

In addition to these problems, there are others which diminish the usefulness of the NIB as a vehicle of the broader intelligence community. Given the early deadlines for submission of articles, necessary in order to obtain community-wide coordination, the <sup>4</sup>NIB is not as timely a publication as the NID. More important, the principal contributors to the NIB outside of CIA--DIA and, to a lesser extent, NSA--have turned in ragged and uneven performances that, on the whole, range from the "fair" (primarily) to the "good" (occasionally). The panel secretary estimated that over 50 percent of the material would not be considered worthy of publication were it not submitted by agencies other than the CIA. To some extent, then, we are lowering our standards for current intelligence merely to acquire the imprimatur of USIB--to make the NIB "national."

DIA's NIB staff representative, [ ] sees the failure to be selective as to what constitutes truly national intelligence as the greatest problem DIA faces. He also feels that there is not sufficient internal criticisms in DIA of articles written there. A third problem he cited-- the lack of a formal requirement for editing within DIA-- has now been partially resolved. DIA in January made provisions for in-house editing and review prior to submitting the articles to the panel chairman. [ ] also believes that, despite reassurances to the contrary, DIA give priority to the Defense Intelligence Notices (DINs) rather than to the NIB.

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In addition to the above deficiencies, both DIA and NSA tend to write articles that are narrowly focused, based on sometimes fragmentary data, and lacking in-depth analysis. As one seasoned observer described it, NSA wants to write even if it has only one piece of SIGINT and no collateral data and DIA tends to take all DDO reports as the gospel truth.

The problems are not all one-sided. DIA feels it has justifiable complaints against the Agency. Analysts at the Pentagon believe that CIA people are too often uncompromising in defending their positions, that they take advantage of the fact that the NIB is headquartered at the Agency to pressure DIA into coordinating a CIA article or withdrawing a DIA piece, that the Agency can run virtually anything it wants while DIA pieces are often rejected, and that the panel chairman and secretary are not always objective. Whether these allegations are true or not, DIA analysts--and doubtless some NSA people--believe them to be so and thus feel, in [ ]'s words, "paranoiac" about the Agency.

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Actually, the acceptance rate for DIA articles is considerably higher than one might presume. In December, DIA had 75 percent of its military submissions accepted; CIA was a bare one percent ahead, with an acceptance rate of 76 percent. (But CIA had proposed, and had accepted, a much higher number of articles). In January, DIA proposed 87 military articles, 55 of which were published for a 63

percent acceptance rate. During the same period, CIA proposed 84 military articles, of which 64 were published--an acceptance rate of 76 percent. Even this record, however, probably is not satisfactory to DIA. CIA is still writing a considerably higher number of military articles than is DIA, which is contrary to Major Gen. Faurer's expressed desire that DIA have "primary" responsibility for military articles and therefore write the largest share of them.

From conversations held at DIA, I came away with the feeling that the higher-ups did want to make the NIB work, but without a concomitant realization on their part that some changes would be necessary in the way DIA does business if their contributions were to be sought after and valuable. No one seems to have any great desire to return to the DIA Intelligence Summary and most seemed to value the prestige they felt was accorded the NIB because of the USIB stamp of approval.

There are suspensions in CIA--and probably justifiable ones--that Gen. Graham still wants to put CIA out of the military reporting business altogether. One line of reasoning was that, if the Agency reverted to a bulletin put out solely by CIA, DIA in the form of the General would make an even more determined effort to grab the whole share of the military pie. The thought was, then, that CIA should keep DIA reasonably happy by accepting their articles for the NIB and thereby diminish the chances that Graham would try to usurp the field of military reporting. If battles are to be fought, the reasoning goes, better that Mr. Colby should save his heavy weapons to ensure OSR and the Agency a place in military intelligence rather than use his prestige to get DIA out of the NIB.

On the positive side, even those most critical of DIA see advantages in that Agency's participation. There is a fund of recognized expertise in DIA that, properly channeled, could be of real service to NIB readers. DIA participation also ensures greater attention to the needs of the Joint Chiefs of Staff--consumers whose interests are deserving of national consideration. And the closer--if grudging--cooperation that is fostered by the NIB does tend to keep both sides honest and careful.

There are pros and cons, then, in having the NIB as a national product. The cons considerably outweigh the pros at this juncture. Nonetheless, there are a number of factors and goals--sometimes conflicting--which must be considered in determining what should be done with the NIB. What follows is an attempt to evaluate various options, giving particular attention to such questions as coordination, security, prestige, and priority of audiences.

