

ADMIRAL TURNER'S REMARKS AT THE UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY

LEXINGTON, KENTUCKY - 12 APRIL 1978

It's really a great treat for me to be back on a university campus, particularly that of the University of Kentucky. As Professor Davis said, I have been here before. I have enjoyed it each time and I know I am going to enjoy being here with you this evening. It's especially important for us in the Intelligence world to maintain the warm and traditional ties that have existed between the intelligence world and the academic world in our country for many years. These ties have become frayed in recent years because of public criticism of our past intelligence activities, but I'm dedicated to trying to rebuild those in every way possible. It's important to us because so much of what we do in intelligence is not cloak and dagger, spy-drama type work; it's good hard analysis and research just as is done on every academic campus in our country. And, with us, as with any research institution, you need, you crave outside stimulation. You need people who will come in from the outside and say, those hypotheses you're working on are outdated, or have you looked at a different alternative. The influence of academia to intelligence in our country is extremely valuable in this regard. We hope too that it's a two-way street; that when we communicate with your academics that there is fruitful exchange in the opposite direction, from our insights, as to how the government processes around the world really do operate.

In addition to this a good relationship between the intelligence community and the academic community is absolutely essential to us because our life's blood comes from the annual input of a few of our college graduates into our various intelligence organizations. We don't need a

great many, but we need some of the best. I hope that in the years ahead some of you here today will consider joining one or another of our intelligence organizations. I can assure you it is as challenging, academic, intellectual exercise as you will find in any profession in the world today. Let me say that the opportunities are almost unlimited. But if you make this choice, I'm sure that you will ask the same kind of questions that I asked myself when the President called me back just a little over a year ago and told me this was what he wanted me to do. I first said to myself, what do we have to do today, to collect intelligence information, analyze it properly so as to be of service to our policy makers of this government in 1978 and on into 1988, rather than never looking back and doing what would have been useful yesterday. Secondly, how can we do that while still protecting the rights under the Constitution, of our citizens and the basic standards of American values. Well, I'm happy to tell you that in the year of asking those questions and surveying our activities, I believe that we are in the midst of an important and dramatic transformation of the American intelligence community. It has been going on for a couple of years and it is resulting in what I term a new American model of intelligence. Let me just describe to you four changes or trends that are coming over the American intelligence community that exemplify this new model.

The first is a change in our product. When you look back, just over 30 years, when we first organized a centralized intelligence activity for our country, back then the primary product of intelligence was information about Soviet military activities and maybe a little bit about some of their satellite nations. That was the threat, that was the focus of concentration. Look how the world has changed around us since then. Today we have important intercourse with almost all of the 150

some nations of the world. But, our relations with the vast majority of those nations are far more political and economic than they are military. So the focus of our analysis, our collection of information, has been shifting and it has called upon us for new demands, new skills, new academic areas of expertise. Now, let me not overstate the case. Understanding Soviet military intelligence is still and must remain our number one priority. But what we have been called upon to do today is to expand our horizons to include much more than that and we are having great fun with the challenge, getting into the international economic analysis, getting into questions of anti-terrorism, questions of anti-drug trafficking, questions of the world energy situation and its prospects. It's exciting, it's new, it's demanding.

The second trend I'd like to mention to you, is that our production line itself has also changed. Historically the basic production line of intelligence has always been the human agent, the spy. It goes back at least as far as Jericho as I know it, because Joshua sent two spies inside before he marched around with his trumpets. Well, we've had a revolution. In the last decade and a half or so, we have developed new technical systems for collecting intelligence, systems which today are producing prodigious quantities of information and data. I suspect it's not an uncommon phenomenon to you because in the academic world there is also a great proliferation of information that is available to scholars. Scholars have the same challenge as our analysts. How do you sort it out? How do you keep track of it? How do you tell what is a critical clue so that it will fit in with something else over here and unveil a picture to you. It's an interesting, difficult challenge that lies ahead of us to change our production line in the way we have to, to absorb these quantities of new technically derived data. But let me

emphasize that it's interesting, that while this great flow of technical data is coming in, the need for the standard old human intelligence agent is perhaps even greater than before. Why? Because when I'm given some of this vast quantity of data and I present it to one of our policy makers, generally speaking it tells us what happened somewhere in the world yesterday, or maybe today. But then, I'm always asked the question: why did it happen and what's going to happen next? Well, that is the forte of the human intelligence agent--finding out what people are thinking and what their intentions are. So, today the difference in our production line is instead of having a single machine, the human intelligence agent, we have to have teamwork. We have to have a careful well-oiled meshing of our machinery between the technical and human; we have to manage our resources better so they complement each other, so that one fills the gap that the other one leaves. Again, it is an exciting and demanding challenge.

