

Remarks by VADM Stansfield Turner at  
Brown University Conference, 22 March 1974

Mr. Clifford has clearly identified the fact that the usefulness of military forces and the situations in which they are appropriate are quite different today than a decade ago. There are many complex reasons for this. Some reasons such as the achievement of nuclear balance by the Soviets, are almost certainly permanent. Others such as the current mutuality of interest in detente for domestic and economic purposes may change tomorrow.

The essential ingredient of today's detente is the military balance that exists. Neither we nor the Soviets could afford detente if we felt vulnerable to military pressure or conquest. The primary role of our military forces today is to preserve that strategic balance so that detente can flourish. This balance is a dynamic matter. This means that we must continuously adapt the size and shape of our military forces and how we employ them to meet the demands of balance.

In doing this we must first achieve equilibrium of strategic nuclear forces. SALT I was an attempt to dampen strategic arms competition, but I do not believe we and the Soviets have yet reached a state of sufficient trust and confidence necessary to achieve an assuring balance. Today there may be substantial overkill capacity on both sides. Yet, overkill or

overinsurance may be the only practical substitute for mutual trust and confidence. If it relaxes fingers on the triggers of nuclear holocaust it may not be all bad.

First and foremost, it seems to<sup>me</sup> that our primary concern should be to ensure that no such exchange ever occurs.

We must search for a new strategy for world security which contains inherent incentives for avoiding nuclear war. For instance, perhaps deliberate efforts to translate some of our investment in nuclear weapons into joint economic adventures within each other's territory could eventually put self interest above fear as the stabilizing factor in super power relations.

In the interim, our approach to strategic nuclear balance should be a positive one of searching for steps that will promote equilibrium and confidence. The result, hopefully will be a smaller and cheaper force, but its composition may be different from what we have today and it may cost more to attain.

In short much as we may wish to adopt a force-cutting strategy it may be incompatible with the requirements to achieve and sustain a nuclear equilibrium in a dynamic world.

Just as balance is necessary in nuclear weaponry, so it is in (what we label as) general purpose forces. As enunciated in the Nixon Doctrine, we must rely on our principal allies for assistance in maintaining enough warfighting capability to deter aggression. It is, however, the U.S. military contribution to this common objective which provides the essential linkage to our nuclear power. Without that, our allies would be subject to nuclear blackmail. This does not mean that we must maintain a capability for sustained warfare in Europe. Our declining defense budget simply does not permit us to do that in any event. The requested defense budget of \$93 billion in obligation authority being considered by the Congress today is well below pre-Vietnam figures in purchasing power.

Chart 1 (Current Dollar)

Let's take a look at what defense expenditures have been - this chart shows from 1964 to 1974 this amount of funding authorized by Congress. The dashed lines from 1974 to 1975 indicates the money requested by the DOD from Congress - In the last 3 or 4 years the difference between what we asked for and what we received has been from 1 to 4 B \$ less.

Mr. Clifford is correct. \$93 billion dollars is the largest amount ever asked for defense spending. Yes, but it must be

looked at in relation to the changes which have taken place in the overall cost of living. I'm sure you will all agree a dollar buys less today than it did a year ago. When the Department of Defense needs to buy something it is faced with the same inflationary problem you are as private citizens.

Chart 2 - (Constant Dollar)

Let's look at defense spending in the same way. The Defense budget is shown here in terms of 1975 dollars. That is the amounts shown in all other years is adjusted to the purchasing power of the 1975 dollar. Seen in this light the defense budget requested for 1975, that is before any Congressional cuts, is a full return to pre Vietnam spending levels. The defense budget for 1975 is virtually the same as the budget for 1964.

Chart 3 - (Retired Pay)

What then has changed? Again, in constant 1975 \$'s comparing the Defense budget from 1964 to 1975, Retired pay has gone from \$2 TO \$6 B and at the same time active duty military pay has gone from 31 to 26 B. The amount of the budget remaining each year for operating, maintaining, buying new equipment, has gone conducting research, etc. from \$60B to 61B.

Chart 4 (Manpower)

This chart shows the active military people in the armed forces. The 3.5 shows the Vietnam Peak, as you can see, in 1975 we will have 600,000 fewer persons in the military than in 1964.

Chart 5 (Forces)

With regard to forces, you can see since 1964 we come down 3 divisions, wings have remained constant, 150 ships less, replenishment ships have been cut by 1/3, and we have added 17 airlift squadrons.

However the cost of operating these forces in 1975 is \$6B higher than it was in 1964 even with reduced forces. This additional money, by and large, is coming out of our own hide. We've cut manpower and have had to cut back on our modernization program.

In summary, our military force structure and employment practices must change under these new circumstances, as Mr. Clifford mentioned. The motivating pressure to achieve this must not be an obsession simply to cut forces and defense dollars. Such an approach could upset the delicate balance of force which we have sought and which has made the current steps toward detente feasible. Rather, our purpose should be to examine continuously what minimum size and shape military force will best preserve that balance. We have a responsibility here not only to ourselves, but to all those others who aspire to freedom and human dignity. While we

contribution that our example and support can give to those  
struggling for what we have been given as our heritage.



BROWN UNIVERSITY Providence, Rhode Island • 02912

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

005  
801

March 1, 1974

A handwritten signature, likely of Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr., written in dark ink.

Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner  
President, Naval War College  
Newport, Rhode Island 02840

Dear Stan:

Enclosed is the schedule for the Defense Symposium. We hope to have Clark Clifford's remarks in advance. An invitation for dinner is en route. Bill Yates will act as your escort and will be in touch with your office.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature that reads "Kirk".

Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr.  
Professor of Political Science  
and University Professor

LBK;egu  
Enclosure

TRIP File

Symposium on DEFENSE POLICY FOR THE SEVENTIES

Alumnae Hall, Brown University, Providence, Rhode Island 02912

FRIDAY, MARCH 22, 8:00 P.M.

Principal Speaker: The Hon. Clark Clifford, former Secretary of Defense and Presidential Adviser.

Panelists: The Hon. John Chafee, former Governor of Rhode Island and Secretary of the Navy.

Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner, President of the Naval War College.

Dr. Herbert Scoville, Jr., former Deputy Director of CIA for Science and Technology and Assistant Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

Professor Laurence Radway, Department of Government, Dartmouth College.

Moderator: Professor Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr. Brown University.

\* \* \* \* \*

Schedule: Friday, March 22

4:30 p.m. Speaker, Panelists and Moderator meet to discuss format.

5:30 p.m. President Donald Hornig hosts cocktails and dinner for participants.

7:30 p.m. Move from dinner to Alumnae Hall.

8:00 p.m. President Hornig opens meeting and introduces participants and guests.

8:02 p.m. Professor Kirkpatrick presents background material on the issue.

8:07 p.m. Mr. Clifford

8:30 p.m. Professor Kirkpatrick presents each panelist in turn for a five minute commentary on Mr. Clifford's talk.

8:50 p.m. Professor Kirkpatrick opens exchange between panelists and speaker asking Mr. Clifford for reaction.

9:10 p.m. Professor Kirkpatrick opens questions from the floor.

9:50 p.m. Each participant is asked for one or two minutes of final comments.

9:55 p.m. Professor Kirkpatrick gives summation.

9:58 p.m. Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003700020001-3

(Note: There will be live TV coverage by Channel 6 - WTEV-New Bedford, Providence. Some of the timing suggested above may be modified for TV



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Inflation at Brown University

	<u>1964</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>% Increase</u>
Tuition	\$1800	\$3250	80%
Room & Board	\$ 950	\$1450	65%

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## Budget Authority and Outlays by Function

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*(in millions of dollars)*

Function	Budget Authority			Outlays		
	1973 actual	1974 estimate	1975 estimate	1973 actual	1974 estimate	1975 estimate
National defense*	\$ 82,787	\$ 88,177	\$ 95,047	\$ 76,021	\$ 80,573	\$ 87,729
International affairs and finance	3,628	5,322	4,680	2,957	3,886	4,103
Space research and technology	3,406	3,038	3,245	3,311	3,177	3,272
Agriculture and rural development	7,148	6,652	7,411	6,191	4,039	2,729
Natural resources and environment	7,183	2,483	—306	589	609	3,128
Commerce and transportation	10,543	22,822	14,459	13,070	13,521	13,400
Community development and housing	6,093	4,960	6,389	4,132	5,450	5,667
Education and manpower	12,049	13,782	11,489	10,185	10,819	11,537
Health	22,226	26,153	28,022	18,417	23,268	26,282
Income security	79,818	93,015	104,012	73,073	84,995	100,071
Veterans benefits and services	12,783	13,787	14,080	12,013	13,285	13,612
Interest	22,813	27,754	29,122	22,813	27,754	29,122
General government	6,007	6,417	6,820	5,480	6,800	6,774
General revenue sharing	8,295	6,055	6,205	6,636	6,147	6,174
Allowances for:						
Acceleration of energy research and development	0	0	809	0	0	461
Civilian pay raises	0	400	750	0	300	600
Contingencies						500
Undistributed intragovernmental transactions	—8,368	—8,942	—13,517	—6,082	—9,963	—10,717
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>\$276,417</b>	<b>\$310,853</b>	<b>\$322,141</b>	<b>\$246,526</b>	<b>\$274,660</b>	<b>\$304,445</b>

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**NATO**  
 Belgium, France, Netherlands  
 Britain, Greece, Norway  
 Canada, Iceland, Portugal  
 Denmark, Italy, Turkey  
 W. Germany, Luxembourg, United States

**WARSAW PACT**  
 Bulgaria, Hungary  
 E. Germany, Rumania  
 Soviet Union



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U.S. and Soviet Bases Abroad  
 ○ Main U.S. Bases Abroad    ● Main Soviet Bases Abroad

MISSIONS

Clifford: "Defend the United States"

- Sounds simple, but really complex. How to best defend?
- ABM? Patrol borders? Territorial defense enough? Is our national life only endangered by direct military attack??
- Recent oil embargo points up US dependence on international trade. If vital imports cut off U.S. industry would soon grind to a halt.
- For the USN, means ensuring free use of the seas (Our first international problem as a new nation was the Barbary pirates - N. Africa - interfering with our trade. Problem much the same today.)
  - Defending U.S. territory is useless if our life lines are cut. Countries are interdependent. Military ensures the international freedom/life of the U.S. - only one way the U.S. is defended.