### Options

Option 1: leave the NIB as is: Clearly, the NIB as presently constituted isn't working properly. There are a number of frustrations and complaints on all sides and some, but not all, can be eliminated if we tinker with the present system. That system is time-consuming, wasteful of analyst time, duplicative, and overly hierarchical.

Option 2: IC Staff proposal for general circulation NID plus supplement. Option 2, as described in a memorandum for the DCI on June 11, 1974, does appear to have some advantages. It would decrease by a net of one the number of major periodicals produced by the intelligence community--a goal to which the IC staff is committed. Use of a general circulation NID would mean a more clearly defined role for other members of the intelligence community and the production of a prestige periodical which would be genuinely "national." And a merger of the NIB and NID would save some resources and permit some reduction in the burden analysts, editors and others now bear.

The disadvantages of the IC staff proposal clearly outweigh the advantages, however. Coordination already is a major problem for all analysts in the community. To attempt to coordinate the huge volume of articles that appears in the NID would be a nightmarish proposition. The NID would lose the flexibility it currently enjoys as a publication which is only "loosely" coordinated and it would be much more difficult to make it as timely as it now is. More important, the necessary inclusion of a number of DIA and NSA articles would, quite bluntly, debase the publication.

Security problems would be increased. Security officials were alarmed in the first instance about publishing a document like the NID which could be so easily tucked away in a stack of unclassified materials. The risks would be greatly magnified if an insert were included on a regular basis, particularly because the insert would contain the most highly classified material in the whole paper.

The questions of prestige and priority of audience are closely related. The key audience is that which now receives the NID. That the NID goes only to this small group makes it an elite publication and in part explains the high value attached to it. Were the NID, even with a supplement, to be circulated to a much wider audience, top policy makers might find their interest waning. Moreover, the layout of the paper is designed to service the busy policy official, with key items and a summary on the front page. With a supplement, some crucial items would still be on the front page, some would be in a supplement, and the summary would no longer be a reliable guide.

Layout problems would also be aggravated, because certain vital items, which would be considered of front page value, might have both a secret version and a highly classified one. Where, then, does each version run?

Option 3: two-tiered NID. Technically, a two-tiered NID is feasible with some modification of the present system. Additional layout and paste-up people would probably be needed, but the number of people associated with the NID would not otherwise be increased; those now working on the NIB would be reassigned, thereby effecting some reduction in the layers of editing. All of the disadvantages (except the security risk) cited in Option 2, however, would still apply.

Option 4: return to the CIB. This option is not viable, and for a reason which is also inherent in the other options discussed. In talks with [redacted] and the IC staff, it became clear that Mr. Colby is committed to the concept of a more integrated intelligence community and that his strategy over the longer run is directed toward that end. The IC staff holds the same views. One way to get more of a handle on the intelligence community, and particularly on the military (which has the money and the power), is to devote a

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really serious effort to the community as a whole. Through such institutions as the KIQs, the NIOs, and the IC staff with its product review function, Mr. Colby has fostered the idea of community participation. The production of current intelligence is one of the most visible and prestigious of the community's activities. If Mr. Colby were seen as withdrawing his support from the NIB, the embodiment of a community commitment to national intelligence, the other agencies in the community might question the need for cooperating on other projects the DCI is pushing. In [ ] words, it would be "politically unwise" for Mr. Colby to retreat and in [ ] words, "it's almost certainly a non-starter."

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Given this, any option which does not retain the concept of community participation--both in the submission of articles and in coordination--almost certainly is doomed to fail.

Option 5: drop the publication entirely. In light of the above, eliminating the publication is no solution. Moreover, the Agency does have a responsibility to provide a large, middle-level audience with a current intelligence publication.

Option 6: the NIB as a total by-product of the NID. Were it not for the Colby commitment to "national" intelligence, the option that makes the most sense is number 6. Articles could be written by the analysts, passed up through a single production chain, coordinated "loosely" for both publications, and then run in two different formats: the newspaper format and the bulletin format. The editorial/production staff could be combined into a single unit and streamlined, analysts would have to deal only with one version of a given piece, and the troublesome aspects of community participation--heavy coordination and outside submission of items--could be eliminated. The prestige of the NID would be retained and the priority audience would continue to get an elite publication (and without security hazards). The second-level readership would also be served, seeing many of the same articles but served up in the traditional format.



