

CEP PRESENTATION FOR  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

RICHARDSON

15 MARCH 1973

NAVY HAS NO OBJECTION TO  
DECLASSIFICATION AND RELEASE.

NAVY review(s) completed.

SECRET

**CEP PRESENTATION**  
**FOR**  
**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**  
**RICHARDSON**  
**15 MARCH 1973**

DOWNGRADED TO CONFIDENTIAL  
ON 1 MAR 78 TO UNCLASSIFIED  
ON 1 MAR 83

SECRET

Approved For Release 2007/03/02 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003500270001-7

**ISSUE:   HOW WELL DOES FORCE  
          PLANNING PROCESS RESPOND  
          TO STRATEGY GUIDANCE ?**

Approved For Release 2007/03/02 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003500270001-7

**SECRET**

ESSENCE OF DOD POLICY GUIDANCE FOR  
GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES

WITH OUR ALLIES, MAINTAIN FORCES  
TO DETER A THEATER CONVENTIONAL WAR INVOLVING  
THE USSR OR CHINA.

PRIMARY EMPHASIS SHOULD BE GIVEN TO  
EUROPEAN DEFENSE.

SHIFT PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY TO ALLIES  
FOR DETERRING OR FIGHTING SUB-THEATER  
CONFLICTS.

**SECRET**

GUIDANCE FOR SIZING GP FORCES  
WITHIN FISCAL CONSTRAINTS

1. PLAN FORCES FOR A NATO CONFLICT (OR A WAR AT SEA WITH THE SOVIETS) WHILE ASIA IS QUIESCENT.
2. IN ADDITION, PLAN A RESERVE OF NOT MORE THAN 2 DIVISIONS, 2 AIR WINGS, AND 2 CARRIER GROUPS.
3. IF, WHILE PROTECTING A MINIMUM NATO CAPABILITY OF 10 DIVISIONS, MORE FORCES ARE NEEDED TO AID AN ALLY VS A CPR OR NON-CPR ATTACK, PROVIDE THOSE FORCES, IF THEY CAN BE ACCOMMODATED IN A BALANCED PROGRAM.

## NET IMPACT OF GUIDANCE

### SUBSTANCE:

1. DEFEND NATO
2. AVOID GROUND WARS IN ASIA

### PROCEDURE

1. SPECIFIC, PRESCRIPTIVE GUIDELINES
2. BASED ON WORST CASE
3. OTHER CASES FORCED TO "LESSER INCLUDED" CATEGORY

% MEASURE OF EFFECTIVENESS OF EQUAL COST SYSTEMS  
IN DIFFERENT SCENARIOS

	<u>NATO</u> <u>SCENARIO</u>	<u>MIDEAST</u> <u>CRISIS</u> <u>SCENARIO</u>	<u>CHARACTERISTICS</u> <u>BUT NO SCENARIOS</u>
SYSTEM A	70-85 %	20-30 %	30-40 %
SYSTEM B	30-45 %	60-70 %	70-85 %

NATO-RELATED PROGRAM DECISION OPTIONS PROVIDED TO SECDEF

	FY 74-78 (\$ BILLIONS)	
	<u>LARGEST ADDITION TO POM</u>	<u>LARGEST DECREASE TO POM</u>
1. LAND FORCE ISSUES (SUCH AS: SIZE OF MARINES, TYPES OF ARMY DIVISIONS SIZE OF ARMY RESERVE, ETC.)	+3	-5
2. TACAIR ISSUES (SUCH AS: NUMBER OF CARRIERS, MUNITIONS FUNDING, A-9/10 BUY, ETC.)	+7	-5
3. NAVAL FORCE ISSUES (SUCH AS: SURFACE ESCORT BUYS, SONOBUOYS, PATROL HYDROFOIL, ETC.)	+2	-3
TOTAL	+12	-13



## IMPACT OF PLANNING PROCEDURES

- DECENTRALIZATION MEANS MANAGEMENT BY EXCEPTION.
- THROUGH ISSUE PAPER PROCESS, SECDEF FOCUSES ON ABOUT 5% OF FORCES.
- PRESCRIPTIVE PLANNING CAN DISTORT FORCE PLANNING.

## NATO DOMINANCE CAUSES:

- HIGH HARDWARE COSTS
- ADVERSE THIRD COUNTRY PERCEPTIONS
- SOPHISTICATED EQUIPMENT
- LOSS OF FLEXIBILITY FOR MORE PROBABLE CONTINGENCIES

## PRESCRIPTIVE GUIDANCE CAUSES:

- FORECLOSED OPTIONS
- TACTICAL THINKING STEREOTYPED
- IMPEDIMENTS TO INNOVATION
- VOYEURISM ENCOURAGED

CEP GUESS AS TO ENVIRONMENT  
OF THE 1970'S

- FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO STABILITY ARE ENCOURAGING
  - SALT, MBFR, ETC.
- BUT INSTABILITIES AND UNCERTAINTIES PERSIST, *e.g.*
  - CHINESE SUCCESSION
  - YUGOSLAV SUCCESSION
  - SINO/SOVIET HOSTILITY
  - EXTRA LEGAL ACTIONS
  - VIETNAM/SEASIA
  - INDIAN SUB-CONTINENT
- NO FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE IN SOVIET OR CHINESE OBJECTIVES OR REDUCTIONS IN POWER

## USES OF MILITARY IN THE ENVIRONMENT OF THE 1970'S

FORCES SERVE BOTH AS AN INSURANCE POLICY  
IN CASE OF WAR AND AS LEVERAGE IN FOREIGN POLICY.