Acquisition Costs of Major Strategic Forces Modernization  
and Improvement Programs 1/

	(Dollars in Millions)		
	FY 1973 Actual Funding	FY 1974 Planned Funding 2/	FY 1975 Proposed Funding
<u>Strategic Offense</u>			
Continued Procurement of MINUTEMAN III Missiles, MINUTEMAN Silo Upgrading and Other Related Programs	816	730	758
Preparations for MINUTEMAN II Operational Base Launch (OBL) Tests	-	-	16
Advanced ICBM Technology	8	4	37
Conversion of SSBNs to POSEIDON Configuration, Continued Procurement of POSEIDON Missiles and Associated Effort	698	313	192
Development, Procurement and Military Construction -- TRIDENT Submarines and Missiles	794	1,435 (25)	2,043
Initiation of Design for a new SSBN	-	-	16
Development of Advanced Ballistic Reentry Systems and Technology (ABRES)	93	90	120
B-52D Modifications	46	38	73
Continued Development of New Strategic Bomber, B-1	445	449	499
Procurement of Short Range Attack Missile (SRAM)	203	133	2
Development of the Bomber Launched and Submarine Launched Versions of the Strategic Cruise Missile	53	14	125
Initial Development of Advanced Tanker/Cargo Aircraft	-	-	20
<u>Strategic Defense</u>			
Continued Development of the Over-the-Horizon (OTH) Back-Scatter Radar	3	3	12
Continued Deployment of SAFEGUARD	599	341	61
Continued Development of Site Defense	80	110	160
Development of Advanced Ballistic Missile Defense Technology	93	62	91
Development and Acquisition of the SLBM Phased Array Radar Warning System	-	-	50
<u>Command and Control</u>			
Development and Procurement of Advanced Airborne Command Post (AADCOP)	117	50	90
Development of SANGUINE ELF System	9	13	15

## SUMMARY OF SELECTED ACTIVE MILITARY FORCES

	Actual June 30, 1964	Actual June 30, 1973	Estimated	
			June 30, 1974	June 30, 1975
<u>Strategic Forces:</u>				
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles:				
MINUTEMAN	600	1,000	1,000	1,000
TITAN II	108	54	54	54
POLARIS-POSEIDON Missiles	336	656	656	656
Strategic Bomber Squadrons	78	30	28	27
Manned Fighter Interceptor Squadrons	40	7	7	6
Army Air Defense Firing Batteries	107	21	21	0
<u>General Purpose Forces:</u>				
Land Forces:				
Army Divisions	16 1/3	13	13	13 1/3
Marine Corps Divisions	3	3	3	3
Tactical Air Forces:				
Air Force Wings	21	22	22	22
Navy Attack Wings	15	14	14	14
Marine Corps Wings	3	3	3	3
Naval Forces:				
Attack & Antisubmarine Carriers	24	16	14	15
Nuclear Attack Submarines	19	60	61	67
Other Warships	368	242	186	191
Amphibious Assault Ships	133	66	65	65
<u>Airlift and Sealift Forces:</u>				
Strategic Airlift Squadrons:				
C-5A	0	4	4	4
C-141	0	13	13	13
Troopships, Cargo Ships, and Tankers	101	53	32	32

<u>PAY &amp; PRICE INCREASES 74-75 (in billions)</u>	<u>CHANGE IN PERCAPITA SPENDING</u>		
	(Constants)	'68	'75
Pay	5		
Subs & Other Allowances	7	Defense \$325	\$202
Petroleum	2	Public \$693	\$900
Inflation on Purchases	5	Private \$2,421	\$3,055

	<u>PAY COSTS &amp; MANPOWER TRENDS (in billions)</u>				
	<u>FY 64</u>	<u>FY 68</u>	<u>FY 73</u>	<u>FY 74</u>	<u>FY 75</u>
Pay & Allow (Mil & Civ) Pay	21	31	37	39	42
Retired Pay	1.2	2.1	4.5	5.2	6
Pay & Allow as % of Total Outlay	43%	42%	56%	55%	55%
Avg Strength-Mil	3M	3.4M	2.3M	2.2M	2.2M
Avg Strength-Civil SVC	1M	1M	1M	1M	1M

	<u>DEFENSE OUTLAYS AS A % OF:</u>				
	<u>64</u>	<u>68</u>	<u>73</u>	<u>74</u>	<u>75</u>
GNP	8.3	9.4	6.0	5.9	5.9
Fed Budget	42	43	29	23	27
Net Public Spend	28	29	19	18	17

	<u>DEFENSE BUDGET SUMMARY (in billions)</u>			
	<u>73</u>	<u>74</u>	<u>75</u>	<u>Change 73-75</u>
<u>Current \$/Constant \$</u>				
Baseline Forces	70/81	77/82	83/83	+14/+11
MAP	18/18	31/3	1/1	+1.2/+1.2
SE Asia	5/6	2/2	2/2	-3/-4
Retired Pay	4/5	5/6	6/6	+2/+1
Total TOA	89/92	87/93	93/93	+12/-1.9

Active Duty Military Personnel,  
Civilian Personnel and Reserve Component Strength  
(end of fiscal years in thousands)

	<u>1964</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>
Direct-Hire Civilian					
Army <u>1/</u>	360	462	333	356	359
Navy	332	419	322	326	324
Air Force <u>1/</u>	305	331	271	271	270
Defense Agencies	<u>38</u>	<u>75</u>	<u>72</u>	<u>76</u>	<u>75</u>
Total <u>1/</u>	1,035	1,287	998	1,029	1,028
Active Duty Military					
Army	972	1,570	801	782	785
Navy	667	765	564	551	541
Marine Corps	190	307	196	196	196
Air Force	<u>856</u>	<u>905</u>	<u>691</u>	<u>645</u>	<u>630</u>
Total	2,685	3,547	2,252	2,174	2,152
Reserve Components (in paid status)					
Army National Guard	382	389	386	383	372
Army Reserve	346	312	284	280	252
Naval Reserve	132	131	129	120	111
Marine Corps Reserve	48	48	38	37	36
Air National Guard	73	75	90	92	90
Air Force Reserve	67	46	45	56	54



### NUCLEAR THREAT

**Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003700020001-3**  
The most important anti-U.S. nuclear capability is USSR.

We must take into account Soviets have:

- better than numerical parity of strategic nuclear launchers.  
(bombers & missiles)
- continued extensive threat to Western Europe even after acquiring massive direct threat to the U.S.
- begun to exploit larger ICBM throw-weight to permit eventual deployment of up to 7,000 potentially high-accuracy large yield MIRVs.
- started production of Backfire bomber which could become an intercontinental threat.

A second important force that we must take into account in our force planning is the PRC. During the past decade, the Chinese have moved steadily from development/testing to a deployed nuclear capability.

Estimate that they already have on line a modest number of MRBMs, IRBMs, and nuclear-capable medium and light bombers. ICBM-IOC early as 1976. SLBM later.


