

10 JUN 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Action Items from Discussions on 10 June 1977

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3. Joe Kraft had an article in the June 9th Washington Post about a "magneto-hydrodynamic" electrical power generating capability that the Soviets have and in which we are also involved. I would like to understand what this is, what its potential is, and what our participation is?

4. Dr. Brzezinski would like to know if we see any connection between the fact that we tested a nuclear power source for a satellite in 1965 and the Soviets first did it in 1971. Did they get the idea from us?

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6. Covered all topics on the agenda.

June 10, 1977

Somalia-Ethiopia: Troubles in Ogaden

- I. The destruction on June 1 by Somali-supported insurgents of three bridges on the railroad linking Addis Ababa to Djibouti, the capital of the French Territory of the Afars and Issas, probably marks the beginning of increased Somali pressure on eastern Ethiopia.
- II. Siad has probably concluded that the time is opportune for regaining the Ogaden while Ethiopia's military capabilities are at their nadir and before Soviet support and Ethiopia's own mobilization efforts bring an improved military posture.
- III. The attack has notably increased tension between the two countries. The railroad is Ethiopia's principal rail link to the sea, and Addis Ababa believes the attack on this vital artery presages increased Somali activity in the Ogaden. Somalia's propaganda attacks against Ethiopia have become particularly virulent, and seem intended to provide a justification for an attempt to regain the Ogaden.
- IV. Ethiopia, despite its concern, is unlikely for now to attempt a military retaliation against Somalia.
 - A. This cautious policy could change if the substantial amounts of military equipment from the Soviet Union,

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East Europe, and Libya, and more aid--including modern Soviet tanks and MIG aircraft--has been promised.

- B. Addis Ababa is also proceeding with the rapid expansion of its regular and irregular forces, and has begun an offensive against insurgents in northern Ethiopia that, if successful, would free troops for use in the Ogaden.
- V. Siad, on the other hand, sees political survival as threatened if he failed to act and allowed Ethiopia to regain the initiative against the insurgents before it was too late.
- VI. Siad and other members of the ruling hierarchy would probably want to avoid the prospect of the insurgents' suffering defeat and being forced back across the border. The insurgents would probably turn against the Mogadiscio Government if they felt it had abandoned them.
- VII. Increase in tensions have made more difficult Moscow's attempt to maintain good relations with both Ethiopia and Somalia.
- VIII. They may come under increased pressure to speed up arms deliveries to Ethiopia in response to the increased threat from Somalia.

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
IX. If there is a conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia, it is likely to be short and limited to the Ogaden and neighboring Somali territory. Neither side could be expected to sustain concentrated military activity by a large number of units for more than a few weeks; each would quickly begin to encounter supply and maintenance problems and shortages of petroleum products.

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Major Ethiopian Combat Units



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
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Major Somali Combat Units

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1977

- One hour "Open House" in your office after each Morning Meeting.
- Presidential items.
- Use of office downtown.
- Administrative flexibility. Don't hold up for observed compliance with format.

DRAFT PRESIDENTIAL ITEM ON IMPACT OF THE 200-MILE FISHING CLAIM ON
THE SOVIET, JAPANESE AND KOREAN FISHING INDUSTRY

1. We talked before about the problems for nations with large fishing industries and/or heavy reliance on the protein from fish for their national diet of the extension of maritime zones to 200 miles. Forty-four countries have claimed such zones, twenty of them since the beginning of this year and _____ more are expected to declare them before the year is over. The attached chart brings this out clearly and it also points out that since nearly all the world's prime fishing grounds are within 200 miles of land that only in the southern hemisphere, and particularly the south Pacific, there is not much opportunity for expansion. When the Australian Foreign Minister was here, I noticed that he commented on expanding Soviet fishing activity in the south Pacific and the graphic illustration certainly shows why.

2. The Soviets, the Japanese and the South Koreans have been taking different methods to offset this impact on their fishing.

a. The Soviets first declared their own 200-mile zone on the first of March of this year and will conserve the catch in their own waters more for themselves. They have, for instance, reduced the Japanese catch by 50% and the South Korean catch by 100%.

b. They are also continuing a program they have had in effect for many years of extending fisheries aid to the lesser developed countries. Over the last 15 years they've given aid to 33 developing countries totaling over \$230 million dollars. The Asians have countered to help the development of local fishing industries but the repayment is generally in the form of goods and services to the Soviets' own fishing fleet operating in the area.

c. The next and most recent Soviet move starting in about 1971 was the conclusion of joint venture fishing agreements with 18 developing countries with another nine currently in negotiations. In this case, the Soviets take a 49% interest in the fishing venture and thus have a voice in the local fishing operations that guarantees them some measure of fishing rights in the territorial waters of these countries. The countries are shown on the next map of the world, the

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salmon-colored countries being those which have received aid, the dotted countries those in which there are joint ventures today, and the hatched ones in which there are negotiations for joint ventures. Attached also is a list of the specific countries who participated in the aid and joint ventures programs. It is noteworthy that almost half of the Soviet investment is in Africa, and nearly 40% of that in Somalia. The other large recipients of aid are Iraq, Egypt, South Yeman, Bangladesh, and Chile.

(1) There are some of us who are suspicious enough to believe that the Soviets have more than protein in mind and are looking for a foot in the door for further ventures by way of the use of military base facilities, the military aid program, and political penetration. This was certainly the sequence that was followed in Somalia between the early 1970's and today.

3. The Japanese are responding in a similar way. They expect to declare their 200-mile fishing zone later this year. They've also lost a \$700 million seven-year program to increase the yields of fishing in Japanese coastal waters.

a. They've established 200 joint fishing companies in 51 countries, with the greatest number in Asia and Oceania, and the bulk of the remainder in Africa and Latin America.

b. Thirty of these companies are jointly owned with United States interests.

4. South Korea has signed fishing agreements with 19 Asian and Latin American lesser developed countries, one of which has helped Koreans by paying licensing fees to fish in these countries' waters.

a. South Koreans have also provided government support for an agreement under which 30 United States fishing vessels will catch 130,000 tons of fish and deliver them to the South Korean processing ship stationed just outside our claimed 200-mile limit. The intent is to avoid U.S. quotas. Whether this unusual procedure will hold up or not remains to be seen.

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