5 July 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Principals' Meeting on Peripheral
Reconnaissance, 2 July 1973

     1.   The subject meeting was chaired by Dr. Hall, ASD(I).
The purpose was to have the Steering Committee brief the principals
on the DoD approach to responding to Dr. Kissinger's memorandum
of 5 June 1973. Attending were:

          Admiral de Poix, DIA
25X1   [   ] DIA (Steering Committee)
          Ray S. Cline, State
          Seymour Weiss, State
25X1   [   ] NSA
          General Davidson, ASD(I) (Steering Committee)
          General Haupt, JCS (Recce) (Steering Committee)
          General Lew Allen, DCI/IC Staff
          Andy Marshall, NSC Staff
25X1   [   ] for E. W. Proctor, CIA

     2.   Dr. Hall announced that the 30 July deadline cited in the
Kissinger memorandum had been extended to 31 August 1973.

     3.   General Davidson, as Chairman of the Steering Committee,
described the organization of the six DoD task teams and the tasks for
each. In the discussion of Team 6 activities, I suggested that the study
include a detailed review of the need for penetration authority based on
assessments of the information gained versus the risk and political
consequences of detection and identification.

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- Hall, Davidson and Haupt were not keen on getting into this question; Hall argued that such a study could not be undertaken in the short time available.

- Cline supported the proposition but thought that such a study would be difficult.

- Hall then conceded that the question should be treated in the Team 6 study.

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- I offered to have the CIA Representative to Team 6 [   ] make available to the Team his outline for a study of the question.

4. In reviewing the approach to "Priorities" by Team 1, General Davidson said that the Team would use the DCID 1/2 Supplement, the JSOP Annex A, and the DoD/JCS Critical Near Term Collection Requirements. I suggested that:

- most of the "requirements" used to justify these missions would fall in the first two or three of the nine priorities in the DCID 1/2 matrix and in the JSOP Annex A;

- such a meager spread would provide no real basis for judging relative priorities of what these missions are working against.

Davidson said this might be so but that DCID 1/2 gave the "authoritative" priorities for U.S. intelligence objectives.

5. Of the handouts, one was a timetable for the study and the other was some sort of flow chart. Both showed USIB in the act and the timetable listed 3 August as a date for "data received from USIB Committees." Lew Allen challenged this, asking what that meant. General Davidson responded that they had drafted a letter for de Poix's signature asking the DCI to have USIB committees (CCPC, COMIREX and SIGINT) provide the "authoritative" word on the degree to which these missions satisfy USIB requirements.

- Lew Allen pointed out that the DCI (Schlesinger) had already chosen to designate his Deputy Director for Intelligence to provide the judgments on the value of these missions to national intelligence and had so informed Secretary Clements.

- I added that we were well down the road on this effort; we had identified about ten or so programs of possible interest to national intelligence (plus six on Southeast Asia) and were fully tied into the DoD Task Teams in providing these judgments.

- Lew Allen pointed out that he would have guessed only about ten or 12 of these programs could be related to "national intelligence" requirements--the remainder are driven by theatre commander needs to meet a JCS requirement.

- Admiral de Poix decided that he should not sign such a memorandum to the DCI--if one were to be sent, it should come from the Secretary of Defense himself.

In conclusion, Dr. Hall stated that he would convene the Group once or twice more to review progress of the study.

6. Subsequently, I contacted [   ] 25X1 to take a reading on the "USIB Committee" proposal. Allen had already talked to [   ] about turning off the idea and riding with our judgments. [   ] has the action.

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7. I also gave [   ] a copy of the OSR outline for study of the penetration question and asked him to lean on DoD to use it in Task Team 6. He will do so via [   ]

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Attachment

ORGANIZATION

1. Team #1   Requirements, Priority and Collection
    (Task 1)   Strategy (All Systems)

2. Team #2   All Missions from Performance Requirements
    (Task 2,3,4)   to Results and Value, Risk and Cost

3. Team #3   Potential for Increased Use of Unmanned
    (Task 5)   and Overhead Vehicles

4. Team #4   Risk and Response Assessment
    (Task 6)

25X1   5. Team #5   [   ] Complete
        (All pertinent tasks)

25X1   6. Team #6   [   ] Complete
        (All pertinent tasks)

STATED AND IMPLIED TASKS

1. Are the intelligence requirements valid and in the correct priority?

2. Are collection requirements consistent with intelligence requirements?

3. What is the justification of current COMINT, ELINT, and imagery collection?

4. Is there a balance between priority and value versus risk and cost?

5. What is the potential for increased use of unmanned and overhead vehicles?

6. Is the system adequate to assess risks to vulnerable collection operations and adequate to respond to incidents?

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SCHEDULE

2 July   -   Brief Principal's Group

17 July   -   Start Visits to Major Commands

25 July   -   Data received from Theaters

31 July   -   Complete visits to Commands

3 August   -   Data received from USIB Committees ✓

10 August -   1st Draft Prepared

24 August -   Staffing Complete

30 August -   Presentation to Sec Def, et al.

31 August -   Submission