The third trend I would like to mention is what I call greater openness in intelligence. Traditionally, intelligence has always operated at maximum secrecy and minimum disclosure. I don't think we can do that anymore in this country in our new American model of intelligence. Why? Because I believe the American public has the right to know as much about our intelligence process as we can reasonably let them know. So what we do today, we come out like I am tonight, speak more to the American public so they can understand what we are doing and what the contribution is that we are making to our country. We participate more in symposiums and conferences; we respond more fully to the members of the media and we publish more. We publish monographs that are of importance to you in the academic community and we hope of importance to the

general American public. Tonight when we leave here I have some samples of these unclassified publications you are welcome to take with you.

What we do today when we publish a classified study, we look at it carefully and say what do we have to take out of this which, if revealed, would prevent us from getting this kind of information again; for, if revealed, it would deprive our policy makers of some unique advantage they have, having an exclusive on this information. If, after we've removed those things, there is enough substance left to be of value to the American public, we publish....(interrruption)....kind of publication, we've done at least two studies a week for the last year, we'll do something to help promote and improve the quality of American debate on important issues. But, let me not overstate the case to you. There is no way in this world today that you could conduct a sensible intelligence activity, an effective intelligence activity, without holding a great many secrets. But I do believe that by publishing as much as we can that we are in effect going to protect the necessary secrets better. When you have too much classified information there simply is not respect for it because people realize much of it does not need to be classified. In recent years this lack of respect has been manifested in a few irresponsible individuals publishing information which should not have been published in the interests of our country. I think the time has come when we cannot tolerate that much longer because the ultimate logic of what they are saying and doing is that each one of us, each one of us 215 million Americans, has the right to determine what his government should keep classified and what it should not--that is an intolerable position. I think the time has come to again repose a little trust and confidence in your appointed and elected officials--that they are not all just out to censure things for their own personal benefit. But I do not

ask you to just take us on trust alone, because the fourth trend that I would like to mention is one of greater oversight.

Out of the crucible of the last three years of public criticism, we have forged a new process of oversight. Because we have to have secrets there is no way that we can have total public oversight. But we do today have mechanisms for what I call surrogate public oversight. By this I mean we have created institutions which provide the average citizen, or the members of the intelligence community themselves, an avenue for expressing their complaints, their questions, or presenting what they think should be given to the American public, but which is technically classified. The first of these surrogates is at the White House itself, the President and the Vice President--who today take a very active and daily interest in our intelligence activities. The second is a new organ created two years ago called the Intelligence Oversight Board. I am privileged to have with us tonight one of the members of that Board, the distinguished former Senator from Tennessee, Senator Albert Gore. Along with Senator Gore, Governor Bill Scranton from Pennsylvania and a Mr. Tom Farmer from Washington D.C. are the members of this board. They are appointed by the President of the United States. They report only to the President of the United States. Any one of you, any one of my employees may communicate with them, any complaints, questions that you have about intelligence activities of our country. It does not go through me. They will look at it, they will determine whether it warrants some action and they will report only to the President as to what they have found. Beyond this, in the last several years we have created two additional oversight mechanisms: a committee on intelligence in the Senate of the United States and another one in the House of Representatives. I am very pleased to mention to you tonight that one of the members of that

Senate Committee is your own Senator Dee Huddleston. He is a delight to work with and a very fine man in this Senate Intelligence Committee.

These committees exercise a true oversight function with respect to us. We report to them in considerable detail, they scrutinize our work, they quiz us and they demand answers of us and we find it a very useful, and comfortable relationship.

At the same time, let me point out that there are risks in this oversight process. There are risks that when you've got too many people who know secrets they will leak. There are risks that if you feel you're bringing too many people into the process you will be timid in what you are willing to do. We cannot have intelligence by timidity and we cannot have intelligence if we have continuous leaks. I believe, however, that we are striking a balance between the amount of oversight and the amount of danger of leaks or timidity. But I would be very candid with you. It will be several years before this balance settles out and we know just where we stand. In the meantime, as Mr. Davis has said to you, the President of the United States on the 24th of January, recognizing these and other trends in our intelligence process, recognizing this new model of American intelligence, signed an Executive Order which reorganizes, changes the structure of our intelligence community in the following ways.

