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FY 75 KIQ STRATEGY REPORT

NSA & DIA Declassification/Release Instructions on File 25 October 1974

WARSAW PACT -- NATO BALANCE

<u>KIQ 26</u>: What are the strengths and weaknesses of Warsaw Pact forces for theatre war?

- I. COMMUNITY COLLECTION AND PRODUCTION STRATEGY
 - A. The effort with regard to this KIQ will be concentrated on providing a good estimate of the combat effectiveness of Warsaw Pact ground forces and tactical aviation in Eastern Europe and also on non-Soviet national air defense forces there -- and on Pact perceptions of NATO strengths and weaknesses.

25X1X4

25X1X4

25X1X4

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& NSA 25X3

25X1D1a

& NSA 25X3

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B. <u>Production</u>. The primary Community output will be in the US MC-161 position paper/NIE 11-14 effort. DIA, CIA and will be the principal participants under the aegis of the NIO.

25X1D NSA

NOTE: Readiness, mobilization and reinforcement are considered in KIQ 27; logistics in KIQ 28.

III. COMMENTS OF THE NIO/CF

The greatest evident deficiency at the outset of work on this KIQ is the insufficient number of analysts assigned at CIA and DIA to work in this area in the short term because of the demands for MBFR support. Although generally speaking, adequate amounts of information are collected. There are some areas where some additional effort is needed.

More useful data can probably be provided by:

25X1X4 & NSA 25X3

25X1X4

& NSA 25X3



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It does not seem profitable to reduce the present level of analytic effort devoted to MBFR, but if the Intelligence Community is to provide the support required by Secretary Schlesinger in his attempts to optimize NATO conventional force structure, more analytic effort will be required for this and KIQs 27 and 28.

In addition to a shortage of analysts, there is a need for improved analytic methodologies to support assessments of Warsaw Pact strengths and weaknesses in relation to current NATO and future posture.

