

1st Part of

15 October 1974

FY 75 KIQ STRATEGY REPORT


KIQ 24: What are Soviet and Warsaw Pact intentions and actions with respect to adherence to arms limitations agreements with the United States? [~~The SALT Monitoring Working Group and observers will deal with part of this question. Namely, "What are Soviet intentions and actions with respect to adherence to the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement?"~~]

I. Community Collection and Production Strategy

A. Collection and production assets will be directed toward Soviet weapon system development, testing, and deployment programs relevant to the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement (henceforth, the agreements), Soviet actions that impede verification, Soviet actions with respect to agreed dismantling and destruction procedures, and statements and actions of Soviet leaders that might bear on their intentions.


B. Chances of timely collection of information on Soviet adherence to the agreements will be enhanced by:

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2. Insuring that collection personnel in the field have sufficient knowledge of the agreements and guidance to insure effective exploitation of knowledgeable individuals.

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~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

D. Communications among technical collectors, human collectors, and analysts of Soviet military and political matters will be improved.

E. We will regularly review collection and production priorities, and reexamine our assessment of Soviet activities bearing on adherence to the agreements.

F. The MBFR Monitoring Study Group will review the intelligence information now being collected and assess our capabilities to monitor Soviet adherence to an MBFR agreement.

II. Agencies Working on This KIQ

A. The USIB Steering Group on Monitoring Strategic Arms Limitations will direct the production of the "SALT Monitoring Report" about three times per year. This report--prepared by the SALT Monitoring Working Group, assisted by observers from collection and processing agencies--will summarize Soviet activity during each four-month period with respect to the provisions of the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement.

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B. The NIO/SP will review collection and production plans and, in consultation with other NIO's, will commission new estimates or additional interagency research and production as necessary. He will coordinate these activities with the USIB Steering Group.

C. Intelligence production components of CIA, DIA, and State will designate individuals with political, military and technical intelligence responsibilities as points of contact to be kept apprised by all elements in their respective offices of information on Soviet adherence to the agreements. They will monitor Soviet test and deployment activities, analyze Soviet intentions and all-source information relating to questionable Soviet activities, and provide results of all such analysis to the SALT Monitoring Working Group.

D. CIA/DDS&T will regularly review technical collection plans and the progress accomplished in acquiring required information. [redacted] upgrading [redacted] the CIA technical [redacted]


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
[redacted] Studies of, and work on, follow-on or


modified collection systems will be accomplished and the Intelligence Community apprised through established channels of significant conclusions and progress. Contractor and in-house analytical efforts and production schedules will be simultaneously reviewed to better direct expenditures and efforts toward answering this KIQ.

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M. CIA, DIA, NSA, State and ACDA will participate in an interagency MBFR Monitoring Study Group under the guidance of the NIO for Conventional Forces in assessment of the Intelligence Community's capability to monitor MBFR agreements;

- given the current allocation of intelligence collection and potential assets
- assuming the current level of resource allocation and analysis but optimizing for MBFR monitoring capability
- by adding new collection and analytic capability as appropriate to indicate the levels necessary for monitoring MBFR agreements.