It really is going back to the National Security Act of 1947, which attempted to establish the Director of Central Intelligence who, as it said, would oversee the coordination of all of our intelligence activities. It never quite worked that way. So the President this January strengthened my authority as the Director of Central Intelligence--not Director of the Central Intelligence Agency which is a separate assignment--in several ways. He gave me the authority to develop and to present to him and the Congress the budget for the entire national

intelligence activity. Secondly, he gave me full authority to do what we call "tasking" of those elements of the intelligence world that go out and collect information. It is my responsibility to see to it that they are collecting on the right substance, that they are doing it in a coordinated way so there is no unnecessary duplication, nor should there be gaps or underlaps that could be dangerous. Thirdly, he has also given me some additional authority to bring together the analytic elements of our intelligence community to assure that we do the right kind of testing and analyzing to help our policy makers. But here, let me express a word of caution. I have not been given any authority to tell the analytic agencies outside the CIA which I don't run, the analytic agencies in Defense, or State, or Treasury, or elsewhere; I have no authority to tell them how to do their business, what to analyze or what conclusions to come up with, because we must have competitive analysis. We must let divergent views come forward so the decision makers really understand what they have before them, not just a coordinated single view because none of us is smart enough to interpret the intelligence data that perfectly. And finally, the President's new order establishes a committee under the National Security Council which is to give overall direction to me, and to all of our intelligence activities in terms of what are our priorities, what should we be doing, what does the nation need out of us.

Let me conclude by saying that I believe these trends in American intelligence directed by the President in his reorganization, today are strengthening our ability to collect and analyze that intelligence information which our country's policy makers need. I believe today we are the number one intelligence service in the world. But at the same time I believe these procedures are strengthening our ability to do our job in ways that will support and defend the institutions and the ideals of



our country. Let me assure you that I am dedicated to keeping us number one in intelligence in the world and to doing so in ways that will support and defend our wonderful, democratic country.

Thank you very much.

Q&A - UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY - 12 APRIL 1978

Q: Do the new authorities that have been given to you lead to the potential for perpetuating abuses that may have occurred in the past?

A: No, it does not. Most of the abuses that have been either alleged or proved were in an area which we call political action--trying to change events in foreign countries as opposed to collecting intelligence. It is not an intelligence function, it is one that this country has assigned to the Central Intelligence Agency. Today, under law, if we are going to undertake any political action in the world, I must obtain the signature of the President of the United States and make a report of what we are doing to each of the committees of Congress. I can assure you that these are very tight strings on our doing anything that is not authorized.

Q: (Inaudible - had to do with elimination of the covert activities branch.)

A: We have not in any way eliminated the covert activities, clandestine collection activities branch of the Central Intelligence Agency. What we have done is to pare down excessive overhead in the Headquarters. We are not reducing the people overseas, we are removing the overhead which has long been recognized as unnecessary and inhibiting to the young people who come into our organization and find themselves under-utilized and over-supervised. We are trying to create greater opportunities for people like yourself to join up and realize they have a good prospect for a career ahead of them.

Q: What is your opinion of the human rights situation in Iran.

A: This is truly a matter for the State Department. My position is that the Central Intelligence Agency and the other intelligence agencies of our government, conduct liaison in those countries of the world where we maintain diplomatic relations. I maintain my cue from the State Department as to where all the agencies of our government have legitimate contacts. There are, however, no deals or arrangements for any activities by foreign countries in our country in exchange for our liaison with them overseas.

Q: I have no eloquent speech on the Shah. In fact, I'd rather change the subject to something that is a bit more important. Do you see the Russian Cosmos satellites now in orbit, nuclear powered ones, as a threat to this nation. What are the chances of another one coming down like Cosmos 954 did in Canada and spewing radioactive waste all over the place?

A: Clearly, one cannot dismiss the possibility that that exact thing will happen again. They have been flying these satellites, ones like that one, for a number of years. This is the first and only instance we have had or known about. It's a danger, our President has suggested to the Soviets that we talk about negotiating regulations that would prohibit this kind of thing. They have not responded.

Q: Can you tell me, what would be the CIA's activities if they would find out intelligence information about a country that was planning to have a socialist government or a government that was not in agreement

or in the style of our government. What would be the CIA's activities when they found this information out?