This option recognizes that, in fact, the NID and NIB already duplicate each other. The difference is that the NIB version of an article is more heavily coordinated; that the NID and NIB articles have been edited by two separate staffs; and that the NIB contains items by outside agencies.

To illustrate the duplication: in January, approximately 240 items (including annexes but excluding for the Record submissions) were published. Of these, 194 appeared in some version in the NID as well. Of the 48 published solely in the NIB, only 18 were produced by CIA. Thus it is clear that, when the CIA analyst writes, his items in the vast majority of cases appear in both publications. Yet in many instances he must treat the item as two separate ones, following each version along the route it must take to reach publication.

However appealing the NIB-as-offshoot-of-the-NID appears, it runs contrary to the Colby concept and has only the remotest chance of acceptance. Therefore, the option I recommend below is not one I consider to be the most desirable solution in terms of what is best for OCI. Rather, it is one which probably will be acceptable to the DCI and the IC staff and tolerable to OCI.

Option 7: the NIB as a partial off-shoot of the NID. This solution is predicated on a belief that, whether we like it or not, we are stuck with the command to produce a national intelligence vehicle which has DIA and NSA as active participants and coordinators. With such an option, there is no extra security risk because the NIB format is retained; the prestige of the NID as a limited distribution publication is preserved; the priority audience continues to be the one that receives the elite publication; and coordination is still "loose" for the NID and "heavy" only for the NIB.

The changes necessary for such an arrangement would be mainly in the production end (to be explained in detail in the next section). If the system works properly, the analyst will write an article which will go through a set of editors who will handle items both for the NID and NIB. Changes made at night by editors to take account of the space problems inherent in a newspaper would not be incorporated in the NIB version, which should already be coordinated.

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The  report makes a number of good points. There are too many layers of review; there are good analysts who wish only to be analysts but who nonetheless would like--and deserve to have--the prestige and salary of a senior official; there is a tendency toward laxity in the divisions because there are so many editors "upstairs;" there should be more than a handful of GS-14 and GS-15 positions reserved for senior analysts; there are too many people who "manipulate" current intelligence in comparison to those who actually create it.

I heartily endorse the concept that the key work should be done at the division level and that too many of the best people have been "kicked upstairs." Over the longer run, OCI could reduce its production superstructure if it took two major steps. (1) It would have to regard the division PO as one of the absolutely key people in the whole process and select for those jobs officers with proven editorial and substantive skills. The PO, it seems to me, should be every bit as carefully selected as a NID editor or a PDB officer. But I suspect that PO slots are too often used as positions for relatively senior people who don't seem to fit in anywhere else, people who may have bounced around on various jobs and now need a home. In short, the PO is not chosen for the right reason: that he is one hell of a good editor with a breadth of substantive experience as well. (2) The same complaint applies to branch chiefs. What are the criteria for selecting branch chiefs? Is there not a tendency to advance the best analysts to those positions whether or not they happen to be good managers and good editors? The branch chief is--or should be--the single most important person in the whole OCI structure. But the skills needed are not merely those of a first-rate analyst, although certainly the analytical talent is essential to a branch chief. If OCI is genuinely interested in turning out the best product possible, I think that the front office should take a long, hard look at its present crop of branch chiefs and production officers, should replace more than a few of them, and select the replacements with a critical, demanding eye.

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There are over-simplifications and errors in the report.

(1) [ ] does not take sufficient account of the fact that the NID, with its round-the-clock schedule and its rigid format and machine requirements, has necessitated a whole new group to ready that publication for distribution.

(2) His model on the OCI production process is somewhat misleading. On the NID, for instance, pieces written by the analyst do go through a branch chief and a division production officer. The division chief and/or his deputy do not edit the piece as such but merely review it, often after the piece has gone forward to the NID staff. The division chief "layer," then, is one quite different from the "layer" of a PO or a NID editor. In addition, the NID editor and his associate do not always review the same piece (although I learned through personal experience that all NID teams work differently and some may be more rigid about seeing every last item). If both do look at the article, the second reviewer does only a quick scan normally and makes no changes unless there are glaring errors.

(3) Division chiefs for the most part are not under-employed and most divisions do need a deputy or someone who will relieve the chief of the numerous administrative-supervisory tasks.

(4) The report, I think, overemphasized the extent to which analysts, frustrated by the bureaucratic superstructure, choose either not to write for high-level publications unless forced to do so or do a shoddy job because they know the "chain of fixers" will do it for them. There are some analysts, I know, who don't write much but primarily because they work on countries where the level of interest is low and sparking that interest is difficult.