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Department of Defense  
FINANCIAL SUMMARY  
(In Millions of Dollars)

	FY 1964	FY 1968	FY 1973	FY 1974 <sup>a/</sup>	FY 1975 <sup>b/</sup>
<u>Summary by Functional Classification</u>					
Military Personnel	12,983	19,939	23,639	24,452	25,898
Retired Military Personnel	1,211	2,093	4,392	5,164	6,014
Operation and Maintenance	11,693	20,908	22,148	24,156	26,596
Procurement	15,036	22,550	18,574	18,653	19,867
Research, Development, Test, & Evaluation	7,053	7,264	8,020	8,333	9,389
Military Construction	977	1,555	1,464	1,821	2,150
Family Housing & Homeowners Asst. Prog.	602	614	1,009	1,148	1,273
Civil Defense	111	86	82	82	86
Special Foreign Currency Program	-0-	-0-	3	3	3
Naval Petroleum Reserve	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	24
Military Assistance Program	989	588	1,120	3,295	1,279
<b>Total - Direct Program (TOA)</b>	<b>50,655</b>	<b>75,597</b>	<b>80,452</b>	<b>87,105</b>	<b>92,579</b>
<u>Summary by Program</u>					
Strategic Forces	8,505	7,236	7,253	6,883	7,628
General Purpose Forces	16,406	30,375	25,810	27,899	29,183
Intelligence and Communications	4,378	5,551	5,683	5,949	6,464
Airlift and Sealift	1,044	1,756	860	973	1,053
Guard and Reserve Forces	1,768	2,196	3,897	4,385	4,796
Research and Development	4,813	4,277	6,463	7,003	8,409
Central Supply and Maintenance	4,639	8,422	8,643	8,873	9,330
Training, Medical, Other Gen. Pers. Activ.	6,959	12,183	16,361	18,193	20,078
Administration and Assoc. Activities	1,077	1,237	1,719	1,849	2,164
Support of Other Nations	1,066	2,364	3,762	5,098	3,474
<b>Total - Direct Program (TOA)</b>	<b>50,655</b>	<b>75,597</b>	<b>80,452</b>	<b>87,105</b>	<b>92,579</b>
<u>Summary by Component</u>					
Department of the Army	12,275	24,972	21,656	22,096	23,618
Department of the Navy	14,458	20,765	25,425	27,575	29,568
Department of the Air Force	19,958	24,917	24,707	25,523	28,029
Defense Agencies/OSD	1,007	1,519	2,008	2,165	2,649
Defense-wide	1,857	2,750	5,454	6,399	7,350
Civil Defense	111	86	82	82	86
Military Assistance Program	989	588	1,120	3,295	1,279
<b>Total - Direct Program (TOA)</b>	<b>50,655</b>	<b>75,597</b>	<b>80,452</b>	<b>87,105</b>	<b>92,579</b>
Financing Adjustments	14	1,143	-49	-178	320
Budget Authority (NOA)	50,669	76,740	80,404	86,928	92,899
Outlays	50,786	78,027	73,823	79,500	85,800

a/ Amounts for proposed legislation for the volunteer force, military retired pay, and flight pay are distributed (\$99M).

b/ Amounts for military and civilian pay increases, and military retired pay reform, volunteer force and other proposed legislation are distributed (\$2242M).



RAW MATERIALS

% Imported

Rubber	100%
Manganese	93%
Cobalt	92%
Graphite	92%
Chromium	91%
Bauxite	89%
Tin	78%
Nickel	75%
Tungston	56%
Zinc	51%
Petroleum	28%
Iron Ore	26% (to incr. to +50% over next 10 years)

US has 6% world's pop. uses 1/3 world's  
mineral output/yr.

80% World's copper fm Chile, Peru, Zambia, Zaire

70% World's Tin from Malaysia & Bolivia

95% World's Bauxite (Aluminum produced) from  
Guinea, Guyana, Surinam & Jamaica

SALT I

<u>US</u>		<u>USSR</u>
	<u>ICBM LAUNCHERS</u>	
1054	Deployed & Under Constr.	1618
NONE	Recent Constr. Rate	250/yr
1054	Planned '77 s SALT	2000
100+1054*	SALT ceiling	1408-1618*

\* Depending on whether old ICBMs are dismantled/replaced by SLBM's

<u>US</u>		<u>USSR</u>
	<u>SLBM Launch Tubes</u>	
656	Present	580
NONE	Recent Constr. Rate	128/yr
656	Planned '77 s SALT	1200
710 **	SALT ceiling	950**

\*\* To reach these levels US would have to dismantle 54 old Titan ICBM's.

USSR would have to dismantle 210 old SS-7 & 8 ICBM's.

<u>US</u>		<u>USSR</u>
	<u>BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBS</u>	
41	Deployed & Under Constr.	52 (approx)
NONE	Present Constr. Rate	7.9/yr
41	Planned '77 s Salt	80-90
44**	SALT ceiling	62**

<u>US</u>	<u>ADMS</u>	<u>USSR</u>
2 sites (100 missiles each)	SALT ceiling	2 sites (100 missiles each)

NOT COVERED BY SALT

466	<u>Strategic Bombers</u>	140
5792	<u>Warheads</u>	2478

U.S. AND U.S.S.R. STRATEGIC FORCE LEVELS

	Mid-1973		Mid-1974	
	U.S.	U.S.S.R.	U.S.	U.S.S.R.
<u>Offensive</u>				
ICBM Launchers <u>1/</u>	1054	1550	1054	1575
SLBM Launchers <u>2/</u>	656	550	656	660
Intercontinental Bombers <u>3/</u>	496	140	496	140
Force Loadings Weapons	6784	2200	7940	2600
<u>Defensive <u>4/</u></u>				
Air Defense Interceptors <u>5/</u>	559	2800	532	2600
SAM Launchers	481	9800	261	9800
ABM Defense Launchers	-	64	-	64

- 1/ Excludes launchers at test sites.  
2/ Excludes launchers on diesel-powered submarines.  
3/ Excludes bombers configured as tankers and reconnaissance aircraft.  
4/ Excludes launchers at test sites.  
5/ These numbers represent Total Active Inventory (TAI)

Mr. Scoville advocates no change be made to our strategic policy that would increase the probability of nuclear war. I AGREE.

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He further suggests that limited nuclear conflict presents a major risk of escalating into an all out nuclear war.

I agree to this point too - and that is precisely why a major thrust of the present strategic program is to improve the entire C<sup>2</sup> network and thus provide decision makers with the resources necessary to hold the level of conflict in the lowest possible level.

Scoville - 1

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Lastly, he states that nuclear war might be made less likely if the decision to initiate it can be made more difficult rather than easier. I disagree on this point. Admittedly this idea has virtue in its simplicity, but it overlooks the necessity of dealing with the many options open to hostile nuclear powers and the use of their weapons. I would suggest that it is only in the process of examining why and how deterrence might fail can we judge the adequacy of our plans and programs for deterrence. Once the study begins it quickly becomes evident there are many ways an enemy might be tempted to use his force to gain advantage or concessions. It is imperative that our own strategic forces and doctrine take a wide range of possibilities into account if they are to successfully perform their deterrent functions.

Scoville - 2



TRIP Folder

25 February 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR VICE ADMIRAL TURNER

Subj: Clifford Panel, 22 March 1974

1. Lyman Kirkpatrick gave me the following information on the Clifford Panel this date:

Schedule

- 1700 - Mr. Clifford, panelists and wives meet with Dr. Hornig for reception and cocktails followed by dinner at the Hornig's.
- 2000 - "A Panel Discussion on Defense Policy For The Seventies," Alumni Hall, Brown University (Channel 6 TV will cover live from 2000 to 2200).
  - Introductions, Dr. Hornig.
  - Factual presentation of issues (charts of rough U.S. vs USSR strength - missiles/ships, etc.) (about 5 minutes) - Kirkpatrick.
  - Address (about 20 minutes) - Clifford.
  - Comments (about 5 minutes each) - Panelists.
  - Open discussion - Clifford, Panelists, Audience.
  - Summary - (5 minutes) - Kirkpatrick.
  - Concluding remarks - Hornig.
- 1000 - Terminate discussion.

2. Clifford's remarks should be available about 1 week in advance.

3. Sketch of Laurence I. Radway.

Professor Laurence I. Radway  
Department of Government  
Dartmouth College  
Hanover, NH 03755

Home:

[Redacted]

STAT

Radway, Professor Laurence I(ngram), b. Staten Island, N.Y. Feb. 2, 19; m. 49; c. 4. Government. B.S., Harvard, 40, I.A., 43, fel, 46-50, A.M., 48, Ph.d., 50; M.P.A., Minnesota, 43; hon. M.A., Dartmouth Col, 59. Tutor, Harvard, 46-50; instr, Govt, Dartmouth Col, 50-52, asst. prof., 52-57, assoc. prof., 57-59, Prof, 59- Prof, Nat. War Col, 62-63; lectr, Am. specialists prog, U.S. Dept. State, 65. Consult, Off. Defense Mobilization, 52; mem. bd. adv., Indust. Col. Armed Forces, 58-62; civilian aide, Secy., Army, 62- U.S.A., 44-46, Capt. Polit. Sci. Asn; Soc. Pub. Admin. Public administration; ST/ foreign and military affairs. Publ: Soldiers and scholars; Military behavior in international organization; Foreign policy and national defense, Scott, 68. Address: [Redacted] Hanover, NH

Very respectfully,

[Redacted]

STA

Copy to:  
Aide  
**003**

*Trap File*

25 February 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR VICE ADMIRAL TURNER

Subj: Clifford Panel, 22 March 1974

1. Lyman Kirkpatrick gave me the following information on the Clifford Panel this date:

Schedule

- 1700 - Mr. Clifford, panelists and wives meet with Dr. Hornig for reception and cocktails followed by dinner at the Hornig's.
- 2000 - "A Panel Discussion on Defense Policy For The Seventies," Alumni Hall, Brown University (Channel 6 TV will cover live from 2000 to 2200).
  - Introductions, Dr. Hornig.
  - Factual presentation of issues (charts of rough U.S. vs USSR strength - missiles/ships, etc.) (about 5 minutes) - Kirkpatrick.
  - Address (about 20 minutes) - Clifford.
  - Comments (about 5 minutes each) - Panelists.
  - Open discussion - Clifford, Panelists, Audience.
  - Summary - (5 minutes) - Kirkpatrick.
  - Concluding remarks - Hornig.
- 1000 - Terminate discussion.