A: Our role is to report to our decision makers on what we think is happening or is going to happen in those countries. We do retain a capability for the political action that I described earlier. We exercise it very very little today. We exercise it only under these type of constraints. We only would take any kind of political action in circumstances such as you described if we were directed to do so by these constituted authorities of the government.

Q: What is the ultimate Soviet objective of their involvement in Africa?

A: I believe that the Soviet Union today will probe any opportunity they have to extend their influence in the countries outside their present sphere of activity. I believe they look for these opportunities and to the extent that they can afford the cost either political, or economic, or military, of trying to establish a position in these countries, they will do so. They have done it at great cost, great effort just recently in Ethiopia. We are concerned at what they may have in mind next.

Q: (Inaudible - concerning an uprising in Iran.)

A: It is not our role to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries...(interruption).... Let me again emphasize that political action activity such as was reported to have taken place in Chile is under very tight controls in our government today, both by statute and by Executive Order of the President of the United States. There is no way the CIA can involve itself in that kind of activity without proper authorization of properly constituted authority.

Q: Does Soviet centralized economic activity give them an advantage over our international corporate type economic activities?

A: On balance, no. Yes, they can direct their efforts in a more coordinated way, they can reduce prices on shipping for instance and try to corner pieces of the market. But at the same time we have so many evidences of these controlled economies of the communist bloc being basically inefficient and they are not strong economies. They can't even teach their own people, and they are basically agricultural nations. But, I don't believe that I would in any way trade ingenuity, the profit and loss factors of our international corporations, for a controlled centralized economy.

Q: I would like to ask, in view of the new American look in intelligence, how does it compare with communist and Soviet intelligence? Are we placing ourselves at a disadvantage?

A: Basically, I think not. The KGB is a very large, expensive, unscrupulous operation on the part of the Soviet Union. They put much more effort into the human intelligence sphere, that I mentioned to you, than we do or can afford. We are much better than they in technical intelligence collection and, in any event, I have great faith that the analytic function

which is a critical part of intelligence can be done so much better in a free society that encourages dissent and differing views such as ours, than in a totalitarian society like the Soviets.

Q: U.S. Ambassador Andrew Young once stated that the presence of Cubans in Africa had a stabilizing effect. I would like to know if you agree with him or not.

A: The Cuban presence in Ethiopia has basically been destabilizing--this has occurred since that remark was made. I think it has tremendous dangers for the future as to where it will be employed again. I don't see that the Cubans have a legitimate interest in this kind of a situation. I think it's a matter of real concern to our country.

Q: In the press, in all sorts of magazines and articles we are getting a whole series of non-Central Intelligence Agency estimates; this professor says the Soviets have learned to do this and that we are slipping behind in that. How can we as the public evaluate these types of reports and get an accurate picture of where we actually do stand in relation to the Soviets.

A: It is very difficult to have to decide which are the most authoritarian, or most unbiased in these publications. If you're talking military balance, I would strongly recommend the International Institute of Strategic Studies in London, which publishes very good data every year on military situations in every country in the world. I would say that that is exactly why we are publishing as much as we possibly can. You can write to the Library of Congress and subscribe to everything we publish, or you can hope to hear about which ones you have most interest in and subscribe to those individually. They are largely on economic and political matters because there is not much military that can be declassified. We are trying to help on this and that's the best I can do for you I'm afraid.

Q: Inaudible.

A: I have reviewed the material and appointed a fine member from Kentucky who works for us, Scott Breckinridge, to look at all the data in the CIA files on the assassination of President John Kennedy. I find no evidence whatsoever of CIA participation or collaboration in that.

Q: What role, if any, is the CIA playing in the Italian government?

A: None.

Q: Let me ask another one. What role and what does the CIA plan on doing, if anything, about the spy device which was taken up the mountain in India-- a nuclear device which has been abandoned now and is losing nuclear waste and when the snows begin to melt will run off....(inaudible)....

A: My understanding is that the report in the newspapers is that that was 13 or 14 years ago, right? I'm not authorized and do not comment on either allegations or ongoing actual CIA clandestine activities. If you do that once, then you are in the position of always having to deny it until you get to the point where you ....(interruption).... So, I cannot comment.

UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY  
1900 12 April 1978

Appreciate opportunity to be with you tonight,

- Have special personal affection for University of Kentucky,
- Participated in seminars at your Patterson School,
- Have enjoyed a long and warm friendship with its Director, Vince Davis.
- Vince was especially helpful to me last summer when I was reviewing the organization of the Intelligence Community of the United States. His ideas and suggestions were instrumental in the final organization which was announced by the President this past January.
- While our friendship predates the assumption of my present responsibilities, a close relationship has always existed between the intelligence agencies of this nation and the academic profession.
- This relationship is normal - it is in fact inevitable;
- And although both you and I may be critical of some intelligence activities which have gone on in the past, the vast preponderance of what we have done together has been wholesome, mutually beneficial, and of very great importance to the United States.
- Today, I am working to strengthen the relationship between the Intelligence Community and the Academic Community.

Drop for Ohio

- 1) Most of what we do is not the cloak and dagger drama of spy stories, but is analysis and interpretation of information - the same kind of research that is conducted on every college campus.
  - ° And, as with any research activity, intellectual stagnation is always a danger. Stimulation, new approaches, and new ideas must be infused regularly from the outside.
  - ° Commonality of interests, of expertise, and of areas of inquiry inevitably make the academic community the natural place to go.
- 2) Beyond that, the Intelligence Community is no different from industry or other government agencies. We depend on continuing infusions of bright young college graduates to replenish our ranks. We don't need many, but we do need some of the best. Over the long run, the quality of young people going into intelligence work will be critical to our future.

*Start -  
Lion's Club  
Economic Club*

Today - perhaps more than anytime since

- 1947 - first peacetime central intelligence - good knowledge of what is happening in the world - vital to our country.
- Greater than 30 years ago - why?
- In three areas of our work - military, political, and economic intelligence - demands greater today than ever before.

- Military, for example, equation today vastly different from 1947

- Then ◊ dominant power
- Today ◊ Soviet Union ◊ can't compete effectively in political or economic spheres - depends on the area where money can buy capability ◊ military.
- Close to parity ◊ neither side can contemplate war without tremendous risk.
- In this kind of situation ◊ intelligence gives impressive advantages ◊
  - ◊ Know capabilities, plans, influences,
  - ◊ Give chance of predicting actions/reactions.
  - ◊ Can use your forces to greater advantage.
- Enemy doesn't tell you his plans or priorities ◊ but reveals clues.
- We put clues together to determine patterns, trends, problems.
- Same time alert policy makers facts on which to base good decisions.  
e.g. SALT

- In politics

- ° 30 years ago - USA dominant - other nations followed,
- ° Today - even smallest, newest nations reject both American and Soviet models as inappropriate to their needs. Go it alone,
- ° Probably healthiest course of action. But, means for us - to continue in leadership role, must understand the cultural imperatives, motives, attitudes, needs of all countries - learn to work with them - spirit of partnership.
- ° Can't do unless we learn all we can about other nations.

- Similarly, in economics -

- ° Again, independent 30 years ago,
- ° Today almost a cliché to say - interdependent,
- ° Everyone recognizes the real or potential power of OPEC, EEC, as well as our far eastern allies - Japan and Korea,
- ° Without a good understanding of these economic forces and advance warning of their initiatives we could lose our shirt - individually and as a nation.

In addition to these increased needs for good intelligence, today we have increased public interest in what the Intelligence Community is doing and how it is doing it.



- Developed over past 3 - 4 years of intense scrutiny and criticism. Much of it justified - some of it not.
- What is important today is that rather than a continuation of the criticism - which frankly has had a profoundly destructive effect on a valuable resource - I am beginning to sense a more constructive questioning of our activities;
  - o How can you acquire adequate intelligence for our country and reflect American values while you are doing it?
  - o How do we know you are respecting the constitutional rights of Americans?
  - o As long as much of what you do is secret, how can you expect to earn the public trust?

All excellent questions. Let me discuss 4 changes that are taking place which, I believe, will both

- satisfy our need for knowledge, and
- ensure we meet the high standards of our democratic society.

#### Shifting Product

- 1947 - ~~one~~ product: military intelligence about Soviet Union
  - o Also 6 or 7 countries E Europe
  - o Soviet forays into 3rd World
  - o Other characteristics: not just information, but do something about it - influence events -  
Covert Action
  - o Iran 53, Guatemala 54, Cuba 61, Vietnam, Angola 75.