Specifically, turning to the recommendations, I would concur in some but not in most of those having to do with a reorganized production staff.

✓ A. As recommended, each division should have only one PO (a savings of two GS-15 and one GS-14 slots).

B. I would not recommend the abolition of the deputy division slot, a possibility [ ] considers. If a deputy is underemployed, he or she could work more closely with the PO and share some of the production responsibilities; could function as a

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generalist for the division and do some writing on broader, longer memos; and could more systematically plan career development and solve personnel problems. If the division had to eliminate the position, I would then recommend that the division chief be provided with a special assistant for administration. That individual would not be a substitute for the division chief in his absence; a branch chief would have to assume that responsibility. Rather, the special assistant would concern himself solely with administration, management, and personnel duties. The job could then be filled, I would think, by a GS-13 or, at most, a GS-14.

- C. The recommendations for a reconstituted production staff are, I think, unworkable. The reorganized staff would work only if some wholesale juggling were done at the division level. Even then, the plan would have to be modified. It's one thing to recommend that "...the responsibility for production review should be returned as much as possible to the Divisions and that the Staff positions savings which result should be redistributed among the Branches." It's another matter altogether to be in a position to implement such recommendations.

I see several potential problems. It may be that some senior editors might no longer be good senior analysts. And they might find the transition difficult and undesirable. Although OCI stresses flexibility--and rightly so--the instant transformation of editor or supervisor into analyst may not be realizable. Then, too, it is perhaps deceptive to maintain that so many high-level slots will be available immediately for analyst use. The [ ] plan will in reality 25X1 open up only a few new slots for analysts at the higher grades. Many of the production people will keep their grade but under a different title.

Even if many of the NID editors came down to the branches, they would handle only a small portion of the articles (and they may or may not make good teachers for junior analysts). The rest of the work will still be done by the present crop

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of analysts and reviewed by the same branch chiefs and POs. Therefore, many of the problems that necessitate editors above the division level will persist.

Moreover, I think [ ] must be only superficially aware of the vast number of chores the NID editors perform, many of which are not editorial at all. They are expeditors, problem solvers, processors, proof-readers, analysts during crisis periods, supervisors, headline writers, summary compilers, PDB overseers, cable officers on occasion, and in general men-and-women-of-all-work. Even if the NID night editors did only a bare minimum of editing and reviewing, they would be gainfully employed--both of them. During the day there is some slack time (it now seems to be more than one person can handle but not enough for two), and one of my recommendations (in the following section) will give the NID day editors some extra duties. Therefore, I don't think it's possible to cut down on the number of NID editors, although it's a tempting target.

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- D. The PDB may be a bit overstaffed, but one person (as [ ] appears to be proposing) can't handle a seven day work week and a 12-14 hour shift. There must be enough people to cover that extended period.

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Finally, [ ] organizational chart still separates into two different branches people who are performing what are essentially service functions for all the publications. There have been problems under the present set-up between those who work in the Publications Control Branch and those in the Publications Support Branch, particularly during the evening hours. [ ] retains this separation by putting proof readers both in the Daily Publications Group he proposes and in the Publications Support Group.

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### Recommendations

Dealing first with the NIB, and accepting that DIA and NSA participation and coordination are necessary evils, my proposal would be to make the NIB an offshoot of the NID insofar as possible for all CIA items. The CIA analyst

would write a piece and, if intended for both publications, would send it through the PO to the NID staff. Under this scheme, there would be no panel chairman (thus eliminating a slot which appears on the chart in [redacted] report as Chief of Production Staff as GS-17) and no panel secretary.

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If needed, and I think it would be, there could be a special assistant to the NID staff during the day, perhaps a person working a 10-6 or 11-7 shift. This person would do some of the chores now handled by the early night editor but would also help keep track of DIA and NSA items, of classifications, coordination, contacts with analysts, and so forth. The actual editing of pieces intended for both the NID and NIB would be done by one or the other of the NID day editors, but both would not work on the same piece. The associate editor would be in general charge, especially in terms of pieces from outside the Agency, but the senior editor (with an assist from [redacted] if he hits a real snag) would make the policy decisions as to whether DIA submissions are acceptable. [redacted] at the 11 o'clock meeting would make the initial determination as to what in general would be entertained from other agencies or what assigned to a given agency if there are two pieces offered on the same subject.