2. Clifford's remarks should be available about 1 week in advance.

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Radway, Professor Laurence I(ngram), b. Staten Island, N.Y. Feb. 2, 19; m. 49; c. 4. Government. B.S., Harvard, 40, I.A., 43, fel, 46-50, A.M., 48, Ph.d., 50; M.P.A., Minnesota, 43; hon. M.A., Dartmouth Col, 59. Tutor, Harvard, 46-50; instr, Govt, Dartmouth Col, 50-52, asst. prof., 52-57, assoc. prof., 57-59, Prof, 59- Prof, Nat. War Col, 62-63; lectr, Am. specialists prog, U.S. Dept. State, 65. Consult, Off. Defense Mobilization, 52; mem. bd. adv., Indust. Col. Armed Forces, 58-62; civilian aide, Secy., Army, 62- U.S.A., 44-46, Capt. Polit. Sci. Asn; Soc. Pub. Admin. Public administration; foreign and military affairs. Publ: Soldiers and scholars; Military behavior in international organization; Foreign policy and national defense, Scott, 68. Address:  Hanover, NH

STA

Very respectfully,

STA

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CLIFFORD PANEL REMARKS

Mr Clifford is correct. The 1975 budget requests the largest amount ever asked for defense spending. I don't agree that the defense budget is \$95B - the amount submitted to Congress by the President was less than \$93B - however, let us agree that at either figure it's a lot of money.

Chart 1 (Current Dollar)

Let's look at what defense expenditures have been over the last 10 years. This chart shows the amount authorized by Congress for Defense from 1964 to 1974. The dashed line from 1974 to 1975 indicates the amount requested by the Department of Defense for 1975. (In the last 3 or 4 years, the difference between what we asked for and what we received has been from 1 to 4B \$ less). However, this chart doesn't give us a true picture. It is important to look at any budget, Federal or private, in relation to its purchasing power. As you all know, the overall cost of living has changed since 1964. A dollar doesn't buy today what it did 10 or even one year ago. Well, when the Department of Defense needs to buy something, be it services or equipment, it is faced with the same inflationary problem you are as private citizens.

Chart 2 (Constant Dollars)

Let's look at Defense spending in terms of what a dollar is worth today. That is, the amounts shown in all

other years is adjusted to the purchasing power of the 1975 dollar. Seen in this light, the Defense budget requested for 1975 - before any Congressional cuts - is a full return to pre-Vietnam spending. The Defense budget for 1975 is virtually the same as the budget for 1964 in real purchasing power. What then has changed?

### Chart 3 (Forces)

Mr Clifford suggested that our strategic missile force has increased by 70% and that our land divisions have dropped from 19½ divisions to 16½ divisions. He didnt mention that we also have 140 fewer combat ships, that our sealift capacity has dropped from 101 ships to 32, and that our airlift has increased by a factor of 17 squadrons.

### Chart 4 (Manpower)

There are also approximately 600,000 fewer people in the military today than there were in 1964.

Why then hasnt the budget gone down with these personnel and equipment reductions? It hasnt for exactly the reason Mr Clifford stated at the beginning of his remarks: because the world has changed. While our armed forces are smaller, <sup>TOTAL</sup> personnel costs have risen <sup>IN EXCESS OF 258\$</sup> ~~nearly 180\$~~ (if we include retired pay, which is payment due for past wars); to operate and maintain <sup>LESS</sup> ~~the same amount of~~ <sup>THAN</sup> equipment, we had in 1964 costs

But, it is suggested, inflation and added costs are not the real culprits. The problem lies with a defense policy that is behind the times. That if that policy truly reflected the world of today Defense costs could be reduced to perhaps \$70B and kept there - a constant. There is certainly that much fat in the budget - that much unnecessary force.

Military policy, I submit, has kept up with the times. Military policy has taken the Vietnam War lessons into account; the US-USSR detente into account; the improving relations with China into account. But - military policy must reflect the reality of National policy. The military makes no treaties with other governments, enters into no international agreements. The military's responsibility is to support and carry out political decisions.

I wonder if Mr Clifford's arbitrary budget cut, even spread over several years, would leave the United States with the means of deterring nuclear attack, asserting our right to freely use the seas for trade, and meet our overseas commitments? Let's look at one last chart.

Chart 5 (\$70B Budget)

Mr Clifford specified a \$70B ~~defense budget~~ in 1974 dollars, (so for simplification let's look at the 1974 budget. That \$87B budget can be divided almost in half as to use:

*purchase power*  
*was in* *4/1*

\$45B went for "people costs" and \$42B went for everything else. To reduce that budget to \$70B means cutting it by \$17B. If \$17B is taken out of the people costs the military would have to be reduced by 1.2 million persons <sup>or about 1/2</sup>. That would be the same as eliminating the ~~whole~~ <sup>entire</sup> Navy and ~~whole~~ <sup>entire</sup> Air Force completely.

If we take the \$17B cut out of everything else other than people, it would be equivalent to cutting all fighting forces <sup>about</sup> in half.

We would all like to see Federal spending reduced. I would like to see a \$70B Defense budget as much as Mr Clifford, but where will the cuts be made? What aspect of our National defense are <sup>we</sup> you willing to forego?

Certainly our military force structure and employment practices must change as circumstances change. But the motivation for this must not be an obsession simply to cut forces and defense dollars. The driving force has to be - what do you expect your military forces to do? Then, how much will that cost?

There is a military balance in the world today. It is bipolar, <sup>between us & the Soviet Union</sup> it is real, it is not measured in how many missiles we have and how many the Soviets have - although this certainly influences it - it is measured in perceptions. Our perceptions of the Soviets; their perceptions of us; and how we are both perceived by all other nations. Any precipitous or careless change in the visible power on either side of this equation could upset a balance which, I for one, believe



EGIB

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made the detente we enjoy today possible. Our purpose in structuring forces should be the continuous reappraisal of what minimum size and shape military force will best preserve that balance and continue to deter nuclear war, as well as lesser aggressions against ourselves or those we have pledged to stand beside.

EGIB

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Acquisition Costs of Major Naval Forces Modernization  
and Improvement Programs 1/

(Dollars in Millions)

	FY 1973 Actual Funding	FY 1974 Planned Funding 2/	FY 1975 Proposed Funding
<u>Aircraft Platforms</u>			
Procurement of CVN-70 Aircraft Carrier	299	657	-
Design and Procurement of the Sea Control Ship	13	29	143
<u>ASW Aircraft</u>			
Development and Procurement of S-3A Carrier-Based ASW Aircraft	618	548	562
Modification of SH-3 Helicopter	9	17	24
Development of the HSX	-	-	2
Continued Procurement of the P-3C Land-Based ASW Aircraft	132	202 (50)	152
<u>Other Surface Combatants</u>			
Procurement of DD-953 Destroyers	249	612	464
Procurement of DLGN Nuclear-Powered Frigates	-	81	256
Acquisition of Patrol Frigate	204	6	437
Continued Development of AEGIS Ship Air Defense System	79	40	67
Acquisition of the Light Airborne Multi-Purpose System (LAMPS)	51	32	34
Development and Test of Surface Effect Ship	32	61	58
Acquisition of Patrol Hydrofoil Missile Ship	30	23	108
<u>Anti-Ship Missiles</u>			
Acquisition of the HARPOON Anti-Ship Missile	60	81	136
Development of Encapsulated HARPOON	12	12	13

Acquisition Costs of Major Naval Forces Modernization  
and Improvement Programs (Cont'd)


(Dollars in Millions)

	FY 1973 Actual Funding	FY 1974 Planned Funding	FY 1975 Proposed Funding
<u>Anti-Ship Missiles (cont'd)</u>			
Acquisition of Active STANDARD Anti-Ship Missile	20	8	35
Acquisition of CONDOR Anti-Ship Missile	28	33	30
<u>Attack Submarines</u>			
Procurement of SSN-688 Class Nuclear Attack Submarines	1,048	921	548
Continued Development and Procurement of MK-48 Torpedo	176	183	160
Acquisition of the AN/BQQ-5 Sonar System	30	57	72
<u>Undersea Surveillance Systems</u>			
Development and Deployment of SOSUS and Improved SOSUS and Development of TASS	127	144	137
<u>Underway Replenishment and Support Ships</u>			
Procurement of Underway Replenishment and Support Ships	189	-	209
<u>Navy and Marine Corps Aircraft</u>			
Continued Development and Procurement of F-14 Multi-Mission Fighter	628	737	756
Acquisition of PHOENIX Missiles	99	100	100
Development of a New Austere Fighter, the VFX	-	-	34
Acquisition and Modification of A-6 Attack Aircraft	241	184	199
Acquisition of A-7E Attack Aircraft	181	150	159
Procurement of A-4M Aircraft	2	116 (58)	67
Procurement of AV-8A HARRIER Aircraft	125	56	-
Development of Navy V/STOL Fighter	11	24	19
Acquisition of EA-6B Aircraft	157	124	129
Acquisition of E-2C Fleet Early-Warning Aircraft	175	160	119
Procurement of F-5E Aircraft	-	(10)	-


## SELECTIVE ACTIVE MILITARY FORCES

	<u>1964</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>
DIVISIONS	19 $\frac{1}{3}$	16	16 $\frac{1}{3}$
AIR WINGS	39	39	39
COMBATANT SHIPS	411	261	273
SEA LIFT	101	32	32
AIR LIFT	0	17	17


# DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET TRENDS (BILLIONS OF CONSTANT FY 1975 \$ - TOA)



GOVERNMENT SPENDING  
1964 - 1974




DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET TRENDS  
(BILLIONS OF CONSTANT FY 1975 \$-TOA)




DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET  
FISCAL YEAR 1974  
(BILLIONS OF DOLLARS)

PEOPLE	45
OTHER	42
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>87</b>

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET TRENDS  
(BILLIONS OF CURRENT \$-TOA)



MILITARY MANPOWER



Mr. Cliffords remarks well balanced - thought provoking -  
Excellent bases our discussion.