### INSURANCE :

NATO  
LESSER INCLUDED CASES

### LEVERAGE :

#### NATO

- DANGER OF FINLANDIZATION
- FLEXIBILITY vs SOVIETS ON FLANKS

#### PACIFIC

- BALANCE OF POWER AMONG FOUR COUNTRIES

#### MIDEAST

- ISRAEL
- OIL

#### LATIN AMERICA

12 R  
(

## SUMMARY

### CURRENT PLANNING STILL EMPHASIZES

- SINGLE 20 YEAR OLD NATO SCENARIO
- SUDDEN EUROPEAN WAR FIGHTING
- LESSER INCLUDED CASE ASSUMPTIONS

CONSEQUENCES OF NATO CONFLICT ARE STILL MORE SERIOUS  
THAN OTHER CONTINGENCIES:

### HOWEVER:

- PROBABILITY OF NATO CONFLICT IS RELATIVELY LOW
- PROBABILITY OF LOWER ORDER CONFLICT IS HIGHER  
BUT FISCAL CONSTRAINTS LEGISLATE AGAINST  
STRUCTURING FOR THAT

**ISSUE - HOW MUCH SHOULD NATO DOMINATE  
FORCE PLANNING?**

**ALTERNATIVES:**

**SPECIFY SCENARIOS OTHER THAN FULL SCALE  
NATO CONFLICT**

**AND/OR**

**SPECIFY GENERAL FORCE CHARACTERISTICS**

# FORCE EVALUATION BY POTENTIAL SCENARIOS (RANK ORDERING)

		Major Wars		Subversion or wars supported by USSR/CPR		Great uncertainty w/major power implications		Minor 3rd Power Problems		Non-Military Actions		
SCENARIO		NATO	Soviet/China Conflict	Vietnam/ S.E. Asia	Korea	Yugoslav Succession	Israel - Arabs	Indonesia	South American Conflict	Indian Subcontinent	Iran/Iraq	Embargo
FORCE												
LAND BASED GROUND FORCES												
SEA BASED GROUND FORCES												
LAND BASED TACAIR												
CARRIER TACAIR												
SEA CONTROL FORCES												

1 - HIGHEST UTILITY  
5 - LOWEST UTILITY

FORCES EVALUATION BY CHARACTERISTICS  
WHICH ENHANCE POL/MIL OBJECTIVES

CHARACTERISTICS FORCE	<div> <div>VISIBILITY</div> <div>GRADUATED OPTIONS</div> <div>EASE OF EXTRACTION</div> <div>SPEED OF RESPONSE</div> <div>DEPENDENCE ON ALLIES</div> <div>COST IN U.S. LIVES</div> <div>MONETARY COST</div> <div>COLLATERAL DAMAGE</div> <div>QUALITY OF FORCE</div> <div>MEDIA ACCEPTABILITY</div> <div>CONGRESSIONAL ATTITUDE</div> <div>VERSATILITY</div> </div>													
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
A. LAND BASED GROUND FORCES														
B. SEA BASED GROUND FORCES														
C. LAND BASED TACAIR														
D. CARRIER TACAIR														
E. SEA CONTROL FORCES														

RANKING + IS POSITIVE  
 O IS UNCERTAINTY  
 - IS NEGATIVE  
 N/A MEANS DOES NOT APPLY

**UNDER EITHER ALTERNATIVE**  
**WHAT WOULD HAPPEN TO FORCES?**

- NEED CONSIDERABLE ANALYSIS
- PROBABLY PREMIUM ON:  
    NUMBERS vs QUALITY OF UNITS  
    MOBILITY
- NOT A PRECIPITATE CHANGE OF DIRECTION BUT MAKING  
    THE CHOICES AVAILABLE TO SECDEF WHICH ARE  
    SOMETIMES OBSCURED OR DISTORTED TODAY
- DISTINCTION BETWEEN CURRENT AND FUTURE FORCES



HOW TO IMPLEMENT A CHANGE IN FORCE  
PLANNING PROCESS?

I. CHOICE:

CONTINUE PRESCRIPTIVE PLANNING DOCTRINE

OR

ESTABLISH ROUGH, INDICATIVE PLANNING GUIDES

II. MEANS:

- CONTINUE OLD DPPG IN FORCE
- REISSUE DPPG REAFFIRMING NATO FOCUS
- REISSUE DDPG WITHOUT FORCE SIZING APPROACH
- DEVELOP NEW DPPG