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For the most part, an item would be sent out for coordination after the NID team had seen it but before it was edited by [redacted] for the NID. To wait for his changes would delay the process too much. The coordinated version worked on by the NID editors would appear in the NIB; the [redacted] version, with whatever coordinating changes are acceptable, would run in the NID.

To ease the burden imposed by the DIA submissions, I propose that we send a good PO to DIA to work in their editing and review shop. Perhaps this could be only a temporary slot until DIA's own editors have a better grasp of things. Or it could be a rotational slot. [redacted] mentioned in an earlier memo that he thought [redacted] was ready for PO responsibilities. He might be a possible choice). In addition, the DIA representative here should do whatever polishing and changing is necessary. If there are still problems, the NID associate editor could help out. But

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the burden should fall on DIA, and if it's necessary to have two DIA people here as well as one of our people there, I think we should insist on it. We are now bearing too much of the burden.

At present, two night editors work on the NIB and help out on the NID. One is on a 4 P.M.-1 A.M. shift and the other works from 10 P.M. until 7 A.M. I would cut this down to one person who would work a shift from 7 P.M. until 3 A.M. or thereabouts--hours could be settled on exactly when the needs of the publications under the new scheme are determined. The duties the present early night editor has (reviewing NIB drafts and graphics; checking for content, grammar and security; preparing the cable, etc.) could be done by the special assistant to the NID team. Consideration should be given to having this person drawn from the ranks of the production end of things rather than from the analytical ranks because the functions would be more those of a processor and copy editor than of a substantive editor. The early morning chores of the late night editor could be handled by the NID team, which usually has a slack time after the paper is put to bed.

[redacted] would head up a unified production staff with [redacted] as his deputy (and responsible for the administrative end of things). Rather than have a special assistant at the GS-14 level (the position [redacted] now holds), I think it would be possible--based on conversations with [redacted]--to have that position filled by a GS-11. [redacted] believes he could teach someone the essentials of that job now that the birth pangs of the newspaper are over.

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The production people per se would be considered a service unit for all publications and would function as part of a single unit--the Publications Support Group--rather than in two separate branches as is the case now. (Eliminating the Publications Control Branch makes one GS-14 slot--the chief--available). There would be a second group labeled an Editorial Group. This group would have the NID/NIB editors, the special assistant to those editors, and the lay-out officers and weekly supervisor. Lay-out people could just as easily be in the Publications Support Group, but I'm told it would be feasible to have those who work on lay-out also be responsible for the

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25X1 Weekly. [ ] who now does lay-out, has worked on the Weekly and the other lay-out person could be trained). At present, there are two lay-out editors and several who rotate as Weekly supervisors. My proposal would be to have only three people assigned to that dual task on a rotating basis.

The information control officer and his assistant, who presently are assigned to the Publications Control Branch, should be moved to Registry. The cable officer, also once in that branch, has already been moved to the Liaison office.

The White House Support Staff would be renamed the White House Support Group and would be asked to function with one less person. There would then be a chief and two intelligence officers assigned to him. I'm told that in mid-week that they are definitely over-staffed, and I suspect that the present shifts could be modified to cover the loss of one intelligence officer. A staffer now comes in at 8 A.M. and yet there is very little to do until much later in the morning. The occasional telephone calls from the White House could be referred elsewhere.

There are several other questions you raised, one dealing with the need for office-level review of the NIO output. I think this should be done by the DD/OCI rather than by the Production Staff, which under the new scheme is not substantively oriented. I would also think that the kind of overview that is needed--given the variety of subjects to be covered--could best be done by someone in the DD/OCI's position.

As to staff functions that could be transferred elsewhere, I have no suggestions. Although I talked to many people about what they did and how they did it, my unfamiliarity with some of the more esoteric tasks that the office undertakes made it difficult for me to think of any more rational way of dealing with these chores.

25X1 I talked with [ ] about the need for including "warning" pieces in the NIB. We agreed that the NIB could probably run a summary of the material put out by [ ]

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Strategic Warning Staff and could also run "small warnings," tagged as such. The exact formula could be worked out later.

A chart of the proposed new staffing is attached. It's a bit sketchy and for the most part I have attached no names. Nor is the exact number of people needed in each case spelled out except in a general way. I would suggest that two-three persons from the present editorial and production staffs get together to work out the details (possibly people like [redacted] or [redacted] plus someone from the NID staff).

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