As I understand - 2 points

1. Military need to review missions
2. He believes we can fulfill for less \$ *post*

Agree with him on both points

On 1st

Assure - much thought and effort has gone and is  
going into adaptation of missions to changes in  
world environment. For instance we in military are  
taking incipient detente with Soviets into account  
in our thinking and planning.

Participating - cooperating in SALT and MBFR  
talks. Navy side we have negotiated and signed  
a Navy - to - Navy agreement with the Soviets on  
preventing incidents at sea.

On 2nd point

Can achieve military objectives with less resources.  
Agree to extent that that is precisely what are doing -  
we have less to spend today than prior Vietnam.

Clifford cited a number budget figures - were not actual  
budget figures - were an interpretation or adaptation of  
actual numbers. Budgets are subject to interpretation, but  
have a chart here shows actual figures so we can all start  
from same facts.



Illustrates rising cost of defense as Clifford points out 2 facts:

1. Dotted line - '75 increase assumes Congress appropriates all that President requests. Congressional action in past has been to cut. May/may not be an increase in '75.
2. Chart misleading - assumes the value of \$ unchanged in past 10 years.

No one in room believes you can purchase as much with \$ today as 10 years ago.

Just as true for defense \$ as personal.

This chart - constant FY 75\$ *with the*

Hump for Vietnam - Long since behind us.

Just holding our own compared with pre-Vietnam days

Again prior Congressional action

Even that overstates case

Two costs never had incur within basic budget.

1. Past Wars

Retirement - \$1 - \$6

2. Artificial subsidy - free good

Draft

Personnel costs

Best Evidence that our real budget is not increasing is that forces and capability have declined.

Mr. Clifford quite unfairly cited two examples to prove that some of our forces have increased in the past 10 years.

His examples were strategic missiles and nuclear powered submarines 10 years ago these were entirely new weapons - we were still building up from zero.

If you look at total submarines we are down by 33%, aircraft carriers, by 40%, total ships by 45%, for example:

Weapons aside, manpower has got to be some index of military strength.

Here is the manpower picture - down 22% since 64.

Clifford suggests that nonetheless \$70B will suffice present needs. *Reasonable*

Let's take a quick look at what \$70B would mean

Chart 5 (\$70B Budget)

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ILLEGIB

DETENTE

LOT OF TALK OF DETENTE

PLACE IN PERSPECTIVE

DETENTE MOST ENCOURAGING DEVELOPMENT

ONE WANT TO ENCOURAGE

NOT IMPRESSED WITH CLIFFORDS REFERENCE TO "EFFUSIVE CORDIALITY"

OF U.S.-SOVIET SUMMIT MEETINGS.

ILLEGIB

WOULD LIKE TO JUDGE DETENTE BY DEEDS

SOVIET DEEDS DURING MID EAST WAR LAST OCT - SUPPLYING

AND ENCOURAGING EGYPT/SYRIA

TAKE ADVANTAGE OUR WEAKNESSES

SOVIET DEEDS LAST FEW WEEKS ENCOURAGING OIL PRODUCING NATIONS

MAINTAIN THEIR EMBARGO

TAKE ADVANTAGE OF OUR VULNERABILITIES

OTHER HAND - SEEMS TO ME SOVIET DEEDS WHEN CONFOUNDED

WITH OUR MILITARY STRENGTH AT THE HEIGHT OF THE MID-EAST

WAR - DID NOT SEND PARATROOPERS INTO EGYPT ARE MORE

MEANINGFUL.

MOREOVER, BEFORE I RISK TOO MUCH ON DETENTE, WANT TO REMEMBER THAT

IT CAN BE TURNED OFF QUICKLY. WHEN DEALING NATION THAT SUPPRESSES

FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, NO WAY TO PREDICT IN ADVANCE WHEN IT MAY

BE TURNED OFF.

SUMMARY

HEARD A LOT ABOUT WHAT DO NOT WANT OUR MILITARY TO BE READY TO DO.

CLIFFORD

NOT PREPARED FOR WORLDWIDE CONTINGENCIES.

NOT PREPARED FOR WAR IN ASIA.

NOT PREPARED FOR PROLONGED WAR IN EUROPE.

YET WANTS US TO BE READY TO FULFILL OUR COMMITMENTS FRANKLY LEAVES  
US IN MILITARY WITH NO CLEAR SENSE OF DIRECTION.

WE REQUIRE POSITIVE INSTRUCTION FROM THE BODY POLITIC

WE NEED DISCUSSION OF WHAT WANT MILITARY PREPAREDNESS  
TO ACHIEVE

SUBMIT THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO CHANGE. WANT TO BE  
RESPONSIVE TO PUBLIC DIRECTION.

WE ARE ACCENTING MORE THAN EVER THE PEACETIME UTILITY OF  
MILITARY FORCE AS AN ADJUNCT TO DIPLOMACY.

NO WAY CAN PRECIPITATELY REVERSE HISTORIC INFLUENCE  
MILITARY PROWESS HAS HAD ON DIPLOMACY AND POLITICS.  
MUST CONTINUALLY STRIVE UPDATE MILITARY POLICIES AND  
FORCES SO THAT THEY WILL BE EFFECTIVE TOOLS OF DIPLOMACY.  
IF WE ATTEMPT TO IGNORE THE INTERPLAY OF POLITICS AND  
MILITARY FORCE WE WILL JEOPARDIZE THE VERY PROGRESS WE  
ARE MAKING AWAY FROM RELIANCE ON VIOLENCE AS AN EXTENSION

MISSIONS

CLIFFORD EMPHASIZES DEFENSE OF U.S.

SEEMS SIMPLE - *request more onshore with invasion*

BUT NEED RECOGNIZE FORTRESS AMERICA DEFENSE ON SHORE-  
LINE NOT ADEQUATE

e.g. U.S. VULNERABLE LOSS OF RAW MATERIAL IMPORTS -

DEPENDENCE SEA-BORNE IMPORTS INCREASING

MUST BE ABLE TO DEFEND FROM ATTACK OR THREAT OF ATTACK

TODAY COMPLEX

LONG RANGE AIRCRAFT

ANTI-SHIP MISSILES

NUCLEAR POWERED SUBMARINES

*Not as simple might assume*

SIMILARLY - CLIFFORD SAYS SUPPORT OUR INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS

BUT DO NOT BE PREPARED TO INTERVENE IN ASIA - WHERE HAVE

COMMITMENT

CLIFFORD SAYS WE HAVEN'T CHANGED OUR MISSIONS -

U.S. NAVY HAS NEW CONCEPT - HI-LO MIX - FEW EACH -

BETTER TAILORED CONDITIONS CLIFFORD HAS DESCRIBED

INCREASING NEEDS

EASY TO POINT OUT ALL REASONS FOR WHICH OUR NEED FOR MILITARY  
FORCE IN PEACETIME IS DECLINING

ARE SOME FACTORS IN OPPOSITE DIRECTION:

1. INCREASING VULNERABILITY THIS COUNTRY TO HAVING ITS  
SUPPLIES OF RAW MATERIALS AND ITS WORLD TRADE THREATENED
2. INCREASING RELIANCE OF WORLD ON USE OF SEAS FOR THE  
GROWING AMOUNTS OF COMMERCE, FOR NATURAL RESOURCES  
SUCH AS OIL AND MINERALS, FOR FOOD, FOR RECREATION.  
MUST AVOID TYPE OF TERRITORIAL DISPUTES THAT HAVE  
SHATTERED PEACE ON LAND OVER THE CENTURIES.
3. ACHIEVEMENT OF NEAR PARITY IN NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY THE  
SOVIET UNION OPENS NEW DANGERS AND POSSIBILITIES FOR  
CONFLICT ON A LOWER SCALE.
4. NUMBER OF POTENTIAL TROUBLE SPOTS SUCH AS ISRAEL AND  
HER ARAB NEIGHBORS IS INCREASING NOT DIMINISHING.


FLEXIBLE RESPONSE

177.  
870 ILLEGIB

FIRST STRIKE NOT ACHIEVABLE EITHER SIDE.

1. SUBMARINES
2. COORDINATION AGAINST TRIAD

LOW CONFIDENCE LEVEL



MUST RECOGNIZE STRATEGIC WORLD HAS CHANGED SINCE MAD INVENTED  
OVER 2 DECADES AGO

No advantages  
in nuc war

SOVIETS HAVE ACHIEVED PARITY

NUMEROUS TECHNOLOGIC CHANGES

MUST CONSIDER WHETHER UPDATING NECESSARY.