- Today -
  - o US interest expanded
    - o 150 + countries - interested in most
    - o President interested in places and organizations which, 5 years ago, were little known or non-existent:
      - e.g., Zimbabwe, Namibia, Benin, OPEC
    - o So, intelligence product
      - 1) broader geographically
      - 2) broader topically - beyond the military
- Other change today - Political or Covert Action
  - o Attitude - less inclined to want to interfere in inner workings of other countries
  - o Utility - recognize its marginal utility.
  - o But, can't eschew.
    - Congress requires CIA maintain capability
    - Most likely future uses -
      - 1) Combat terrorism e.g., nuclear device
      - 2) Fight drug traffic
      - 3) Try to get all sides of issues to people in countries where the media is controlled by the government and only the governments interpretation reaches people.
- Second change - different production line
  - Traditionally - human agent
  - Last decade and half - revolution in how we collect

- information - best typified by U-2 - made world aware that change had occurred.
- Today our problem is less - how to collect, but more, how to fully use the quantities we get.
  - Ironically, rather than making the human agent obsolete it has made him more important.
    - o Technically collected information raises many questions. The more you can see or hear, the more you ask, why? What does that mean? What will happen next?
    - o A photograph cannot usually answer these questions. A human can uncover motives, influences, plans, etc.
  - So today, we are using the human agent better - pinpointing better the gaps which only he can fill in.
  - So the way we product intelligence has changed.
    - o Complementary: technical/human
    - o Stronger emphasis on good management of these valuable assets.
  - Third area of change: Openness
    - Traditionally, intelligence agencies operated in maximum secrecy.
    - Can't do that any longer - nor should we
    - Reasons:

- 1) You have a right to benefit from
  - as much information as we can share with you -
  - improves public debate
  - let's you know how we are working for you
  - benefits us through more vigorous exchange of ideas with you.
  - have been publishing 2 unclassified studies a week for the past year.
    - e.g., Soviet economy:
      - o prospects bleak
      - o implications for world stability & prices
      - o ability of Soviets to buy technology and manufactured goods.
    - e.g., Steel; Energy; Terrorism
- 2) Permits us also to protect better truly sensitive information
  - everything secret, nothing secret
  - declassify as much as possible
  - improve protection of real secrets -
  - What are they?
    - o our sources - would dry up
    - o our methods - could compromise
      - enormously expensive systems
      - or jeopardize peoples lives
    - o An advantage gained by knowing

something the enemy doesn't know  
we know.

e.g., if during WW II the Axis  
powers knew we had their codes  
they would have changed them  
immediately and cut off our  
unique window on their plans.

- An aside - real lack of respect today  
for classified information.

e.g., Agee, Snepp - not so much a question of  
whether or not they divulged secrets -  
although certainly important - more  
the problem of any individual taking it  
upon himself to decide what can or cannot  
be released to the general public  
(including, I might add, the KGB, who  
read every line printed publicly in  
this country).

- o Agee and Snepp are not in a position to judge  
the harm the wrong information can do in the KGB's  
hands because they are not aware of all the  
equities in the situation.
- o logical extension would be for all 215 million  
Americans to decide what should or should not  
be kept secret - chaos.

- o Suggest we move away from the Watergate mentality which holds all public officials guilty of constant deception or worse. Time to return to where public places a modicum of confidence in public officials.
- o Not asking for no checks on what we do -- asking for the use of established checks - many of them totally new, and, I believe, fully effective to protect your interest -

Brings me to fourth change -

Oversight

- Public oversight impractical
- Surrogate oversight
  - President
  - VP
  - NSC
  - IOB
  - Congressional Committees
- Strengths
  - o Others share decisions
  - o Closer contact with public will
- Risks
  - o Danger of leaks - as increase number in the know
  - o danger of timidity

- Finding balance

In January, President recognized these changes I've been discussing and incorporated them in an E.O.

- Three characteristics of E.O.

- 1) Establishes PRC

- o guidance
- o priorities
- o SecSta/Def/NSC Adv/Treas.

- 2) Strengthened DCI

- o To pull together diverse agencies and coordinate
- o Collection expensive - must coordinate
- o Analysis - remains independent

- 3) Checks & Balances through Attorney General

- o Protects rights of US citizens.


- New procedures, orders will do 2 things:

- 1) Strengthen our ability to produce superior intelligence for decision makers


- 2) Protects both your rights and the values of this nation.

- I can assure you, I am dedicated to those goals.

- Thank you.



C. T.



CASSETTE  
TAPE