CLIFFORD SAYS WE ARE NOT WILLING TO CHANGE  
REDUCED FEAR OF CONSEQUENCES OF USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS?

CONSEQUENCES EVEN OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE TOO HORRIBLE TO  
CONTEMPLATE.

CONTENDS MUST TRY TO CONVINCING OTHER WORLD LEADERS THAT WE WOULD  
RESPOND TO ANY NUCLEAR ATTACK WITH EVERYTHING WE HAVE NOT  
CREDIBLE. MUST BE PREPARED FOR SOMETHING ELSE.

MUST LOOK AT IT FROM POINT OF VIEW OF PRESIDENT.

IDEA THAT LACK OF PREPAREDNESS IS THE WAY TO REDUCE  
LIKELIHOOD OF NUCLEAR WAR IS INGENIOUS BUT NOT PLAUSIBLE  
IF WE LOOK AT HISTORY.



WHAT ABOUT SMALL ATTACKS?

ALL OUT RESPONSE? FIND IT ON ACCIDENT/UNAUTHORIZED

NO RESPONSE - ONLY TO FIND IT PART OF A GRADUAL EMASCULATION.

NUCLEAR THREAT

The most important nuclear capability facing the United States is that of the USSR. As we engage in our own planning we need to understand better than we now do why this capability is evolving at such a rapid rate and what the Soviets hope to gain by such large expenditures and such ambitious programs. Only with an improved understanding can we decide judiciously what impact this capability should have on our own choice of strategic programs.

We must take into account the fact that the Soviets have:

- acquired better than numerical parity with the United States in terms of strategic nuclear launchers (counting bombers as well as missiles);
- continued their extensive threat to Western Europe even after having acquired a massive direct threat to the United States;
- begun to exploit the larger throw-weight of their ICBMs so as to permit the eventual deployment of as many as 7,000 potentially high-accuracy MIRVs with large yields;
- started production of the Backfire bomber which could well evolve into an intercontinental threat.

The Soviet strategic capability no longer is the only one that we must take into account in our force planning. A second important force from the standpoint of the United States is that of the Peoples' Republic of China (PRC). During the past decade, the Chinese have moved steadily from a program of development and testing to a deployed nuclear capability. We now estimate that they already have on line a modest number of MRBMs, IRBMs, and nuclear-capable medium and light bombers. ICBM-IOC early as 1976. SLBM somewhat later.

Intentions ?

Primarily at issue are the answers to two major questions. To what extent have the Soviets simply responded to and tried to counter U.S. initiatives? And to what extent have they sought (and do they continue to seek) something more ambitious than a capability for second-strike massive retaliation against the United States?

Need for Options (Strategic)

President Nixon underlined the drawbacks to sole reliance on assured destruction in 1970 when he asked:

"Should a President, in the event of a nuclear attack, be left with the single option of ordering the mass destruction of enemy civilians, in the face of the certainty that it would be followed by the mass slaughter of Americans? Should the concept of assured destruction be narrowly defined and should it be the only measure of our ability to deter the variety of threats we may face?"

Today, a massive retaliation against cities, in response to anything less than an all-out attack on the U.S. and its cities, appears less and less credible. Yet, deterrence can fail in many ways. What we need is a series of measured responses to aggression which bear some relation to the provocation, have prospects of terminating hostilities before general nuclear war breaks out, and leave some possibility for restoring deterrence. It has been this problem of not having sufficient options between massive response and doing nothing, as the Soviets built up their strategic forces, that has prompted the President's concerns and those of our Allies.

Flexibility of response is essential because, despite our best efforts, we cannot guarantee that deterrence will never fail; nor can we forecast the situations that would cause it to fail. Accidents and unauthorized acts could occur, especially if nuclear proliferation should increase. Conventional conflicts could escalate into nuclear exchanges; indeed, some observers believe that this is precisely what would happen should a major war break out in Europe. Ill-informed or cornered and desperate leaders might challenge us to a nuclear test of wills. We cannot even totally preclude the massive surprise attack on our forces which we use to test the design of our second-strike forces, although I regard the probability of such an attack as close to zero under existing conditions. To the extent that we have selective response options--smaller and more precisely focused than in the past--we should be able to deter such challenges. But if deterrence fails, we may be able to bring all but the largest nuclear conflicts to a rapid conclusion before cities are struck. Damage may thus be limited and further escalation avoided.

I should point out in this connection that the critics of options cannot have the argument both ways. If the

nuclear balance is no longer delicate and if substantial force asymmetries are quite tolerable, then the kinds of changes I have been discussing here will neither perturb the balance nor stimulate an arms race. If, on the other hand, asymmetries do matter (despite the existence of some highly survivable forces), then the critics themselves should consider seriously what responses we should make to the major programs that the Soviets currently have underway to exploit their advantages in numbers of missiles and payload. Whichever argument the critics prefer, they should recognize that:

- inertia is hardly an appropriate policy for the United States in these vital areas;
- We have had some large-scale pre-planned options other than attacking cities for many years, despite the rhetoric of assured destruction;
- adding more selective, relatively small-scale options is not necessarily synonymous with adding forces, even though we may wish to change their mix and improve our command, control and communications.

The real issue is how much hard-target-kill capability we need, rather than the development of new combinations of accuracy and yield per se. Resolution of the quantitative issue depends directly on the further evolution of the Soviet strategic offensive forces and on progress in the current phase of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks.

In some circumstances a set of hard targets might be the most appropriate objective for our retaliation, and this I realize is a subject fraught with great emotion. Even so, several points about it need to be made.

- The destruction of a hardened target is not simply a function of accuracy; it results from the combined effects of accuracy, nuclear yield, and the number of warheads applied to the target.
- Both the United States and the Soviet Union already have the necessary combinations of accuracy, yield, and numbers in their missile forces to provide them with some hard-target-kill capability, but it is not a particularly efficient capability.
- Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union now has a disarming first strike capability, nor are they in any position to acquire such a cap-

ability in the foreseeable future, since each side has large numbers of strategic offensive systems that remain untargetable by the other side. Moreover, the ABM Treaty forecloses a defense against missiles. In addition, they have many other nuclear forces. Any reasonable calculation would demonstrate, I believe, that it is not possible for us even to begin to eliminate the city-destruction potential embodied in their ICBMs, let alone their SLBM force."

In summary with a reserve capability for threatening urban-industrial targets, with offensive systems capable of increased flexibility and discrimination in targeting, and with concomitant improvements in sensors, surveillance, and command-control, we could implement response options that cause far less civilian damage than would now be the case. For those who consider such changes potentially destabilizing because of their fear that the options might be used, let me emphasize that without substantially more of an effort in other directions than we have any intention of proposing, there is simply no possibility of reducing civilian damage from a large-scale nuclear exchange sufficiently to make it a tempting prospect for any sane leader. But that is not what we are talking about here. At the present time, we are acquiring selective and discriminating options that are intended to deter another power from exercising any form of nuclear pressure. Simultaneously we and our allies are improving our general purpose forces precisely so as to raise the threshold against the use of any nuclear forces.

DEFENSE POLICY FOR THE SEVENTIES

*Clark Clifford*  
*3/24/77*

President Hornig, Professor Kirkpatrick, Distinguished Members of  
the Panel, Ladies and Gentlemen:

Our nation's policy regarding its national security is of such  
vital significance to all of us that it should be the subject of widespread  
discussion and debate. If war is too important to leave to the generals,  
then defense policy is too important to leave to officials in Washington.  
It is you, the public, who must make your views known. It is your  
lives that are affected, your futures that may be imperiled, and you are  
the ones who have to foot the bills.

It is my hope that you will find this evening's discussion  
sufficiently provocative and challenging that you will choose to enter  
the controversy on this subject that is now just beginning to emerge in  
Washington.

The major thrust of my remarks tonight is that (A) the world  
has changed; and (B) the United States' defense policy and defense budget  
have not. I cannot state the problem more simply.

As our tragic intervention in Indo-China draws too slowly to  
a halt, we look at the world around us and we see a near total transformation.  
In this transformation, we will find the guides for reshaping our defense  
policies and budgets.

During the Cold War era, faced with an aggressive USSR, what  
we took to be Soviet-Chinese solidarity, and a communist effort to be

involved in every significant conflict over the future of any nation -- those responsible for our nation's policies, including the state of our military forces, felt that the United States had to plan its military forces with the real expectation that they might, at any moment, be called upon to resist militarily, and directly, large-scale aggression in Asia or Europe, and perhaps in both simultaneously.

On the nuclear side, as our atomic monopoly evaporated, the need for a constantly increasing stock of even more sophisticated nuclear weapons seemed to grow greater, not less. The first priority was to build a deterrent, proof against the most effective conceivable surprise Soviet attack. In addition, in an effort to extend our nuclear strength to protect our allies, we deployed literally thousands of nuclear weapons throughout the world.

This image of the world on which our military forces were premised is scarcely recognizable from the perspective of early 1974.

First, our relations with the USSR have changed. To be sure, profound differences between the social and political systems and the international interests of the United States and the Soviet Union remain. Nonetheless, the relationship of the two superpowers simply can no longer be described as one of general and unrelenting confrontation. We have seen two United States-Soviet summits marked by effusive cordiality, and a third is promised for this spring. There has been a strategic arms limitation agreement which, whatever its limitations, marks an acceptance by both sides that there is no real defense against nuclear war except mutual vulnerability and opens the way for the current talks on further agreements. We hear

intense discussion of immensely expanded economic links between the United States and the Soviet Union.

The European security conference and the negotiations on force reductions in Europe are signs of a change in the relationship between the Soviet Union and the nations of Western Europe and may portend more basic settlements in the long run.

By contrast, relations between China and the USSR have so deteriorated as to make the phrase "Sino-Soviet Bloc" but a memory. Even as the USSR and China remain openly hostile to each other, the United States and China have opened a process of reestablishing communications and contact. Domestic government upheavals in China -- or one might add in the United States -- are unlikely to change the foundation of that process, which is a recognition that however different we are from China and she from us, the real points of conflict between our important interests are few indeed.

And, of course, in planning defense policy, there is the fact that we are involved no longer in direct combat in the war in Indo-China.

Finally, in a world in which economic issues on the international scene are growing in relative importance, we must recognize that the United States has lost its economic domination of the international scene, even while retaining its vast military strength.

From these profound changes in the international setting, one would expect profound changes in American military policy and military forces.



For it is, of course, to serve our international policy that we create military forces, however often it may seem that the relationship is reversed.

Yet, despite these changes and the much-advertised winding down of American involvement in Viet Nam, we are being asked to spend more, not less, on military force. The Administration has asked Congress this year for more dollars than have ever been spent on defense in our history. Even in today's inflated dollars, the amount is still staggering -- approximately \$95 billion in new appropriations for the Defense Department, after adjusting the stated figures to reflect more accurately funds properly attributable to the coming year.

That represents an increase of \$13 billion over the 1974 budget.

And that increase is by no means due only to inflation. The growth in the defense budget exceeds pay and price increases by more than \$7 billion dollars -- which means an increase in real terms of more than 8 percent.

What a contrast to past post-war budgets -- not a cut in spending, but a big increase! What kind of forces would the Administration be asking the American people and the economy to support if international relations had remained essentially the same? And What would we be told we required if relations with China and the Soviet Union had worsened?

These profound changes in the world setting are not reflected in our defense policies. Instead, we maintain and we are being asked to pay more in the future to continue to maintain, essentially the forces that were created to meet what we felt to be the needs of the height of the Cold War.

LLEGIB



When we look at the forces today and compare them with the forces of the early 60's, it is evident that it is simply incorrect to proclaim, as Administration spokesmen sometimes do, that in demobilizing the forces created to fight in Vietnam, we have also made significant cutbacks in the pre-Vietnam "baseline" force.

Of course, there are differences between our 1975 forces and those of 1964, but it is striking how similar they are. To be specific:

-- We have 70 per cent more strategic missiles than in 1964, more than compensating for the decline in bombers.

-- We maintain the same number of tactical air wings -- 38 -- as in 1964.

-- The Navy has the same number of attack carriers and 3 1/2 times as many nuclear submarines. The Pentagon itself explains the decline in the number of surface war ships as due to retirement of "marginally effective" ships.

-- The number of ground divisions has declined from 19 1/3 to 16 1/3, while there have been major increases in firepower and equipment. This modest reduction reflects, one would assume, such facts as the Berlin buildup included in the 1964 force, the vastly increased cost of manpower relative to equipment, and the abandonment of plans to fight major land wars simultaneously in both Asia and Europe.

And, these are crude comparisons of numbers only. Qualitatively, the 1975 forces are vastly more powerful than those maintained in 1964. To

give just two examples, the 1964 missiles mounted about 1,000 warheads, while the force planned for the end of 1975 will have approximately 7,000 warheads. The number of helicopters attached to Army units has increased from about 4,000 in 1965 to well over 8,000.

Moreover, the missions assigned these forces seem to be essentially the same as those of 1964 -- deep interdiction by the Air Force of enemy supply routes as part of a prolonged war in Europe or on the Asian continent; a sustained anti-submarine effort by the Navy in the North Atlantic and carrier air support for sustained shore combat; for the Army, a long land war in Europe, and, to judge from the deployment and numbers of ground forces, also a sustained land battle on the Asian continent.

The future cost of maintaining such a force for the indefinite future regardless of international events can only climb constantly upward. The time has come to look critically at our military forces and to bring them into line with our real needs for the last quarter of the twentieth century.

Certainly nothing in very recent events, dramatic as they may be, can justify the large increase in funds for defense which are proposed, or continued adherence to our Cold War defense policy.

Our nation's current economic difficulties may, it has been responsibly suggested, have led to the inclusion of as much as \$5 billion extra in the defense budget to "help the economy." Such a load factor for pump priming makes a mockery of the argument that this huge budget is dictated by real national security needs. When we face such immense inflationary pressures, this kind of wasteful spending will not help the

economy but do the reverse. Nor is increased spending on unproductive and unnecessary weapons of war a sound way to avoid unemployment when there are so many truly vital projects crying out for funds.

This has been the year of energy. In a period when increasing energy prices and shortages of fuel may have a serious adverse economic impact, we should cut back the costs of government wherever we can, including in the defense area. At the very least, the energy shortage suggests that our true national security in the long term would be better served by taking some of the excessive funds allocated to defense and putting them into an effort to improve our sources and uses of energy.

Nor does the renewed fighting in the Middle East furnish any excuse for ignoring the need to reexamine our defense policy in the light of changed world conditions. Far from the October War showing the world to be a highly unstable place in which relatively small differences in military power may make a crucial difference, I believe that the war shows the reverse. The sharp fighting between the Israelis and Arabs did not draw the United States and the USSR into conflict, despite the important interests of each side involved.

Of course, a basic adequate U. S. military force is an essential part of effective diplomacy, and maintaining such a force is not in dispute. But, for me, the lesson of the recent Mid East crisis is that military gestures that are but dangerous window dressing, far from being crucial aids, may be a serious interference with the process of diplomacy and negotiation which

offers the best hope of a solution to this long-standing problem.

Nor does the American concern for the security of Israel justify either an increase in defense spending, or the permanent maintenance of our present force. We can meet our obligations and commitments to Israel, like those to our other allies, at a significantly more economical force level.

In short, a critical item on our national agenda remains to bring our defense establishment and budget into line with world realities -- to give us a defense policy for the world as it is, not as it used to be.

Substantial savings can be made simply from greater efficiency, particularly in use of manpower, in curtailing our propensity for excessively complex weapons, and in restraining ourselves from procuring nuclear weapons which may actually lessen our security by making the nuclear balance less stable. But we must go beyond these steps to a more fundamental reexamination of the missions and structure of our military forces.

We must ask "What military missions make sense in this decade of the twentieth century?"

ILLEGIB

First, of course, to defend the United States itself. Indeed, we see how large our military has become by realizing how small it could be if defending the territory of the U. S. itself were the only mission. For that an invulnerable nuclear deterrent and minimum conventional forces, costing perhaps a third of our current budget, would be enough.


But despite the changes in the world, it remains true that America in her own self-interest also needs military forces adequate to support her

international commitments jointly agreed upon by the Congress and the President.

In strategic forces, we need a secure and stable nuclear deterrent. But we must not expect more of our nuclear forces than deterrence. For all their frightfulness, the political and military use of nuclear weapons beyond the deterrence of their use by others is limited indeed.

The recent proclamation of a strategy of increased "flexibility" for our nuclear forces must not be allowed to lead us astray from absolute deterrence of nuclear war as our objective. It may be desirable that we should have some response to a nuclear attack other than a world-destroying spasm, horrible as even the smallest such a strike would be. However, we can have all the choice of response to a nuclear attack any one would want without any significant change in our present force.

ILLEGIB



It seems to me useful also to say what we do not need our military forces to be able to do. We do not need to exceed our potential opponents in every possible category merely to avoid the supposed stigma of not being "number one" in everything. We do not need to be ready to intervene everywhere in the world on short notice. We do not need to maintain forces prepared to fight in contingencies -- such as the so-called war at sea or a long conventional war in Europe -- which are not only remote but would provide the warning of a radical change in the political setting.

For strategic forces we need sufficiency; we do not need to be frightened of disparities in crude force levels or destructive power which measure only how many times over each side can utterly destroy the other.

ILLEGIB

We do not need to accumulate "bargaining chips" which in fact make negotiations on arms control more difficult by fostering responsive programs by the Soviets and creating vested constituencies on each side for the preservation of weapons. We may need to offer the President a greater range of horrible choices should nuclear war occur; we do not need the missile accuracies or other technology which might give our opponents cause to fear that we were seeking the choice of a first strike.

If we proceed from these goals, both positive and negative, and not from the habits of the past or the pressures of bureaucratic and service interests, it is clear that substantial cuts can be made in our defense budget and in our forces, while fully meeting our real national security needs.

I do not favor that the kind of cuts we need be made precipitately all in one year. Smaller reductions spread over a period of years would have less impact on our domestic economy, upon employment in defense industries, and upon the attitude of other countries.

However, I do believe that far from a \$7 billion real increase in defense spending, we should begin in fiscal 1975 a process of cutting back on real defense expenditures. I have proposed annual cuts of about \$4 billion, to stabilize at a budget of around \$70 billion in four years -- all stated in terms of constant 1974 purchasing power. In this period, therefore, under the plan I recommended, we would, in round numbers, have instead of a current budget of some \$95 billion -- likely to grow in the future -- a budget stabilized (in real terms) at \$70 billion a year in 1979.

This is not the occasion, nor have I the time this evening, to present in detail the specific cuts to reach this objective. I can indicate some general areas in which changes should be made.

The substantial ground and air forces earmarked for Asian contingencies can be cut back sharply or eliminated, to reflect the tragically hard-learned lesson that we should not and need not fight land wars in Asia.

We should start bringing some troops back from Europe now. Bringing our NATO forces up to date gradually and in close consultation with our allies will not, as is so often claimed, unbalance the deterrent in Europe, destroy the alliance, or foredoom arms control possibilities in Europe.

ILLEGIB

In our strategic nuclear and our conventional weapons, in our tanks, in our airplanes, in our missiles, in our ships, we must put a stop to the technologically-driven process of buying systems which are inordinately complex and expensive, and which represent little if any real advance in terms of real combat capability over existing systems, or over more combat-wise alternatives. And we must determine the design of such forces, and their numbers, with a view to the most likely, not the most remote contingencies.

ILLEGIB

We must make more efficient use of military manpower, both uniformed and civilian. Some 55 percent of the defense dollar now goes for pay and allowances for personnel. This huge part of the defense budget -- like the massive support costs area generally -- has only recently been subjected to intense public analysis. Those analyses demonstrate that very significant cuts can readily be made.



I emphasize that such cuts will leave us with a military establishment fully adequate for our own defense, for meeting our commitments to our allies, and for providing the necessary underpinning for our diplomacy. Indeed, by reducing the costs to a level we can sustain, they will strengthen our economy and the overall confidence and unity of our society, and with that they will increase our true national security.

For the debate is not between proponents of military strength and advocates of deliberate weakness, but over what military posture will give us the strength we need at a price we can afford.

Let me urge you to take part in this debate. It is our younger citizens who have the greatest stake in the determination of these questions. The decisions made now will have an impact on your entire life.

Get in the struggle. Keep in mind, if you will, a quotation of Theodore Roosevelt. He said:

"It is not the critic who counts; not the man who points out how the strong man stumbled, or where the doer of deeds could have done better. The credit belongs to the man who is actually in the arena; whose face is marred by dust and sweat and blood; who strives valiantly; who errs and comes short again and again; who knows the great enthusiasms, the great devotions and spends himself in a worthy cause, who at the best knows in the end the triumphs of high achievement; and who at the worst, if he fails, at least fails while daring greatly; so that his place shall never be with those cold and timid souls who know neither defeat nor victory."

Thank you.

SUMMARY

HEARD A LOT ABOUT WHAT DO NOT WANT OUR MILITARY TO BE READY TO DO.

CLIFFORD

NOT PREPARED FOR WORLDWIDE CONTINGENCIES.

NOT PREPARED FOR WAR IN ASIA.

NOT PREPARED FOR PROLONGED WAR IN EUROPE.

YET WANTS US TO BE READY TO FULFILL OUR COMMITMENTS FRANKLY LEAVES  
US IN MILITARY WITH NO CLEAR SENSE OF DIRECTION.

WE REQUIRE POSITIVE INSTRUCTION FROM THE BODY POLITIC

WE NEED DISCUSSION OF WHAT WANT MILITARY PREPAREDNESS  
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SUBMIT THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO CHANGE. WANT TO BE  
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NO WAY CAN PRECIPITATELY REVERSE HISTORIC INFLUENCE  
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ARE MAKING AWAY FROM RELIANCE ON VIOLENCE AS AN EXTENSION

INCREASING NEEDS

EASY TO POINT OUT ALL REASONS FOR WHICH OUR NEED FOR MILITARY  
FORCE IN PEACETIME IS DECLINING

ARE SOME FACTORS IN OPPOSITE DIRECTION:

1. INCREASING VULNERABILITY THIS COUNTRY TO HAVING ITS  
SUPPLIES OF RAW MATERIALS AND ITS WORLD TRADE THREATENED
2. INCREASING RELIANCE OF WORLD ON USE OF SEAS FOR THE  
GROWING AMOUNTS OF COMMERCE, FOR NATURAL RESOURCES  
SUCH AS OIL AND MINERALS, FOR FOOD, FOR RECREATION.  
MUST AVOID TYPE OF TERRITORIAL DISPUTES THAT HAVE  
SHATTERED PEACE ON LAND OVER THE CENTURIES.
3. ACHIEVEMENT OF NEAR PARITY IN NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY THE  
SOVIET UNION OPENS NEW DANGERS AND POSSIBILITIES FOR  
CONFLICT ON A LOWER SCALE.
4. NUMBER OF POTENTIAL TROUBLE SPOTS SUCH AS ISRAEL AND  
HER ARAB NEIGHBORS IS INCREASING NOT DIMINISHING.

DETENTE

LOT OF TALK OF DETENTE

PLACE IN PERSPECTIVE

DETENTE MOST ENCOURAGING DEVELOPMENT

ONE WANT TO ENCOURAGE

NOT IMPRESSED WITH CLIFFORDS REFERENCE TO "EFFUSIVE CORDIALITY"

OF U.S.-SOVIET SUMMIT MEETINGS.

WOULD LIKE TO JUDGE DETENTE BY DEEDS

SOVIET DEEDS DURING MID EAST WAR LAST OCT - SUPPLYING

AND ENCOURAGING EGYPT/SYRIA

TAKE ADVANTAGE OUR WEAKNESSES

SOVIET DEEDS LAST FEW WEEKS ENCOURAGING OIL PRODUCING NATIONS

MAINTAIN THEIR EMBARGO

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OTHER HAND - SEEMS TO ME SOVIET DEEDS WHEN CONFRONTED

WITH OUR MILITARY STRENGTH AT THE HEIGHTH OF THE MID-EAST

WAR - DID NOT SEND PARATROOPERS INTO EGYPT ARE MORE

MEANINGFUL.

MOREOVER, BEFORE I RISK TOO MUCH ON DETENTE, WANT TO REMEMBER THAT

IT CAN BE TURNED OFF QUICKLY. WHEN DEALING NATION THAT SUPPRESSES

FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, NO WAY TO PREDICT IN ADVANCE WHEN IT MAY

BE TURNED OFF.

FLEXIBLE RESPONSE

FIRST STRIKE NOT ACHIEVABLE EITHER SIDE.

1. SUBMARINES
2. COORDINATION AGAINST TRIAD

LOW CONFIDENCE LEVEL

MUST RECOGNIZE STRATEGIC WORLD HAS CHANGED SINCE MAD INVENTED  
OVER 2 DECADES AGO

SOVIETS HAVE ACHIEVED PARITY

NUMEROUS TECHNOLOGIC CHANGES

MUST CONSIDER WHETHER UPDATING NECESSARY.

CLIFFORD SAYS WE ARE NOT WILLING TO CHANGE  
REDUCED FEAR OF CONSEQUENCES OF USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS?

CONSEQUENCES EVEN OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE TOO HORRIBLE TO  
CONTEMPLATE.

CONTENDS MUST TRY TO CONVINCING OTHER WORLD LEADERS THAT WE WOULD  
RESPOND TO ANY NUCLEAR ATTACK WITH EVERYTHING WE HAVE NOT  
CREDIBLE. MUST BE PREPARED FOR SOMETHING ELSE.

MUST LOOK AT IT FROM POINT OF VIEW OF PRESIDENT.

IDEA THAT LACK OF PREPAREDNESS IS THE WAY TO REDUCE  
LIKELIHOOD OF NUCLEAR WAR IS INGENIOUS BUT NOT PLAUSIBLE  
IF WE LOOK AT HISTORY.

WHAT ABOUT SMALL ATTACKS?

ALL OUT RESPONSE? FIND IT ON ACCIDENT/UNAUTHORIZED

NO RESPONSE - ONLY TO FIND IT PART OF A GRADUAL EMASCULATION.

MISSIONS

CLIFFORD EMPHASIZES DEFENSE OF U.S.

SEEMS SIMPLE

BUT NEED RECOGNIZE FORTRESS AMERICA DEFENSE ON SHORE-  
LINE NOT ADEQUATE

e.g. U.S. VULNERABLE LOSS OF RAW MATERIAL IMPORTS -

DEPENDENCE SEA-BORNE IMPORTS INCREASING

MUST BE ABLE TO DEFEND FROM ATTACK OR THREAT OF ATTACK

TODAY COMPLES

LONG RANGE AIRCRAFT

ANTI-SHIP MISSILES

NUCLEAR POWERED SUBMARINES

SIMILARLY - CLIFFORD SAYS SUPPORT OUR INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS

BUT DO NOT BE PREPARED TO INTERVENE IN ASIA - WHERE HAVE

COMMITMENT

CLIFFORD SAYS WE HAVEN'T CHANGED OUR MISSIONS -

U.S. NAVY HAS NEW CONCEPT - HI-LO MIX - FEW EACH -

BETTER TAILORED CONDITIONS CLIFFORD HAS DESCRIBED

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